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

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THE

HISTORY

OF

PHILOSOPHY:

CONTAINING

The Lives, Opinions, Actions and Diſcourſes

OF THE

PHILOSOPHERS

Of every SECT.

By *THOMAS STANLEY*, Eſquire.

The FOURTH EDITION.

In which the innumerable Miſtakes, both in the Text and Notes of all former Editions are corrected, the Citations and References exactly adjuſted and compared throughout with the Originals, and with the *Latin* Tranſlation printed at *Leipſick*.

To which is prefixed, an Account of the LIFE and Writings of the AUTHOR.

LONDON:

Printed for A. MILLAR at *Buchanan's Head*, over againſt *Katharine Street* in the *Strand*, A. WARD, S. BIRT, D. BROWNE, T. LONGMAN, J. OSWALD, H. WHITRIDGE, and the Executors of J. DARBY and S. BURROWS.

MDCCXLIII.

WELLCOME
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To my Honoured UNCLE,

JOHN MARSHAM Eſquire.

SIR,

I Send this Book to you, becauſe you firſt directed me to this Deſign. The Learned *Gaſſendus* was my Precedent; whom nevertheleſs I have not followed in his Partiality: For he, tho' limited to a ſingle Perſon, yet giveth himſelf Liberty of Enlargement, and taketh Occaſion from this Subject to make the World acquainted with many excellent Diſquiſitions of his own. Our Scope being of a greater Latitude, affords leſs Opportunity to favour any Particular, whilſt there is due to every one the Commendation of their own Deſerts. This Benefit I hope to have received from the Variety of the Subject; but far more are thoſe I owe to your Encouragement, which, if I could wiſh leſs, I ſhould upon this Occaſion, that there might ſeem to have been expreſſed ſomething of Choice and Inclination in this Action, which is now but an inconſiderable Effect of the Gratitude of,

Dear Uncle,

Your moſt affectionate Nephew, and

Humble Servant,

THOMAS STANLEY.

THE PREFACE.

HISTORY (*which by expounding Actions paſt, teacheth to regulate the future, and furniſheth us with Wiſdom at the Coſt of other Mens Experience*) *is not unlike Painting: Their Scope is the ſame. And as in the latter it argues want of Skill to look upon the whole Draught with an indifferent Eye, but to ſelect and inſiſt upon ſome chief Particular is proper to an Artiſt; ſo he who reſts ſatisfied with the general Relation of Affairs, (not fixing upon ſome eminent Actor in that Story) loſeth its greateſt Benefit; ſince what is moſt particular, by its nearer Affinity with us, hath greateſt Influence upon us.*

Hence it is that there are two Kinds of Hiſtory; one repreſents general Affairs of State; the other gives Account of particular Perſons, whoſe Lives have rendered them eminent. Homer *hath given an Eſſay of each; of the firſt in his* Iliads, *a Relation of a War betwixt different Nations; of the ſecond in his* Odyſſes, *confined to the Perſon of* Ulyſſes.

Now the Life of Man being either Practick, *buſied in civil Affairs of Peace and War, or* Contemplative, *retired from publick Buſineſs to Speculation and Study of Wiſdom, Divine or Human, it follows that this perſonal Hiſtory be twofold likewiſe, deſcribing either the Actions of ſuch Perſons as are wholly intereſted in the Affairs of State (properly compared to the Perſons of a Dramatical Deſign, whoſe ſingle Characters and Parts ſerve only to make up one joint Plot: Such are moſt of thoſe whoſe Lives are related by* Plutarch, *and the twelve* Cæſars *of* Suetonius) *or the Lives of ſuch as have been excellent in ſome Kind of Learning. Thus* Antipho *writ of Poets;* Eudemus *of Aſtrologers;* Cicero *and* Plutarch *of Orators;* Suetonius *of Grammarians. They who writ of Philoſophers exceeded the reſt far in Number, of whom to give a particular Account will be unneceſſary, becauſe their Works are not extant, and therefore we ſhall only name them,* Aetius, Anaxilides, Antigonus, Antiſthenes, Ariſtocles, Ariſtoxenus, Callimachus, Clitomachus, Diocles, Diogenes Laertius, Eunapius, Heraclides, Hermippus, Heſychius, Hippobotus, Jaſon, Idomeneus, Nicander, Nicias, Panætius, * Porrius, Plutarch, Sotion *and* Theodorus.

Of almoſt all theſe (which is much to be deplored) there remain not any Footſteps; the only Author in this Kind for the more ancient Philoſophers is Diogenes Laertius, *for the later* Eunapius. *And to make the Misfortune the greater, that which* Laertius *gives us is ſo far ſhort of what he might have done, that there is much more to be found of the ſame Perſons diſperſed among other Authors, which I have here collected and digeſted, with what Diligence I could.*

Nor is it unſeaſonable at this Time to examine the Tenets of old Philoſophers, when ſo great Variety of Opinions daily ſpring up; ſome of which are but raked out of the Ruins of Antiquity, which ought to be reſtored to their firſt Owners; others being of late Invention will receive Addition, when advanced to ſuch Height, we look down to the Bottom from which Philoſophy took her firſt Riſe, and ſee how great a Progreſs ſhe hath made, whoſe Beginnings are almoſt inſcrutable.

Altho' ſome Grecians *have challenged to their Nation the Original of Philoſophy, yet the more Learned of them have acknowledged it derived from the Eaſt. To omit the dark Traditions of the* Athenians *concerning* Muſæus, *of the* Thebans *concerning* Linus, *and of the* Thracians *about* Orpheus, *it is manifeſt that the Original of the* Greek *Philoſophy is to be derived from* Thales, *who*

* There is no ſuch Name as *Porrius*, perhaps it ſhould be *Phanias*.

travelling into the East, *first brought natural Learning, Geometry, and Aſtrology thence into* Greece *for which Reaſon the Attribute of* Wiſe *was conferred upon him, and at the ſame Time upon ſix others for their Eminence in Morality and Politicks. Thus Learning in the ancienteſt Times was by the* Greeks *called* Sophia (Wiſdom) *and the Profeſſor thereof, who raiſed his Soul to an eminent Degree of Knowledge,* Sophos (Wiſe:) Pythagoras *firſt named it* Philoſophy (Love of Wiſdom) *and himſelf a Philoſopher, affirming, that no Man is Wiſe, but only God.*

* *As concerning thoſe who were honoured with this Attribute of* Wiſe, Damon *the* Cyrenean *undervalues them all, eſpecially the ſeven.* Anaximenes *ſaith, They were all addicted to Poetry*; Dicæarchus, *that they were neither wiſe Men nor Philoſophers, but upright Men and Law-givers.* Archetimus *the* Syracuſian *wrote concerning their Meeting with* Cypſelus (*Father to* Periander) *whereat he ſaith himſelf was preſent.* Ephorus *affirms they all met with* Crœſus, Thales *only excepted. Some ſay they met alſo at the* Panionian *Feaſt, and at* Corinth, *with* Periander *at* Delphi.

There is ſome Controverſy concerning their Sentences, of which ſome are aſcribed to ſeveral Perſons, as that,

Lacedæmonian Chilon this profeſs'd,
Nothing too much; a Mean in all is beſt.

There is no leſs Diſſent concerning their Number. Leandrius *for* Cleobulus *and* Myſon, *inſerts* Leophantus *Son of* † Gorſiades *a* Lebedian, *or* Epheſian, *and* Epimenides *the* Cretan. Plato (*in his* Protagoras) *ſubſtitutes* Myſon *for* Periander: Ephorus, Anacharſis *for* Myſon. *Some add* Pythagoras. Dicæarchus *alledgeth four, acknowledged by all,* Thales, Bias, Pittacus *and* Solon: *Then names ſix more, out of which are to be ſelected three,* Ariſtodemus, Pamphilus, Chilon *the* Lacedæmonian, Cleobulus, Anacharſis, Periander; *ſome add* ‖ Acuſilaus *Son of* Caba *or* Scabra *an* Argive. Hermippus *in his Treatiſe of the ſeven wiſe Men, ſaith, they were in all ſeventeen, of which ſeven were variouſly named, which were,* Solon, Thales, Pittacus, Bias, Chilon, Cleobulus, Periander, Anacharſis, Acuſilaus, Epimenides, Leophantus, Pherecydes, Ariſtodemus, Pythagoras, Laſus *of* Hermionea, *Son of* Charmantides, *or* (*according to* Ariſtoxenus) *of* Simbrinus, Anaxagoras ‡. Hippobotus, *in his Commentary of Philoſophers, reckons* Linus, Orpheus, Solon, Periander, Anacharſis, Cleobulus, Myſon, Thales, Bias, Pittacus, Epicharmus, Pythagoras.

Laertius *reckons them thus,* Thales, Solon, Chilon, Pittacus, Bias, Cleobulus, Periander; *whereunto he adds,* Anacharſis, Myſon, Epimenides, *and* Pherecydes. *Theſe, ſaith he, were called the* Wiſe Men, *to whom ſome annex* Piſiſtratus *the Tyrant.*

Among the Romans *alſo three had the Sirname of* Sapiens, M. Cato, C. Lælius, *and* L. Acilius.

* Laert. vit. Thalet.
† Not *Leophantum Gorſiadem*, as the Interpreters render.
‖ So Suidas Ἀκουσίλαος Κάβα υἱὸς Ἀργεῖος, by which Laertius is explained contrary to the Interpreters.
‡ Here are but ſixteen named. There ſhould be ſeventeen, *Caſaubon* thinks the one omitted was *Myſon.*

AN

ACCOUNT

OF THE

Life and Writings

OF

THOMAS STANLEY, Eſquire.

THE Reader cannot expect to find in this Place a long Recital of Intrigues and Adventures; for as the Life of a Courtier or a Soldier is paſt in a Court or a Camp, ſo that of a Scholar is in the Solitude of his Study: And as Mr. *Stanley*'s Learning made up the brighteſt Part of his Character, ſo an Account of his Life is but a Relation of his Atchievements in the Learned World.

Mr. *Stanley* was Son of Sir *Thomas Stanley*, and born at *Cumberlow-Green* in *Hartford-Shire*. At the Age of fourteen Years he was ſent to *Cambridge*, and placed at *Pembroke-Hall*, under the Tuition of Mr. *Balcanchol*, Brother to the Dean of *Durham*. This worthy Gentleman, who had married the Lady *Steward* his Grandmother, took a more than ordinary Care in the Education of his Pupil: He ſpared no Pains to cheriſh and animate thoſe Deſires of Learning which viſibly appeared the predominant Paſſion of his Mind.

While he continued yet in the Univerſity, his Fancy began to exert itſelf, and give ſome Preſages of what the World was to expect from his Genius: It was here he compoſed thoſe *Madrigal Poems* *, and other Pieces, which, together with ſome Tranſlations out of the *French*, *Italian* and *Spaniſh*, were publiſhed in one Volume after his Return from his Travels. As in his firſt Pieces he has given the World a Proof of the Fertility of his Invention; ſo in the latter, which are incomparably better, he has, beyond Exception, done of his great Diligence and Learning.

Soon after his Return home, when he had finiſhed his Tour of *France*, *Italy* and *Spain*, and by Travel extended his Knowledge beyond the Bounds of his native Iſland, he married *Dorothy*, Daughter of Sir *James Engan* of *Flower*, in the County of *Northampton*, whilſt his Father and Mother were ſtill living, and before he was arrived at that Age, which by the Laws of his Country put an End to his Minority. This Alteration in his State and Condi-

* Europa, Cupid crucified, and Venus Vigils, with Notes, *Lond.* 1649. — Anacreon, Bion, Moſchus, Kiſſes by Secundus, Cupid crucified by Auſonius, Venus Vigils, with divers other Poems, 1651. Octavo.

tion of Life, did not in the leaſt change his Temper and Diſpoſition, or abate his Affection to Learning, which was no leſs vigorous now than before. Neither the Cares nor Concerns for his Family, nor the Careſſes and Endearments of a young Wife, could prevail with him to intermit his ordinary Studies, on which he was obſtinately bent. I will not ſay of him as a learned Chancellor of *France* has ſpoke of himſelf, † who complains in Print, that upon his Wedding-Day he had not more than ſix Hours to employ in his Studies; but his Aſſiduity and Application is viſible to all who ſhall conſider the Greatneſs of his Works, and the ſhort Limits of Life in which he finiſhed them.

The firſt Work which he enriched the Publick with, was this Hiſtory of the Lives and Opinions of the Ancient *Greek* Philoſophers. This Work was firſt begun after the Example of the learned *Gaſſendus*, who has compoſed the Lives of *Copernicus*, *Tycho Brahe*, *Peurbachius*, *Regiomontanus*, and other modern Aſtronomers and Philoſophers. Mr. *Stanley* was not the firſt who had attempted this Province; *Diogenes Laertius*, in the Time of the Emperor *Marcus Antoninus*, compiled a Volume of the Lives of the Elder Philoſophers, and after him *Ennapius* writ the Lives of the Sophiſts. Beſides what is extant, *Antiſthenes* and many others, whoſe Volumes have periſhed, writ upon the ſame Subject. The learned *Gerard Voſſius* in our Age, has writ a ſhort Treatiſe of the Ancient Philoſophy, and the ſeveral Sects, not to mention others; but Mr. *Stanley* has outdone all that preceded him in the Extent of his Deſign, and the vaſt Multitude of Particulars he has amaſſed together.

The many Editions of ſo large a Work are undeniable Proofs of the Approbation it has received from the Publick. To ſpeak the Truth, the Excellence and Variety of the Matter, and the vaſt Reading which the Author has diſcovered in every Part of it, could not miſs of Admiration. Beſides, moſt Men have a Reliſh for Diſcourſes of this Kind; and there are few who have not a Curioſity to know the Lives and Actions of thoſe whoſe Virtues they admire. This has engaged ſo many Pens to write the Lives of Princes, great Captains, Miniſters of State, and other Perſons who have made a conſiderable Figure in the World, or had a Share in the Revolutions of Empires and Kingdoms. Others again have entertained the Publick with the Lives of Divines, Lawyers, Poets, Phyſicians, *&c.* which have been kindly received, and judged both uſeful and diverting.

There are two Ways of Inſtruction; the one by Precept, the other by Example; the former is dry and barren, and makes at moſt but a languid Effort; the latter is lively and briſk, and leaves a ſtrong Impreſſion, creating in the Mind Deſires and Inclinations to imitate what is good and excellent, and a Horror for what is baſe and ill. Mr. *Stanley* only conſiders Philoſophers, and the Amuſements and Speculations of Men retired from the Hurry and Noiſe of the World. He has with extreme Diligence compiled an exact Hiſtory of their Lives, their Opinions and Notions of *Good* and *Evil*, of *God and Nature*; their *Theories* of the *Univerſe*, their *Thoughts* about the Principles of *Things*, their Schemes of Morality and Policy, their Conduct and Behaviour.

By this we ſee the Steps by which the *Arts* and *Sciences*, and all Parts of human Knowledge have been promoted, and the ſeveral Advances it has made from its Infancy, till it arrived at the Pitch it is at preſent at.

I mentioned before thoſe Writers who preceded our Author in this Deſign, but none have executed it with ſo much Advantage; his Aim is more comprehenſive, his Account is in every Part ſuccinct, pertinent, without Excurſions, and conſiſts of a vaſt Number of Fragments, which are not in others, ſupplied out of the vaſt Treaſures of his Reading.

* Budæus de Aſſe. Præf.

The

The following History consists of nineteen Parts; the first treats of the Seven Sages or wise Men of *Greece*, so famous in Antiquity; the other give us an ample Account of the twelve different Sects of Philosophers, the Lives of the most eminent Professors, and the Opinions held by them. The last treat of the *Chaldaick* Philosophy, an abstruse and difficult Subject, and which required no less Learning than Mr. *Stanley*'s to venture on it.

Thales the *Milesian*, was the first who employed himself in natural Enquiries, and was thought to deserve the magnificent Title of *Wise*, for his noble Discoveries in Geometry, Astronomy, and the Theory of the Universe. His Principle was, That Water is the chief Material of which natural Bodies are formed, and into which they are resolved. He imagined the Earth a great Mass, floating on a vast Abyss or Ocean of Water; and from hence gave the Reason of Earthquakes and Eruption of Springs. He conceived God as the Author of all natural Motion, and the Soul which animated the Universe. Mr. *Stanley* tells us, he imagined *Loadstone* and *Jett* to have Souls, because of their Virtue of attracting Bodies to them. To him is ascribed the Invention of Measuring the Height of the Pyramids by their Shadows, and found the natural Reason of Eclipses, which before were look'd on as portentous, and Presages of some Calamity. Our Author tells us, he foretold that which ended the five Years Wars between the *Lydians* and the *Medes*; when those poor People, frighted at the strange Darkness, and believing the Sun hid himself to avoid seeing the Slaughter, laid down their Arms, and composed their Quarrels. Besides *Thales*, *Solon*, *Chilon*, *Pittacus*, *Bias*, *Cleobulus*, *Periander*, had the same Title bestowed on them. And as *Thales* was the first, who by his Travels into the Eastern Countries, made himself acquainted with Mathematical and Natural Learning, and introduced it into *Greece*, these were the Authors of several excellent Laws and Schemes of Government: And as the illustrious Title of *Wise* was conferred on the First for his excellent Skill in Geometry, and the Knowledge of Nature, it was conferred on the other for their excellent Precepts in Morality and Politicks. Indeed the Attribute of *Wise* was given to all who professed any Sort of Knowledge above the Vulgar, till *Pythagoras* changed *that* into the Name of *Philosophy*, piously thinking so great a Title could only be ascribed rightfully to the infinite and supreme Wisdom.

It will not be expected we should enter into a Detail of their Lives; this would be to anticipate the Reader, who will find all their Doctrines, Letters, occasional Speeches, *&c.* recounted by our Author in their Place.

The Sects of Philosophers had a double Original; the one from *Anaximander* the Disciple of *Thales*, and therefore *Ionick*; and the other from *Pythagoras*, that Prince of Philosophers, which from the Place where he held his School was called the *Italick*. *Anaximander* varied from the Doctrine of his Master, and instead of *Water* made *Infinity* the Principle of all Things, but has left us without an Explanation of his Meaning. He first discovered the Obliquity of the *Zodiack*, made Geographical Charts, and invented Dials: Tho' Mr. *Stanley*, after *Salmasius*, thinks his Gnomon did only note the Tropick and Equinoctial Points, the Division of Hours not being used till a long Time after. Of this Sect, besides him, were *Anaximenes*, *Anaxagoras*, &c.

Socrates, an *Athenian*, was the Author of the Second Sect: His chief Study was Virtue, Morality, and the Regulation of our Lives and Actions. He was Son of a *Statuary*, but the Greatness of his Genius raised him above his Birth and Condition. He did not confine himself to set Lectures in the Chair. Wherever he was, his Conversation was still pleasant and instructive. The Camp, the *Forum*, the publick Streets, the Houses of his Friends, the Prison in which he endured great Hardship, were so many Schools of Knowledge and

Virtue,

Virtue. For his great Wiſdom, his manly and noble Thoughts, the Eaſe and Sweetneſs of his Expreſſion, he was admired by all Men, and eſteemed the Prince of Philoſophers. He had a right Notion of the divine Nature, and vigorouſly oppoſed *Politheiſm*; for which his Enemies reproached him as an Infidel, and an Enemy of the Gods, and condemn'd him to Death; which he drank with ſuch Majeſty of Soul, ſuch Serenity of Mind, as ſhewed the abſolute Empire of his Reaſon over his Paſſions, and the Impotence of his Enemies Malice; who by Death itſelf could not break in upon the Tranquillity of his Mind, or make him die other than *Socrates*. There are great Diſputes maintain'd, not without ſome Heat, among Chriſtian, as well as Pagan Writers, concerning the *Dæmon* which attended *Socrates*, and gave him Preſages of Events which ſhould happen ſoon after. The Diſcuſſion of this may be ſeen in an entire Chapter, in the Life of this Philoſopher. Notwithſtanding his eminent Virtue and Wiſdom, he could not eſcape the Malice and Wit of *Ariſtophanes*, who has expoſed him in a Play called *The Clouds*, which Mr. *Stanley* has tranſlated into *Engliſh*, and annexed as an Appendix to his Life.

The Succeſſion of the *Ionick* Philoſophy, which before *Socrates* was ſingle, was ſoon after divided into ſeveral Schools and Sects, ſome of which were of leſs Note, and laſted but a ſhort Time, others were more conſiderable, and of longer Continuance; of the firſt Sort were the *Cyrenaick*, *Megarick*, *Eleack*, and *Eretriack* Sects; of the latter were the *Academick* and *Cynick*, which two gave Birth to the *Peripatetick* and *Stoick*.

Ariſtippus, a Diſciple of *Socrates*, was the chief of the *Cyrenaick* Sect. He placed the Sovereign Good in Pleaſure, and thinks Virtue only commendable, as it conduces to acquire that. The Diſtinction of Right and Wrong, Juſt and Unjuſt, he thought arbitrary, and not eſtabliſhed by Nature, but Law and Cuſtom. As his Principles were looſe, his Life was ſuited to his Doctrine, which he paſt away in Jollity and Mirth. His good Humour rendered him agreeable to *Dionyſius* the Tyrant of *Sicily*, while the Severity of *Plato*, which he miſcalled Moroſeneſs, offended that haughty Prince. I cannot forbear here to recount one or two of the many witty Replies which are recorded of that Philoſopher, and which our Author has collected among the other Incidents of his Life. When *Dionyſius* aſked him what brought him to his Court, he replied, He came to traffick with him, to offer him what he had, and receive from him what he wanted, meaning to barter the Wit and Humour he was Maſter of for the other's Money. He did not confine himſelf to the Rules of Temperance, Sobriety, and Continence. Upon a certain Time entering into the Houſe of a famous Curtezan, he obſerved one of the Company to bluſh. *Sir*, ſaid he, *there's no Harm in going in, but in not being able to come out.* When a certain Strumpet charged him with being with Child by him, *You know that no more*, ſays he, *than in paſſing through a Buſh which Thorn it is that pricks you.* When *Dionyſius* offered him three beautiful Women, and bid him chuſe one out of them, which he liked beſt; he took them all three away with him, that he might not, as he ſaid, incur the Fate of *Paris*, who had been ſo ſeverely puniſhed for his Indiſcretion in preferring one to two. *Ariſtippus* owned but two Paſſions, Pleaſure and Grief, as the Springs of all human Actions; and theſe are diverſified according to the Temper and Complexion of every Perſon. He derided the Calmneſs and Serenity of Mind, or Exemption from all Paſſion, in which others place all human Happineſs, regarding this as mere Inactivity, and a tireſome Indolence. He likewiſe derided the Plainneſs, Simplicity, and coarſe Living of his old Friend *Antiſthenes*, and admired the Plenty, Eaſe and Luxury of the *Sicilian* Court. Many other Pleaſantries of the ſame Kind are mentioned in their Place, but I fear I have treſpaſſed the Bounds I preſcribed myſelf, in deſcending to theſe Particulars.

Beſides the *Cyrenaick*, Mr. *Stanley* treats of *Megarick*, *Eleack*, and other Sects; but the moſt eminent of all thoſe derived from *Socrates*, was the *Academick*, who took their Name from the Place where their School was erected. *Plato* was the chief of theſe, concerning whoſe

whose Birth Mr. *Stanley* relates several odd and marvellous Rumours. It was the common Fame at *Athens*, that *Apollo* had condescended to visit his Mother's Bed; and the God appearing in a Vision to his Father, required him to refrain the Company of his Wife till after her Delivery. A pretty Artifice, sometimes used by the Pagan Women, to delude their credulous Husbands. He had a plentiful Fortune, and after he had been a Scholar of *Socrates* for a while, he travelled to hear the greatest Masters of his Time. In *Italy* he studied the *Pythagorick* Doctrines, and seems to have drawn many Things out of the Books of *Moses*, which he might probably have met with in his Voyages. He passes with some for the Inventor of Dialogue, but Mr. *Stanley* pretends he did only refine and polish it, and thinks the Analytick Way of Reasoning, a noble Invention, ought to be ascribed to him. This is the Method of discovering Truth, by supposing the Thing sought as true or known, and enquiring what the Consequents are.

Mr. *Des Cartes* has given us an illustrious Instance of the Use of this Method in his *Meditations* and *Method*, where the chief Truths of Philosophy are demonstrated with great Force and Exactness. The Examples of this Method are to be found in the Books of *Euclid*, *Apollonius*, *Pappus*, and other Places of the old Geometers, as Mr. *Stanley* has marked. *Plato* thought Mathematical Learning of Use in all Parts of human Knowledge, and requires all his Scholars to be previously instructed in the Elements of Geometry.

His Philosophy was held in Veneration in the first Ages of Christianity, which Mr. *Stanley* thinks proceeded from his Teaching, That God had one only begotten Son, whose Power extended over all Creatures. In short, his Notions are in many Points agreeable to the Scheme of our Religion.

Plato held the Soul was immaterial and immortal; that it was free and independent, but subject to Necessity or Fate.

He had a great and noble Genius, and surprizes the Mind with the Eloquence of his Stile, and the Abundance of his Imagination. To give us a more compleat Idea of his Philosophy, Mr. *Stanley* presents us with an Abridgment of the Doctrines of the old Academy out of *Cicero*, and after that a compleat Summary. Several Collections of this Kind are found in *Plutarch*, *Laertius*, *Apuleius*; but our Author passing these by, has chosen that of *Alciucus*, as most perfect and compleat, and annexed it entire, as an Appendix to the Life of this Philosopher. In the last Place, to illustrate the Matter, he has inserted a *Platonick* Discourse, written after a poetical Manner in *Italian*, by the famous *John Picus* Earl of *Mirandola*.

After the Death of *Plato*, his Disciples divided into two Sects; the first remained in the old Academy, the other took Possession of the *Lycæum*. The rest were called *Peripateticks*, of whom *Aristotle*, a Native of *Stagyra*, was chief. Neither his Birth nor Education were so advantageous as *Plato*. Mr. *Stanley* denies that he ever practised as a Quack, or sold Remedies at *Athens*. This, and the pretended divine Honours paid to his Wife *Pythias*, and being concerned in a Plot against *Alexander*, Mr. *Stanley* rejects as Calumnies, groundless and injurious to the Memory of so great a Man. He made great Improvements in Logick, as well as other Parts of Philosophy, invented Categories, formed the Syllogism, and determined several Modes and Figures, detected the Arts of Sophistry, writ a great Number of Books of Metaphysicks, Physicks, Natural History of Animals, *&c.*

The Fortune of this Philosopher is very strange; and it is surprising to find Men judge so differently of the same Person in one Age: Men have been excommunicated and treated as Hereticks for reading him to their Disciples: At other Times he has been introduced into Schools and Universities, and no other Doctrine taught to their Scholars. His Writings in

one Age have been made the Standard of Truth. He has been ſtiled the Genius of Nature, and his Performances the higheſt Pitch of human Wit. Again, at others his Philoſophy has been treated as trifling, verboſe, empty and litigious. However it be, Mr. *Stanley* has given a curious and exact Abſtract of his Doctrine.

Another Branch of the School of *Socrates* were the *Cynicks*. *Antiſthenes* was the chief of theſe, which after was made famous by *Diogenes* his Scholar. It is difficult to determine whence this Name took its Riſe. Mr. *Stanley* thinks partly from the *Cynoſarges*, the *Gymnaſium* or School of *Antiſthenes*, and partly the Roughneſs and Severity of their Manners. *Diogenes* was the moſt conſiderable of this Sect, and made ſo great a Noiſe by the Singularity of his Maxims, that *Alexander* had the Curioſity to ſee him. His odd Manner of living in a Tub, his ſeeking honeſt Men with a Candle and Lantern at Noon, and the other pleaſant Incidents of his Life, are all collected by Mr. *Stanley*.

The Sect of *Stoicks* had its Original from that of the *Cynicks*. *Zeno* was the Author of this, who having firſt been a Scholar of *Crates*, and afterwards a Hearer of other Philoſophers, at laſt inſtituted this new Sect. This Philoſophy has formed great Men, and charmed a World of People by its proud and oſtentatious Principles. It aims to fortify Men againſt bodily Torments, and arm them againſt the Blows of Fortune. *Zeno* admitted only one God, whoſe different Powers and Operations were expreſs'd by ſeveral Names. The ſovereign Happineſs of Man he placed in Virtue, as the only Means to make him immortal, and afford him a ſolid and laſting Pleaſure. He thought the Frame of the World would one Day be diſſolved, and periſh in Flames. That abſolute Empire of Man over his Body and Mind, which he ſo highly aſſerted, gave Riſe to that pernicious Doctrine, that any one might lawfully deſtroy himſelf. And yet there is ſomething in this Philoſophy which is bright and glorious, and capable of dazling the Sight of thoſe who only look at the Splendor of the Pagan Virtues. With what an Air did *Zeno* teach his Wiſe Men the Contempt of Death, and an Indifference for the Things of the World?

The *Stoicks* were ſubtil Logicians, as well as excellent Moraliſts: But we muſt not enter into Particulars. Mr. *Stanley* has collected the Remains out of *Laertius*, *Cicero*, *Stobæus*, and others, and given us a large Summary of that Philoſophy at the End of the Life of this Philoſopher. Beſides *Zeno*, were eminent *Cleanthes*, *Chryſippus*, *Panætius*, *Poſſidonius*, and others, all whom have Juſtice done them by our Author.

The *Stoicks* were the laſt of all the Philoſophers derived from *Thales*, and conclude the Succeſſion of the *Ionick* School.

Pythagoras, whom moſt believe a *Samian*, was chief of the *Italick* Sect. He continued a great while in *Egypt* to learn their Myſteries. Mr. *Stanley* tells us, that he was made Priſoner by *Cambyſes*, who ſent him to *Babylon*, where he became familiar with the *Magi* and *Chaldeans*, and was acquainted with the Prophet *Ezekiel*. He was a comely Man, and had a majeſtick Mien, proper to attract the Veneration of the People, and was thought by his Followers to be Hyperborean *Apollo*.

No Philoſopher had more Diſciples than *Pythagoras*. He enjoined an exact Submiſſion to all he ſaid, and impoſed a rigorous Silence on his Scholars for two Years. Temperance was the Virtue which he moſt earneſtly recommended, as moſt neceſſary to bring the Body to an entire Subjection. His Philoſophy was Cabaliſtick, and full of Myſteries. He held the Preexiſtence of the Soul, and its Migration from one Body to another. Thus he reported in his Writings of himſelf, that before the *Trojan* War he was *Æthalides* the Son of *Mercury*, then *Euphorbus*, then *Hermotimus*, then *Pyrrhus* a *Delian*, laſtly, *Pythagoras*. In his Writ-

ings he reports that he came 207 Years since from the *Inferi*, and other Extravagancies. After his Life, Mr. *Stanley* has annexed an Account of his Discipline and Doctrine, his symbolical Way of Teaching, and transcribed into his Works the learned *Reuchlius* Explanation of the *Pythagorick* Doctrine. Of this Sect were *Empedocles*, *Archytus*, *Philolaus*; and to them it must be owned we are indebted for the true System of the Universe, which places the Sun in the Centre, and the Earth in the Planetary Chorus.

The Sects which spring from the *Italick* may be reduced to four, the *Heraclitian*, the *Eleatick*, the *Sceptick* or *Pyrrhonian*, and the *Epicurean*.

Heraclitus, by the Advantage of a good Genius, was Master of that Knowledge which others acquire with Difficulty and painful Researches.

His contemplative Humour and Disdain for the World, made him love Retirement and Solitude. He withdrew from the Society of Men, and spent his Time in the solitary Top of a Mountain, in seriously bemoaning the Follies and Vanity of the World.

Democritus, the Head of the *Eleatick* Sect, was of a Temper very different from *Heraclitus*: He had a smiling Countenance, and diverted himself with laughing at the ridiculous Passion which Men discovered for Trifles, the Diligence and Pains they used to obtain them, and the Regret and Grief they shewed upon any Loss or Disappointment. The People of *Abdera*, among whom he lived, observing him to laugh frequently, began to doubt of his good Sense, and sent for *Hippocrates* to cure him. But having shewn his *Diacosmus*, the Opinion they had of his Folly was soon converted into Admiration. He was the first Inventer of the Doctrine of *Atoms* and a *Vacuum*, or the *Corpuscular Philosophy*, the Elements of which Mr. *Stanley* has delivered.

Pyrrho was chief of the *Scepticks*. He affirmed Man could only judge by Appearances of Truth and Falshood, and therefore pretended the Mind only ought to continue in Suspence, and not determine any Thing. All the Subtilty of these Gentlemen lay in finding Reasons of Diffidence and Distrust in Matters which appeared plain and evident. The Curious will find their entire Philosophy in its proper Place.

The Author of the last Sect was *Epicurus*, whom our Author tells us writ more than any other of the Philosophers. He placed the Sovereign Good in virtuous Pleasure. The wrong Interpretation of his Opinions, and the Abuse of them by his Disciples, has brought his Philosophy into Disrepute, and caused it to be decried as the Source of all Vice and Immorality. But Mr. *Stanley* affirms the Weakness of his Constitution, and his extreme Sobriety, ought to remove so injurious a Charge. Besides, the Altars erected to his Honour after his Death, will not suffer us to believe him so voluptuous a Man as his Enemies would represent him. Every one knows he taught *Atoms* and a *Void* to be the Principles of Things held, and contrary to *Aristotle* and others, that the World was not eternal. Nay, he affirms it bears sensible Marks of its Newness; urging for Instance, the Rise of Arts and Sciences as undeniable Proofs of its small Continuance. *Lucretius*, in his elegant Poem has given us his Doctrine of the Universe, Providence, the Principles of Things; and *Gassendus*, who revived his Philosophy in this Age, has written his Life.

It is Time now to proceed to the three last Parts of this large Work, which contain an Account of the *Chaldaick*, *Persian*, and *Sabæan* Learning. As the *European* Sciences had their Source in *Greece*, so the Philosophy of those People was derived from the Eastern Nations, whose Original is very obscure. The Writings of the Ancient Sages are long since perished, and *Plato* and *Pythagoras*, who have mixed their Tenets with their Philosophy, have done it in such a Manner, that it is hard to distinguish what they have borrowed, from their own Inventions.

ventions. This Difficulty has rather animated than diſcouraged Mr. *Stanley*, who with mighty Care has amaſſed the ſcattered Fragments, and by digeſting what is genuine, has compiled an Idea of the Oriental Learning.

The *Chaldeans*, in the Time of *Alexander*, pretended they had continued to obſerve the Stars for 470000 Years. But this muſt be regarded as an empty Boaſt, ſince all the Obſervations they could then produce, as Mr. *Stanley* aſſures us, did fall ſhort of two thouſand Years, and there is nothing extant, at preſent, of their Aſtronomy more ancient than the *Æra* of *Nabonaſſar*, or the 3967th Year of the *Julian* Period.

Zoroaſter is commonly own'd as the firſt Author of Arts and Sciences amongſt the *Chaldeans*, but who he was, or in what Age he lived, is dark and uncertain. His Diſciples, the *Magi*, propagated this Learning, which was introduced into *Greece* by *Beroſus*, before or about the Time of *Alexander*.

The Eaſtern Learning was not taught in Schools to a promiſcuous Audience, but confined to certain Families, the Father of whom inſtructed his Children, and by this Means conveyed his myſterious Knowledge to Poſterity. Their Wiſemen were regarded by the Vulgar as ſacred Perſons, and had a ſeparate Habitation, enjoying great Privileges, and an Exemption from publick Charges. They were divided into ſeveral Kinds or Sects, according to the Subject of their Studies, as *Naturaliſts*, *Prieſts*, *Aſtrologers*, &c.

Their Great Maſter *Zoroaſter* divided all Things into three Kinds: The firſt Eternal, without Beginning or End; the next Immortal, which had Beginning, but no End; and the laſt Mortal and Corruptible: They thought the Firſt of all Things was eternal and ſupreme God, whom they termed Father and King, and placed his Eſſence in Light and Truth.

After God, were their good and ill *Dæmons*, which they conceived to inhabit the Regions of Fire, Air, Water, and Earth. The Former they fancied to dwell in the Light of the Divine Preſence, and were the Miniſters and Meſſengers of God. The latter, whom they ſuppoſed to be Spirits of Darkneſs, did wander up and down, and were Enemies and Haters of Mankind, and continually ſeeking to hurt and deſtroy them. Of theſe they thought the Earth, and Sea, and their moſt retired Cavities and Depths were full. Of the ill *Dæmons*, they accounted ſome to be worſe than others: Thoſe who kept their Reſidence in the Air, they thought to be wanton and ſportive, who either diverted Men with their capricious Tricks, or inſpired them with ſanguine and amorous Thoughts. On the contrary, thoſe which frequented ſolitary and dark Places, or lodg'd in the Caverns of the Earth, were extremely malignant and fierce, and like wild Beaſts, attacked and tore in Pieces whomſoever they met. If, by the Permiſſion of Heaven, they were ſuffered to remove their Seats, they enter'd into the Bodies of Men, threw them into Madneſs, Epilepſies, Convulſions, and other diſmal and affrighting Diſtempers.

After the Immaterial Beings, the next Order were the Corporeal Worlds, of which they accounted Seven; one *Empyreal*, three *Etherial*, and three more *Material*, by which they meant the Terreſtrial Globe compos'd of Water, Air, and Earth.

We have ſaid enough of their *Theology* and *Phyſicks*; the next Branch of the *Chaldaick* Learning was their Arts of *Prognoſtick*, or *Preſages* of *Future Events*. The Chief of theſe were *Aſtrology*, *Augury*, *Interpretation of Dreams*, *Explanation of Prophecies*, and other like myſtical Sciences.

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The third Part of the Wisdom these Sages were famous for, was their *Magick*, *Natural* and *Theurgick*. By the Help of the former they pretended to have a great Power over the Natural World, to drive away wild Beasts and venomous Creatures, to preserve the Fruits of the Earth, to keep off Storms and Tempests, Thunder, and what not. By the latter they affirmed, they could command *Dæmons*, and call the Good to their Aid and Assistance, and repel and chase the malignant Ones. I shall not enter further into an Enumeration, but leave the Reader to see the Original, where Mr. *Stanley* has given us a large and ample Account of the Worship, Religions, Rites, Arts and Sciences of these Nations.

Having thus given a View of the History of Philosophy, we shall proceed to the rest of his learned Labours, which are either printed, or remain in Manuscript in the Hands of the Curious.

When Mr. *Stanley* had happily finished this Work, and before he was Twenty-eight Years of Age, he undertook * *Æschylus*, the most knotty and intricate of all the *Greek* Poets; and in the Year 1663, after a World of Pains spent in illustrating and restoring him, he published his accurate and beautiful Edition of that Author. This was a Work of great Difficulty, and an Enterprize worthy of Mr. *Stanley*'s Abilities and great Skill in the *Greek* Language. *Henry Stephens*, *Salmasius*, and divers other Criticks, thought the Difficulties insuperable, and despair'd of seeing this accomplished.

Six Tragedies of this Poet were first of all published by *Aldus* at *Venice*, in the Year 1518. After this, *Adrian Turnebus* printed them with various Readings at the End, in 1558. The same Year they came out at *Venice*, revised by *Roboretus*, who added his own Conjectures, together with those of *Michael Sophianus*, and in this Edition the *Choephoræ* was first added with *Scholia* out of the Ancient Copies. Not long after, the Whole came out all more correct than before, by the Care of *Petrus Victorius* from the Press of *Henry Stephens*. In the last Place, these Seven Tragedies were published by *G. Cauterus* at *Antwerp* in 1580; in which Edition, besides the Correction of an infinite Number of Faults, there is an Account given of his Versification. *Isaac Causabon*, in his Notes upon *Strabo*, declares his Intent to publish and illustrate *Æschylus*; but either he did nothing in it, or his Labours have perished, to the great Detriment of Learning.

After these great Men, Mr. *Stanley* engaged in this Work, and what he has done in it, may be drawn from the Account himself has premised to his Edition. The *Greek* Text he has taken from the *Cauterian* Edition, and the *Scholia* from *Victorius*; to which, that he might omit nothing, he has annex'd the various Readings, Epistles, Prefaces, Conjectures and Observations. He has farther collated the former Tragedies, with Two Manuscripts, the One in the *Bodleian*, and the other in the *Arundellian* Library, both of which were lent him by Mr. *Selden*. By Means of the First he has enriched the *Scholiast* on the first Three Tragedies, and by Help of the latter published a *Scholiast*, which never before saw the Light. The Account of the Versification which *Cauterus* published, he has amended, collected the Fragments, made a new *Latin* Translation; and lastly, compleated the whole Work with a most learned Commentary.

Besides these Monuments of his Learning which are published, there are divers other Proofs of his unwearied Application remaining still in Manuscript; all or most of which are in the Library of the Right Reverend the Lord Bishop of *Norwich*. Here are his large Commen-

* Quis *Æschylum* possit affirmare Græcè nunc scienti, magis patere explicabilem, quam Evangelia & Epistolas Apostolicas. Unus ejus *Agamemnon* superat obscuritate quantum est Librorum Sacrorum cum suis Hebraismis & Syriasmis & toto Hellenisticâ supellectile vel Farragine. CC. Salmas. de Hellenisticâ Ep. Ded. P. 37.

taries on *Æſchylus* † in Eight Volumes in *Folio*, which were never publiſhed, his ‡ *Adverſaria*, or Promiſcuous Remarks, in which ſeveral Paſſages of *Sophocles*, *Euripides*, *Stephanus de Urbibus*, *Juvenal*, *Perſius*, *Heſychius*, *Callimachus*, and other Ancient Authors are amended and explained. Beſides what is mentioned, there are large Prelections on *Theophraſtus* § his Characters, and a Critical Eſſay on the Firſt Fruits and the Tenths of the Spoil ſaid in the Epiſtle to the ‖ *Hebrews* to be given by the Prophet *Abraham* to *Melchiſedeck*; all which are full of excellent Learning, and no leſs juſtly valued by their preſent Poſſeſſors.

And thus you have a ſhort Account of our Author, who was a Gentleman of a comely Aſpect, and exceeded by none of his Time for Modeſty, Candour, and Learning.

His Contemporaries paid that Deference to him which he ſo well deſerved; his Works were much beyond the Number of his Years; and in this he might be accounted another *Picus Mirandola*, in that he died about the ſame Age, leaving our Nation exceedingly indebted to his Family for affording Two ſuch illuſtrious *Engliſh* Men as Sir *John Marſham* and himſelf.

† N° 667. Thom. Stanleii Ampliſſimi Commentarii in Æſchyli Tragædias [quas ſuâ manu ſcripſit nondum Editi] 8 Vol. Fol.

‡ N° 668. Tho. Stanleii Adverſaria in quibus Sophoclis, Euripidis, Stephani de Urbibus, Juvenalis, Perſii, Achillis, Tatii, Theocriti, Ariſtidis, Parthenii, Heſychii, Antigoni, Caryſtii, Callimachi loci plurimi emendantur & explicantur. Fol.

§ N° 669. Tho. Stanleii Prælectiones ampliſſimæ in Theophraſti Characteres.

‖ N° 670. Tho. Stanleii ἀκροάσεις five Exercitatio Philologica de Primitiis ſeu Decimis Prædæ ad verſ. 4. c. 7. Epiſtolæ ad Hebræos. Qua nonnulla ſacræ Scripturæ loca explicantur, veteres aliquot Ritus eruuntur, Auctores plurimi præſertim Græci partim illuſtrantur partim emendatur, Ind. Cod. Manuſcript. Joh. Mori Epiſc. Norvicenſis.

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THE

CONTENTS.

The First Part.

Containing those on whom the Attribute of *WISE* was conferred.

THALES.

Chap. Page

1. THE *Country and Parents of* Thales 1
   2. *The Time of his Birth* 2
   3. *His Travels* 3
4. *How he lived at* Miletus ibid.
5. *The Attribute of* Wise *conferred on him* ibid.
6. *Of his Philosophy* 5
   Sect. 1. *That Water is the Principle of all Things* ib.
   2. *Of God* 6
   3. *Of Dæmons* 7
   4. *Of the Soul* ibid.
   5. *Of the World* 8
7. *Of his Geometry* 9
   Sect. 1. *Propositions invented by him* ibid.
   2. *Of his taking the Heighth of the Pyramids* 10
8. *Of his Astronomy* ibid.
   Sect. 1. *Of the cœlestial Spheres* 11
   2. *Of the Sun, Moon, and Stars* ibid.
   3. *Of Eclipses* ibid.
   4. *Of the Year* 12
   5. *His Astrological Predictions* ibid.
9. *His Moral Sentences* 13
10. *His Judgment in Civil Affairs* 14
11. *Of his Writings* 15
12. *His Auditors and Scholars* ib.
13. *Of his Death* 16

SOLON.

1. Solon's *Parents, Country, and Children* 17
2. *How by his Means the* Athenians *took* Salamis, Cyrrha, *and the* Thracian Chersonesus ibid.
3. *How he composed Differences and Seditions at Home* 19
4. *What Alterations he made during his Government, and first of the Sisacthia* 20
5. *How he divided the People into Classes, and erected Courts of Judicature* 21
6. *His Laws* 22
7. *Of the Axes, and Cyrbes, Senators, Oaths, and other Institutions of* Solon 27
8. *How he entertained* Anacharsis; *his Travels to* Egypt, Cyprus, Miletus, Delphi, Corinth, *and* Crete 28
8. *The Attribute of* Wise *conferred on him; his Moral Sentences* 29
10. *How he opposed* Pisistratus, *and reprehended* Thespis 30
11. *How he travelled to* Lydia *and* Cilicia 31
12. *His Death* 33
13. *His Writings* ibid.

CHILON.

1. Chilon's *Life* 36
2. *His Moral Sentences, Precepts, and Verses* 37
3. *His Death and Writings* 38

PITTACUS.

1. Pittacus's *Life* 39
2. *His Moral Sentences, Precepts, and Verses* 40
3. *His Death, Brother, Wife, Son, Writings* 41

BIAS.

1. Bias's *Life* 42
2. *His Moral Sentences, Precepts, and Verses* 43
3. *His Death and Writings* ibid.

CLEOBULUS.

1. Cleobulus's *Life, Death, and Writings* 44
2. *His Moral Sentences, Precepts, and Verses* ib.

PERIANDER.

1. *The Country, Ancestors, and Parents of* Periander 45

CONTENTS.

Chap. Page

2. *The Time of his Birth, his Reign, and the Change of his Diſpoſition* 46
3. *Of his being placed in the Number of the Seven Sages. His Sentences and Writings* 47
4. *The Story of* Arion 48
5. *Of his Wife* 49
6. *Of his Children* ibid.
7. *His Death* 50

SOSIADES.

His Collection of the Precepts of the Seven Sophiſts 51
Auſonii Ludus Septem Sapientum 52

ANACHARSIS.

1. Anacharſis's *Life and Writings* 54
2. *His Apothegms* 55

MYSON 56
EPIMENIDES 57
PHERECYDES 58

The Second Part.

Containing the *Ionick* Philoſophers.

ANAXIMANDER.

1. *Of his Life* 60
2. *Of his Opinions* 61

Sect. 1. *That Infinity is the Principle of all Things* ibid.
2. *Of the Heavens* ibid.
3. *Of the Meteors* ibid.

ANAXIMENES.

1. *His Life* 62
2. *His Opinions* ibid.

Sect. 1. *That the Air is the Principle of all Things* ib.
2. *Of the Heavens* ib.
3. *Of Meteors* 63

ANAXAGORAS.

1. *His Country, Time, and Study of Philoſophy* ib.
2. *Of his Opinions* ibid.

Sect. 1. *Of the firſt Principles and Beginning of all Things* ibid.
2. *Of the Heavens* 64
3. *Of Meteors* ibid.
4. *Of the Earth* 65
5. *Of living Creatures* ibid.

3. *His Predictions* ibid.
4. *His Scholars and Auditors* 66
5. *Of his Tryal, Death, Sentences, and Writings* 67

ARCHELAUS 68

The Third Part.

Containing the *Socratick* Philoſophers.

SOCRATES.

1. *His Country, Parents, and Time of Birth* 69
2. *His firſt Education* 70
3. *His Maſter* 71
4. *Of his School and manner of Teaching* ibid.
5. *Of his Philoſophy* 72

Sect. 1. *Metaphyſicks* 73
2. *Ethicks* ibid.
3. *Oeconomicks* 78
4. *Politicks* ibid.

6. *Of his Dæmon* 79
7. *His Military Actions* 81
8. *How he carried himſelf in the Democracy and the Oligarchy* 82
9. *His falling out with the Sophiſts, and with* Anytus 84
10. *His Trial* ibid.
11. *His Impriſonment* 88
12. *The Time and Manner of his Death* 89
13. *What happened after his Death* 92
14. *Of his Perſon and Virtues* 93
15. *His Wives and Children* 95
16. *His Scholars and Auditors* 96
17. *His Writings* 98

The Clouds of Ariſtophanes 102

XENOPHON.

1. Xenophon's *Country, Parents, and following of* Socrates 114
2. *On what Occaſion he followed* Cyrus *into* Aſia ib.
3. *How he brought off the Grecian Army* 115
4. *The End of the Retreat* 117
5. *His following of* Ageſilaus, *and Baniſhment* 118
6. *How he lived at* Scilluns *and at* Corinth 119
7. *His Death, Perſon, Virtues* 120
8. *His Writings* ibid.

His Epiſtles 121

ÆSCHINES.

1. *His Life* 123
2. *His Writings* 124

CRITO 125
SIMON ib.
GLAUCO ib.
SIMMIAS 126
CEBES ibid.

A Chronology 127

The Fourth Part.

Containing the *Cyrenaick*, *Megarick*, *Eleack*, and *Eretriack* Sects.

The *Cyrenaick* Sect.

Chap. Page

1. ARistippus's *Country and Parents* 135
2. *How he went to* Athens *and heard* Socrates ibid.
3. *How he went to* Ægina 136
4. *His Institution of a Sect* ibid.
   Sect. 1. *Of Judgment and Judicatories* ibid.
   2. *Of the End or chief Good* 137
   3. *Of Virtue* 138
5. *How he went to* Dionysius's *Court* ibid.
6. *His Emulators* 139
7. *His Apophthegms* 141
8. *His Writings* 142
9. *His Death* 143
10. *His Disciples and Successors* 144

HEGESIAS.

1. *His Life* ibid.
2. *His Philosophy* ibid.

ANNICERIS.

1. *His Life* 145
2. *His Philosophy* ibid.

THEODORUS.

1. *His Life* ibid.
2. *His Philosophy* 146
3. *His Death, Writings, &c.* ibid.

BION.

1. *His Life* 147
2. *His Apophthems* ibid.
3. *His Death* 148

The *MEGARICK* Sect.

EUCLID.

1. *His Country and Masters* 149
2. *His Institution of a Sect* ib.
3. *His Apophthegms and Writings* ib.

EUBULIDES 150
ALEXINUS 152
EUPHANTUS ib.
APOLLONIUS CHRONUS ib.

DIODORUS.

1. *His Life* ibid.
2. *His Philosophy* 153

ICHTHYAS ib.
CLINOMACHUS 154

Chap. Page

STILPO.

1. *His Life* 154
2. *His Philosophy* 155
3. *His Disciples* ibid.
4. *His Death and Writings* ibid.

The *Eleack* and *Eretriack* Sects.

PHÆDO 156
PLISTHENES ibid.

MENEDEMUS.

1. *His Country, Parents, Teachers* ibid.
2. *His School and Philosophy* 157
3. *His Manner of Living* ibid.
4. *His Civil Employments* 158
5. *His virtuous Apophthegms* ibid.
6. *His Departure from* Eretria, *and Death* 159

The Fifth Part.

Containing the *Academick* Philosophers.

PLATO.

1. THE *Country, Parents, and Time of* Plato 160
2. *His first Education, Exercises, and Study* 163
3. *His Masters in Philosophy, and Travels to that End* 164
4. *What Authors he followed* 165
5. *His School* 167
6. *How he instituted a Sect* ibid.
   Sect 1. *Ethick* ibid.
   2. *Physick* 168
   3. *Dialectick* ibid.
7. *His Inventions* ibid.
8. *His Distinctions* 169
9. *His three Voyages to* Sicily 173
10. *His Authority in Civil Affairs* 178
11. *His Virtues and Moral Sentences* ibid.
12. *His Will and Death* 180
13. *His Disciples and Friends* 181
14. *His Emulators and Detractors* ibid.
15. *His Writings* 183

The Doctrine of *Plato*, delivered by *Alcinous*.

1. *Of Philosophy, and how a Philosopher must be qualified* 188
2. *That Contemplation is to be preferred before Action* 189
3. *The three Parts of Philosophy* ibid.
4. *Dialectick* ibid.
5. *The Elements and Office of Dialectick* 190
6. *Of Propositions and Argumentations* 191
7. *Of Theoretick Philosophy* 192
8. *Of first Matter* 193
9. *Of Ideas* ibid.

10. *Of*

CONTENTS.

Chap. Page

10. *Of God* 194
11. *Of Qualities* 195
12. *Of the Causes, Generations, Elements, and Order of the World* ibid.
13. *Of the Conveniences of Figures with the Elements and World* 196
14. *Of the Soul of the World, the Spheres, and the Stars* ibid.
15. *Of Dæmons and Elements* 197
16. *Of younger Gods Makers of Men* ibid.
17. *Of the Body and Parts of Men, and Powers of the Soul* ibid.
18. *Of Sight* 198
19. *Of the rest of the Senses* ibid.
20. *Of Heavy and Light* 199
21. *Of Respiration* ibid.
22. *Of the Causes of Diseases* ibid.
23. *Of the three principal Powers of the Soul* ibid.
24. *Of the Distinction of the Parts of the Soul* ibid.
25. *Of the Immortality of the Soul* 200
26. *Of Fate and Free-will* ibid.
27. Ethick, *of the chief Good and of Virtues* 201
28. *The Definition and Kinds of Virtue* 202
29. *Of Virtues, Vices, and their Differences* ibid.
30. *That Virtue is voluntary, Vice involuntary* 203
31. *Of Love and Friendship* ibid.
32. *Of Passions* 204
33. *Of the Forms of Common-wealths* 205
34. *Of a Sophist* ibid.

A *Platonick* Discourse, written by *John Picus* Earl of *Mirandula*, in Explication of a Sonnet, by *Hieronymo Benivieni* 206

The Second Part 209

The Third Part 215

SPEUSIPPUS.

1. *His Life* 218
2. *His Profession of Philosophy* 219
3. *His Writings* ibid.
4. *Of his Death* ibid.

XENOCRATES.

1. *His Country, Parents, living with* Plato 220
2. *His Profession of Philosophy* ibid.
3. *His Virtues and Apophthegms* 221
4. *His Writings* 222
5. *His Death* ib.

POLEMO 223

CRATES 224

CRANTOR ib.

ARCESILAUS.

1. *His Country, Parents, Teachers* 225
2. *On what Occasion he constituted the middle Academy* 226
3. *His Virtues and Apophthegms* 228
4. *His Death* 229

LACYDES 230

CARNEADES.

1. *His Country, Parents, Time, Masters* 231
2. *How he constituted the new Academy* ibid.
3. *On what Occasion he was sent on an Embassy to* Rome. 234
4. *His Virtues and Apophthegms* ibid.
5. *His Death and Writings* 235

CLITOMACHUS ibid.

PHILO 236

ANTIOCHUS 237

The Sixth Part.

Containing the *Peripatetick* Philosophy.

ARISTOTLE.

1. *HIS Country, Parents, and Time of his Birth* 238
2. *His first Education and Studies* 239
3. *How he heard* Plato ibid.
4. *How he lived with* Hermias 241
5. *How he lived with* Philip *and* Alexander ib.
6. *His School and Manner of Teaching* 242
7. *His Philosophy* 243
8. *His Correspondence with* Alexander 244
9. *On what Occasion he left* Athens *and went to* Chalcis 246
10. *His Apophthegms* ibid.
11. *His Will and Death* 247
12. *His Person and Virtues* 248
13. *His Wives and Children* 249
14. *His Disciples and Friends* ibid.
15. *His Detractors* 250
16. *His Writings* 251
17. *His Commentators* 254
18. *His Epistles* 255

The Doctrine of *Aristotle.*

The First Part.

1. *Of Philosophy in general, and in particular of Dialectick* 257
2. *Of Terms* ibid.
3. *Of Propositions* 258
4. *Of Syllogisms* ib.
5. *Of Apodeictick or demonstrative Syllogism* 259
6. *Of Dialectick Syllogism* 260
7. *Of Sophistick Syllogism* ibid.

The Second Part.

1. *Of Physick* 261
2. *Of the Principles of Natural Bodies* ibid.
3. *Of Nature, and the Cause of Natural Bodies* 262
4. *Of the Affections of Natural Bodies, Motions, Place, and Time* ibid.

5. *Of*

CONTENTS.

Chap. Page

5. *Of the Kinds and Properties of Motion* 263
6. *Of the first Mover* ibid.
7. *Of Heaven* 264
8. *Of Elements* 265
9. *Of Generation, Corruption, Alteration, Augmentation and Diminution* ibid.
10. *Of Action a Passion* 266
11. *Of Mixtion and Temperament* ibid.
12. *Of imperfect mix'd Bodies* 267
13. *Of perfect mix'd Bodies* 268
14. *Of Plants and Animals* 269
15. *Of the Soul* 270
16. *Of the Nutritive Faculty* ibid.
17. *Of the Sensitive Faculty* 271
18. *Of common Sense* 272
19. *Of Phantasy and Cogitation* ibid.
20. *Of Memory and Reminiscence* ibid.
21. *Of Sleep and Waking* 273
22. *Of Dreams* ibid.
23. *Of the Intellectual Faculty* ibid.
24. *Of the Motive Faculty* 274
25. *Of Life and Death* ibid.

The Third Part.

1. *Of Ethick* 275
2. *Of Oeconomick* 280
3. *Of Politick* 281

The Fourth Part.

1. *Of Metaphysick* ibid.
2. *Of the first Principle* 282
3. *Of the Substance and Accident* ibid.
4. *Of Power and Act* ibid.
5. *Of True and False* 283
6. *Of one, the same, and divers* ibid.
7. *Of immortal, eternal, and immoveable Substances* ibid.
8. *Of Gods* 284
9. *Of Intelligences* ibid.

THEOPHRASTUS.

1. *His Country, Parents, Masters* 285
2. *His Profession of Philosophy and Disciples* ibid.
3. *His Virtues and Apophthegms* ibid.
4. *His Will and Death* 286
5. *His Writings* 271

STRATO.

1. *His Life* 289
2. *His Will and Death* ibid.
3. *His Writings* 290

LYCO.

1. *His Life* 291
2. *His Will and Death* ibid.

ARISTO 292

CRITOLAUS 293

DIODORUS ibid.

Chap. Page

The Seventh Part.

Containing the *Cynick* Philosophers.

ANTISTHENES.

1. *HIS Life* 294
2. *His Institution of a Sect* ibid.
3. *His Apophthegms* 295
4. *His Writings* 297
5. *His Death* ibid.

DIOGENES.

1. *His Country, Parents, Time, Banishment* 298
2. *How he lived at* Athens ibid.
3. *How he lived at* Corinth 299
4. *His Philosophy* 300
5. *His Apophthegms* 301
6. *His Writings* 308
7. *His Death* ibid

MONIMUS 309

ONESECRITUS ibid.

CRATUS 310

METROCLES 311

HIPPARCHIA ibid

MENIPPUS 312

MENEDEMUS ibid.

The Eighth Part.

Containing the *Stoick* Philosophers.

ZENO.

1. *HIS Country, Parents, first Studies* 313
2. *Of his Masters* 314
3. *His School and Institution of a Sect* ibid.
4. *What Honours were conferred on him* ibid.
5. *His Apophthegms* 315
6. *His Death* 317
7. *His Person and Vertues* ibid.
8. *His Writings* 318
9. *His Disciples* 319

The Doctrine of the *Stoicks.*

Of Philosophy in general 321
1. *Of Dialectick* ibid.
2. *Of Instruments and Rules of Judgment* 322
3. *Of Sense* 323
4. *Of Phantasy* ibid
5. *Of True and Truth* 325
6. *Of Comprehension* ibid.
7. *Of Assent* ibid.
8. *Of Notions* 326
9. *Of Science and Opinion* 327
10. *Of Voice, Speech, and Words* ibid.
11. *Of Definition and Division* 330
12. *Of Genus, Species, &c.* 331
13. *Of Things* ibid.
14. *Of Subjects* ibid.
15. *Of Qualitatives* ibid.
16. *Of Quodammodotatives* 332
17. *Of Quodammodotatives as to others* ibid.

Chap. Page

18 *Of Decibles* 333
19 *Of Categorems* 334
20 *Of Simple Axioms* ibid.
21 *Of not Simple Axioms* 335
22 *Of contrary Axioms* 336
23 *Of Possible, Impossible; Necessary, and Unnecessary, Probable, Paradoxal, and Reasonable Axioms* ibid.
24 *Of reciprocal Axioms* 337
25 *Of Signs* ibid.
26 *Of Reason or Arguments* ibid.
27 *Of Conclusive Reasons* 338
28 *Of Syllogism* ibid.
29 *Of Moods* 339
30 *Of not syllogistick conclusive Reasons* 340
31 *Of not conclusive Reasons* ibid.
32 *Of fallacious Reasons or Sophisms* 341
33 *Of Method* 342

Ethick.

1 *Ethick, and the Parts thereof* 343
2 *Of Appetite* ibid.
3 *Of first Natural Appetite* ibid.
4 *Of Appetites consequent to the first* 348
5 *Of Good and Ill* 349
6 *Of Eupathies* 352
7 *Of Passions* ibid.
8 *Of Sickness and Infirmities* 354
9 *Of Virtue and Vice* 356
10 *Of the End* 358
11 *Of Indifferents* 359
12 *Of Estimation* ibid.
13 *Of Actions and Offices* 360
14 *Of Præter-Offices* 363
15 *Of wise and virtuous Persons Paradoxes* 364

Physick.

1 *Physick, and the Parts thereof* 368
2 *Of Bodies* ibid.
3 *Principles* 369
4 *Of Matter* ibid.
5 *Of the World* ibid.
6 *Of Elements* 371
7 *Of Fire* ibid.
8 *Of Stars* 372
9 *Of the Sun* 373
10 *Of the Moon* ibid.
11 *Of Air* ibid.
12 *Of Water and Earth* 374
13 *Of Mistion and Temperament* ibid.
14 *Of Generation and Corruption* 375
15 *Of Motion* ibid.
16 *Of living Creatures* ibid.
17 *Of God* 376
18 *Of Nature* 378
19 *Of Fate* 379
20 *Of Incorporeals, and first of Decibles* 380
21 *Of Vacuum and Place* ibid.

Chap. Page

22 *Of Time* 381

CLEANTHES.

1 *His Life* 382
2 *His Apophthegms* ibid.
3 *His Writings* 383
4 *His Death* 384

CHRYSIPPUS.

1 *His Life* 384
2 *His Apophthegms* 385
3 *His Writings* ibid.
4 *His Death* 388
ZENO 389
DIOGENES ibid.
ANTIPATER ibid.
PANÆTIUS 390
POSIDONIUS ibid.
Francis *Lord* Verulam's *Judgment on the Philosophers* 391
Mr. Montagu's 392

The Ninth Part.

Containing the *Italick* Sect.

PYTHAGORAS.

1. THE *Country, Parents, and Time of* Pythagoras 393
2 *His first Education and Masters* 394
3 *How he travelled to* Phœnicia 396
4 *How he travelled to* Egypt ibid.
5 *How he went to* Babylon 397
6 *How he returned to* Samus 398
7 *How he went to* Delus, Delphi, Crete, *and* Sparta 399
8 *How he went to* Olympia *and* Phlius ib.
9 *How he lived at* Samus 400
10 *His Voyage to* Italy ibid.
11 *His Arrival at* Crotona, *and upon what Occasion he became eminent there* 402
12 *His Oration to the young Men* 403
13 *His Oration to the Senators* 404
14 *His Oration to the Boys* 405
15 *His Oration to the Women* ib.
16 *His Institution of a Sect in Private and Publick* 406
17 *His Authority in Civil Affairs* 407
18 *Wonders related of him* 409
19 *His Death* 411
20 *His Person and Virtues* 414
21 *His Wife, Children, Servants* 415
22 *His Writings* 416
23 *His Disciples* 418
24 *The Succession of his School* 419

The Discipline and Doctrine of *Pythagoras.*

1 *The great Authority and Esteem of* Pythagoras *among his Disciples* 421

CONTENTS.

Chap. Page
2 *The two sorts of Auditors, and first of the Exoterick, how he exploded them* 422
3 *Purificative Institution, by Sufferings* ibid.
4 *Silence* 423
5 *Abstinence, Temperance, and other Ways of Purification* ibid.
6 *Community of Estates* 424
7 *Admission or Rejection of the Exoterick Disciples* ib.
8. *Distinction of those that were admitted to be Exotericks* ibid.
9 *How they disposed the Day* 425
10 *How they examined their Actions Morning and Evening* 426
11 *Secrecy* 427

1 Sciences *preparative to Philosophy* 428
2 *Mathematick, its Name, Parts* ibid.

SECT. 1. Arithmetick 429
1 *Number, its kinds; the first Kind intellectual, in the Divine Mind* ibid.
2 *The other Kind of Number, sciential, its Principles* ibid.
3 *The two Kinds of Sciential Numbers, odd and even* 430
4 *Symbolical Numbers* ibid.
5 *The Monad* 431
6 *The Duad* ibid.
7 *The Triad* 432
8 *The Tetrad* 433
9 *The Pentad* 434
10 *The Hexad* ibid.
11 *The Heptad* 435
12 *The Ogdoad* ibid.
13 *The Ennead* ibid.
14 *The Decad* 436
15 *Divination by Numbers* ibid.

SECT. 2. Musick. 437
1 *Voice, its kind* ibid.
2 *First Musick in the Planets* 438
3 *Octochord* ibid.
4 *The Arithmetical Proportions of Harmony* 439
5 *The Division of the Diapason, according to the Diatonick Kind* 440
6 *The Canon of the Monochord* ibid.
7 *Institution by Musick* ibid.
8 *Medicine by Musick* 441

SECT. 3. Geometry. 442
1 *Of a Point, Line, Superficies, Solid* 443
2 *Propositions* ibid.
3 *How he collected the Statues of* Hercules 444

SECT. 4. Astronomy. ibid.
1 *The System of the Spheres* ibid.
2 *The Motions of the Planets* 446
3 *The Intervals and Harmony of the Spheres* ibid.
4 *Of the Planet* Venus 447
5 *Philosophy, its Name, Definition, Parts, Method* ibid.

SECT. 1. *Practick* Philosophy, its Parts; and first of *Pædeutick* 449
1 *Institution, Silence, Abstinence* ibid.
2 *Fortitude* 450
3 *Temperance and Continuance* ibid.
4 *Sagacity and Wisdom* 450

SECT. 2. Of *Politick*, the other Part of *Practick* Philosophy ibid.
1 *Common Conversation* ibid.
2 *Friendship* ibid.
3 *Worship of the Gods* 453
4 *Piety to the Dead* 454
5 *Reverence of Parents, and Obedience to the Law* 455
6 *Law-making* ibid.

SECT. 3. *Theoretick* Philosophy, its Parts; and first of the *Science concerning the Intelligibles* ib.

1 *Of the supreme God* 456
2 *Of Gods, Dæmons, Heroes* ibid.
3 *Of Fate and Fortune* ibid.
4 *Divination* ibid.

SECT. 4. Physick ibid.
1 *Principles* 457
2 *Of the World* 460
3 *Of the superior or etherial Parts of the World* ib.
4 *Of the sublunary Parts of the World* ib.
5 *Of living and animate Creatures* 461
6 *Of the Generation of animate Creatures* ib.
7 *The Soul, its Parts; and first of the irrational Part* ib.
8 *Of the rational Part of the Soul, the Mind* 462
9 *Of the Transmigration of the Soul* 463
10 *The separate Life of the Soul* 464

SECT 5. Medicine ib.
1 *Diætstick* ib.
2 *Therapeutick* 465

1 Pythagoras *his symbolical Way of Teaching* 466
2 *The Symbols of* Pythagoras, *according to* Jamblicus 467
3 *An Explication of the* Pythagorick *Symbols, by* Jamblicus 468
4 *The same Symbols explained by others* 473
5 *Other Symbols* 475
The Golden Verses of Pythagoras 477
Timæus *the* Locrian, *of the Soul of the World, and of Nature* 478
An Explication of the Pythagorick *Doctrine, by* John Reuchlin 482
1 *Of* Pythagoras *his Way of Teaching by Silence and Symbols* ibid.

Chap. Page
2 *The Triple World* 483
3 *The ſupreme World* 484
4 *The intelligible World* 485
5 *The ſenſible World* 486
6 *The State of the Soul after Death* 487
7 *Of the* Pythagorical *Tranſmigration* 488

EMPEDOCLES.

1 *His Country, Parents* 489
2 *His Maſters* 490
3 *How he lived among the* Agrigentines; *his Power and Authority* ibid.
4 *Wonders related of him* 491
5 *His Death* 492
6 *His Writings* ibid.
7. *His Opinions* 493
EPICHARMUS 494
ARCHYTAS ibid.
ALCMÆON 496
HIPPASUS ibid.
PHILOLAUS 497
EUDOXUS ibid.

The Tenth Part.

HERACLITUS.

1 *HIS Country, Parents, Maſters* 499
2 *How he lived at* Epheſus 500
3 *His Retirement* ibid.
4 *His Sickneſs and Death* 503
5 *His Apophthegms* 504
6 *His Writings* ibid.
7 *His Doctrine* 505

Sect. 1 *That Fire is the Principle of all Things* ib.
2 *Of the Stars, Sun, Moon, Day, Night, &c.* 506
3 *Of the Ebbing and Flowing of the Sea* ibid.
4 *Of living Creatures* ibid.

The Eleventh Part.

XENOPHANES.

1 *HIS Life* 507
2 *His Opinions* 508

PARMENIDES.

1 *His Life* 509
2 *His Opinions* ib.
3 *Ideas* 510

MELISSUS.

1 *His Life* 511
2 *His Opinions* 512

ZENO.

1 *His Life* ibid.
2 *His Inventions of Dialectick* 513
3 *His Opinions* ibid.
LEUCIPPUS 514

DEMOCRITUS.

1 *His Country, Parents, Brethren, Time* 515
2 *His firſt Education, and Maſters* ibid.
3 *His Travels* 516
4 *How he lived at* Abdera, *after his Return from Travels* ibid.
5 *His Retirement* 517
6 *His Communication with* Hippocrates ibid.
7 *His Death* 523
8 *His Writing* ibid.
9 *Phyſick* 525

Sect. 1. *of the Principles of Things, Atoms, and Vacuum* ibid.
2 *Of the Motion of the Atoms in Vacuum, whereby all Things are made* ibid.
3 *Of the Generation, Corruption, Alterations and Qualities of Compounds* 526
4 *Of the World* 527
5 *Of the Heavens* ibid.
6 *Of Air, Earth, Water* ibid.
7 *Of the Generation of living Creatures* 528
8 *Of the Soul* ibid.
9 *Of the Gods* ibid.
10 *Ethick* 529

PROTAGORAS.

1 *His Country, Father, and the Occaſion upon which he ſtudied Philoſophy* 532
2 *His Opinions and Writings* ibid.
3 *His Death* 533
ANAXARCHUS ibid.

The Twelfth Part.

Containing the *Sceptick* Sect.

PYRRHO.

1 *HIS Country, Parentage, Time, Maſters* 534
2 *His Inſtitution of a Sect* ibid.
3 *His Manner of Life* 535
4 *His Death and Diſciples* 536

TIMON.

1 *His Life* ibid.
2 *His Death and Writings* 537
3 *Succeſſion of the School* ibid.

A Summary of *Scepticiſm*, by *Sextus Empiricus*.

1 *The three Differences of Philoſophers in general* 538
2 *The Parts of Scepticiſm* ibid.
3 *The Names of Scepticiſm* ibid.

CONTENTS.

Chap. Page
4 *What Scepticism is* ibid.
5 *The Principles of Scepticism* 539
6 *Whether the Sceptick dogmatizeth, and hath a Sect, and treats of Physick* ibid.
7 *Whether the Sceptick takes away Phænomena's* ib.
8 *The Critery of Scepticism* ib.
9 *The End of Scepticism* 540
10 *The general Ways (or Places) of Scepticism* ib.
11 *The Ten common Places of Suspension* 541
12 *The first common Place* ibid.
13 *Whether the Creatures, commonly termed Irrational, have Reason* 543
14 *The second common Place* 544
15 *The third common Place* 545
16 *The fourth common Place* ibid.
17 *The fifth common Place* 547
18 *The sixth common Place* ibid.
19 *The seventh common Place* ibid.
20 *The eighth common Place* 548
21 *The ninth common Place* ibid.
22 *The tenth common Place* 549
23 *The five common Places* 550
24 *Two other common Places* ibid.
25 *The Places for Confutation of Ætiologicks* 551
26 *The Phrases of the Scepticks* ibid.
27 *Wherein Scepticism differs from those philosophical Sects, which are most like it; and first wherein it differs from the Philosophy of* Heraclitus 553
28 *Wherein Scepticism differs from the Philosophy of* Democritus ibid.
29 *Wherein Scepticism differs from the* Cyrenatick *Sect* ibid.
30 *Wherein Scepticism differs from the Institution of* Protagoras 554
31 *Wherein Scepticism differs from the Academick Philosophy* ib.
32 *Whether Empirical Medicine be the same with Scepticism* 555

Of DIALECTICK.

1. *Whether a Sceptick can examine or dispute against Assertion* 556
2 *From whence the Inquisition against Dogmatists should begin* 557
3 *Of the Critery* ibid.
4 *Whether there be any Critery of Truth?* ibid.
5 *Of the Critery in which* 558
6 *Of the Critery by which* 560
7 *Of the Critery according to which* 562
8 *Of True and Truth* ibid.
9 *Whether Truth be something in Nature?* 563
Chap. Page
10 *Of Sign* 564
11 *Whether there be any Endeictick Sign?* ibid.
12 *Of Demonstration* 565
13 *Whether there is Demonstration?* ibid.
14 *Of Syllogisms* 571
15 *Of Induction* 572
16 *Of Definition* ibid.
17 *Of Division* 573
18 *Of the Division of a Word into Significations* ib.
19 *Of Whole and Part* ib.
20 *Of Genus and Species* 574
21 *Of common Accidents* 575
22 *Of Sophisms* ibid.
23 *Of Amphibolies* 577

Of PHYSICK.

1 *Of God.* 578
2 *Of Cause* 579
3 *Whether there be any Cause of a Thing?* ib.
4 *Of Material Principles* 580
5 *Whether Bodies be incomprehensible?* 581
6 *Of Temperament* 583
7 *Of Motion* ibid.
8 *Of Local Motion* ibid.
9 *Of Argumentation and Diminution* 585
10 *Of Detraction and Addition* ibid.
11 *Of Transposition* 586
12 *Of Whole and Part* ibid.
13 *Of Alteration* 587
14 *Of Generation and Corruption* ibid.
15 *Of Rest* 588
16 *Of Place* ibid.
17 *Of Time* 589
18 *Of Number* 591
19 *Of the* ETHICAL *Part of Philosophy* 592
20 *Of Goods, Ills, and Indifferents* ib.
21 *That Good is taken three Ways* ib.
22 *Of Indifferents* 593
23 *Whether there is any Thing naturally good, ill, or indifferent* ib.
24 *What that is which is call'd* Art about Life 594
25 *Whether there be an Art about Life?* 598
26 *Whether there is in Men an Art about Life?* 599
27 *Whether the Art about Life can be taught?* ib.
28 *Whether there be any Thing taught?* ib.
29 *Whether there be a Teacher and a Learner?* ib.
30 *Whether there be a Way of Learning?* 600
31 *Whether the Art concerning Life be profitable to him that hath it?* 601
32 *Why the Sceptick sometimes on set Purpose alledgeth weak Arguments* ib.

The

CONTENTS

Chap. Page

The Thirteenth Part.

Containing the *Epicurean* Sect.

EPICURUS.

1 *HIS Country, Parents, Brethren* 602
2 *The Time of his Birth* 603
3 *Where he lived in his younger Time* 604
4 *His Masters* ibid.
5 *When, and upon what Occasion he addicted himself to Philosophy, and instituted a Sect* 605
6 *His School* 606
7 *How he lived with his Friends* ib.
8 *His Friends and Disciples* 607
9 *How much he wrote* 609
10 *What Writings of his are particularly mentioned by Authors* ibid.
11 *His Will* 611
12 *The Manner of his Death* 612
13 *The Time of his Death* ib.
14 *How dear his Memory was to his Followers* 614
15 *With what Constancy and Unanimity the Succession of his School flourished* 615
16 *The Successors and Followers of* Epicurus 616
17 Laertius *his Vindication of* Epicurus ib.

The Doctrine of *Epicurus.*

Of Philosophy in general 618

CANONICK, *of the Criteries* 619
1 *Of Truth and its Criteries* 620
2 *Canons of Sense, the first Critery* ib.
3 *Canons of Prænotion or Anticipation, the second Critery* 624
4 *Canons of Affection or Passion, the third Critery* 625
5 *Canons concerning the Use of Words* 626

PHYSICK, *or of Nature* ibid.

§ 1 *Of the Universe, or the Nature of Things* 627

1 *That the Universe consists of Body, and Vacuum or Place* ibid.
2 *That the Universe is infinite, immoveable, and immutable* 628
3 *Of the Divine Nature in the Universe* 629
4 *Of first Matter, or of the Principles of Compound Things in the Universe* 631
5 *That there are Atoms in Nature, which are the Principles of Compound Bodies* ibid.
6 *Of the Properties of Atoms, and first of their Magnitude* 632
7 *Of the Figure of Atoms* 633
8 *Of the Gravity (or Weight) and manifold Motions of Atoms* 634
9 *That Atoms (not the vulgar Elements or Homoiomera's) are the first Principles of Things* 635
10 *Of the first and radical Cause of Compounds, that is, of the Agent or Efficient* 636
11 *Of Motion, which is the same with Action or Effection; and of Fortune, Fate, End, and sympathetical and antipathetical Causes* ibid.
12 *Of the Qualities of compound Things in general* 637
13 *Qualities from Atoms considered according to their Substance and Interception of Vacuum,* 638
14 *Qualities springing from Atoms, considered according to the Properties peculiar to each* 639
15 *Qualities from Atoms, considered according to their Properties taken together* ib.
16 *Of those Qualities which are esteemed the Accident of Things, and particularly of Time* 641
17 *Of the Generation and Corruption of Compounds* ibid.
18 *Whence it comes, that a generated Body is in a certain Kind of Things, and distinguished from other Things* 643

SECT. 2. Of the World ibid.

1 *Of the Form and Figure of the World* 644
2 *Of the late Beginning of the World* 645
3 *Of the Cause of the World* ibid.
4 *Of the Generation of the World* 646
5 *Of the Vicissitudes in the World* 647
6 *A Digression concerning Genii or Atoms* 648
7 *Of the End or Corruption of the World* 649
8 *Of infinite Worlds* 650

SECT. 3. Of Inferior Terrestrial Things 651

1 *Of the Earth situate in the Middle of the World* ibid.
2 *Of Earthquakes, and the Flames of Ætna* 652
3 *Of the Sea, Rivers, Fountains, and the overflowing of* Nilus 653
4 *Of the Properties of some Waters, and of Ice* ib.
5 *Of Things terrestrial inanimate* 654
6 *Of the Load-stone in particular* 655
7 *Of the Generation of Animals* 656
8 *Of the Use of Parts in Animals* 657
9 *Of the Soul the intrinsick Form of Animals* ib.

Chap. Page

10 *Of Sense in general, which is the Soul (as it were) of the Soul* 659
11 *Of Sight, and of the Images which glide into it* 660
12 *That Seeing is performed by Means of those Images* 661
13 *Of Hearing* 662
14 *Of Smelling* 663
15 *Of Tasting* ibid.
16 *Of Touching* 664
17 *Of the Intellect, Mind, or Reason, and its Seat* ib.
18 *That the Soul thinketh by Images which glide into it* 665
19 *Of the Affections or Passions of the Soul* 666
20 *Of voluntary Motion, and particularly of Speaking, and Imposition of Names* 667
21 *Of Sleep and Dreams* 668
22 *Of Death* 669

SECT. 4. Of superior Things, as well Celestial as Aerial 671

1 *Of the Substance and Variety of the Stars* 672
2 *Of the Magnitude and Figure of the Stars* ib.
3 *How the Stars move, out-run one another, and are turned round* 673
4 *Of the Rising and Setting of the Stars, and of the alternate Length of Days and Nights* 674
5 *Of the Light of the Stars, and of the Changes and Spots in the Moon* 675
6 *Of the Eclipses of the Stars, and their set Periods* 676
7 *Of the Presignifications of the Stars* ib.
8 *Of Comets, and those which are called Falling Stars* ib.
9 *Of Clouds* 677
10 *Of Winds and Presters* ib.
11 *Of Thunder* 678
12 *Of Lightning and Thunder-claps* 679
13 *Of Rain and Dew* 680
14 *Of Hail, Snow, and Frost* ib.
15 *Of the Rain-bow and Halos* 681
16 *Of Avernal Places* ib.
17 *Of Pestilence* ib.

ETHICK, *or* Morals 682

1 *Of Felicity, or the End of God, as far as Man is capable of it* 683
2 *That Pleasure (without which there is no Notion of Felicity) is in its own Nature good* 684
3 *That Felicity consists generally in Pleasure* 685
4 *That the Pleasure wherein consists Felicity, is Indolence of Body, and Tranquility of Mind* 686
5 *Of the Means to procure this Felicity, and of Virtues the Chief* 687

Chap. Page

6 *Of Right Reason, and Free-Will, from which the Virtues have all their Praise* 688
7 *Of the Virtues in general* 689
8 *Of Prudence in general* 690
9 *Private Prudence* ib.
10 *Domestick Prudence* 691
11 *Civil Prudence* 692
12 *Of Temperance in general* 693
13 *Of Sobriety, opposite to Gluttony* 694
14 *Of Continence, opposite to Lust* 696
15 *Of Meekness, opposite to Anger* 697
16 *Of Modesty, opposite to Ambition* 698
17 *Of Moderation, opposite to Avarice* 699
18 *Of Mediocrity, betwixt Hope and Despair of the Future* 700
19 *Of Fortitude in general* 701
20 *Of Fortitude, as to Fear of the Gods* ib.
21 *Of Fortitude, as to Fear of Death* 702
22 *Of Fortitude against corporeal Pain* 703
23 *Of Fortitude against Discontent of Mind* 705
24 *Of Justice in general* 706
25 *Of* Jus *(Right) or Just, whence Justice is denominated* ibid.
26 *Of the Original of Right and Just* 707
27 *Between whom Right and Justice is to be exercised* 709
28 *With what Right Justice is to be exercised* 711
29 *Of Beneficence, Gratitude, Piety, Observance* 712
30 *Of Friendship* 713
31 *Wherein* Epicurus, *asserting Pleasure to be the ultimate God, differs from the* Cyrenaicks 714

The Fourteenth Part.

Of the *Chaldaick* Philosophy.

THE *Chaldean* Philosophers, Institution and Sects 757

SECT. I. Of the *Chaldean* Philosophers ib.

1 *The Antiquity of the* Chaldaick *Learning* ib.
2 *That there were several* Zoroasters 758
3 *Of the* Chaldean Zoroaster, *Institutor of the* Chaldaick *Philosophy* 760
4 *Of* Belus, *another reputed Inventer of Sciences among the* Chaldeans 761
5 *Other* Chaldean *Philosophers* ib.
6 *Of* Berosus, *who first introduced the* Chaldaick *Learning into* Greece ib.

Chap. Page

SECT. II. The *Chaldaick* Institution and Sects 763

1 *That all Professors of Learning were more peculiarly termed* Chaldeans ib.
2 *Their Institution* ib.
3 *Sects of the* Chaldeans *distinguished according to their several Habitations* 764
4 *Sects of the* Chaldeans *distinguished according to their several Sciences* ib.

The Fifteenth Part.

The *Chaldaick* Doctrine. 765

SECT. I. Theology *and* Physick ib.

1 *Of the Eternal Being, God* ib.
2 *The Emanation of Light or Fire from God* ib.
3 *Of Things eviternal or incorporeal* 766
4 *The First Order* ib.
5 *The Second Order* 767
6 *The Third Order* ib.
7 *Fountains and Principles* 768
8 *Unzoned Gods and Zoned Gods* ib.
9 *Angels and immaterial Dæmons* 769
10 *Souls* ib.
11 *The suramundane Light* 770
12 *Of Things Temporal or Corporeal* ib.
13 *The Empyreal World* 771
14 *The Ethereal Worlds* ib.
15 *The Material Worlds* ib.
16 *Of Material Dæmons* 772

SECT. II. Astrology and other Arts of Divination 774

1 *Of the Stars, fixed an erratick, and of their Presignification* ib.
2 *Of the Planets* 775
3 *The Divisions of the Zodaick* ib.
4 *Of the Planets considered in respect of the Zodiack* 776
5 *Aspects of the Signs and Planets* 778
6 *Schemes* ibid.
7 *Other Arts of Divination* 779

SECT. III. Magick, Natural *and* Theurgick ibid.

1 *Natural Magick* 780
2 *Magical Operations, their kinds* ib.
3 *Of the Tsilmenaia (or Telesmes) used for Averruncation* ib.
4 *Of the Tsilmenaia used for Prediction* 781
5 *Theurgick Magick* 782
6 *Theurgick Rights* ibid.
7 *Apparitions* 783
8 *Material Demons, how to be repulsed* ibid.

SECT. IV. Of the Gods, and Religious Worship of the *Chaldeans* 784

1 *Of their idolatrous Worship of the true God* ib.
2 *Worship of other Gods, Angels, and Dæmons* 785
3 *Worship of the Celestial Bodies* ib.
4 *Of the Sun* ib.
5 *Of the Moon* 787
6 *Of the Planets* ib.
7 *Of the other Stars* 788
8 *Of Fire* 789
9 *Of the Air and Earth* ib.

The Sixteenth Part.

Of the *Persians.*

THE *Persian* Philosophers, their Sects and Institutions ib.

SECT. I. Of the *Persian* Philosophers ib.

1 *Of the* Persian Zoroaster, *Institutor of Philosophy among the* Persians ib.
2 *Of* Hystaspes, *a great Improver of the* Persian *Learning* 790
3 *Of* Osthanes, *who first introduced the* Persian *Learning into* Greece ib.

SECT. II. The Institution and Sects of the *Persians* 791

1 *The* Persian *Magi, their Institution* ib.
2 *The Sects, Discipline, and Manners of the Magi* 792

The Seventeenth Part.

The Doctrine of the *Persians.*

1 *Theology and Physick* ib.
2 *Arts of Divination* 793
3 *Of the Religious Rites or Magick of the* Persians ibid.
4 *The Gods of the* Persians 794

The

CONTENTS.

Chap. Page

The Eighteenth Part.

Of the *Sabæans.*

The *Sabæan* Philoſophers.

1 *OF the Inſtitutors of the* Sabæan *Sect* 796
2 *Others of the* Sabæan *Sect* ib.
3 *Their Writings* 798

The Nineteenth Part.

The Doctrine of the *Sabæans.*

1 *OF the Gods and Rites of the* Sabæans 799
2 *Other Rites of the* Sabæans, *contrary to the* Levitical *Law* 800
3 *The* Chaldaick *Oracles of* Zoroaſter *and his Followers* 801

A

TABLE

OF THE

PHILOSOPHERS,

WHOSE

Lives, Writings, Opinions, Deaths, &c. are particularly treated of.

A	Page
ALcmæon	496
Alexinus	152
Anacharsis	54
Anaxagoras	63
Anaxarchus	533
Anaximander	60
Anaximenes	62
Anniceris	145
Antiochus	237
Antipater	389
Antisthenes	294
Apollonius	152
Arcesilaus	225
Archelaus	68
Archytas	494
Aristippus	135
Aristo	292
Aristotle	238
Æschines	123
B	
BElus	761
Berosus	ibid.
Bias	42
Bion	147

C	Page
CArneades	231
Cebes	126
Chilon	36
Chrysippus	384
Cleanthes	381
Cleobulus	44
Clinomachus	154
Clitomachus	235
Crantor	224
Crates	ibid.
Cratus	310
Crito	125
Critolaus	293
D	
DEmocritus	515
Diogenes	298, 389
Diodorus	152, 293
E	
EMpedocles	489
Epicharmus	494
Epicurus	602
Epimenides	57
Eubulides	150

	Page
Euclid	149
Eudoxus	497
Euphantus	152
G	
GLauco	125
H	
HEgesias	144
Heraclitus	499
Hipparchia	311
Hippasus	496
Hystaspes	790
I	
IChthyas	153
L	
LAcydes	230
Leucippus	514
Lyco	291
	Melissus

CONTENTS.

M	Page
Meliſſus	511
Menedemus	156, 312
Menippus	312
Metrocles	311
Monimus	309
Myſon	56
O	
Oneſicritus	309
Oſthanes	790
P	
Panætius	390
Parmenides	509
Periander	45
Phædo	156
Pherecydes	58
Philo	256
Philolaus	497
Pittacus	39
Plato	160
Pliſthenes	156
Polemo	223
Poſidonius	390
Protagoras	532
Pyrrho	534
Pythagoras	393
S	
Sextus Empiricus	538
Simmias	126
Simon	125
Socrates	69
Solon	17
The ſeven Sophiſts *Precepts*	51
Speucippus	218
Stilpo	154
Strato	289
T	
Thales	1
Theodorus	145
Theophraſtus	285
Timæus	478
Timon	536
X	
Xenocrates	220
Xenophanes	507
Xenophon	114
Z	
Zeno	313, 512
Zoroaſter	760; 789, 801

A TABLE *of* AUTHORS, *Reſtored, Explained, and Noted, (or Cenſured) in the Hiſtory of the* Chaldaick *and* Greek *Philoſophy.*

Anonymous Summariſt of the *Chaldaick* Doctrine, frequently in the *Chaldaick* Philoſophy
Ariſtotle, Thal. chap. 6. ſect. 1. Democr. ch. 9. ſect. 6, 7, 8.
Arnobius, Chald. ch. 1. ſect. 2.
Baſil, Plat. ch. 1. Pyth. Doctr. ſect. 1. ch. 3.
Cicero, Seuſip. ch. 2. Zeno, Eleat. ch. 2.
Clemens Alexandrinus, Chald. ſect. 1. ch. 2. Pyth. ch. 24. Heracl. ch. 1. Democr. ch. 4.
Curtius, Chald. ſect. 1. ch. 1.
Diodorus Siculus, Chal. ſect. 2. ch. 7. Socr. ch. 1. Pyth. Doctr. ch. 10.
Diogenes Laertius, frequently in *Greek* Philoſophy.
Dionyſius Halicarnaſſæus, Socr. ch. 16.
Epicharmus, Pla. ch. 4.
Etymologicum magnum, Solon, ch. 11.
Euſtathius, Pyth. Doct. ſect. ch. 3, 4.
Gregor. Nazianzenus, Pyth. ch. 22.
Herodotus, Thales, ch. 10. Anacharſ. ch. 1.
Hierocles, Euclid. ch. 3.
Higinus, Thal. ch. 1.
Jamblichus, frequently in the Life and Doctrine of *Pythagoras*
Marmora Arundeliana, Chilon, ch. 1. Xenophon, ch. 2.
Micomachus, frequently Pyth. Doctr.
Pliny, Pyth. ch. 20.
Plutarch, Pyth. ch. 19.
Porphyrius, Pyth. ch. 2, 7. Doctr. ch. 1.
Proclus, Chald. Doctr. ſect. 2. ch. 7. Thal. ch. 7. *ibid.* ſect. 1. Euclid, ch. 3. Pyth. Doctr. ſect. 2. ch. 2. ſect. 3. ch. 2.
Sextus Empericus, his Pyrrhonian Hypotypoſes, in the Scepticiſm
Socratick Epiſtles, Socr. Epiſt. 1, 5, 6, 7. Simon. Ariſtip. ch. 6.
Stobæus, Sto. Doctr.
Strabo, Chald. ſect. 2. ch. 4. Pyth. ch. 10.
Themiſtius, Pyth. ch. 19.
Timæus, after the Life of *Pythagoras*.
Zoroaſtræan Oracles, after the *Chaldaick* Philoſophy.

NOTED.

Aldobrandinus, Thal. ch. 6. ſect. 4. and frequently elſewhere.
Anonymous Author of *Ariſtotle*'s Life, Ariſtot. ch. 3, 6, 8.
Apuleius, Pyth. ch. 2.
Caſaubon, Thal. ch. 1. Chilo. ch. 1.
Anaximander, ſect. 2. ch. 2. *Xenoph.* ch. 1
Eugubinus, Pla. ch. 4.
Gaſſendus, Democr. ch. 9. ſect. 3. Epic. ch. 2.
Kircher, Chald. ſect. 1. ch. 2. and frequently in the *Chaldaick* Doctrine
Leo Allatius, Socrat. ch. 1, 12. Epiſt. 1, 6. Xenoph. Epiſt. 5, 8. Simon. Ariſtip. ch. 8.
Lipſius, Zeno, Eleat. ch. 2.
Leucas Holſtenius, Pyth. ch. 19.
Lucian, Thal. ch. 13.
Magnenus, Democr. ch. 2, 7, 8, 9. ſect. 1, 2, 4. ch. 10.
Meibomius, Pythag. Doct. ſect. 2. ch. 3, 4.
Meurſius, Thal. ch. 2. Socr. ch. 1, 12.
Naudæus, Chald. ſect. 1. ch. 2.
Nunneſius, Ariſt. ch. 8.
Olympiodorus, Ariſt. ch. 3.
Patricius, Chald. ſect. 1. ch. 2.
Petavius, Thal. ch. 2, 13. Carnead. ch. 5.
Pliny, Pyth. ch. 10. Doct. ſect. 4. ch. 4.
Ramus, Thal. ch. 7. ſect. 1.
Salmaſius, Thal. ch. 5. Pla. ch. 1. Pyth. ch. 1.
Scaliger, Chald. ſect. 2. Thal. ch. 2. Socr. c. 12
Selden, Chilon, ch. 1. Xenoph. ch. 2
Sigonius, Thal. ch.
Simplicius, Pyth. Doc. ſect. 4. ch. 1.
Stephanus, Thal. ch. 10.
Suidas, Thal. ch. 2. Zeno, ch. 6.
Valerius Maximus, Plat. ch. 7.
Valla, Thales, ch. 10.
Voſſius, Thales, ch. 2.
Urſinus, Chald. ſect. 1. ch. 2.
Zoroaſtræan Oracles, after the *Chaldaick* Philoſophy.

A TABLE *of* PHILOSOPHERS *mentioned in the History of the* Chaldaick *and* Greek *Philosophy.*

A

ABavis, *Pyth. ch.* 23, 24
Abroteles, *ch.* 24
Acmonides, *ibid*
Arouſiladas, *ibid*
Acuſilaus, *Preface*
Adicus, *Pyth. ch.* 24
Adraſtus, *Ariſt. ch.* 14, 14
Ægeas, *Pyth.* 24
Ægon, *ibid*
Æmon. *ibid*
Æneas, *ibid*
Æneſidemus, *ibid*
Æſchines
Æſchrion, *Ariſt. ch.* 14
Æthiops, *Ariſtip. ch.* 9
Aetius, *Pyth. ch.* 24
Agelas, *ibid*
Ageſarchus, *ibid*
Ageſidemus, *ibid*
Agylas, *ibid*
Alcias, *ibid*
Alcimachus, *ibid*
Alcimus, *Stilp. ch.* 3
Alcuneion, *Pyth, ch.* 24
Alexander Aphrodiſæus, *Ariſt. ch.* 17
Alexinus
Aliochus, *Pyth. ch.* 24
Alcmeon
Alopecus, *Pyth. ch.* 24
Ammonius, *Ariſt. ch.* 17
Amoetus, *Pyth. ch.* 24
Amyclus, *Pla. ch.* 13
Anacharſis
Anaxagoras
Anaxarchus
Anaximander
Anaximenes
Anchypillus, *Mened. ch.* 1
Andronicus, *Ariſt. ch.* 17
Animenes, *Pyth. ch.* 24
Anniceris
Anthocarides, *Pyth. ch.* 24
Antimedon, *ibid*
Antiochus, *Tim. ch.* 3
Antipater, *Ariſtip. ch.* 9
Antipater, the *Sidonian*
Antiſthenes
Apellico, *Ariſt. ch.* 16
Apollonius Chronus
Apollodorus Cepotyrannus *Epic. ch.* 16
Arceſilaus
Archelaus
Archippus of Samus, *Pyth. c.* 24
Archippus of Tarentum, *ibid*
Areſtades, *ibid*
Arete, *Ariſtip. ch.* 8
Arignote, *Pyth. ch.* 21
Arimneſtus, *Pyth. ch.* 21
Ariſtæus, *Pyth. ch.* 24
Ariſtagoras, *Socr. ch.* 3
Ariſtangelus, *Pyth. ch.* 24
Ariſteas, *Chald. l.* 1. *p.* §. *c.* 2
Ariſtides, *Stilp. ch.* 3
Ariſtides, *Pyth. ch.* 24
Ariſtides, a Locrian. *Plat. c.* 13
Ariſtippus
Ariſtippus the younger, *Ariſtip. ch.* 6
Ariſtippus of Tarentum, *Pyth. ch.* 24
Ariſto, *Ariſt. ch.* 17
Ariſtoclides, *Pyth. ch.* 24
Ariſtocrates, *ibid*
Ariſtodemus, *Preface*, *Thal. c.* 5
Ariſtomenes, *Pyth. c.* 24
Ariſtonymus, *Plat. c.* 13
Ariſtotle
Ariſtotle the *Cyrenæan*
Ariſtoxenus, *Ariſt. ch.* 14
Arytus, *Pyth. ch.* 24
Aſclepiades, *Pyth. Mened.*
Aſpaſia, *Socr. ch.* 3.
Aſpaſius, *Ariſt. ch.* 17
Aſteas, *Pyth. ch.* 24
Aſtæus, *Pyth. ch.* 21
Aſtylus, *Pyth. ch.* 24
Athamas, *Pyth.*
Athenodorus of Soli, *Zen. c.* 9
Athenodorus of Tharſis, *Ariſt. ch.* 17
Atnoſion, *Pyth. ch.* 24
Atticus, *Ariſt. ch.* 17
Averroes, *ibid*
Avicenna, *ibid*
Axiothea, *Pla. c.* 13. *Speus. c.* 2.
Azonaces, *Chald. lib.* 1. *pag.* 1. *Sect.* 1. *ch.* 5.

B

BAlielma, *Pyth. ch.* 24
Baſilides, *Epic. ch.* 16.
Bathilaus, *Pyth. ch.* 24
Belus, *Chald. lib.* 1. *p.* 1. §. *c.* 4
Beroſus, *Chald. lib.* 1. *p.* 1. *ſect. ch.* 6.
Bias
Bio, *Pyth. ch.* 24
Bion
Boethius, *Ariſt. ch.* 17
Brias, *Pyth. ch.* 24
Bruthius, *ibid*
Bryas, *ibid*
Brontinus, *ibid*
Bryſo, *Socr. ch.* 3
Bulagoras, *Pyth. ch.* 24
Butherus, *ibid*

C

CÆnias, *Pyth. ch.* 24
Calibrotus, *ibid*
Caliphon, *Pyth. c.* 23
Callippus, an Athenian, *Pla.* 13. *Ariſt. c.* 14
Callippus, a Corinthian, *Zen. c.* 9
Calliſthenes, *Ariſt. c.* 14
Carneades
Carophantidas, *Pyth. c.* 24
Cebes
Cerambus, *Pyth. c.* 24
Chærephon, *Socr. c.* 17
Chæron, *Pla. c.* 13
Charondas, *Pyth. c.* 24
Chilas, *ibid*
Chilon
Chilonis, *Pyth. c.* 24
Chriſippus
Chryſippus, a Thyrrhene, *Pyth. c.* 24
Cleæchma, *ibid*
Cleanor, *ibid*
Cleanthes

Clearatus,

Clearatus, *Pyth. c.* 24
Clearchus of Soli, *Ariſt. c.* 14
Cleobulina, *Cleob. c.* 1
Cleobulus
Cleon, *Pyth. c.* 24
Cleophron, *ibid*
Cleoſthenes, *ibid*
Clinagoras, *ibid*
Clinias, *ibid*
Clinomachus
Clitarchus, *Stilp. c.* 3
Clitomachus
Clitus, *Ariſt. c.* 14
Colaes, *Pyth. c.* 24
Colotes, *Epic.*
Coriſcus, *Pla. c.* 13
Cranius, *Pyth. c.* 24
Crantor
Crates
Crito
Brito the Ægean, *Pyth. c.* 24
Critolaus.

D

DAcydes, *Pyth. ch.* 24
Damarmenus, *ibid*
Damaſcenus Jo. *Ariſt. c.* 17
Damaſcenus, Nicho. *ibid*
Damaſcius, *ibid*
Damocles, *Pyth. c.* 24
Damon, *ibid*
Damotages, *ibid*
Dardanius, *ibid*
Demetrius of Amphipolis, *Pla. c.* 13.
Demetrius Lacon, *Epic. c.* 16
Demetrius Phalereus
Democritus
Demon, *Pyth. c.* 24
Demoſthenes, *ibid*
Deonax, *ibid*
Dexippus, *Ariſt. c.* 17
Dexitheus, *Pyth. c.* 24
Dicæarchus, *Ariſt. c.* 14
Dicæarchus, *Pyth. c.* 24
Dicon, *ibid*
Dinarchus, *ibid*
Dinocrates, *ibid*
Diocles, a Phliaſian, *ibid*
Diocles, a Syberite, *ibid*
Dioclides, *Stilp. c.* 1.
Diogenes
Diogenes of Seleucia, *Ep. c.* 16
Diogenes of Tharſus, *ibid.*
Diodorus the Aſpendian, *Pyth. ch.* 24
Diodorus Chronus
Diodorus the Peripatetick
Dion, *Pla. c.* 13
Dionyſius, *Epic. c.* 16
Dionyſius, a Colophonian, *Menip.*
Dioſcorides, *Timon, c.* 3
Dioteles, *Ariſt. c.* 14
Diotyma, *Socr. c.* 3
Diphylus, *Stilp. c.* 3
Drymon, *Pyth. c.* 24
Dymas, *ibid.*

E

ECcelo, *Pyth. c.* 24
Echecrates, a Phliaſian, *ibid*
Echecrates, a Tarentine, *ibid*
Echecrates, a Woman, *ibid*
Echecratides, *Ariſt. c.* 14
Egeſinus
Eiriſcus, *Pyth. c.* 24
Elicaon, *ibid*
Empedocles
Empedus, *Pyth. c.* 24
Epicurus
Epimenides
Epiphron, *Pyth. c.* 20
Epiſylus, *ibid*
Epitimides, *Ariſtip. c.* 9
Eraſtus, *Pla. c.* 13
Eratus, *Pyth. c.* 24
Erus Armenius, *Chald. lib.* 1. *p.* 1. *ſect.* 1. *ch.* 2.
Eſtiæus, *Pyth. c.* 24
Euæmon, *Pla. c.* 13
Euæus, *Pyth. c.* 24
Euagon, *Pla. c.* 13
Evander
Evander of Crotona, *Pyth. c.* 24
Evander, of Metapontum, *ibid*
Evander, of Tarentum, *ibid*
Evanor, *ibid*
Eubulides
Eubulus, *Timon, c.* 3
Euclid
Eucratides, *Epic. c.* 16
Eudemus of Cyprus, *Ariſt. c.* 14
Eudemus of Rhodes, *ibid*
Eudoxus
Euelthon, *Pyth. c.* 23
Euetes, *ibid*
Eumeridias, *ibid*
Euphantus
Euphemus, *ibid*
Euphranor, *Timon, c.* 3
Euphratus, *Pla. c.* 13
Eurymedon, *Pyth. c.* 24
Euriphamus, *ibid*
Eurycrates, *ibid*
Eurytus, *ibid*
Euſtathius, *Ariſt. c.* 17
Euthenus, *Pyth. c.* 24
Euthycles, *ibid*
Euthymus, *ibid*
Euxithius, *Ariſt. c.* 14

G

G*Lauco*
Glorippus, *Pyth. c.* 24
Glycinus, *ibid*
Gyptius, *ibid.*

H

H*Egeſias*
Hegeſilaus, *ſee* Egeſinus
Heloris, *Pyth. c.* 24
Heracleodorus, *Pla. c.* 13
Heraclides, an Ænian, *ibid*
Heraclides the Peripatetick
Heraclides of Pontus, *Pla. ch.* 13 *Ariſt. c.* 14
Heraclides the Sceptick, *Timon, ch.* 3
Heraclitus
Hermachus, *Epic. c.* 12
Herminus, *Ariſt. c.* 17
Hermodamas, *Pyth. c.* 2
Hermodorus, *Pla. c.* 13
Herodotus, *Timon, c.* 3
Heſtiæus, *Pla. c.* 13
Hieronymus of Rhodes, *Ariſt. c.* 14
Hipparchia
Hipparchides, *Pyth. c.* 24
Hipparchus, *Ariſt. c.* 14
Hippaſus
Hippochus, *Chald. l.* 4. *p. ch.* 2
Hippocrates, *Democ. c.*
Hippomedon, *Pyth. c.* 24
Hippon, *Pyth. c.* 24
Hippoſtatus, *ibid*
Hippoſthenes of Crotona, *ibid*
Hippoſthenes of Cyzicus, *ibid*
Hippothales, *Pla. c.* 13
Hyſtaſpes, *Chald. l.* 2. *p.* 1. *ſect* 1. *c.* 2

I

IAmblicus, *Ariſt. c.* 17
Icchus, *Pyth. c.* 24
Ichthyas
Itanæas, *Pyth. c.* 24

L

LAcon, *Pyth. c.* 24
Lacrates, *ibid*
Lacydes
Laphaon, *Pyth. c.* 24
Laſthenia, *Pla. c.* 13. *Speuſ. c.* 2
Laſthenia, a Pythagorean, *Pyth. c.* 24
Laſus, *Preface*
Leocritus, *Pyth. c.* 24
Leocydes, *ibid*
Leon. *Ariſt. c.* 14
Leon, a Pythagorean, *Pyth. c.* 24
Leophantus, *Preface*
Leophron, *Pyth. c.* 24
Leptines, *ibid*
Leucippus
Lyco
Lyco, a Pythagorean, *Pyth. c.* 24
Lyſides, *ibid*
Lyſias, *Epic. c.* 16
Lyſibius, *Pyth. c.* 24
Lyſiphanes, *Epic. c.* 1
Lyſis, *Pyth. c.* 24
Lytamnus, *ibid*

M

MAgentinus, *Ariſt. c.* 17
Malias, *Pyth. c.* 24
Marinus, *Ariſt. c.* 17
Marmaradius, *Chal. l.* 1. *p.* 1. *ſect.* 1. *ch.* 5
Maximus, *Ariſtot. c.* 17
Mededimus, *Pla. c.* 13
Megiſtias, *Pyth. c.* 24
Menalippus, *ibid*
Meliſies, *ibid*
Meliſſus
Menedemus the Cynick
Menedemus the Eretrian
Meneſtius, *Pyth. c.* 24
Menippus
Menodorus, *Epic. c.* 10
Menodotus, *Timon, c.* 3
Menon, *Pyth. c.* 24
Meton, *ibid*
Metopus, *ibid*
Metrocles
Metrodorus, ſirnamed the *Theoretick*, *Stilp. c.* 3
Metrodorus the Chian, *Ep. c.* 4
Melias, *Pyth. c.* 24
Milo, *ibid*
Miltiades, *ibid*
Mimnomachus, *ibid*
Mnaſon, *Ariſt. c.* 14
Mneſarchus, *Pyth. c.* 21, 24
Mneſibulus, *Pyth. c.* 24
Mneſiſtratus, *Pla. c.* 13
Moſchus, *Mened. c.* 1
Muya, *Pyth. c.* 21
Muyes, *Pyth. c.* 24
Myrmex, *Stilpo c.* 3

N

NAſtas, *Pyth. c.* 24
Nauſiphanes, a Pythagorean, *Epis. c.* 4
Nauſitheus, *Pyth. c.* 24
Neocritus, *ibid*
Nicanor, *Ariſt. c.* 14
Nicephorus Blemmydes, *Ariſt. c.* 17
Niolochus, *Tim. c.* 3

O

OCcelo, *Pyth. c.* 24
Occlo, *ibid*
Ocylus, *ibid*
Odius, *ibid*
Olympiodorus, *Ariſt. c.* 17
Onatus, *Pyth. c.* 24
Opſimus, *ibid*
Oreſandrus, *ibid*
Oſthanes, *Chald. lib.* 2. *p.* 1. § 1. *ch.* 3

P

PAchymerius, Geogr. *Ariſt. c.* 17
Pacton, *Pyth.*
Pæonius, *Stilp. c.* 3
Palæphatus, *Ariſt. c.* 14
Pamphilius, *Epic. c.* 4
Panætius
Parmenides
Parmiſchus, *Pyth.*
Paſciles, *Stilp. c.* 1
Paſicrates, *Ariſt. c.* 14
Periander
Phædo
Phædo, a Pythagorean, *Pyth. c.* 24
Phæſidemus, *Stil. c.* 3
Phancelus, *Pyth. c.* 24
Phanius, *Ariſt. c.* 14
Phanton, *Pyth. c.* 24
Pherecydes
Philippus, an Opuntian, *Pla. c.* 13
Philo, a Theban, *Zen. c.* 9
Philo the Peripatetick, *Ariſt. c.* 14
Philodemus, *Pyth. c.* 24
Philolaus
Philolaus of Tarentum, *Pyth. c.* 24
Philonides, *ibid*
Philoponus, *Ariſt. c.* 17
Philtes, *Pyth. c.* 24
Phiatias, *ibid*
Phormio, *Pla. c.* 13
Phraſidemus, *Ariſt. c.* 14
Phrinycus, *Pyth. c.* 24
Phrontides, *ibid*
Phyacyades, *ibid*
Phytius, *ibid*
Piſerrydus, *ibid*
Piſicrates, *ibid*
Pithon, *Pla. c.* 13
Pittacus
Plato
Plato the younger, *Ariſt. c.* 14
Pliſthenes
Plutarch the younger, *Ariſt. c.* 17
Polemæus, *Pyth. c.* 24
Polemarchus, *ibid*
Polemo
Poliades, *Pyth. c.* 24
Polymneſtus, *ibid*
Polyſtratus, *Epic. c.* 17
Poſidonius
Praxiphanes, *Epic. c.* 4
Praytus, *Tim. c.* 3
Proclus, *Ariſt. c.* 17
Proclus, a Pythagorean, *Pyth. c.* 24
Prorus, *ibid*
Protagoras
Protarchus, *Epic. c.* 16
Proxenus, Poſidonean, *Pyth. c.* 24
Proxenus, a Sybarite, *ibid*
Pſellus, *Ariſt. c.* 17
Ptolemæus, a Cyrenian, *Tim. c.* 3
Ptolemæus the Black, *Epic. c.* 16
Ptolemæus the White, *ibid*
Ptolemæus of Cyrene, *Tim. c.* 3
Pylyctor, *Pyth. c.* 24
Pyrrho
Pyrrho the younger, *Tim. c.* 3
Pyrrho, a Pythagorean, *Pyth. c.* 24
Pyſirronde, *ibid*
Pythagoras
Pythodotus

R

RHexibius, *Pyth. c.* 24
Rhodippus, *ibid*

S

SAlaccra, *Pyth. c*
Sara, *Pyth. c.* 21
Sarpedon, *Tim. c.* 3
Saturninus, *ibid*
Satyrus, *Arist. c.* 14
Sextus, *Tim. c.* 3
Sycas, *Pyth. c.* 24
Silius, *ibid*
Simichus, *Pyth. c.* 23
Simmias
Simmias the Megarick, *Stilp. c.* 3
Simon
Simplicius, *Arist. c.* 17
Simus, *Pyth. c.* 24
Smichæas, *ibid*
Socrates
Socrates, a Bythinian, *Arist. c.* 14
Solon
Sosistratus, *Pyth. c.* 24
Sosthenes, *ibid*
Sostratius, *ibid*
Sotion, *Arist. c.* 17
Speusippus
Sphærus, *Zeno, c.* 9
Sthenonides, *Pyth. c.* 24
Stilpo
Strato
Syrianus, *Aristot. c.* 17

T

TAurus, *Arist. c.* 17
Telauges, *Pyth. c.* 21
Terpsion, *Socr. c.* 17
Teucer, *Chald. lib.* 1. *p.* 1. *sect.* 1. *c.* 5
Thales
Theano, Wife of Brontino, *Pyth. c.* 24
Theano, Wife of Pythagoras, *c.* 21, 24
Themistius, *Arist. c.* 17
Theodas, *Tim. c.* 3
Theodectus, *Arist. c.* 14
Theodorus the Atheist
Theodorus Metochita, *Arist.*
Theodorus of Cyrene, *Pyth. c.* 24
Theodorus of Tarentum, *ibid*
Theophrastus
Thoridas, *Pyth. c.* 24
Thrascus, *ibid*
Thrasydemus, *ibid*
Thrasymachus, *Stilp. c.* 1
Thrasymedes, *Pyth. c.* 24
Timæus the Crotonian, *ibid*
Timæus the Cyzicene, *Pla. c.* 13
Timæus the Locrian, *Pyth. c.* 24
Timæus the Parian, *ibid*
Timagoras, *Stilp. c.* 3
Timaras, *Pyth. c.* 24
Timarchus, *Arist. c.* 14
Timesianax, *Pyth. c.* 24
Timolaus, *Pla. c.* 13
Timosthenes, *Pyth. c.* 23
Tydas, *ibid*
Tymasius, *ibid*
Tymicha, *ibid*
Tyrsenus
Tyrsenus, *ibid*

X

XAnthus, *Tim. ch.* 3
Xenocides, *Pyth. c.* 24
Xenon, *ibid*
Xenocrates
Xenophanes
Xenophantus, *Pyth. c.* 24
Xenophilus, *ibid*
Xentas, *ibid*

Z

ZAbratus, *Pyth. c.* 5
Zaleucus, *Pyth. c.* 24
Zamoixis, *Pyth. c.* 21
Zarmocenidas, *Chald. l.* 1. *p.* 1. *sect.* 1. *c.* 5
Zeno
Zeno Eleates
Zeno the Epicurean, *Stilp. c.* 3 *Zen. c.* 9. *Epic. c.* 16
Zeno of Tarsis
Zeuxes, *Tim. ch.* 3
Zeuxippus
Zopyrus a Colophronian, *Menip.*
Zopyrus a Tarentine, *Pyth. c.* 24
Zoroaster the Chaldean, *Chald. l.* 1. *p.* 1. *sect.* 1. *c.* 2, 3
Zoroaster the Babylonian, *Chald. lib.* 1. *p.* 1. *sect.* 1. *c.* 2
Zoroaster the Bactrian, *ibid*
Zoroaster the Pamphilian, *ibid*
Zoroaster the Persian, *ibid. lib.* 2. *p.* 1. *sect.* 1. *c.* 1
Zoroaster the Proconnesian, *Chal. lib.* 1. *p.* 1. *sect.* 1. *c.* 2
Zoromasdres, *Chald. lib.* 1. *p.* 1. *sect. c.* 5.

THE

THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY.

THE FIRST PART,

Containing thoſe on whom the Attribute of WISE was conferred.

THALES.

CHAP. I.

The Country and Parents of THALES.

GREAT Wits, which have been happy in benefiting Poſterity by their excellent Inventions, have not always had the Fortune to enjoy the juſt Reward, their Glory being intercepted oftentimes by ſome later Diſguiſe of Alteration or Addition. It were therefore Gratitude in us, who find ourſelves inſtructed by the Ancients, to vindicate the Memory of our Maſters, by enquiring diligently the Author of thoſe Labours whereof we reap the Harveſt. This Kind of Injury hath happened very conſiderably to *THALES*, the wiſe Man of *Miletus*, who firſt introduced Natural and Mathematical Learning into *Greece*, from whence it is derived to us; but the Honour of ſo noble a Deſign, the ambitious Oppoſition of ſome, the Induſtry of others hath ſo obſcured, that there is little of the Reputation left to the deſerving Author. I have therefore eſteemed it worth my Pains, to digeſt what I could collect or obſerve of a Perſon, to whom all Lovers of Learning are ſo much obliged.

The Original of *Thales* is very obſcurely delivered. Some conceive he was a *Phenician* by Birth, whoſe Opinion ſeeming to be ſtrongly founded upon *Laertius* [a], and the Authorities by him alledged, it is neceſſary that we begin with a Diſquiſition upon his Words, which are, as commonly rendered, theſe:

Now Thales *was born, as* Herodotus, Duris *and* Democritus *affirm, his Father being* Examius, *his Mother* Cleobulina, *of the* Thelidæ, *who were* Phœnicians, *the moſt illuſtrious of all from* Cadmus *and* Agenor, [*as* Plato *alſo ſaith.*] The Teſtimony of *Herodotus*, tho' [b] *Hyginus* and [c] *Suidas* ſeem to underſtand it, according to the common Error, as if he were born in *Phenicia*, expreſly confirms the contrary, being thus: *Thales*, a *Mileſian*, afar off by Deſcent a *Phœnician*; whence we may gather, that the other two Authorities of *Duris* and *Democritus* imported little more, or at leaſt nothing to a contrary Senſe. So likewiſe that of *Leander*, which is by [d] *Clemens Alexandrinus* cited jointly with *Herodotus*, to prove him of a *Phœnician* Extract.

He was made free of Miletus *when he went with* Neleus *who was baniſh'd out of* Phœnicia.] The learned [e] *Caſaubon*, to reconcile this Story with that

a Diog. Laert. l. 1. Segm. 22. b Hygin. l. 2. c. 2. c *Aſtronom. Natione fuit Phœnix, ut Herodotus Mileſius dicit.* Which doubtleſs is corrupt (for what *Herodotus* is that?) and to be reſtored to this Effect, *Natione fuit Phœnix ut Herodotus, Mileſius ut alii dicunt.* d *In voce Thales.* Herod. Clius. e Clem. Alexand. Strom 1. In not. ad Diog. Laert.

of *Neleus*, who was not baniſhed out of *Phenicia* when he built *Miletus*; for ὅτε ἦλθε σὺν Νειλέῳ ἐκπεσόντι φοίνικης, *reads*, ἐκπεσὼν τῆς φοίνικης, as if *Thales* being baniſhed out of *Phenicia* had gone with *Neleus* to *Miletus*; which Alteration begetteth a very great Anachroniſm, for this *Thales* was above four hundred Years later than that *Neleus*. Therefore if *Laertius* meant the ſame *Neleus*, either he was ſtrangely miſtaken, or his Text is corrupt, and ought to be underſtood of the Anceſtors of *Thales*, to which Senſe it may be reduced with little Alteration, thus, ἐπολιτογραφήθησαν δὲ ἐν Μιλήτῳ ὅτε ἦλθον σὺν Νειλέῳ ἐκπεσόντι φοινίκης, as if they being *Phœnicians* went into *Caria*, and became Citizens of *Miletus*, at what Time *Neleus*, Son of *Codrus*, being put beſide the Kingdom of *Athens* by his younger Brother *Medon*, led thither the *Ionian* Colonies, whereof *Miletus* (which he built) was the chief City. Of this Colony ſee [f] *Herodotus*, *Strabo*, and *Ælian*.

But as moſt ſay he was born there, at Miletus, *and of a noble Race.*] So they render ἰθαγενὴς, but in Oppoſition to the firſt Opinion, which only mentions his Family, not Country, it may perhaps be underſtood here in the ſame Relation: Some (ſaith he) think he was of a *Phenician* Extract, of thoſe who were incorporated at *Miletus*; others, that he was of a *Grecian* Family, and that noble. Of this latter Opinion is [g] *Plutarch*, who reproves *Herodotus* for making *Thales* deſcended afar off from a *Barbarian* Stock, and [h] *Hermippus*, who aſcribes that Saying to him, that he thanked the Gods he was a *Grecian*, not a *Barbarian*.

CHAP. II.

Of the Time of his Birth.

APollodorus *ſaith, that* Thales *was born the firſt Year of the thirty-fifth Olympiad*; [i] Demetrius Phalereus *ſaith, that he was honoured with the Title of Wiſe, when* Damaſias *was* Archon. Damaſias *was* Archon *according to* [k] Dionyſius Halicarnaſſæus, *the ſecond Year of the thirty-fifth Olympiad, when* Ancus Martius *the fourth King of* Rome *began his Reign.*

Hereupon an Anachroniſm of one Year is ſuppoſed by very learned Men, who would have *Thales* to be born the ſame Year that *Damaſias* was Archon. Whence [l] *Sigonius*, [m] *Voſſius*, and others, bring down the Birth of *Thales* to the ſecond Year of this Olympiad; [n] *Scaliger*, [o] *Meurſius*, [p] *Petavius*, and others, raiſe *Damaſias* to the firſt Year, that they may make his Magiſtracy agree with *Thales*'s Birth; neither rightly; for the Office of *Damaſias* relateth not to the Birth of *Thales*. For the Clearing whereof we muſt take Notice, that *Damaſias* in the *Athenian Faſti* is twice ſaid to be Archon, firſt in the ſecond Year of the thirty-fifth Olympiad, the next Year after the Birth of *Thales*, and again the fourth Year of the forty-eighth Olympiad, when he obtained the Title of *Wiſe*; the latter we cannot mention without Acknowledgment of the great Light Chronology hath received by Mr. *Selden*'s *Marmora Arundeliana*.

It will be alſo worth Obſervance, that there was another of this Name, whom [q] *Euſebius* placeth at the eighth Olympiad, and *Laertius* and [r] *Plutarch* make contemporary with *Homer*, *Heſiod* and *Lycurgus*. [s] *Scaliger*, who perceived the Inconſiſtency of this Account, perceived not the Reaſon of it; for *Lycurgus* and *Iphitus* inſtituted the Olympic Games twenty ſeven Olympiads before *Coræbus* was Victor, who, according to *Euſebius*, is the firſt. Theſe two *Thales*'s are by ſome confounded; *Euſebius* calls the firſt a Natural Philoſopher, whereas it is certain that Kind of Learning was firſt introduced into *Greece* by the ſecond. [t] *Suidas* cites *Phlegon*, that the latter *Thales* flouriſhed in the ſeventh Olympiad, which *Phlegon* [u] doubtleſs meant of the firſt. [w] They who place *Thales* about the ſeventh Olympiad, and make him contemporary with *Romulus*, confounded the latter *Thales* with the firſt, and the true Epocha of the Olympiads with the Vulgar. For the firſt *Thales* lived in the ſeventh Olympiad from the firſt of *Iphitus*; *Romulus* liv'd about the ſame Diſtance from the Olympiad of *Coræbus*.

This Time is miſtaken by that learned Father *Clemens Alexandrinus*, to prove *Thales* younger than the later Prophets. [x] *Thus* (ſaith he) *it is demonſtrated that they who propheſied in the Time of* Darius Hyſtaſpes *in the ſecond Year of his Reign, that is to ſay*, Aggæus, Zacharias, *and* Malachy, *who was one of the twelve, ſeeing that they propheſied in the firſt Year of the forty-eight Olympiad, were more ancient than* Pythagoras, *who is ſaid to have been in the ſixty ſecond Olympiad*; *and then* Thales, *eldeſt of the* Greek *Sages, who was about the fiftieth Olympiad*; as if this were not rather an Argument to prove theſe Prophets contemporary with *Thales*, which *Euſebius* allows. [y] *About the Time* (ſaith he) *of* Cyrus *King of* Perſia, *the ſeven wiſe Men flouriſhed*; *this was the Time in which the laſt of the* Hebrew *Prophets propheſied, ſince* Troy, *above ſix hundred Years after* Moſes, *no leſs than fifteen hundred Years.* But if with *Clemens Alexandrinus*, we account theſe Prophets coætaneous with *Darius Hyſtaſpes*, they will appear much younger than *Thales*, for *Darius* began his Reign in the laſt Year of the ſixty-fourth Olympiad.

f Herodot. lib. 9. Strabo, lib. 14. Ælian. v. H. viii. g De Herod. malign. h Laert. vit. Thal. i Laert. k Lib. 3. 36. l De Athenienſ. tempor. m De ſcient. mathemat. 32. 8. n In Euſeb. o Archont. 1. 11. p Rationar. temp. 2. 12. q Euſeb. l. c. Diog. Laert. l. 1. 38. r Vita Lycurg. s In Euſeb. t In voce Thales. u Phlegon Frag. w See St. Auguſtin. de civit. Dei, lib. 18. cap. 24 & 27. x Stromat. 1. y Prepar. Evangel. 10. 4.

CHAP.

CHAP. III.

His Travels.

HE employed the first and greatest Part of his Time in Travel; he went to *Crete*, to inform himself of the Mysteries of their Religion (for that Island was famous for the Birth of *Jupiter*) as is acknowledged by himself in an [z] Epistle to *Pherecides*.

That he travelled also into *Asia* is affirmed in the same Epistles; some say into *Phœnicia*, arguing from his Astrology, which he is thought to have learned of the *Phœnicians*, Masters of that Science; and particularly, because he is said to have first observed the Constellation of the *Lesser Bear* by which the *Phenicians* sailed. [a] *Vossius* essays to prove the Word *Cynosura* to be *Phœnician*, not as derived from κυνὸς οὐρὰ, but from כנם and אור as being a *Collection of Light*; or כונש אירא *Umbilicus igneus*.

His last Journey (being [b] in Years) was into *Egypt*, to confer (as he acknowledgeth in his Epistle to *Pherecides*) with Priests and Astronomers. There he was instructed by the Priests at *Memphis*, particularly, saith [c] *Jamblichus*) by those of *Jupiter*. *Laertius* affirms he learn'd Geometry of them; *Plutarch* implies as much of his Philosophy.

He was there in the Reign of [d] *Amasis*, *by whom much favoured and admired for many Things, especially for measuring the Height of the Pyramids by the Shadow; until at last accused to him of Disaffection to Monarchs and that Kind of Government, to which Effect many bitter Sayings of his were alledged concerning Tyrants. As when* Molpagoras, *an eminent Person of* Ionia, *demanded what was the strangest Sight he ever saw, he answered, a Tyrant old. Another Time being at a Feast where a Question arose, what Beasts were most dangerous; of Wild, saith he, a Tyrant; of Tame, a Flatterer; and Princes* (saith *Plutarch*) *however they profess themselves far different from Tyrants, yet take no Pleasure in such Apophthegms:* Hereupon he lost the Favour of *Amasis*. Thus having studied Philosophy in *Egypt*, he returned to *Miletus*, and [e] transported that vast Stock of Learning which he had there collected, into his own Country.

CHAP. IV.

How he lived at Miletus.

HIS Life at *Miletus* (as [f] *Heraclitus* affirms) was retired and private; some report he married and had a Son named *Cibissus*, but the truer Opinion is of those who say he lived unmarried, and made his [g] Sister's Son [h] (whom *Plutarch* calls *Cybisthus*) his Heir. [i] He put off his Mother when she first moved him to marry, by telling her it was not yet Time; and when he was more in Years, being again solicited by her, he answered, nor is it now Time, meaning, it was then too late. Being demanded why he took not some Course to have Issue, he answered, διὰ φιλοτεκνίαν, which is the same in pronouncing with δι' ἀφιλοτεκνίαν, and may be taken either *because he loved Children*, or *did not love them*, as [k] *Casaubon* conjectures; but perhaps his Meaning may better be gathered out of another Answer of his to the same Question, [l] *that he did not mean to draw voluntary Cares upon his Life, and disturb the Quiet thereof*; or from this Story related by [m] *Plutarch*.

Solon *coming to* Miletus *to visit him, told him that he wondered he wholly neglected Marriage and Issue.* Thales *at that Time answered nothing, but some few Days after suborned a Stranger to pretend that he came within ten Days from* Athens; Solon *demanded what News from thence; nothing (answered the other as he was instructed) but the Burial of a young Man attended by the whole City, being, as was said, Son of the most eminent Person of the City, who at the same Time was abroad in Travel. Unhappy Man (cries* Solon) *what was his Name? I heard it, answered the other, but have forgot, only I remember he was very famous for Wisdom and Justice.* Solon's *Fear increasing upon every Answer, he at last asked him, if the Father's Name were not* Solon? *which the other affirming, he beat his own Head, and did other Actions accompanied with Speeches proper to such as are transported with Grief; whereupon* Thales *smiling, and interrupting him; these Things*, Solon, *said he, deterr'd me from Marriage, which thus disorder even thee a most constant Person, but be not troubled at this News, it is counterfeit.*

In this Privacy of Life he was solicited and sent unto by many Princes, whose Invitations and Amities, (*Plutarch* [n] saith, he refused; visited by many eminent Persons.

[o] He is said to have cohabited some Time with *Thrasibulus* (a Man of excellent Wit and Judgment) who was King, (or according to the *Greek* Word) Tyrant of *Miletus*, [p] tho' his Reign continued but eleven Months; [q] about the Time that the *Milesians* entered into a League with *Alyattes* the second, then King of *Lydia*.

CHAP. V.

The Attribute of Wise *conferred on him.*

THE Attribute of *Wise*, as [r] *Plutarch* and St. *Augustine* [s] observe, was conferr'd upon the

z Laert. lib. 1. 43. a De Scien. Mathemat. cap. 32. b Plut. de plac. Phil. 1. c Vit. Pythag. 1. 2. d Plutarch. Symp. sept. sap. conviv. e Cyril. Julian. l. 1. f Laert. l. 1. 25. g Laert. 1. 26. Suid. in Θαλ. h Vita Solon. i Laert. Plut. Sympos. 3. 6. Stob. Serm. 66. k In Laertium. l Stob. serm. 66. m Vita Solon. n Sept. Sap. conviv. o Laert. 1. 27. p Arist. pol. 5. ultim. q Herodot. 1. r Vit. Solon. s De Civit. Dei, 8. 2.

reſt in reſpect of their moral Rules and Practice, but upon *Thales* particularly for his ſpeculative Learning. It was firſt beſtowed on *Thales*, at what Time *Damaſias* was Archon, *under whom* (according to [t] *Demetrius Phalereus*) *all the ſeven were called* Wiſe. The ſecond *Damaſias* was Archon in the third Year of the 49th Olympiad, which *Salmaſius* [u] knew not, when to make the Words of *Laertius* agree with the firſt *Damaſias*, he miſinterpreted *Euſebius* and *Clemens Alexandrinus*, and ſubverted all other Accounts of the Birth and Death of *Thales*, whereas this fortunately complies with the Times of all the ſeven.

The firſt was *Thales*, juſtly preferred before the reſt in reſpect of his great Learning, which he owed not to any Maſter. The Time when this Honour was conferred on him, falls upon the fifty ninth Year of his Age.

The ſecond, *Pittacus* of *Mitylene*, who flouriſhed in the forty ſecond Olympiad, and died in the third Year of the fifty ſecond.

The third, *Bias*, of *Priene*, contemporary with *Pittacus*, living under *Alyattes* and *Crœſus*.

The fourth, *Solon*, who was Archon at *Athens* the third Year of the forty-ſixth Olympiad. He died Olymp. 55.

The fifth, *Cleobulus* of *Lindus*, coætaneous with *Solon*.

The ſixth, *Myſon* of *Chene*.

The Seventh, *Chilon* of *Lacedæmon*, who was Ephorus, Olymp. 56.

The Credit and Glory of theſe Seven, was much increaſed (ſaith *Plutarch*) *by a Tripod ſent round from one to another, by a mutual, noble, and modeſt Conceſſion: The Occaſion related thus, by* Laertius *and* Valerius Maximus.

Some [w] *young Men of* Ionia *having bought a Draught of the* Mileſian *Fiſhermen, when the Net was drawn up, there was found in it a Tripod* [[x] a Golden Delphic Table of great Weight.] [y] *Hereupon aroſe a Diſpute,* [[z] thoſe affirming they had bargain'd only for the Fiſh; the others, that they bought the Draught at a Venture. By Reaſon of the ſtrangeneſs of the Caſe, and the Value of the Tripod, it was delivered to the City *Miletus*]. *The* [a] Mileſians *ſent to the Oracle at* Delphi *about it, and received this Anſwer:*

Com'ſt thou *Mileſian* to conſult my Shrine?
The Tripod to the Wiſeſt I aſſign.

Hereupon the Mileſians, *by Agreement, preſented it to* Thales, *he ſent it to* Bias, Bias *to* Pittacus, *he to another, till it paſs'd through all the ſeven, coming at laſt to* Solon, *who affirming God to be the wiſeſt, ſent it back to* Delphi, [[b] giving him at once the Title and Reward of greateſt Wiſdom.]

But Callimachus *in his Iambicks, (continueth* Laertius) *relates it otherwiſe; that* Bathycles *an* Arcadian *left a Cup, with order that it ſhould be given to the wiſeſt, whereupon it was preſented to* Thales, *and paſs'd about in Courſe till it came to him again, who then dedicated it to* Apollo Didymæus, *with theſe Verſes, according to* Callimachus:

Thales to him that rules th' *Ionian* State
This twice obtained Prize doth conſecrate.

In Proſe thus: Thales *the* Mileſian, *Son of* Examius, *to* Delphian Apollo *of the* Grecians, *offers this twice received Prize of Eminence. He that carried the Cup from one to another, was* Thyrion, *Son to* Bathycles,] whither allude theſe Verſes of *Phœnix* [c] *Colophonius.*

Thales, *whoſe Birth his Country bleſt,*
Eſteemed of all Men the beſt,
Was of the Golden Cup poſſeſt.

Eudoxius *of* Cnidus, *and* Euanthes *of* Miletus, *report that a Friend of* Crœſus *having received from him a golden Cup to be given to the wiſeſt of the* Grecians, *deliver'd it to* Thales, *and that at laſt it came to* Chilon, *who ſending to the* Pythian *Oracle to know who was the wiſeſt, was anſwered* Myſon; *whom* Eudoxius *ſubſtitutes for* Cleobulus, Plato *for* Periander, *the Oracle concerning* Myſon *was this:*

Oetæan Myſon I declare
Wiſer than thoſe that wiſeſt are.

He that was ſent upon the Enquiry was Anacharſis. Dædacus *the* Platoniſt, *and* Clearchus *affirm, that the Cup was ſent by* Crœſus *to* Pittacus, *and ſo carried about. Andron* in *Tripode* (which ſeems to have been a Diſcourſe wholly upon this Subject, and is likewiſe cited by *Clemens Alexandrinus*, to prove that *Thales* and the other ſix flouriſhed about the fiftieth Olympiad) *writes that the* Argives *propoſed this Tripod as a Prize to the Wiſeſt of the* Greeks, *and that it was adjudged to* Ariſtodemus *a* Spartan, *who reſigned it to* Chilon; Ariſtodemus *is mentioned by* Alcæus.

This Speech we to *Ariſtodemus* owe,
Money's the Man, none's poor and honeſt too.

There are who report that a Ship richly laden, ſent by Periander *to* Thraſibulus *Tyrant of* Miletus, *was caſt away in the* Coan *Sea, and the Tripod taken up by ſome Fiſhermen.* Phanodius *affirms it was loſt in the* Athenian *Sea, and afterwards brought to the City, and upon Conſultation voted to be ſent to* Bias. *Others ſay this Tripod was made by* Vulcan,

t Laert. 1. 22. u Exercitat. Plinian. pag. 843. w Laert. l. 1. 28. x Valer. Maxim. 4. 1. y Laert. ibid. z Val. Max. ibid. a Laert. ibid. b Val. Max. ibid. c Athen. dipn. xi.

who

who gave it to Pelops *as his Wife's Portion; from him it came to* Menelaus, *and afterwards being taken away with* Helena *by* Paris, *was by the* Lacedæmonian [Helen] *thrown into the Sea, calling to mind* [an [d] Oracle] *that it would prove in time to come the Ground of many Contentions. After this some* Lebedians *fishing thereabouts drew it up, and quarrelling with the Fishermen about it, it was brought to* Coos, *but the Controversy not decided, the Business was told to those of* Miletus, *which is the chief City of that Country; they sent a Messenger to demand it, and finding themselves slighted, made War upon the* Coans; *in which many being slain on both Sides, the Oracle declared that the Tripod should be given to the wisest, whereupon both Parties with joint Consent presented it to* Thales, [[e] the *Coans* being willing to grant that to a private Person, for which they before contested with all the *Milesians*] *who dedicated it to* Apollo Didymæus; *the Effect of the Oracle to the* Coans *was this:*

This Contestation shall continue till
The Golden Tripod's into th'Ocean cast
By *Vulcan*, you present to one whose Skill,
Extends to Things to come, present and past.

To the Milesians,

Comest thou, *Milesian*, to consult my Shrine? *as before.* Thus *Laertius.* [f] *Plutarch* adds, that *Thales* said, *Bias was wiser than himself, whereupon it past'd to him, from him to another, as wiser; so passing in a Circle from one to another, it came at last to* Thales *the second Time. Finally, it was sent from* Miletus *to* Thebes, *and dedicated to* Ismenian Apollo. Theophrastus *saith it was first sent to* Bias *at* Priene, *then by* Bias *to* Thales *at* Miletus, *so passing through all, it came again to* Bias; *and finally was sent to* Delphi. *This is most generally reported, saving instead of a Tripod, some say it was a Cup sent from* Crœsus; *others, that it was left there by* Bathycles.

Thus was the Priority of *Thales* confirmed by the Oracle, for which Reason, he is by [g] *Cicero* and *Strabo* stiled *Prince of the Wise Men*, to whom the rest yielded the Pre-eminence.

CHAP. VI.

Of his Philosophy.

Thales (saith [h] *Laertius*) *is by many affirmed to be the first that made Disquisitions upon Nature.* *Cicero* [i] (who taught the *Greek* Philosophers first to speak *Latin*,) acknowledges *Thales* to be the *first Author thereof.* [j] *Strabo* saith, that he *first of the* Grecians *made Enquiry into natural Causes and the* Mathematicks. [k] *Plutarch* calls him *Inventor of Philosophy*; Justin Martyr, [l] *the most ancient of Philosophers*; Tertullian, [m] *first of Natural Philosophers*; [n] Lactantius, *the first that made Enquiry after natural Causes.*

Sect. 1. *That* Water *is the Principle of all Things.*

IN his Disquisition of the Natural Causes of Things, he conceived *Water to be the first Principle of all natural Bodies, whereof they consist, and into which they resolve.* His Reasons (as delivered by [o] *Plutarch*, and repeated by [p] *Stobæus*) these:

First, *Because Natural Seed, the Principle of all living Creatures is humid, whence it is probable that Humidity is also the Principle of all other Things.*

Secondly, *Because all Kinds of Plants are nourished by Moisture; wanting which, they wither and decay.*

Thirdly, *Because Fire, even the Sun itself and the Stars, are nourished and maintained by Vapours proceeding from Water, and consequently the whole World consists of the same. Whence* Homer *supposing all Things to be engendered of Water, saith,*

Ὠκεανὸς ὅσσπερ γενέσις πανσὶν τετύκται.

The Ocean whence all Things receive their Birth.

In Pursuit ([q] as *Aristotle* saith) *of this Opinion,* he assigned Water the lowest Place, *holding* (according to [r] *Seneca*) *that the whole Earth floats, and is carried above the Water, whether that we call the Ocean or great Sea, or any simple Moisture of another Nature, or a moist Element. By this Water* (saith he) *the Earth is sustained as a great Ship, which presseth upon the Water that bears it up, because the most weighty Part of the World cannot be upheld by the Air, which is subtle and light.* Thus is [s] *Aristotle* to be explained, who saith, *Thales held, that the Earth being capable of swimming, resteth as Wood or the like; now of such Things, none swim upon Air, but upon Water.*

Upon this Ground it was, that he held *Water* (as *Laertius* saith) *to be the Cause of Earthquakes.* Thus [t] *Seneca*, *He holds that the Globe of the Earth is upheld by the Water, and carried as a Bark, and floateth by the Mobility thereof, at such Time as it is said to quake.* One of his Reasons alledged by *Seneca* [u], is this, *because in all extraordinary Motions thereof some new Fountains commonly issued, which if they incline to one Side, and shew their Keel aside-long, gather Water; which, if it chance the Burden they bear be over weighty, raiseth itself higher towards the Right or Left Side.*

d Plut. vit. Sol. e Plut. vit. Sol. f Vit. Sol. g Cicer. de Leg. 2. 11. Strabo l. 14. h Laert. 1. 24. i De Natura Deor. 1. j Lib. 14. k De plac. phil. 1. 3. l Paræneſ. ad Græc. m Apologet. c. 26. n De falſ. rel. 1. 5. o Placit. philoſoph. 1. 3. p Eclog. Phyſ. 1. 13. q Metaph. 1. 3. r Natur. quæſt. 6. 6. s Metaphyſ. 1. 3. t Nat. quæſt. 3. 13. u Nat. quæſt. 6. 6.

From

From the Teſtimony of *Homer*, by which *Thales* (according to *Plutarch* and *Juſtin Martyr*) defended this Tenet (that Water is the Principle of all Things) it is manifeſt it was delivered, (tho' imperfectly) by other *Grecians* before *Thales*; *Plutarch* [w] elſewhere producing this Authority of [x] *Heſiod*.

Παντῶν μὲν πρώτιστα χάος γενέτ' ——

Of all Things Chaos *was the firſt.*——

addeth, *the greater Part of ancient Philoſophers being called Water* Chaos, ἀπὸ τῆς χύσεως *from Diffuſion*. The Scholiaſt of [y] *Apollonius* upon theſe Words,

—— χθὼν, ἀϋτὴ ἐξ ἰλύος ἐκλάστησε.

The Earth of Slime was made.

affirms (citing *Zeno*) that *the Chaos, whereof all Things were made, according to* Heſiod, *was Water, which ſettling became Slime, the Slime condenſed into ſolid Earth; to which add this Teſtimony of* [z] Orpheus,

Ἐκ τοῦ ὕδατος ἰλὺς κατέστη.

Of Water Slime was made.

This Opinion they borrowed from the *Phœnicians*, with whom the *Græcians* had a very ancient Correſpondence. *Linus* came from thence; *Orpheus* had his Learning from thence: as *Thales* is conceived to have done likewiſe, which appears clearly in [a] *Numenius*, an ancient Philoſopher, who cites the very Words of *Moſes* for this Opinion. *The Spirit of God moved on the Face of the Waters.* There is an eminent Place in [b] *Euſebius* to prove this: *The Divinity of the* Phœnicians *aſſerts the Principle of this World to be a dark Spiritual Air, or the Spirit of dark Air, and Chaos troubled and involved in Darkneſs, that this was infinite, and a long Time had no Bounds: But (ſay they) the Spirit being moved with the Love of his own Principles, there was made a Mixtion, which Nexure was called Love; this was the Beginning of the Production of all Things; but the Spirit itſelf had no Generation, and from this Connexion of the Spirit was begotten* Μώτ, *which ſome call Slime, others Corruption of watery Miſtion, and of this was made the Seed of all Creatures, and the Generation of all Things.*

Nor were the *Indians* ignorant of this, as *Megaſthenes* delivers their Opinion. [c] *They are of the ſame Mind in many Things with the* Grecians, *as that the World had Beginning, and ſhall have End; that God its Maker and Governor goes quite through it; that all Things had different Beginnings, but that of which the World was made was Water.*

The Word ἀρχὴ, *Principle*, becauſe with Philoſophers it includes the efficient Cauſe, and conſequently underſtood ſingly excludes the reſt, that being the moſt noble, hath given Occaſion to ſome to miſtake *Thales*, as if by acknowledging no other Principle, he conſequently accounted *Water* to be *God*; but that *Thales* underſtands by *Principle* only the material Cauſe, we may eaſily gather from *Plutarch* [d], who condemneth *Thales* for confounding a *Principle* with an *Element*, and for holding them to be both one; *whereas* (ſaith he) *there is great Difference; Elements are compounded, Principles are neither compounded, nor are any compleat Subſtance; and truly Water, Air, Earth, Fire, we term Elements, but Principles we call other Natures, in this reſpect that there is nothing precedent to them, whereof they are engendered. For otherwiſe, if they were not the firſt, they would not be Principles, but that rather ſhould be ſo termed whereof they were made. Now certain Things there are precedent, whereof Earth and Water are compounded,* viz. *The firſt, Matter without Form, the ſecond, the Form itſelf, the third Privation.* Thales *therefore errs, affirming Water to be both Element and Principle of all Things.* Thus we ſee by *Plutarch*, that the Objection can only be as to the Name, not to reaſon of the Name; for the Diſtinction of Principle and Element being not uſed in that Time, *Thales*, by *Principle*, meant nothing of the efficient Cauſe, which is moſt certain from *Ariſtotle*. *Thales*, ſaith he, *affirms Water to be the Principle: Wherefore he held the Earth to be above the Water; perhaps he conceived ſo, becauſe he ſaw that the Nutriment of all Things is humid, that Heat itſelf conſiſts thereof, and that every Creature lives thereby; he held that of which Things are made to be the Principles of all Things, for thoſe Reaſons he was of this Opinion, as alſo, becauſe the Seeds of all Things are of a humid Nature, and Water is the Principle of Things humid.*

Sect. 2. *Of God.*

TERTULLIAN [e] ſaith, That *Thales* to *Cræſus enquiring concerning the Deity, gave no certain Account, but deſired ſeveral Times of deliberating to no Effect.* He ſeems to reflect upon the ſame or a like Story to that which is reported of *Simonides* and *Hieron*.

But what the Opinion of *Thales* was concerning *God*, may be gathered from two Apophthegms cited by *Laertius*, repeated with this Gloſs by [f] *Cle-*

w *Ignis an aqua utilior?* x Theogen. y Argonaut. 4. z Cited by Athenagoras. a Porphyr. de antro Nymph. b Præpar. Evangel. 1. 10. c Strab. lib. 15. d De placit. Philoſ. e Apologet. contra gent. Metaphyſ. 1. 3. f Stromat. 5.

mens

mens Alexandrinus; *and what are not thoſe the Sayings of* Thales *that are derived from hence, That God is glorified for ever and ever, and he openly confeſſes that he is called* καρδιογνώστης, *he who knoweth Hearts. For* Thales *being demanded what God was, that* (ſaith he) *which hath neither Beginning nor End. Another asking, if a Man might do ill and conceal it from God.* How, ſaid he, *when a Man that thinks it cannot? Men ought to think* (ſays [g] *Cicero* in his Name) *that the Gods ſee all Things*, or rather, *all Things are full of the Deity.*

He acknowledged the firſt of Beings, and Author of the World, aſſerting (according to *Laertius*) that *the moſt ancient of all Things is God, for he is not begotten*; that *the faireſt is the World, for it is his Work.* This is confirmed by *Cicero.* Thales *the* Mileſian (ſaith he [h]) *who firſt enquired into theſe Things, ſaid, that Water was the Principle of Things, but that God was that Mind which formed all Things of Water. If Gods may be without Senſe and Mind, why did he join the Mind to Water? Why Water to the Mind, if the Mind can ſubſiſt without a Body?* Thus *Cicero*, who underſtands *Thales* to intend the material Principle to be co-eternal with the efficient; which *Thales* himſelf ſeems not to mean, when he declared God to be the firſt of Beings. But that the *Mens* of *Anaxagoras*, for the annexing of which to Matter he was ſo much famed, was no more than what he borrowed from *Thales*, the Words of *Cicero* make good.

He affirmed that God by the immutable Decree of his Providence governs the World. *Thales* (ſaith [i] *Stobæus*) *being demanded what was moſt ſtrong, anſwered, Neceſſity, for it rules all the World. Neceſſity is the firm Judgment and immutable Power of Providence.* Hither we muſt likewiſe refer what is cited under his Name by the ſame *Stobæus*, that *the firſt Mover is immoveable*, which [k] *Ariſtotle* hath borrowed from him, not owning the Author.

Something imperfectly was before delivered by *Orpheus* concerning God, alledged by [l] *Clemens Alexandrinus* and others; but as *Cicero* ſaid, Thales *was the firſt among the* Grecians, *who made any Search into theſe Things*; and that he brought it out of *Egypt*, the *Grecians* themſelves deny not, [m] for they acknowledge that they received the Names of their Gods from thence, and believed the *Egyptians* to be the firſt, who looking up to the World above them, and admiring the Nature of the Univerſe, reflected upon the Deity.

Sect. 3. *Of Dæmons.*

Thales, (ſaith [n] *Plutarch*) *with* Pythagoras, Plato, *and the* Stoicks *hold, that* Dæmons *are ſpiritual Subſtances, and the Heroes Souls ſeparated from the Bodies, of which Sort there are two, good and bad; the good Heroes are the good Souls, the bad the bad.* The ſame Order [o] *Athenagoras* atteſts to be obſerved by *Thales*, ranking the three Degrees thus: Firſt, that of the Immortal Gods, next Dæmons, thirdly, Heroes: This was followed by *Pythagoras*, that *the Gods were to be preferred in Reverence before Dæmons, Heroes before Men.*

He affirmed (as [p] *Stobæus* ſaith) *the World to be full of theſe Dæmons.* This is thought the Meaning of that of [q] *Ariſtotle*, repeated by *Cicero*, [r] Thales *thought that all Things were full of Gods.* The ſame Aſſertion *Laertius* [s] aſcribes to *Pythagoras*, *That all the Air is full of Souls, which are Heroes and Dæmons.*

This Opinion was aſſerted by the *Greeks*, before the Time of *Thales*, particularly by *Heſiod*; but whether that be Argument enough to deny, that *Thales* had it from the *Ægyptians*, I queſtion; that they held it in the ſame Manner, we may learn by [t] *Jamblichus.* Beſides, *Pythagoras* and *Plato* (whom *Plutarch* joins in the Tenet with *Thales*) drew their Learning from the ſame Fountain.

Sect. 4. *Of the Soul.*

PLutarch and *Stobæus* ſay, *That* Thales *firſt affirm'd the Soul to be* αὐτοκινητὸν, *a ſelf-moving Nature.* [u] *Ariſtotle*, that he calls it κινητικὸν, in reſpect to the Motion it gives to other Things, in which are included both Parts of the Definition of the [w] *Platoniſts, a Subſtance, having within itſelf a Power to move itſelf and other Things:* Which *Plato* [x] argues to this Effect: *The firſt of Motions is that whereby a Thing moves itſelf; the ſecond, that whereby it moves another: Every Thing that moves itſelf, lives; every living Thing lives, becauſe it moves itſelf, therefore the Power of Self-motion is the Eſſence of that Subſtance which we call the Soul, which Soul is the Cauſe of the firſt Generation and Motion of Things which are, were, and ſhall be; and of all their Contraries, as of all Tranſmutation, the Principal of Motion, and therefore more ancient than the Body, which it moves by a ſecond Motion.* And afterwards declares theſe to be the Names of the Soul's Motion, *to will, to conſider, to take care, to conſult, to judge rightly, and not rightly, to joy, to grieve, to dare, to fear, to hate, to love*, and the like. *Theſe which are the firſt Motions, and ſuſcipient of the ſecond corporal, bring all Things into Augmentation, and Decreaſe, Concretion or Condenſation, and Diſcretion or Rarefaction.* This Opinion, firſt raiſed by *Thales*, was entertained in the Schools with the Aſſent of *Pythago-*

g De Legib. 2. h De Natur. Deor. 1. 10. i Phyſ. c. 8. k Phyſ. 8. 7. l Admonit. ad gent. m Herodot. lib. 2. n Placit. Philoſ. 1. 8. o Apolog. p Phyſic. c. 1. q De Anima. l. 1. 8. r De Legib. 2. s Vit. Pythag. t De myſter. Egypt. ſub initio. u De Plac. Phil. 4. 2. Stob. Ecl. Phyſ. c. 40. w De Anima. 1. 2. x Plato in Timæ.

ras,

ras [y], *Anaxagoras*, *Socrates*, and *Plato*, till exploded by [z] *Ariſtotle*, whoſe chief Arguments againſt it were theſe. 1. That nothing is moved but what is in Place, nothing in Place but what hath Quantity, which, becauſe the Soul wants none of the four Kinds of Motion (*viz.* Lation, Alteration, Diminution, Accretion) are compatible (*per ſe*) to her. Secondly, that Self-motion is not eſſential to the Soul, becauſe ſhe is moved accidentally, by external Objects. The firſt, if underſtood of Circumſcription, not only denies the Motion of all Things, that are definitively in Place, as Spirits, but of the higheſt Sphere, if compared with *Ariſtotle*'s Definition of Place; yet that ſome of theſe Species of Motion, tho' in a different extraordinary Manner, are competent to the Soul, and not accidentally, may be argued, 1. From the further Diffuſion of the Soul, according to the Augmentation of the Body. 2. From Intellection, which is acknowledged a Perfection, and conſequently a Kind of Alteration, which that *Thales* underſtood to be one of the Soul's Motions, is clear from that Apophthegm aſcribed to him by [a] *Laertius*, *the ſwifteſt of all Things is the Mind, for it over-runs all Things*: Whence [b] *Cicero* (confeſſing almoſt in every Word of *Thales*, that *nothing is ſwifter than the Mind*, that no *Swiftneſs may compare with the Swiftneſs of the Mind*) would interpret the ἐντελέχεια of *Ariſtotle*, a *continued and perpetual Motion.*

The ſecond Reaſon may be queſtioned by comparing the Acts of the *Memory*, and *Reminiſcence*; the firſt occaſioned by exterior Things yet *objective* only, ſo that the Motion is within herſelf; but by the other ſhe moves herſelf, from a Privation to a Habit, without the Help of any Exterior.

It is worth Notice, that among theſe and other Reaſons alledged by [c] *Ariſtotle* to deſtroy this Aſſertion, one is the Poſſibility of the Reſurrection of the Body; but this ὡς ἐν παρόδῳ.

From the ſecond Part of the Difference in the Definition (*viz.* from moving other Things) *Thales* argued, that the Loadſtone and Amber had Souls; the firſt becauſe it draws Iron; the ſecond Straw. *He further* (ſaith *Laertius*) *aſſerted thoſe Things we count inanimate, to have Souls; arguing it from the Loadſtone and Amber:* The Reaſon of which latter Example, [d] *Aldobrandinus* falſely interprets its Change of Colour, and jarring as it were at Poiſon: But [e] *Ariſtotle* more plainly; *for of thoſe whom we mentioned*, Thales *ſeems to have taken the Soul to be ſomething* κινητικον, *apt to move, ſince he affirmed a Stone to have a Soul, becauſe it moved Iron.*

He aſſerted likewiſe the Soul (of Man) to be immortal, and according to [f] *Cherilus*, was the firſt that held ſo. [g] *Cicero* aſcribes the Original of this Opinion to *Pherecides*, but it rather ſeems to have been brought by *Thales* from the *Egyptians*; that they held ſo [h] *Herodotus* atteſts.

Sect. 5. *Of the World.*

THales held, [i] that *there was but one World*, and that [k] *made by God*; which Truth was followed by all Philoſophers; as [l] *Ariſtotle* confeſſeth, until he rejected it, to defend, by the contrary, an Aſſertion equally falſe, that the World is everlaſting, *which could not be*, ſaith he, *if it had Beginning.*

That [m] *the World being God's Work, is the faireſt of Things, whatſoever diſpoſed in lively Order being a Part thereof*, for which Reaſon *Pythagoras* (according to [n] *Plutarch*) called it firſt κόσμον.

That *Night is elder than Day.* This Circumſtance of the Creation was held likewiſe by [o] *Orpheus* and *Heſiod*, who had it from the *Phenicians:* For this Reaſon the *Numidians* [p], *Germans* [q], and *Gauls* [r], reckoned by Nights.

That *the World is animated*, and *that* [s] *God is the Soul thereof, diffuſed through every Part, whoſe divine Moving Virtue penetrates through the Element of Water.* Thus explained by the *Hermetick* Philoſophers: The divine Spirit, who produced this World out of the firſt Water, being infus'd, as it were, by a continual Inſpiration into the Works of Nature, and diffus'd largely through, by a certain ſecret and continual Act, moving the whole, and every Particular according to its Kind, is the Soul of the World.

That *the* [t] *World is contained in Place.* This agrees with the Definition of Place by *Space*; but they who with *Ariſtotle* define a Place a *Superficies*, tho' they hold the Parts of the World to be in Place, as forced to deny the whole to be ſo.

That *in the World there is no Vacuum* [u], in which (as *Plutarch* obſerves) all Philoſophers agree, who affirm the World to be animated, and governed by Providence; the contrary defended by thoſe who maintain that it conſiſteth of Atoms, is inanimate, not governed by Providence.

That [w] *Matter is fluid and variable.*

That [x] *Bodies are paſſible and diviſible, in infinitum, and continuous, as are alſo a Line, Superficies, Place and Time.*

That [y] *Miſtion is made by Compoſition of the Elements.*

That [z] *the Stars are earthly, yet fiery*; *the* [a] *Sun earthy. They who affirm the Stars to be fiery*, ſaith [b]

y Stob. Ecl. phyſ. lib. 1. z Ariſt. de anima. l. 2. a Laert. l. 35. b Tuſcul. quæſt. 1. 10. c De anima 1. 3. d In Laert. 1. 24. e De anima 1. 2. f Laert. ibid. g Tuſc. quæſt. 1. h Lib. 2. i Plutarch de plac. phil. 2. 1. k Laert. 1. 35. l De Cœlo 1. 10. 12. m Laert. ibid. n De plac. phil. 2. 1. o Timoth. p Damaſcen. q Tacit. de mor. Germ. c. 11. r Cæſar. de bello Gall. 6. s Laert. ibid. t Laert. ibid. Plut. ſept. ſapient. conviv. u Plut. de plac. phil. 1. 18. w Ibid. 1. 9. x Ibid. 1. 16. y Ibid. 2. 13. Achil. Tat. Iſag. in Arat. z De Cœlo. 2. 7. Plut. de plac. phil. 2. 28. a Ibid. 3. 9. b Ibid. 3. 10.

Ariſtotle, hold ſo, as conceiving the whole ſuperior Body to be Fire.

That *the Moon is of the ſame Nature with the Sun, that ſhe is illuminated by him*, Plutarch and *Stobæus* affirm this to be firſt held by *Thales*, tho' *Eudemus* cited by [z] *Theon* aſcribe it to *Anaximander*.

That *the monthly Occultations of the Moon are cauſed by the nearneſs of the Sun ſhining round her.*

That *there is but* [a] *one Earth*, [b] *round, in faſhion of a Globe*, [c] *ſeated in the Midſt of the World*, to which relates that Speech aſcribed to him by *Cleodemus*, that, *if the Earth were taken out of the World, there muſt of Neceſſity follow a Confuſion of all Things.*

That *the Overflowing of* Nilus *is cauſed by the Eteſian* (yearly) *Winds*, which riſe with the Dog-ſtar, after the Summer Solſtice, and beginning the Blow from the North, ſpread (as [d] *Ariſtotle* deſcribes them) into remote Quarters. *Theſe* (ſaith [e] *Plutarch*) *blowing directly againſt* Egypt, *cauſe the Water to ſwell, that the Sea, driven by theſe Winds, entereth within the Mouth of that River, and hindereth it, that it cannot diſcharge itſelf freely into the Sea, but is repulſed. Whereupon* (adds [f] *Diodorus Siculus*) *it overflows* Egypt, *which lieth low and level. But this Reaſon, tho' it ſeem plauſible, is eaſily diſproved; for if this were true, all the Rivers which are diſcharged into the Sea, oppoſite to the Eteſian Winds, ſhould have the ſame Overflowing.* Thus *Diodorus*, in his excellent Diſcourſe upon this Subject, which concludes with the Opinion of *Agatharchides*, that it is occaſioned by Rain coming from the Mountains of *Ethiopia*.

CHAP. VII.

Of his Geometry.

A*Puleius* [g], who calls *Thales the Inventor of Geometry amongſt the Grecians*, is more juſt to his Memory than *Anticlides* and others, who aſcribe the Honour thereof to *Mæris*, or to *Pythagoras*, who by the Acknowledgment of [h] *Jamblichus*, a *Pythagorean*, learned Mathematicks of *Thales*. The Original and Progreſs of this Science [i], to the Perfection it received from *Pythagoras* (which gave Occaſion to that Miſtake) is thus delivered by *Proclus*.

Geometry was invented by the Egyptians, *taking its Beginning from meaſuring Fields; it being neceſſary for them, by Reaſon of the Inundation of* Nilus, *which waſhed away the Bounds of their ſeverals. Nor is it to be wondered at, that as well this, as other Sciences, ſhould have their Beginning from Commodiouſneſs and Opportunity; ſince, as is ſaid in Generation, it proceeds from imperfect to perfect* [k]; *therefore, not without Reaſon is the Tranſition from Senſe to Conſideration, and from Conſideration to the Mind. As therefore among the* Phœnicians, *by Reaſon of Merchandize and Traffick, the certain Knowledge of Numbers had its Beginning; ſo likewiſe among the* Egyptians, *Geometry was found out upon the foreſaid Occaſion; and* Thales *going to* Egypt, *firſt brought over this Science into* Greece: *And many Things he found out himſelf, and taught his Fellows the Principles of many Things, declaring ſome more generally, other Things more plainly. Next him* Ameriſtus, *Brother to* Steſichorus *the Poet, is remembered* [l] *as having touched Geometry, of whom* Hippias *the* Elean, *makes Mention, as eminent in that Knowledge: After theſe,* Pythagoras *conſidering the Principles therefore more highly, advanced it into a liberal Science.*

Sect. 1. *Propoſitions invented by him.*

THat he improved (as *Proclus* implies) the Geometry which he learned of the *Egyptians*, with many Propoſitions of his own, is confirmed by *Laertius*, who ſaith, that *he much advanced thoſe Things, the Invention whereof* Callimachus *in the Iambicks, aſcribes to* Euphorbus *the* Phrygian, *as ſcalenous Triangles, and others.* Nor is it to be doubted, but that many of them are of thoſe, which *Euclid* hath reduced into his Elements; whoſe Deſign it was to collect and digeſt thoſe that were invented by others, accurately demonſtrating ſuch as were more negligently proved, but of them only, theſe are known to be his.

1. [[n] *Every Diameter divides its Circle into two equal Parts.*] This Propoſition, which *Euclid* makes Part of the Definition of a Diameter, [o] *Proclus* affirms to have been firſt demonſtrated by *Thales*.

2. [[p] *In all Iſoſceles Triangles, the Angles at the Baſe are equal the one to the other, and thoſe right Lines being produced, the Angles under the Baſe are equal.*] [q] *Proclus* ſaith, that *for the Invention of this likewiſe, as of many other Propoſitions, we are beholding to* Thales, *for he firſt obſerved and ſaid, that of every Iſoſceles, the Angles at the Baſe are equal, and according to the Ancients called equal alike.* Theſe are three Paſſages in the Demonſtration, which infer nothing towards the Concluſion, of which Kind there are many in *Euclid*, and ſeem to confirm the Antiquity thereof, and that it was leſs curiouſly reformed by him.

3. [*If two Lines cut one the other, the Vertical Angles ſhall equal the one the other.*] [r] *Eudemus* at-

z Stob. Ecl. Phyſ. a Plut. de plac. phil. 3. 11. b Sept. ſap. conviv. c Laert. 1. 37. d Meteor. 2. 6. e De plac. phil. 4. 1. f Lib. 1. g Florid. lib. 4. Laert. vit. Pythag. h De vita Pythag. 1. 2. i In Euclid. 2. 4. k Supply the Breach in the Text, ἐκ τοῦ λογισμοῦ εἰς τὴν νοῦν ἡ μετάβασις, &c. ſo Barocius tranſlates. l Read ὡς ἐφαψάμενον τῆς περὶ γεωμετρίας πραγματείας, μνημονεύεται. m Laert. 1. 25. n Lib. 1. def. 17. o Euclid lib. 2. com. 14. p Ibid. lib. 1. prop. 5. q Lib. 3. com. 9. r Euclid lib. 1. prop. 15. Procl. lib. 3. com. 19.

teſts this Theorem to have been invented by *Thales*, but firſt demonſtrated by *Euclid*.

4. [r *If two Triangles have two Angles equal to two Angles, the one to the other, and one Side equal to one Side, either that which is adjacent to the equal Angles, or that which ſubtendeth one of the equal Angles, they ſhall likewiſe have the other Sides, equal to the other Sides, both to both, and the remaining Angle equal to the remaining Angle.*] s Eudemus *attributes this Theorem* (ſaith *Proclus*) *to* Thales, *for ſhowing the Diſtance of Ships upon the Sea, in that Manner as he is ſaid to do, it is neceſſary that he perform it by this.*

Pamphilia (ſaith *Laertius*) *affirms, that he firſt deſcribed the Rectangle Triangle of a Circle.*] t *Ramus* attributes to *Thales* (upon this Authority of *Laertius*) the ſecond, third, fourth, and fifth Propoſitions of the fourth Book of *Euclid*, which are concerning the Adſcription of a Triangle and a Circle, and conſequently takes καταγράφαι here to include both Inſcription and Circumſcription; whereas in all thoſe Propoſitions, there is nothing proper to a Rectangle Triangle; ſo that if the Word ὀρθογώνιον be retained, it muſt relate to the 31ſt Propoſition of the third Book, whence may be deduced the Deſcription of a Rectangle Triangle in a Circle. But becauſe there is no ſuch Propoſition in *Euclid*, and this hath but an obſcure Reference to Part of that Theorem; it is to be doubted that the Text of *Laertius* is corrupt, and the Word (or Mark κύκλῳ inſerted by Accident, without which theſe Words καταγράφαι τὸ τριγωνον ὀρθογάνιον exactly correſpond with thoſe of u *Vetruvius*, *Pythagoricum trigonum orthogonium deſcribere:* by which he means (as he at large expreſſeth w elſewhere) the forty-fifth Propoſition of the firſt Book of *Euclid*, *that in Rectangle Triangles, the Square of the Hypotheneuſe is equal to the Square of the Sides containing the right Angle.* That *Vitruvius*, *Proclus*, and others, attribute this Invention to *Pythagoras*, confirms it to be the ſame here meant by *Laertius*; who adds, that *Thales for the Invention ſacrificed an Ox, tho' others* (ſaith he) *among whom is* Apollodorus, *aſcribe it to* Pythagoras. And in the Life of *Pythagoras*, he cites the ſame *Apollodorus*, that Pythagoras *ſacrificed a Hecatomb, having found out, that the Hypotheneuſe of a right angled Triangle, is of equal Power to the two Sides, including the right Angle according to the Epigram.*

That noble Scheme *Pythagoras* devis'd,
For which a Hecatomb he ſacrific'd.

Cicero x, tho' he differs in the Author, agrees in Quantity of the Offering with *Laertius*; affirming, that *Pythagorus, upon any new Invention, uſed to ſacrifice an Ox:* Which Kind of Gratitude begun by *Thales*, was imitated by others alſo, as by *Perſeus.*

y *Finding three Spiral Lines, in Sections five,*
Perſeus *an Offering to the Gods did give.*

Sect. 2. *Of his taking the Height of the Pyramid.*

THE Pyramids of *Egypt* are ſuppoſed by z *Solinus*, *Auſonius* a, *Ammianus* b *Marcellinus*, and c *Caſſiodorus*, to caſt no Shadow at all, which (as Mr. *Greaves* hath obſerved in his excellent Diſcourſe upon this Subject) muſt be meant either of the Summer-time, or which is nearer the Truth, that for the three Quarters of the Year, they have none at Mid-day.

For, that *Thales* by the Shadow meaſured their Height is acknowledged. d *Hieronymus* ſaith, *he meaſured the Pyramids by the Shadow, obſerving when they are of equal Bigneſs.* e *Pliny* affirms he *found out a Way to take the Height of them, and all ſuch like, by meaſuring the Shadow, at what Time it is equal to the Body.* But f *Plutarch* hath given a more regular and exact Account of his Manner of Operation, *by erecting a Staff perpendicular upon the End of the Shadow of the Pyramid, and by two Triangles made by the Beams of the Sun, he demonſtrated, that what Proportion there was between the Shadows, the ſame was betwixt the Pyramid and the Staff:* A Demonſtration ſo rational, that it is the ordinary Way of taking Heights by Shadows, founded upon this Theorem.

g *Of equiangle Triangles, the Sides that are about equal Angles are proportional, and the Sides that ſubtend the equal Angles are homologous.*

Which, if *Proclus* had proceeded as far as the ſixth Book of *Euclid*, we ſhould in all Likelihood have found aſcribed to *Thales*; for the ſame Argument wherewith *Eudemus* proves him Inventor of the fourth Theorem in the foregoing Section, whereby he took Diſtances, is of equal Force in this, whereby he took Altitudes.

The Height of the great Pyramid (which *Thales* meaſured) is by its Perpendicular (according to Mr. *Greaves*) 499 Feet, by its declining Aſcent 693 Feet.

CHAP. VIII.

Of his Aſtronomy.

OMitting the Fable of h *Orpheus*'s Harp alluding to the ſeven Planets, and the Obſervations of *Heſiod*, which were little more than of the Riſing

r Euclid lib. 1. prop. 26. s Procl. lib. 3. com. 31. t Geom. l. 3. u Lib. 10. cap. 11. w Lib. 9. cap. 2. x De naturâ Deor. y Procl. in Euclid. lib. 2. def. 4. where the Words perhaps are inverted, and for τρεῖς γραμμὰς ἐπὶ πέντε τομαῖς εὐθείας, τὰς περικὰς εὐθάν. z Polyhiſt. c. 32. a Idyl. 10. b Lib. 22. c Var. 7. form. 15. d Laert. 1. 27. e Lib. 36. cap. 17. f Conviv. ſep. ſapient. g Euclid. lib. 6. prop. 4. h Lucian de Aſtrolog.

and

and Setting of ſome principal Stars, (ſo imperfect, that [i] *Plato* calls all thoſe who ſatisfy themſelves with ſuch ſuperficial Knowledge, *Aſtronomers according to Heſiod*) we may with *Eudemus* and others affirm, that *Thales was the firſt of the Grecians that was skilful in Aſtronomy.* Which Science [k] *Pliny* aſſerts to have been brought out of *Phœnicia*; *Ariſtotle* [l], that the *Grecians* owe much of it to the *Egyptians*, where it hath been a long time practiſed: Thither, indeed, [m] *Thales* acknowledgeth that he travelled to confer with Aſtronomers.

Sect. 1. *Of the Celeſtial Sphere.*

THales and *Pythagoras* (ſaith [n] *Plutarch* repeated *by* [n] *Stobæus*) *with their Followers, affirm, the Celeſtial Sphere is divided into five Circles (which they call* Zones) *whereof one is called Artick, and is always in View to us; one of the Summer Tropicks, one the Equinoctial, one the Winter Tropick, one the Antartick Circle, never ſeen by us. The oblique Circle, called the Zodiac, lieth under the three middle Circles, it toucheth them all three as it paſſeth, and each of them is cut in right Angles by the Meridian, which goeth from Pole to Pole. Unjuſtly therefore is the Invention of the Zones aſcribed by* [o] Poſidonius *to* Parmenides; *and that of the Obliquity of the Zodiac by* [p] *others to* Anaximander, Pythagoras, *or* Ænipodes.

[q] *Eudemus* ſaith, that *he firſt obſerv'd the Tropics*; *Laertius*, that *he firſt found out the Acceſſion of the Sun from Tropick to Tropick.* The Word τροπαι, ſignifies not only the Solſtices, but the Equinoxes likewiſe: [r] *Sextus Empiricus. The Tropick Signs are thoſe into which the Sun coming, changeth and maketh Converſions of the Air; ſuch a Sign is* Aries, *and the oppoſite to it* Libra, *ſo alſo* Capric. *and* Canc. *for in* Aries *is made the vernal Converſion, in* Capr. *the Winter, in* Canc. *the Summer, in* Libra *the autumnal.* This Expoſition [s] *Laertius* confirms, when he ſaith that *Thales compoſed only two Treatiſes, one of the Tropicks, the other of the Equinoctials*, and that *he diſtinguiſhed the Seaſons of the Year.*

Sect. 2. *Of the Sun, Moon, and Stars.*

HE firſt obſerved the apparent Diameter of the Sun, which is the Angle made in the Eye, to be the 720th Part of his Orb: This, doubtleſs, is the Meaning of [t] *Laertius*, his Words theſe, ϰ πρῶτος τὸ τῆ ἡλίᾳ μέγεθ☉ τῆ σεληναίᾳ ἑκτακοσιοστὸν ϰ εἰκοστὸν μέρος ἀπεφήναλο. Than which Reading, which implies the Sun to be 720 Times leſſer than the Moon, nothing is more ridiculous; for knowing (as is granted by all) the Cauſe of Eclipſes, he muſt likewiſe know the Sun to be greater than the Moon: Nor is it much mended by thoſe who read ϰ πρὸς τὸ τῆ ἡλίᾳ μέγεθ☉ τὸ τῆ σεληναίᾳ, the Text ſeems rather to require ζωδιακῆ for σεληναίᾳ, or ſomething to that Effect, of which thus, [t] *Archimedes, this we ſuppoſe when* Ariſtarchus *ſaith, the Sun appeareth, as being the* 720*th Part of the Circle of the Zodiac; for he conſidered how he might by Inſtruments take the Angle made in the Eye by the Sun's apparent Diameter: But to take any ſuch Thing exactly is not eaſy; for neither the Sight nor the Hand, nor the Inſtruments wherewith the Obſervation is made, are of Credit ſufficient to demonſtrate it exactly.* This Correction *Apuleius* thus confirms, *in his declining Age he made an excellent Demonſtration of the Proportion of the Sun, which I have not only learned* (ſaith *Apuleius*) *but confirmed by Practice, how many times the Sun's Magnitude is comprehended in the Circle which his Motion makes. This, as ſoon as he found out,* Thales *ſhewed to* Mandryatus *of* Pryene, *who being infinitely delighted with this new and unexpected Knowledge, bad him ask what he would in Recompence for ſuch an excellent Invention: It will be Reward enough for me, ſaid* Thales, *if what you have learned of me, whenſoever you communicate it to others, you profeſs me to be the Inventor.*

He firſt found out the Conſtellation of the *leſſer Bear*, [u] *Callimachus*

> *He to* Miletus *ſail'd, invited*
> *By* Thales' *Glory, who quick-ſighted,*
> *Is ſaid t'have mark'd the* leſſer Bear,
> *The Star by which* Phœnicians *ſteer.*

Hyginus affirms that he firſt called it Ἀρκ☉, *the Bear.*

Sect. 3. *Of Eclipſes.*

HE *was the firſt* [w] (ſaith *Laertius*) *that foretold Eclipſes, as* Eudemus *affirms in his Aſtrologic Hiſtory; for which* Xenophanes *and* Herodotus *admire him; atteſted alſo by* Heraclitus *and* Democritus. [x] *Theon Smyrnæus*, and [y] *Clemens Alexandrinus* cite the ſame Place of *Eudemus*; the Scope of whoſe Book was the Hiſtory of Aſtrologers, and what every one found out. Thus likewiſe [z] *Pliny*, *amongſt the* Grecians, *the firſt that ſearched into Eclipſes, was* Thales *the* Mileſian.

[a] *Plutarch* affirms, that *he was the firſt that obſerved the Eclipſe of the Sun, and ſaid, that it was occaſioned by the Moon, coming in a direct Line underneath him, which may be ſeen in a Baſon of Water or Looking-glaſs.* [b] *That the Eclipſe of the Moon*

i Plato in Epinom. 1. k Lib. 5. cap. 13. l De Cœlo. 2. 12. m Epiſt. ad Pherecyd. apud Laert. n De plac. phil. 2. 11. o Strab. lib. 2. p Plin. 2. 8. q Laert. 1. 24. r Adverſ. mathem. 5. 2. s L. 1. Seg. 23. t L. 1. Seg. 24. t In Arenar. u Laert. 1. 23. Achil. Tat. Iſag. in Arat. Hyginus poetic. aſtronom. w Laert. 1. 23. x Apud Voſſ. de Scient. Mathemat. y Clem. Alexand. Strom. 1. z Natur. Hiſt. l. 2. 9. a De placit. phil. 2. 2. b Plut. de Plat. Phil. 2. 28.

is caused by the Shadow of the Earth, which being placed betwixt these two Stars, darkens the lesser.

The Testimony of *Herodotus*, alledged by *Laertius* is this: [e] *A five Years War was raised between the* Lydians *and the* Medes, *in which sometimes the* Medes *had the better of the* Lydians, *sometimes the* Lydians *of the* Medes, *and one Battle was fought by Night: The War being thus equal on both Sides, in the sixth Year, the Armies being joined, it happened as they were fighting, the Day on a sudden became Night; which Alteration of that Day,* Thales *a* Milesian *had foretold the* Ionians, *designing the Year wherein it should happen. The* Lydians *and* Medes *seeing the Day turned to Night, left off fighting, and laboured to conclude a mutual Peace,* which, by the Mediation of *Syennesis* King of *Cilicia*, and *Labynetus* King of *Babylon* (whom *Scaliger* conceives to be *Nebuchadnezzar)* was concluded, with the Marriage of *Aryæna* Daughter of *Alyattes*, with *Astyages*, Son of *Cyaxares*, ratified by drinking Blood.

This is the Story of that memorable Eclipse, the Time whereof is uncertain: [f] *Pliny* placeth it in the fourth Year of the forty-eight Olympiad, before the Building of *Rome* 170 Years: [g] *Solinus* in the 49th Olympiad, the 604th Year after the Destruction of *Troy*; which falls upon the first Year of that Olympiad. [h] *Clemens Alexandrinus* (citing *Eudemus*) about the fiftieth Olympiad, at what time *Cyaxares*, Father of *Astyages*, reigned in *Media*: *Alyattes*, Father of *Crœsus* in *Lydia*. *Eusebius* in the second Year of the forty-eighth Olympiad, 1430 Years after *Abraham*. *Cleomedes* saith, it was total in *Hellespont*; in *Alexandrina*, but of ten Digits. [i] *Joannes Antiochenus* saith, *it continued many Hours*; but they could not exceed three.

Of later Writers differing Accounts thereof are delivered by these:

Ricciolus placeth it before the Incarnation 585 Years, *May* 28th about 6 a-Clock in the Afternoon, the Digits eclipsed 12. 56.

Calvisius before the Incarnation 607 Years Olympiad 43. 4. differing from *Pliny* 18 Years.

The learned Bishop of *Armagh*, in the Reign of *Cyaxares*, Olympiad 44. 4. the 147 Year of *Nabonassar*, the fourth Day of the *Egyptian* Month *Pachon*, according to the *Julian* Account *September* 20 *feria* 1. beginning after Sun-rise 1 3^{m}. 25^{s}. Digits eclipsed 9. continuing almost two Hours.

Petavius Olympiad 45. 4, *Julian* Period 4117. before the Incarnation 597, after the Building of *Rome* 157. *July* 9. *feria*, 3. beginning after Midnight 4^{h}. 45^{m}. Digits eclipsed 9. 22^{m}. Continuance full two Hours.

Kocca confutes *Petavius*, because that Eclipse suits not with the Circumstances of the Story, as beginning too early in the Morning, and being defective as to the Quantity in *Pontus* and *Lesser Asia*.

Lansbergius, Olympiad. 48. 3. the 163 Year of *Nabonassar*, the 12th Day of *Tybi*, which is *May* 28, Digits eclipsed 12. 20^{m}. in *Hellespont*: 10. 12^{m}. in *Alexandria*.

Kepler, *Scaliger*, *Buntingus*, and *Salianus*, follow *Pliny*: Digits eclipsed (according to *Buntingus)* 11. 30^{m}.

Neither is it easy to determine whether this Variety arises from the Incertainty of the Astronomers or of the Chronologers.

Sect. 4. *Of the Year.*

Laertius [k] saith, that *he distinguished the Seasons of the Year*, that, *he first called the last Day of every Month* τριακὰς, the thirtieth Day, that he *divided the Year into three hundred sixty and five Days.*

This Calculation of the Year he seemed to have learned in *Egypt*, where it was in Use, thus explained and commended by [l] *Herodotus*. *The* Egyptians *were of all Men the first that found out the Year, distinguishing it into twelve Months; this they gathered from the Stars, and more judiciously (in my Opinion) than the* Grecians, *for as much as the* Grecians *every third Year, intercalate a Month to make up the Time; but the* Egyptians, *to the Number of* 360 *Days, which twelve Months make, add yearly five Days, whereby the Account of the Circle of Time returning into itself is made good.*

This was called in later Times, *the* Ægyptian *Year* (perhaps because used by *Ptolomy*, who lived in *Egypt)* in Distinction from the *Julian* Year, which was then used in all the Western Parts, and hath the Addition of six Hours: The most perfect is the *Gregorian*, consisting of three hundred sixty five Days, five Hours, forty nine Minutes, twelve Seconds.

Sect. 4. *His Astrological Predictions.*

Thales being earnestly addicted to Astrology, became obnoxious to the Censure of some Persons. *As he was led abroad one Night by an old Woman,* his Maid, (a [m] *Thracian) to look upon the Stars, he fell into a Ditch* (wherein she purposely led him) *to whom, as he complained,* Thales, *said she, do you think, when you cannot see those Things that are at your Feet, that you can understand the Heavens?*

He was also for preferring this Study before Wealth, and was reproved by some Friends, not without Reproach to the Science, as conferring no

e Lib. 1. 23. f Lib. 2. cap. 9. g Cap. 20. h Strom. 1. i Lib. 6. ἐν ᾧ χρόνῳ ὁ ἥλιος ἐξέλειψεν ἐπὶ πολλὰς ἄρας τῆς ἡμέρας, περιεφάνη, θαλῆ τῷ φιλοσόφῳ τὴν ἔκλειψιν τοῦ ἡλίου. The MS. prepared for the Press in the Hands of my honoured Friend Edward Bisbe, Esq; k Lib. 8. 27. l Herod. l. 2. m Plat. Theaet. T. 1. & Jamblich. Protr. c. 14.

Advantage on its Profeſſors; whereupon he thus vindicated himſelf and the Art from that Aſperſion. *When they upbraided him*, ſaith [n] Ariſtotle, *with his Poverty, as if Philoſophy were unprofitable, it is ſaid, that he by Aſtrology, foreſeeing the Plenty of Olives that would be that Year, before the Winter was gone*, antequam florere cœpiſſent, (ſaith [o] Cicero) *gave earneſt, and bought up all the Places for Oil at* Miletus *and* Chios, *which he did with little Money, there being no other Chapman at that Time to raiſe the Price; and when the Time came that many were ſought for in haſte, he ſetting what Rates on them he pleaſed, by this Means got together much Money, and then ſhewed, that it was eaſy for Philoſophers to be rich, if they would themſelves, but that Wealth was not their Aim.* To this [p] *Plutarch* alludes, when he ſays, that *Thales is reported to have practiſed Merchandize.*

CHAP. IX.

His Moral Sentences.

OF his Moral Sentences thoſe are firſt to be remembered which [q] *Plutarch* mentions upon this Occaſion.

Amaſis King of *Egypt* entering into Conteſtation with the King of *Ethiopia* concerning Wiſdom, propounded theſe Queſtions to be reſolved by him; *What is oldeſt of all Things, what faireſt, what greateſt, what wiſeſt, what moſt common, what moſt profitable, what moſt hurtful, what moſt powerful, what moſt eaſy?*

The Anſwers of the *Ethiopian* were theſe, the oldeſt of Things is Time, the wiſeſt Truth, the faireſt Light, the moſt common Death, the moſt profitable God, the moſt hurtful the Devil, the moſt powerful Fortune, the moſt eaſy that which pleaſeth. *Thales* demanded of *Niloxenus* whether *Amaſis* approved theſe Solutions? *Niloxenus*, who was ſent by *Amaſis* into *Greece* with theſe other Queſtions to be reſolved by the Sages, anſwered, that with ſome he was ſatisfied, with others not; *and yet*, replies *Thales*, *there is not one but is erroneous and betrays Ignorance. As for the firſt, how can it be defended, that Time is the oldeſt of Things, when one Part of it paſt, the other preſent, the third yet to come, for that which is to come muſt in Reaſon be eſteemed younger than all Men or Things? Next, to affirm that Truth is Wiſdom, is as much as if we ſhould ſay, that Light and ſeeing is all one. Again, if he eſteem Light fair, why doth he forget the Sun? His Anſwers concerning God and the Devil are bold and dangerous, but that of Fortune moſt improbable, for if ſhe be ſo powerful, how comes it that ſhe is ſo eaſily changed. Nor is Death the moſt common, for it is not common to the Living. The moſt ancient of Things is God, for he never had Beginning or Birth, the greateſt Place of the World containeth all other Things, Place contains the World; the faireſt the World, for whatſoever is orderly diſpoſed is Part thereof; the wiſeſt is Time, for it hath found out all Things already deviſed, and will find out all that ſhall be; the moſt common* [r] *Hope, for that remains with ſuch as have nothing elſe; the moſt profitable, Virtue, for it maketh all Things uſeful and commodious;* [s] *the moſt hurtful, Vice, for it deſtroyeth all good Things; the moſt powerful, Neceſſity, for that only is invincible; the moſt eaſy, that which agreeth with Nature, for even Pleaſures are many Times given over and cloy us.*

To which Apophthegms theſe are added by [t] *Laertius*, *The ſwifteſt of Things is the Mind, for it over-runs all. He affirm'd that there is no Difference betwixt Life and Death; being thereupon asked why he did not die, becauſe, ſaith he, there is no Difference; to one who asked which was eldeſt, Night or Day, he anſwered, Night by a Day; another enquiring whether a Man might do ill and conceal it from the Gods; nor think it ſaid he. To an Adulterer, queſtioning him if he might clear himſelf by Oath* [u]*; Perjury, ſays he, is worſe than Adultery: Being demanded what was difficult, he anſwered, to know one's ſelf; what eaſy, to be rul'd by another; what ſweet, to follow one's own Will; what divine, that which hath neither Beginning nor End.* At his Return from Travel, being demanded *what was the ſtrangeſt Thing he had ſeen*, he anſwered, *a Tyrant old. What will help to bear ill Fortune? to behold our Enemies in worſe. How ſhall a Man live juſtly? by avoiding what he blames in others. Who is happy? he who hath a ſound Body, a rich Fortune, and a docile Nature.*

[w] *Plutarch* adds theſe; *We may well report probable News, but improbable ſhould not be related. We ought not to believe our Enemies in credible Things, nor to diſtruſt our Friends in incredible.* Periander *being much troubled at a Monſter which a Youth brought him, born of a Mare, with the Head only of a Horſe, the reſt reſembling a Man, he adviſed him not to take Care for Expiation of what the Prodigy portended,* ἐγὼ δὲ σοὶ παραινῶν (ſaith he) ἐθίσω τὸ μὴ χρᾶσθαι νομεῦσιν ἵππων, ἢ διδόναι γυναῖκας ἀνδράσι.

Stobæus theſe; [x] *Being demanded how far Falſehood was diſtant from Truth, as far, ſaith he, as the Eyes from the Ears. It is hard but good to know ourſelves, for that is to live according to Nature.*

His moral Precepts are thus delivered by *Demetrius Phalereus*; [y] *If thou art a Surety, Loſs is nigh; be equally mindful of Friends preſent and abſent;*

n Pol. 1. 7. Plin. 18. 68. o De divinat. 1. p In vit. Solon. q Sept. ſap. conviv. r Stob. ſerm. c. 11. s Etiam apud ſerm. 2. t Laert. l. 35. u ἀ χεῖρον μοιχείας ἐπιορκία, not as counſelling the later, but reproving the former. Plutar. de Dæm. Socr. w Sympoſ. ſept. ſap. x Serm. 12. 104. y Stob. Serm. 3.

ſtudy

ſtudy not to beautify thy Face but thy Mind: enrich not thyſelf by unjuſt Means. Let not any Words fall from thee which may accuſe thee to him who hath committed any Thing in Truſt to thee (i. e. be true to thy Truſt.) *Cheriſh thy Parents. Entertain not Evil. What thou beſtoweſt on thy Parents, thou ſhalt receive from thy Children in thy old Age. It is hard to underſtand well. The ſweeteſt Thing is to enjoy our Deſire. Idleneſs is troubleſome. Intemperance hurtful. Ignorance intolerable. Learn and teach better Things. Be not idle tho' rich. Conceal thy domeſtic Ills. To avoid Envy be not pitiable. Uſe Moderation. Believe not all. If a Governor, rule thyſelf.* I follow thoſe Copies of *Stobæus*, that aſcribe theſe to *Thales* rather than to *Pittacus*, becauſe the greater Part are confirmed by *Laertius*.

Auſonius hath reduced theſe into Verſe under his Name.

Fear ere thou ſin, thyſelf tho' none elſe nigh;
Life fades, a glorious Death can never die.
Let not thy Tongue diſcover thy Intent,
'Tis Miſery to dread, and not prevent.
He helps his Foes that juſtly reprehends.
He that unjuſtly praiſeth, harms his Friends,
That's not enough that to Exceſs extends.

His Motto was, according to *Laertius*, *Know thyſelf*; according to [z] *Didymus* and [a] *Hyginus*, *If thou be a Surety, Loſs is nigh*; by [b] *Hermippus*, this is aſcribed to him, tho' by others to *Socrates*: *He gave Thanks to Fortune for three Things: Firſt, That he was born rational, not a Beaſt; ſecondly, that a Man, not a Woman; thirdly, that a* Grecian, *not a Barbarian.*

There are beſide cited by *Laertius*, under the Name of ἀδομένα, or *looſe Verſes*, theſe Sentences,

Not many Words much Wiſdom ſignify.
Chooſe one Thing excellent, to which apply
Thy Mind, and ſtop the Mouth of Calumny.

CHAP. X.

His Judgment in Civil Affairs.

POliticks were, according to *Laertius*, his firſt Study, in which his Advice was of great Authority, tho' he were the only Perſon (as [c] *Cicero* obſerves) of the ſeven wiſe Men, that was not Ruler of the City wherein he lived.

Of his Judgment herein we have two Inſtances; the firſt from [d] *Herodotus*; *Good alſo, even before the Deſtruction of* Ionia, *was the Advice of* Thales, *a* Mileſian, *afar off by Deſcent a* Phœnician, *who commanded the* Ionians *to build one common Council-Hall, and that in* Teos, *for that* Teos *is in the Midſt of* Ionia, *and the reſt of the inhabited Cities, nevertheleſs, to be in Repute, according as the Citizens were.*

The other cited by [e] *Laertius* (with no leſs Applauſe) is this. In the firſt Year of the fifty eighth Olympiad, *Crœſus* King of *Lydia*, fearing the greatneſs of *Cyrus*, and encouraged thereunto, as he conceived, by the Oracle, ſent Ambaſſadors and Preſents to the moſt conſiderable of the *Grecians*, perſuading them to join with him in an Expedition againſt *Cyrus*, which the *Lacedemonians*, with many others did: But *Thales* forbad the *Mileſians* to enter into League with him. *It appears* (adds *Laertius*) *that his Advice in Civil Affairs was excellent; for this Thing* (Cyrus *getting the better*) *preſerv'd the City.*

Yet did he afford *Crœſus* his particular Aſſiſtance in paſſing his Army over *Halys*, as the *Grecians* affirm, tho' [f] *Herodotus* be of a contrary Opinion, who gives this Account of both. *When* Crœſus *was come to the River* Halys, *then, I believe, by Bridges that were there, he paſſed over his Army; but the common Report of the* Grecians *is, that* Thales *the* Mileſian *was he who conveyed it over: For* Crœſus *being doubtful over what Part of the River his Army ſhould paſs, there being in thoſe Days no Bridges,* Thales, *who was in the Field with him, is ſaid to have cauſed the River that did run on the left Hand of the Army, to run alſo on the right, which he brought to paſs thus. Beginning above the Trench, he digged a deep Trench, and brought it in the Faſhion of a Half-moon, that the River being turned into the Trench from the former Channel at the Back of the Army, and paſſing by the Camp, came into the old Channel again, ſo that as ſoon as the River was thus divided,* (*which* Lucian [g] *ſaith, was done in one Night*) *it became fordable on either Side: Some ſay that the old Channel was quite made up, but that I do not believe, for then, how could they in their Return paſs over?* That this is the Meaning of *Herodotus*, miſtaken by [h] *Valla*, will appear from the [i] Scholiaſt of *Ariſtophanes*, who relates it in the ſame Manner, not without applauding *Thales* for his Excellency in Mechanicks.

He was a great Enemy to Tyrants, and accounted all Monarchy little better, as appears by [k] *Plutarch*, who makes him ſpeak thus: 'As for taking 'one for the other, (*viz. A Monarch for a Tyrant*) 'I am of the ſame Mind with the young Man, 'who throwing a Stone at a Dog, hit his Step-

z Clem. Alex. Strom. 1. a Fab. 21. b Laert. 1. 33. c De Orator. l. 3. c. 34. d Lib. 1. τὰς δὲ ἄλλας πολιὰς οἰκεομένας, μηδὲν ἧσσον νομίζεσθαι κατάπερ εἰ δῆμοι εἶεν, *which* Valla *renders thus*; Cæteras autem civitates habitatas nihilo minus huic paturas, quam aliarum civitatum tribus legibus parerent. *Stephanus* thus: Nihilo minus eodem loco haberi tribus: *Both (I conceive) amiſs.* e Laert. 1. 25. f Herodot. l. 1. g Hippia, T. 11. h Who renders ταύτῃ κατὰ τὴν διόρυχα ἐκτραπόμενος τῶν ἀρχαίων ῥεέθρων ἐς αὖτις παραμειβόμενος τὸ στρατόπεδον, εἰς τὰ ἀρχαία ἐσῴκλοι, in quam cum introduxiſſet ex priſtino alveo fluvium, iterum cum ubi exercitus trajectus eſſet in ſuum alveum refunderet. i In Nubes. k Conviv. ſep. ſapient.

mother;

'mother; it is no Matter, said he, for even so, it 'lights not amiss, truly always esteemed *Solon* very 'wise, for refusing to be King of his own Country: 'and *Pittacus*, if he had not taken upon him a Mo- 'narchy, would never have said, how hard it is to 'be a good Man: And *Periander* being seized (as 'it were with an hereditary Disease, derived from 'his Father) by the same Tyranny, did very well 'to endeavour as much as he could to disengage 'himself from it, by frequenting the Conversation 'of the best Men, inviting Sages and Philosophers, 'and being invited by them, not approving the 'dangerous Counsel of *Thrasibulus* my Country- 'man, who persuaded him to take off the Heads 'of the chiefest. For a Tyrant, who chooseth 'rather to command Slaves than Free-men, is like 'a Husband-man, who preferreth the gathering of 'Locusts, and catching of Fowl, before reaping of 'good Corn. These Sovereign Authorities have 'only this Good, in Recompense of many Evils, 'a kind of Honour and Glory, if Men be so hap- 'py, that in ruling good Men, they themselves 'prove better; as for such, who in their Office aim 'at nothing but Security, without Respect of Ho- 'nour and Honesty, they are fitter to be set over 'Beasts than Men.

In the same Symposion, he gives this Account of Monarchy, Democracy, and Oeconomicks. *That* [l] *Prince is happy, who lives till he is old, and dies a natural Death. That* [m] *Common-wealth is best ordered, where the Citizens are neither too rich nor too poor. That* [n] *House is best, wherein the Master may live most at ease.*

CHAP. XI.

Of his Writings.

SOme *affirm* (saith [o] *Laertius*) *that he left nothing behind him in Writing.* Others, that he writ,

Of natural Philosophy: St. [p] *Augustin* saith, that *Thales, to propagate his Doctrine to Succession, searched into the Secrets of Nature, and committing his Opinion to Monuments and Letters, grew famous.*

Of Nautick Astrology (mentioned by [q] *Simplicius*) which is by some ascribed to *Phocus* a *Samian.*

Of the Tropicks and Equinoctials: which two Treatises *Laertius saith he composed, as judging the rest easy to be understood.* These seem to be those Astrological Writings which *Lobon*, an *Argive*, who writ concerning the Poets, affirmeth to have extended to two hundred Verses.

Of Meteors: A Treatise in Verse, mentioned by *Suidas.*

The History of his own Times: If we may give Credit to [r] *Joannes Antiochenus*, who saith, *These Things* Thales, Castor, *and* Polybius *most wise Authors, committed to Writing, and after them* Herodotus *the Historian:* but perhaps this may be no more probable, than that *Polybius* and *Castor* should precede *Herodotus.*

Ἀδόμενα, of which those that are cited by *Laertius*, we have inserted among his moral Sentences; for such they were, tending to the Instruction of the common People, a kind of loose Verse coming near Prose, whence *Demosthenes* makes two Kinds of Poets, τὸς ἐμμέτρους καὶ τὸς ἀδομένους, (as *Casaubon* observes) those that write in *Metre*, and, (if we may so term it) those that write in *blank Verse.* Whatsoever *Laertius* in the Lives of the seven wise Men produceth in this Kind, seemeth not to be taken out of any Poet, but to have been written by the wise Men themselves.

Epistles, of which two only are extant, preserved by *Diogenes Laertius*, l. 1. 43.

Thales *to* Pherecydes.

I *Hear, that you, first of the* Ionians, *are about to publish a Discourse to the* Greeks *concerning Religion, and* [s] *justly you conceive that your Work ought rather to be laid in a publick Library than transmitted to uncertain Persons: If therefore it may any Way pleasure you, I will willingly confer with you about that which you have written, and if you desire, will visit you at* Syrus; *for neither myself, nor* Solon *the* Athenian *should deserve the Titles of* wise Men, *if we, who sail'd to* Crete *to inform ourselves of Matters there, and into* Egypt, *to confer with Priests and Astronomers, should not likewise make a Journey to you:* Solon *also, if you think fit, will come. You who affect home, seldom pass into* Ionia, *nor care to enjoy the Society of Strangers; we, who write nothing, spend our Time in travelling through* Greece *and* Asia.

Thales *to* Solon.

IF *you leave* Athens, *you may, in my Opinion, settle yourself (with those you take along with you) at* Miletus, *for here is nothing to trouble you. If you dislike that we* Milesians *are governed by a Tyrant (for you are averse to all Monarchs, even elective) yet may you please yourself in the Society and Conversation of me your Friend.* Bias *likewise hath sent to invite you to* Priene; *if to abide at* Priene *please you better, we will also come and dwell there with you.*

CHAP. XII.

His Auditors and Scholars.

THE first eminent Person of those who heard *Thales* [t] and professed his Philosophy, was *A-*

l Stob. Serm. 46. m Ibid. 41. n Ibid. 83. o Laert. l. 1. 23. p De civit. Dei, l. 8. c. 11. Vitruv. 9. 7. q Laert. 1. 23. r Lib. 6. ταῦτα δὲ ἱστόρησαν οἱ σοφώταλοι Θαλὴς καὶ Κάτων καὶ Πολύβιος συγγραψάμενοι καὶ μετ' αὐτὸς Ἡρόδοτος ὁ ἱστοριογράφος.
s But the Interpreters render this to another Effect. t Suid. Ἀναξιμανδ. Euseb. Præp. Evangel. 10. Laert. 2. 1. 2.

naximander

naximander Son of *Praxides* a *Mileſian*, who flouriſhed in the Time of *Polycrates* Tyrant of *Samos*.

Next is *Anaximenes* a *Mileſian* alſo, Son of *Euriſtratus*, (who according to *Euſebius*) flouriſhed in the ſecond Year of the 56th Olympiad. He was Scholar to *Anaximander* and *Parmenides*; but that he heard *Thales* alſo, he acknowledgeth in an Epiſtle to [u] *Pythagoras*.

We may (as in that Epiſtle *Anaximenes* doth) amongſt the Diſciples of *Thales* reckon *Pythagoras* the *Samian*, Inſtitutor of the *Italick* Sect, who being from his Youth particularly addicted to Inveſtigation of religious Myſteries, addreſs'd his firſt Journey to *Thales* at *Miletus*, as to one that could beſt further his Deſign, being (according to [w] *Jamblichus*) not fully eighteen Years old; which, if we follow the Account of *Euſebius* for his Birth (the fourth Year of the ſeventieth Olympiad) and that of *Soſicrates* for his Age, eighty Years (for the reſt, the farther they exceed that Time, are ſo much the more incapable of Reconcilement) will fall about the ſecond Year of the fifty fourth Olympiad, which is the 82d of *Thales*. From *Thales* he received the Rudiments of that Excellence which he afterwards attained. This is acknowledged by [x] *Jamblichus*. *Thales*, ſaith he, *entertained him very kindly, admiring the Difference between him and other Youths, which exceeded the Fame he had received of him. After that he had inſtructed him as well as he was able in the Mathematicks, alledging for Excuſe his old Age and Infirmity, he adviſed him to go to* Egypt, *and to converſe with the* Memphian *Prieſts, eſpecially thoſe of* Jupiter, *of whom he himſelf had in his Travels learned thoſe Things, for which by many he was eſteemed wiſe*; and, [y] again, *among other Things* Thales *chiefly adviſed him to husband his Time, in reſpect whereof he abſtained from Wine and Fleſh, only eating ſuch Things as are light of Digeſtion, by which Means he procured ſhortneſs of Sleep, Wakefulneſs, Purity of Mind, and conſtant Health of Body.*

CHAP. XIII.

Of his Death.

Thales having now lived to a great Age, being full of Honour and Wiſdom, [z] died in the firſt Year of the fifty eighth Olympiad (when, according to *Pauſanias*, *Erxyelides* was Archon) as he was beholding the Olympick Games, oppreſt with Heat, Thirſt, and the Burden of his Years, which amounted to ninety two. *Laertius* under-reckons him to have lived but eighty ſeven Years, having before acknowledged his Birth to have been in the firſt of the 35th Olympiad. [a] *Petavius* over-reckons, who makes him live to the End of the 58th, which could not be, becauſe he died Spectator of the Olympick Games. [b] *Lucian* and [c] *Sincellus* more, who ſay he lived 100 Years. [d] *Soſicrates* comes neareſt to the Truth, who allows him to have lived 90 Years; and to have died in the 58th Olympiad; for from the firſt of the 58th are 23 entire Olympiads.

The Manner of his Death gave *Laertius* occaſion to favour him with this Epigram.

Viewing th'Olympick Games Elean Jove,
Thou didſt wiſe Thales *from that his Race remove*
Nigher thyſelf; and 'twas well done, now old
He could not well from Earth the Stars behold.

He was buried, according to his own Appointment [e], in a poor obſcure Part of the *Mileſian* Field, where he preſaged that in future Times their *Forum* ſhould be; upon his Tomb this Diſtich,

Narrow the Tomb, the Fame than Heaven more wide,
Of wiſeſt Thales *whom this Earth doth hide.*

There was alſo a Statue erected in Honour of him bearing this Inſcription,

Mileſian Thales *this doth repreſent,*
Who all in wiſe Aſtrology outwent.

[f] There were five more of this Name mentioned by *Demetrius* the *Magneſian*, an Orator of *Calantes*, an affected Imitator. A Painter of *Sicyonia*, of a great Spirit. The third very Ancient, contemporary with *Heſiod*, *Homer*, and *Lycurgus*; The fourth mentioned by *Duris*: The fifth of later Times, by *Dionyſius* in *Criticis*. [g] *Laertius* names *Pherecydes* as a Detractor from *Thales* the Philoſopher.

u Laert. l. 2. 4. w De vita Pythag. 1, 2. x Ibid. 2. y Ibid. 1, 3. z Laert. 1. 38. Pauſan. Phocic. c. 5. a Rationar. temp. 1. 12. b De longævit. c Chronol. d Apud Laert. 1. 38. e Plut. vit. Solon. f Laert. 1. 38. g Vit. Socrat.

SOLON.

CHAP. I.

His Parents, Country, and Condition.

Philocles [a], cited by *Didymus*, affirms that *Solon*'s Father was named *Euphorion*, but by the unanimous Conſent of all other Writers, he was called *Execeſtides*, a Perſon, though of ſmall Fortune and Account among the Citizens, yet of the moſt noble Family in *Athens*, deſcended from *Codrus*, [b] *Solon* deriving himſelf from *Neleus*, Son of *Codrus*, and from *Neptune*: [c] His Mother near of Kin to the Mother of *Piſiſtratus*; his Parents had another Son named *Dropides*, Archon, the Year after *Solon*, from him was *Plato* deſcended.

Solon was born (according to [d] *Laertius*) at *Salamis*, for which Reaſon he deſired at his Death that his Body might be carried thither; but from his Parents and the Place of his Reſidence, he was ſirnamed *Athenian*.

[e] His Father, by Munificence and Liberality brought his Eſtate ſo low, as to want even Neceſſaries: *Solon* (aſhamed to receive from any, being of a Houſe which uſed to maintain others) betook himſelf to Merchandize: Others ſay, he travelled rather to improve his Knowledge and Experience, for he was a profeſſed Lover of Wiſdom, and even to his laſt uſed to ſay, *I grow old in Learning*; Riches he eſteemed not much, but to grow rich like

——— *him who abounds*
In Heaps of Gold, as in rank Corn his Grounds,
In Mules and Horſes, whilſt his numerous Wealth
Made pleaſing by uninterrupted Health:
If to compleat theſe Joys, he be poſſeſt
Of Wife and Children, he is truly bleſt.

And elſewhere,

Riches I wiſh, not Riches that are plac'd
In unjuſt Means, for Vengeance comes at laſt.

That he was profuſe, and delicate, and more luxurious in his Verſes than beſeems a Philoſopher, is attributed to his practiſing Merchandize, ſuch Perſons requiring more than ordinary Delicacies and Freedoms in Recompence of their many and great Dangers. That he was rather in the Number of the Poor than of the Rich, is apparent from theſe his Verſes.

Many Unjuſt grow rich, and Pious poor,
We would not change our Virtue for their Store,
For conſtant Virtue is a ſolid Baſe:
Riches from Man to Man uncertain paſs.

[f] *Ariſtotle* ranks *Solon* amongſt the inferior Sort of Citizens, which (ſaith he) *is manifeſt from his Elegies*, meaning perhaps, ſome of thoſe which *Plutarch* cites. *Lucian* [g] ſaith, he was extremely poor: *Palæologus* [h], that he neither had nor valued Wealth.

CHAP. II.

How by his Means the Athenians *took* Salamis, Cyrrha, *and the* Thracian Cherſoneſus.

Many (ſaith [i] *Demoſthenes*) *of obſcure and contemptible Birth, have become illuſtrious by Profeſſion of Wiſdom.* Solon *both living and dead flouriſhed in extraordinary Glory, to whom the utmoſt Honours were not denied, for he left a Monument of his Valour, the* Megaræan *Trophy, and of his Wiſdom, the Recovery of* Salamis; the Occaſions theſe.

[k] The Iſland *Salamis* revolted from the *Athenians* to the *Megarenſes*; [l] the *Athenians* having had a long troubleſome War with the *Megarenſes* for its Recovery, grew at length ſo weary, that giving it over, they made a Law, forbidding any upon Pain of Death to ſpeak or write any Thing to perſwade the City to re-attempt it: *Solon* brooking with much Reluctance this Ignominy, and ſeeing many young Men in the City deſirous to renew the War, (tho' not daring to move it, by Reaſon of the Edict) counterfeited himſelf mad, which he cauſed to be given out through the City, and having privately compoſed ſome elegiac Verſes, and got them by Heart, came skipping into the Forum with his Cap (or, as *Laertius* [m] ſaith, *a Garland*) on; the People flocking about him, he went up into the Place of the Cryer, and ſung his Elegy, beginning thus:

A Cryer I, from Salamis *the fair,*
Am come in Verſe this Meſſage to declare:

[n] The Lines wherewith they were moſt excited were theſe:

Rather than Athens, *would I ow'd my Birth*
To Pholegondrian, *or* Sicinian *Earth:*
For Men where e'er I go will ſay this is
One of th' Athenians *that loſt* Salamis.

a Plut. Sol. b Laert. 1. 45. Plut. in Solon. c Laert. vit. Sol. Proclus in Timæum. d Laert. 1. 46. e Plut. Sol. f Polit. 4. 11. g In Scytha. h Orat. 1. i Orat. de falſa legat. k Pauſan. Attic. c. 40. l Plut. Sol. m Laert. 1. 46. n Pauſan. ibid.

And,

Then let's to Salamis, *renew our Claim,*
And with the Iſle recover our loſt Fame.

[o] This Poem was intitled *Salamis*; it conſiſted of a hundred Verſes, very elegant: When he had made an End of ſinging, it was much applauded by his Friends, particularly by *Piſiſtratus*, who excited the Citizens to follow his Advice: By this Means the Law was repealed, and the War recommenced, wherein *Solon* was made General: The common Report is, that taking *Piſiſtratus* along with him, *(whence it is that ſome aſcribe the whole Glory of the Action to* Piſiſtratus, *of whom are* Frontinus, Æneas *and* Juſtin) he ſailed to *Colias*, where finding all the Women celebrating the Feſtival of *Ceres*, he ſent a truſty Meſſenger to *Salamis*, who pretending to be a Renegade, told the *Megarenſes*, that if they would ſurpriſe the principal Women of *Athens*, they ſhould go with him immediately to *Colias*. The *Megarenſes* believing what he ſaid, manned a Ship, and ſent it along with him; *Solon*, as ſoon as he ſaw the Ship come from the Iſland, commanded the Women to retire, and as many beardleſs young Men to put on their Gowns, Head-tyre and Shoes, hiding Daggers under their Garments, and ſo danced and played by the Sea-ſide till the Enemy were landed, and their Ship at Anchor: By this Time the *Megarenſes*, deceived by their outward Appearance, landed in great Haſte, and came upon them, thinking to take them away by Force, [p] *but they ſuddenly drawing their Swords, ſhewed themſelves to be Men, not Women*; the *Megarenſes* were all ſlain, not one eſcaping, the *Athenians* going immediately to the Iſland took it.

[q] Others deny it was taken in this Manner, but that firſt receiving this Anſwer from the *Delphian* Oracle.

Let Sacrifice be to thoſe Heroes paid,
Who under the Aſopian *Ground are laid,*
And dead, are by the ſetting Sun ſurvey'd.

Solon by Night ſailed to the Iſland, and ſacrificed Burnt-Offerings to the Heroes *Periphemus*, and *Cichris*; then he received five hundred Men of the *Athenians*, with Condition, that if they gained the Iſland, the ſupreme Government thereof ſhould be in them: Shipping his Men in Fiſher-boats, attended by one Ship of thirty Oars, they caſt Anchor by *Salamis*, near a Point oppoſite to *Eubœa*: The *Megarenſes* who were in *Salamis* hearing an uncertain Rumor hereof, betook themſelves confuſedly to Arms, ſending forth a Ship to bring them more certain Intelligence from the Enemy, which *Solon*, as ſoon as it came near, took, and killing the *Megarenſes*, manned with choice *Athenians*, whom he commanded to make directly for the City, with all poſſible Secrecy; in the mean time, he with the reſt of the *Athenians*, aſſaulted the *Megarenſes* by Land, and whilſt they were in Sight, they who were in the Ship, making Haſte, poſſeſt themſelves of the Town. This Relation is confirmed by their Solemnity, an *Athenian* Ship comes thither firſt in Silence, then falling on with Cries and Shouts, an armed Man leaps forth, and runs directly towards the *Scirradian* Promontary againſt thoſe that come from the Land: Hard by is the Temple of *Mars*, built by *Solon*; for he overcame the *Megarenſes*, and let go ranſomleſs all thoſe that eſcaped the Miſery of the War. *Ælian* [r] ſaith, *he took two Ships of the* Megarenſes, *whereinto he put* Athenian *Officers and Soldiers, bidding them put on the Armour of the Enemy, whereby deceiving the* Megarenſes, *he ſlew many of them unarmed.*

[s] But the *Megarenſes* perſiſting in Obſtinacy, to the Loſs of many Lives on both Sides, the Buſineſs was referred to the *Lacedemonians* to be decided; many affirm *Solon* alledged the Authority of *Homer*, inſerting a Verſe into his Catalogue of Ships, which he thus recited at the Trial,

Ajax *twelve Veſſels brought to* Salamis,
And where th' Athenian *Men had ſtood rank'd his.*

By which ſecond Verſe of his own making and Addition he evinced, that Salamis *of old belonged to the* Athenians.) But the *Athenians* eſteem this Relation fabulous, affirming, *Solon* demonſtrated to the Judges, that *Phylæus* and *Euriſaces*, Sons of *Ajax*, being made free Denizons by the *Athenians*, delivered this Iſland to them, and dwelt, one at *Brauro* in *Attica*, the other in *Melita*, whence there is a Tribe named *Philaidæ*, from *Philæus*, of which was *Piſiſtratus*. [t] *He overcame the* Megarenſes *in an Oration, getting the better of them, not with ſpecious Words, but Weight of Argument.* [u] More clearly to convince them, he inſtanced in the Burial of the Dead, *and Inſcription of the Names of Towns*, uſed by thoſe of *Salamis*, [w] *as he ſhewed by digging up ſome Graves*, after the Manner of the *Athenians*, not of the *Megarenſes*; for in *Megara* they buried their Dead with their Faces to the Eaſt, in *Athens*, to the Weſt. But *Hereas* of *Megara* denying this, affirms, the *Megarenſes* buried alſo with their Faces toward the Weſt; for further Confirmation, *Solon* alledged, that the *Athenians* had for each Man a ſeveral Coffin, the *Megarenſes* buried three or four in the ſame. It is ſaid alſo, that *Solon* was much helped by certain Oracles of *Apollo*, wherein he calls *Salamis Ionia*. This Cauſe

o Plut. Sol. p Polyæn. lib. 1. 20. Plut. Sol. q Plut. Sol. r Var. Hiſt. 7. 9. s Plut. Sol. t Ælian. var. Hiſt. 7. 19. u Plut. Sol. w Laert. 1. 48.

was

was decided by five *Spartans*, *Critolaidas*, *Amomphoretus*, *Hypſechidas*, *Anaxilas*, and *Cleomenes*.

[x] By this Action *Solon* grew into great Eſteem and Honour, but he became [*not long after*] much more admired and cried up by the *Greeks*, for ſpeaking concerning the Temple at *Delphi*. *The* Cyrrhæans *committed many Impieties againſt* Apollo, *and cut off Part of the Land belonging to him.* [y] *Solon* declared, that it behoved them to relieve it, and not to ſuffer the *Cyrrhæans* to prophane the Oracle, but that they ſhould vindicate the Gods Cauſe. The *Amphictions* thus inſtigated by him, undertook the War with much Eagerneſs, as *Ariſtotle* affirms, aſcribing to *Solon* the Honour of that Enterprize. *Æſchines* ſaith, the Motion made by *Solon* was confirmed by the Oracle. Some affirm he was made General; others *Alcmæon*: *But the whole Army of the* Greeks *was* (*according to* [z] Pauſanias) *led by* Cliſthenes, *Tyrant of* Sycionia, *along with whom they ſent* Solon *from* Athens *to be his Counſellor.* [a] Suidas ſaith, *he was choſen Counſellor by thoſe who were pick'd out for the Service of that War.* [b] *Whilſt* Cliſthenes *beſieged* Cyrrha, [c] *they enquired concerning the Victory*; *and from the* Pythian *Oracle received this Anſwer*,

This City's Fort you ſhall not take before
Blue *Amphitrite*'s ſwelling Billows roar (Shore.
Againſt my Wave-waſh'd Grove, and hallow'd

Whereupon Solon *advis'd to conſecrate the* Cyrrhæan *Field to* Apollo, *by which Means the Sea ſhould touch ſacred Land.* [d] *He uſed alſo another Stratagem againſt the* Cyrrhæans; *the River* Pliſtus, *which ran through the City, he diverted another Way, the Town holding out againſt the Beſiegers, ſome drunk Well-water, others Rain, which they ſaved in Ciſterns. He cauſed Roots of Hellebore to be thrown into* Pliſtus, *and when he found it was full poiſoned, turned the River again into its proper Channel: The* Cyrrhæans *drinking greedily of that Water, were taken with a continual Flux, and forced thereby to give over the Defence of their Works. The* Amphictions *being poſſeſt of the City, puniſhed the* Cyrrhæans, *and avenge the Gods.* Theſe two Stratagems were aſcribed to *Cliſthenes*, the firſt by [e] *Poliænus*, the ſecond by [f] *Frontinus*, but the Reaſon is apparent, he doing them by the Direction of *Solon*.

[g] *Solon* perſuaded alſo the *Athenians* to reduce into their Power the *Thracian Cherſoneſus*.

CHAP. III.

How he compoſed Differences and Seditions at home, and was made Archon.

THE *Cylonian* [h] Impiety had for a long time vexed the City, ever ſince the Complices of *Cylon*, having taken Sanctuary, were perſuaded by *Megacles* the Archon, to put themſelves upon a Trial, they laying hold of a Thread which was tied to the Image of *Pallas*; when they came near the Images of the Furies, the Thread broke of itſelf, whereupon *Megacles*, with the other Archons, fell upon them, as perſons diſown'd by the Goddeſs; thoſe that were without the Temple they ſtoned, thoſe who run to the Altars, they were murdered; they only eſcaped who ſued to their Wives, whence being called impious, they were accounted odious: Thoſe that remained of the *Cylonians* were grown very rich, and had perpetual Enmity with the Family of *Megacles*; at what Time this Diſſention was the higheſt, and the People thereby divided into Factions, *Solon* being of much Authority amongſt them, taking with him the chiefeſt of the City, interpoſed betwixt them, and with Intreaties and Advice perſuaded thoſe who were called impious to ſubmit to the Judgment of three hundred of the chief Citizens: *Miro* was their Accuſer; they were condemned, the Living to be baniſhed, the Bones of the Dead to be digged up, and thrown beyond the Confines of the Country.

During theſe Commotions, the *Megarenſes* took *Nyſſa*, and recovered *Salamis* from the *Athenians*; the City was full of ſuperſtitious Terrors and Apparitions; the Prieſts declared, that the Entrails of the ſacrificed Beaſts imported great Crimes and Impieties, which required Expiation. [i] *There was alſo a great Plague*; [k] the Oracle adviſed them to luſtrate the City; to this End they ſent ([l] *Nicias*, Son of *Niceratus*, with a Ship) [m] to fetch *Epimenides* out of *Crete*, who coming to *Athens*, was entertained by *Solon* as a Gueſt, converſed with him as a Friend, inſtructed him in many Things, and ſet him in the Way of making Laws. *This Luſtration of the City*, Euſebius *under-reckons*, *placing it in the ſecond Year of the forty-ſeventh Olympiad*, *whereas* Solon's *being Archon*, *which certainly happened after this*, *was in the third Year of the forty-ſixth.* Suidas *ſeems to over-reckon*, *ranking it in the forty-fourth.* *The Opinion of* [n] Laertius *agrees beſt with the Circumſtances of the Story*, *that it was in the forty-ſixth.*

[o] The Commotions of the *Cylonei* being thus appeaſed, and the Offenders extirpated, the People fell into their old Difference about the Government of the Common-wealth, whereby they were divided into as many Factions as the Province contained Diſtinctions of People; the Citizens were Democratical, the Countrymen affected Oligarchy, the Maritimes ſtood for a mix'd Kind of Government, and hindered both the other Parties from having the Rule; at the ſame time the City was in a dangerous Condition, by Reaſon of a Diſſenſion betwixt the Rich and the Poor, ariſing from their

x Plut. Sol. y Ibid. z In Phoc. c. 37. a In voce Solon. b Polyæn. lib. 3. c Pauſan. d Ibid. e Lib. 3. c. 5. f Lib. 3. c. 7. g Laert. 1. 47. h Plut. Sol. i Laert. 1. 110. k Plut. Sol. l Laert. ibid. m Plut. ibid. n In Epimenid. o Plut. ibid.

Inequality, the Buſineſs ſeemed Impoſſible to be compoſed, but by a Monarchy; the Commons were generally oppreſſed by the Money which they had borrowed of the rich, and either had tilled their Land, paying to them the ſixth Part of the Crop, whence they were called *Hectemorii* and *Thetes*, or engaged their Bodies to their Creditors, whereof ſome ſerved at home, others were ſold abroad, many alſo (there being no Law to the contrary) were neceſſitated to ſell their Children, and leave the City, through the Cruelty of theſe Uſurers, the greateſt Part (ſuch as had moſt Courage amongſt them) aſſembling together, mutually exhorted one another not to endure theſe Things any longer, but chuſing ſome truſty Man to be their Leader, to diſcharge thoſe that paid not their Money at the ſet Day, to ſhare the Land, and quite invert the State of the Common-wealth. The diſcreeteſt among the *Athenians* looking upon *Solon* as a Perſon free from any Crime (neither engaged in the Oppreſſions of the Rich, nor involved in the Neceſſities of the Poor) intreated him to take Charge of the Common-wealth, and to compoſe the Differences of the People. *Phanias* the *Lesbian* affirmeth, that for Preſervation of the State, he deceived both Parties, promiſing under-hand to the Poor, a Diviſion of the Land; the Rich, to make good their Contracts; but that he firſt made Scruples of undertaking the Buſineſs, deterred by the Avarice of the one, and Inſolence of the other; he was choſen Archon, next after *Philombrotus* (p *in the third Year of the forty-ſixth Olympiad)* at what Time he made his Laws alſo, being at once a Peace-maker and a Law-giver, acceptable to the Rich, as rich, and to the Poor, as good; the People had often in their Mouths this Saying of his, *Equality breeds no Strife*; which pleaſed alike both Parties; one Side underſtanding it of Number and Meaſure, the other of Worth and Virtue; upon which Hope, the moſt powerful of both Factions courted him much, and deſired him to take upon him the Tyranny of that Common-wealth, which he had now in his Power, offering themſelves to his Aſſiſtance: Many alſo of the moderate Part, ſeeing how laborious and difficult it would be to reform the State by Reaſon and Law, were not unwilling to have a Prince created, ſuch an one as were moſt prudent and juſt: Some affirm he received this Oracle from *Apollo*,

Sit at the Helm of State, their Pilot be,
The Common-wealth's glad to be ſteer'd by thee.

But he was moſt of all reproved by his familiar Friends, for being deterred by the Name of a Tyrany, as if the Virtue of a King were not diffuſed through the Kingdom, inſtancing in *Tynondas*, long ſince Tyrant of *Eubœa*, and *Pittacus*, at preſent of *Mytelene*. Nothing they alledged could move him; he told them a Tyranny was a fair Poſſeſſion, but it had no Paſſage out. To *Phocus* writing thus in Verſe,

That I preſerved free my native Soil,
Nor did with bloody Tyranny defile
My Honour, I not bluſh at by this Deed,
All that was done by others I exceed.

Whereby it appears, he was of great Authority before he writ his Laws. The Contumelies of ſuch as reproved him for declining the Government, he thus expreſt in Verſe:

Nor wiſe is Solon, *nor good Counſel knows,*
For he reſiſts the good that God beſtows,
The Prey within his Power he did behold,
But would not draw the Net; Thoughts meanly cold:
Had but his Soul with noble Aims been fir'd,
The Kingdom for one Day he had deſir'd,
Then ſplit, and all his Family expir'd.

CHAP. IV.

What Alterations he made during his Government, and firſt of the Siſachthia.

THough he refuſed the Tyranny, yet he behaved not himſelf remiſly in the Government q, not complying with the powerful, nor making Laws to pleaſe thoſe who had choſen him; where Things were tolerable he corrected nor altered nothing; fearing, leſt if he ſhould change and confound the Common-wealth in every Particular, he ſhould want Strength to ſettle it again, and to temper it with the beſt Reaſon; but ſuch Things unto which he conceived he might perſuade the Obſequious, and compel the Refractory, thoſe he enacted; joining (as he ſaid) Force and Juſtice, whence, being afterwards demanded if he had given the *Athenians* the beſt Laws, the beſt (ſaith he) they would receive.

r The firſt Change he made in the Government was this, he (s *introduced the* Siſachthia, *which was a Diſcharge of Bodies and Goods; or as* t Heſychius *defines it, a Law for Remiſſion of private and publick Debts, ſo called from ſhaking off the Oppreſſion of Uſury:* u *For at that Time they engaged their Bodies for Payment, and many through Want were conſtrained to ſerve their Creditors, he therefore)* ordained that for the Time paſt, all Debts ſhould be acquitted, and for the future, no Security ſhould be taken upon the Body of any; this by a moderate Term he called *Siſachthia*; there want

p Laert. ibid. q Plut. Sol. r Ibid. s Laert. 1. 45. t In Verb. σεισαχθ. u Laert. ibid.

not

not (of whom is *Androtion*) who affirmed he contented the Poor, not by an absolute Discharge of the Debt, but by moderating the Interest, which he called *Sisachthia*; whereto he added the Increase of Measures, and Valuation of Money; for the Mina, which was before seventy-three Drachms, he made a hundred: By this Means the poorer Sort paid a greater Sum in less Coin, which was a great Ease to the Debtor, and no Wrong to the Creditor: But the greater Part hold it was an absolute Discharge, which agreeth best with the Verses of *Solon*, wherein he boasteth he had *removed the Bounds throughout the Land, freed such as were under Oppression, called home those, who being forced to travel, had forgotten their native Language; and others that were at home under Bondage, set at Liberty.* The same Law, [w] *Diodorus Siculus* observes to be among the *Egyptians*, conceiving *Solon* (tho' as yet he had not been there) derived it from them.

[x] But in this Design a great Misfortune befel him, whilst he endeavoured to redress the Oppression of Usury, and was studying how to begin an Oration suitable to the Thing, he acquainted his intimate Friends, in whom he reposed most Confidence, *Conon*, *Clinias* and *Hipponicus*, that he meant not to meddle with Land; but to cut off all Debts; they (preventing the Edict) borrowed of the Rich great Sums of Money, wherewith they purchased much Land; the Edict being published, they enjoyed their Purchase, without satisfying their Creditors: *Solon* was much blamed, as not defrauded with the rest, but as being a Defrauder with those, and a Partaker of their Cozenage; but this Imputation was immediately washed away with five Talents, so much he had forth at Interest, which he first, according to the Law, blotted out (*Laertius* saith six, persuading others to do the like) others, of whom is *Polytelus* the *Rhodian*, fifteen; but his Friends were ever after called χρεωκοπίδαι.

[y] This pleased neither Party; he discontented the Rich by cancelling their Bonds, the Poor more, not making good a Parity of Estates, which they expected, as *Lycurgus* had done, he being the eleventh from *Hercules*, having reigned many Years in *Lacedæmon*, great in Authority, Friends, and Wealth, whereby he was able to make good what he thought convenient for the State, rather by Force than Persuasion, even to the Loss of his Eye, effected as a Thing most expedient to the Preservation and Peace of the Common-wealth, that none of the Citizens were either rich or poor: But *Solon* attained not this in the Common-wealth, he was one of the People, and of a mean Degree; yet he omitted nothing within his Power, carried on by his own Judgment, and the Faith which the Citizens had in him; that he displeased many, who expected other Things, is thus acknowledged by himself.

Before they look'd upon me kindly, now
With Eyes severe, and a contracted Brow:
Had any else my Power, he would exact
Their Riches, and their fattest Milk extract.

But both Parties soon found how much this conduced to the general Good, and laying aside their private Differences, sacrificed together, calling the Sacrifice Σεισαχθέια.

CHAP. V.

How he divided the People into Classes, and erected Courts of Judicature.

HEreupon [z] they chose *Solon* Reformer and Lawgiver of the Common-wealth, not limiting him to any Thing, but submitting all to his Power, Magistracies, Convocations, Judgments, Courts to take an Account of them, to prescribe what Number and Times he pleased; to disannul or ratify of the present Law what he thought good.

[a] First then, he quite abolished all the Laws of *Draco*, except for Murder, because of their Rigidness and Severity, for he punished almost all Offences with Death; as that they who were surprized in Idleness should be put to Death; they who stole Herbs or Apples should undergo the same Punishment with such as had committed Murder or Sacrilege; whence *Demades* wittily said, *Draco* writ his Laws not in Ink, but Blood; he being asked why he punished all Offences with Death, answered, *he conceived the least deserved so much, and he knew no more for the greatest.* Herodicus, *alluding to his Name, said his Laws were not of a Man, but of a Dragon, they were so rigid*; *And* [b] Aristotle saith, *there was nothing in them extraordinary and worthy of Memory, but that Severity and greatness of Penalty* which was so excessive, that [c] *not by any Edict or Command, but by a silent unexpressed Consent amongst the* Athenians, *they were laid aside*; *afterwards they used the milder Laws made by* Solon, differing even in Name, the first being called θεσμοί, the latter νόμοι. [d] Those of *Draco* were made in the 39th Olympiad, 47 Years (as *Ulpian* [e] accounts) before these of *Solon*.

[f] Next, *Solon* (being desirous that all Offices might continue as they were, in the Hands of the Rich, but that other Privileges of the Common-wealth, from which the People were excluded, might be promiscuously disposed) took an Account and Valuation of the People [[g] *and divided them into four Orders*] those whose Stock of dry and liquid Fruits amounted to 500 Measures, he ranked

w Lib. 1. x Plut. Sol. y Ibid. z Ibid. a Ibid. b Arist. Rhet. 2. 23. c A. Gell. 11. 18. d Tatian. Clem. Alex. Suid. e In Demost. Timocr. f Plut. Solon. g Pollux. 8. 10.

in

in the first Place, and called *Pentacosiomedimni*, [h *these paid a Talent to the publick Treasury.*] In the second Class were those who were able to maintain a Horse, or received 300 Measures, these he called [i *for that Reason*] *Horsemen*; *they paid half a Talent.* The third Class were *Zeugitæ* (k *so called*) because they had 200 Measures of both Sorts l, *these paid* 10 *Minæ*; the rest were all called *Thetes*, whom he suffered not to be capable of any Magistracy, neither did they pay any Thing, but only had so far Interest in the Common-wealth, as to have a Suffrage in the publick Convocation, and at Judgments, which at first seemed nothing, but afterwards appeared to be of great Consequence; for in whatsoever was brought before the Judges, he gave them leave (if they would) to appeal to the common *Forum*; moreover, writing his Laws obscurely and perplexedly, he increased the Power of the *Forum*, for not being able to determine Controversies by the Law, they were forced to have Recourse to the Judges, as Masters of the Law; this Equality he himself thus expresseth,

The Commons I sufficient Power allow;
Honour from none I took, on none bestow;
Those who in Power or Wealth the rest outshin'd,
In Bounds of Moderation I confin'd;
To either Part I was a firm Defence,
And neither did allow Prebeminence.

Hither m *Seneca* alluding, saith, Solon *founded* Athens *upon equal Right*; *and* n Justin, *he carried himself with such Temper between the Commons and the Senate, that he attracted equal Favour from both*; *he suffered no Man* (saith o *Eneas Gazeus*) *to have a peculiar Law, but made all Men subject to the same.*

p He likewise (continues *Plutarch*) constituted the Court of the *Areopagus*, consisting of the yearly *Archons*, whereof himself (being the Chief) was one; perceiving the People to be much exalted and emboldened by the Remission of their Debts, he ordained a second Court of Judicature, selecting out of each Tribe (which were in all four) a hundred Persons, who should resolve upon all Decrees before they were reported to the People; nor should any Thing be brought to them, until it had first past the Senate: The supreme Senate he appointed Judge and preserver of the Laws, conceiving the City would be less apt to float up and down, and the People become more settled, relying upon these two Courts, as on two Anchors; thus the greater Part of Writers make *Solon* Institutor of the Court of *Areopagus* (*of whom also is* q Cicero) which seems to be confirmed, in that *Draco* never mentions the *Areopagites*, but in Criminal Causes always names the *Ephetæ*; but the eighth Law of the thirtieth Table of *Solon* hath these Words, *Those who are branded with Infamy before* Solon *was Archon, let them be restored to their Fame, except such as were condemned by the* Areopagites, *or by the* Ephetæ, *&c.* And it is certain, *that the Court of* Areopagus *was long before* Solon's *Time, until then consisting promiscuously of such Persons as were eminent for Nobility, Power, or Riches, but* Solon *reformed it, ordaining none should be thereof, but such as had first undergone the Office of Archon.* See *Meursius, Areop. cap.* 3.

r Pollux *saith, that* Solon *ordained a thousand Men to judge all Accusations*; s Demetrius Phalereus, *that he constituted the* Demarchi, *first called* Nauclari.

CHAP. VI.

His Laws.

HAving thus disposed the Common-wealth, and Courts of Judicature, he in the next Place applied himself to making Laws, which he performed so excellently, that he is generally remembered under that Notion, with *Minos* of *Crete*, and *Lycurgus* of *Lacedæmon*, whose Laws those of *Solon exceeded*, (as t *Tacitus* saith) *both in Exquisiteness and Number*: u *Of how much greater Esteem they were than all before them, may be computed from this, that they were the last, and continued always in the City: They, for whom they were made, thought them more illustrious than their publick Ornaments, which transcended those of all other Cities, more impregnable than their Tower, which they accounted the strongest of all upon Earth, and far better than those Things wherein they gloried most*: w Nor were they of less Esteem among Foreign Nations, insomuch that the *Romans agreeing concerning Laws in general, but differing about the Law-giver, sent Ambassadors to* Athens, Sp. Posthumius Albus, A. Manlius, P. Sulpitius Camerinus, *commanding them to transcribe the renowned Laws of* Solon: x Which *transferred out of the Books of* Solon, *the* Decemviri, *expounded in the twelve Tables.* Hence y *Ammianus Marcellinus* saith, *that* Solon, *assisted by the Sentences of the* Egyptian *Priests, having with just Moderation framed Laws, added also to the* Roman *State the greatest Foundation.*

Of his Laws, these have been preserved by *Plutarch* and others.

z *If any Man were beaten, hurt, or violently treated, whosoever had the Means and Will might sue the Offender.* Thus (saith *Plutarch*) he wisely brought the Citizens to a mutual Sense of one anothers Hurts, as if done to a Limb of their own Body.

h Pollux. 8. 10. i Ibid. k Ibid. l Ibid. m Epist. 90. n Lib. 2. 7. o In Theophrast. p Plut. Solon. q De offic. l. 1. 9. c. 21. r Lib. 8. cap. 6. s Schol. Aristoph. in Nub. t Annal. 3. 26. u Man. Palæolog. in protreptr. ad doctr. w Liv. lib. 3. c. 31. x Aurel. Vict. de vir. illust. c. 21. y Lib. 22. 16. z Plut. Sol.

Of

Of infamous [a] *Persons, let all such as were infamous before the Government of* Solon, *be restored to their Fame, excepting whosoever were condemned by the* Ephetæ, *or in the* Prytanæum *by the Magistrates, banished for Murder, Theft, or aspiring to Tyranny.* This was the eight Law of the thirteenth Table. There were two Kinds of Infamy; by the lesser, a Man was degraded and made incapable of all Honour or Office in the Common-wealth; by the greater, he and his Children were liable to be killed by any Man, and he not to be questioned for it.

[b] Of his Laws, those seem most singular and paradoxal, which declare him infamous, who in a Sedition takes neither Part: It is cited out of *Aristotle* by [c] *A. Gellius* in these Words: *If through Discord and Dissension, any Sedition and Difference divided the People into two Factions, whereupon with exasperated Minds both Parties take up Arms and fight; he, who at that Time, and upon that Occasion of civil Discord, shall not engage himself on either Side, but solitary and separated from the common Evil of the City, withdraw himself, let him be deprived of House, Country and Goods by Banishment.* [d] He would not that any one saving himself harmless, should be insensible of the common Calamity, or boast himself to have no Share in the publick Grief, but that instantly applying himself to the better and juster Side, he should interest himself in the common Danger, and assist, rather than out of all Hazard, expect which Side should get the better. When we did read (saith *A. Gellius*) this Law of *Solon*, a Person endued with singular Wisdom, at first we remained in great Suspence and Admiration, enquiring for what Reason he judged those worthy of Punishment, who withdrew themselves from Sedition and civil War; then one whose Sight pierced more deeply into the Use and Meaning of the Law, affirmed, the Intent thereof was not to increase but appease Sedition; and so indeed it is: For if all good Persons, who in the Beginning are too few to restrain a Sedition, should not deter the distracted raging People, but dividing themselves, adhere to either Side, it would follow, that they being separated, as Partakers of both Factions, the Parties might be temper'd and govern'd by them, as being Persons of greatest Authority; by which Means they might restore them to Peace, and reconcile them, governing and moderating that Side whereof they are, and desiring much rather the adverse Party should be preserved than destroyed. [e] *Cicero* citing this Law, averreth the Punishment to have been capital, perhaps understanding Infamy here of the more severe Kind.

Absurd and ridiculous (saith *Plutarch*) seemeth that Law which alloweth an *Inheritrix, if he who possesseth her by Law as her Lord and Master, be impotent, to admit of any of her Husband's nearest Kindred.* But some aver it is just, as to those, who tho' they are impotent, yet will marry rich Heiresses for their Money, and by the Privilege of Law wrong Nature; for when they see it lawful for the Heiress to admit whom she pleaseth, either they will refrain from such Marriages, or undergo them with the Reproach of Avarice and Dishonesty. It is well ordered also, that she may not admit any one, but only whom she will of her Husband's Kindred, whereby the Issue may be of his Family and Race. [f] Hitherto likewise it tends, that *the Bride be shut up in a Room with the Bridegroom, and eat a Quince with him.* (Intimating, according to [g] *Plutarch*'s Interpretation, that the first Grace of her Lips and Voice should be agreeable and Sweet) and that *he who marrieth an Heiress be obliged to visit her thrice a Month at the least:* For tho' they have not Children, this argues a Respect due to a chaste Wife, and prevents or reconciles Unkindness and Dissension.

Those Words of the former Law, *He who possesseth her by Law as her Lord and Master*, have Reference to another Law of his, mentioned by *Diodorus Siculus* [h], that *the next of Kin to an Heiress might by Law require her in Marriage, and she likewise might require him that was next of Kin who was obliged to marry her, tho' never so poor, or to pay* 500 *Drachms for her Dowry.* Hereto [i] *Terence* alludes.

The Law commands an Heir to marry with
Her Husband's next of Kin, and him to take her.

And to the putting her off without a Dowry of 500 Drachms, (that is five *Minæ*) [k] elsewhere.

Tho' I be injur'd thus, yet rather than
I'll be contentious, or bound still to hear thee,
Since she's my Kinswoman, take hence with her
The Dower the Law enjoyns me, here's five Pound.

[l] In all other Marriages he forbad Dowries, ordaining that *a Bride should bring with her no more than three Gowns, and some slight Houshold Stuff of small Value*, the Particulars whereof were expressed, as [m] *Pollux* seems to imply, *for he would not that Marriage should be mercenary or vendible, but that the Man and Woman should cohabit for Issue, Love, and Friendship.* Hither [n] *Isidor* alludes, amongst the *Athenians*, legal Marriage was said to be contracted in respect of Issue.

That Law of his also was commended, as [o] *Demosthenes* and *Plutarch* attest, which forbad to revile the Dead, *Let no Man revile any dead Person,*

a Plut. Sol. b Ibid. c Lib. 2. cap. 12. d Plut. Sol. e Ad Attic. 10. 1. f Plut. Sol. g In præcept. conjugal. h Lib. 12. i Hec. Act. 1. Scen. 2. k Phorm. Act. 2. Scen. 3. l Plut. Sol. m 1, 12, 15. n Lib. 3. Epist. 243. o Orat. in Leptin.

tho' provoked by the Revilings of his Children. [p] To eſteem the deceaſed holy, is pious; to ſpare the abſent, juſt; to take away the Eternity of Hatred, civil.

[q] He forbad *to revile any living Perſon at ſacred Solemnities, Courts of Judicature, and publick Spectacles, upon Penalty of three Drachms to be paid to the reviled Perſon; two more to the common Treaſury.* To moderate Anger no where, he accounted rude and diſorderly, every where difficult, to ſome impoſſible. A Law muſt be accommodated to what is poſſible; intending to puniſh ſome few, to advantage not many to no Purpoſe.

[r] His Law concerning Teſtaments is much approved; for before, no Man had Power to make a Will, but his Goods and Lands continued in the Family of the deceaſed Perſon. *Solon* made it *lawful for him that had no Children, to give his Eſtate to whom he pleaſed.* He preferred Friendſhip before Kindred, and Favour before Neceſſity; and ordered, that Wealth ſhould be at the Diſpoſal of him in whoſe Hands it was; yet he permitted not this raſhly, or abſolutely, but conditionally; *If he were not wrought upon by Sickneſs, Potions, Bondage, or the Blandiſhments of a Wife.* Juſtly he eſteemed it all one, whether a Man be ſeduced by indirect Means, or violently conſtrained; thus comparing Deceit with Force, and Pleaſure with Pain, as being of equal Power to put a Man out of his right Mind. This Law is mentioned likewiſe by [s] *Demoſthenes.*

He alſo limited the Viſits, Mournings, and Feaſts of Women, by a Law which curbed their former Licentiouſneſs. *Her who went abroad, he permitted not to carry with her above three Gowns, nor more Meat and Drink than might be bought with an Obolus; nor a Basket above a Cubit in Bigneſs; nor to travel by Night, unleſs in a Chariot, and with Torch-light. He forbad them to tear their Cheeks to procure Mourning and Lamentation, at the Funerals of thoſe, to whom they have no Relation. He forbad to ſacrifice an Ox at Funerals, and to bury more than three Garments with the dead Body; not to approach the Monuments of Strangers, unleſs at their Exequies.* Of which (ſaith *Plutarch*) our Laws are full. [t] *Cicero* alſo affirms, that the Laws of the twelve Tables for contracting the Pomp of Funerals, and concerning Mourning, are transferred from thoſe of *Solon*, who (as *Phalereus* writes) as ſoon as Funerals began to be ſolemnized with Pomp and Lamentation, took them away; which Law the *Decemviri* put into the tenth Table, almoſt in the very ſame Words, for that of three Neighbourhoods, and moſt of the reſt, are *Solon*'s; that of Mourning, in his expreſs Words, *Let no Women tear their Cheeks, nor make Lamentation at a Funeral.*

[u] Conſidering that all the City grew very populous, many recurring thither from all Parts of *Attica*, for Liberty and Security, that the Country was, for the moſt Part, barren and bad; that ſuch as trade by Sea import nothing for thoſe that have not wherewith to barter or exchange with them; he addicted the Citizens to Arts; and made a Law, that *the Son ſhould not be obliged to maintain his Father, if he had not brought him up to a Trade* (mentioned alſo by [w] *Vitruvius*, [x] *Galen*, [y] *Theophylact*, and others) and commanded *the Court of* Areopagus *to examine by what Gain every Man maintained himſelf, and to puniſh idle Perſons, whom he made liable to the Action of every Man; and at the third Conviction, puniſhed with Infamy.* This Law [z] *Herodotus*, and [a] *Diodorus Siculus*, affirm to have been in uſe amongſt the *Ægyptians*, made by *Amaſis*, and from them derived by *Solon* to the *Athenians.*

[b] Yet more ſevere was that mentioned by *Heraclides* of *Pontus*, which *diſengaged the Sons of Concubines from maintaining their Fathers.* He who tranſgreſſeth the Bounds of Marriage, profeſſeth he doth it not out of Deſire of Iſſue, but for Pleaſure, and therefore already hath his Reward, and can expect to have no further Tye upon thoſe he begets, whoſe Birth is their Shame.

[c] Moſt incongruous ſeem thoſe Laws of *Solon*, which concern Women; for he permitted, that whoſoever ſurprized an Adulterer (with the Wife or [d] Concubine of any) might kill him, (or exact Money of him.) *He that raviſhed a free Woman was fined* 100 *Drachms; he that plaid the Pander,* 20, ([e] *Æſchines* ſaith, to die) *except to ſuch Women as were common.* He alſo forbad *any Man to give his Siſter or Daughter to that Profeſſion, unleſs himſelf firſt ſurprize her with a Man.* This (ſaith *Plutarch*) ſeems abſurd, to puniſh the ſame Offences ſometimes ſeverely with Death, ſometimes with a pecuniary Mulct; unleſs, becauſe at that Time Money was very rare in *Athens*, the Scarcity thereof aggravated the Puniſhment.

[f] He aſſigned *five hundred Drachms to the Victor of the Iſthmian Games, a hundred to the Victor of the Olympick.* Atteſted alſo by [g] *Laertius*, who ſaith, he contracted the Rewards of the Athleta's, judging them dangerous Victors; and that they were crowned rather againſt, than for their Country.

[h] *Whoſoever brought a he-Wolf, was to receive five Drachms; for a ſhe-Wolf, one*; according to *Demetrius Phalereus*, this being the Price of a Sheep, that of an Ox. It is cuſtomary with the *Athenians*, that ſuch as have Grounds fitter for Paſture than Plowing, make War with the Wolves.

[i] Foraſmuch as there is ſuch Scarcity of Rivers, Lakes, and Springs in the Country, that they are conſtrained to dig Wells, he made a Law, *Where*

p Plut. Sol. q Plut. Sol. r Plut. Sol. s Orat. in Lept. t De leg. lib. 2. u Plut. Sol. w Præfat. lib. 6. x Exhort. ad Art. y Epiſt. 7. z Lib. 7. a Lib. 1. b Plut. Sol. c Plut. Sol. d Lyſias in Orat. de cæde Eratoſth. e Orat. in Timarch. f Plut. Sol. g Laert. 1. 55. 56. h Plut. Sol. i Plut. Sol.

there

there was a common Well within a Hippicon, they ſhould make Uſe of it. (A Hippicon is the Diſtance of four Furlongs.) 'They that lived further off, 'ſhould procure Water of their own; and if when 'they digged ten Fathom deep, they find not any, 'they might be allowed to fill a Pitcher of ſix Gal-'lons twice a Day, at their Neighbour's Well.'

[k] Theſe exact Rules he preſcribed for planting; *Whoſoever planted any young Tree in his Ground, ſhould ſet it five Foot diſtant from his Neighbour's; who a Fig-tree or Olive-tree, nine:* Becauſe the Roots of theſe ſpread far; nor is their Neighbourhood harmleſs to all, but ſucks away the Nouriſhment, and to ſome their Blatt is prejudicial.

[l] 'Whoſoever diggeth any Hole or Ditch, muſt 'make it ſo far diſtant from his Neighbours, as it 'is deep. Theſe are confirmed by [m] *Cajus*, ad-'ding, Whoſoever makes a Hedge, to divide him-'ſelf from his Neighbour, muſt not exceed his own 'Bounds; if a Wall, he muſt leave the Space of 'a Foot; if a Houſe, two Feet; if a Well, a Fa-'thom.'

Whoſoever placeth a Hive of Bees, ſhould obſerve the Diſtance of thirty Feet, from thoſe that were before placed by his Neighbour.

[n] He commanded *the Archons to curſe him who exported any thing out of the Country, or that he ſhould pay a hundred Drachms to the publick Treaſury*, whereby they are not to be rejected, who ſay, that of old the Exportation of Figs was prohibited; and that he who diſcovered an Exporter, was called a Sycophant.

[o] He made a Law concerning ſuch as ſhould be hurt by a Dog, wherein he ordained, *the Dog that bit to be bound in a Chain four Cubits long.*

[p] This Law concerning Denization is difficult; *That none ſhould be made free of the City, except ſuch who were baniſhed for ever out of their own Country, or came to* Athens *with their whole Families, to exerciſe ſome Trade.* This he did, not to drive away Foreigners, but to invite them to *Athens*, by Certainty of Admittance into the City; conceiving ſuch would be faithful, thoſe out of Neceſſity, theſe out of Good-will.

[q] Likewiſe to be feaſted in the publick Hall, was the peculiar Inſtitution of *Solon*, which he called παρσιτεῖν, not permitting the ſame Perſon to eat there frequently: But if he who were invited, would not accept of it, he was puniſhed; conceiving this Contempt of the publick Honour, that an inordinate Appetite.

Hitherto *Plutarch.* Theſe following are recited by *Laertius.*

[r] *If any one maintain not his Parents, let him be infamous; as likewiſe he that devours his Patrimony.* Hitherto [s] *Æſchines* alludes: In the fourth Place, With whom hath he to do? If any Man, by Prodigality, hath conſumed his Patrimony, or hereditary Goods. For he conceived, he who had ordered his own Family ill, would, in the ſame Manner, take Care of the Common-wealth; neither did the Law-giver imagine it poſſible that the ſame Perſon ſhould be privately wicked, and publickly good, or that it were fitting ſuch a one ſhould go up into the Chair, who took more Care to frame an Oration, than to compoſe his Life.

[t] He *forbad ſuch as haunted common Women to plead*; confirmed by *Æſchines* [u]. In the third Place, With whom hath he to do? If any Man (ſaith he) be a Haunter of common Women, or procure Money by ſuch Means. For he conceived, ſuch a one as ſold his own Fame for Money, would eaſily ſell the Buſineſs of the State. And [w] *Demoſthenes*; It is worth Enquiry and Conſideration, *Athenians*, how great Care, *Solon*, the Author of this Law, had in the Common-wealth in all thoſe which he made; and how particularly ſolicitous he was herein, above all other Things; which as it is evident by many other Laws, ſo alſo by this, which forbids thoſe, *qui ſe proſtituerunt*, either to plead or judge in publick.

[x] He augmented the Rewards of ſuch as ſhould die in War, whoſe Sons he *ordered to be brought up and inſtructed at the publick Charge.* [y] *Ariſtides*, ſpeaking of the *Athenians*, ſays, You alone, of all Men, did ordain theſe three Things by Law, That ſuch as died for their Country, ſhould be annually praiſed publickly at their Sepulchres; their Children, till grown Men, maintained at the publick Charge, then ſent back to their Father's Houſe with compleat Arms. Likewiſe, that infirm Citizens ſhould be maintained at the publick Charge. [z] *Plato* adds, that the ſame Indulgence was allowed to the Parents. You know the Care of the Common-wealth, which in the Laws concerning the Children and Parents of ſuch as died in the War, *commands the ſupream Magiſtrate to take Care, that the Parents of thoſe that died in the War, above all other Citizens, ſhould not receive any Injury.* The State brings up the Children alſo. Hereby, ſaith *Laertius*, they became eager of Fame and Honour in War; as *Polytelus*, as *Cynegyrus*, as all thoſe in the *Marathonian* Fight: to whom may be added *Harmodius*, *Ariſtogiton*, *Miltiades.*

[a] *Let not a Guardian marry the Mother of his Ward; nor let any one be Guardian to him, who if he die ſhall inherit his Eſtate*; confirmed by [b] *Syrianus*, [c] *Marcellius*, and others; who add, that the ſame Law forbad the Ward to marry her Guardian's Son.

i Plut. Sol. k Plut. Sol. l Plut. Sol. m Lib. 4. ad 12. tab. n Plut. Sol. o Plut. Sol. p Plut. Sol. q Plut. Sol. r Laert. 55. s Orat. in Timarch. t Laert. ibid. u In Timarch. w In Androt. x Laert. ibid. y In Panathen. z Menexen. T. II. a Laert. ibid. b In Hermog. c In Hermog.

[d] *Let*

[d] *Let not a Graver keep the Impreſſion of any Seal, after he hath ſold it.*

[e] *If any Man put out the Eye of another, who had but one, he ſhall loſe both his own.*

His Law concerning Theft, *Laertius* expreſſeth thus; *What thou laidſt not down, take not up, otherwiſe the Puniſhment Death.* [f] *Æſchines* adds, if they confeſſed themſelves guilty; others affirm, the Puniſhment was only to pay double the Value; of whom is [g] *A. Gellius* and [h] *Hermogenes*, who affirm, the Law made that Diſtinction betwixt Sacrilege and Theft, puniſhing the firſt with Death, the latter with double Reſtitution. [i] *Demoſthenes* clears this, reciting this Law exactly in theſe Words; *If any Man ſteal in the Day-time above fifty Drachms, he may be carried to the eleven Officers; if he ſteal any thing by Night, it ſhall be lawful for any to kill him; or in the Purſuit to wound him, and carry him to the eleven Officers. Whoſoever is convict of ſuch Offences as are liable to Chains, ſhall not be capable of giving Bail for his Theft, but his Puniſhment ſhall be Death; and if any one ſteal out of the* Lyceum, *or the Academy, or* Cynoſarges, *a Garment, or a ſmall Veſſel of Wine, or any other Thing of little Value, or ſome Veſſel out of the* Gymnaſia, *or Havens, he ſhall be puniſhed with Death; but if any Man ſhall be convict privately of Theft, it ſhall be lawful for him to pay a double Value; and it ſhall be alſo at the Pleaſure of the Convictor, beſides Payment of Money, to put him in Chains five Days, and as many Nights, ſo as all Men may ſee him bound.* [k] Even thoſe who ſtole Dung, were by *Solon*'s Law liable to Puniſhment.

[l] That *if an* Archon *were taken drunk, he ſhould be puniſhed with Death.*

To thoſe recited by *Laertius*, add theſe collected by others.

He *allowed Brothers and Siſters by the ſame Father to marry; and prohibited only Brothers and Siſters of the ſame Venter*; whereas contrariwiſe (ſaith [m] *Philo*) the *Lacedæmonian* Law-giver allowed theſe, and prohibited thoſe. Hence [n] *Cornelius Nepos* affirms, *Cimon* married his Siſter *Elpinice*; invited, not more by Love, than the *Athenian* Cuſtom, which allows to marry a Siſter by the ſame Father.

[o] He writ according to the Manner of the Antients, ſeverally concerning the Diſcipline of Matrons. For *a Woman taken in Adultery, he permitted not to wear Ornaments, nor to come into publick Temples, leſt by her Preſence ſhe ſhould corrupt modeſt Women: If ſhe came into a Temple, or adorned herſelf, he commanded every one to rend her Garments, to tear off her Ornaments, and to beat her; but not kill, or maim her.* By this Means depriving ſuch a Woman of all Honour, and giving her a Life more bitter than Death. This is alſo confirmed by [p] *Demoſthenes*, who adds; *If any Man ſurprize an Adulterer, it ſhall not be lawful for him who took them to have the Woman in Marriage; if he continue to keep her as his Wife, let him be infamous.*

[q] *Let the dead Body be laid out within the Houſe, according as he gave Order, and the Day following, before Sun-riſe, be carried forth. Whilſt the Body is carrying to the Grave, let the Men go before, the Women follow. It ſhall not be lawful for any Woman to enter upon the Goods of the Dead, and follow the Body to the Grave, under threeſcore Years of Age, excepting thoſe within the Degree of Couſins; nor ſhall any Woman enter upon the Goods of the deceaſed, after the Body is carried forth, excepting thoſe who are within the Degree of Couſins.*

[r] Concerning Sepulchres, he ſaith no more, than that *no Man ſhall demoliſh them, or bring any new Thing into them; and he ſhall be puniſhed, whoſoever violates, caſts down, or breaks any Tomb, Monument, or Column.*

[s] *If any one light upon the dead Body of a Man unburied, let him throw Earth upon it.*

[t] *Whoſoever ſhall diſlike a received Law, let him firſt accuſe it; then, if it be abrogated, ſubſtitute another:* The Manner whereof is largely expreſſed by *Demoſthenes.*

He ordained (according to [u] *Libanius*) that *Children ſhould be obliged to perform all due Offices to their Parents.* [w] *Sextus*, ſaith he, made a Law of Indemnity, whereby he allowed any Man to kill his Son; but [x] *Dionyſius Halicarnaſſæus* affirms, he permitted them to turn their Children out of Doors, and to diſinherit them, but nothing more.

[y] He ordained, that *all ſuch as declined to be engaged in War, or forſook the Army, or were Cowards, ſhould have all one Puniſhment; to be driven out of the Bounds of the* Forum, *not permitted to wear a Garland, or to enter into publick Temples.*

[z] *If any one be ſeized on, for having abuſed his Parents, or forſaken his Colours, or being forbidden by Law, hath gone into Places where he ought not, let the eleven Officers take and bind him, and carry him into the* Heliæa; *it ſhall be lawful for any one that will to accuſe him; and if he be caſt, it ſhall be at the Judgment of the* Heliæa *to impoſe what Puniſhment or Fine they ſhould think fit; if a Fine, let him be kept in Fetters till it be paid.*

[a] He permitted *not a Man to ſell Unguents*, as being an effeminate Office.

[b] As concerning Orators, he ordered, that *the eldeſt of the Citizens ſhould go up firſt into the Pleader's*

d Laert. ibid. e Laert. ibid. f Orat. in Timarch. g Lib. 11. c. 18. h Partit. ſect. 4. i Orat. in Timocr. k Schol. Ariſt ph. ad equites. l Laert. ibid. m De leg. ſpec. lib. 2. n In Proœm. & in Cimonis vitas. o Æſchin. Orat. in Timarch. p In Neæram. q Demoſth. Orat. in Macartat. r Cicer. de leg 2. s Ælian. var. hiſt. 2. 42. &c. 5. 14. t Demoſth. in Lept. u Declam. 18. w Pyrrh. Hipp. 3. 24. x Lib. 2. c. 26. y Æſchin. in Cteſiph. z Demoſt. Orat. in Timocr. a Athenæus. deipn. lib. 15. b Æſchin. in Cteſiph.

Chair

Chair, modeſtly without Tumult and Perturbation to move, what he out of Experience ſhould conceive beſt for the Common-wealth; then that every Citizen, according to his Age, ſhould ſeverally and in Order declare his Judgment.

[c] He ordered that *a Citizen of* Athens *ſhould be tried no where but at* Athens.

[d] He commanded that *no young Man ſhould bear the Office of a Magiſtrate, nor be admitted to Council, tho' he were eſteemed exceeding wiſe.*

[e] For the common People he ordained ſlow puniſhments, for Magiſtrates and Rulers of the People ſudden, conceiving thoſe might be puniſhed at any Time, but that the Correction of theſe would admit no Delay.

[f] As for the Gods and their Worſhip, he decreed nothing, [g] nor againſt Parricides, anſwering thoſe who queſtioned him about it, *he did not think any could be ſo wicked.*

CHAP. VII.

Of the Axes and Cyrbes, Senators Oath, and other Inſtitutions of Solon.

THeſe *Laws he ratified, for a hundred Years* [h]; they were [i] *carved* in different Tables. Thoſe which concerned private Actions, in oblong quadrangular Tables of Wood, with Caſes, which reached from the Ground, and turned about upon a Pin like a Wheel, whence they were called [j] Ἄξονες, [k] placed firſt in the Tower, then brought into the Prytanæum, that all might ſee them, where there were ſome Remains of them in *Plutarch*'s Time. Thoſe which concerned [l] publick Orders and Sacrifices, in [m] triangular Tables of Stone called κύρβεις either from [n] *Cyrbus*, who took the Account of every Man's Eſtate, or ἀπὸ τῦ ταῦτα κυρωθῆναι τοῖς γράμμασι, or ἀπὸ [o] τῦ κεκορυφῶσθαι, or from the *Corybantes*, to whom the Invention thereof is by ſome aſcribed. Theſe were placed in the *Porticus regia*. [p] Both the *Axones* and *Cyrbes* were written after the ſame Manner as Oxen turn in ploughing βουστροφηδὸν γράφειν; whence *Demoſthenes* calls that Law the loweſt which beginneth on the left Side.

[q] *The Senate took one common Oath to make good the Laws of* Solon *for a hundred Years, each of the Theſmothetæ ſworn in the* Forum *at the Crier's Stone; if he violated them, to dedicate a golden Statue of equal Weight with himſelf at* Delphi.

Some Particulars of the Oath impoſed by *Solon* mentioned by ſeveral Authors, (as, *not to abrogate his Laws*, by *Plutarch*; *to admit no young Man to be Judge*, by [r] *Stobæus*; *to hear impartially both the Plaintiff and Defendant*, by [s] *Demoſthenes*; argue it to be the ſame which the ſame [t] Author delivers in theſe Words.

I will declare my Opinion according to the Laws of the Athenians, *and five hundred Senators. By no Aſſiſtance from me ſhall Tyranny or Oligarchy be admitted. I will never ſide with him who hath corrupted the People, intends or endeavours it. I will never ſuffer any new Tables or any Diviſion of thoſe already received, or a Parity of Lands or Goods. I will never call home any baniſhed or confined Perſon. I will conſent that he be expelled the City, who denies theſe Laws, decreed by the Senate, confirmed by the People; I will never permit any to be injured, I will never conſtitute any Magiſtrate before he hath given account of his laſt Magiſtracy. I will never permit the ſame Man to be choſen twice in one Year, or at once to hold two Offices. I will neither take, nor ſuffer any to take Bribes or Rewards. I am thirty Years old, I will hear impartially both Plaintiff and Defendant, and condemn without Excuſe thoſe that deſerve it. I ſwear by* Jove, *by* Neptune, *and by* Ceres, *may they deſtroy me, my Houſe and Children, if I obſerve not all theſe Particulars.* Hence perhaps it is that [u] *Heſychius* affirms, *Solon* in his Laws to have ordained an Oath by three Gods.

Conſidering the Irregularity of Months, and the Courſe of the Moon, which agreed not always with the Riſing and Setting of the Sun, but ſometimes overtook and went paſt him in one Day, he called that Day the ἕνη καὶ νέα, *laſt and firſt*, attributing that Part which precedes the Conjunction to the laſt Month, the reſt to the Beginning of the next. Thus [w] *he taught the* Athenians *to accommodate the Reckoning of their Days to the Motion of the Moon*; [x] and was (as it appears) the firſt who underſtood rightly that of *Homer*.

When one Month ended and the next began.

The Day following he called Νουμηνία, *the new Moon*; from the twentieth Day to the thirtieth he reckon'd not by Addition but by Subſtraction, in reſpect of the Moon's Decreaſe: For this ſee [y] *Ariſtophanes*.

[z] He ordered the Verſes of *Homer* to be recited ſucceſſively, that where the firſt ended the next ſhould begin; whence *Diuchides* ſaith, he illuſtrated *Homer* more than *Piſiſtratus* (by whom the *Rhapſodies* were firſt collected) the principal Verſes were.

They who inhabit Athens, *&c.*

[a] He firſt tolerated common Courteſans, and with

c Liban. declam. 13. d Stob. 114. e Demoſt. in Ariſtogit. f Maxim. Tyr. Diſſert. 39. g Cicero orat. pro S. Roſc. h Plut. Solon. i A. Gell. 2, 12. Plut. Etymol. k Pollux. 8. 10. l Suid. m Ammon. de differ. voc. n Suid. in Κυρβ. o Schol. Ariſtoph. in Ares. p Didym. apud Harp. & Suid. q Plut. Sol. r Serm. 106. s Orat. pro Coron. t Demoſt. orat. adv. Timocr. u τρεῖς θεοί. w Laert. 1. 57. x Plut. Sol. y The Clouds, Act. 4. Scen. 1. z Laert. ibid. a Athen. deipn. 13.

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the Money they paid to the State erected a Temple to *Venus*, πανδήμος.

[b] He first taught Soldiers to march by the Sound of Fifes and Harps, observing a Kind of Measure in their Pace.

CHAP. VIII.

How he entertained Anacharsis ; *his Travels to* Egypt, Cyprus, Miletus, Delphi, Corinth *and* Crete.

IN the forty-seventh Olympiad (according to [c] *Sosicrates*) *Anacharsis* came to *Athens* ; *Eucrates* being Archon, [d] he went immediately to the House of *Solon*, and knocking at the Door, said he was a Stranger desirous of his Friendship and Hospitality : *Solon* answered, *It is better to contract Friendship at home* ; *then you that are at home*, (replies *Anacharsis*) *make me your Friend and Guest*. *Solon* admiring his Acuteness, entertained him kindly, and kept him some time with him, whilst he was employed about publick Affairs, and ordering his Laws ; which *Anacharsis* understanding, smiled, that he undertook to curb the Injustice and Covetousness of Citizens by written Ordinances, not differing from Cobwebs, holding fast the Weak and Poor, whilst the Powerful and Rich break through them ; whereto *Solon* answered, *That Men stand fast to those Covenants which it is not convenient for either Party to break* : He gave the Citizens such Laws, as it was evident to all, that to keep were better than to transgress ; but the Event agreed more with the Conjecture of *Anacharsis* than the Expectation of *Solon*.

[e] After his Laws were promulgated, some or other coming daily to him, either to praise or dispraise them, or to advise to put in or out whatsoever came into their Minds, the greater Part to have the Meaning explained, questioning how every Thing was to be understood, and intreating him to unfold the Sense ; he (considering, that not to satisfy them, would argue Pride, to satisfy them would make him liable to Censure) determined to avoid Ambiguities, Importunities and Occasions of Blame ; (for, as he said,

In Things that are not small,
'Tis hard to sing to all.)

Colouring his Travel with being Master of a Ship, and having obtained Leave of the *Athenians* to be absent ten Years, he put to Sea, hoping in that time his Laws would become familiar to them.

[f] The first Place of his Arrival was *Egypt*, where he dwelt, as himself saith,

At Nilus' *Mouth*, *near the* Canopian *Shore*.

He studied Philosophy a while with *Psenophis* of *Heliopolis*, and *Sonches* of *Sais*, the most learned of those Priests, by whom, [g] *Plato* affirms, he was taught the *Atlantick* Fable, which he afterwards began to explain in Verse. When he questioned them in Antiquities, the elder said to him, *O* Solon, Solon, *you* Greeks *are always Children*, *there is not one* Greek *an old Man*.

[h] Thence he went to *Cyprus*, where he was much favoured by *Philocyprus*, one of the Kings of that Country, who had a little Town built by *Demophoon*, Son of *Theseus*, upon the River *Clarius*, in a strong Place, but rugged and barren : *Solon* persuading him, there lying a pleasant Plain underneath it, to transfer the Town thither, making it more spacious and delightful : *Solon* being present at the doing hereof, took Care it might be peopled, and assisted the King to contrive it, as well for Health as Strength ; whereupon many came in to *Philocyprus*, whom other Kings emulated ; for this Reason, he ascribed the Honour thereof unto *Solon*, naming the City (which before was called *Æpea*) from him *Soli*. This Foundation he mentions in his Elegies, addressing his Speech to *Philocyprus*,

Mayst thou in Cyprus *long as King abide*,
And o'er this People and this Town preside ;
In a fleet Vessel from this Haven may
Cytheræa *crown'd with Violets me convey*.
Her kind Aspect and Happiness may she
Grant to this Town a safe Return to me.

He visited *Thales* also at *Miletus*, whose Imposture towards him (related already in *Plutarch*'s Words) receive from *Tzetzes*.

Solon's *Friend* Thales *led a single Life*,
By Solon *often mov'd to take a Wife* ;
These a Milesian (Thales *so contriv'd*)
Meeting, *pretends from* Athens *late arriv'd*,
Solon *asks curiously what News was there* ;
One that's abroad, *saith he*, *hath lost his Heir*,
The City waited on his Obsequies.
Was it not Solon's *Son*, Solon *replies* ?
To this the Stranger (as suborn'd) assents :
He with torn Hair in Cries his Passion vents ;
Whom Thales, *(tenderly embracing) leave*
This Grief, *saith he*, *I did thee but deceive* ;
'Tis for these Reasons Marriage I decline,
Which can deject so great a Soul as thine.

Whether it belong to this Deceit, or to a real Loss [i] *Dioscorides*, and [k] *Stobæus* report, that weeping for the Death of his Son, one told him, *But*

b Sect. Empiric. adverf. Mathem. 6. c Plut. Sol. d Laert. 1, 110. e Plut. Sol. f Ibid. g In Timæo. h Plut. Sol. i Laert. 1. 63. k Serm. 121.

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this helps nothing, he answered, *and therefore I weep.*

[l] At *Delphi* he met with the rest of the wise Men, and the Year following at *Corinth*, by *Periander*'s Invitation, which was as [m] *Plutarch* implies, long before *Pisistratus* came to reign; nor doth [n] *Dion Chrysostom* intend the contrary, tho' so interpreted by [o] a learned Person, his Words importing only this; Solon *fled not the Tyranny of* Periander, *tho' he did that of* Pisistratus.

That he went also to *Crete* (perhaps to visit *Epimenides*) is evident from an [p] Epistle of *Thales* [q].

CHAP. IX.

The Attribute of Wise *conferred on him: His moral Sentences.*

WHen *Damasius* (the second) was [r] Archon, (in the Year of the 49th Olympiad) all the seven received the Attribute of *Wise*. Of these was *Solon*, upon whom ([s] *Themistius* saith, it was conferred as an honourable Title full of Dignity: [t] *Plutarch* avers that all of them (except *Thales*) were so called from their Skill in civil Affairs. And again, ' [u] in Philosophy *Solon* chiefly affected (as did likewise most of the wise Men) that Part of Morality which concerns Politicks; and speaking of *Mnesiphilus*, he was not (saith he) an Orator, ' nor of those Philosophers who are called natural, ' but embraced that Wisdom which teacheth Government of a State, and Prudence in publick ' Actions, which he retained as a Sect delivered by ' Succession from *Solon*. Whence [w] *Macrobius* instanceth *Solon* as skilful in that Kind of Learning ' which draweth Philosophy deeper, and establisheth a State.'

Hereto may be added his moral Learning, for which (tho' *Socrates* reduced it first to a Science, and was thereupon honoured as the Inventor thereof) the seven were so famous, that some affirm the Title of Wise was given them only for excelling others in a laudable Course of Life, and comprehending some moral Rules in short Sentences; of these they had three Sorts, Apophthegms, Precepts, and Ἀδόμενα.

Of his Apophthegms *Laertius* recites these, ' *Speech is the Image of Action; he is a King who hath Power. Laws are like Cobwebs which entangle the lesser Sort, the greater break through. Those who are in favour with Princes resemble Counters used in casting Accounts, which sometimes stand for a greater Number, sometimes for a lesser; so those are sometimes honoured, sometimes cast down. Being demanded how Men might be brought to do no wrong, if, said he, they who have received none, and those who are wronged, be alike concerned; Satiety comes of Riches, Contumely of Satiety.*

[x] *Plutarch* and others, these; ' *He conceived that City to be best governed, where the People as eagerly prosecute Wrongs done to others, as to themselves.* [y] *Being demanded how a City might be best ordered, he answered, if the Citizens obeyed the Magistrates, the Magistrates the Laws; he affirmed, that King and Tyrant should become most glorious, who would convert his Monarchy to Democracy. He esteemed that Family best, wherein Wealth is gotten not unjustly, kept not unfaithfully, expended not with Repentance.*

[z] He defined, *the Happy those who are competently furnished with outward Things, act honestly, and live temperately*; which Definition *Aristotle* approves.

[a] He said, *A Commonwealth consists of two Things, Reward and Punishment.*

[b] *Seeing one of his Friends much grieved, he carried him to the Tower, and desired him to view all the Buildings below, which observing the other to have done, now saith he, think with yourself how many Sorrows have heretofore and do at present dwell under those Roofs, and shall in future Ages; and forbear to be troubled at the Inconveniencies of Mortality, as if they were only yours. He said also, that if Men should bring their Misfortunes together in one Place, every one would carry his own home again, rather than take an equal Share out of the common Stock.*

[c] *Being in drinking, demanded by* Periander, *whether he were silent through Want of Discourse, or through Folly, answered, no Fool can be silent amidst his Cups.* [d] *He said, that City was best ordered, wherein the good were rewarded, the bad punished.*

[e] *He said, a Man ought to fear nothing, but that his End exceed not Philosophy.*

[f] *Demosthenes* recites a Discourse which he used to the Judges, in accusing one who had moved a pernicious Law, to this Effect; *It is a Law generally received in all Cities, that he who makes false Money should be put to Death. Then he demanded of the Judges, whether the Law seemed to them just and commendable, whereunto they assenting, he added, that he conceived Money to be used amongst Citizens, in respect of private Contracts; but that Laws were the Money of the Common-wealth: Therefore Judges ought to punish those, who embased the Money of the Common-wealth much more severely than those who embase that of private Persons; and that they might better understand it to be a far greater Offence to corrupt Laws than adulterate Coin, he added, that many Cities use Money of Silver allay'd with Brass or Lead, without any Prejudice to them-*

l Laert. 1. 40, m Conviv. sept. sapient. n Orat. 37. o J. Meursius. p Ad Pherecyd. q Apud Laert. 1. 43. r Laert. 1. 22. s Orat. 4. t Vit. Sol. u Vit. Themist. w Somn. Scip. 2. 17. x Vit. Sol. y Sympos. sept. sapient. z Arist. Ethic. 1. 8. a Cic, Epist. 15. ad Brut, b Val, Max, 7. 2, c Stob, Serm, 34. d Ibid, 41, e Johan, Salisb, polycr. 8. 14. f Orat. in Timocrat,

selves;

ſelves; but whoſoever ſhould uſe Laws ſo adulterated, could not eſcape Ruin and Death.

[g] *Mimnermus* writing thus,

From Trouble and Diſeaſes free,
At threeſcore Years let Death take me.

He reproved him, ſaying,

By my Advice, that Wiſh extend,
Nor for his Counſel ſlight thy Friend.
Alter thy Song, and let it be,
At fourſcore Years let Death take me.

His moral Precepts are thus delivered by [h] *Demetrius Phalereus*, ſome whereof are cited by *Laertius*. *Nothing too much. Sit not as Judge; if thou doſt, the condemned will eſteem thee an Enemy. Fly Pleaſure, for it brings forth Sorrow. Obſerve Honeſty in thy Converſation more ſtrictly than an Oath. Seal Words with Silence, Silence with Opportunity. Lie not, but ſpeak the Truth. Conſider on ſerious Things, Say not ought is juſter than thy Parents. Procure not Friends in Haſte, nor procured, part with in Haſte. By learning to obey, you ſhall know how to command. What Forfeiture you impoſe on others, undergo yourſelf. Adviſe not Citizens what is pleaſant, but what is beſt. Be not arrogant. Converſe not with wicked Perſons. Conſult the Gods. Cheriſh thy Friend. Reverence thy Parents. Make Reaſon thy Guide. What thou ſeeſt ſpeak not. What thou knoweſt conceal. Be mild to thoſe that belong to thee. Conjecture hidden Things from apparent.*

His particular Sentence, according to [i] *Didymus* and *Laertius* was, *Nothing too much*; according to *Auſonius*, *Know thyſelf*, who aſcribes theſe alſo to him.

Him I dare happy call whoſe End I ſee.
Match with thy like, Unequals not agree.
By Fortune guided, none to Honour raiſe;
A Friend in private chide, in publick praiſe;
Honours atchiev'd created far exceed;
If Fates be ſure, what helps it to take Heed?
And if unſure, there is of Fear leſs need.

Of his ἀδόμενα *Laertius* mentions theſe.

Of every Man be careful, leſt he bear
A Sword conceal'd within his Breaſt, a clear
Aſpect, and double Tongue, a Mind ſevere.

CHAP. X.

How he oppoſed Piſiſtratus, *and reprehended* Theſpis.

DUring the Abſence of *Solon* [k], the former Diſſenſion broke forth again in the City: *Lycurgus* was Head of the Countrymen, *Megacles* of the Maritimes, *Piſiſtratus* of the Townſmen, who were moſt violent againſt the Rich; *Solon*'s Laws were ſtill obſerved in the City, but the People aimed at Novelty and Change, not as thinking it moſt juſt, but in Hopes to be Maſters of other Men's Goods, and to ſuppreſs the adverſe Party. *Solon*, whilſt Things ſtood thus, returned to *Athens*, where he was much reverenced and honoured by all, but could not ſpeak or act in publick, through the Weakneſs of his Body and Spirits, yet privately taking every one of the Commanders apart, he endeavoured to reconcile their Differences, wherein *Piſiſtratus* ſeemed the moſt ready to be perſuaded, with whom he had a very ancient Friendſhip, grounded as well upon their Kindred, as upon the good Qualities of *Piſiſtratus*, than whom (as *Solon* uſed to ſay) there could not be a Perſon of more Worth, if he were cured of his Ambition.

[l] About this Time (according to *Plutarch*) which was in the fiftieth Olympiad, *Theſpis* began to preſent Tragedies (which *Suidas* erroneouſly accounts ten Olympiads later, as is obſerved by *Meurſius*) the People were much taken with the Novelty of the Thing, for as yet there were no Contentions therein. *Solon* naturally deſirous to hear and learn, and by Reaſon of his Age indulging more to Eaſe and Pleaſure, Feaſting and Muſick, went to ſee *Theſpis* himſelf act, as was then the Manner; the Play ended, he went to *Theſpis*, and asked him, if he were not aſhamed to ſpeak ſo many Lies before ſo great an Auditory? *Theſpis* anſwered, it was no Shame to act or ſay ſuch Things in Jeſt. *Solon* ſtriking the Ground hard with his Staff, replied, but in a ſhort Time we who approve this Kind of Jeſt ſhall uſe it in earneſt, in our Contracts and Tranſactions. [m] *In fine, he abſolutely forbad him to teach or act Tragedies, conceiving their Falſity unprofitable, whereto he related the Deceit of* Piſiſtratus, who ſoon after having wounded himſelf [n], came into the *Forum* in a Chariot, pretending to have been ſo uſed by his Enemies in behalf of the Common-wealth, and inflamed the People with much Rage. *Solon* coming near to him, Son of *Hippocrates* (ſaith he) you act *Homer*'s *Ulyſſes* ill in uſing the ſame Means to deceive the Citizens, wherewith he (whipping himſelf) deluded the Enemy. Immediately the People flocked in to defend *Piſiſtratus*. *Ariſton* moved he might be allowed a ſtanding Guard of fifty Men; *Solon* roſe up to oppoſe it, uſing Speeches, the Effect whereof he afterwards thus expreſt in Verſe.

If evil your Impieties befal,
Gods not the Authors of thoſe Miſchiefs call,

g Laert. 1. 60. h Stob. Serm. 3. i Clem. Alex. Strom. 1. k Plut. Sol. l Ibid. m Laert. 1. 59. n Plut.

Yourſelves

Yourſelves the Cauſes, have given Power to thoſe,
Who in Requital Servitude impoſe.
Lion whom the Footſteps of the Fox purſue,
Whoſe Soul's Deceit and Vanity endue.
The Man's ſmooth Tongue and Speech you only heed,
But never penetrate into the Deed.

He alſo foretold them the Aims of *Piſiſtratus*, in an Elegy to this Effect.

Vapours condens'd ingender Hail and Snow,
And Thunder doth from radiant Lightning flow.
The Sea is troubled by the raging Wind,
When not diſturb'd by that, nothing more kind.
A City by great Perſons is o'erthrown,
And taught beneath a Monarchy to groan.

But ſeeing the poorer Sort much addicted to *Piſiſtratus*, and tumultuous, the richer afraid, conſulting their Safety by Flight, he retired, ſaying, *Athenians*, I am wiſer than ſome, valianter than others, wiſer than thoſe who underſtand not the Deceit of *Piſiſtratus*, valianter than thoſe who underſtand it, yet hold their Peace through Fear. The Senate being of the ſame Faction with *Piſiſtratus*, ſaid he was mad, whereto he anſwered,

A little Time will to the People clear
My Madneſs, when i'th'midſt Truth ſhall appear.

The People having granted *Piſiſtratus* his Requeſt concerning a Guard, queſtion'd not the Number of them, but conniv'd ſo long at his preſſing and maintaining as many Soldiers as he pleaſed, that at laſt he poſſeſt himſelf of the Tower; whereupon the City being in a Tumult, *Megacles*, with the reſt of the *Alcmæonidæ* fled. *Solon*, now very old, and deſtitute of thoſe that might back him, went into the *Forum*, [o] armed with a Spear and Shield, and made an Oration to the People, partly accuſing them of Folly and Cowardice, partly inciting them not to forſake their Liberty, uſing this celebrious Speech, *It had been far eaſier to have ſuppreſt this Tyranny in the Growth, but much more noble to cut it off now it is at the Height.* No Man daring to hear him, he went home and taking his Arms, ſet them in the Street before his Door (*Laertius* ſaith, *before the Magazine*) ſaying, *I have helped my Country and the Law as much as lay in me*; or as *Laertius*, *O Country, I have aſſiſted thee both in Word and Deed.* *Plutarch* adds, that from that time he lived retired, addicted to his Study; and told by many the Tyrant would put him to Death, and demanded wherein he confided ſo much, he anſwered in his Age: But *Laertius* affirms (which ſeems truer) that as ſoon as he had laid down his Arms, he forſook the Country: And [p] *A. Gellius*, that in the Reign of *Servius Tullius*, *Piſiſtratus* was Tyrant of *Athens*, *Solon* going firſt away into voluntary Exile.

CHAP. XI.

How he travelled into Lydia, *and* Cilicia.

Solon at his Departure from *Athens*, received Invitations from many; by *Thales* deſired to come to *Miletus*; by *Bias*, to *Priene*; by *Epimenides*, to *Crete*; by *Cleobulus*, to *Lindus*; as is evident from their ſeveral Letters to that Effect; even *Piſiſtratus* preſſed him to return home by this Epiſtle.

Piſiſtratus *to* Solon.

'NEither am I the only Perſon of the *Greeks* [q], nor am I without Right to the Kingdom I poſſeſs, as being deſcended from *Codrus*: That which the *Athenians* having ſworn to give to *Codrus* and his Heirs, took away, I have recovered; no otherwiſe do I offend either God or Man; I take Care that the Common-wealth be governed according to the Laws you ordained for the *Athenians*, and that better than by a Democracy. I ſuffer none to do wrong, neither do I enjoy any Privileges of a Tyrant, more than Honour and Dignity; ſuch Rewards only as were conferred upon the ancient Kings; every Man pays the Tenth of his Eſtate, not to me, but to the Maintenance of publick Sacrifices, or other Charges of the Common-wealth, or againſt Time of War. You I blame not for diſcovering my Intents; you did it more in love to the State than in hate to me; beſides, you knew not what Government I meant to eſtabliſh, which if you had, perhaps you would have brooked my Rule, and not baniſhed yourſelf; return therefore home, and believe me without an Oath. *Solon* ſhall never receive any Diſpleaſure from *Piſiſtratus*, you know my very Enemies have not, and if you will vouchſafe to be of my Friends, you ſhall be of the firſt, for I never ſaw any Thing in you deceitful or falſe; if otherwiſe, you will live with the *Athenians*; uſe your Freedom, only deprive not yourſelf of your Country for my Sake.

Solon returned this Anſwer.

Solon *to* Piſiſtratus.

'I Believe I ſhall not ſuffer any Harm by you [r], for before you were Tyrant, I was your Friend, and at preſent am no more your Enemy, than any other *Athenian* who diſlikes Tyranny. Whether it be better they be governed by a ſingle Perſon, or by a Democracy, let both Parties de-

o Laert. 1. 49. p Lib. 17. cap. 21. q Laert. 1. 53. r Laert. 1. 66.

termine

'termine. I pronounce you the beſt of Tyrants; 'but to return to *Athens* I think not fitting, leſt I 'incur Blame, who ſettled an Equality in the *A*-'*thenian* Common-wealth, and would not accept 'of the Tyranny; by returning, I ſhall comply 'with thy Actions.'

Cræſus alſo ſent to invite him, to whom he thus anſwered[s]:

Solon *to* Cræſus.

'I Love your Humanity towards us, and by '*Pallas*, but that I affect above all Things to 'live under a Democracy, I ſhould much ſooner 'chooſe to live in your Kingdom than at *Athens*, 'whilſt *Piſiſtratus* rules there by Force; but it is 'moſt pleaſing to me to live where all Things are 'juſt and equal; yet will I come over to you, be-'ing deſirous to become your Gueſt.'

Solon upon this Invitation went to *Sardis*, where *Cræſus* (ſaith *Herodotus*[t]) received him very kindly. After the third or fourth Day, the Officers, at *Cræſus*'s Appointment, led him into the Treaſuries, to ſhew him all their Greatneſs and Riches; when he had beheld all, *Cræſus* ſpoke thus unto him: Athenian *Gueſt*, *becauſe we have heard much Fame of your Wiſdom and Experience, having out of Love to Philoſophy travelled into many Countries, I have a Deſire to enquire of you if ever you ſaw any Man whom you could call moſt happy.* This he demanded, hoping himſelf to be eſteemed ſuch. *Solon*, nothing flattering him, anſwered according to the Truth, ſaying, *O King*, Tellus *the* Athenian. *At which Speech* Cræſus *wondering: Why do you judge* Tellus *the moſt happy? Becauſe* (replied *Solon*) *in a well ordered State, he had Children honeſt and good, and ſaw every one of thoſe have Children all living; thus having paſſed his Life as well as is poſſible for Man, he ended it gloriouſly: A Fight happened between the* Athenians *and their Neighbours in* Eleuſis, *he came in to their Succour, and putting the Enemy to flight, died nobly; the* Athenians *buried him in the Place where he fell with much Honour.* Whilſt *Solon* recounted the Happineſs of *Tellus*, *Cræſus* being moved, demanded to whom he aſſigned the next Place, making no queſtion but himſelf ſhould be named a ſecond. Celobis (*ſaith he*) *and* Bito, *they were* Argives *by Birth, they had ſufficient wherewithal to maintain themſelves; and withal, ſo great Strength of Body, that both were alike Victors in the publick Games, of whom it is thus reported; the* Argives *celebrating the Feſtival of* Juno, *it was neceſſary their Mother ſhould be drawn to the Temple by a Pair of Oxen, there being no Oxen in the Field ready, theſe young Men, ſtreightened in Time, underwent the Yoke, and drew the Chariot of their Mother forty-five Stadia, till they came to the Temple; when they had ſo done, in the Sight of all the People, they obtained the happieſt End of their Days, whereby the God declared it better for a Man to die than to live; the* Argives *preſſing about them, the Men applauded the Piety of the Sons; the Women the Happineſs of the Mother; the Mother herſelf infinitely joyed with the Action, and the Glory thereof, ſtanding before the Image, prayed the Goddeſs to give her Sons,* Cleobis *and* Bito, *the beſt Thing that could happen to Man; after this Prayer, having ſacrificed and feaſted, they lay down to ſleep in the Temple, and never waked more, but ſo ended their Days; their Images (as of moſt excellent Perſons) were made by the* Argives, *and ſet up at* Delphi. Theſe *Solon* ranked in the ſecond Degree. Hereat *Cræſus* growing angry; *Stranger* (ſaid he) *doth our Happineſs ſeem ſo deſpicable that you will not rank us equal with private Perſons?* He anſwered, *Do you enquire,* Cræſus *concerning human Affairs of me, who know, that divine Providence is ſevere and full of Alteration? In proceſs of Time we ſee many Things we would not, we ſuffer many Things we would not; let us propoſe ſeventy Years as the Term of Man's Life, which Years conſiſt of twenty five thouſand and two hundred Days, beſides the additional Month; if we make one Year longer than another by that Month, to make the Time accord, the additional Months, belonging to thoſe ſeventy Years, will be thirty five, the Days of thoſe Months a thouſand and fifty, whereof one is not in all Things like another. So that every Man, O* Cræſus, *is miſerable! You appear to me very rich, and are King over many, but the Queſtion you demand I cannot reſolve, until I hear you have ended your Days happily; he who has much Wealth is not happier than he who gets his Living from Day to Day, unleſs Fortune continuing all thoſe good Things to him, grant that he die well. There are many Men very rich, yet unfortunate, many of moderate Eſtates fortunate, of whom he who abounds in Wealth, and is not happy, exceeds the Fortunate only in two Things, the other, him in many; the Rich is more able to ſatisfy his Deſires, and to overcome great Injuries; yet the Fortunate excels him, he cannot indeed inflict Hurt on others, and ſatisfy his own Deſires, his good Fortune debars him of theſe; but he is free from Ills, healthful, happy in his Children, and beautiful; if to this a Man dies well, that is he whom you ſeek, who deſerves to be called happy; before Death he cannot be ſtiled happy, but fortunate; yet for one Man to obtain all this is impoſſible, as one Country cannot furniſh itſelf with all Things, ſome it hath, others it wants, that which hath moſt is beſt; ſo in Men, no one is perfect; what one hath, the other wants; he who hath conſtantly moſt, and at laſt quietly departs this Life, in my Opinion, O King, deſerves to bear that Name. In every Thing we muſt have Regard to the End,*

s Laert. 1, 67. t Herod. l. 1.

whither

whither it tends; for many, to whom God dispenseth all good Fortunes, he at last utterly subverts. This Story is related by *Plutarch* [u], also mentioned by *Laertius*, who adds, *that* Crœsus *being magnificently adorned, and seated on his Throne, asked him, Whether he had ever seen any Thing more glorious?* Who answered, *Cocks, Pheasants, and Peacocks, who are much more beautiful in their natural Colour.* *Solon* [w] after his Discourse with *Crœsus*, not soothing him, or making any Esteem of him, was dismissed, and accounted unwise for neglecting the present Good in regard to the future. [x] *Æsop*, the Writer of Fables was at that Time at *Sardis*, sent for thither by *Crœsus*, with whom he was much in Favour; he was grieved to see *Solon* so unthankfully dismist, and said to him, *Solon, We must either tell Kings nothing at all, or what may please them.* *No*, saith *Solon*, *either nothing at all, or what is best for them.* Thus was *Solon* much despised by *Crœsus*.

[y] Afterwards *Crœsus* being taken Prisoner by *Cyrus*, was at his Command fettered and set upon a great Pile of Wood to be burned: As he was in this Posture, it came into his Mind what *Solon* had divinely said to him, that no living Man is happy; as soon as he remembered these Words, he fell into a great Defection of Spirit, and sighing deeply, named *Solon* thrice, which *Cyrus* hearing, commanded the Interpreters to ask upon whom he called? They went to him and asked, he was silent; at last pressing him further, he answered, *Upon him who I desire above all Wealth, might have spoken with all Tyrants*; notwithstanding, after much Pressure and Importunity, he told them, Solon *an* Athenian *came long since to him, and beholding all his Wealth, valued it at nothing*; *moreover, that all which he told him had come to pass, nor did it more belong to him than to all Mankind, especially to those who think themselves happy.* Whilst *Crœsus* said this, the Fire began to kindle, and the outward Parts thereof to be seized by the Flame. *Cyrus* being informed by an Interpreter of all that *Crœsus* had said, began to relent, knowing himself to be but a Man, who delivered another Man, nothing inferior to him in Wealth, to be burned alive, fearing to be punished for that Act, and considering that nothing was certain in human Affairs, he commanded the Fire to be instantly quenched, and *Crœsus*, and those that were with him to be brought off; [z] whom ever after, as long as he lived, he had in Esteem. Thus *Solon* gained Praise, that of two Kings, his Speech preserved one, and instructed the other.

Plutarch relates this done in the former ten Years Travel of *Solon*, upon the finishing of his Laws, whence he maketh an Apology for the Incongruity thereof, with the Rules of Chronology, which had less needed, if with *Laertius*, he had placed it after *Pisistratus* his Usurpation of the Tyranny.

Laertius saith, he went from hence to *Cilicia*, and built there a City called after him *Solos*, whither he brought also some few *Athenians*, whose Language growing corrupt by that of the Country, they were said to solecise; of this is the Etymologist doubtless to be understood, who derives Σολοικοὶ ἀπὸ σόλων κιλικίων (so read we, not ἀπὸ Σόλων Θ· κιλιός.) This is also attested by *Suidas*, as a distinct Relation from that of *Cyprus*, in Confirmation whereof *Laertius* adds, the *Cilicians* were called *Solenses*, the *Cyprians Solii*.

CHAP. XII.

His Death.

[a] *Heraclides* affirms *Solon* lived long after *Pisistratus* began to Reign; [b] *Lucian*, that his Life extended to a hundred Years; with whom those best agree, who said (as *Suidas* relates) he lived in the fifty-sixth Olympiad; [c] but according to *Phanias*, Pisistratus *took the Tyranny upon him, when* Comias *was Archon; who succeeded* Comias, *which was in the first Year of the fifty-fifth Olympiad.* If this latter Opinion had not every where taken Place of the other, the Disagreement betwixt the Time of *Solon*'s Death, and *Crœsus*'s Reign had not been urged by many, as an Argument against the Story of their Meeting.

He died (according to [d] *Laertius*) aged eighty Years (being, as [e] *Ælian* saith, very decrepit) in *Cyprus*, (as is likewise attested by [f] *Valerius Maximus* and *Suidas*) and left Order with his Friends that they should carry his Bones to *Salamis*, and there causing them to be burnt, scatter the Ashes all over the Country; which Story *Plutarch* (tho' he counts it fabulous) acknowledgeth to be attested by many Authors of Credit, particularly *Aristotle*.

[g] *Laertius* confirms it by the Testimony of *Cratinus*, who makes him speak thus:

The Island I inhabit, sown,
As Fame reports in Ajax *Town.*

That Desire of Knowledge which he usually professed, continued with him to his End, [h] confirmed the last Day of his Life, his Friends sitting about him, and falling into some Discourse, he raised his weary Head, and being demanded why he did so, he answered, *That when I have learned that, whatsoever it be, whereon you dispute, I may die.* His [i] Brother's Son singing an Ode of *Sappho*, he,

u In vit. Sol. Laert. 1. 51. w Herodot. x Plut. Sol. y Herodot. l. 1. z Plut. ibid. a Plut. Sol. b De Longævis.
c Plut. ibid. d Laert. 1. 62. e Var. Hist. 8. 16. f Lib. 5. cap. 3. g Laert. ibid. h Val. Max. 8. 1. i Stob. 29.

delighted therewith, bad him teach him it, and being demanded why, *that*, ſaid he, *I may learn whilſt I depart out of this Life.*

After his Death, the *Athenians* erected his Statue in Braſs, before the [k] checker'd Cloiſter [l] in the *Forum:* Another was ſet up at *Salamis*, hiding (as *Demoſthenes* and *Æſchines* deſcribe it) the Hand within the Garment, in the ſame Habit wherein he uſed to make Speeches to the *Athenians*, perhaps the ſame that carried this Inſcription,

Fam'd Salamis, *the* Perſian *Pride caſt down,*
And gave to Solon *Birth, the Laws Renown.*

[m] *Laertius* beſtows this Epigram upon him,

A Foreign Cyprian *Fire burn'd* Solon, *yet*
Salamis *keeps his Bones, their Aſhes Wheat;*
His Soul to Heaven mounts with his Laws ſo light
A Burthen, they not clog, but help his Flight.

CHAP. XIII.

His Writings.

HIS Excellency both in Rhetorick and Poetry is atteſted by many: *Cicero* ſays, [n] 'Before 'Solon's Time, no Man is recorded for Eloquence. '[o] And again, *Lycurgus* and *Solon* we place in the 'Number of the Eloquent.' [p] *Dion Chryſoſtom* obſerves, 'Ariſtides, *Lycurgus*, *Solon*, *Epaminon*'das, and if there be any other of the ſame Kind, 'ought to be eſteemed Philoſophers in the Com'mon-wealth, or Orators, according to ingenious 'true Rhetorick. [q] *Ariſtides*, *Solon* is ſaid to have 'ſung thoſe Things which concern the *Megarenſes*; 'but neither his Laws nor Orations, which ſome'times he made for the Rich to the Commons, 'ſometimes for the Commous to the Rich, did he 'ſing or compriſe in Verſe, but uſed a rhetorical 'Form, excellently demonſtrating in all theſe, 'that he deſerved to be eſteemed an Orator and a 'wiſe Man, having attained both thoſe Titles and 'Faculties.

As to Poetry, *Plutarch* avers [r], 'he addicted him'ſelf thereto from the Beginning, not in ſerious 'Matters, but ludicrous, uſed (as it ſeems) for his 'Exerciſe and Paſtime; afterwards he included 'many philoſophical Sentences in Verſe, and many 'Affairs of State, not in relation to Hiſtory, but 'to vindicate his own Actions, ſometimes alſo to 'correct and reprove the *Athenians*.' *Plato* ſaith, '[s] That at the *Apaturian* Feaſt, the Boys uſed 'to repeat his Poems; and that if he applied him'ſelf to nothing but Poetry, as others did, and had 'finiſhed the Hiſtory he brought with him out of '*Egypt*, and had not been conſtrained by Seditions 'and other Diſtractions to lay aſide that Study, 'neither *Heſiod*, *Homer*, nor any of the Poets 'would have been more famous.'

Of his Writings in Proſe, we muſt with [t] *Laertius* name in the firſt Place his

Laws; of which already.

Orations to the People.

His *Poems* are cited under that general Title by *Phrynicus* [u], their particular Subjects and Titles theſe,

Exhortations to himſelf, mentioned by *Laertius*, *Ariſtides* [w], and *Suidas*.

Elegies.

Salamis; of which *Chap.* 2.

Of the Athenian *Commonwealth*, which *Laertius* affirms to have extended to two thouſand Verſes, according to [x] *Pauſanias* and *Philo*, in Elegiac Verſe.

Iambicks, mentioned by *Laertius*, cited by *Athenæus* and *Ariſtides*.

Epodes, mentioned by *Laertius*.

Elegies to King Cypranor, cited by the Author of *Aratus*'s Life. Ἀδομένα, cited by *Laertius*.

Some, ſaith *Plutarch* [y], affirm he began to reduce his own Laws into Verſe.

The laſt Work he undertook was concerning the *Atlantick* Speech or Fable, which beginning late, he was deterred by the greatneſs of the Work, as *Plutarch* ſaith, and prevented by Death.

Beſides thoſe Epiſtles already alledged, theſe are preſerved alſo by [z] *Laertius*.

Solon *to* Periander.

'YOu ſend me Word there are many who plot 'againſt you; if you ſhould put them all to 'Death, it would advantage you nothing; ſome 'one there may be of thoſe, whom you ſuſpect 'not, who plots againſt you, either fearing him'ſelf, or diſdaining you, or deſirous to ingratiate 'himſelf with the City, tho' you have done him 'no Injury; it is beſt, if you would be free from 'Jealouſy, to acquit yourſelf of the Cauſe; but if 'you will continue in Tyranny, take Care to pro'vide a greater Strength of Strangers than is in your 'own City; ſo ſhall you need to fear no Man, 'nor to put any to Death.'

Solon *to* Epimenides.

'NEither are my Laws likely to benefit the *Athe*'*nians* long, nor have you advantaged the 'City by Luſtration; for divine Right and Law'givers cannot alone benefit Cities; it importeth

k Pauſan. Attic. l Demoſth. in Ariſt. 2. Ælian. var. hiſt. 8. 16. m Laert. 1. 26. n In Bruto. o De Orat. lib. 1. 13. p Orat. 21. q Orat. Plat. 2. r Plut. in Solon. s In Timæo, 1. Crit. t Laert. 1, 61. u Eclig. dict. Attic. w In Orat. περὶ κοσμου. x Attic. περὶ κοσμου. y Plut. in Solon. z Laert. 1. 64.

much

'much of what Mind they are who lead the common People; Divine Rights and Laws, if they 'direct them well, are profitable, if they direct them 'ill, profit nothing; neither are those Laws I 'gave in any better Condition; they who had 'Charge of the Common-wealth not preventing '*Pisistratus*'s Usurpation of the Tyranny, lost 'the City, of which, when I foretold them, I 'could not be believed; the *Athenians* would rather credit his Flatteries than my Truth; where-'fore, laying down my Arms before the Magazine, 'I said, that I was wiser than those who did not 'see *Pisistratus* aimed at the Tyranny, and stouter 'than those who durst not resist him: They reputed *Solon* a Madman. Lastly, I made this 'Profession, O Country! behold *Solon* ready to 'vindicate thee in Word and Deed: They again 'esteemed me mad. Thus I being the only Person that opposed *Pisistratus*, I came away from 'them; let them guard him with their Arms, if 'they please; for know, (dear Friend) the Man 'came very cunningly by the Kingdom, he complied at first with the Democracy, afterwards 'wounding himself, came into *Eliæa*, crying out, 'he had received those Hurts from his Enemies, 'and required a Guard of four hundred young 'Men, which they (not hearkening to me) granted; these carried Halberts. After this, he dissolved the popular Government; truly I labour-'ed in vain to free the poorer Sort from mercenary 'Slavery, when they all now serve one *Pisistratus*.

Such Fragments of his Poems as have been hitherto preserved are thus collected.

One of his [a] Elegies.

SPrung from Mnemosyne *and* Jove's *great Line,*
Pierian *Muses, to my Prayer incline,*
Grant that my Life and Actions may call down
Blessings from Heaven, and raise on Earth Renown;
Sweet to my Friends, and bitter to my Foes,
To these my Sight bring Terror, Joy to those.
Riches I wish, not Riches that are plac'd
In unjust Means, for Vengeance comes at last.
Riches dispens'd by Heaven's more bounteous Hand,
A Base on which we may unshaken stand.
But that which Men by Injuries obtain,
That which by Arts and Deeds unjust they gain,
Comes slowly, swiftly by Revenge pursued,
And Misery like a close Spark include,
Which soon to a devouring Flame dilates,
Wrong is a weak Foundation for Estates.
Jove *doth the End of every Thing survey,*
As sudden vernal Blasts chase Clouds away.
Ransack the Bottom of the roaring Main,
Then swiftly over-run the fertile Plain,
Ruffling the wealthy Ears; at last they rise
To Jove's *high Seat, a Calm then smooths the Skies.*
The Sun's rich Lustre mildly gilds the green
Enamel of the Meads, no Clouds are seen.
Such is Jove's *heavy Anger, differing far*
From Men whose every Trifle leads to War:
They are not hid for ever, who offend;
In secret, Judgment finds them in the End.
Some in the Act are punish'd, others late,
Even he who thinks he hath deluded Fate:
At last resents it in just Miseries,
Which Nephews for their Ancestors chastise.
We think it fares alike with good and bad;
Glory and self-conceit our Fancies glad
Till Suffering comes, then their griev'd Spirits bleed,
Who did before their Souls with vain Hope feed.
He whom incurable Diseases seize,
Sooths his deluded Thoughts, with Hopes of Ease.
The Coward's valiant in his own Esteem,
And to themselves, fair the deformed seem.
They who want Means, by Poverty oppress,
Believe themselves of full Estates possest.
All is attempted, some new Seas explore
To bring home Riches from a foreign Shore:
Seas, on whose boist'rous back secur'd they ride,
And in the Mercy of the Winds confide.
Others to crooked Ploughs their Oxen yoke,
And Autumn with their Plants and Sets provoke.
Some Vulcan's *and* Minerva's *Arts admire,*
And by their Hands their Livelihoods acquire.
Others the fair Olympian Muses trace,
And lovely Learning studiously embrace.
One by Apollo *is prophetick made,*
And tells what Mischiefs others shall invade.
With him the Gods converse, but all the Skill
In Birds or Victims cannot hinder ill.
Some to Peonian *Knowledge are inclin'd;*
Nor is the Power of Simples unconfin'd.
The smallest Hurts sometimes increase and rage,
More than all Art of Physick can assuage;
Sometimes the Fury of the worst Disease,
The Hand by gentle stroking will appease.
Thus good or bad arrives as Fates design,
Man cannot what the Gods dispens'd decline.
All Actions are uncertain, no Man knows
When he begins a Work, how it shall close.
Some who their Business weigh with prudent Care,
Out of the Issue intercepted are;
Whilst others, who have rashly ought design'd,
An End successful of their Labours find.
There is no Bound to those who Wealth acquire,
For they who are possest of most, desire
As much again, and who can all content,
Even those full Blessings which the Gods have lent,
Man variously to his own Harm applies,
Whom Jove *by Means as various doth chastise.*

[a] Stob. Grotii, p. 60.

Again [b].

OUR City never can ſubverted be
By Jove *or any other Deity:*
For Pallas' *Eye ſurveys with pious Care*
The Walls which by her Hand protected are:
Yet the Inhabitants of this great Town,
Fondly inclin'd to Wealth, will throw it down;
And thoſe unjuſt great Perſons who are bent
Others to wrong, themſelves to diſcontent;
For their inſatiate Fancies have not Power
T'enjoy the Sweetneſs of the inſtant Hour,
But by all wicked Means, Intent or Gain,
From hallowed, nor from publick Things refrain.
Riches by Theft and Cozenage to poſſeſs,
The ſacred Bounds of Juſtice they tranſgreſs.
Who ſilent ſees the preſent, knows the paſt,
And will revenge theſe Injuries at laſt:
Cauſing a careleſs Rupture in the State,
And all our Liberties ſhall captivate.
Rouſe War from his long Slumber, who the Flower
Of all our Youths ſhall bloodily devour.
For Cities which injuriouſly oppoſe
Their Friends, are ſoon invaded by their Foes.
Theſe are the common Evils; of the Poor
Many tranſported to a foreign Shore,
To Bondage there, and Fetters ſhall be ſold.
Each private Houſe that ſhares the publick Fate,
Nor can exclude it with a barr'd up Gate;
For ſcaling furiouſly the higher Walls,
On thoſe whom Beds or Corners hides, it falls.
My Soul, Athenians, *prompts me to relate*
What Miſeries upon Injuſtice wait:
But Juſtice all Things orderly deſigns,
And in ſtrict Fetters the unjuſt confines.
What's ſour, ſhe ſweetens, and allays what cloys.
Wrong ſhe repels, Ill in the Growth deſtroys,
Softens the Stubborn, the Unjuſt reforms,
And in the State calms all ſeditious Storms:
Bitter Diſſention by her Reign ſuppreſt,
Who wiſely governs all Things for the beſt.

Another [c].

NO Man is bleſſed, bad is every one
That feels the Warmth of the all-ſeeing Sun.

Another [d].

LET me not die unpiti'd, every Friend
With Sighs and Tears my lateſt Hour attend.

b Ex Demoſth. Orat. de falſ. leg. c Stobæus Grotii. p. 404. d Ibid. p. 502.

CHILO.

CHAP. I.

His Life.

CHilo [e] was a *Lacedæmonian*, Son of *Damagetus*, corruptly termed in [f] *Stobæus*, *Pages*. He was eminent among the *Greeks* for two Predictions.

The firſt to *Hippocrates* [g] to whom (being a private Perſon) happened a great Prodigy at the Olympick Games. Having prepared an Offering, and filled a Cauldron with Fleſh and Water, it boiled over without Fire. This Portent *Chilo* (accidentally preſent) beholding, adviſed him, *that he ſhould not take a Wife by whom he might have Iſſue; that if he had one, he ſhould put her away, and if a Son, turn him out of Doors.* *Hippocrates* not following this Advice, brought up his Son *Piſiſtratus*, who in the Sedition of the Maritimes and Countrymen at *Athens*, thoſe led by *Megacles*, theſe by *Lycurgus*, ſtirred up a third Faction, and gained the Tyranny.

[h] He was much renowned alſo for his Prediction concerning *Cythera*, a *Lacedæmonian* Iſland; examining the Situation thereof, *Would to God* (ſaid he) *it had never been; or ſince it is, it might be ſwallowed up by the Sea*; and wiſely did he foreſee. Damaratus *a* Lacedæmonian Exile, counſelled *Xerxes* to ſeize upon that Iſland; which Advice, if he had followed, would have ruined all *Greece*. His Words (according to [i] *Herodotus*) were theſe: *You may effect your Deſires if you ſend three hundred Ships to the* Lacedæmonian *Coaſt*; *there lies an Iſland named* Cythera, *of which* Chilo, *a Perſon of greateſt Wiſdom amongſt us, ſaid, it were better for the* Lacedæmonians *that it were under Water than above. He, it ſeems, expected from it ſome ſuch Things as I am now going to declare; not that he foreſaw your Navy, but doubting any in the ſame*

e Laert. 1, 68. f Serm. 3. g Herodot. lib. 1. Laert. ibid. h Ibid. 1, 71. i Lib. 7. 235.

Kind;

Kind; let your Men issue out of this Island upon the Lacedæmonians, *to strike them into Terror.* Afterward [k], in the Time of the *Peloponesian* War, *Nicias* taking the Island, placed some *Athenians* therein, who much infested the *Lacedæmonians.*

Laertius saith, *That he was old in the fifty-second Olympiad, at what Time Æsop flourished: That he was Ephorus in the fifty-sixth.* (*Casaubon* reads the fifty-fifth.) *But* Pamphila (continueth *Laertius*) *saith in the sixth, he was first Ephorus, when* Euthydemus *was Archon, as* Soficrates *also affirms, and first appointed the Ephori to be joined with Kings, which* Satyrus saith, *was the Institution of* Lycurgus. Hence it is doubtful whether *Chilo* was Ephorus in the sixth Olympiad, or in the fifty-sixth; the latter is more probable, in as much as he bore that Office when *Euthydemus* was Archon at *Athens*, which was in the fifty-sixth Olympiad, as appears by the *Marmor Arundelianum*, where for Εὐθυδήμου is corruptly read τῷ δήμῳ rendered *Archonte populo.* But it is likewise true that the Ephori were first created about the sixth Olympiad, when *Polydorus* and *Theopompus* were Kings of *Lacedæmon*, a hundred and thirty Years after *Lycurgus*, as *Plutarch* (in his Life affirms) from which time there were five annual Ephori chosen in *Lacedæmon*, whereof the first is called ἐπώνυμος, because the Year had its Denomination from him: The first of the first Election was [l] *Elatus*; *Chilo* in the fifty-sixth Olympiad was the first of the five of his Year, which might perhaps give the Occasion of the Mistake to them, who take him to be the first of that Institution, of whom is [m] *Scaliger.*

[n] How he behaved himself in this Office, may be gathered from his Speech [o] to his Brother, displeased that himself was not Ephorus at the same Time: *I can bear Injuries*, saith he, *you cannot.*

He was so just in all his Actions, [p] that in his old Age he professed he never had done any Thing contrary to the Conscience of an upright Man, only that of one Thing he was doubtful; having given Sentence against his Friend according to Law, he advised his Friend to appeal from him (his Judge) so to preserve both his Friend and the Law: *A. Gellius* relates it thus; 'When his Life drew towards an End, ready to be seized by Death, he 'spoke thus to his Friends about him: My Words 'and Actions in this long Term of Years, have 'been (almost all) such as I need not repent of, 'which perhaps you also know truly; even at this 'Time I am certain, I never committed any 'Thing, the Remembrance whereof begets any 'Trouble in me, unless this one Thing only, 'which, whether it were done amiss or not, I am 'uncertain: I sat with two others as Judge upon 'the Life of my Friend; the Law was such as the 'Person must of Necessity be condemned; so that 'either my Friend must lose his Life, or some Deceit be used towards the Law. Revolving many 'Things in my Mind for Relief of a Condition so 'desperate, I conceived that which I put in Practice 'to be of all other the most easy to be born: Silently I condemned him, and persuaded those others who judged to absolve him: Thus preserving (in so great a Business) the Duty both of a 'Judge and Friend; but from that Act I receive 'this Trouble, that I fear it is not free from Perfidiousness and Guilt, in the same Business, at 'the same time, and in a publick Affair, to perswade others, contrary to what was in my own 'Judgment best.

CHAP. II.

His moral Sentences, Precepts and Verses.

OF his Apophthegms, these are remembered by *Laertius* [q]; he said, 'Providence of future 'Things collected by Reason, is the Virtue of a 'Man.' Being demanded wherein the Learned differ from the Unlearned? He answered, 'In a 'good Hope.' What is hard? 'To conceal Secrets, to dispose of Leisure well; and to be able 'to bear an Injury.'

[r] Being invited to a Feast by *Periander*, (with the rest of the wise Men) he would not promise to come before he knew what other Company would be there, saying, *a Man is necessitated to brook an ill Companion in a Ship at Sea, or in a Tent in a Camp; but to mix indifferently with all Sorts of People at a Feast is Indiscretion.* Upon the same Occasion *Plutarch* recites these Sentences of his; *A Prince must not think upon any transitory mortal Things, but only upon the eternal and immortal. That Common-wealth is best where the People mind the Law more than the Lawyers. A Family must resemble as much as possible a City governed by a King.* [s] *Hearing a Man say he had no Enemy, he asked him if he had any Friend; conceiving Love and Hate necessarily must follow one another.*

His moral Precepts are thus delivered by [t] *Demetrius Phalereus. Know thyself. Speak not much in thy Drink, for thou wilt transgress*; (or as *Laertius*, rule thy Tongue, especially at a Feast.) *Threaten not free Persons, for it is not just*; (*Laertius* [u], Threaten none, for that is like a Woman.) *Speak not ill of thy Neighbour; if thou dost, thou shalt hear what will trouble thee. Go slowly to the Feasts of thy Friends, swiftly to their Misfortunes*; (*Laertius* [w], go more readily to a Friend in Adversity than in Prosperity.) *Celebrate Marriage frugally. Speak well of the Dead. Reverence thy elder*; (*Laertius*, Honour Age.) *Hate him who*

k Laert. 7. 235. l Plut. vit. Lycur. m In Euseb. p. 67. n Laert. 1. 68. o Ibid. p Laert. 1, 71. q Ib. 1. 68.
r Plutarch Sympos. sept. sap. s Plut. de anima. t Stob. serm. 3. u Laert. 1. 69. w Ib. 1. 70.

is.

is inquisitive into the Business of others. Prefer Loss before unjust Gain (for that (adds *Laertius*) brings Grief but once, this for ever.) *Deride not the unfortunate. If thou art strong, behave thyself mildly, that thou mayst rather be respected than feared* (*Laertius*, of thy Neighbours, learn to) *Order thy House well. Let not thy Tongue run before thy Mind. Bridle thy Anger. Covet not Impossibilities. In the Way hasten not forward. Shake not thy Hand* (*Laertius*, in Discourse) *for it is like a Mad-man. Obey the Laws. Be reconciled to those who have wronged you, but revenge Contumelies.* To which *Laertius* adds these, *To preserve thyself. Not to hate Divination. Make Use of Quietness.*

[x] *Pliny* speaking of Authority, saith, *That Men ranked* Chilo *amongst Oracles, consecrating three Precepts of his at* Delphi, *in golden Letters, which are these: Every Man to know himself, and to desire nothing too much; the Companion of another's Money and Strife is Misery.*

[y] He only kept within Bounds the two most fierce Affections of the Soul, Love and Hate, saying, *Love with such Limitation, as if hereafter you might chance to hate: Hate so far, as that perhaps you might hereafter love.*

Ausonius ascribes to him the Effect of these Verses:

Me, may the Mean not fear, nor Great despise,
Have Death and Health alike before thy Eyes.
The Benefits thou givest remember never,
Of those thou dost receive, be mindful ever.
Learn of thyself and Friend t' o'ercome cross Fate,
Age, Youth resembling, is a light Estate,
Youth, Age resembling, is a greater Weight.

His particular Sentence was, *To a Surety Loss is near.*

Of his Ἀδομένα, [z] *Laertius* mentions this as most eminent.

Gold's Worth we by the Touchstone find,
Gold is the Touchstone of the Mind.

[a] He asked *Æsop* what *Jupiter* was doing, who answered, pulling down the High, and raising the Low.

CHAP. III.
His Death and Writings.

HE died (according to [b] *Hermippus*) at *Pisa*, embracing his Son, Victor in the Olympic Games of the *Cæstus*, the Weakness of his Age overcome with Excess of Joy; all who were present at that great Assembly attended on his Funerals, as is affirmed by [c] *Pliny* and *Laertius*, who hath this Epigram upon him,

To the illustrious Pollux *Thanks I pay,*
That Chilo's *Son the Olive bore away.*
The Father died o'erjoy'd his Child to see
So crown'd; a happy Death! such befal me.

Upon his Statue this Inscription.

The Birth of Chilo *warlike* Sparta *grac'd,*
Who of the Seven, in the first Rank was plac'd.

[d] He was short in Speech, whence *Aristagoras* calls that Manner of speaking *Chilonian*. [e] *Ausonius* also alludes hereto in the Speech he makes under his Name.

[f] He writ Elegies, extending almost to two Hundred Verses: There is likewise an Epistle of his extant to this Effect.

Chilo *to* Periander.

'YOU send me Word of an Expedition you
'are preparing against Foreigners, intending
'to go in Person with your Army: a Monarch,
'I think, hath little Safety, even at home. That
'Tyrant I esteem happy who dies at home a na-
'tural Death.

x Lib. 7. cap. 32. y A. Gell. 1. 3. z Laert. 1. 73. a Ibid. 1. 98. b Laert. 1. 72. c Lib. 7. cap. 32. Laert. 1. 73. d Ibid. 1. 72. e Lud. sept. sap. f Laert. 1. 61.

PITTACUS.

CHAP. I.

His Life.

Pittacus [g] was of *Mitelene* (the chief City of *Lesbos*) Son of *Caicus*, [h] or (rather) *Cyrrhadius*, a *Thracian*, his Mother a *Lesbian*, born in the thirty second Olympiad.

Laertius saith, he flouriſhed in the forty-ſecond Olympiad; [i] at that Time he gave Teſtimony of his great Courage and Love to his Country, in killing (aſſiſted by the Brethren of *Alcæus* the Poet) *Melanchrus*, Tyrant of *Lesbos* and *Mitelene*.

[k] *Pittacus*, grown eminent by this Action, was by the *Miteleneans* made General, and *ſent with a Fleet againſt the* Athenians [l], with whom they had a long Conteſt concerning the *Achillæan* Field; the Ground of their Difference this: [m] Piſiſtratus *took* Sigeum *by Force from the* Miteleneans, *and ſettled there (as King)* Hegeſiſtratus *his natural Son, by an* Argive *Woman, who kept it, not without much Diſpute; for betwixt the* Miteleneans *and* Athenians, *there was a long War; thoſe ſallying out of the* Achillæan *Town, theſe out of* Sigeum: Thoſe lay claim to the Town, as built by *Arohænactes* of *Mitelene*, of the Stones of old *Troy* (for the *Lesbians* challenged the greateſt Part of *Troas* as their Hereditary Right, where they had built many Houſes, ſome, ſaith [n] *Strabo*, ſtanding at this Day, others demoliſhed). [o] *Theſe oppoſed their Claim; alledging the* Æolians *had no more Right to this* Ilian *Country than themſelves or any other of the* Greeks, *who aſſiſted* Menelaus *in the Recovery of* Helen. [p] The *Athenians* ſent thither as General, *Phryno*, a tall robuſt Perſon, who had been Victor in all the Olympick Exerciſes; perhaps the ſame whom *Euſebius* names in the thirty-ſixth Olympiad. [q] Pittacus *having been ſeveral Times worſted in Battle, at laſt challenged* Phryno *to ſingle Combat, and met him, being armed with the Weapons of a Fiſherman, hiding a Net under his Shield, wherewith catching* Phryno *ſuddenly, he ſlew him with his Trident and Dagger, and by his Death recovered the Field.* From this Stratagem of *Pittacus*, was derived the like Kind of Fighting among the *Roman* Gladiators, called *Retiarii* (deſcribed by *Lipſius* [r]) as is expreſly obſerved by [s] *Polyænus* and *Feſtus* [t].

[u] But this War ended not ſo, until at laſt both Parties referred themſelves unto *Periander*, [w] chooſing him Umpire; he awarded that each Side ſhould keep what they were in Poſſeſſion of, whereby *Sigeum* fell to the *Athenians*. [x] Demetrius *argues* Timæus *of Falſhood, for affirming* Periander *built* Achilleum (*a ſmall Town where was the Tomb of* Achilles) *in Oppoſition to the* Athenians, *of* Ilian *Stones, and thereby to have aided* Pittacus. *But neither was it built of ſuch* Stones (ſaith *Strabo*) *nor was* Periander *the Founder: How could he be choſe Arbitrator, whoſe Actions had declared him an Enemy?*

[y] Hereupon *Pittacus* was highly honoured by the *Miteleneans*, who [z] *being infeſted by baniſhed Perſons, under the leading of* Antimenides, *and* Alcæus *the Poet)* [a] either in Obligation to his Merit, or Confidence in his Equity, by their free Votes [b] (*tho'* Alcæus *deny it*) inſtated him in the Tyranny; [c] *with many Acclamations of Praiſe and a great Concourſe of People* (as is manifeſt from *Alcæus*, who for that Reaſon reprehends them.) [d] They alſo with general Conſent offered him great Gifts, and bad him take of that Field which he recovered from the Citizens as much as he would. He darting his Spear, demanded only ſo much as that had paſſed over; which he dedicated to *Apollo*, called (even to the Time of *Plutarch* and *Laertius*) *the* Pittacæan *Field*. [e] *Soſicrates* avers, he took Part of it for himſelf, ſaying, the Half was more than the Whole. Thus he [f] *diverted his Mind from the Gift, conceiving it not fitting to diminiſh the Glory of the Virtue, by the Greatneſs of the Reward.*

' Being poſſeſſed of this Power [g] he ſhewed the ' Moderation wherewith his Breaſt was furniſhed, ' towards *Alcæus* the Poet, who had behaved him- ' ſelf pertinaciouſly againſt him, with bitter Hate ' and ſcurrilous Wit (whereof ſee many Inſtances ' in *Laertius*) *Pittacus* only inform'd him how able ' he was to oppreſs him.'

During his Government, he made many Laws, one whereof is mentioned by [h] *Cicero*, forbidding *any Man to go to the Funeral of ſuch as he was not Kin to.* Another by [i] *Ariſtotle*, that *whoſoever being drunk, ſhould ſtrike any Man, ſhould pay double as much as if he had been ſober*; or as [k] *Laertius* delivers it, *whoſoever offended, being drunk, ſhould pay a double Forfeit*; which he did to reſtrain the *Miteleneans* from Drunkenneſs, becauſe their Iſland

g Laert. 1. 74. Suid. h So the Vatican MS. of Suidas, better than the printed Editions, which reads. i Suid. k Laert. ibid. l Strab. 1. 13. m Herod. 5. n Strabo 1. 13. o Herod. continues. p Strab. Laert. ibid. q Strab. Laert. ibid. r Saturnal. 2. 8. s Polyæn. Stratagem. l. 25. t In Retiario. u Strab. Laert. ibid. w Herod. 5. 95. x Strab. ibid. y Laert. 1. 75. z Ariſt. Polit. 3. 14. a Val. Max. 6. 5. b Plut. Amator. c Ariſt. pol. 31. 4. d Plut. de malig. Herod. Laert. Suid. e Laert. ibid. f Val. Max. 6. 5. g Val. Max. 4. 1. h De Legib. 2. c. 26. i Polit. 2. 12. k Laert. 1. 76.

abounded in Wine. His usual Exercise, even whilst he was King, (as *Clearchus* affirms) was to grind Corn, esteeming it a healthful Exercise, much commending a Mill, that in so little Room, it afforded Exercise to many. There was a Song [l] called for that Reason Επιμύλιον, of which [m] *Thales* affirms he heard a she Slave in *Lesbos* sing the Beginning as she ground, which was thus.

Grind, grind my Mill amain,
For Pittacus *that* Lesbian *King*
To grind doth not disdain.

Being well in Years, he was constrained to take upon himself the Leading of an Army, whereupon he said, *It is hard to be good*; which [n] *Simonides* mentions, saying,

Hard to be truly honest, this
The Pittacean *Sentence is*

Plato also remembers it in his *Protagoras*, where *Simonides* reproves *Pittacus* for saying, it is hard to continue good, which he affirms to be easy, but to become good, hard; wherein he differs from *Laertius*'s Expression of it.

[o] He continued in the Government of the Kingdom ten Years; [p] *Valerius Maximus* saith, *only as long as the War with the* Athenians *concerning* Sigeum *lasted, but afterwards as soon as Peace was obtained by Victory* (having in this Time settled the Affairs of the Common-wealth, *he laid it down, notwithstanding the* Miteleneans *cried out to the contrary, lest he should continue Lord of the Citizens longer than the Necessities of the Kingdom required*, and lived ten Years after a private Person.

'[q] He went to *Sardis*, at what Time (as some 'say, tho' others apply it to *Bias*) *Crœsus* having 'made the *Grecians* in *Asia* tributary, had given 'Order for the Building of a Navy to invade the 'Islanders: As soon as he came thither, *Crœsus* 'asked him what News from *Greece?* He by his 'Answer diverted the King from going forward 'with his building Ships. The Islanders, saith he, 'have bought a World of Horses, intending an Expedition against *Sardis*; and *Crœsus*, thinking he 'had spoken Truth, answered, I wish the Gods 'would put it in their Minds to come against the '*Lydians* on Horseback; he replied, It is not 'without Reason, great King, that you wish and 'hope to catch the Islanders on Horseback in the 'Continent; and what think you the Islanders 'wish more, than (hearing your Preparation to set 'out a Navy against them) that they may catch 'the *Lydians* upon the Sea, and revenge the Cause 'of those inland *Grecians* whom you have reduced 'to Servitude. *Crœsus*, much delighted with this 'Speech, and dissuaded (for it seemed to him he 'spoke very ingenuously) from building a Navy, 'gave it over, and contracted Amity with the *Ionian* Islands.

CHAP. II.

His moral Sentences, Precepts, and Verses.

OF his Apophthegms, *Laertius* [r] recites these. 'The Gods themselves cannot resist Necessity. 'Power shews the Man. Being on a Time demanded what is best, he answered, To do the present well. To *Crœsus*, who asked which was the greatest Government? That of various Wood, saith he, meaning the Law carved in wooden Tables. To a *Phocæan*, who said, I must seek an honest Man: Tho' you seek much, saith he) you shall not find him. To some who demanded what was most pleasing, he answered, Time. He said it was the Part of wise Men to foresee Inconveniencies, and prevent them before they came; of valiant Men, to order them well when they come.

Add these from [s] *Plutarch*, 'That Prince is 'happy, who can make his Subject afraid not of 'him, but for him. That Common-wealth is best 'ordered, where the Wicked have no Command, 'and the good have. That House is best ordered, 'which needs nothing either of Ornament or Necessity.

[t] He counselled *Periander* to shun Drunkenness and Excess in Feasting, lest he should be known to be what he was, not what he seemed.

To a young Man asking his Advice concerning Marriage, what Directions he gave, is thus expressed by [u] *Callimachus.*

An Acarnæan *Stranger* Pittacus,
Hyrrhadius *Son of* Lesbos *question'd thus*;
Father, a double Match is offered me;
The Birth and Means of one with mine agree;
The other far exceeds me, which is best?
By your Advice my Aim shall be addrest.
Lifting his Staff, (his Age's sole Defence)
He pointing said, go fetch Advice from thence;
(There he espied some Boys by Chance at Play,
As they were whipping Tops along the Way)
Follow their Steps, saith he. When nigh he drew,
He heard them say, an Equal take to you;
By which Direction guided, he forsook
The richer Fortune, and the equal took;
Be you (as he) by this wise Counsel led,
And take an Equal to your Marriage-Bed.

l Pollux. 1. 4. m Plut. Sympos. sept. sap. n Hence correct Suidas who saith Simon. o Laert. 1. 750. p 1. 6. q Herod. 1. r Laert. 1. 77. s Sympos. sept. sap. t Athen. deipn. lib. 10. u Ep. 1.

Whither

Whither *Æschylus* (as is observed by his Scholiast) alluded [w], saying,

Wise, truly wise was he
Who first sententiously
His Judgment thus expresst,
An equal Match is best.

His moral Precepts are thus collected by [x] *Demetrius Phalereus*, 'Know Opportunity. What 'thou intendest, speak not before thou dost it, for 'being frustrate of thy Hope, thou wilt be derided. 'Use thy Friends. What thou takest ill in thy 'Neighbour do not thyself. Reproach not the Un-'happy, for the Hand of God is on them. Restore 'what is committed to thy Trust. Bear with thy 'Neighbour. Love thy Neighbour. Reproach not 'Friend, tho' he recede from thee a little; nor 'wish well to thy Enemy; it is against Reason. 'It is hard to foresee the future, what is past is 'certain, what is to come obscure. The Earth 'is faithful, the Sea faithless, Gain insatiable. 'Acquire Honesty; seek Obsequiousness; love 'Discipline, Temperance, Prudence, Truth, 'Faith, Experience, Dexterity, Society, Diligence, 'Oeconomy, and Piety.

[y] *Ausonius* cites these as his:

None know to speak who know not to refrain,
One good Man's Praise 'fore many ill Men's Gain.
He's mad who envies in the Happy, Pride;
Or Grief in the Unhappy doth deride.
Who makes a Law must not that Law transgress.
Purchase all Friends thou canst in Happiness;
And to the fewest trust in thy Distress.

[z] Of his Ἀδρόμενα, these were most celebrious.

Who hath a Quiver and a Bow,
Against a wicked Man should go,
Whose doubtful Tongue never expresst,
The faithless Meaning of his Breast.

His particular Sentence was, *Know Opportunity.*

CHAP. III.

His Death, Brother, Wife, Son, Writings.

HE [a] lived to a full Age, above seventy Years, or (following the Account of *Suidas* for his Birth) eighty. [b] *Lucian* exceeds, who reckons him amongst those who lived one hundred Years; for he [c] died when *Aristomenes* was Archon, in the third Year of the fifty second Olympiad: Upon his Monument this Epitaph,

Weep, Citizens, as sacred Lesbos *weeps*
For Pittacus; *this Tomb his Ashes keeps.*

He had a Brother, who dying without Issue, his Estate devolved to *Pittacus*; whereupon, refusing the Wealth *Crœsus* offered him, he said, he had more by half than he desired.

He married a Wife of Birth higher than himself, Sister to *Draco*, Son of *Penthilus*; she behaved herself imperiously towards him; whereof [d] *Plutarch* gives this Instance, *Having invited some Friends, she came in and overthrew the Table; he seeing his Guests troubled, said,* 'Each of you hath 'some Misfortune, *he is happiest who hath no more than this. Laertius* saith, the Advice he gave concerning equal Marriage (*Chap.* 2.) was out of Resentment of his own Troubles.

[e] He had a Son named *Tyrrheus, who at* Cuma *sitting in a Barber's Shop,* (as was used amongst the Ancients, by such as loved to discourse of News) *was causually killed by a Brasier with a Blow of a Hatchet; the* Cumeans *took the Offender and sent him to* Pittacus; *he being informed of the Accident set him at Liberty, saying, Pardon is better than Penitence.*

Of his Writings [f] *Laertius* mentions,
Ἀδρόμενα, already cited.
Elegies, amounting to six hundred Verses.
Of Laws in Prose, directed to his own Countrymen.
Epistles; of which this is preserved:

Pittacus *to* Crœsus.

YOU command me to come to Lydia *to behold your Wealth; without Sight whereof I can easily believe the Son of* Alyattes, *to be the richest of Kings, and therefore need not in that Respect go to* Sardis; *for I want not Gold, but have enough even for my Friends also; yet I will come to you to enjoy your Conversation as a Guest.*

[g] There was another *Pittacus*, called the Lesser, a Law-giver, mentioned by *Phavorinus* and *Demetrius.*

w Prom. vinct. v. 886. x Stob. Serm. 3. y Sent. sept. sap. z Laert. 1. 79. a Laert. ibid. b Longæv. c Laert. 1. 79. d De anim. tranquil. e Laert. 1. 76. f Laert. 1. 78. g Laert. 1. 79.

BIAS.

CHAP. I.

His Life.

BIAS [a] was of *Priene*, Son of *Tutamis*; ſome affirm he was rich, others that he had no Eſtate, but lived as an Inmate. *Satyrus* ranketh him firſt of the ſeven wiſe Men. The Occaſion whereby that Title was conferred on him was this; he redeemed ſome Captive *Meſſenian* Virgins, brought them up as his Daughters, gave them Portions, and ſo ſent them back to their Parents. A Tripod being afterwards found at *Athens* (as was related in the Life of *Thales*, the Place only different) with this Inſcription in Gold, *To the Wiſe*. Theſe Virgins (as *Satyrus* affirms) or (as *Phanodicus*) their Father came into the Congregation, and pronounced *Bias Wiſe*, declaring what he had done for them: Hereupon the Tripod was ſent to him, which *Bias* beholding, averred *Apollo* to be the moſt wiſe, and would not accept it; ſome affirm he dedicated it to *Hercules* at *Thebes*, as being deſcended from the *Theban* Colony, ſent to *Priene*.

That he made good this Attribute, there are many Inſtances; [b] *Alyattes* beſieging *Priene*, *Bias* turned out of the Town two exceeding fat Mules, which coming to the Camp, *Cræſus* wondered to [c] ſee their Plenty extended to the very Beaſts, and deſirous of Reconcilement, ſent a Meſſenger to them. *Bias* cauſing many Heaps of Sand to be made, and covered over with Wheat, ſhewed them to the Meſſengers, whereof *Alyattes* informed, was more eager of Peace than before, and ſent immediately to deſire *Bias* to come to him; but I (anſwered he) wiſh *Alyattes* may feed on Onions, meaning to weep.

[d] Some aſcribe it to *Bias*, the Diverſion of *Cræſus* his Expedition againſt the *Greek* Iſlands, by others imputed to *Pittacus* related in his Life.

Cyrus having taken *Cræſus*, ſent an Army againſt the *Græcians*; the *Ionians* much troubled, aſſembled at the *Panionium*, where *Bias* gave them wiſe Advice, which, had they followed (ſaith *Herodotus*) they might have been the happieſt of all the *Greeks*: He counſelled them to join together in one Fleet, to ſail to *Sardinia*, and there build one City common to all the *Ionians*; whereby they might preſerve themſelves from Bondage, happy in poſſeſſing an Iſland far greater than all the reſt, and commanding them; but if they continued in *Ionia*, there was no apparent Hope of Liberty. This Advice was juſtified, the *Ionians* being ſubdued.

[e] *Bias*, (his Country *Priene* invaded by Enemies, all, whom the Cruelty of War ſuffered to eſcape, flying away laden with the moſt precious of their Wealth) being demanded why he carried none of his Goods with him; I (ſaith he) carry my Goods with me: He bore them (adds *Valerius Maximus*) in his Breaſt, not to be ſeen by the Eye, but priſed by the Soul; encloſed in the narrow Dwelling of the Mind, not to be demoliſhed by mortal Hands, preſent with thoſe who are ſettled, and not forſaking ſuch as fly.

[f] He refuſed not the Amity of Kings, (as *Thales* did) particularly, that of *Amaſis*, King of *Egypt*, who ſent him a Victim, commanding him to take from it the beſt and worſt Part. *Bias* ſent him the Tongue, for which Ingenuity he was much admired.

[g] Another Queſtion of *Amaſis* he reſolved, whilſt he was at *Corinth* (invited thither with the reſt of the wiſe Men by *Periander*) where *Niloxenus* brought him this Letter.

Amaſis, *King of* Egypt *ſaith thus to* Bias, *wiſeſt of the* Greeks: *The King of* Ethiopia *contendeth with me for Pre-eminence in Wiſdom; maſter'd in other Things, he in Concluſion requires an abſurd, ſtrange Thing, that I drink up the Sea; this Propoſition, if I reſolve, I ſhall have many of his Towns and Cities; if I reſolve not, I muſt loſe all thoſe which are about* Elephantina. *Ponder it, and ſend* Niloxenus *back with all Speed; whatever we can do for your Friends and Country, ſhall not be wanting.*

Having read the Letter, *Bias* with a ſhort Pauſe, recollecting himſelf, and having whiſpered to *Cleobulus* who ſat next him. 'What (ſaith he) *Nau-*
'*cratites*, *Amaſis*, who commands ſo many Men,
'and poſſeſſeth ſo excellent a Country, will he for
'a few obſcure contemptible Villages drink up the
'Sea? *Bias* (ſaith *Niloxenus* ſmiling) conſider, as
'if he meant to do it, how it might be effected.
'Bid the *Ethiopian* (replied *Bias*) with-hold the
'Rivers from running into the Sea, until he hath
'drunk off that which is now Sea; for the Impoſi-
'tion concerns that only which is ſuch at preſent,
'not what ſhall be hereafter. *Niloxenus* embraced him with Joy, the reſt applauding his Solution.

a Laert. 1. 82. b Ibid. 1. 84. c Laert. ibid. μέχρι ἐξ ἀλίγων διὰ τείνειν ἀυλῶν τῶν ἐυθείνειαν read ἐυθηνίαν. d Herod. l. 1.
e Val. Max. 7. 2. f Plut. conv. ſept. ſap. g Plut. ibid.

CHAP. II.

His moral Sentences, Precepts, and Verſes.

HIS Apophthegms are thus delivered by *Laertius* [h], and others. 'He is unfortunate who cannot 'bear Misfortune. It is a Diſeaſe of the Mind to 'deſire ſuch Things as cannot be obtained, and to 'be unmindful of the Miſeries of others. To one 'that ask'd what is hard, he anſwered, to bear 'courageouſly a Change to the worſe. Being at 'Sea in Company with wicked Men, who, a 'Storm ariſing, called upon the Gods; hold your 'Peace, ſaith he, leſt they know you are here. To 'a wicked Man, enquiring what was Piety, he 'was ſilent, the other asking the Reaſon of his 'Silence: I anſwer not, ſaith he, becauſe you en-'quire after that which nothing concerns you. Be-'ing demanded what is ſweet to Mankind, he an-'ſwer'd Hope. It is better to decide a Difference 'betwixt our Enemies than Friends, for one of the 'Friends will certainly become an Enemy, one of 'the Enemies a Friend; being asked what a Man 'did with Delight, he anſwered, Gain by Labour. 'We ſhould ſo live, as tho' our Life would be both 'long and ſhort. So love, as if hereafter we might 'hate, converſing in Friendſhip with Caution, 'remembring that it may poſſibly convert to En-'mity.

'[i] To one demanding whether he ſhould take a 'Wife; ſhe muſt be (ſaith he) either fair or foul; 'if fair, ſhe will be common, if foul, a Pennance.

'[k] That Tyrant ſhall gain moſt Glory, who 'firſt himſelf obeys the Laws of his Country: 'That Common-wealth is beſt ordered, wherein 'every Man fears the Law more than a Tyrant. 'That Family is beſt ordered, where the Maſter 'behaves himſelf voluntarily within Doors, as he 'doth without by Conſtraint of the Law.

'[l] Thoſe who buſy themſelves in vain Know-'ledge reſemble an Owl, which ſeeth only in the 'Night, but is blind in the Light; ſo is their 'Mind ſharp-ſighted in Vanity, dark at the Ap-'proach of true Light.

[m] *Auſonius* hath theſe under his Name.

What is our chiefeſt Good? A Conſcience free.
Our greateſt ill? Man's Man's worſt Enemy.
Poor? Th' avaricious. Rich? Who nought deſires.
A Wife's beſt Dower? The Fame chaſte Life acquires.
Chaſte? She, of whom Report dare ſpeak no Ill.
Wife? Who hath Power to hurt, but wants the Will.
A Fool? Who wants the Power, and yet would kill.

His moral Precepts, according to [n] *Demetrius Phalereus* theſe. 'Moſt Men are evil. ([o] His 'particular Sentence) Before you do any Thing, 'behold your Face in a Glaſs; if it ſeem hand-'ſome, do handſome Things; if deformed, ſup-'ply the Defects of Nature. Practiſe Honeſty. 'Undertake deliberately, but having once begun, 'go through. Abhor to ſpeak haſtily [*Laer.* It is 'Madneſs.] leſt thou ſin, for Repentance follows: 'Be neither ſimple nor ſubtle. Admit not Impru-'dence. Love Prudence. Every where profeſs 'there are Gods. Weigh what is to be done. Hear 'much, ſpeak ſeaſonably. If poor, reprove not 'the Rich, unleſs great Advantage may ariſe there-'by. Praiſe not an unworthy Perſon for his 'Wealth. Acquire by Perſuaſion, not by Violence. 'When thou doſt good, impute it not to thyſelf, 'but the Gods. In thy Youth, gain Wealth, in 'thy Age, Wiſdom. [Or as *Laertius*, from thy 'Youth to thy Age gain Wiſdom, for it will be 'more ſure to thee than all other Poſſeſſions.] Pre-'ſerve in thy Actions Remembrance; in Oppor-'tunity, Caution; in thy Manners, Ingenuity; 'In Labour, Patience; in Fear, Warineſs; in 'Wealth, Love; in Diſcourſe, Perſuaſion; in 'Silence, a Decorum; in Sentence, Juſtice; in 'Boldneſs, Fortitude; in Action, Power; in Glo-'ry, Eminence; in thy Nature, Generoſity.'

[p] Of his Ἀσφάλεια, theſe were moſt eſteem'd.

To all the City where thou liv'ſt be kind,
They who moſt Favour ſhow, moſt Favour find:
But Pride is often with Deſtruction join'd.

And,

Strength is a Gift, which Nature's Hand beſtows.
Rhetorick and Policy the Wiſe Soul knows,
Riches a Preſent that from Fortune flows.

CHAP. III.

His Death and Writings.

HE was much addicted to Pleading [q], very earneſt therein, but always employed in juſt Cauſes; which [r] *Demodicus* the *Alerian* implies, ſaying, *If thou chance to be a Judge, give Sentence on the* Prienæan *Side*; and *Hipponax, to plead a Cauſe better than* Bias *the* Prienæan. And in that Manner he died, being very old, as he was pleading, having ended his Speech he repoſed his Head in the Boſom of his Siſter's Son; his Adverſary having ended his Defence, the Judges gave Sentence on *Bias*'s Side; the Court diſmiſt, he was found dead in his Nephew's Boſom. The City beſtowed

h Laert. 1. 86. i A. Gell. 5. 11. k Plut. conviv. ſept. ſap. l Stob. Serm. 3. m Auſon. in Lud. ſept. ſap. n Stob. Serm. 3. o Laert. 1. 88. p Ibid. 1. 86. q Ibid. 1. 84. r Ibid. Δημόδικος ὁ Ἀλείος: Perhaps it ſhould be Δημόδικος ὁ Ἀλείος.

a magnificent Monument upon him, with this Inſcription;

Bias *of* Prienæan *fam'd Deſcent*
Lies here, Ionia's *great Ornament.*

They alſo dedicated a Temple to him, called the *Teutamian.*

[s] *Laertius* beſtows upon him this Epigram.

Bias *lies hidden here, whom* Hermes *led*
To th' Grave, when Age had ſnow'd upon his Head.
His Head, which (pleading for his Friend) enclin'd
Upon his Nephew, to long Sleep reſign'd.

He writ concerning *Ionia*, by what Means it might be moſt happy (perhaps that Counſel already mentioned) two thouſand Verſes.

s Laert. 1. 86.

CLEOBULUS.

CHAP. I.

His Life, Death, and Writings.

Cleobulus [t] was of *Lindus*, (a City of *Rhodes*) or, according to *Duris*, of *Caria*, Son of *Evagoras*, lineally deſcended from *Hercules*; excellent both in Wiſdom, outward Beauty, and Strength [u], beyond all thoſe of his Time; learned in the Philoſophy of the *Egyptians*. That he was Tyrant of *Lindus*, is manifeſt from [w] *Plutarch*. He re-edified the Temple of *Minerva*, founded by *Danaus*.

He had a Daughter [x], whom he named *Eumetis*, but was called commonly from her Father *Cleobulina*: She compoſed Verſes and Riddles, in Hexameters, famous for her Wiſdom and Acuteneſs in thoſe Riddles, ſome of her Queſtions having ſpread as far as *Egypt*, which ſhe uſed jocularly, like Dice upon Occaſions, only conteſting with ſuch as provoked her; ſhe was alſo endued with an admirable Height of Mind, and a Wit both Politick and full of Humanity, cauſing her Father to govern his People with more mildneſs. *Cratinus* alſo mentions her in a Comedy named from her *Cleobulæ*, often cited by *Athenæus*.

[y] He died full of Years, which extended to ſeventy. His Tomb carried this Inſcription,

Wiſe Cleobulus's *Death, the* Lyndian *Shore,*
To which his Birth was owing, doth deplore.

[z] He compoſed Verſes and Riddles to the Number of three thouſand; of which was this Riddle concerning the Year, (by *Suidas* aſcribed to his Daughter *Cleobulina*.)

One Sire, twelve Sons, from every one a Race
Of thirty Daughters with a double Face:
Their Looks are black, and white ſucceſſively;
Immortal they are all, and yet all die.

[a] Some aſſert him the Author of this Epigram upon *Midas* (not *Homer*; who, as they account, lived long before *Midas*, tho' *Herodotus* otherwiſe.)

A brazen Virgin ſtretch'd on Midas' *Tomb,*
To laſt whilſt Water runs, and Trees ſhall bloom;
Whilſt Sun and Moon dart their ſucceſſive Beams,
And the rough Sea ſupplied by gentle Streams.
I dwell upon this diſmal Sepulchre,
To tell all thoſe that paſs, Midas *lies here.*

There is likewiſe extant under his Name this Epiſtle [b].

Cleobulus *to* Solon.

YOU have many Friends, and a Habitation every where; but I dare affirm, Lindus *would be moſt pleaſing to* Solon, *being governed by a Democracy; an Iſland where there is no Fear of* Piſiſtratus, *thither your Friends will come to you from all Parts.*

CHAP. II.

His moral Sentences, Precepts, and Verſes.

OF his moral Sayings [c], are theſe: *Employ thyſelf in ſomething excellent. Be not vain and ungrateful. Beſtow your Daughters, Virgins in Years, Matrons in Diſcretion: Implying, that the Virgins alſo ſhould be inſtructed,* which the *Greeks* uſed not, the *Romans* brought them up in the Liberal Sciences. *Do good to your Friend, that he may be more*

t Laert. 1. 89. u Suid. Κλεοβ. w De ſ. delph. x Plut. conviv. ſept. ſap. y Laert. 1. 93. z Ibid. 1. 91. a Ibid. 1. 89. b Ibid. 1. 93. c Ibid. 1. 91.

your

your Friend, your Enemy that he may become your Friend; for we ſhould beware of the Calumny of Friends, of the Treachery of Enemies: When any Man goeth forth, let him conſider what he is to do; when he returns, examine what he hath done.

[d] *A Prince may be happy, if he truſt none that are about him. That Common-wealth is beſt ordered, wherein the Citizens fear Reproach more than Law. That Family is beſt, wherein more love than fear the Maſter.*

His Precepts thus collected by [e] *Demetrius Phalereus. A Mean is beſt.* ([f] His particular Sentence) *To reverence thy Father is Duty. Take Care of thy Body and Soul. Hear willingly, but truſt not haſtily.* (Or as *Laertius*, 'tis better to love to hear, than to love to ſpeak.) *It is better to know many Things,* (*Laertius*, to love Knowledge) *than to be ignorant of all. Teach your Tongue to ſpeak well. It is proper to Virtue, and contrary to Vice, to hate Injuſtice.* (*Laertius*, be a Friend to Virtue, a Stranger to Vice.) *Preſerve thy Piety. Adviſe thy Countrymen what is beſt. Govern thy Tongue.* (*Laertius* Pleaſure.) *Do nothing by Violence. Inſtruct thy Children. Pray to Fortune. Forego Enmity. The Enemy to thy Country, eſteem thy own. Fight not, nor be kind to thy Wife in the Preſence of others, one argues Folly, the other Madneſs. Correct not your Servants when they are drunk, it ſhews as if you were drunk yourſelf. Marry with your Equal; for by matching into a higher Family, you procure Maſters, not Kinſmen. Laugh not in Compliance with him who derides others; for you will be hated by thoſe he derides. Rich, be not exalted; Poor, be not dejected.* (*Laertius* adds, Learn to bear the Changes of Fortune.)

[g] *Auſonius* aſcribes theſe to him,

The more is in thy Power, deſire the leſs;
Not to be envy'd is Unhappineſs.
None long in his Impieties can thrive,
In others much, nought in thyſelf forgive.
All Men would ſpare the good, the bad caſt down,
We ſhare not in our Anceſtors Renown:
But their inglorious Actions often own.

Of his Ἀσκήσεις theſe were moſt noted [h].

By Ignorance moſt Deeds are ſway'd,
In many ſpecious Words array'd;
But all Things ſhall by Time be weigh'd.

d Plut. Sympoſ. ſept. ſap. e Stob. Serm. 3. f Laert. 1. 93. g Auſon. in Lud. ſept. Sap. h Laert. ibid.

PERIANDER.

CHAP. I.

The Country, Anceſtors, and Parents of Periander.

PEriander was Son of *Cypſelus* Tyrant of *Corinth*, his Mother *Cratea*, his Anceſtors the *Heraclidæ*, ([i] deſcended from *Hercules* and *Jardana*) reigned Kings of *Lydia* five hundred and five Years, the Son continually ſucceeding the Father for two and twenty Generations. The Original of *Cypſelus*, and the Manner of his obtaining the Kingdom receive thus from [k] *Herodotus*.

When *Corinth* was governed by an Oligarchy, inhabited by the *Bacchiadæ*, who never would marry out of their own Family, one of them (called *Amphion*) had a lame Daughter (by name *Labda*) whom when none of the *Bacchiadæ* would take to Wife, *Eetion* married (Son of *Echetrates* of the *Betræan* Tribe, but deſcended afar off from *Lapithe* and *Cænis*) having no Children, he conſulted the *Delphian* Oracle about it; as ſoon as he entered, the Propheteſs ſpake thus to him.

Eetion *none will thee tho' great reſpect,*
A Stone from Labdas *fruitful Womb expect,*
Which ſhall the People cruſh, Corinth *correct.*

This Oracle to *Eetion*, agreed with another delivered to the *Bacchiadæ* (tho' by them not underſtood) to this Effect.

A Lyon by an Eagle ſhall be laid,
Upon a Rock, fierce, making all afraid.
Corinthians, *what I ſay conſider well,*
Who in tall Corinth *and* Priene *dwell.*

The *Bacchiadæ*, who could not comprehend the Meaning of this Oracle, when they heard that to *Eetion*, underſtood their own by the Affinity it had with the other, and thereupon ſecretly deſigned amongſt themſelves to kill *Eetion*'s Child. His Wife being delivered, they ſent ten Men of their own

i Laert. 1, 94. Herod. 1. k Lib. 5.

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to the Tribe wherein *Eetion* dwelt, that they ſhould murther the Infant; when they came to *Petra* to *Eetion*'s Houſe, they demanded the Child. *Labda* (not knowing their Intent, but thinking they came to congratulate with the Father) brings her Son, and gives him into the Hands of one of them. They had agreed (upon the Way) that he into whoſe Hands the Child were delivered, ſhould daſh out its Brains againſt the Ground, but by divine Providence, the Child ſmiling upon him to whom *Labda* had given it, he was moved therewith to ſuch Compaſſion, that he could not find in his Heart to kill it, but delivered it to another, he to a third, until at laſt it paſt through the Hands of all the ten; none of them having Power to kill it, they reſtored it to the Mother. Then going forth and ſtanding before the Door, they began to find Fault with one another, but chiefly with him who took the Child firſt, for not performing the Agreement; after ſome Debate, they agreed to go in all, and be equal Sharers in the Murder; but it was decreed that *Eetion*'s Child ſhould be the Oppreſſor of *Corinth*, for *Labda* ſtanding at the Door heard all their Diſcourſe, and fearing leſt their Minds changing, they ſhould murder it, carried away the Child, and hid it in a Meaſure of Corn (called *Cypſela*) a Place which ſhe conceived they could never ſearch if they returned, and ſo it fell out. They came back and ſought all about; when they could not find him, they agreed amongſt themſelves to tell thoſe who ſent them, they had done what they required, and returning home, did ſo. *Eetion*'s Son growing up was called *Cypſelus* from the Danger he had eſcaped in the Corn-meaſure. When he came to Man's Eſtate, he conſulted with the *Delphian* Oracle, and received a doubtful Anſwer, in Confidence whereof he attempted *Corinth* and took it, the Oracle was this,

Happy is Cypſelus, *who to my Fane*
This Viſit makes; *he* Corinth*'s Crown ſhall gain*;
He and his Sons (but not their Sons) ſhall reign.

Being poſſeſt of the Kingdom, he perſecuted the *Corinthians*, depriving many of their Eſtates, more (by far) of their Lives; having reigned thirty Years, he died, and was ſucceeded by his Son *Periander*, whoſe Reign compleated this Tyranny, which laſted according to [l] *Ariſtotle* ſeventy three Years and ſix Months: So that *Cypſelus* began to reign in the ſecond Year of the thirtieth Olympiad.

CHAP. II.

The Time of his Birth, his Reign, and the Change of his Diſpoſition.

PEriander [m] (by Computation from his Death, which, according to *Laertius*, was in the eighty Year of his Age, the laſt of the forty-eighth Olympiad) was born in the laſt Year of the twenty-ninth Olympiad. His Reign (according to [n] *Ariſtotle*'s Account, laſting forty four Years) begun in the fourth Year of the thirty-ſeventh Olympiad. *Suidas* ſaith, he ſucceeded in the Kingdom, [o] as being his Father's eldeſt Son, which *Plutarch* calls, *a Diſeaſe hereditary to him*, [p] flouriſhed in the thirty eight Olympiad.

He [q] was at firſt of a mild gentle Diſpoſition, but afterwards grew very rigid upon this Occaſion [r]. His Mother, whilſt he was very young, kept him much in her Company, when he grew more in Years, fell in love with him; with Time her Paſſion increaſed to ſuch Extremity, that ſhe could no longer ſuppreſs it; aſſuming Confidence, ſhe told her Son, there was a beautiful Lady fallen in love with him, and adviſed him not to ſlight her Affection. He anſwered, he would not tranſgreſs Law and Virtue, by touching a married Woman. His Mother preſſed him with Intreaties; at laſt he conſented; ſhe appointed a Night, adviſing him not to have any Light in his Chamber, nor to conſtrain the Lady to ſpeak, but to excuſe her for Modeſty's Sake. *Periander* engaged himſelf to do all ſhe directed. She, attired as richly as ſhe could, went to his Chamber, and departed again before Day-break. On the Morrow ſhe enquired if he were pleaſed, and if the Lady ſhould come again to him. *Periander* ſaid, it was his chiefeſt Deſire, and that he affected her exceſſively. From that Time ſhe viſited her Son often. He, at laſt, was moved with a great Curioſity to know who ſhe was, and ſolicited his Mother very importunately that he might have ſome Diſcourſe and Acquaintance with her, ſeeing he was ſo much taken with Love of her, affirming it was unreaſonable he ſhould be denied the Sight of one, with whom he had ſo often a nearer Acquaintance. His Mother affirmed it could not be done, in reſpect to the Modeſty of the Lady. Hereupon he gave one of his Servants Order to hide a Light in his Chamber: She came as ſhe uſed, and when ſhe was aſleep, *Periander* roſe, took the Light, and ſeeing it was his Mother, was about to have killed her, but with-held by ſome Genius or Apparition, forbore. From that Time forward he was troubled in Mind, grew cruel, and killed many of his Subjects. His Mother, much accuſing her unhappy Genius, ſlew herſelf. *Laertius* ſaith [s], they were both conſcious hereof, and that being diſcovered, he grew cruel to every one.

[t] In the Beginning of his Reign he was much more merciful than his Father, but keeping Correſpondence by Meſſengers with *Thraſibulus* Tyrant of *Miletus*, ([u] to whom in Times paſt he had been a Gueſt, before he arrived to the Government) he became at laſt much more bloody than his Father.

l Ariſt. Polit. 5. 12. m Laert. 1. 95. n Politic. 5. o Excerpt. Nicol. Damaſc. Suid. p Conviv. ſept. ſap. q Laert. 1. 95. Suid. r Parthen. Erotic. c. 17. s Laert. 1. 96. t Herod. l. 1. u Laert. 1. 95.

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He ſent an Expreſs to *Thraſibulus*, to know what Courſe he ſhould take to ſettle himſelf, and to govern the City in the beſt Manner. *Thraſibulus* led the Meſſenger out of the Town, and as they walked together in a Corn-field, queſtion'd him concerning his coming from *Corinth*, and in the mean time lopped off all the Heads of Corn that grew higher than the reſt, and threw them away; in this Manner he went over the whole Field, not ſpeaking one Word to the Meſſenger, and ſo ſent him home; where being returned, *Periander* greedily enquired what Inſtructions he had brought; he anſwered, *Thraſibulus* had given him none, and that he wondered he would ſend him to a Mad-man, who deſtroyed his own Goods. *Periander* enquired what *Thraſibulus* did, and immediately apprehended that he adviſed him to put the moſt eminent in the City to Death. [w] *Laertius* recites a Letter to that Effect, which, if not ſuppoſititious, muſt have been ſent at another Time after this Meſſenger departed.

Thraſibulus *to* Periander.

I *Gave your Meſſenger no Anſwer, but carrying him into a Field of Corn, lopped off with my Stick ſuch Ears as grew higher than the reſt, whilſt he followed me; if you enquire, he will relate all to you that he hath heard or ſeen: Do you ſo likewiſe, if you mean to ſettle yourſelf in the Government, take off the Heads of the chiefeſt Citizens, whether your profeſſed Enemies, or others. A Tyrant muſt ſuſpect every Friend.*

Tho' [x] *Plutarch* deny he followed this Advice, *Herodotus* avers, that from thence forward *Periander* exerciſed all Cruelty upon his Subjects, diſpatching thoſe that had eſcaped the Rigour and Perſecutions of his Father. [y] He firſt appointed a Guard of Halberdiers to ſecure his Perſon, which conſiſted of three hundred, and converted the Government to a Tyranny ([z] through his Cruelty and Violence). He forbad the Citizens to keep any Servants, or to be idle, always finding ſome Employment for them: If any Man ſat in the *Forum*, he was fined, for he feared leſt they ſhould plot againſt him. [a] The Citizens being deſirous to live ἐν ἀστει he would not ſuffer them; he was always in War, being of a martial Diſpoſition. He made Ships with three Banks of Oars, which he uſed in both Seas. He attempted to dig the Iſthmus off from the Continent.

Of his Friendſhip and Correſpondence with *Thraſibulus*, [b] *Herodotus* gives another Inſtance, affirming he ſent to inform him of the Oracle's Anſwer to *Alyattes* King of *Lydia*, concerning the re edifying of the Temple of *Minerva*, and adviſed him to provide before-hand for his own Security.

[c] He made a Vow, if he were Victor in the Chariot-race at the Olympick Games, to erect a Statue of Gold: He chanced to be victorious, and wanting Gold, beholding upon a Feſtival of that Country the Women richly adorned, he took off all their Ornaments, and ſo ſent them home.

CHAP. III.

Of his being placed in the Number of the ſeven Sages. His Sentences and Writings.

P*Eriander* (ſaith [d] *Plutarch*) being become a Tyrant by hereditary Diſeaſe derived to him by his Father, endeavoured to purge himſelf thereof as much as poſſible, by uſing the ſound Converſation of good Perſons, and invited wiſe Men to come to him; [e] to which Purpoſe he ſent this Epiſtle to thoſe of *Greece*, at ſuch Time as they met at *Delphi*.

Periander to the Wiſe Men.

I *Give* Pythian Apollo *many Thanks, that you being met together there, will alſo by my Letters be brought to* Corinth; *I will entertain you as you well know very kindly. I hear that laſt Year you met at the* Lydian *King's in* Sardis: *Delay not now to come to me, Tyrant of* Corinth, *for the* Corinthians *will look kindly upon you, if you come to the Houſe of* Periander.

Upon this Invitation they went to him, not ſeven, but twice as many, of whom was *Diocles*, *Periander*'s Friend, in whoſe Name [f] *Plutarch* makes a large Deſcription of their Entertainment, which was not in the City, but at the Port *Lecheon*, in a great Hall appropriated to ſolemn Feaſts, joining to the Temple of *Venus*, to whom he had not ſacrificed ſince the unhappy Death of his Mother until that Time, the Particulars of the Feaſt, by Reaſon of the largeneſs of the Diſcourſe, we refer to *Plutarch*.

He was alſo himſelf put into the Number of theſe wiſe Men, who, [g] *Plutarch* ſaith, were originally but five, but that afterwards *Cleobulus* Tyrant of *Lindus*, and *Periander* Tyrant of *Corinth*, who had neither Virtue nor Wiſdom, by the Greatneſs of their Power, the Multitude of their Friends, and the Obligations they conferred upon thoſe that adhered to them, forced a Reputation, and thruſt themſelves violently into the uſurped name of *Wiſemen*; to which End, they ſpread abroad Sentences and remarkable Sayings throughout all *Greece*, the very ſame which others had ſaid before, whereat the other firſt Sages were much diſpleaſed, yet would

w Laert. 1. 100. x Sept. ſap. conviv. Herodot. l. 1. y Laert. 1. 98. z Excerpt. Nicol. Damaſcen. and Suidas from him. a Laert. 1. 9. b Lib. 1. c Ibid. 1. 95. d Sept. ſap. conv. e Laert. 1. 99. f Conviv. ſept. ſap. g De ei Delph.

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not discover or convince their Vanity, nor have any publick Controversy about that Title with Persons of so much Wealth and Power; but meeting together at *Delphi*, after some private Debate, they consecrated there the Letter *E*, the fifth in the Alphabet, and in Numeration, to testify to the God of that Temple they were no more than five, and that they rejected and excluded from their Company the sixth and the seventh, as having no Right thereto.

Of those [h] who excluded him out of the Number of the Seven, some (as [i] *Plato*) substitute in his Room *Myso*; [j] others say there were two of this Name Cousins, one the Tyrant, the other of *Ambracia*. But *Aristotle* and others, assert him of *Corinth* to be the Wise, which Attribute seems to be conferred upon him, not in respect to his Actions, but moral Sayings and Writings, which were these.

[k] *Do nothing for Gain, that is proper to Tradesmen. They who will rule safely, must be guarded with Love, not Arms. Being demanded why he continued King, because* (saith he) *it is dangerous willingly to refrain, or unwillingly to be deposed.*

[l] When the other six had given their Opinions concerning Tyranny (at the Feast to which he invited them) he being desired to add his, answered with a troubled Countenance, *Enough has been said to deter any Man of sound Judgment from Rule.* When they had in like Manner declared their Opinions concerning a Common-wealth, he added, *The Result of all which had been said, commended that Democracy most, which came nearest an Aristocracy.*

[m] *Being demanded what was the greatest in the least, he answered, a good Mind in a human Body.*

His Precepts (according to [n] *Demetrius Phalereus*) were these, *Consideration is all* ([o] which was his particular Sentence) *Quiet is good, Temerity dangerous. Gain sordid, the Accusation of Nature. A Democracy is better than a Tyranny. Pleasures are mortal, Virtues immortal. In good Fortune be moderate, in bad prudent. It is better to die than to want. Study to be worthy of your Parents. Be praised living, beatified dead. To your Friends in Prosperity and Adversity be the same. What thou hast promised amiss, perform not.* [*Laert.* Keep thy Word.] *Betray not Secrets. So reproach, as if thou shouldst ere long be a Friend. Use new Diet, but old Laws. Punish those who have sinned; restrain those that are about to sin. Conceal thy Misfortune, that it may not glad thy Enemies.*

[p] *Ausonius* ascribes these to him.

Pleasure and Profit never disagree,
As more solicitous, more happy be.
'Tis ill to wish, but worse to fear to die,
With what Necessity enjoins, comply.
If thou art fear'd of many, many fear.
Be not exalted when thy Fortune's clear:
Nor be dejected, if a Storm appear.

[q] He writ two thousand Verses of moral Instructions.

CHAP. IV.

The Story of Arion.

DUring the Feast we mentioned (by [r] *Plutarch's* Account) or rather according to *Eusebius*, in the fortieth Olympiad, there happened a strange Accident, which (because *Herodotus* [s] calls it a Miracle shewed to *Periander*) we shall relate in his Words.

[t] *Arion*, the most famous Lutinist of that Time, having lived a long Time with *Periander*, took a Voyage to *Italy* and *Sicily*, there having gotten together much Wealth, he designed to return to *Corinth*: At *Tarentum* he hired a *Corinthian* Vessel, confiding above any in *Corinthians*; they, when they were at Sea, plotted to cast *Arion* over board, that they might be Masters of his Wealth, which he understanding, offered to give them all, so they would save his Life; they refusing, bad him lay violent Hands upon himself, if he would be buried in his own Country, otherwise to leap immediately into the Sea. *Arion* reduced to this Extremity, intreated them to give him Leave to put on his richest Ornaments, and so standing upon the Poop of the Ship, to play a Tune, promising, as soon as he had done, to deliver himself into their Hands. The Men moved with a great Desire to hear the most excellent Lutinest in the World, retired from the Poop to the Middle of the Ship: He put on his best Ornaments, and standing upon the Poop, began that Tune which they call the Morning Hymn, as soon as he had ended it, he threw himself into the Sea, with his Ornaments and Lute; the Ship sailed on to *Corinth*. It is reported, a Dolphin took him upon his Back, and carried him to *Tænarus*, where he landed, and took Shipping again for *Corinth*; he arrived there in the same Habit, and related all that passed; which *Periander* not believing, committed him to close Custody, not permitting him to go any whither, and in the mean time sent for the Mariners. When they came, he asked them News of *Arion*. They answered he was very well in *Italy*, and that they left him safe at *Tarentum*: Immediately *Arion* appeared, attired as when he leaped out of the Ship, whereat they were so confounded, they could not say any Thing in their own Defence. This is attested both by the

h Suid. i Protagor. j Laert. 1. 98. k Ibid. 1. 97. l Plut. sept. sap. conv. m Stob. Serm. 3. n Stob. ibid.
o Laert. 1. 98. p Auson. in Lud. sept. sap. q Laert. 1. 97. r Plut. conv. sept. sap. Euseb. Chronic. s Herod. l. 1.
t See also A. Gellius, who translates this of Plutarch, Lucian, and others.

Corinthians and *Lesbians*. At *Tænarus* there is a little Image given as an Offering of a Man sitting upon a Dolphin's Back: That *Periander* caused such a one to be made, is evident from this Epigram of *Bianor*.

[u] *The Statue of* Arion *o'er the Main*
Sailing upon a Dolphin's Back was carv'd
By Periander's *Order. See, Men slain*
By cruel Men, by Fishes kind preserv'd.

CHAP. V.
Of his Wife.

HIS Wife was named *Lysis* [w], by him called *Melissa*, Daughter to *Procleus*, Tyrant of *Epidaurus* and *Eristhenea*, the Daughter of *Aristocratis*, by the Sister of *Aristodemus*, which Persons ruled over the greatest Part of *Arcadia*. [x] He fell in love with her seeing her in a *Peloponesian* Dress, in her Petticoat, without a Gown, giving Drink to her Father's Workmen: [y] Long after he killed her in his Fury, big with Child, with a Stool, or a Blow of his Foot, being wrought upon by the Accusations of his Concubines, whom he afterwards burnt.

[z] He sent one Day to *Thesprotos*, upon the River *Acheron*, to enquire by Necromancy concerning a *Depositum*. *Melissa* appearing, said, she would not tell them in what Place it was laid, because she was cold and naked, the Cloths wherein she was buried doing her no good, for they were not burned, confirming the Truth whereof by *Periander*'s putting Bread into a cold Oven; which Answer carried to *Periander* made good the Suspicion that ([a] *through Excess of Love*) νεκρᾷ εὑσαι Μελίσσαν ἐμίγη. Hereupon he caused Proclamation to be made, that all the *Corinthian* Women should come to *Juno*'s Temple to celebrate a Festival, attired in their richest Ornaments: When they came, having placed a Guard of Soldiers in Ambush, he stripped them all, without any Distinction (Free-women and Servants) of their Clothes, which he carried to *Melissa*'s Grave, and having prayed, burnt them to her: This done, he sent Messengers to enquire the second Time; to whom *Melissa*'s Ghost appeared, and told them where the *Depositum* was laid.

CHAP. VI.
Of his Children.

HE had [b] by *Melissa* two Sons, *Cypselus* and *Lycophron*, the younger ingenious, the elder a Fool; he had likewise a Daughter; his elder Son at the Time of his Mother's Death was eighteen Years old, the younger seventeen. These their Grandfather by the Mother's Side *Procleus* (Tyrant of *Epidaurus*) sent for over to him, and loved them much, as in Reason he ought, being the Children of his own Daughter; when he was to send them back, he said to them, Do you know, Children, who slew your Mother? The elder took no Heed to that Speech, but *Lycophron* the younger was so troubled at it, that when he came to *Corinth*, he neither spoke to his Father, nor would make him any Answer, looking upon him as the Murderer of his Mother; whereat *Periander* at length became so incensed, that he turned him out of Doors. He being gone, *Periander* question'd the elder what Discourse his Grandfather had with him; he related to him how kindly he used him, but told nothing of that which *Procleus* had said to them at their Departure, for he had not taken any Notice of it; *Periander* said, it was not possible but that he should say something more, and pressed him more strictly; at last he calling it to Mind, told him this also; which *Periander* resenting, and not willing to use his Son more mildly, sent to the People with whom he lived in his Ejection, forbidding them to receive him into any of their Houses. Turned out of that wherein he was, he sought to go into another, but was denied; *Periander* having threatened those that should entertain him, and commanded all to drive him away. Expelled thence, he went to another of his Acquaintance, who knowing him the Son of *Periander*, entertained him, tho' with Fear: At length *Periander* proclaimed, That whosoever received him into their House, or spoke to him, should pay what Fine to *Apollo* he should impose; from that Time none durst venture to entertain him or speak to him; nor would he himself make Trial of a Thing which he knew to be desperate, but passed his Time in the common Walks. Four Days after, *Periander* seeing him poor and extenuated with Fasting, took Compassion of him, and laying aside his Anger, drew nigh to him, and said, *Son, which is better, to undergo what you now suffer, or by obeying your Father to enjoy my Wealth and Kingdom? You being my Son, and next Heir to the Kingdom of fruitful* Corinth, *have made Choice of the Life of a Vagabond, angrily opposing him whom you ought not to oppose; if any Unhappiness befel you in those Things whereof you suspect me, it befel me, and I have so much the greater Share therein, in being the Instrument thereof; hear how much better it is to be envied than to be pitied, and what it is to be angry with our Parents or Betters.* In these Words *Periander* reprov'd his Son, who made him no other Answer, than, *That he ought to pay a Fine to the God for speaking to him.* *Periander* perceiving the Evil of his Son to be incurable, removed him out

[u] Anthol. l. 4. c. 16. [w] Laert. 1. 94. [x] Athen. Delph. [y] Laert. ibid. [z] Herod. 5. [a] Suid. [b] Herod. lib. 3.

of his Sight, and ſending him by Ship to *Corcyra*, of which he was alſo Tyrant: Having thus diſpoſed of him, he made War with his Father-in-law, *Procleus*, as the chief Cauſe of all that happened.

Laertius mentions an Epiſtle which he ſent him to this Effect:

Periander *to* Procleus.

WE committed unwillingly that Crime upon your Daughter, but you, if willingly, you alienate my Son's Mind from me, you do unjuſtly; therefore either ſoften his Mind towards me, or I ſhall revenge this Injury; I have ſatisfied your Daughter by burning in her Honour the Garments of all the Women of Corinth.

[c] In fine, he took *Epidaurus* and *Procleus* therein, whom he preſerved alive.

[d] In proceſs of Time *Periander* growing old, and knowing himſelf to be no longer fit for the Charge of the Common-wealth, ſent to *Corcyra* to invite *Lycophron* to the Government of the Kingdom; conceiving his eldeſt Son uncapable of that Office by Reaſon of his Stupidity. *Lycophron* would not vouchſafe ſo much as to ſpeak to the Meſſenger. *Periander* (affectionate to him) ſent the ſecond Time his Son's Siſter, his own Daughter, hoping he would be ſooner perſuaded by her; ſhe coming, ſaid to him, *Brother, had you rather the Kingdom ſhould fall into the Hands of others, and our Father's Houſe be diſperſed, than go home and have it yourſelf? Return to your own Houſe, injure yourſelf no longer. Obſtinacy is an unhappy Inheritance: Cure not one Evil with another; many prefer Compliance before Juſtice; many in purſuit of their Mother's Right loſe their Father's Kingdom; a Kingdom is a ſlippery Thing coveted by many; our Father is old and feeble, give not your own Goods to others.* Thus ſhe pleaded to him as her Father had inſtructed her; he anſwered he would never come to *Corinth* whilſt his Father lived there: Which, as ſoon as *Periander* underſtood, he ſent a Meſſenger the third Time, to let him know he would remove to *Corcyra*, and to command him to come to *Corinth* to take the Government upon him; to this the Son aſſented. *Periander* prepared for *Corcyra*, his Son for *Corinth*: The People of *Corcyra* informed hereof, that *Periander* might not come into their Country, killed his Son: In Reveng of which Fact *Periander* ſent three hundred Boys of the chief of the *Corcyræans* to *Sardis* to *Alyattes* King of *Lydia*, there to be gelt: The *Corinthians* who had Charge of them, were driven upon *Samos*, the *Samians* underſtanding to what End they were ſent to *Sardis*, adviſed them to take Sanctuary in the Temple of *Diana*, and would not ſuffer them, as being Suppliants, to be pulled away: The *Corinthians* not permitting any Food to be given them, the *Samians* celebrated a Feſtival, which is obſerved (ſaith *Herodotus*) at this Day; when Night was come, the Company of Youths and Maids danced whilſt the Children were praying, and in their Dance, having made Cakes of Meal and Honey, flung them amongſt the Children, whereby they were ſuſtain'd alive; this they did ſo long till the *Samians*, who had Charge of the Children, were fain to go away and leave them; then the *Samians* conveyed the Children home to *Corcyra*. [e] *Antenor* and *Dionyſius* affirm, the *Gnidians* came to *Samos* with a Fleet, drove away *Periander*'s Guard from the Temple, and carried the Children to *Corcyra*; for which Reaſon the *Corcyræans* allowed the *Gnidians* many Honours and Immunities which they gave not (even) to the *Samians*.

CHAP. VII.

His Death.

EXceſſive Melancholly (amidſt theſe Croſſes [f]) occaſioned his Death, in the laſt Year of the forty-eight Olympiad, the eightieth Year of his Age. Being deſirous none ſhould know where he was buried, he thus contrived it: He commanded two Men to go to a certain Place at Night, and to kill whom they firſt met, and bury him. After them he ſent four to kill and bury the two; after the four, more: They obeyed his Order; the firſt killed him. The *Corinthians* erected for him an empty Monument with this Inſcription.

Periander *lies within* Corinthian *Ground,*
For Power and Wiſdom above all renown'd.

Laertius hath this Epigram upon him:

At whatſoe'er ſhall happen be not ſad:
Alike for all that God diſpenſeth glad.
Wiſe Periander *did through Grief expire,*
Becauſe Events not join'd with his Deſire.

c Herod. lib. 3. d Ibid. e Plut. de malign. Herod. f Laert. 1. 95.

SOCIADES

His Collection of

The Precepts of the Seven Sophists.

Follow God[g]. *Obey the Law. Worship the Gods. Reverence thy Parents. Suffer for Justice. Understand what thou learnest. Know what thou hearest. Know thyself. About to marry, chuse Opportunity. Consider mortal Things. When thou art a Guest, acknowledge it. Respect Hospitality. Command thyself. Relieve thy Friends. Govern thy Anger. Exercise Prudence. Honour Providence. Use not Swearing. Love Friendship. Apply thyself to Discipline. Pursue Glory. Emulate Wisdom. Speak well of that which is good. Disparage none. Praise Virtue. Do what is just. Be kind to thy Friends. Revenge upon thy Enemies. Practice Generosity. Abstain from Evil. Be sociable. Keep what is thine. Refrain from what belongs to others. Speak Words of good Omen. Hear all Things. Gratify thy Friend. Nothing too much. Husband Time. Regard the future. Hate Injury. Have Respect to thy Servants. Instruct thy Children. If thou hast ought, gratify others. Fear Deceit. Speak well of all. Be a Lover of Wisdom. Judge according to Equity. What thou knowest, do. Abstain from Bloodshed. Wish Things possible. Converse with the Wise. Examine Wits. What thou hast received restore. Distrust none. Make Use of Art. Defer not what thou intendest to give. Esteem Benefits. Envy none. Guard thyself. Approve Hope. Hate Calumny. Possess justly. Reverence the Good. Acknowledge thy Judge. Be moderate in Wedlock. Respect Fortune. Fly Engagements for any. Converse with all. Make Use of thy like. Regulate Sumptuousness. Enjoy what thou possessest. Exercise Modesty. Return Benefits. Pray for Prosperity. Love Fortune. Hearing, see. Aim at Things that may be acquired. Hate Dissention. Abhor Reproach. Curb thy Tongue. Repel Injury. Determine equally. Make Use of thy Wealth. Examine without Corruption. Blame the present. Speak knowing. Use no Violence. Live pleasantly. Converse mildly. Go through thy Undertakings fearless. Be benign to all. Confide not in thy Children. Govern thy Tongue. Do well to thyself. Be affable. Answer seasonably. Labour with Equity. Do that whereof thou shalt not repent. When thou hast sinned be penitent. Confine thy Eye. Counsel profitably. Perfect quickly. Preserve Amity. Be grateful. Observe Concord. Declare no Secret. Fear what is more powerful. Pursue what is profitable. Wait for Opportunity. Dissolve Enmities. Expect Age. Boast not of Strength. Use to speak well. Fly Hatred. Possess Wealth justly. Forsake not Glory. Hate Malice. Be not weary of Learning. Hazard thyself prudently. What thou joyest in, quit not. Admire Oracles. Love those thou maintainest. Blame not the Absent. Reverence thy Elders. Teach those that are younger. Confide not in Wealth. Stand in Awe of thyself. Begin no Injury. Crown thy Ancestors. Die for thy Country. Oppugn not Life. Deride not the Dead. Condole with the Unhappy. Gratify without Damage. Be not troubled upon every Occasion. Let thy Children be by a Free-Woman. Promise none. Wrong not the Dead. Suffer as Mortal. Trust not Fortune. Be in Childhood modest, in Youth temperate, in Manhood just, in old Age prudent. Die untroubled.*

g Stob. Ser. 3.

AUSONII LUDUS

Septem Sapientum.

The PROLOGUE.

THE ſeven wiſe Men, (that Name Times paſt applied
To them, nor hath Poſterity deny'd)
Themſelves this Day unto your View preſent.
Why doſt thou bluſh, gown'd *Roman*? Diſcontent
That ſuch grave Men ſhould on the Stage be brought!
Is't Shame to us? 'Twas none to *Athens* thought:
Whoſe Council-Chamber was their Theatre.
True; here for Buſineſs ſeveral Places are
Aſſign'd, the Cirque for Meetings, Courts to take
Enrolments, *Forums* in which Pleas to make:
But in old *Athens*, and all *Greece* was known
No other Place for Buſineſs but this one.
viz. the Theatre.
Which latter Luxury in *Rome* did raiſe.
The Edile heretofore did build for Plays
A Scaffold-Stage, no Work of carved Stone;
So *Gallius* and *Murena*, 'tis well known.
But after, when great Men not ſparing Coſt,
Thought it the higheſt Glory they could boaſt,
To build for Plays a Scene more eminent,
The Theatre grew to this vaſt Extent;
That *Pompey*, *Balbus*, *Cæſar* did enlarge,
Vying which ſhould exceed for State and Charge.
But to what End all this? we came not here
To tell you who firſt built the Theatre,
Forum, or City Gates, but t'uſher in
Grave Sages, who by Gods approv'd have been.
Such as in pleaſing and inſtructive Verſe,
Their own judicious Sentences rehearſe,
Known to the Learned, and perhaps to you.
But if your Mem'ries cannot well renew
Things ſpoke ſo long ſince; the Comedian ſhall,
Who better than I knows them, tell you all.

Enter Comedian.

A *Thenian Solon*, Fame ſings, wrote at *Delphis*
Γνῶθι σεαυτὸν, whoſe Senſe *know thyſelf*, is.
But this to *Spartan Chilon* muſt aſſign.
Some queſtion, *Chilon*, whether this be thine,
Τελὸς ὁρᾶν μακρᾶ βίᾳ, *The Cloſe*
Of a long Life regard; but muſt ſuppoſe
That *Solon* this to *Lydian Crœſus* ſpake.
From *Lesbian Pittacus* this Motto take,
Γίγνοσκε καιρὸν; that's *Know Time*. But he
By Καιρὸν here means *Opportunity*.
Οἱ πλεῖστοι κακοὶ, *Bias* did proceed
From thee; that is, *Moſt Men are ill*. Take Heed
You not miſtake him; for by ill Men here
He means the ignorant. The next you hear
Is *Periander's* Μελιτη τὸ πᾶν,
That is, *Thought's all in all*; a thoughtful Man!
But *Lyndian Cleobulus* does proteſt
Αριστον Μέτρον; *Mean in all is beſt*.
Thales ἐγγύα, παρέσι δ' ἄτη cries,
Upon a Surety preſent Danger lies.
But this, for thoſe who gain by it to tell,
May 'chance diſpleaſe. Now *Solon* comes, farewel.
Exit.

Enter Solon.

LO! *Solon* in his *Greeks* Dreſs treads the Stage,
To whom (as of the ſeven the greateſt Sage)
Fame gave the Prize of Wiſdom from the reſt;
But Fame is not of Cenſure the ſtrict Teſt.
Nor firſt nor laſt I take my ſelf to be,
For there's no Order in Equality.
Well did the *Delphick* Prophet ſport with him
Who ask'd, which firſt of the wiſe Men might ſeem,
Saying; if on a Globe their Names he writ,
None firſt or loweſt he ſhould find in it.
From midſt of that learn'd Round come I, that ſo
What once I ſpake to *Crœſus*, all here now
Might take as ſpoken to themſelves; 'tis this:
Ορᾶν Τελὸς μακρᾶ βίᾳ, which is,
Mark th' End of a long Life; till when forbear
To ſay theſe wretched, or thoſe happy are:
For all *till* then are in a doubtful State,
The Proof of this we'll in few Words relate.
Crœſus the King or Tyrant (chooſe you which)
Of *Lydia*, happy thought, and ſtrangely rich;
Who to his Gods did Gold-wall'd Temples build,
Invites me o'er; I to his Summons yield.
His Royal Summons went to *Lydia*,
Willing his Subjects by our Means might find
Their King improv'd, and better'd in his Mind.
He asks me whom I thought the happieſt Man?
I ſaid *Telana*, the *Athenian*,
Who his Life nobly for his Country gave.
He piſhes at it, will another have.
I told him then *Aglaus*, who the Bounds
Ne'er paſt in all his Life of his own Grounds.

Smiling

Smiling he says, What think you then of me,
Esteem'd the happiest in the whole World? We
Reply'd, his End could only make that known.
He takes this ill. I willing to be gone,
Kiss his Hand, and so leave him. For some Ends,
Mean time, 'gainst *Persia* he a War intends;
And all Things ready, does in Person go.
How speeds? He's vanish'd, Prisoner to his Foe,
And ready now to yield his latest Breath,
(For by the Victor he was doom'd to Death)
Upon the Funeral Pile rounded with Flames
And Smoke, he thus with a loud Voice exclaims
O *Solon! Solon!* now I plainly see
Th' art a true Prophet! thrice thus naming me;
Mov'd with which Words, *Cyrus*, (the Conquerour)
Commands the Fire be quench'd, which by a Show'r
Of Rain then falling, happily was laid.
Thence to the King, by a choice Guard convey'd
And question'd who that *Solon* was? and why
He called so on his Name? He, for Reply,
In Order all declares. Pity at this
The Heart of *Cyrus* moves; and *Crœsus* is
Receiv'd to Grace, who in a princely Port
Liv'd after, honour'd in the *Persian* Court.
Both Kings approv'd and prais'd me, but what I
Said then to one, let each Man here apply.
As spoke t'himself, 'twas for that End I came.
Farewel. Your Liking let your Hands proclaim.
Exit.

Enter Chilon.

MY Hips with sitting, Eyes with seeing ake,
Expecting when *Solon* an End would make.
How little and how long your *Atticks* prate!
Scarce in three Hundred Lines one Word of Weight,
Or a grave Sentence, how he look'd on me
At going off? —— Now *Spartan Chilon* see!
Who with *Laconian* Brevity commends
To you *the Knowledge of yourselves*, kind Friends!
Γνῶθι σεαυτὸν carv'd in a *Delphos* Fane.
'Tis a hard Work, but recompenc'd with Gain.
Try your own Strength; examine what 'tis you
Have done already, what you ought to do.
All Duties of our Life, as Modesty,
Honour and Constancy included be
In this, and Glory, which we yet despise.
Farewel, your Claps I not respect nor prize. [*Exit.*

Enter Cleobulus.

I *Cleobulus*, tho' my Native Seat
Be a small Isle, am Author of a great
And glorious Sentence; Μέτρον ἄριστον,
A Mean is best. You, Sirs, that sit upon
The fourteen middle Benches next unto
Th' *Orchestra*, best may judge if this be true.
Your Nod shews your Assent. We thank you but
We shall proceed in Order. Was it not
One *Afer* (who a Man of your own Clime is)
That said once in this Place, *Ut ne quid nimis?*
And hither does our Μηδὲν ἄγαν aim.
The *Doriek* and the *Latin* mean the same.
In speaking, being silent, or in sleep,
In good Turns, or in bad, a Mean still keep,
In Study, or whatever you intend.
I've said, and that I mean, I keep here End. [*Exit.*

Enter Thales.

I'M *Thales*, who maintain (as *Pindar* sings)
Water to be the best and first of Things.
To whom by Phœbus *Mandate*, *Fishers brought*
A golden Tripod, *which they Fishing caught*,
By him as Present to the Wisest meant.
Which I refus'd, and unto others sent
In Knowledge my Superiors as I thought.
From one to th' other of the Sages brought,
By them again return'd, to me it came,
Who to *Apollo* consecrate the same.
For since to seek the Wisest, he enjoin'd,
I judge no Man, but God by that designed.
Now on the Stage (as those before) I come
T'assert the Truth of my own Axiom.
Perhaps by some 'tmay be offensive thought:
But not by those by sad Experience taught.
Ἐγγύα πάρεστι δ' ἄτη, say we,
Be Surety, and be sure a Loser be.
A thousand Instances I could produce
To prove Repentance is the only Use
That can be made of it, but that we here
Examples by their Names to cite, forbear.
Make your own Application, and conceive
The Damage Men by this sole Act receive.
Nor this our good Intention take amiss,
You that like, Clap, you that dislike it, Hiss.
[*Exit.*

Enter Bias.

I Am *Priænean Bias*, who once taught
Οἱ πλειστοι κακοὶ, *That most Men are naught.*
I wish't had been unspoke; for Truth gains Hate.
But by bad Men, I mean illiterate,
And those who barbarously all Laws confound.
Religion, Justice; for within this Round
I see none but are good; believe all those
Whom I proclaim for bad among your Foes.
Yet there is none so partially apply'd
To Vice, but with the Good will side,
Whether he be truly such, or would fain
Of a good Man the Reputation gain.
The hated Name of an ill Man all shun.
Then *(most good Men)* your Praise, and I ha' done.
[*Exit.*

Enter Pittacus.

I'M *Pittacus*, who once this Maxim penn'd,
Γίγνωσκε καιρὸν, that's, *Time apprehend.*

But

But by Time we meant Time in Seaſon, as
In tempore veni is your *Roman* Phraſe.
And your own Comick Poet *Terence*, he,
Chief of all Things makes Opportunity,
Where *Dromo* comes unto *Antiphila*
I' th' Nick of Time; conſider what I ſay,
And mark how great an Inconvenience
Moſt ſuffer through this want of Providence
But now 'tis more than Time we ſhould be gone;
Farewel, and give your Approbation. [*Exit.*

Enter Periander.

NOW on the Stage ſee *Periander* move!
He who once ſaid, and what he ſaid will prove,
Μελέτη τὸ πᾶν, *Thought is all in all.*
Since him a perfect Agent we may call,
Who firſt conſiders what he undergoes;
For we ſhould ſtill forecaſt, as *Terence* ſhews,
Th' Event of Buſineſs, whether good or bad,
Ere w' undertake it; where may beſt be had
Conveniency for Planting, where to Build,
When to wage War, and when to pitch a Field.
Nor inconſiderately take in hand
Or great, or ſmall Things, for that makes a Stand
In the free Progreſs of all new Deſigns;
Like Conſultation; hence we ſee it clear,
Who uſe it not, by Chance, not Counſel ſteer,
But I retire, whilſt you with better Fate
Employ your Thoughts how to uphold your State
[*Exit*

ANACHARSIS.

CHAP. I.

His Life and Writings.

THoſe Nations (ſaith [a] *Herodotus*) *which Border upon the* Euxine *Sea, are of all moſt illiterate, the* Scythians *only excepted; we can alledge nothing relating to Learning of any People within the Compaſs of that Sea, neither know we any Perſon learned but the* Scythians Anacharſis. [b] *Amongſt theſe,* notwithſtanding the Roughneſs of their Education, *(for they fed upon Mares Milk, and dwelt in Waggons) were ſome who far exceeded all in Juſtice.*

Such was *Anacharſis*, [c] Son of *Gnurus*, Brother of *Cadovides*, King of *Scythia*; *his Mother a* Grecian, *by which Means he had the Advantage of two Languages*, but was Owner of no other Houſe than the Cuſtom of that Country allowed, a Chariot, whence [d] he compared his Dwelling to that of the Sun, carried in that Manner round the Heavens.

[e] The *Scythians* never travel beyond their own Confines, but *Anacharſis*, as a Perſon endued with more than ordinary Wiſdom, extended his Journey farther, [f] being ſent by the King of *Scythia* to *Greece*. [g] He came to *Athens* in the firſt Year of the forty-ſeventh Olympiad, *Eucrates* being *Archon*; and [h] firſt met with *Toxaris* one of his own Country, by whom, as the moſt compendious Way to take a Survey of *Athens* and *Greece*, he was addreſs'd to *Solon*. How *Solon* received and entertained him, is already related in his Life. He inſtructed him in the beſt Diſciplines, recommended him to the Favour of nobleſt Perſons, and ſought all Means of giving him Reſpect and Honour. *Anacharſis* admired his Wiſdom, continually followed him, in a ſhort Space learned all Things of him, and was kindly received by every one for his Sake, being (as *Theoxenus* atteſts) the only Stranger whom they incorporated into their City.

[i] Thus was he much honoured by the *Grecians* for his Perfection, Wiſdom, Temperance, wherein he excelled many of their Philoſophers, whereupon they conferred the Attribute of *Wiſe* upon him, ſome accounting him one of the Seven. *Periander* invited him with the reſt to *Corinth*; the Feaſt is largely deſcribed by *Plutarch*: There *Anacharſis* carrying with him Chaplets of Flowers, Ivy, and Laurel, drunk, as the *Scythians* uſe, to great Exceſs, [k] and required the Prize of Drinking to be given him, becauſe he was firſt drunk. *In a Race* (ſaith he) *he wins who comes firſt at the Poſt, in Drinking he who comes firſt to the End deſerves the Reward.*

[l] *Having ſeen much of the World, and improved his Knowledge, he returned to* Scythia (as *Lucian* conjectures, not until *Solon* was dead.) *As he ſailed along the* Helleſpont, *he put in at* Cyzicum, *and*

a Lib. 1. b Strab. lib. 7. c Laert. 1. 101. d Plut. conviv. ſept. ſap. e Ælian. var. hiſt. 4. 7. f Herod. 4. g Laert. 1. 101. h Lucian. Scyth. i Strab. lib. 7. Clem. Alex. Strom. 1. Clem. Alex. Strom. 5. Ælian. lib. 2. k Athen. deipn. 10. l Herod. 4.

2

finding

finding the People celebrating a Feſtival to the Mother of the Gods, with much Splendor and Munificence; he made a Vow, if he got ſafe home, to ſacrifice in the ſame Manner as he had ſeen thoſe of Cyzicum, *and to inſtitute a Vigil. When he came into* Scythia, *he withdrew himſelf privately to* Hylæa, *near the* Achyllean *Courſe, a Place abounding with Trees, and performed the Rites of the Goddeſs with a Timbrel (and Cymbal* [m] *about his Neck.) A* Scythian *eſpying him, carried Word to* Saulius *the King, who went immediately thither, and being an Eye-witneſs thereof, ſhot him through with an Arrow* ([n] to puniſh his Effeminacy, and prevent the Infection thereof in others). [o] *And now if any enquire concerning* Anacharſis, *the* Scythians *deny they knew him, becauſe he travelled into* Greece, *and affected the Cuſtoms of that Country. As I am informed by* Timnes, *Tutor of* Spargapithes, *he was Uncle to* Indathyrſus, *King of* Scythia, *Son of* Gnurus, *Son of* Lycus, *Son of* Spargapithes. *Now* Anacharſis *being of this Family, it is manifeſt he was* [p] *ſlain by his Brother,* (that his Brother was King of *Scythia*, and ſlew him, is confirmed by *Laertius*, tho' he differ in the Name) *for* Indathyrſus *was Son of* Saulius, Saulius *was he who ſlew* Anacharſis, and conſequently is the ſame whom *Laertius* calls *Cadovides*, adding, *ſome report that he ſhot him in hunting; for being addicted to the* Greek *Cuſtoms, and endeavouring to alter the Laws of* Scythia, *whereupon he dying, ſaid, he returned ſafe out of* Greece, *guarded by his own Wiſdom, but was ſlain at home by the Envy of others.* Upon him *Laertius* [q] hath this Epigram.

From Travel Anacharſis *came at laſt,*
And Scythia *in a* Grecian *Mould was caſt:*
Whilſt he was teaching how, by the Surprize
Of a wing'd Arrow carried to the Skies.

[r] There were many Statues erected in Honour of him by the *Grecians*, upon which was writ, Γνώσσις, γαστρὸς αἰδοίων κράτει. He was temperate and skilful in many Things. He freely and largely diſcourſed of the Manner of Diet and Medicine, which the *Scythians* uſed in curing the Sick. From the plain Freedom he uſed in Speech, aroſe a Proverb, *The* Scythian *Phraſe*. He writ eight hundred Verſes of Orders for the *Scythians* and *Greeks*, concerning frugal Living and martial Affairs. There are alſo two Epiſtles of his extant.

Anacharſis *to* Crœſus.

KIng of the Lydians, *I came into* Greece *to be informed of their Manners and Studies; I need not Money, it is enough if I can return into* Scythia *bettered: But I will come to* Sardis, *becauſe I highly eſteem your Favour.*

[s] Anacharſis *to* Hanno, *Health.*

MY Apparel [t] *is a* Scythian *Rug, my Shoes the Hardneſs of my Feet, my Bed the Earth, my Sauce Hunger; I feed on Milk, Cheeſe, and Fleſh. You may come to me as to one that's contented: But thoſe Gifts which you ſo much eſteem, beſtow either on your Citizens, or the immortal Gods.*

[u] He is ſaid to have invented Tinder, [w] the Anchor, and the Potter's Wheel; but this latter is by *Strabo* evinced clearly to be falſe, becauſe mentioned by *Homer*, who lived long after him, *Anacharſis* being in the Time of *Crœſus*.

CHAP. II.

His Apophthegms.

HIS Apophthegms are theſe, [x] *He ſaid a Vine bare three Grapes, the firſt of Pleaſure, the ſecond of Drunkenneſs, the third of Repentance. He wondered, that amongſt the* Greeks, *Artiſts contended, and they who were no Artiſts determined. Being demanded by what Means a Man might be brought not to love Wine, he ſaid, by ſetting before his Eyes the Actions of drunken Perſons. He wondered the* Grecians, *who puniſhed Injuries by Law, rewarded the* Athletæ *at publick Exerciſes for beating one another. Being told a Ship is four Inches thick, ſo far from Death, ſaid he, are they who ſail. He ſaid Oil was a Receipt procuring Madneſs, becauſe the* Athletæ, *the more they were anointed therewith, the more fierce they were againſt one another. How comes it,* ſaid he, *that they who forbid lying themſelves, lye openly, when they put off their Wares? He wondered that the* Greeks *in the Beginning of a Feaſt drank in little Cups, and when they were full in great.* [y] *Being demanded (by* Ardalus) *whether there were any Flutes in* Scythia, *he anſwered, not ſo much as Vines* (which [z] *Ariſtotle* calls a Demonſtration ὅτι, by the remote Cauſe [a].) Ardalus *adding, are there not Gods amongſt the* Scythians? *Yes, reply'd he, which underſtand all Languages.* [b] *Being asked what Ship was ſafeſt, he anſwered, that which is in the Haven. He affirmed the moſt remarkable Thing he had ſeen among the* Grecians *to be this, that they left the Smoke upon the Mountains, and carried the Wood into their Cities. Being demanded whether the Number of the Dead or the Living were the greateſt; amongſt which, ſaith he, do you account thoſe who are at Sea? To an* Athenian, *who reproached him for being a* Scythian,

m Clem. Alex. admonit. ad gent. n Ibid. o Herod. continues. p For ὑπό τῦ ἀδελφι φῶν read ἀδελφῦ. q Laert. 1. 102. r Ibid. 1. 104. Plut. conviv. ſept. ſap. s Cic. Tuſcul. quæſt. 5. t Clem. Alex. cites this Fragment, doubtleſs out of the ſame Epiſtle. Ἐμοὶ περίβλημα, χλαῖνα δείπνου γάλα, τυρός. u Strab. 7. w Laert. 105. x Ibid. 123. y Plut. conviv. ſept. ſap. Strab. 15. z Analyt. poſt. 1. 13. a Plut. conviv. ſept. ſap. b Laert. 1. 103.

my

my Country, (ſaith he) *is a Diſgrace to me, but you are a Diſgrace to your Country. Being demanded what in Man is both good and bad, he anſwered the Tongue. He affirmed it is better to have one Friend worth much, than many worth nothing. He ſaid the* Forum *was the proper Place for Cheating and unjuſt Gain. To a young Man who reproached him at a Feaſt; Youth, ſaid he, if at theſe Years you cannot bear Wine, when you grow old, you will not be able to bear Water.*

[c] *When he returned to* Scythia, *he told the King who ſent him, the* Greeks *were buſied in all Kinds of Wiſdom, except the* Lacedæmonians, *who only knew how to give and receive prudently.*

[d] *He ſaid, the* Greeks *made no other Uſe of Money but to account with it.* [e] *At a publick Aſſembly in* Athens, *he ſaid, he wondered, why in the* Greek *Convocations, wiſe Men propounded Buſineſs, and Fools determined it.* [f] *That Prince is happy who is wiſe. That City is beſt, wherein (all Things elſe being equal) Virtue hath the better Condition, Vice the worſe.*

[g] *To one, who, as they were drinking, ſaid, beholding his Wife,* Anacharſis, *you have married one who is nothing handſome: I am (anſwered he) of that Opinion alſo; but put leſs Water in my Wine, that I may make her handſome.*

[h] *Relating the Qualities of the Vine to the King of* Scythia, *and ſhewing him ſome Slips thereof, he added, and by this Time it would have reached into* Scythia, *if the* Greeks *did not every Year cut off its Branches.* [i] *At a Feaſt, ſuch being ſent for, as might procure Mirth, he alone ſmiled not; afterwards, an Ape being brought in, he laughed, ſaying, that Beaſt is ridiculous by Nature, Man by Art and Study.*

Whilſt he ſlept, he uſed κατέχειν τῇ μὲν λαιῇ τὰ αἰδοῖα τῇ δεξιᾷ δὲ τὸ στόμα, *implying that a Man ought to take great Care to govern both, but that it is harder to reſtrain our Pleaſure than our Tongue. He ſaid, that to him all the* Grecians *were* Scythians.

c Herod. 4. d Plut. de profect. virtut. ſent. e Plut. vit. Sol. f Plut. conv. ſap. g Stob. ſerm. 16. h Athen. deipn. lib. 10. i Athen. deipn. lib. 14. Clem. Alex. ſtrom. lib. 5. Clem. Strom. 1.

MISON.

MYſon [k] was (according to *Hermippus*) Son of *Stremon*, born at *Chene*, a Village either of *Oetæa*, or *Lacedæmonia*, his Father a Tyrant. *Anacharſis* demanding of the Oracle, if any were wiſer, was anſwered (as was in the Life of *Thales* mentioned of *Chilon.*)

Oetæan Myſon *I declare*
Wiſer than thoſe who wiſeſt are.

His Curioſity increaſing by this Anſwer, he went to the Village, and finding him fitting a Ploughſhare to the Plough, ſaid, *Myſo*, it is not yet Time to plough: But it is (anſwered he) to prepare. Others affirm the Oracle called him *Etean*, about which there is much Difference. *Parmenides* ſaith, that *Etea* is a *Lacedæmonian Village*, whereof *Myſon* was. *Soſicrates*, that he was *Etean* by his Father, *Chenean* by his Mother. *Euthyphron*, that he was a *Cretan*, *Etea* being a City of *Crete*, *Anaxilaus* an *Arcadian*. *Hipponax* mentions him in theſe Words: *And* Myſo, *whom* Apollo *declared the wiſeſt of all Men.* *Ariſtomenus* affirms he was of the ſame Humour as *Timon* and *Apemantus*, a Man-hater. He retired from *Lacedæmon* into the Deſert, and was there ſurprized all alone; ſmiling, being demanded why he ſmiled, no Man being preſent, he anſwered, for that Reaſon. *Ariſtoxenus* ſaith, he was of no Account, becauſe not of the City, but of an obſcure Village; whence ſome aſcribe his Sayings to *Piſiſtratus*, but others reckon him one of the Seven. [l] *Plato* puts him in the Room of *Periander*. He ſaid, *We muſt not ſeek Things from Words, but Words from Things; Things were not made for Words, but Words for Things.* He died ninety-ſeven Years old.

k Laert. 1. 106. l Protagor. t. 1.

EPI-

EPIMENIDES.

EPimenides [m] is by all acknowledged a *Cretan*, (tho' contrary to the Cuſtom of that Place he wore long Hair) but in the Town where he was born they agree not. *Laertius*, following the greater Part of Writers, ſaith it was [n] *Gnoſſus*, *Strabo*, *Phæſtus*. There is no leſs Difference about the Names of his Parents; ſome call his Father *Phæſtius*, or *Phæſtus*, others *Doſiades*, his Mother *Blaſta*, others *Ageſarchus*; *Apollonius*, *Bolus*, *Laertius*, and *Suidas* name his Mother *Blaſta*; *Plutarch* [o] *Balta*, ſuppoſed a Nymph.

It is reported, that when he was a Youth, being ſent by his Father and Brethren to their Field to fetch home a Sheep to the City, tired with the Heat and Travel in Search thereof, he withdrew himſelf at Noon (or as *Apollonius*, at Night) from the common Way into a private Cave, where he ſlept (according to [p] *Theopompus*) fifty ſeven Years, according to [q] *Varro*, [r] *Plutarch*, and [s] *Tertullian*, fifty, [t] *Pauſanias* forty, in which Interval of Time, moſt of his Kindred died; at the End hereof awaking, he betook himſelf again to the Search of his Sheep, thinking it the ſame, or the next Day to that wherein he lay down, and that he had ſlept but a little while; not finding it, he returned to the Field, where he ſaw all Things changed, and a Stranger in Poſſeſſion thereof; thence to the City much amazed; going into his own Houſe, they queſtioned who he was; at laſt he met with his younger Brother, now grown old, by whom he was informed of all that paſſed, and the Time of his Abſence. *Plutarch* ſaith, he awaked an old Man; [u] *Pliny* and *Laertius*, that he grew old in as many Days as he had ſlept Years. [w] Some affirm he ſlept not, but retired a while, employing himſelf in cutting up Roots.

Many other Wonders are reported of him; [x] ſome ſay, he received Food of the Nymphs, which he kept in an Ox's Hoof, and took thereof a little every Day, requiring no other Suſtenance, never being ſeen to eat; [y] he often counterfeited Reſurrection from Death to Life; his [z] Soul going out of his Body whenſoever he pleaſed, and returning again.

[a] He is reported to be the firſt that luſtrated Houſes and Fields, [b] which he performed by Verſe. To this End the *Athenians* in the forty-ſixth Olympiad, viſited with a Plague, and commanded by the Oracle to luſtrate the City, ſent *Nicias*, Son of *Niceratus* with a Ship to *Crete*, to deſire *Epimenides* to come to them, which he did, and there contracted Acquaintance with *Solon*, whom he privately inſtructed, ſetting him in the Way of making Laws. He reduced the divine Rights to a leſſer Charge; he moderated the Mournings of the Citizens, he added ſome Sacrifices to the Ceremonies of Funerals, taking away barbarous Cuſtoms which the Women uſed upon thoſe Occaſions; and (which was of greateſt Concernment) by Propitiations, Procurations, and Offerings, he luſtrated and expiated the City, rendering the People more obſequious to Juſtice and Unity, [c] and ſtayed the Peſtilence in this Manner: He took Sheep, black and white, and brought them into the *Areopagus*; there he let them looſe, to go whither they would, giving Order to thoſe who followed them, that whenſoever any of them lay down, they ſhould ſacrifice in that Place to the proper Deity, whereby the Plague ceaſed. Hence it is, that at this Day, (ſaith *Laertius*) are to be ſeen in many *Athenian* Villages, nameleſs Altars, Monuments of that Expiation. Some affirm he imputed it to the *Cylonian* Impiety (of which already in the Life of *Solon*) and aſſwaged it, by putting to Death two young Men, *Cratinus* and *Cteſibius*.

[d] He is ſuppoſed firſt to have built Temples; one he erected in *Athens* to the *Eumenides*; another he intended to conſecrate to the Nymphs, but a Voice from Heaven was heard in theſe Words, Epimenides, *not to the Nymphs but to* Jupiter.

[e] Beholding the Haven *Munychia*, he ſaid to thoſe who ſtood by, how blind is Man to the future! The *Athenians* would tear this Haven in Pieces with their Teeth, if they foreſaw how much it will infeſt the City. This he foretold many Years before it came to paſs, which was in the ſecond Year of the 114 Olympiad, when *Antipater* put a Gariſon of *Macedonians* into the *Munychia*.

The *Athenians* [f] being afraid of the *Perſian* Navy, he told them, it would not invade them for many Years, and when it did, the *Perſians* ſhould not effect the leaſt of their Hopes, but depart home with greater Loſs to themſelves than they had given their Adverſaries; which was fulfilled in the Fights at *Marathon* and *Salamis*.

[g] He foretold the *Lacedæmonians* (and *Cretans* alſo) the Overthrow they ſhould receive by the *Arcadians*, which happened when *Euricrates* and *Archidamus* reigned in *Lacedæmon*.

Theſe Predictions, (for which the [h] *Grecians*

m Laert. 1. 109. n Val. Max. 8. 13. o One of theſe Names perhaps is corrupt. p Apollon. Hiſt. com. cap. 1. Plin. 7. 52. Laer. ibid. q De Ling. Lat. 6. r An ſeni ſit gerenda reſp. s De anima. 46. t Attic. the Number in Suidas ſeems falſe, as alſo in the Vatican Appendix of Adages; one hath 6. the other 7. u Plin. 7. 52. w Laert. 1. 115. x Apollon. Laert. 1. 114. y Laert. ibid. z Suid. a Laert. 1. 112. b Strabo l. 10. c Laert. 1. 110. d Laert. 1. 112. e Plut. vit. Sol. f Plato de leg. 1. 2. g Laert. 1. 115. h Ibid. 1. 109.

esteemed him [i] divine, beloved of the Gods, [k] and put him in the Number of their Sophists; the *Cretans* [l], whose Prophet he is stiled by [m] St. *Paul*, sacrificed to him as a God, were either not known, or not credited by *Aristotle* [n], who avers, he used not to prophesy of future Things, but only such as were past and obscure.

For his Lustration of the City and other Things, he was much honoured by the *Athenians*, who offered him many Gifts, would have rewarded him with a Talent, and appointed a Ship to transport him back to *Crete*: He refused their Gifts and Money, nor would accept of any Thing but a little Branch of sacred Olive out of the Tower, wherewith (having procured a League betwixt the *Cnossians* and *Athenians*) he returned home, and soon after died [o] 157 Years old, or according to [p] others, 150, the *Cretans* say he wanted but one of 300. *Xenophanes* affirms he heard him when he was 154 Years of Age. His Body the *Lacedemonians* kept by the Direction of the Oracle. It was taken up many Years after, marked all over with Characters, whence arose a Proverb concerning abstruse Things, *the Skin of Epimenides*. He called himself *Æacus*, others named him *Cures*.

He was a great [q] Poet, and writ many Things in Verse; the Subject of his Writings were these.

Initiations, *Lustrations*, and other obscure Matters in Verse.

The Generation and Theogony of the Curetes *and* Coribantes, 5000 Verses.

The Building of Argo, *and Expedition of* Jason *to* Colchos, 6500 Verses.

Of Sacrifices, in Prose.

Of the Cretan *Common-wealth.*

Of Minos *and* Radamanthus.

[r] *Of Oracles and Responses*, out of which St. *Paul* cites this Verse.

Κρῆτες ἀεὶ ψῦσται, κακὰ θηρία, γαστέρες ἀργαί.

The Cretans *are always Lyars, Evil Beasts, Slow-bellies.*

There is extant under his Name (saith *Laertius* [s]) an Epistle to *Solon* concerning the Orders of Government given by *Minos* to the *Cretans*; which *Demetrius* conceives of later Date, not written in the *Cretan*, but *Athenian* Language; but I have met with another to this Effect.

Epimenides *to* Solon.

BE *of Comfort Friend*; *for if* Pisistratus *were Ruler of* Athenians, *inured to Servitude, and void of Discipline, his Way perhaps might continue for ever. But now he subjects not base People, but such as are mindful of* Solon's *Instructions, who ashamed of their Bondage will not brook his Tyranny; and tho' he should settle himself in the Government unmoveable, yet I hope it will not devolve to his Children; for it is hard for free Persons, brought up under excellent Laws, to suffer Bondage. As for you, wander not, but come to* Crete *to me, where you will find no oppressive Monarch. If in travelling up and down you should light upon some of his Friends, I fear you may suffer some Mischief.*

[t] There were two more of this Name, one a Genealogist: The other writ in the *Dorick* Dialect concerning *Rhodes*.

i Plat. l. c. k Plut. Sol. l Laert. 1. 109. m Tit. 1. n Rhetor. 3. 17. o Laert. citing Phlegon. Plin. 1. 52.
p Apollon. Hist. com. 1. citing Phlegon. Suid. q Suid. r D. Hieronym. in Epistol. ad Titum. See the Place. Tit. 11. 2.
s Laert. 1. 113. t Laert. Ibid.

PHERECYDES.

P*Herecydes* [u] was of *Syrus* (one of the *Cyclades* near *Delus*) Son of *Badys*, or as others, *Babis*; born according to [w] *Suidas* in the 46th Olympiad; he lived in the Time of *Alyattes* King of *Lydia*; contemporary with the seven Sophists, by some accounted one of them. *Laertius* saith he was in the fifty-ninth Olympiad, [x] *Cicero* in the Time of *Servius Tullus*.

[y] There are who affirm he heard *Pittacus*; others say he had no Master, but procured and studied by himself the abstruse Books of the *Phœnicians*.

[z] In *Syrus* being thirsty, he required Water of one of his Scholars, which [a] (being drawn out of a Well) he drank, and thereupon declared there would be an Earthquake within three Days in that Island; which happening as he foretold, gained him much Credit, tho' ascribed by *Cicero* [b] not to a divine, but a natural Cause.

[c] Again going to *Juno*'s Temple in *Samos*, he beheld a Ship with full Sail entering the Harbour, he said to those that were present, it would never

u Laert. 1. 116. w Suidas Φερεκ. x Tusc. quæst. 1. y Laert. ibid. z Apollon. hist. comment. cap. 5. a Laert. ibid.
b De Divin. 1. 13. c Apollon. ibid. Laert. ibid.

come

come into the Haven; whilſt he was ſpeaking, a Storm aroſe, and the Ship ſunk in their Sight.

[d] Going by *Meſſana* to *Olympia*, he adviſed *Perilaus*, at whoſe Houſe he lay, to remove thence with all his Family; which he obeyed not: *Meſſana* was ſoon after taken.

[e] He bad the *Lacedæmonians* not to eſteem Gold or Silver. *Hercules* having ſo commanded him in a Dream, who appeared likewiſe to the Kings, and bad them obey *Pherecydes*: This ſome aſcribe to *Pythagoras*.

He held Opinions contrary to *Thales*, but [f] agreed with him in that of Water, that it is Principal of all Things. He ſaid the Gods called a Table Συνοχὰς. [g] He firſt aſſerted the Immortality of the Soul, according to ſome. [h] *Tzetzes* affirms he was Maſter to *Thales*, but that ſuits not with their Times: That he inſtructed *Pythagoras* is generally acknowledged.

The Manner of his Death is variouſly related. *Hermippus* ſaith [i], in a War betwixt the *Epheſians* and *Magneſians*, he, deſirous the *Epheſians* might be Victors, demanded of one preſent, whence he was? Who anſwer'd of *Epheſus*: Draw me then, ſaith he, by the Legs into the *Magneſian* Territory, and bid your Countrymen, after they have gained the Battle, bury me. I am *Pherecydes*. This Meſſage he delivered; they overcame the *Magneſians*, and finding *Pherecydes* dead, buried him honourably. Some affirm he went to *Delphi*, and threw himſelf from the *Corycean* Mountain; but the more general Opinion is, that [k] he died moſt miſerably, his whole Body eaten up with Lice (*Pliny* [l] ſaith, with Serpents which broke out of his Skin) whereby, when his Face became deform'd, he avoided and refuſed the Sight of his Acquaintance. When any one came to viſit him (as *Pythagoras* did) and demanded how he did, he putting out his Finger at the Key-hole, conſumed by his Diſeaſe, ſhewed them the Condition of his whole Body, ſaying χροὶ δῆλον, *the Skin ſheweth*; which Words the Philoſophers take in an ill Senſe. The *Delians* affirm the God of that Place ſent this Diſeaſe to him out of Anger, becauſe he boaſted much of his own Wiſdom to his Diſciples, ſaying, if he ſhould never ſacrifice to any God, he ſhould lead a Life no leſs pleaſant than thoſe that offered Hecatombs. *Pythagoras* buried him; his Tomb carried this Inſcription,

Of Wiſdom I compriſe the utmoſt Bound;
Who further would be ſatisfied, muſt ſound
Pythagoras, *of* Greeks *the moſt renown'd.*

Some affirm [m] he was the firſt that writ in Proſe, which others aſcribe to *Cadmus*. He writ *Heptamuchos* or *Thocraſia*; perhaps the ſame with his *Theology*, ten Books containing the Origin and Succeſſion of the Gods (if not miſtaken for the Theogony of the younger *Pherecydes*) an obſcure dark Work, the Allegories whereof *Iſidore* cited by *Clemens Alexandrinus* [n] conceives taken from the Prophecy of *Cham*.

Concerning this Book there is extant an Epiſtle under the Name of *Pherecydes*, but may well be ſuſpected to be ſpurious.

Pherecydes *to* Thales [o].

WEll may you die whenever your fatal Hour arrives; as ſoon as I received your Letter I fell ſick, was over-run with Lice, and had a Fever; whereupon I gave Order to my Servants, that as ſoon as I was buried they ſhould carry the Book to you; if you, with the reſt of the wiſe Men approve it, publiſh it; if you approve it not, publiſh it not, for me it doth not pleaſe; there is no Certainty in it; whatſoever the Theologiſt ſaith, you muſt underſtand otherwiſe; for I write in Fables, conſtrain'd by my Diſeaſe. I have not admitted of any Phyſician or Friend, but when they came to the Door, and ask'd how it was with me, putting my Finger out at the Key-hole, I ſhewed them how deſperate ill I was, and beſpoke them to come on the Morrow to the Funeral of Pherecydes.

There was another of this Name of the ſame Iſland, an Aſtrologer. There are more mentioned by *Suidas*.

d Laert. 1. 116. e Ibid. f Achil. Tat. Iſag. in Art. g Cicer. Tuſc. quæſt. 1. 16. h Chiliad. 1. i Laert. 1. 117. k Elian. 4. 28. See alſo 5. 2. l Nat. Hiſt. l. 7. m Suidas in Φερεκ. n Clem. Alexand. Strom. 6. o Laert. 1. 122.

THE

HISTORY

OF

PHILOSOPHY.

THE SECOND PART,

Containing the *Ionick* Philoſophers.

ANAXIMANDER.

CHAP. I.

Of his Life.

PHILOSOPHY had a twofold Beginning [a], one from *Anaximander*, another from *Pythagoras*. *Anaximander* was Diſciple to *Thales*, whence that Philoſophy was called *Ionick*; *Thales* being an *Ionian*, for he was of *Miletus*. *Pythagoras* was Diſciple to *Pherecydes*; that King of Philoſophy, called from the Place where he taught, *Italic*. *Thales* was ſucceeded by *Anaximander*, *Anaximander* by *Anaximenes*, *Anaximenes* by *Anaxagoras*, *Anaxagoras* by *Archelaus*, in whom (as *Plutarch*, *Laertius*, and others affirm) it ended, *Socrates* (the Scholar of *Archelaus*) introducing Morality.

Anaximander, a *Mileſian*, [b] Countryman, Companion and [c] Kinſman of *Thales*; was his Diſciple alſo, and [d] Succeſſor in the Propagation of his Doctrine; Son of *Praxiades* (corruptly called by ſome [e] *Praxidamus*) born the third Year of the 42d Olympiad. [f] He flouriſhed moſt in the Time of *Polycrates*, Tyrant of *Samos*.

[g] He demonſtrated the Compendium of Geometry; [h] being next *Homer*, the firſt Maſter of that Science; he firſt ſet forth a Geographic Table, of which [i] *Laertius* is to be underſtood, who affirms, *he deſcribed the Circumference of the Sea and Land.*

[k] In the 50th Olympiad he found out the Obliquity of the Zodiac, *that is*, (ſaith *Pliny*) *he opened the Gates of all Things.* [l] He invented the *Gnomon*, and ſet up the firſt in an open Place at *Lacedæmon*. He [m] found out the Equinoctial Solſtices and Horologies; [n] He framed *Horoſcopes* to denote the Tropicks and Equinoxes; whence [o] *Salmaſius* conceives the Uſe of his Dial was only to delineate the Tropic and Equinoctial Points; that they did not ſerve to diſtinguiſh the Hours or twelve Parts of the Day, he proveth becauſe the very Name ὥρα in that Senſe, or the Diviſion of the Day into twelve equal Parts, was not known a long Time after.

[p] He adviſed the *Lacedæmonians* to quit their City and Houſes, and to lie armed in the open Field, foretelling an Earthquake which threw down the whole City, and tore away a Piece of the Mountain *Taygetus*.

[q] As he ſung, the Boys uſed to deride him,

a Laert. pref. b Cic. acad. quæſt. 4. c Suid. Ἀναξίμανδ. d Strab. lib. 1. & 4. e Clem. Alexand. Strom. 1. f Laert. ibid. g Suid. ibid. h Strab. lib. 1. i Laert 2. 1. k Plin. 2. 6. l Laert. 11. 1. m Suid. n Laert. 11. o Plinian exercit. p Cicer. divinat. Plin. 2. 79. 1. 50. q Laert. 2. 2.

where-

whereupon he said, we must learn to sing better for the Boys.

Of his Auditors are remembered *Anaximenes* and *Parmenides*.

Of his Writings these:

[r] Περὶ φύσεως, *Of Nature.* This Treatise perhaps *Laertius* means, who saith he digested his Opinions into Commentaries, which Book fell into the Hands of *Apollodorus* the *Athenian*.

Γῆς περίοδος.

Περὶ τῶν ἀπλανῶν.

Of the Sphere, with other Things.

He was, according to *Apollodorus*, 64 Years old the second Year of the 58th Olympiad, and died soon after.

CHAP. II.

Of his Opinions.

Sect. 1. *That Infinity is the Principle of all Things.*

THales (saith *Cicero*) [s] *who held that all Things consist of Water, could not perswade his Countryman and Companion* Anaximander *thereto, for he asserted, that Infinity is that whereof all Things were made*, or (according to [t] *Plutarch*, *Laertius*, and *Justin Martyr* [u], *that it is the Principle and Element of Things* (for these two he confounded, as was observed of his Master *Thales*) [w] *but not declared what this Infinity is, whether Air, Water, Earth, or any other Body*, for which he was condemned by *Plutarch*.

That *it is* [x] *one, infinite in Magnitude* (not Number) whence [y] *Aristotle* reprehends him for imagining Contrarieties can proceed from the same Principle. [z] That *is for that Reason is infinite, that it may not fail.*

[a] That *the Parts thereof are changed; the whole is immutable.* [b] *(Simplicius* saith moveable) [c] That *out of it all Things proceed, and resolve into it.*

That *there are infinite Worlds generated which corrupt into that whereof they were generated.*

Sect. 2. *Of the Heavens.*

HIS Opinion (according to [d] *Cicero*) was, that *the Gods are native* (having a Beginning) *rising and setting by long Intervals*, and that *there are innumerable Worlds:* This *Plutarch* [e] and *Stobæus* apply to the Heavens and Stars. *But how can we* (adds *Cicero*) *understand a God that is not eternal.* That [f] *Heaven consists of Cold and Heat mixed.*

That *the Stars are globous Instances, consisting of Air full of Fire, respiring Flames at some certain Part;* [g] *mov'd by the Circles and Spheres wherein they inhere; which Assertion* Aristotle *borrowed from hence.*

[h] That *the Sun is seated highest, the Moon next, then the fixed Stars and Planets.*

That *the Circle of the Sun is* [i] 28 *Times* (Theodoret [k] saith 26) *greater than the Earth, having a hollow Circle about it like a Chariot-wheel, full of Fire; in one Part whereof there is a Mouth, at which the Fire is seen as out of the Hole of a Flute, which is the Sun* [l] *equal in Bigness with the Earth.*

[m] That *the Cause of the Sun's Eclipse is the stopping that Hole in the Midst, out of which the Fire issues.*

[n] That *the Circle of the Moon is* 29 *Times greater than the Earth, like a Chariot Wheel, having a hollow Orb, in the Midst full of Fire (like the Sun) and oblique, breathing Fire out at one Part as out of a Tunnel.*

[o] That *the Eclipse of the Moon happens according to her Conversions, when the Mouth out of which the Fire issueth, is stopped.*

[p] That *the Moon hath a Light of her own, but very thin;* [q] that *she shineth in the Light she borroweth from the Sun;* which two Assertions are so far from being [r] inconsistent, that it is the common Opinion [s] both are true.

Sect. 3. *Of Meteors.*

THat [t] *Wind is a Fluxion of the Air, when the most subtle and liquid Parts thereof are either stirred or resolved by the Sun.*

[u] That *Thunders, Lightnings, Presters, and Whirlwinds are caused by the Wind enclosed in a thick Cloud, which, by Reason of its Lightness breaketh forth violently; the Rupture of the Cloud maketh a Crack, and the Divulsion by Reason of the Blackness causeth a flashing Light.* [w] Seneca *more expressly, He ascribed all to Wind. Thunder* (saith he) *is the Sound of a breaking Cloud: Why unequal? Because the Breakings are unequal. Why doth it thunder in a clear Day? Because even then the Wind breaks through the thick and dry Air. Why sometimes doth it thunder and not lighten? Because the thinner and weaker Spirit is able to make a Flame but not a Sound. What is Lightning? The Agitation of the Air severing itself, and rushing down, discloshing a faint Fire. What is Thunder? The Motion of a piercing thick Spirit.*

r Laert. ibid. Suid. s Acad. quæst. 4. 37. t De plac. phil. 1. 3. u Paren. ad Græc. w Laert. 2. 1. x Symplic. in Phys. 1. 2. phys. 1. 5. y Plut. plac. phil. 1. 3. z Laert. ibid. a Cap. 6. b Cic. acad. quæst. 4. c Plut. plac. phil. 1. 3. Just. Mart. parænes. d De nat. deor. 1. 10. e In plac. phil. 1. 7. f Stob. Ecl. phys. 1. c. 25. g Stob. ibid. h Stob. ibid. i Plut. plac. phil. 2. 20. k Theod. Therapeut. l. 1. l Plut. plac. phil. 2. 21. m Laert. 2. 1. n Plut. plac. phil. 2. 24. Stob. l. 1. o Plut. plac. phil. 2. 25. p Ibid. 2. 28. q Laert. ibid. r As a learned Person conceives upon those Words of Laert. i. e. Casaubon. s See Erasm. Reinholdus in Theoricus Purbachii, pag. 161. t Plut. plac. phil. 3. 7. u Ibid. 3. 3. Stob. l. c. w Nat. quæst. 2. 18.

All

[x] *All Things are ſo ordered, that ſome Influence deſcend from the Æther upon inferior Things; ſo Fire ſounds, forc'd upon cold Clouds: When it breaks them it ſhines; the fewer Flames beget Lightnings, the greater, Thunder: A great Part, the reſt was altered from its natural Kind by its exceſſive Heat.*

[y] That *the firſt Creatures were bred in Humidity, and enclоſed within ſharp thorny Barks, but as they grew older, they became drier, and at laſt the Bark being broken round about them, they lived ſome little Time after it.*

x Sen. nat. quæſt. 2. 19. y Plut. plac. phil. 5. 19.

ANAXIMENES.

CHAP. I.

His Life.

Anaximenes [a], was a *Mileſian*, Son of *Euriſtratus*, [b] Friend, [c] Diſciple and Succeſſor to *Anaximander*. According to *Euſebius*, he flouriſhed in the ſecond Year of the 56th Olympiad. *Suidas* [d] ſaith he lived in the 55th Olympiad at the taking of *Sardis* when *Cyrus* overthrew *Crœſus*. So that the Account of [e] *Apollodorus* (who affirms he was born in the 63d Olympiad) is corrupt. He heard alſo, as ſome affirm, *Parmenides*. He uſed the *Ionick* Dialect, plain and incompoſed. [f] *Pliny* calls him the Inventor of Gnomonicks; but perhaps it is a Miſtake for *Anaximander*. Of his Auditors were *Anaxagoras* and *Diogenes Apolloniates*.

Theſe two Epiſtles of his are preſerved by *Laertius* [g].

Anaximenes to *Pythagoras.*

'THales having lived happily even to old Age, 'ended his Days unfortunately. One Night 'going out of his Houſe (as he uſed) with his Maid, 'to contemplate the Stars, gazing, and not taking 'Heed to the Place, he lighted upon a Precipice 'and fell down. This was the Fate of the *Mileſian* Aſtronomer. But let us who were his Auditors, preſerve the Memory of the Perſon, and our Sons and Auditors after us. Let us ſtill retain his Sayings, and begin all our Diſcourſes 'with *Thales*.

Anaximenes to *Pythagoras.*

'YOU are more adviſed than we, who leaving '*Samos* for *Crotona*, live there in quiet; the 'Æacides prove injurious to others, and the *Mileſians* want not Tyrants of their own chooſing. 'The King of *Media* is likewiſe terrible to us, but 'would not be ſo, ſhould we pay him Tribute. 'The *Ionians* are reſolved to war with the *Medes* 'for the general Liberty, and if they fight we have 'no Hope of Safety. How then can *Anaximenes*, 'perplexed with Fear of Death and Slavery apply 'his Mind to Celeſtial Speculations? But you are 'coveted by the *Crotonians* and all *Italians*; Auditors come to you as far as from *Sicily*.

CHAP. II.

His Opinions.

Sect. 1. *That the Air is the Principle of all Things.*

HE held that [h] *the Air is the Principle of the Univerſe, of which all Things are engendered, and into which they reſolve; our Souls by which we live are Air, ſo Spirit and Air contain in being all the World, for Spirit and Air are two Names ſignifying one Thing.*

That [i] *the Air is God, begotten, immenſe, infinite, ever in Motion*; [k] *but that thoſe Things which ariſe out of it are finite, firſt are begotten, Earth, Water, Fire, then of theſe all Things.* That the Air is God, he underſtands of the Faculties penetrating through the Elements or Bodies.

Sect. 2. *Of the Heavens.*

THat [l] *the outward Superficies of Heaven is earthly.*

That *the Stars are of a fiery Subſtance, inviſible, earthly Bodies intermixt with them; that they are inherent, as Nails in Chryſtal.*

That [m] *they are forced back by the thick reſiſting Air,* [n] *and move not above (or under) but about the Earth.*

a Laert. 2. 3. b Simplic. l. 1. Phyſ. c Cic. acad. quæſt. 4. 37. Plin. 2. 76. d Suid. e Laert. ibid. f Lib. 2. g Laert. 2. 4. h Plut. de plac. 1. 3. Juſtin Martyr. parænet. 1. 3. i Cic. de nat. Deor. 1. 10. k Cic. acad. quæſt. 4. l Plut. plac. phil. 2. 11. m Ibid. 2. 23. n Laert. 2. 3.

That

That [o] *the Sun is flat as a Plate, of fiery Substance.*

That [p] *the Signs of Summer and Winter come not by the Moon, but by the Sun only.*

That [q] *the Sun is eclipsed when the Mouth out of which issueth his Heat, is closed.*

That [r] *the Moon is likewise of a fiery Nature.*

That [s] *the Moon is eclipsed when the Mouth out of which issueth her Heat, is closed.*

Sect. 3. *Of Meteors.*

THat [t] *the Clouds are made by Condensation of Air, Rain by Condensation of the Clouds, out of which it is squeezed; Snow of Rain congeal'd in falling, and Hail of the same, contracted by a cold Wind.*

[u] Concerning Thunder, Lightning, &c. to the Assertion of *Anaximander* he added the Comparison of the Sea, *which being broken with Oars, shineth.*

That [w] *the Rainbow is made by Reflection of the Sun-beams upon a thick Cloud, which, not able to pierce it, are refracted upon it.*

That *Earthquakes proceed from the Rarity and Dryness of the Earth, one being caused by excessive Heat, the other by excessive Cold.* Further explained by *Aristotle* [x] thus; *He held that the Earth, as well when it is moist as when it is dry, breaketh, and by these great Pieces thereof which use to fall upon it, is shaken: Hence it is that Earthquakes happen either in Droughts or great Rains: By Droughts it is broken, and by great Showers excessively moistened, parts likewise in sunder.*

He called [y] *the Contraction and Condensation of Matter, cold; the Laxation and Rarity thereof Heat; whence a Man breathes out of his Mouth both hot and cold; his Breath compressed by his Lips, and condens'd is cold; but breathed forth with an open Mouth is hot, by Reason of the Rarity.*

o Plut. plac. phil. 2. 19. p Ibid. 2. 16. q Ibid. 2. 22. r Ibid. 2. 19. s Ibid. 2. 24. t Ibid. 3. 4. u Stob. l. c. w Plut. plac. phil. 3. 5. x Ibid. 3. 15. Meteor. 2. 7. Senec. nat. quæst. 6. 10. y Plut. de primo frig.

ANAXAGORAS.

CHAP. I.

His Country, Time, and Study of Philosophy.

Anaxagoras [a] was of *Glazomenæ*, Son of *Hegesibulus* or *Eubulus*, born in the 70th Olympiad, according to *Apollodorus*, in the first Year thereof; eminent for his noble Birth and wealthy Fortunes, but more for his magnanimous Contempt of them. [b] He left his Lands and Patrimony, saith [c] *Cicero*) to learn and obtain the divine Delight of Philosophy: And [d] converted himself from civil Affairs to the Knowledge of Things. *Suidas* affirms, he left his Grounds to Sheep and Camels to be eaten up: And therefore *Apolloneus Tyaneus* said, he read Philosophy to Beasts rather than to Men. [e] *Plato* derides him for quitting his Estate; *Laertius* [f] reports, he assigned it to his Friends; whereupon being by them accused of Improvidence; *why* (answered he) *do not you take Care of it?* To one who reproved him, as taking no Care of his Country, *wrong me not*, saith he, *my greatest Care is my Country*, pointing to the Heavens. To another, asking for what End he was born, he answered, *to contemplate the Sun, Moon, and Heavens.* [g] In fine, he withdrew himself to Contemplation of natural Philosophy, not regarding civil Affairs. In this Study *Anaximanes* was his Master [h] from whom he received his Learning.

[i] In the twentieth Year of his Age, the first of the 75th Olympiad, *Calliades* being Archon (whom *Laertius* [k] corruptly calls *Callias*) at the Time of *Xerxes*'s Expedition into *Greece*, he went to *Athens* to study Philosophy, where he continued thirty Years, and was honoured with the Title of Νοῦς, *the Mind*, as being the first that added that Principle to Matter; so *Timon*,

Where dwells fam'd Anaxagoras, *the Mind*,
[l] *For he that Agent first to Matter join'd,*
Which Things confused orderly designed.

CHAP. II.

Of his Opinions.

Sect. 1. *Of the first Principles and Beginning of Things.*

HE held that *the material Principle of all Things is one and many* ὁμοιομερὰ *Parts infinite, simu-*

a Laert. 2. 6. b Plut. contra usur. Lysand. c Tusc. quæst. 5. d De orator. 3. e Hip. maj. t. 3. f Laert. 2. 6. g Ibid. 2. 10. h Cic. de nat. Deor. 1. 11. i Laert. 2. 7. k Ibid. 2. 6. l Laert. perhaps ἐ τι δὴ νῷ αὐτῶς.

lar,

lar, and contrary, continuous to the Touch, [m] *ſuſtaining themſelves, not contained by any other.* His Grounds theſe: Firſt, becauſe, according to the common Rule of natural Philoſophers, of nothing proceeds nothing, it is not poſſible any Thing can be made of that which is not; or that which hath a Being can be reſolved into that which hath none. Secondly, becauſe Contraries are made mutually of each other, therefore they were in each other before; for if it be neceſſary, that whatſoever is made, be made of that which is, or is not, but that it ſhould be made of that which is not impoſſible, wherein all agree that ever diſcourſed upon Nature, it follows neceſſarily, that they be made of Things that are, and are within theſe very Things, tho' by Reaſon of their Smalneſs, not diſcernable by us: Hence it is that they ſay, every Thing is mixed with every Thing; becauſe they ſee any Thing made of any Thing: But Things ſeem different, and are called divers in reſpect to one another, by Reaſon that the Multitude of Infinites which are within, aboundeth in the Miſtion; for the whole is neither quite white nor black, Fleſh nor Bone, but every Thing ſeemeth to be of the Nature of that whereof it hath moſt [n] of ſimple Nouriſhment, as Bread, Water, and the like, are bred the Hair, Veins, Arteries, Nerves, Bones, and other Parts of the Body, all Things are therefore in this Food, as Nerves, Bones, and the like, diſcernable by Reaſon, tho' not by Senſe: Of theſe Atoms the whole World conſiſteth, as [o] Gold of Grains; theſe homogeneal Parts are the Matter of all Things, his Opinion is thus expreſt by [p] *Lucretius.*

Next Anaxagoras *we muſt purſue,*
And his Homoiomeria *review;*
A Term that's no where mention'd but among
The Greeks, *too copious for our narrow Tongue:*
Yet may the Senſe be in more Words array'd;
The Principle of all Things, Entrails made
Of ſmalleſt Entrails, Bone of ſmalleſt Bone,
Blood of ſmall ſanguine Drops reduc'd to one;
Gold of ſmall Grains, Earth of ſmall Sands compacted,
Small Drops to Water, Sparks to Fire contracted;
The like in every Thing ſuppos'd, yet he
Nature aſſerted from all Vacuum free;
And held that each corporeal Being might
Be ſubdivided into infinite.

That [q] God is an infinite ſelf-moving Mind, that this divine [r] infinite Mind, not incloſed in any Body, [s] is the efficient Cauſe of all Things; out of the infinite Matter conſiſting of ſimilar Parts, every Thing being made according to its Species by the divine Mind, who, when all Things were at firſt confuſedly mingled together, came and reduced them to Order.

Sect. 2. *Of the Heavens.*

THat *the higher Parts of the World are full of Fire, the Power that is there he called Æther,* and that properly, ſaith *Ariſtotle* [t], for the Body, which is continually in quick Motion, is conceived to be divine by Nature, for that Reaſon called *Æther,* none of thoſe that are here below being of that Kind.

That [u] *the ambient* Æther *being of a fiery Nature by the Swiftneſs of its Motion, ſnatcheth up Stones from the Earth, which being ſet on Fire, become Stars,* [w] *all carried from Eaſt to Weſt.*

That [x] *the Stars are impelled by the Condenſation of the Air about the Poles, which the Sun makes more ſtrong by compreſſing.*

That [y] *the Stars are earthly, and that after the firſt Secretion of the Elements, the Fire ſeparating itſelf, drew ſome Parts of the Earth to its own Nature, and made them like Fire; whereupon he farther affirmed,*

[z] *The Sun is a burning Plate or Stone,* [a] *many Times bigger than* Peloponneſus, *whoſe Converſion is made by the Repulſe of the northern Air, which he, by compreſſing, makes more ſtrong.*

[b] That *the Moon is a dark Body, enlightened by the Sun, habitable, having Plains, Hills and Waters;* that [c] *the Inequality in her Face proceeds from a Mixture, cold and earthly, for there is Darkneſs mix'd with her fiery Nature, whence ſhe is called a Star, or falſe Light.* [d] Plato *ſaith, that the Moon was occaſion of Diſhonour to him, becauſe he aſſumed the Original of this Opinion of her borrowing Light to himſelf, whereas it was much more ancient.*

[e] That *the Milky-way is the Shadow of the Earth upon that Part of Heaven, when the Sun, being underneath, enlightens not all;* [f] *or as* Ariſtotle, *that the Milky-way is the Light of ſome Stars, for the Sun being under the Earth, looks not upon ſome Stars, the Light of thoſe on whom he looks is not ſeen, being ſwallowed up in his; the proper Light of thoſe which are hindered by the Earth from the Sun's Illumination, is the* Galaxy. Laertius [g] *ſaith, he held the* Galaxy *to be the Reflection of the Light of the Sun.*

Sect. 3. *Of Meteors.*

THat [h] *Comets are the Co-apparition of wandering Stars, which approach ſo near each other, as that they ſeem to touch one another: Or as* Laertius, *the Concourſe of Planets, emitting Flames.*

m Plut. plac. phil. 1. 3. Ariſt. phyſ. 3. 4. Ariſt. phyſ. 3. 7. n Plut. ibid. o Laert. 2. 8. p Lib. 1. 5. q Lactan. falſ. rel. 1. 5. r Cic. nat. Deor. 1. 11. s Auguſt. de Civ. Dei. 8. 2. t Ariſt. Met. 1. 3. u Plut. plac. phil. 2. 13. w Ibid. 2. 16. x Ibid. 2. 23. y Achil. Tat. Iſag. in Arat. c. 11. z Plut. plac. phil. 2. 20. Laert. 2. 8. Achil. Tat. Iſag. in Arat, a Plut. plac. phil. 2. 21. b Ibid. 2. 25. c Ibid. 2. 30. Laert. d In Cratylo. e Plut. plac. phil. 3. 1. f Meteor. 1. 8. g Laert. 2. 9. h Ariſt. Meteor. 1. 6.

That

That *falling Stars are ſhot down from the* Æther, *as Sparkles, and therefore ſoon extinguiſhed.*

That [i] *Thunder is the Colliſion of the Clouds, lightning their mutual Attrition; or as* Plutarch, *the Cold falling upon the Hot, or the* ætherial *upon the* aerial, *the Noice which it makes is Thunder; of the Blackneſs of the Clouds is cauſed Lightning, of the Greatneſs of the Light Thunderbolts, of the more corporeal Fire, Whirl-winds, of the more cloudy Preſters.*

That *Lightning diſtils from the* Æther; *and that from that great Heat of Heaven many Things fall down, which the Clouds preſerve a long Time encloſed.*

That [k] *the Rainbow is a Refraction of the Sun's Light upon a thick dark Cloud, oppoſite to him as a Looking-glaſs; by the ſame Reaſon (ſaith he) appeared chiefly in* Pontus, *two or more Suns.*

That [l] *Winds proceed from Extenuation of the Air by the Sun.*

That [m] *Earthquakes are cauſed by the Air or* Æther, *which being of its own Nature apt to aſcend, when it gets into the Veins and Caverns of the Earth, finding Difficulty in the getting out, cauſeth that ſhaking; for the upper Parts of the Earth contract themſelves by the Benefit of Rain, Nature having made the whole Body thereof alike, lax and ſpongy, the Parts as in a Ball, ſuperior and inferior; the Superior, that which is inhabited by us, the Inferior, the other. This Wind getting into the inferior Parts, breaks the condenſed Air, with the ſame Force as we ſee Clouds broken, when, upon the Colliſion of them, and Motion of the agitated Air, Fire breaks forth; this Air falls upon that which is next, ſeeking to get out, and tears in Pieces whatſoever it meets, until through thoſe narrow Paſſages, it either finds a Way to Heaven, or forceth one; which* Laertius *obſcurely expreſſeth, the Repulſion of the Air upon the Earth.*

That [n] *Snow is not white, but black, nor did it ſeem white to him, becauſe he knew the Water whereof it is congealed to be black.*

Sect. 4. *Of the Earth.*

THat [o] *the Beginning of Motion proceeding from the Mind, the heavy Bodies obtained the loweſt Place, as the Earth; the light the higheſt, as the Fire; thoſe betwixt both, the middle, as the Air and Water: Thus the Sea ſubſiſts upon the Superficies of the Earth, which is flat, the Humidity being rarified by the Sun.*

That [p] *the primitive Humidity being diffuſed, as a Pool was burned by the Motion of the Sun about it, and the unctious Part being exhaled, the Remainder became Salt.*

That [q] *as ſoon as the World was made, and living Creatures produced out of the World, the World inclined of itſelf towards the South, according to divine Providence; that ſome Parts thereof might be habitable, others not habitable, by Reaſon of the Extremities of Heat and Cold.*

That [r] *the Miſtion of the Elements is by appoſition.*

That [s] *the Inundation of* Nilus *is cauſed by the Snow of* Æthiopia, *which is diſſolved in Summer, and congealed in Winter.*

Sect. 5. *Of living Creatures.*

THat [t] *Creatures were firſt generated of Humidity, Calidity, and earthly Matter; afterwards mutually of one another, Males on the right Side, Females on the Left.*

That *the Soul is that which moveth,* [u] *that it is aerial, and hath a Body of the Nature of Air.*

That [w] *there is a Death of the Soul likewiſe, which is Separation from the Body.*

That *all Animals have active Reaſon.*

That [x] *Sleep is an Action of the Body, not of the Soul.*

That [y] *in the Hand of Man conſiſts all his Skill.*

That [z] *the Voice is made by the Wind, hitting againſt firm reſiſting Air, returning the Counter-blow to our Ears, which is the Manner whereby alſo the Repercuſſion of the Air is formed, called Eccho.*

That [a] *the Gall is the Cauſe of acute Diſeaſes, which overflowing, is diſperſed into the Lungs, Veins, and Coſts.*

CHAP. III.

His Predictions.

SUidas ſaith, he foretold many Things: Of thoſe, two Inſtances only have been hitherto preſerved. The firſt thus related by *Pliny*, [b] *The* Grecians *celebrate* Anaxagoras *of the* Clazomenian, *and for foretelling by his Learning and Science in the ſecond Year of the* 78*th Olympiad, on what Day a Stone would fall from the Sun, which happened in the Day time in a Part of* Thrace *at the River* Ægos, *which Stone is at this Day ſhewn, about the Bigneſs of a Bean, of an aduſt Colour, a Comet alſo burning in thoſe Nights.*

[c] *Plutarch* adds, that it was in his Time not only ſhewn, but reverenced by the *Peloponneſians. Euſebius* reckons the Fall of this Stone upon the fourth of the 78th Olympiad, which is two Years after *Pliny*'s Account of the Prediction. *Silenus*, cited by *Laertius* [d], ſaith, it fell when *Dymilus* was Archon, which, if it be to be read *Dyphilus* (for

i Laert. 2. 9. Plut. plac. phil. 3. 3. k Plut. plac. phil. 3. 5. l Laert. 2. 9. m Ariſt. Meteor. 2. 7. Plut. plac. phil. 3. 15. Senec. nat. quæſt. 6. 9. n Cic. Acad. quæſt. 4. o Laert. 2. 8. p Plut. plac. phil. 3. 16. q Ibid. 2. 8. r Ibid. 1. 17. s Ibid. 4. 1. t Laert. 2. 9. u Plut. plac. phil. 4. 1. w Ibid. 5. 24. x Ibid. 5. 25. y Ibid. z Plut. de amore frat. a Ariſt. de Part. Animal. 4. b Plin. nat. hiſt. l. 11. 59. c Vit. Lyſand. d Laert. 11. 11.

the other Name is not to be found near these Times) will be the first Year of the 84th Olympiad. But the Marble at *Arundel House* (graven about the 129th Olympiad, to be preferred before any other Chronological Account) expressly names the Fall upon the 4th Year, upon the 77th Olympiad, when *Theogenides* was Archon, two Years before *Pliny* saith it was foretold. It was believed to have portended (as *Plutarch* testifies) the great Defeat given to the *Athenians* by *Lysander* at the River *Ægos* sixty-two Years after, *viz.* the 4th Year of the 93d Olympiad.

Of the Wonder [e] *Aristotle* gives a very slight Account, affirming, it was a Stone snatched up by the Wind, and fell in the Day-time, a Comet happening in those Nights, which is disproved by *Plutarch* [f], who hath this large Discourse upon it: 'It 'is said that *Anaxagoras* did prognosticate that one 'of the Bodies included the Heavens, it should be 'loosed by shaking, and fall to the Ground, the 'Stars are not in Place where they were first created, they are heavy Bodies, of the Nature of Stone, 'shining by the Reflection of the *Æther*, being 'drawn up by Force, and kept there by the Violence of that circular Motion, as at the Beginning in the first Separation of Things, cold and 'heavy they were restrained. There is another 'Opinion more probable, which saith, those which 'we call falling Stars are not Fluxions of the *Æther* extinguish'd in the Air, almost as soon as 'lighted, nor Inflammations or Combustions of any Part of the Air, which by it spreadeth upwards, but they are cœlestial Bodies failing of 'their Retention by the ordinary Course of Heaven thrown down, not upon the habitable Earth, 'but into the Sea, which is the Cause we do not 'see them; yet the Assertion of *Anaxagoras* is confirmed by *Damachus*, who writeth in his Book 'of Religion, that seventy-five Days together before this Stone fell, they saw a great Body of Fire 'in the Air like a Cloud enflamed, which tarried 'not in one Place, but went and came, uncertainly removing, from the driving whereof issued 'Flashes of Fire that fell in many Places like falling Stars; when this great Body of Fire fell in 'that Part of the Earth, the Inhabitants emboldened, came to the Place to see what it was, and 'found no Appearance of Fire, but a great Stone 'on the Ground, nothing, in Comparison of that 'Body of Fire. Herein *Damachus* had need of 'favourable Hearers: But if what he saith be true, 'he confuteth those Arguments, who maintain it 'was a Piece of a Rock by the Force of a boisterous Wind torn from the Top of a Mountain, 'and carried in the Air so long as this Whirlwind continued, but so soon as that was laid, the 'Stone fell immediately; unless this Lightning 'Body which appeared so many Days was Fire 'indeed, which coming to dissolve, and to be put 'out, did beget this violent Storm of Force to tear 'off the Stone, and cast it down.

This it is likely [g] *Charimander* meant, who in his Book of *Comets* saith, *Anaxagoras* observed in the Heavens a great unaccustomed Light, of the Likeness of a huge Pillar, and that it shined for many Days.

The other memorable Prediction of *Anaxagoras* was, [h] of a Storm, which he signified by going to the Olympick Games, when the Weather was fair, in a shaggy Gown, the Rain pouring down, all the *Grecians*, (saith *Ælian* [i]) saw and gloried that he knew more divinely than according to Human Nature.

CHAP. IV.

His Scholars and Auditors.

THese are remembered as his Scholars and Auditors.

[k] *Pericles* Son of *Xantippus* being instructed by *Anaxagoras*, could easily reduce the Exercise of his Mind from secret abstrusive Things to publick popular Causes. [l] *Pericles* much esteemed him, was by him instructed in Natural Philosophy; and besides other Virtues, freed from superstitious Fears, arising from Ignorance of Physical Causes; whereof there is this Instance, the Head of a Ram with but one Horn being brought to *Pericles*, was by the Sooth-sayers interpreted prodigious: *Anaxagoras* opening it, shewed that the Brain filled not its natural Place, but contracted by Degrees in an oval Form, toward that Part where the Horn grew. Afterwards *Anaxagoras*, neglected and decrepit with Age, in a melancholly Resentment thereof, lay down and covered his Face, resolving to starve himself; which *Pericles* hearing, came immediately to him, bewailing, not *Anaxagoras*, but himself, who should lose so excellent a Counsellor: *Anaxagoras* uncovering his Face, said, They, *Pericles*, who would use a Lamp, must supply it with Oil.

Archelaus, Son of *Apollodorus*, was Disciple to *Anaxagoras*, and, as *Laertius* [m] affirms, called the Natural Philosopher, for first bringing that Kind of Learning to *Athens*; but how that consists with his Relation to *Anaxagoras*, who, as he acknowledgeth, studied Natural Philosophy thirty Years in *Athens*, *Casaubon* justly questions.

Euripides, [n] as *Manuel Moschopulus*, the Writer of his Life, affirms, Son of *Mnesarchus*, born at the first Time of *Xerxes*'s Expedition into *Greece*, the same Day that the *Grecians* overthrew the *Persians*, was first a Painter, then an Auditor of *Anaxa-*

e Meteor. 1. 7. f Vit. Lysand. g Senec. nat. quæst. 7. 5. h Suid. i Ælian de Animal. 7. 8. k Cicer. de Orat. c. 3. l Plut. vit. Peric. m Laert. 2. 16. n His Words (because never published) these: διήκουσε δὲ καὶ Ἀναξαγόρᾳ τῷ Κλαζομένῃ ἐπὶ τεσσαρακοντάετες, ὅτε καὶ ἡ Ξέρξου διάβασις ἐγένετο καὶ ἡ Περσῶν ἧττα ἐν Πλαταιαῖς καὶ Μυκάλῃ. ἐν δὲ τῇ Ἀναξαγόρου διατριβῇ καὶ ζωγραφίαν ἐπετήδευσεν, ὡς καὶ τὸν Ἀναξαγόραν ἐν ὕπνοις ὁρᾶν δοκεῖν τὸν κόσμον ὠοειδῆ γενόμενον, καὶ ἐκ τούτου τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἐκκύπτοντα, καὶ τὸν ἥλιον ἐν μέσῳ τῶν ἄστρων ἐπιφαινόμενον, καὶ ἐπὶ τούτοις ἅρμα πυρὸς ἐπὶ τὸν οὐρανὸν ἀνιόν, καὶ ἄνδρα ἐπ' αὐτοῦ ἡνιοχοῦντα πτερωτὸν, στέφανον ἔχοντα, καὶ ἐπὶ τὸν ἥλιον ἐπειγόμενον· ἐπὶ δὲ τούτοις ἀετὸν ἐν τῷ ἀέρι ἐπιφανέντα, καὶ ἐν τῇ δεξιᾷ χειρὶ ἔχοντα ἀκάνθινον στέφανον, καὶ ἐν τῇ ἀριστερᾷ ἀστραπὴν καὶ βροντὴν ἐκπεμπόμενον· ἐκ δὲ τούτου τὸν Εὐριπίδην ἐκπεπληγμένον ἐπὶ τοῖς ὁραθεῖσιν ἐκ τοῦ ὕπνου ἐγερθῆναι.

goras; but seeing him persecuted for his Opinions, lastly converted himself to Tragic Poesy.

Socrates, Son of *Sophroniscus*, was, according to *Aristoxenus*, an Auditor of *Anaxagoras* till he left the City, and thereupon applied himself to *Archelaus*, which *Porphyrus* reckons above the 17th Year of his Age, or rather the 19th.

Democritus also is by some affirmed, being younger than *Anaxagoras* forty Years, to have applied himself to him; but *Laertius* [o] affirms he could not endure *Democritus*, and shunn'd his Conversation; *Phavorinus* likewise attests, that because he would not admit him, *Democritus* professed himself his Enemy, and denied his Opinion of the Sun and Moon, but said they were ancient, and that he stole them, as likewise his Description of the World, and the Assertion concerning the Mind.

Metrodorus of *Lampsacum* is likewise mentioned by *Laertius* [p] as Friend to *Anaxagoras*.

CHAP. V.

Of his Trial, Death, Sentences, and Writings.

OF his Trial, saith *Laertius* [q], there are several Reports. *Sotion*, in his Treatise of the Succession of Philosophers saith, he was accused by *Cleon* of Impiety, for asserting the Sun to be a burning Plate; but being defended by *Pericles* his Scholar, he was fined five Talents and banished.

Satyrus [r], that he was cited to the Court by *Thucydides*, who was of the contrary Faction of *Pericles*, accused not only of Impiety, but of holding Intelligence with the *Persians*, and in his Absence condemned to Death; when News was brought him at the same time, both of the Death of his Sons, which (according to *Ælian*) were two, all that he had, and his own Condemnation, of the latter, he said, Nature long since condemned both them and me to Death. Of his [s] Sons [t] (with a calm Look) [u] *You tell me nothing new or unexpected; I knew that I begat them mortal*, which some ascribe to *Solon*, others to *Xenophon*; *Demetrius Phalereus* saith, he buried them with his own Hands.

[w] *Hermippus*, he was imprisoned to be put to Death, but *Pericles* appearing before the Judges, asked if they knew any Thing in his Life that they could accuse? To which they answered nothing; but I, saith he, am his Disciple, then be not transported by *Calumnies* to kill the Man, but believe me and set him at Liberty; so he was dismissed; but not able to brook the Disgrace, he killed himself.

[x] *Hieronymus* saith, that *Pericles* brought him into the Court in poor Garments extenuated with Sickness, an Object fitter for Compassion than Justice. And thus much saith *Laertius* of his Trial.

Suidas, that he was cast into Prison by the *Athenians* for introducing a new Opinion concerning God, and banish'd the City, tho' *Pericles* undertook to plead his Cause, and that going to *Lampsacum*, he there starved himself to Death.

Josephus [y], that the *Athenians* believing the Sun to be God, which he affirmed to be without Sense and Knowledge, he was by the Votes of a few of them condemned to Death.

But if we credit *Plutarch* [z], he was neither condemned nor accused but by *Pericles*, who feared the Ordinance of *Diopithes*, which cited those which held prophane or sublime Opinions sent out of the City. [a] Yet elsewhere he confesseth he was accused.

His Departure from *Athens* being thirty Years after his coming thither, falls the third Year of the eighty second Olympiad, the sixty third of his Age. Thence he went to *Lampsacum*, where he continued the rest of his Age, which extended to 22 more, so little mindful of *Athens*, or of his Country, as to one, who told him that he was deprived of the *Athenians*; he answered no, but they of me; and [b] to his Friends, who, when he fell sick, asked if he would be carried to *Clazomenæ* his Country; no, said he, there is no Need, the Way to the Grave is alike every where. [c] Before he died, the Magistrates of the City asked him if he would they should do any Thing for him; he answered, that his only Request was, that the Boys might have Leave to play yearly on that Day of the Month whereon he died; which Custom (saith *Laertius*) [d] is continued to this Time. Those of *Lampsacum* buried him magnificently, with this Epitaph.

Here lies, who through the truest Paths did pass
O' th' World Celestial, Anaxagoras.

Ælian mentions two Altars erected to him; one inscribed to the Mind, the other to Truth. *Laertius* concludes his Life with this Epigram.

Fam'd Anaxagoras *the Sun defin'd*
A burning Plate, for which to die, design'd:
Sav'd by his Scholar Pericles; *but he*
[e] *Abandon'd Life to seek Philosophy.*

[f] He is observed never to have been seen either to laugh or smile.

[g] Being demanded if the Mountains of *Lampsacum* would in Time become Sea; he answered, Yes, if Time fail not first.

[h] Beholding the Tomb of *Mausolus*, he said, a sumptuous Monument was a Sign the Substance was turned into Stone.

o Laert. 2. 19. p Ibid. 2. 24. q Ibid. 2. 14. r Ibid. 2. 12. s Plut. consol. ad Apollon. t Simplic. in Epictet. u Val. Max. 5. 10. w Laert. 2. 55. x Ibid. 2. 14. y Adv. Appion. l. 2. z Vit. Pericl. a De superstit. b Cic. Tusc. quæst. 1. 43. c Plut. instruct. polit. d Laert. 2. 14. e Ælian. var. Hist. 5. 8. f Laert. 2. 10. g Ibid. h Ibid.

He [i] first affirmed the Poesy of *Homer* to consist of Virtue and Justice; to which *Metrodorus* added, that the Poet was skilful in natural Philosophy.

[k] He conceived that there were two Lessons of Death, the Time before our Birth, and Sleep.

Laertius [l] and *Clemens Alexandrinus* assert him first of the Philosophers that put forth a Book. He writ

Of natural Philosophy, out of which *Aristotle* cites the Fragments, *All these Things were together*; which was the Beginning of the Book; and, *to be such is to be changed.* [m] *Plato* this, *the Mind is the Disposer and Cause of all Things.* [n] *Athenæus* this, *what is commonly called the Milk of the Hen, is the White of the Egg.* *Plato* censures the Book as not using the Mind at all, nor assigning any Cause of the Order of Things, but Aerial, Æthereal, and Aquatick Natures, and the like incredible Things for Causes.

The Quadrature of the Circle; which Treatise, *Plutarch* [o] saith, he composed during his Imprisonment.

[p] There were three more of the same Name; the first an Orator, Follower of *Isocrates*: The second a Statuary, mentioned by *Antigonus*: The last a Grammarian, Scholar to *Zenodotus*.

i Laert. 2. 10. k Stob. Serm. 119. l Laert. 2. 11. Strom. 1. m Phoed. 1. n Athen. l. 2. Phoed. 1. o De Exil. p Laert. 2. 15.

ARCHELAUS.

Archelaus was either an *Athenian* or a *Milesian*; his Father *Apollodorus*, or according to some, *Mydon* [q]; he was Scholar to *Anaxagoras*, Master to *Socrates*. He first transferr'd Natural Philosophy out of *Ionia* to *Athens* (but how that can be, when *Anaxagoras* his Master taught there thirty Years, *Casaubon* justly questions) and therefore was called *the Natural Philosopher*: In him Natural Philosophy ended, *Socrates* his Scholar introducing Morality; but he seems also to have touched Moral Philosophy, for he treated of Laws, of Things honest and just; from whom *Socrates* receiving his Learning, because he increased it, is therefore thought to have invented it; whereas, as *Gassendus* [r] observes, Moral Philosophy was far more ancient, that being the principal Ground of the Attribute of *Wise* conferred upon the Seven, whose Learning lay chiefly that Way: But *Socrates* is called the Author thereof, because he first reduced it to a Science. *Archelaus* asserted,

That Principles of all Things are twofold, one incorporeal, [s] *the Mind, (not Maker of the World) the corporeal, infinite in Number, and* [t] *dissimilar, which is the Air, and its Rarefaction and Condensation, whereof one is Fire, the other Water.*

That the Universe is infinite.

That the Causes of Generation are two; Heat and Cold.

That the Stars are burning Iron Plates.

That the Sun is the greatest of Stars.

That the Sea is made by Percolation of the hollow Parts of the Earth.

That living Creatures are generated of Slime or warm Earth, emitting a milky Kind of Slime like the Chile; that this humid Matter being dissolved by the Fire, that of it which settles into a fiery Substance is Earth, that which evaporates is Air.

That [u] *the Winds getting into the hollow Places of the Earth, filling all the Spaces, the Air condensed as much as possible, the Wind that comes next presseth the first, forcing and disturbing it by frequent Impulsions. This Wind seeking a Room through the narrow Places, endeavoureth to break Prison, whereby it happens, the Wind struggling for Passage, that the Earth is moved.*

Of the Definition of the *Voice*, by *Plutarch* [w] attributed to *Anaxagoras*, *Laertius* [x] makes *Archelaus* the Author, describing it a Percussion of the Air.

That what is just or dishoneſt is defined by Law, not by Nature.

[y] These five, *Thales*, *Anaximander*, *Anaximenes*, *Anaxagoras*, *Archelaus*, by continual Descent succeeding one another, compleat the *Ionick* Sect.

q Laert. 2. 16. r Gassend. in lib. 10. Laert. s Stob. Ecl. phys. 1. t Plut. plac. phil. 1. 3. u Sen. nat. quæst. 6. 12. w Plut. de plac. phil. 1. 4. x Laert. 2. 16. y Plut. de plac. 1. Laert. Proem.

THE

THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY.

THE THIRD PART,

Containing the *Socratick* Philoſophers.

SOCRATES.

CHAP. I.

His Country, Parents, and Time of Birth.

Socrates was by Country an *Athenian*[a], born at *Alopece*, a Town, according to *Suidas* and *Phavorinus*, belonging to the *Antiochian* Tribe. This was one of thoſe ſmall Villages ſcattered thro' *Attica*, before *Theſeus* reduced the People within the Walls of a City, which notwithſtanding his Decree, were not deſerted, but continued and preſerved by their Inhabitants.

His Parents were very mean; [b] *Sophroniſcus* (an *Athenian*[c]) his Father, [d] a Statuary, or Carver of Images in Stone; *Phænareta*, his Mother, a Midwife, a Woman of a bold, generous and quick Spirit, as is implied by the Character [e] *Plato* gives her, (tho' wreſted by [f] *Athenæus*) of which Profeſſions of his Parents, he is [g] obſerved to have been ſo far from being aſhamed, that he often took Occaſion to mention them.

Apollodorus, *Laertius* and *Suidas* affirm he was born in the fourth Year of the ſeventy-ſeventh Olympiad; which may likewiſe be collected from the Marble at *Arundel Houſe*, which ſaith, *he died when* Laches *was Archon*, and reckons ſeventy Years of his Life, which was compleat, becauſe *Plato*[h] ſays πλείω ἑβδομηκόντα, and from [i] *Demetrius Phalereus* (who was himſelf Archon the fourth Year of the hundred and ſeventeenth Olympiad) who ſaith, *he died the firſt Year of the ninety-fifth Olympiad*, when he had lived ſeventy Years, the ſeventieth Year incluſively upwards, is the fourth of the ſeventy-ſeventh Olympiad, when *Apſephion*, (or, as ſome call him, *Aphepſion*) was Archon, of whoſe Name, in [k] *Diodorus Siculus*, no more is left than [l] φαίνΘ, which ſhould be ἀλεξίωνΘ, but hath been incurioufly alter'd into φαίδωνΘ, which if [m] *Meurſius* had obſerved, he had not corrected *Laertius* without Cauſe, nor he and *Allatius* followed the Miſtake of *Scaliger* (whom they term *Anonymus*) in placing *Aphepſion* in the fourth Year of the ſeventy-fourth Olympiad.

The Day of *Socrates*'s Birth was, [n] according to *Apollodorus*, the ſixth of the Month *Thargelion*, memorable (ſaith *Laertius*) for the Birth of *Diana*, according to the Traditions of the *Delians*, upon which Day the *Athenians* did yearly luſtrate their City. Many other good Fortunes happening to the *Athenians* upon this Day, are recorded by [o] *Ælian.*

a Laert. 2. 18. b Laert. ibid. Plat. Theæt. Alcib. 1. c Liban. d Laert. λιθοξόος. Val. Max. 3. 4. mamorarius. e Theætet. f Deipnoſ. g Liban. Apol. h Apolog. i Laert. ibid. k Lib. 11. l Archont. 2. 7. m Dialog. de ſcript. Socr. n Laert. 2. 44. o Var. hiſt. 2. 25.

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The Day following, *viz.* the ſeventh of this Month was the Birth-day of *Plato*, both which were kept with much Solemnity by the *Greek* Philoſophers ([p] even to the Time of *Plotinus*) as is affirmed by *Plutarch* [q], who thereupon obſerves it as the Effect rather of Providence than of Chance, that their Birth-days ſhould be ſo near, and that of the Maſter precede the Scholars.

To accommodate this Time with our Account, is neither eaſy nor certain, yet in reſpect it may give ſome Satisfaction by Way of Conjecture, we ſhall found it upon theſe Hypotheſes, taking that Order of Months which *Petavius* gives.

1. That after the Olympiads, the Beginning of the *Grecian* Year was always on the firſt of *Hecatombæon*, and Olympick Games on the fifteenth.

2. That the *Neomenia* of *Hecatombæon*, did (at leaſt in the Times wherein we enquire) never precede the Solſtice, being then about the Calends, or *pridie Calendarum Julii*, they ſuppoſing them in *octavis ſignorum*, it did not precede the ninth of *July*. This *poſtulatum*, tho' it be doubly queſtioned by *Petavius*, yet none of his Arguments pretend beyond *Meton*'s Time.

3. That upon that Suppoſition, if *Scaliger* hath rightly ordered the *Neomenia* in his Olympic Period (againſt which *Petavius* brings no one ſufficient Argument) and conſequently the reſt, the Olympic Period doth certainly exhibit the *Neomenia* of *Hecatombæon*. It is true, that *Petavius* diſputes the Period of ſeventy-ſix Years, as having never been uſed till *Calippus* his Time, but we take it here only proleptically, as the *Julian* Year, to which we would accommodate it.

4. That this being after *Solon*'s Time, the Civil Year was Lunary (and conſiſted of Months, which were alternately of twenty nine, and thirty Days) at *Athens*, tho' divers Places of *Greece*, eſpecially the more remote from thence, did not for a long Time after part with their tricenary Months.

Theſe things ſuppoſed the ſixth of *Thargelion*, will (according to the *Julian* Account, taken proleptically) fall upon *Tueſday* the twentieth of *May*; according to the *Gregorian*, upon *Tueſday* the thirtieth of *May*, in the Year of the *Julian* Period 4247, before the Incarnation 467 Years, the fourth Year of the ſeventy ſeventh Olympiad, at which Time *Socrates* was born.

CHAP. II.

His firſt Education.

PLutarch ſaith [r], that as ſoon as he was born, *Sophroniſcus* his Father conſulting the Oracle, was by it adviſed to ſuffer his Son to do what he pleaſed, never compelling him to do what he diſliked, nor diverting him from that whereto he was inclined; to give Thanks for him by Sacrifice to *Jupiter Agoræus* and the Muſes; to be no farther ſolicitous for him, he had one Guide of his Life within him, better than five hundred Maſters.

But his Father not obſervant of the Oracle's Direction, applied him to his own Trade of carving Statues, contrary to his Inclination, whereupon ſome [s] have argued him of Diſobedience, reporting that oftentimes, when his Father bad him work, he refuſed, and went away following his own Will.

His Father dying, left him (according to [t] *Libanius*) fourſcore Minæ, which being entruſted with a Friend for Improvement, they miſcarried. This Loſs (though it were of all his Stock, and he thereby reduced to incredible Poverty) *Socrates* paſſed over with Silence, but was thereupon neceſſitated to continue his Trade for ordinary Subſiſtence. This [u] *Suidas* intimates when he ſaith he was firſt a Statuary. [w] *Duris*, [x] *Pauſanias*, and the Scholiaſt of *Ariſtophanes* affirm three Statues of the Graces cloathed, (for ſo they were moſt anciently made, not naked) ſet up before the Entrance into the Tower at *Athens*, were his Work. *Pauſanias* implieth as much of a Statue of *Mercury* in the ſame Place; which [y] *Pliny* ſeems not to have underſtood, who ſaith, they were made by a certain Perſon named *Socrates*, but not the Painter. Hence *Timon*.

From theſe the fluent Statuary came,
Honour'd through Greece, who did againſt the Name
Of Orator abuſively declaim.

But being naturally averſe from this Profeſſion, he only followed it when Neceſſity enforced him: *Ariſtoxenus* ſaith [z], he wrought for Money, and laid up what he got till it came to a little Stock, which being ſpent, he betook himſelf again to the ſame Courſe.

Theſe Intermiſſions of his Trade were beſtowed upon Philoſophy, whereunto he was naturally addicted, which being obſerved by *Crito*, a rich Philoſopher of *Athens* [a] he took him from his Shop, being much in Love with his Candour and Ingenuity, and inſtructed, or rather gave him the Means to be inſtructed by others; taking ſo [b] much Care of him, that he never ſuffered him to want Neceſſaries. And tho' his Poverty were at firſt ſo great as to be brought by [c] ſome into a Proverb, yet he became at laſt, as [d] *Demetrius* affirms, Maſter of a Houſe and fourſcore *Minæ*, which *Crito* put out to Intereſt: But *his Mind* (ſaith [e] *Libanius*) *was raiſed far above*

p Porphyr. vit. q Sympoſ. 8. 1. r De Gen. Socr. s Porphyrius apud Theodor. de Græc. affect. cur. lib. 12. t Apol. Soc. u Laert. 2. 19. w Lib. 9. x In nub. y Nat. Hiſt. 37. 4. Laert. 2. 19. z Laert. 2. 20. a Laert. ibid. b Laert. vit. Crit. c Ælian. var. hiſt. 2. Plut. de util. virtut. d Plut. comparat. vit. Ariſtis. & Caton. e Apolog.

his

his Fortune, and more to the Advantage of his Country; not aiming at Wealth, or the Acquisition thereof by sordid Arts, he considered that of all Things which Man can call his, the Soul is the chief; that he only is truly happy, who purifies that from Vice; that the only Means conducing thereto is Wisdom, in Pursuit whereof he neglected all other Ways of Profit and Pleasure.

CHAP. III.

His Master.

THE first Master of *Socrates* was [f] *Anaxagoras*, whereby, amongst other Circumstances, it is demonstrable, that the Account of *Laertius* is corrupt, *Anaxagoras* not dying in the seventy-eighth, but eighty-eighth Olympiad.

Aristoxenus saith, that as soon as *Anaxagoras* left the City, he applied himself to [g] *Archelaus*, which, according to *Porphyrius*, was in the seventeenth Year of his Age. [h] Of him he was much beloved, and travelled with him to *Samos*, to *Pytho*, and to the *Isthmus*.

He was Scholar likewise to *Damon*, whom *Plato* calls a most pleasing Teacher of Musick, and all other Things that he would teach himself to young Men. *Damon* was Scholar to *Agathocles*, Master to *Pericles*, *Clinias* and others; intimate with *Prodicus*. He was banished by the unjust [i] *Ostracism* of the *Athenians* for his Excellence in Musick.

He heard also (as he acknowledgeth) *Prodicus* the Sophist, a *Cian*, whom *Eusebius* ranks in the eighty sixth Olympiad, contemporary with *Gorgias*, *Hippias*, and *Hippocrates* the Physician.

To these add *Diotyma* and *Aspasia*, Women excellently learned, the first supposed to have been inspired with a prophetical Spirit. By her he affirmed that he was instructed concerning Love, by corporeal Beauty to find out that of the Soul; of the Angelical Mind, of God. See *Plato*'s *Phædrus*, and that long Discourse in his *Symposium* upon this Subject, which *Socrates* confesseth to be owing to her.

Aspasia was a famous *Milesian* Woman, not only excellent herself in Rhetorick, but brought many Scholars to great Perfection in it, of whom were *Pericles* the *Athenian*, and ([l] as himself acknowledgeth) *Socrates*.

[m] Of *Euenus* he learned Poetry, of *Ichomachus*, Husbandry, of [n] *Theodorus* Geometry.

Aristagoras a *Melian* [o], is named likewise as his Master.

Last in his Catalogue is *Connus*, [p] *Nobilissimus fidicen*, as *Cicero* terms him, which Art *Socrates* learned of him in his [q] old Age, [r] for which the Boys derided *Connus*, and called him the old Man's Master.

CHAP. IV.

Of his School and Manner of Teaching.

THat *Socrates* had a proper School, may be argued from [s] *Aristophanes*, who derides some Particulars in it, and calls it his *Phrontisterium*.

[t] *Plato* and *Phædrus* mention as Places frequented by him and his Auditors, the *Academy Lycæum, and a pleasant Meadow without the City on the Side of the River* Ilissus, *where grew a very fair Plain-tree. Thence, according to the Fable,* Boreas *snatched away* Orithya, *to whom, three Furlongs from thence was a Temple, and another to* Diana.

[u] Xenophon *affirms, he was continually abroad, that in the Morning he visited the Places of publick Walking and Exercise; when it was full the* Forum; *and the rest of the Day he sought out the most populous Meetings, where he disputed openly for every one to hear that he would.*

He did not only teach, saith *Plutarch* [w], *when the Benches were prepared, and himself in the Chair, or in set Hours of Reading and Discourse, or Appointments of walking with his Friends, but even when he played, when he eat, or drank, when he was in the Camp or Market; finally, when he was in Prison; thus he made every Place a School of Virtue.*

His Manner of Teaching was answerable to his Opinion, that the Soul pre-existent to the Body, in her first separate Condition, endowed with perfect Knowledge, by Immersion into Matter, became stupified, and in a manner lost, until awakened by Discourse from sensible Objects; whereby, by Degrees, she recovers her first Knowledge; for this Reason, he taught only by *Irony* and *Induction*: The first [x] *Quintilian* defines, *an absolute Dissimulation of the Will more apparent than confest; so as in that, the Words are different, from the Words, in this the Sense from the Speech, whilst the whole Confirmation of the Cause, even the whole Life, seems to carry an* Irony, *such was the Life of* Socrates, *who was for that Reason called* εἴρων; *that is, one that personates an unlearned Man, and is an Admirer of others as wise.* [y] *In this* Irony (saith *Cicero*) *and Dissimulation he far exceeded all Men in Pleasantness and Urbanity; it is a very elegant, sweet and facete kind of Speech; acute with Gravity, accommodated with Rhetorick, Words, and pleasant Speeches;* [z] *he detracted from himself in Dispute, and attributed more to those he meant to confute, so, when he said or thought another Thing, he freely used that Dissimulation which the* Greeks *call* Irony; *which* Fannius *also saith, was in* Africanus.

f Laert. 2. 19. g Cic. Tusc. quæst. 5. h Laert. 2. 23. i Plut. in Pericl. k Plat. Men. l Plato Menex. m Maximus Tyr. Diss. 22. n Plat. Thæetet. o Schol. Aristoph. in Nub. p Epist. 9. 22. q Quintil. 1. 10. r Plat. Euthyd. s Nub. t Phædr. Epist. Socratic. u Memor. 1. w Utrum. sen. ger. vesp. x Lib. 9. cap. 2. y De Orat. 2. z Cicer. Acad. quæst. 4.

Induction

Induction is by [a] Cicero *defined a Manner of Discourse, which gains the Assent of him with whom it is held, to Things not doubtful, by which Assents it causeth that he yield to a doubtful Thing, by Reason of the Likeness it hath to those Things whereunto he assented: This Kind of Speech* Socrates *most used, because he would not himself use any Argument of Persuasion, but rather chose to work something out of that which he granted him with whom he disputed, which he, by Reason of that which he already yielded unto, must necessarily approve; of which he gives a large Example in* Plato's [b] Meno. Thus, *whosoever disputed with him, of what Subject soever,* ([c] his End being only to promote Virtue) *was at last brought round about to give an Account of his Life past and present, whereinto being once entered, he never gave him over till he had sufficiently examined those Things, and never let them go* ([d] Proteus *like*) *till they came at last to themselves.*

For this Reason [e] he used to say, his Skill had some Affinity with that of his Mother, he being like a Midwife, tho' barren (as he modestly affirms) in himself, endeavoured, with a particular Gift in assisting others, to bring forth what they had within themselves; [f] and this was one Reason why he refused to take Money, affirming that he knew nothing himself, and that [g] he was never Master to any.

These Disputes of *Socrates* were committed to writing by his Scholars, wherein [h] *Zenophon* gave Example to the rest, in doing it first, as also with most Punctualness, as *Plato* with most Liberty, intermixing so much of his own, as it is not easy to distinguish the Master from the Scholar; [i] whence *Socrates* hearing him recite his *Lysis*, said, how many Things doth this young Man feign of me? And [k] Xenophon *denying* Socrates *ever disputed of Heaven, or of natural Causes, or the other Disciplines which the* Greeks *call* μαθήματα, *saith, they, who ascribe such Dissertations to him, lye falsely, wherein* (as *A. Gellius* observes) *he intends* Plato, *in whose Books* Socrates *discourseth of Natural Philosophy, Musick, and Geometry.*

CHAP. V.

Of his Philosophy.

PO*rphyrius* (who was so abusive, as [l] *Nicephorus* observes, that he traduced *Socrates* with no less Bitterness, than, as if he endeavoured to out-do his Accusers, *Anytus* and *Melitus*) affirms; [m] *He was ingenious in nothing, unlearned in all, scarce able to write, which when upon any Occasion he did, it was to Derision, and that he could read no better than a stammering School-boy:* To which we shall oppose these Authorities: *Xenophon,* who attests he was excellent in all Kinds of Learning, instanceth in Arithmetick, Geometry, and Astrology; *Plato,* in Natural Philosophy; *Idomeneus,* in Rhetorick; *Laertius,* in Medicine: In a Word, *Cicero* [n] avers, *That by the Testimony of learned Men, and the Judgment of all* Greece, *as well in Wisdom, Acuteness, Politeness, and Subtilty, as in Eloquence, Variety, and Copiousness, to whatsoever Part he gave himself, he was, without Exception, Prince of all.*

Having searched into all Kinds of Science, he observed these Inconveniencies and Imperfections: First, [o] That it was improper to leave those Affairs which concern Mankind, to enquire into Things without us. Secondly, That these Things are above the Reach of Man, whence are occasioned all Disputes and Oppositions, some acknowledging no God, others worshipping Stocks and Stones; some asserting one simple Being, others infinite; some that all Things are moved, others, that all Things are immoveable. And thirdly, that these Things, if attained, could not be practised, for he who contemplating divine Mysteries, enquires by what Necessity Things were made, cannot himself make any Thing, or upon Occasion produce Winds, Water, Seasons, or the like.

Thus esteeming speculative Knowledge as far only as it conduceth to Practice, he cut off in all Sciences what he conceived of least Use.

[p] In *Arithmetick*, he approved only as much as was necessary. ([q] *Plato* instanceth in Merchandise and Tacticks) but to proceed to useless Operations he disallowed. In *Geometry* he allowed that Part which teacheth Measuring, as no less easy than useful; but to proceed to infinite Propositions and Demonstrations he disallowed, as wholly unprofitable. In *Astrology* he approved the Knowledge of the Stars, and Observation of the Night, Months and Seasons, as being easily learned, and very beneficial in Navigation, and to those who hunt by Night; but to examine the Difference of Spheres, Distance of Stars from the Earth, and their Circles, he dissuaded as useless.

[r] Finally, *Noting how little Advantage Speculation brought to the Life and Conversation of Mankind, he reduced her to Action. He first,* saith Cicero [s], *called Philosophy away from Things involved by Nature in Secrecy, wherein, until his Time, all Philosophers had been employed, and brought her to common Life, to enquire of Virtues and Vices, Good and Evil.*

Man, who was the sole Subject of his Philosophy, having a twofold Relation of divine Speculation, and human Conversation, his Doctrines were in the former Respect *Metaphysical*, in the latter *Moral.*

a De invent. 1. b Plat. Lach. c Liban. Apol. d Plat. Eutyph. e Plat. Theætet. Plutarch. quæst. Platon. 1. f Schol. Aristoph. in nub. p. 129. g Plat. Apol. h Laert. vit. Xenoph. i Laert. vit. Plut. k Epist. ad Æschin. l Histor. Eccles. 10. 36. m Theodoret. n De Orat. 3. 16. o Xen. mem. 1. pag. 710. p Xenoph. mem. 4. q De leg. r Laert. 2. 21. s Acad. quæst. 1.

Sect. 1. *Metaphyſicks.*

HIS Metaphyſical Opinions are thus collected and abridged out of *Plato* [t], *Xenophon*, *Plutarch*, and others.

Philoſophy is the Way to true Happineſs, the Offices whereof are two, to contemplate God, and to abſtract the Soul from corporeal Senſe.

There are three Principles [u] *of all Things*, God, Matter, *and* Ideas; God *is the univerſal Intellect*; Matter *the Subject of Generation and Corruption*; Idea, *an incorporeal Subſtance, the Intellect of God*; *God the Intellect of the World.*

God is one [w], τὸ ὂν αὐτὸ ἕκαστον ἕκαστον αὐτὸ τὸ καλὸν, αὐτὸ τὸ ζωῆς εἶδος; *perfect in himſelf, giving the Being, and Well-being of every Creature; what he is*, (ſaith he) *I know not, what he is not, I know.*

[x] *That God, not Chance, made the World and all Creatures, is demonſtrable from the reaſonable Diſpoſition of their Parts, as well for Uſe as Defence; from their Care to preſerve themſelves, and continue their Species, that he particularly regards Man in his Body, from the excellent Upright Form thereof, from the Gift of Speech, from Allowance* τὰς τῶν ἀφροδισίων ἡδονὰς συνεχῶς παρέχειν *in his Soul, from the Excellency thereof above others; in both for Divinations, predicting Dangers; that he regards Particulars; from his Care of the whole Species; that he will reward ſuch as pleaſe him, and puniſh ſuch as diſpleaſe him; from his Power to do it, from the Belief he hath imprinted in a Man, that he will do it; profeſt by the moſt wiſe and civilized Cities and Ages; that he at once ſeeth all Things, from the Inſtances of the Eye, which at once over-runs many Miles; and of the Mind, which at once conſidereth Things done in the moſt diſtant Places. Finally, that he is ſuch, and ſo great, that he at once ſees all, hears all, is every where, and orders all.* This is the Sum of his Diſcourſe with *Ariſtodemus*, to which we may annex what is cited under his Name (if not miſtaken) by *Stobæus*,

Care, if by Care ought may effected be;
If not, why car'ſt thou, when God cares for thee?

[y] He held, *That the Gods knew all Things, ſaid, done, or ſilently deſired.*

[z] *That God takes Care of all Creatures, is demonſtrable from the Benefits he gives them of Light, Water, and Fire, ſeaſonable Production of Fruits of the Earth, that he hath particular Care of Man, from the Nouriſhment of all Plants, and Creatures for Man's Service, from their Subjection to Man, tho' they excelled him never ſo much in Strength, from the Variety of Man's Senſe, accommodated to the Variety of Objects, for Neceſſity, Uſe, and Pleaſure; from Reaſon, whereby he diſcourſed through Reminiſcence, from ſenſible Objects; from Speech, whereby he communicates all that he knows, gives Laws, and governs States; that God, notwithſtanding he is inviſible, hath a Being, from the Inſtances of his Miniſters, inviſible alſo, as Thunder and Wind, from the Soul of Man, which hath ſomething with the divine Nature in governing thoſe that cannot ſee it.* This is the Effect of his Diſcourſe with *Euthidemus*.

The [a] *Soul is immortal, for what is always moveable is immortal; but that which moveth another, or is moved by another, hath a Ceſſation of Motion and Life.*

The Soul is pre-exiſtent to the Body, endued with Knowledge of eternal Ideas, which in her Union to the Body ſhe loſeth, as ſtupified, until awakened by Diſcourſe from ſenſible Objects. Thus is all her Learning only Reminiſcence, a Recovery of her firſt Knowledge.

The Body [b] *being compounded, is diſſolved by Death, the Soul being ſimple paſſeth into another Life, incapable of Corruption.*

The [c] *Souls of Men are divine, to whom, when they go out of the Body, the Way of their Return to Heaven is open, which to the beſt and moſt juſt is the moſt expedite.*

The [d] *Souls of the Good after Death, are in a happy Eſtate, united to God in a bleſſed inacceſſible Place; the bad, in convenient Places, ſuffer condign Puniſhment; but to define what thoſe Places are* [e], *is* hominis νῦν μὴ ἔχοντος; *whence being demanded what Things were in the other World, he anſwered, neither was I ever there, nor ever did I ſpeak with any that came from thence.*

Sect. 2. *Ethicks.*

HIS Morals conſider a Man either as a ſingle Perſon, or as the Father of a Family, or as a Member of the Common-wealth; In the firſt Reſpect are his Ethicks, wherein ſuch Sentences as have been preſerved by *Xenophon*, *Diogenes*, *Laertius*, *Stobæus*, and others, are thus collected.

Of Virtue and Vice.

'HE [f] exhorted his Friends to endeavour to be 'the moſt wiſe and beneficial, becauſe, what 'wants Reaſon, wants Reſpect, as the Bodies of 'dead Friends, and Hair, Nails, and the like, 'which are cut off and caſt away.

'To be [g] employed is good and beneficial; to be 'idle, hurtful and evil: They that do good are 'employed, they that ſpend their Time in vain 'Recreations, are idle.

t Plat. Phæd. u Plutarch plac. phil. 1. 3. w Plat. Phæd. x Xen. memor. 1. y Ibid. 1. p. 711. z Ibid. 4. a Schol. Ariſtoph. in nub. p. 128. b Plat. Phæd. c Cic. de amicit. d Plat. Phæd. e Stob. Eth. 262. f Xen. mem. 1. p. 720. g Ibid.

'He [h] that hath most Advantage by Gifts of 'Nature, as well as he that hath least, must learn 'and meditate on those Things wherein he would 'be excellent.

'He [i] only is idle who might be better employ-'ed.

'To [k] do good, is the best Course of Life, there-'in Fortune hath Share.

'They [l] are best, and best pleasing to God, 'who do any Thing, with any Art or Calling; 'who followeth none, is useless to the Publick, 'and hated of God.

[m] He taught every where, 'That a just Man 'and a happy were all one, and used to curse him 'who first by Opinion divided Honesty and Profit '(which are coherent by [n] Nature) as having done 'an impious Act, for they are truly wicked who 'separate profitable and just, which depends on 'Law.' The *Stoicks* have followed him so far, that whatsoever is honest, the same they esteem profitable.

He asked *Menon* [o] a *Thessalian*, who thought himself very learned, and that he had reached (as *Empedocles* saith) the Top of Wisdom, 'What is 'Virtue? He answered readily and boldly, that 'there is one Virtue of a Child, another of an old 'Man, one of a Man, another of a Woman, one 'of a Magistrate, another of a private Person, one 'of a Master, another of a Servant. Very good, 'replies *Socrates*; I ask for one Virtue, and you 'give us a whole Swarm; truly conceiving, that 'he knew not one Virtue, who named so many.

[p] Being demanded by *Gorgias*, 'If he account-'ed not the great King of *Persia* happy? I know 'not answered he, how he is furnished with Learn-'ing and Virtue:' As conceiving that true Happiness consisteth in these two, not in the frail Gifts of Fortune.

[q] *Euripides* in his *Auge* saying of Virtue; 'It 'is best carelesly to part with these;' he rose up and went away, saying, 'It was ridiculous to seek 'a lost Servant, or to suffer Virtue so to go away.

[r] He said, 'he wondered at those who carve Ima-'ges of Stone, that they take such Care to make 'Stones resemble Men, whilst they neglect and suf-'fer themselves to resemble Stones.

[s] 'He advised young Men to behold themselves 'every Day in a Glass, that if they were beautiful 'they might study to deserve it; if deformed, to 'supply or hide it by Learning.

He said, [t] 'To begin well is not a small Thing, but depending on a small Moment.

He said, 'Virtue was the Beauty, Vice the De-'formity of the Soul.

[u] He said, 'Outward Beauty was a Sign of in-'ward Beauty, and therefore chose such Auditors.

[w] 'In the Life of Man, as in an Image, every 'Part ought to be beautiful.

[x] 'Incense to God, Praise is due to good Men.

[y] 'Who are undeservedly accused ought to be 'defended; who excel others in any good Quality, 'to be praised.

[z] 'A Horse is not known to be good by his Fur-'niture, but Qualities; a Man by his Mind, not 'Wealth.

[a] 'It is not possible to cover Fire with a Gar-'ment, Sin with Time.

[b] Being demanded, *who live without Perturbation?* He answered, *They who are conscious to themselves of no Ill.*

[c] To one who demanded *what Nobility is?* He answered, *A good Temper of Soul and Body.*

Of Affections, Love, Envy, Grief, &c.

'THat [d] two Brothers God meant should be more 'helpful to each other than two Hands, Feet, 'Eyes, or whatsoever Nature hath formed; doubt-'less, because if they love they may at great Di-'stance mutually help one another, is the Scope of 'his Discourse with *Chærecrates*.

[e] 'That all Things are good and fair to those 'Things wherewith they agree, but ill and de-'formed in respect of those Things with which 'they agree not, is the Conclusion of his second 'Discourse with *Aristippus*.

[f] 'Envy is a Grief, not at the Adversity of 'Friends, nor the Prosperity of Enemies, but at 'the Prosperity of Friends; for many are so foolish-'ly inclined as to malign those in good Fortune, 'whom in Misfortune they pitied.

[g] 'A Ship ought not to trust to one Anchor, nor 'Life to one Hope.

[h] 'To ground Hopes on an ill Opinion, is to 'trust a Ship to a slight Anchor.

[i] 'The Beauty of Fame is blasted by Envy as 'by a Sickness.

[k] 'Many adorn the Tombs of those, whom 'living they persecuted with Envy.

[l] 'Envy is the Saw of the Soul.

[m] 'Nothing is pleasant or unpleasant by Nature, 'but by Custom.

[n] 'Unseasonable Love is like Hate.

[o] Being demanded, 'What is grievous to the 'Good,' he answered, 'The Prosperity of the 'Wicked.

[p] Being demanded, 'How a Man might live 'without Trouble,' he answered, 'It was not

h Xen. mem. 3. p. 778. i Ibid. p. 779. k Ibid. p. 78. de offic. 3. & de leg. 1. o Plut. de amicor. multit. p. 93. p Plut. de lib. educ. q Laert. 2. 33. r Ibid. s What παιχεὸν means, is explained by Aristotle, polit. 5. 3. & physic. 2. 4. t Clem. Alex. Strom. 5. u Nonn. in Greg. Stelieut. w Stob. Ech. serm. 1. x Stob. 1. y Ibid. z Ibid. a Ibid. 37. b Ibid. 46. c Ibid. 24. d Xen. mem. 2. e Ibid. 3. f Ibid. 3. g Stob. serm. 109. h Stob. 2. i Ibid. 23. k Ibid. l Ibid. 38. m Ibid. 20. n Ibid. o Ibid. 144. p Ibid. 109.

'possible but that he who lives in a City or a Family must sometimes be afflicted.

[q] 'Wicked Hopes, like ill Guides, deceive a 'Man, and lead him into Sin.

[r] 'A Woman cannot deceive without a Man, nor 'a good Hope produce any Benefit without Labour.

[s] 'Winter had need of Garments, old Age of Disengagement from Grief.

[t] 'In Life, as in a Theatre, we should continue 'so long as the Sight of Things, and Actions of 'Life seem delightful.

[u] 'The Mad should be bound, the Ignorant instructed.

[w] That 'we should endeavour to shun the Censorious, and to apply ourselves to such as are candid; that we should undertake only such Things 'as we can perform, and decline such as we cannot; that whensoever we undertake any thing, 'we should employ therein our utmost Study and 'Endeavour, is the sum of his Advice to *Eutherus*.

[x] He said, 'The Office of a wise Man is to discern what is good and honest, and to shun that 'which is dishonest.

[y] 'They who know what they ought to do, and 'do it not, are not wise and temperate, but Fools 'and stupid.

[z] Justice, and every other Virtue, is Wisdom.

[a] To be ignorant of ourselves, to seem to know 'those Things whereof we are ignorant, is next to 'Madness.

[b] 'That a pious Person is rightly defined, such 'a one as knows what is lawful as to the Gods, just, 'he that knows what is lawful to Men, that a Man 'is wise as far as he knows, that what is profitable 'is fair to that whereto it is profitable, that they 'who know how to use terrible Things, and dangerous, are valiant, the contrary timorous, is the 'Sum of his Discourse with *Euthidamus*.

[c] He conceived 'the only Wisdom of Man to 'consist in not thinking he understands those Things 'which he doth not understand.

[d] To one that complained he had not benefited himself by Travel, *And not without Reason*, saith he, *because thou didst not travel with thyself.*

[e] He affirmed 'There is but one good Thing, 'Knowledge; one ill, Ignorance; but that Riches 'and Nobility had nothing in them of Worth, but, 'on the contrary, all Evils.

[f] 'When a wise Man openeth his Mouth, his Virtues are as manifest as Images in a Temple.

[g] 'In Navigation we ought to be guided by the 'Pilot; in the Course of Life, by those of better 'Judgment.

[h] Being demanded what Wisdom was, he answered, *The Composure of the Soul.* Being demanded who were wise, *They*, said he, *who do not easily err.*

[i] 'The Soul's Reason augmenteth itself as in a 'Play; the wisest, not the richest, ought to bear 'the Prize.

[k] 'Fugitives fear, tho' not pursued; Fools, tho' 'not in Adversity, are troubled.

[l] Seeing a young Man rich, and unlearned, *Behold*, saith he, *a Golden Slave.*

The Luxurious is hardly cured in Sickness, the Fool in Adversity.

The Coward useth Arms against himself, the Fool Money.

Achilles Armour fits not *Thersites*, nor the good Habits of the Soul a Fool.

[m] 'Be not forward in Speech, for many Times 'the Tongue hath cut off the Head.

[n] 'In War, Steel is better than Gold; in Life, 'Wisdom excelleth Wealth.

Of Piety and Obedience.

[o] THat the 'greatest of Vices is Ingratitude; of 'Obligations, that to Parents; that a disobedient Son the Gods will not bless, nor Men 'love, as doubting his Return of either, knowing 'he doth it not where so much is due; is the Sum 'of his Discourse with *Apiles*.

[p] 'Our Prayers should be for Blessings in general, for God knows best what is good for us; our 'Offerings proportioned to our Abilities, for he considers Integrity, not Munificence.

[q] He said (with the *Pythian* Oracle) that 'the 'Gods are to be worshipped according to the Law 'of the City where a Man lives; they who do 'otherwise, he thought superstitious and vain.

[r] 'The best Way of worshipping God, is to do 'what he commands.

[s] 'Superstition is obedient to Pride, as its Parent.

[t] 'A harsh Father, like a severe Law, must notwithstanding be obeyed.

[u] 'The Reproof of a Father is a kind Remedy; 'it brings more Ease than Pain.

Of Fortitude and Imbecility.

[w] THat 'a Man ought to inure himself to voluntary Labour and Sufferance, so as what 'shall be imposed by Necessity, may appear in him 'not compulsive, but free; that soft Ways of living in Pleasures beget no good Constitution of 'Body, nor Knowledge of the Mind; that Tolerance raiseth us to high Attempts, is the Effect of 'his Discourse with *Aristippus*.

[x] To one who was fearful to go so far on Foot as *Olympia*, *he demonstrated* (to make the Journey

[q] Stob. 149. [r] Stob. ibid. [s] Stob. 216. [t] Stob. 120. [u] Xen. mem. 2. p. 719. [w] Xen. mem. 2. [x] Xen. mem. 3. [y] Xen. mem. 3. [z] Xen. mem. 3. [a] Xen. mem. 3. [b] Xen. mem. 4. [c] Plato Apol. [d] Senec. Epist. 28 & 104. [e] Laert. 2. 31. [f] Stob. 1. [g] Stob. 3. [h] Stob. ibid. [i] Stob. ibid. [k] Stob. 4. [l] Stob. 4. [m] Stob. 79. [n] Stob. 211. [o] Xen. mem. 2. [p] Xen. mem. 1. 722. 4. 804. [q] Xen. mem. 1. 722. [r] Xen. mem. 4. 803. [s] Stob. 22. [t] Stob. 78. [u] Stob. 81. [w] Xen. mem. [x] Xen. mem. 3.

ſeem eaſy) *that it was no more than his daily Walk within Doors, if extended at length, would eaſily reach.*

[y] One that complained he was weary of a Journey, ‘ He reproved him for being more weary than ‘ his Servant that followed him laden.

[z] He ſaid, ‘ Death reſembled either a deep Sleep, ‘ or a long Journey out of our Native Country, or ‘ an abſolute Annihilation of Soul and Body, examining all which, he affirmed, Death to be in ‘ none of thoſe reſpects evil. As to the firſt, ſaith ‘ *Plutarch*, it is not ill with thoſe that ſleep, and ‘ we eſteem that Sleep ſweeteſt which is deepeſt; ‘ and if we look on it as a Journey, it is rather a ‘ Bleſſing, for thereby we are freed from the Slavery and Affections of the Fleſh, which poſſeſs ‘ and infatuate the Mind: In the laſt Reſpect, it ‘ makes us inſenſible of Ill and Pain, as well as of ‘ Good and Pleaſure.

[a] ‘ A Statue ſtands firm on its Baſe, a virtuous ‘ Man on firm Reſolutions.

[b] ‘ Voluntary Labours are delighted with Aſſurance of Eaſe; Idleneſs, and tranſitory Pleaſures, ‘ beget neither a good Conſtitution of Body, nor ‘ any good Habit in the Soul.

[c] ‘ Being demanded, ‘ What is Strength? He ‘ anſwered, the Motion of the Soul with the Body.

[d] ‘ Seeing the Gates of *Corinth* ſtrongly barr'd, he asked, ‘ Dwell Women here?

[e] ‘ An honeſt Death is better than a diſhoneſt ‘ Life.

[f] He uſed to ſay, ‘ Liberty is Siſter to Sloth; inſtancing in the *Indians* and *Perſians*, both lazy; ‘ the *Phrygians* and *Lydians* very induſtrious, as being under Servitude.

Of Temperance, Continence, and Contentedneſs.

[g] HE adviſed *to ſhun all Occaſions of Incontinence, affirming that ſuch as converſed much with fair Women could not eaſily be continent.*

[h] That *the Sight and Kiſſes of the Fair infuſe a Poiſon more dangerous than that of Scorpions and Spiders, is the Sum of his Diſcourſe to* Xenophon *and* Critobalus.

[i] That *a free Man ought not to entertain a Servant addicted to Pleaſures; that he which is a Slave to Pleaſures, ſhould pray to the Gods for better Maſters, is the Concluſion of his Diſcourſe* de continentia.

[k] That *Happineſs conſiſts not in Luxury and Pride; that to want nothing is divine; to want the leaſt, next to divine, is the Concluſion of his Diſcourſe with* Antipho.

[l] *He adviſed ſuch as could not eaſily abſtain at Feaſts, to take heed of ſuch Things as perſuade thoſe that are not hungry to eat, and thoſe that are not thirſty to drink, for they deſtroyed the Appetite, the Head, and the Soul.* He uſed to ſay merrily, Circe *turned Men into Swine, by feaſting them with ſuch Meats; but that* Ulyſſes, *partly through* Minerva's *Advice, partly through his own Temperance, refraining from ſuch Things, remained unchanged.*

[m] That *Health of Body ought diligently to be preſerved, as that whereon all Knowledge of the Soul depends, is the Sum of his Diſcourſe with* Epigenes.

[n] He adviſed one that complained he had no Delight in his Meat, *to refrain from Eating, whereby his Diet would become more pleaſant, cheap, and wholeſome.*

[o] In the Word ἐναχεῖσθαι (*to feaſt*) the Particle ἐν implies, that we ſhould eat only ſuch Things as will not hurt the Mind nor the Body, and are eaſy to be gotten.

[p] ‘ That only temperate Perſons, that diſcern and ‘ chooſe the beſt Things, refraining from the worſt; ‘ that by Temperance Men become the moſt excellent, and moſt happy, fitteſt for Diſcourſe; is ‘ the Sum of his Diſcourſe with *Euthidemus.*

Hearing one of his Friends ſay, [q] ‘ this Town is ‘ exceeding dear, Chiar Wine coſts a Mina, Purple ‘ three, a Pint of Honey five Denaries, he carried ‘ him to the Mealmen; Here, ſaith he, a Pint is ‘ ſold for an Obolus; it is cheap living in this Town. ‘ Then to thoſe that ſold Olives, a Chœnix two ‘ Farthings; thence to the Frippery, a Suit ten ‘ Drachms; Things are cheap in this Town.

[r] ‘ He ſaid, the Hungry wanted no Sauce, the ‘ Thirſty no choice of Wines.

[s] He commended Quiet and Leiſure above all ‘ Things.

[t] ‘ He ſaid, they who buy early Fruits at dear ‘ Rates, believe they will not come in their due ‘ Seaſon.

[u] Being asked what was a young Man's Virtue, he anſwered, to do nothing too much.

[w] Seeing one eat Broth very greedily, he ſaid, ‘ Which of you here preſent uſeth Bread for Broth, ‘ and Broth for Bread?' Of which, ſee more at large, *Xenophon* his *Memorab. Lib.*

[x] One ſaying, That it was a great Matter to abſtain from what a Man deſires, he anſwered, ‘ But ‘ it is much a greater not to deſire at all.

[y] ‘ A clear Fire becomes the Chimney, Serenity ‘ the Mind.

[z] He ſaid, ‘ We ought not to ſeek Pleaſures in ‘ others, but in ourſelves, the Body being prediſpoſed according as it ought.

y Xen. mem. 3. z Plut. conſol. ad Apollon. a Stob. 1. & 296. b Stob. 7. c Stob. 39. d Stob. 155. e Stob. ibid. f Ælian. var. Hiſt. 10. 14. g Xen. mem. 1. h Xen. mem. 1. i Xen. mem. 1. k Xen. mem. 1. l Xen. mem. 3. m Xen. mem. 3. n Xen. mem. 3. o Xen. mem. 3. p Xen. mem. 4. q Plut. de anim. tranquil. r Laert. 2. 27. s Laert. ibid. t Laert. ibid. u Laert. ibid. w Laert. ibid. x Ælian. var. Hiſt. 9. 29. y Stob. 3. z Stob. 5.

[a] He said, It is the Property of God to need nothing; to need least, nigheſt to God.

[b] Being demanded from what Things we ought to refrain moſt, he anſwered, 'From ſordid unjuſt 'Pleaſures.

[c] 'Contentedneſs is like a ſhort and pleaſant Way, 'it hath much Delight, little Toil.

[d] 'He that would ſee Virtue as his Country, muſt 'paſs by Pleaſures, as *Syrens*.

[e] Being demanded whom he thought richeſt, he anſwered, 'Him who is contented with leaſt; for 'Content is the Riches of Nature.

[f] Being demanded what Continence is, he anſwered, 'Government of Corporeal Pleaſures.

[g] He ſaid, 'The Wicked live to eat, but the 'Good eat to live.

[h] 'When a Woman ſaith ſhe loveth thee, take 'heed of thoſe Words more than when ſhe revileth 'thee.

Of Liberality, Prodigality, and Covetouſneſs.

[i] *He conceived, that they who took Money of any, owned them for their Maſters in the meaneſt Degree of Servitude.*

[k] *That Wiſdom is proſtituted as well as Beauty, by taking Money for it; that he who meets with an ingenious Perſon, ought to acquaint him with all the Good he can, gratis, whereby he acquires a Friend, and doth the Part of a good Member of a Commonwealth; is the Sum of this ſecond Diſcourſe with* Antipho.

[l] *He ſaid, If a rich Man be proud of his Wealth, that he could not praiſe him till he knew how he would employ it.*

[m] *None can ſafely manage a Horſe without a Bitt, nor Riches without Reaſon.*

[n] *He compared covetous Perſons to Birds, one devoureth whatever it meets till it choaks itſelf, the reſt falling upon what the firſt left, are one after another choaked alſo.*

[o] *The Wealth of covetous Perſons is like the Sun after he is ſet, delights none.*

[p] *He that gives to a rich Man, throws Water into the Sea.*

[q] *The Life of a covetous Perſon is like the Feaſts made for the Dead, he hath all, but enjoys nothing.*

[r] *He compared the Wealth of Prodigals to Fig-Trees growing on a Precipice: for theſe none are the better, but Kites and Crows; for thoſe only Harlots and Flatterers.*

[s] *Being demanded who were covetous, he anſwered, Such as ſeek after ſordid Gain, and neglect their neceſſary Friends.*

[t] *Wine changeth with the Veſſel, Riches follow the Manners of the Owner.*

Of Magnanimity and Pride.

[u] *TO one angry for having ſaluted a Man that returned not his Salutation; it is ridiculous, ſaith he, if you are not angry with every one you meet of worſe Shape or Form than yourſelf, to be angry with any for having leſs Manners.*

[w] *Pride, like an ill Potter, or Statuary, repreſents the Forms of Things inverted.*

[x] *Wind puffs up empty Bladders, Opinion Fools.*

[y] *To be exalted with good Fortune, is to run in a ſlippery Way.*

Of Patience.

[z] 'THere is leſs Danger in drinking intemperate-'ly of troubled Water, than with a troubled 'Mind full of Wrath, before it be allayed and pu-'rified, to ſatisfy thy Anger in the Puniſhment of 'a Kinſman or Countryman.

[a] 'If every one ſhould bring his Misfortunes into 'the publick Stock, to be ſhared alike amongſt all 'Men, the greater Part of thoſe that now complain 'ſo much, would be contented and glad to keep 'their own.

[b] 'It is all one if a Man being overcome in any 'Gymnick Sports ſhould ſue his Adverſary, as for 'a Man overmaſter'd by Fortune to accuſe her; 'not knowing upon what Conditions we entered 'into the Conteſts of Life.

Of Veracity and Flattery.

[c] 'THere is no better Way to Glory than to en-'deavour to be good, as well as to ſeem ſuch.

[d] 'The Kindneſs of Flatterers is chaſed away by 'Adverſity.

[e] 'Hunters take Hares with Hounds, many take 'Fools with their own Praiſes.

[f] 'Wolves reſemble Dogs, and Flatterers Friends, 'but their Aims are quite contrary.

[g] 'Flattery is like a painted Armour, only for 'Shew, not Uſe.

[h] 'Think not thoſe faithful who praiſe all thy 'Words and Actions, but thoſe who reprove thy 'Faults.

[i] 'Suffer not a Talker and Slanderer, for he tells 'not thee any Thing out of Good-will; but as he 'diſcourſeth the Secrets of others, ſo will he thine 'to others.

[k] 'Good Men muſt let the World ſee that their 'Manners are more firm than an Oath.

a Stob. ibid. b Stob. ibid. c Stob. ibid. d Stob. ibid. e Stob. 32. f Stob. 64. g Stob. ibid. h Stob. 67. i Xen. mem. 1. k Xen. mem. 1. l D. Baſil. hom. 24. de legand. lib. gentil. m Stob. 3. n Stob. 17. o Stob. 41. p Stob. 42. q Stob. 58. r Stob. 17. s Stob. 140. t ibid. u Xen. mem. 3. w Stob. 22. x Stob. ibid. y Stob. 147. z Plut. de his qui ſero à num. vind. a Plut. de conſol. ad Apollon. b Stob. 108. c Xen. mem. 1. d Stob. 14. e Stob. ibid. f Stob. ibid. g Stob. ibid. h Stob. ibid. i Stob. 53. k Stob. 85.

Of

Of Urbanity and Converſation.

l ‘A Little Hall will ſerve to dance in, and every ‘Place and Poſture to ſpeak.

m ‘Wind kindles Fire, Converſation Love.

n ‘Freedom of Diſcourſe, like the Seaſons of the ‘Year, is beſt in its proper Time.

o It is Arrogance to ſpeak all, and to be unwil- ‘ling to hear any Thing.

p ‘Converſe at Diſtance, and ſoftly, with thoſe ‘that are in Authority.

Of Juſtice.

q ‘THat the Gods preſcribe juſt Things by Law, ‘and that Juſt and Lawful is to them the ‘ſame Thing, is the Sum of his Diſcourſe with ‘*Hippias*.

r ‘They who convert Goods ill gotten to good ‘Uſes in a Common-wealth, do like thoſe who ‘make religious Uſe of Sacrilege.

Of Friendſhip.

s ‘THat a diſcreet virtuous Friend is of all Poſ- ‘ſeſſions the moſt fertile, and ought chiefly ‘to be regarded, is the Scope of his Diſcourſe, *de* ‘*amicitia*.

t ‘That every Man ſhould examine himſelf, of ‘what Value he is to his Friend, and endeavour to ‘be of the moſt Worth he can to him, is the Ef- ‘fect of his Diſcourſe with *Antiſthenes*.

u ‘That wicked Men cannot be Friends, either ‘amongſt themſelves, or with the Good: That the ‘Way to procure Friends is firſt, to endeavour to ‘be good, wherein he would ſeem good: That all ‘Virtues may be augmented by Study and Learn- ‘ing, is the Scope of his Diſcourſe with *Critobulus*.

w ‘That we ought, to our utmoſt Abilities, to ‘relieve the Neceſſities of our Friends, is the Effect ‘of his Diſcourſe with *Ariſtarchus*.

x ‘He ſaid, he had rather have *Darius* to his ‘Friend, than his *Daries*, a Coin ſo named from ‘him.

y ‘He wondered that every Man kept an Inven- ‘tory of his Goods, none of his Friends.

z ‘They who violate Friendſhip, though they ‘eſcape the Puniſhment of their Friends, ſhall not ‘eſcape the Vengeance of God.

a ‘They who forſake their own Brethren, to ſeek ‘out other Friends, are like thoſe who let their own ‘Grounds lie fallow, to till another's.

b ‘Fear not a Friend in Adverſity.

c ‘We eſteem not that Corn beſt which grows ‘on the faireſt Ground, but that which nouriſheth ‘beſt; nor him a good Perſon or Friend who is of ‘higheſt Birth, but moſt noble in Qualities.

d ‘Phyſicians muſt relieve the Sick, Friends the ‘Afflicted.

e ‘It is pleaſant to grow old with a good Friend ‘and ſound Senſe.

Sect. 3. *Oeconomicks.*

IN the ſecond reſpect are his Oeconomicks, which he learned of *Iſchomachus*, by *Xenophon* expreſly delivered in a Treatiſe upon that Subject, to which add theſe few Sentences.

f ‘So contrive the Building of your Houſe, as ‘that thoſe Parts which are towards the South may ‘be higheſt, that the Winter Sun be not excluded; ‘thoſe toward the North loweſt, that they may be ‘leſs ſubject to the Wind. In fine, ſo order it, ‘that a Man may live in every Quarter thereof ‘with moſt Delight and Safety. Pictures and Co- ‘lours take away more Pleaſantneſs than they af- ‘ford.

g ‘To one who beat his Servant for being glut- tonous, covetous, and idle, he ſaid, *Did you at any Time conſider whether you deſerve not more to be beaten yourſelf?*

h ‘To one that asked his Advice about taking a Wife, *Whether you do or not*, ſaith he, *you will re- pent it.*

i ‘To others that asked his Opinion concerning ‘Marriage, he ſaid, *As Fiſhes in a Net would fain get out, and thoſe without would get in, take heed, young Men, it be not ſo with you.*

k *Men muſt obey the Laws of their Country, Wives their Husbands.*

Sect. 4. *Politicks.*

IN the third Reſpect are his Politicks, which *Heſychius Illuſtrius* makes to be the ſame which *Plato* hath delivered under this Name, where you may have them, though diſguiſed with the Language and Additions of *Plato*, to which may be annexed thoſe Sentences of his in that kind out of *Xenophon*, *Stobæus*, and others.

m ‘They who cannot, upon Occaſion, be uſeful ‘either to an Army, a City, or a Commonwealth, ‘yet have Confidence of themſelves, ought, though ‘never ſo rich, to be under Reſtraint.

n ‘*Antipho* demanding how he might make others ‘skilful in Politicks, whilſt himſelf meddled not ‘therein, although he knew that he could manage ‘them, which Way, ſaith he? *Antipho*, I do moſt ‘act the Buſineſs of the Commonwealth, if I prac-

l Plut. de ſanit. tuend. m Stob. 6. n Stob. 49. o Stob. 95. p Stob. 170. q Xen. mem. 2. r Stob. 10. s Xen. mem. 2. t Xen. mem. 2. u Xen. mem. 2. w Xen. mem. 2. x Plut. de frat. amore. y Laert. 2. 30. z Stob. 135. a Stob. ibid. b Stob. ibid. c Stob. 84. d Stob. 112. e Stob. 150. f Xen. mem. 3. g Xen. mem. 3. p. 7. 88. ſee more there, Laert. 2. 33. h Stob. 124. i Stob. ibid. k Stob. 72. l Heſych. Plat. m Xen. mem. 1. n Xen. mem. 1.

‘tiſe

'tise it only, or if I endeavour to make many able 'to act therein.

o 'That Place is fittest for Temples and Altars 'which is most open, and yet retired; for it is fit-'ting that they who pray, see; and no less fitting 'that they come thither pure.

p 'They are not Kings who are in Possession of 'a Throne, or come unjustly by it, but they who 'know how to govern.

q 'A King is a Ruler of willing Subjects accord-'ing to the Laws, a Tyrant is a Ruler of Subjects 'against their Will, not according to the Laws, 'but arbitrary; an Aristocracy is that Government 'wherein the Magistrates are.

r 'The Offices of a good Citizen are, in Peace, 'to enrich the Common-wealth, in War, to sub-'due the Enemies thereof, in Embassy to make 'Friends of Foes, in Sedition to appease the People 'by Eloquence.

s 'Of common People he said, they were as if 'a Man should except against one Piece of bad 'Money, and accept a great Sum of the same.

t He said, 'The Law was not made for the 'Good.

v 'Deserving Persons ought to be Sharers in the 'good Fortunes of the Common-wealth.

w 'Being demanded *What City is strongest?* he said, *that which hath good Men.*

x Being demanded, *What City is best ordered?* he said, *that wherein the Magistrates friendly agree.*

y Being demanded, *What City was best?* he said, *that wherein are proposed most Rewards of Virtue.*

z Being demanded, *What City lives best?* he said, *that which liveth according to Law, and punisheth the Unjust.*

CHAP. VI.

Of his Dæmon.

THat *Socrates* had an Attendant Spirit (meant, as *Plutarch* conceives by the [a] Oracles Answer to his Father) which diverted him from Dangers, is impugned by *Athenæus*, not without much Prejudice, which the Bitterness of the Discourse betrays. Souls that are not candid, and think ill of the best, saith *Origen*, never refrain from Calumny, seeing that they mock even the Genius of *Socrates* as a feigned Thing. On the contrary, we have the Testimony of *Plato*, *Xenophon* and [b] *Antisthenes* contemporary with him, confirmed by *Laertius*, *Plutarch*, *Maximus Tyrius*, *Dion Chrysostomus*, *Cicero*, *Apuleius*; [c] by Fathers, *Tertullian*, *Origen*, *Clemens Alexandrinus* and others, whereof a great many Instances (as *Cicero* saith) were collected by *Antipater*: These only preserved by other Authors.

[d] 'Theocritus going to consult *Euthyphron*, a 'Sooth-sayer, found him with much Company 'walking in the Streets, amongst whom were *Simi-'us* and *Socrates*, who was very busy, asking him 'many Questions. In the midst of his Discourse 'he made a sudden Stop, and after some Pause, 'turned back and went down another Street, cal-'ling out to the rest of the Company to return and 'follow him, as being warned by the *Dæmon*. 'The greater Part did so, the rest went forward, 'on Purpose to confute the *Dæmon*, and drew a-'long with them one *Charillus* that played on the 'Flute; but in the Way, which was so narrow 'as not to give them room to pass by, they were 'met, and overturned in the Dirt by a great Herd 'of Swine; by Repetition of which Accident, '*Charillus* often afterwards defended the *Dæmon*.

Nor did the Advice of this Spiritual Attendant only respect the Good of *Socrates*, but extended to such Friends as conversed with him, whereof himself gives these Instances.

[e] 'Charmides Son of *Glauco*, going to exercise 'in the *Nemean* Race, as he was discoursing with 'Socrates, was by him, upon Notice of the Voice, 'dissuaded from going, to which he answered, that 'perhaps the Voice meant that he should not get 'the Victory, but, *saith he*, however, I shall ad-'vantage myself by exercising at this Time; which 'said, he went to the Games, where he met with 'some Accident, which tho' it be not related, is 'acknowledged to have justified the Counsel given 'him by the *Dæmon*.

[f] Timarchus *and* Philemon *Son of* Philemonides, *having plotted together to murther* Nicias, *Son of* Heroscamander, *were at the same time drinking with* Socrates. Timarchus, *with Intention to execute what they had determined, offered to rise from the Table, saying to* Socrates, *well* Socrates, *drink you on, I will but step a little Way and return immediately. Rise not, said* Socrates, *(hearing the Dæmon as soon as he spake) for the Dæmon hath given me the accustomed Sign; whereupon he sate still, presently after he offered again to be gone;* Socrates *hearing the Voice, with-held him. At last, as* Socrates *was diverted by something, and did not mind him, he stole away and committed the Murder, for which being brought to Execution, his last Words to his Brother* Clitomachus *were, that he was come to that untimely End for not obeying* Socrates. [g] *Another time, seeing his Friend* Crito's *Eye tied up, he asked him the Reason, who answering, that as he walk'd in the Field, one pulling a Bough, it gave a Jerk back, and hit him in the Eye; then you did not take my Advice, replies* Socrates, *for I call'd you back, making Use, as I have accustomed, of divine Presage.*

That it had likewise a great Influence upon the

o Xen. mem. 3. p Ibid. 3. 779. q Ibid. 4. 813. r Ibid. 4. s Laert. 2. 33. t Clem. Alex. Strom. 3. u Stob. 41. w Stob. 41. x Ibid. y Ibid. z Ibid. a De Gen. Socr. b Apud Athenæum. c De divinat. lib. 1. d Plut. de Gen. Socr. e Plato. Theag. Ælian. var. hist. 8. 1. f Plat. Theag. g Cic. de Divinat. 1. 54.

Souls

Souls of those who conversed with him, and lived with him, [h] he alledgeth as Examples *Aristides* Son of *Lysimachus*, and *Thucydides* Son of *Melissus*. The first leaving *Socrates* to go to the Wars, lost, with his Company, the Habit of Learning, which he acknowledged to have gained, not by any verbal Instructions, of which he had none from him, but by being near him, seeing him, and sitting in the same Room with him. The second as easily, by the same Means attained the same Habit.

And not only to particular Persons, but to general Affairs did these Predictions extend: He foretold some Friends the Defeat of the *Athenian* Army in *Sicily*, as is attested by *Plutarch*, and mentioned by himself in *Plato*, where he gives another fair Example, or rather Trial of the Truth of the *Dæmon*'s Predictions, speaking of a Business whereof the Event was at that Time doubtful: [i] *You will hear*, saith he, *from many in* Sicily, *to whom it is known what I foretold concerning the Destruction of the Army, and we may now have an Experiment if the* Dæmon *speak true.* Sannion, *Son of* Calus, *is gone in an Expedition, the Sign came to me: He goes with* Thrasylus *to War against* Ephesus *and* Ionia: *My Opinion is, that he will either be slain, or at least in much Danger, I greatly fear the whole Design.* These are his Words in *Plato*, delivered before the Event of that Action, which fell out according to his Prediction; [k] for *Thrasilus* was repulsed and beaten by the *Ephesians*, the *Athenians* put to flight with the Loss of four hundred Men; of which Victory the *Ephesians* erected two Trophies: This was in the one and twentieth Year of the *Peloponnesian* War.

We have alledged the universal Consent of Authors, that *Socrates* had such a spiritual Attendant; yet is there some Disagreement concerning the Name, more concerning the Nature of it.

It is commonly named his *Dæmon*, by which Title he himself owned it. *Plato sometimes* calls it his Guardian, *Apuleius* his God, *because* (saith St. *Augustine* [l]) *the Name of* Dæmon *at last grew odious.* But we must observe, that he did not account it a God, but sent from God, and in that Sense affirmed the Signs to come from God, to wit, by the Mediation of this Spirit. This, besides other Places, we may argue from his first Epistle, where he speaks of the Sign itself; he useth the Word *Dæmon*, when of the Advice, whereof that Sign was the Instrument, he names God. Thus are we to understand these, and all other Places of the same Nature in *Plato*, where *Socrates* speaking of the *Dæmon* saith, *if it please God, you shall learn much, and the Sign from God did not offer to stay me.*

As for the Sign or Manner of the Prediction, some affirm [m] it was *by sneezing, either of himself or others; if any chanced to sneeze standing before him, behind him, or on his Right Hand, he went immediately about that which he intended; if on the Left Hand, he refrained or desisted; if he sneezed himself before the Enterprize, it was applausive, if in the Action, dissuasive.* There needs not much Argument to prove this Opinion. If this Sternutation proceeded either from Chance, or his natural Constitution, it could not have that provident supernatural Effect; if it proceeded from some more excellent outward Cause, we recur to the Genius.

Others confine this Prescience within the Soul of *Socrates* himself, that he said, *his Genius advised him*, they interpret it, as we usually say, *his Mind gave him, or so inclined him.* In this Sense indeed *Dæmon* is not seldom taken; but this is inconsistent with the Description which *Socrates* gives of a Voice and Signs *ab exteriore*, besides this Knowledge is not above Human Nature.

Plutarch having exploded the Opinion of *Terpsion* concerning sneezing, conjectured first, that it might be some Apparition; but at last concludes, that it was his Observation of some inarticulate unaccustomed Sound, (or Voice) conveyed to him by some extraordinary Way, as we see in Dreams. This avoids not the Inconvenience of the former; if *Socrates* did first of himself interpret this Sound, it is the same with the last Opinion, that his Soul had a prophetick Inspiration, if by any Help it will come at last to the Genius.

Some conceive it to be one of those Spirits which have a particular Care of Men; which *Maximus Tyrius*, and *Apuleius* describe in such Manner, that they want only the Name of a good Angel.

But there want not those who give it that Appellation: [n] *Lactantius* having proved that God sends Angels to guard Mankind, adds, *and* Socrates *affirmed that there was a* Dæmon *constantly near him, which kept him Company from a Child, by whose Beck and Instruction he guided his Life. Eusebius*, upon these Words of the Psalmist, [o] *He hath given his Angels charge over thee, that they should keep thee in all thy Ways. We learn out of Scripture* (saith he) *that every Man hath a Guardian appointed him from above*; *and* Plato *doubteth not to write in this Manner: All Souls having chosen a Condition of Living, they proceed in order thereto, being moved by the* Dæmon, *which is proper to every one, and is sent along with them to preserve them in this Life, and to perfect those Things whereof they have made Choice.* And immediately after; *You may believe*, saith he, *that* Socrates *meant this, when he often affirmed that he was governed by a* Dæmon. More plainly [p] *Eugubinus, the* Dæmon *of* Socrates, saith he, *mentioned so often by* Plato *(seeing that* Socrates *was a good Man, and exhorted all Men to Virtue, and by the* Dæmon *was always excited to that which was good) may perhaps not unjustly be thought his*

h Plat. Theag. i Ibid. k Xenoph. hist. Græc. 1. l De civ. Dei. 8. 15. m Plut. de gen. Socr. n De Orig. error. 2. 15. o In Psalm. 91. p De perenn. philo. 1. 8.

Angel,

Angel, as that which appeared to Balaam *the Prophet, and diverted him from his Wickedneſs.* [q] But *Ficinus* expreſly; *if you are not pleaſed,* ſaith he, ſpeaking of this Spirit, *to call the familiar Guide of a Man his Spirit, call it if you pleaſe, his good Angel.*

The chiefeſt Argument of [r] *Collius*, who oppoſeth this Opinion, and endeavours to prove it was an evil Spirit is, that the *Dæmon* never diſſuaded or diverted from Vice, but only from outward Danger, whereas the contrary is evident enough from the foregoing Story of *Timarchus* and *Philemon.*

True it is, that the Advice of the *Dæmon* was always diſſuaſive, *never,* [s] as *Cicero* ſaith, *impulſive, often coercive. Apuleius* flatters *Socrates* with this Reaſon; *Socrates,* ſaith he, *as being a Man abſolute and perfect of himſelf, ready in all Offices that concerned him, never needed any Exhorter, but ſometimes a Prohibiter, if it happened there were any Danger in that which he went about, that being forewarned he might take Heed, and decline the Undertaking for that Time; which afterwards he might reaſſume, or attempt ſome other Way.*

CHAP. VIII.

His Military Actions.

IT [t] is obſerved by many, that *Socrates* little affected Travel, his Life being wholly ſpent at home, ſaving when he went out in Military Service.

[u] In the ſecond Year of the eighty-ſixth Olympiad broke forth a War, the greateſt that ever happened amongſt the *Grecians*, betwixt the *Lacedemonians* and the *Athenians*, the Occaſions and Pretexts of it ariſing from the Controverſies of the *Athenians* with the *Corinthians*, concerning *Corcyra* and *Potydæa*, both which being revolted from the *Athenians*, to whom they had been tributary, fought for Aid from the *Lacedemonians*, who ſent Forces to the Relief of *Potydæa.*

In this War was *Socrates* thrice perſonally engaged; firſt at the Siege of *Potydæa*, in the ſecond Year of the eighty-ſixth Olympiad, againſt which the *Athenians* ſent one thouſand ſix hundred choice Men of Arms, under the Conduct of *Phormio*, who beſieged it from the Sea by his Galleys, and on the Land-ſide by a Wall: Amongſt theſe were *Socrates* and *Alcibiades: Laertius* ſaith, *they were on the Sea-ſide*, and that *there was no Means to come on the Land-ſide further.* [x] Plato, *that they ſerved both on Foot*, which diſagrees not with the other; for there was not any ſet Battle during all the Time of the Siege, only Sallies and Skirmiſhes. Here *Alcibiades* [y] his Comrade atteſts, Socrates *outwent all Soldiers in Hardineſs; and if at any Time,* ſaith he, *as it often happens in War, the Proviſions failed, there was none could bear the want of Meat and Drink like him; yet on the other Side, in Times of Feaſting, he only ſeemed to enjoy them, and tho' of himſelf he would not drink, yet being invited, he far out-drank all others, and which is ſtrangeſt of all, never any Man ſaw him drunk. The Exceſſes of Cold in the Winter, which in that Country are extraordinary, he as wonderfully endured; when the Froſt was ſo ſharp that very few durſt go out of their Tents, and thoſe wrapping their Legs and Thighs in Skins and Furs, he went along with them, having no more Cloaths than thoſe he uſually wore. He walked bare-footed upon the Ice with leſs Tenderneſs than others in Shoes, to the Wonder of the Soldiers, who thought themſelves reproached by his Hardineſs. His contemplative Rapture at the ſame time was no leſs worthy Admiration; he fell into a deep Contemplation one Morning, and continued all the while ſtanding in the ſame Poſture; at Noon it was taken Notice of by the Soldiers, who told it from one another, that* Socrates *had ſtood ſtill in the ſame Place all that Morning: In the Evening ſome* Ionian *Soldiers wrapping themſelves warm, came and lay down by him in the open Field, to watch if he would continue all Night in the ſame Poſture, which he did until the Morning, and as ſoon as the Sun aroſe, ſaluted it, and retired.* Of theſe Kind of Raptures *A. Gellius* [z] ſaith he had many. We muſt not omit how he behaved himſelf there in Fight; [a] ſeeing his Friend *Alcibiades* deeply engaged, and much wounded, he ſtepped before him, defended him and his Arms from the Enemy, and brought him ſafely off. Nor was his Modeſty inferior to his Love or Courage; for whereas after the Battle, the Generals were to beſtow an honourable Reward upon him that had fought the beſt, the Judges aſſigned it to *Socrates*, he declined it, and by his earneſt Interceſſion, procured that it might be conferred upon *Alcibiades.*

The ſecond Action of *Socrates* was in the firſt Year of the eighty ninth Olympiad at *Delium*, a Town in *Boetia*, which the *Athenians* took. *The* Boetians (ſaith *Thucydides*) *led by* Pagondas, *followed them, and bid them Battle, the left Wing of the* Boetians, *to the very Middle of the Army, was overthrown by the* Athenians, *and fled to the other Parts, where they were yet in Fight; but the Right had the better of the* Athenians, *and by little and little forced them to give Ground, and followed them from the very firſt.* Pagondas, *whilſt the Left Wing of his Army was in Diſtreſs, ſent two Companies of Horſe ſecretly about the Hill, whereby that Wing of the* Athenians *which was victorious, apprehending upon their ſudden Appearing, that they*

p Argum. ad Apol. Soc. r De anim. pagan. 5. 14. s De divinat. 1. 54. t Laert. 2. 22. u Thucyd. l. 1. w Laert. 2. 23. x Sympoſ. y Plut. Sympoſ. z Lib. 2. cap. 1. a Plut. Symp. Athen. deipnoſ. citing Antiſthenes.

had been a fresh Army, was put into a Fright, and the whole Army of the Athenians, *now doubly terrified by this Accident, and by the* Thebans *that continually won Ground, and broke their Ranks, betook themselves to Flight, some fled towards* Delium *and the Sea, others to* Oropus, *others the Mountain* Parnethes, *and others other Ways, as to each appeared Hope of Safety. The* Boetians, *especially their Horse, and those* Locrians *that came in after the Enemy was defeated, followed, killing them. Socrates* in this Engagement behaved himself with his accustomed Valour (so well, that [b] *Laches* confesseth, if the rest had fought like him, they had not lost the Day) and Care of his Friends; for [c] *seeing* Xenophon *unhorsed in the Flight, and thrown down on the Ground (himself likewise having his Horse slain under him, fought on Foot) he took him upon his Shoulders, and carried him many a Stadia, and defended him till they gave over the Pursuit.* And being thus at the Loss of the Day, with others dispersed in Flight (amongst whom was *Laches* the Archon, and *Alcibiades*) [d] *in the constant slowness of his Retreat expressed a Courage far above* Laches, *frequently looking back and round about, as greedy to be revenged of the Enemy, if any should pursue them; which was the Means that brought him off more safely; for they who express least Fear in their Retreat, are less subject to be assaulted, than such as repose their Confidence in flying.*

[e] As they came to a Way that was divided into two, *Socrates* made a Stand, and advised those that were with him not to take that Way which they were going into, along the Mountain *Parnethes*, but the other by the Way *Retiste*, for, saith he, I heard the *Dæmon*'s Voice. The greater Part were angry, as if he had trifled at a Time so serious; some few were perswaded to go along, amongst whom were *Laches* and *Alcibiades*, and got safely home; the rest were met by some Horsemen, who returning from the Pursuit, fell upon them; they at first resisted, but at last enclosed by the Enemy, who exceeded them in Number, they gave back, and were in the End oppressed and all killed, except one, who by the Help of his Shield getting away, brought the News to *Athens*, and *Pyrilampes* Son of *Antiphon*, who being wounded by a Javelin, was taken Prisoner; and when he heard by those that were sent from *Athens* to *Thebes* to treat of Peace, that *Socrates* and the rest with him got safe home; he openly professed to the *Thebans*, that *Socrates* had often called him and others of his Company back, who not following the Advice of his Genius, were slain.

The last Military Engagement was the same Year at [f] *Amphipolis*, which was then taken by *Brasidas* the *Lacedemonian* General.

CHAP. IX.

How he carried himself in the Democracy, and the Oligarchy.

Socrates forebore to accept any Office in the Common-wealth, (except in his latter Years that of Senator) either (as [g] *Ælian* saith) because he saw the *Athenian* Government, tho' under the Form of a Democracy, was yet nearer to a Tyranny or Monarchy, or [h] as himself professeth, being dissuaded by his Genius from meddling in publick Affairs, which Advice was his Preservation, being too honest to comply with the Injustices of the Common-wealth, and to oppose them was extremely dangerous, as he found experimentally in that short Time.

[i] He was chosen into the Senate for the *Antiochian* Tribe, whereunto (as we have said) *Alopece*, the Town where he was born belonged, and in order thereto took the Oath which *Solon* appointed to be given to every Senator, to give Sentence according to the Laws, not biassed either by Favour, Hatred, or any other Pretext: In the third Year of the 93d Olympiad ([k] the Pre-eminence coming in Course to the *Antiochian* Tribe, and *Socrates* thereupon becoming President of the People) he had this Occasion of manifesting his Constancy. [l] There happened a Sea-fight between the *Athenians* and the *Lacedemonians* at *Arginusæ*: The *Athenian* Commanders were ten; the *Lacedemonians* Commander in chief, *Callicratidas*; the *Lacedemonians* were overthrown, their Admiral sunk; the *Athenians* went back to *Arginusæ* with the Loss of twenty five Ships, and all the Men in them, except some few that escaped to Land; the ten Commanders ordered *Theramenes* and *Thrasibulus*, (Captains of the Galleys) to look out after the Vessels that were shipwreck'd, which, as they were going to do, a sudden Tempest arose and hindered them; six of those Commanders returned to *Athens*, where they no sooner came, but upon the Account they gave of the Fight, the Senate committed them to Prison; *Theremenes* was their Accuser, who urged that they might be questioned for not relieving those that were lost by Shipwreck; the Commanders justly answered, that they had given Order for their Relief, and that *Theramenes* and *Thrasibulus*, on whom that Charge was imposed, were (if any) to be condemned; but that they would not retort the Fault on their Accusers, for the Tempest sufficiently excused them. This satisfied the Senate for that Time; but at the next Feast, being the *Apaturia*, some Friends of *Theramenes*, by his Instigation

b Plato Sympos. c Strab. lib. 9. Laert. 2, 23. d Plat. ibid. e Plut. de Demon. & Socrat. Epist. 1. f Plat. Apol. Laert. 2. 22. Thucyd. l. 4. g Var. hist. 3. 17. h Plat. Apol. i Plat. Apol. Gorg. chap. 1. Xen. memor. 1. k Plat. Apol. l Xenoph. hist. Græc. 1.

shaving

ſhaving their Hair, and putting on Mourning Apparel, pretending to be Kinſmen of thoſe that were drowned, came in that Habit to the Senate, and cauſing the Charge againſt the ten Commanders to be renewed, ſo much incenſed the People, that they by Menaces contrary to all Law, enforced the Senate to condemn them. *Socrates* being ordered to write the Decree againſt them, avoided it, by pretending he could not write, and knew not the Form, which occaſioned Laughter in the Senate (and perhaps that Aſperſion of *Porphyrius*, that he was ſcarce able to write, which when he did, it was to Deriſion) but the true Reaſon is by *Athenæus* acknowledged to be his conſtant Fortitude, in that he would not violate the Laws of the Common-wealth contrary to the Oath he had taken, [m] to which he took more Heed than to the Violence wherewith he was threatened; for when the Senate proceeded to their Condemnation, [n] he alone oppoſed it with his Suffrage, whereupon many Orators prepared to accuſe him, and the People cried out with loud Clamours, that he might be brought to anſwer for it: But he choſe rather to hazard himſelf for Law and Juſtice, than through Fear of Impriſonment and Death to conſent to Injuſtice, as the Death of theſe Men was afterwards known to be, even to the *Athenians* themſelves: And was ſoon after puniſhed in *Theramenes* by the like, wherein *Socrates* gave the ſame Teſtimony of his Courage upon this Occaſion.

Athens, after a long War with the *Lacedæmonians* of twenty-ſeven Years, being taken at laſt by *Lyſander*, the *Lacedæmonian* General, in the firſt Year of the 94th Olympiad, there grew ſome Debate concerning the Alteration of the Government, from a Democracy to an Oligarchy; *Theramenes* ſtood for the Continuance of the Democracy, but being overſwayed by the Power and Threats of *Lyſander*, yielded to the Conſtitution of thirty Perſons, by Title [o] Governors, in effect Tyrants, of which Number was *Theramenes* (whom they took, in regard of his known Moderation and Equity, to bridle the Rapine and Avarice of others) *Critias* firſt a Friend, but now a great Enemy to *Socrates* for reproving his Love of *Euridamus*) *Charicles* and others, whoſe Names are ſet down by *Xenophon*, as are alſo their Murders, unjuſt Sequeſtrations of Lands, and Confiſcations of Goods; they began with Puniſhment of the worſt Perſons, proceeded to the richeſt, and ended with the beſt. Never (ſaith [p] *Seneca*) was any City more miſerable; 1300 (*Æſchines* ſaith, 1500) of the beſt Perſons they put to Death without any legal Trial, nor was their Fury thereby aſſuaged, but more exaſperated; that City where was the *Areopagus*, the moſt religious Court of Judicature, where the Senate and People like the Senate uſed to aſſemble, was daily made a ſad Colledge of Executioners, an unhappy Court, too narrow for the Tyrants without reſt from Oppreſſion, without Hope of Liberty or Remedy. All fled the City but *Socrates*, who *all this while ſet not his Foot out at the Gates*; he was continually amongſt the People, comforting the lamenting Fathers, encouraged thoſe that deſpaired of the State, reproached the Rich, that had lived in Fear to loſe their Wealth, the late Repentance of their dangerous Avarice, and to thoſe that would imitate him, gave great Examples, whilſt he walked free amidſt the thirty Oppreſſors.

Theramenes oppoſing this Cruelty and Injuſtice, was accuſed by *Critias* for betraying the Truſt of the Common-wealth, whereof he acquitted himſelf to the Satisfaction of the Senate; but *Critias* and his Faction, fearing he might overthrow the Oligarchy, ſeized upon him with a Troop of Soldiers; *Theramenes* run to the Altar, but being dragged from thence by the Officers, he behaved himſelf like (ſaith [q] *Diodorus*) the Diſciple of *Socrates*; the People pitied him, but none of them durſt offer to help him, becauſe he was compaſſed in by the Soldiers, except *Socrates* and two of his Companions, who ran to him and endeavoured to reſcue him out of the Hands of the Officers; *Theramenes* deſired them to forbear, telling them that he much loved and commended their Kindneſs and Virtue, but that it would be the greateſt Misfortune he could have, if their Love to him ſhould occaſion their Deaths; whereupon *Socrates* and his Companions ſeeing none come in to join with them in his Aid, and that the contrary Party was too ſtrong for them, gave over: *Theramenes* was carried to Priſon, and there (being ſentenced to drink Hemlock) died.

Theſe Outrages of the thirty Tyrants *Socrates* did not forbear to cenſure: [r] *Seeing many eminent Perſons put to Death, and the rich circumvented and betrayed to exceſſive Puniſhments, he ſaid to* Antiſthenes, *Doth it repent thee that we have done nothing in our whole Lives great and remarkable, as thoſe Monarchs who are deſcribed in Tragedies*, Atreus's, Thyeſtes's, Agamemnon's *and* Egiſthus's? *They are in thoſe Plays beheaded, feaſted with their own Fleſh, and generally deſtroyed; but no Poet was ever ſo bold and impudent as to bring a Hog killed upon the Stage.*

[s] To another, *who murmured becauſe he was not looked upon ſince they began to rule, Are you ſorry for it ſaid he?* He ſaid likewiſe, [t] *that it were ſtrange if a Neat-herd who diminiſhed and impoveriſhed his Herd, ſhould not confeſs himſelf an ill Neat-herd; but more ſtrange that one who being ſet over the City, made the Citizens worſe, and their Number leſs, ſhould not confeſs himſelf an ill Governor. This*

m Xenoph. memor. 1. n Laert. 2. 24. Ἀλλὰ ᾧ μόνῳ (perhaps μόνον ἀποψηφίσασθαι τῶν δέκα στρατηγῶν. o Diod. Sic. lib. 14.
p De tranquill. Animæ Æſch. Ctesiph. q Diod. l. 14. r Ælian. var. hiſt. 2. 11. s Laert. 2. 34. t Xenoph. memor. 1.

came to their Knowledge, whereupon Critias *and* Charicles *sent for him, and forbad him ſtrictly to teach or diſcourſe with any of the young Men.* Socrates *asked them, if in Acts of Prohibition he might be permitted to queſtion what he underſtood not, which they granting; Then (continues he) I am ready to obey the Laws, but leſt I tranſgreſs them thro' Ignorance, I deſire to be informed, whether when you forbid me the Act of Speaking, this Act be to be underſtood of Things ſpoken rightly or not rightly; if of the firſt, I muſt abſtain from ſpeaking what is right; if of the ſecond, I muſt take Care to ſpeak nothing but what is right. Hereupon* Charicles *being diſpleaſed, ſaid, Since you underſtood not that,* Socrates, *we command you what is eaſier to be underſtood, that hence-forward you ſpeak not at all with any of the young Men. To take away all Ambiguity, replies* Socrates, *that I may not exceed my Limitation; let me know expreſly at what Years you call a young Man. So long (ſaith* Charicles) *as he is uncapable of being Senator, and hath not attained to the Heighth of his Judgment; you are not to ſpeak with any under Thirty. May I not buy (anſwers* Socrates) *of any under that Age, nor ask them the Price of any Thing? That you may, (ſaith* Charicles) *but your Cuſtom is to ask Queſtions of Things which you know very well; forbear thoſe. And ſhall I not then (replies* Socrates) *make Anſwer, if any one ask me where* Charicles *dwells, or where* Critias *is? To ſuch Queſtions (ſaith* Charicles) *you may. You muſt (continues* Critias) *refrain from the Artificers, whoſe Ears you have ſufficiently grated with your impertinent Diſcourſe; I muſt then abſtain (ſaith* Socrates) *from Juſtice, Piety, and the like; even from the very Neat-herds, (replies* Charicles) *which unleſs you do, take heed your Herd come not ſhort home.*

This Ill-Will and Jealouſy which they had conceived againſt *Socrates*, was increaſed by the ſecret Departure of ſome Friends of his out of the City; which was reported to be done by his Contrivement, to give Intelligence to the *Thebans:* Nor was that Suſpicion without Reaſon, as is manifeſt by his laſt Epiſtle. Hereupon, they ſummoned him into the Court, where ſome Complaints were brought againſt him; of which having acquitted himſelf, they (to get a better Cauſe of Quarrel againſt him) gave Order to him and four more to go to the *Pyræum*, and to apprehend *Leon*, whom they meant to put to Death, that they might poſſeſs his Eſtate: but *Socrates* refuſed, adding, that he would never willingly aſſiſt an unjuſt Act; whereupon *Charicles* ſaid, Doſt thou think, *Socrates*, to talk thus peremptorily, and not to ſuffer? A thouſand Ills, (anſwered *Socrates)* but none ſo grievous as to do unjuſtly. *Charicles* made no Reply, nor any of the reſt; the other Four went for *Leon*, *Socrates* directly to his Houſe; but from thenceforward, the Jealouſy they had of him was ſo much encreaſed, that [u] if their Power had not been ſoon diſſolved, they would have gone near to have taken away his Life.

CHAP. X.

His falling out with the Sophiſts, and with Anytus.

THE Sophiſts, *Maſters of Language in thoſe Times,* ſaith [w] *Cicero (whereof was* Gorgias *of* Leontium, Thraſimachus *of* Chalcedon, Protagoras *of* Abdera, Prodicus *a* Ceian, Hippias *an* Elian, *and many others) profeſt in arrogant Words to teach, how an inferior Cauſe (ſuch was their Phraſe) might, by ſpeaking, be made ſuperior,* [x] *and uſed a ſweet fluent kind of Rhetorick, argute in Sentence, lofty in Words, fitter for Oſtentation than Pleading, for the Schools and Academies, rather than the* Forum, were ſo highly eſteemed, that [y] *whereſoever they came, they could perſwade the young Men to forſake all other Converſation for theirs.* [z] *Theſe* Socrates *oppoſed; and often, by his Subtilty of diſputing, refelling their Principles,* [a] *with his accuſtomed Interrogatories, demonſtrated that they were indeed much beneath the Eſteem they had gained; that they themſelves underſtood nothing of that which they undertook to teach others; he withdrew the young Men from their empty Converſation. Theſe, who till then had been looked upon as Angels for Wit and Eloquence, he proved to be vain Affecters of Words, ignorant of thoſe Things which they profeſſed, and had more need to give Money to be taught, than to take* (as they uſed) *Money for Teaching. The* Athenians, *taken with theſe Reproofs which* Socrates *gave them, derided them, and excited their Children to the Study of ſolid Virtue.*

Another Quarrel *Socrates* had of long Continuance, for it was the Occaſion of his Death, but begun many Years before, with *Anytus*, an Orator by Profeſſion, privately maintained and enriched by Leather-ſellers. He had put Two of his Sons to *Socrates* to be taught; but not being pleaſed, that whilſt they were in that Way, they had not learn'd ſo much as to be able thereby to get their Living, he took them from *Socrates*, and put them to that Trade which himſelf was aſhamed to own; wherewith *Socrates* being much diſpleaſed in reſpect of the two Youths, whoſe Ruin he preſaged, (and truly, for they fell afterwards into Debaucheries which occaſioned it) ſpared not to reproach *Anytus* in diſcourſing to his Scholars, [b] telling them, *That the Trade of dreſſing Leather was not fit to be ſpoken of amongſt young Men; for they who benefit themſelves by any Art, cheriſh and profeſs it, as* Acumenus *Phyſick*, Damon *and* Connus *Muſick; even* Anytus, *whilſt his Sons were his Scholars, was not aſhamed of that which they learned, though it were not ſufficient to maintain them by Pleading; but for himſelf, he gloried that he walk'd inviſible with* Pluto's *Hel-*

u Plat. Apol. w Brut. x Cic. Orator. y Liban. Apol. z Cic. Brut. a Liban. Apol. b Socratic. Epiſt. 14.

met,

met, or Gyges's *Ring, concealing from the People the true Means of his Subsistence, which indeed was by dressing Leather, which was not just, to be ashamed of the Trade, and not of the Profit; for he ought to own this, or to disclaim that.*

Anytus (*saith* [c] Ælian) *to answer this Reproach, studied all Occasions and Ways of Revenge; but feared the* Athenians, *doubting if he should accuse* Socrates, *how they would take it, his Name being in high Esteem for many Respects, chiefly for opposing the* Sophists, *who neither taught nor knew any solid Learning.* He [d] advised with *Melitus*, a young Man, an Orator, unknown to *Socrates*, described by [e] *Plato*, with long plain Hair, a high Nose, and a thin Beard, one that for a Dram might be bought into any Thing, by whose Counsel [f] *He begins, by making Trial in lesser Things, to sound how the* Athenians *would entertain a Charge against his Life; for to have accused him upon the very first, he conceived unsafe, as well for the Reason already mentioned, as lest the Friends and Followers of* Socrates *should divert the Anger of the Judges upon himself, for falsly accusing a Person so far from being guilty of any Wrong to the State, that he was the only Ornament thereof. To this End he suborns* Aristophanes, *a comic Poet, whose only Business was to raise Mirth; to bring* Socrates *upon the Stage, taxing him with Crimes which most Men knew him free from, impertinent Discourse, making an ill Cause by Argument seem good; introducing new and strange Deities, whilst himself believed and reverenced none; hereby to insinuate an ill Opinion of him, even into those who most frequented him.* Aristophanes *taking this Theme, interweaves it with much abusive Mirth: The best of the* Grecians *was his Subject; not* Cleon, *the* Lacedæmonians, *the* Thebans, *or* Pericles *himself, but a Person dear to all the Gods, especially* Apollo. *At first (by reason of the Novelty of the Thing, the unusual personating of* Socrates *upon the Stage) the* Athenians, *who expected nothing less, were struck with Wonder. Then (being naturally envious, apt to detract from the best Persons, not only of such as bore Office in the Commonwealth, but any that were eminent for Learning and Virtue) they begun to be taken with the* Clouds, *(so was the Play named) and cried up the Actor that personated* Socrates *with more Applause than ever any before, giving him with many Shouts the Victory, and sending Word to the Judges, that they should set down no Name but that of* Aristophanes. Socrates *came seldom to the Theatre, unless when* Euripides *contested with any new Tragedian, there, or in the* Pyræum, *then he went; for he affected the Wisdom, Goodness, and Sweetness of his Verse. Sometimes* Alcibiades *and* Critias *would invite him to a Comedy, and in a manner compel him; for he was so far from esteeming Comedians, that he contemn'd them as lying, abusive, and unprofitable; whereat they were much displeased. These (with other Things suggested by* Anytus *and* Melitus) *were the Ground of* Aristophanes *his Comedy, who, it is likely, got a great Sum of Money by it, they being eager in Prosecution of their Design, and he prepared by Want and Malice to receive their Impression: In fine, the Play got extraordinary Credit, that of* Cratinus *being verified,*

The Theatre was then
Fill'd with malicious Men.

'It being at that Time the Feast of *Bacchus*, a 'Multitude of *Grecians* went to see the Play: *Socra-* 'tes being personated on the Stage and often nam'd, '(nor was it much the Players should represent him, 'for the Potters frequently did it upon their Stone 'Juggs) the Strangers that were present (not know- 'ing whom the Comedy abused) raised a Hum and 'Whisper, every one asking who that *Socrates* was? 'which he observing, (for he came not thither by 'Chance, but because he knew himself should be a- 'bused in the Play, had chosen the most conspicuous 'Seat in the Theatre) to put the Strangers out of 'doubt, he rose up, and all the while the Play lasted, 'continued in that Posture, ([g] laughing) [h] one that 'was present asked him if it did not vex him to see 'himself brought upon the Stage? *Not at all*, (an- 'swered he) *methinks I am at a Feast, where every* 'one enjoys me.' [i] This Comedy was first acted when '*Isarchus* was Archon, *Cratinus* Victor, in the first 'Year of the eighty ninth Olympiad. *Aristophanes* 'being by some reprehended for it, to vindicate him- 'self, caused it to be acted again the Year following, '*Amintas* being Archon, but with worse Order than 'at first.

[k] *Amipsias* also (another Comic Poet) derided him thus in *Tribone.*

O Socrates, *the best of few, the vainest*
Of many Men; and art thou come amongst us?
Where is thy Gown? Did not this great Misfortune
Befal thee by the Leather-dresser's Help?

CHAP. XI.

His Trial.

[l] MANY Years past since the first falling out betwixt *Socrates* and *Anytus*, during which Time, one continued openly reproving the other, secretly undermining; until at length, *Anytus* seeing the Time suit with his Design, procured *Melitus* to prefer a Bill against him to the Senate in these Terms.

Melitus *Son of* Melitus, *a Pythean, accuseth* Socrates *Son of* Sophroniscus, *an Alopecian.* Socrates

c Var. hist. 2. 13. d Schol. Aristoph. ab Nub. e Liban. f Ælian. ibid. g Ælian, var, hist. 5. 8. h Plut. de educand. lib. i Schol. Aristoph. in Nub. k Laert. 2. 28. l Plat. Apol. Liban. Apol.

violates the Law, not believing the Deities which this City believeth, but introducing other new Gods. He violates the Law likewise in corrupting Youth; the Punishment Death.

This Bill being preferred upon Oath (*Plato* calls it [m] ἀνωμοσία) *Crito* became bound to the Judges for his Appearance at the Day of Trial. * Soon after, *Anytus sent privately to him, desiring him to forbear the mention of his Trade, and assuring him that he would thereupon withdraw his Action*; but Socrates *returned him Answer, that he would never forbear speaking Truth as long as he lived; that he would always use the same Speeches concerning him; that his Accusation was not of Force enough to make him refrain from speaking those Things which he thought himself before obliged to say.*

[n] The Interval of Time betwixt his Accusation and Trial, he employed in his usual philosophical Exercises, not taking any Care to provide his Defence, for which being observed and questioned by *Hermogenes*, Son of *Hipponicus*, 'I provide Apology enough (saith he) in considering and pursuing 'the constant Course of my Life; *Hermogenes* demanding how that could be? Because (saith he) 'I never did any unjust Act, which I conceive the 'best Apology: But we often see Judges (saith '*Hermogenes*) oversway'd by Rhetorick, to condemn the Innocent and acquit the Guilty: The 'Truth is, (replied *Socrates*) going about to make 'my Apology, I was twice with-held by the *Dæmon*, whereat *Hermogenes* wondering, Is it strange '(continues he) that God should think it fit for me 'to die at this Time? Hitherto no Man hath 'lived more uprightly; which, as it is now my 'greatest Comfort, so it was the greatest Delight 'to myself and Friends; if I live longer, I know 'I must undergo what is proper to old Age, Defects of Hearing and Sight, Slowness to apprehend, 'Aptness to forget, how can I then be pleased to 'live longer and grow worse: It is likely God in 'his Love to me hath ordained that I should die 'in the most convenient Age, and by the gentlest 'Means; for if I die by Sentence, I am allowed 'the Benefit of the most easy Kind of Death; I 'shall give my Friends the least Trouble, I shall 'do nothing unseemly before those that are present, 'and shall depart sound in Body and Soul; is not 'this very desirable? God with much Reason forbids me to make any Defence: If I could effect 'it, I should only stay longer to be taken away by 'the Torment of Diseases, and Imperfections of 'Age, which truly *Hermogenes* I desire not; if 'when I give an Account of my Actions towards 'God and Men, the Judges think fit to condemn 'me, I will rather chuse to die than beg *of them* 'a Life worse than Death. Other Friends used 'the same Persuasions to him with Assurance of 'Victory. [o] *Lysias* an excellent Orator offered 'him an Oration, which he had written in his 'Defence, desiring him if he thought good to make 'Use of it at his Trial; *Socrates* perused it, and 'told him, that it was a good one, but not fit for 'him. *Lysias* asking how that could be? Why '(saith he) may not a Garment or Shoes be rich, 'yet not fit for me? If you should bring me *Sicionian* Shoes, I would not wear them tho' they 'were fit for my Feet, because they are effeminate: 'He conceived the Oration to be ingenious and eloquent, but not stout and manly; [p] for tho' it 'were very bitter against the Judges, yet [q] was it 'more rhetorical than became a Philosopher.

The Day of Trial being come, [r] *Anytus*, *Lyco*, and *Melitus* prepared to accuse him, one in behalf of the People, the second of the Orators, the last of the Poets: *Melitus* first went up into the Chair proper for that Purpose, and there spoke an Oration which was in itself mean enough, but withal delivered so unhappily and School-boy like, that sometimes he was out with Fear, and turned about to be prompted like a Player, enough to beget Laughter even in those that were most concerned in so serious a Cause: Part of the Effect whereof seems to be the same, which is thus by *Xenophon* dispersedly delivered, some Particulars whereof are confirmed by *Libanius*.

[s] *That* Socrates *persuaded his Auditors to contemn the received Laws, saying it was fit only for Fools to be governed by a Bean, (meaning the Suffrages of the Senate so gathered.)*

That he was intimately conversant with Critias *and* Alcibiades, *one most covetous and violent in the Oligarchy, the other ambitious of Tyranny.*

That he taught Disrespect and Disobedience to Parents, telling his Scholars he would make them wiser than their Fathers, and that it was lawful for any one to bind his Father, if he were mad, and for those that were the more wise, to do as much as those that were less wise.

That he taught also Disrespect of all other Kinsmen, saying they were not useful to the Sick, or to the Accused, the first being in more need of a Physician, the latter of an Orator; that the good Will of unable Friends was nothing worth, that only the most knowing Persons were most worthy of Honour; by which Means he would arrogate all Respect to himself.

That he selected out of the Poets some ill Places, and perverted others that were not so, to excite his Friends to impious Actions; as that of Hesiod,

There is no Work pursued Shame:
'Tis Idleness that merits Blame.

He expounded, as if the Poet meant all Acts might be committed for Gain.

m See Suidas upon that Word. * Liban. Apol. p. 644. n Xenoph. Apol. & memor. 4. o Cicer. de Orat. 1. Laert. 2. 42. p Plut. 10. Rhetor. q Laert. 2. 40. r Plat. Apol. s Xenoph. mem. 1.

That he often repeated and misinterpreted these Words of Homer, *as if the Poet allowed the Poor to be beaten.*

When he a Prince, or some great Person meets,
Such with soft Language kindly thus he greets;
Happy above the Reach of Fear are you;
Sit down, and bid your Followers do so too.
But of the lower Sort when any speaks,
Forth these Words with Blows his Anger breaks,
Be quiet; to thy Betters Wretch submit;
For Action and Advice alike unfit.

Melitus (his Oration ended) came down; [t] next him came *Anytus* with a long malicious Speech, and last of all *Lyco* with all the Artifice of Rhetorick concluded the Accusation.

Socrates [u] would not (as was the Custom) procure an Advocate to plead for him; all the while his Accusers were speaking, he seemed to employ his Mind about nothing less: As soon as they had done, he went up into the Chair, ([w] in which Action he observed that the Dæmon did not with-hold him) and with [x] an angry Smile began [y] this unpremeditated Answer, [z] not as a Suppliant, or guilty Person, but as if Master of the Judges themselves, with a free Contumacy, proceeding not from Pride, but the Greatness of his Mind.

[a] 'But I wonder first *(Athenians)* how *Melitus* 'came by this Knowledge, that (as he saith) I do 'not worship those Gods the City worships? Others 'have seen me, (and so might *Melitus* if he had 'pleased) sacrifice at common Festivals on the pub-'lick Altars; how do I introduce new Deities, 'when I profess to be directed in all my Actions 'by the Voice of God? They who observe the 'Notes of Birds, or Answers of Men, are guided 'by the Voice: None doubts of Thunder whether 'it be loud or oraculous: Doth not the Priestess on 'the Tripod convey to us by Voice what the God 'delivers to her? And that he foreknows Events, 'communicating them to whom pleaseth him, all 'Men (as well as I) believe and profess: Others 'call those that foretel Events, Augurs, Soothsay-'ers, and Diviners, I the Dæmon, and (I conceive) 'more religiously than they who ascribe a divine 'Power to Birds: That I am no Impostor herein, 'many can attest who have asked my Advice, 'and never found it fail.' Here there arose a Murmur in the Senate, some not believing, others envying what he said, that he should surpass them in such a particular Favour of the Deity. 'Let such 'as are incredulous hear this also, to confirm their 'Opinion that I am not favoured of the Gods; 'when *Chærephon*, in the Presence of many Wit-'nesses, question'd the *Delphian* Oracle concerning 'me, *Apollo* answered, that no Man was more free, 'more just, or more wise; (here another Murmur 'arose amongst the Judges; he proceeded) yet the 'same God said more of *Lycurgus* the *Lacedemo-'nian* Law-giver, that he knew not whether to call 'him a God or a Man; me he compared not with 'the Gods, tho' he gave me the Priority amongst 'Men. But trust not the God herein, consider me 'exactly yourselves; whom know you less a Ser-'vant to corporeal Pleasures? whom more free? 'I accept not either Rewards or Gifts; who more 'just than he who so conforms himself to the pre-'sent Time, as he needs not the Help of any other; 'who will say he deserves not the Title of Wise, 'who since he was able, never desisted to learn by 'Enquiry all Good possible? And that I took not 'this Pains in vain, is evident in that, many Citi-'zens and Strangers studious of Virtue, prefer my 'Conversation above all others: What is the Rea-'son, that tho' all Men know I have no Wealth 'to requite them, so many desire to oblige me by 'Gifts? That I require no Return from any, 'yet engage so many? That when the City being 'besieged, every one lamented his Condition, I was 'no more moved than when it was most flourishing? 'That whilst others lay out Money on outward 'Things to please themselves, I furnish myself from 'within myself with Things that please me better? 'If none can disprove what I have said, deserve I 'not the Commendations both of Gods and Men? 'And yet you *Melitus* pretend that with these In-'Instructions I corrupt Youth; every one knows 'what it is to corrupt Youth: Can you name but 'one that I of religious have made impious, of mo-'dest, impudent, of frugal, prodigal, of sober, de-'bauch'd, of hardy, effeminate, or the like? But I 'know those, answered *Melitus*, whom you have 'persuaded to be more obedient to you than to their 'own Parents: That as far as concerns Instruction, 'replied *Socrates*, I confess this they know to be 'my proper Care: For their Health Men obey 'Physicians before their Parents, in Law-suits 'Counsellors before their Kindred. Do you not in 'War prefer the most experienced Soldiers to com-'mand before your own Allies? Yes, answers '*Melitus*, 'tis fit we should. And do you think it 'Reason, then, replies *Socrates*, if others are pre-'ferred for such Things as they are excellent in, 'that because in the Opinion of some, I have an 'Advantage beyond others in educating Youth, 'which is the greatest Benefit amongst Men, I 'ought therefore to die? [b] *Anytus* and *Melitus* '(saith he, addressing himself to the Judges) may 'procure my Death, hurt me they cannot: [c] To 'fear Death is to seem wise, and not to be so; for 'it is to pretend to understand that which we un-'derstand not: No Man knows what Death is, 'whether it be not the greatest Happiness that can

t Liban. Apol. t. 1. u Cic. de divinat. 1. w Cic. de divinat. 1. x Socratic. Epist. 14. y Plat. Apol. z Cic. de Orat. 1.
a Xenoph. Apol. b Plut. de tranq. anim. c Plut. de consol. ad Apol.

'arrive

'arrive to a Man, and yet all fear and ſhun it as if 'they were ſure it were the greateſt Misfortune.

This and more (ſaith *Xenophon*) was ſaid both by himſelf and his Friends, but the Judges were ſo little pleaſed with his unuſual Manner of Pleading, that [d] as *Plato* went up into the Chair, and began a Speech in theſe Words, *Tho' I*, Athenians, *am the youngeſt of thoſe that come up in this Place*, they all cried out, *of thoſe that go down*, which he thereupon was conſtrained to do, and they proceeding to vote, *Socrates* was caſt by 281 Voices; it was the Cuſtom of *Athens*, as *Cicero* obſerves, when any one was caſt, if the Fault were not capital, to impoſe a pecuniary Mulct; when the Judges had voted in that Manner, the guilty Perſon was asked the higheſt Rate whereat he eſtimated his Offence; the Judges willing to favour *Socrates*, propounded that Demand to him, he anſwered 25 (or as *Eubulides* ſaith, 100 Drachms, nor would he ſuffer [e] his Friends, [f] *Plato*, *Crito*, *Critobolus* and *Apollodorus* (who deſired him to eſtimate it at 50 *Minæ*, promiſing to undertake the Sum) to pay any Thing for him, ſaying, that to pay a Penalty, was to own an Offence, and telling the Judges that (for what he ſtood accuſed) he deſerved the higheſt Honours and Rewards, and daily Suſtenance at the publick Charge out of the *Prytanæum*, which was the greateſt Honour that was amongſt the *Grecians*; with this Anſwer the Judges were ſo exaſperated, that they condemned him to Death by eighty Votes more.

[g] The Sentence being paſt, he could not forbear ſmiling, and turning to his Friends, ſaith thus, they who have ſuborned falſe Witneſſes againſt me, and they who have born ſuch Teſtimonies, are doubtleſs, conſcious to themſelves of great Impiety and Injuſtice; but as for me, what ſhould more deject me now than before I was condemned, being nothing the more guilty; they could not prove I named any new Gods for *Jupiter*, *Juno*, and the reſt, or ſwore by ſuch. How did I corrupt young Men, by inuring them to Sufferance and Frugality? Of capital Offences, as Sacrilege, Theft, and Treaſon, my very Adverſaries acquit me; which makes me wonder how I come to be condemned to die; yet that I die unjuſtly will not trouble me, it is not a Reproach to me, but to thoſe who condemned me; I am much ſatisfied with the Example of *Palamedes*, who ſuffered Death in the like Manner; he is much more commended than *Ulyſſes* the procurer of his Death; I know how future and paſt Times will witneſs, I never hurt or injured any, but on the contrary have advantaged all that converſed with me to my utmoſt Ability, communicating what Good I could, *gratis*. This ſaid, he went away, his Carriage anſwerable to his Words, his Eyes, Geſture, and Gate expreſſing much chearfulneſs.

CHAP. XII.

His Impriſonment.

SOcrates (ſaith [h] *Seneca*) *with the ſame reſolved Look wherewith he ſingly oppoſed the thirty Tyrants, entered the Priſon, and took away all Ignominy from the Place, which could not be a Priſon whilſt he was there.* Here ([i] being fettered by the eleven Officers) he continued [k] thirty Days after he was condemned upon this Occaſion. [l] The Ship which carried *Theſeus* and fourteen more Perſons into *Crete*; he vowed, if they got ſafe home, as it fortuned they did) to dedicate to *Apollo*, and to ſend it every Year with a Preſent to *Delos*, which Cuſtom the *Athenians* religiouſly obſerved; before the Solemnity, they uſed to luſtrate their City, and all condemned Perſons were reprieved till it returned from *Delos*, which ſometimes, the Wind not ſerving, was a long Time. The Prieſt of *Apollo* began the Solemnity, by crowning the Poop of the Ship, which happening the Day before *Socrates* was condemned, occaſioned his lying in Priſon ſo long after.

In this Interval he was viſited by his Friends, with whom he paſt the Time in Diſpute after his uſual Manner; he was often ſolicited by them to an Eſcape, ſome of them offered to carry him away by Force, which he not only refuſed but derided, asking, if they knew any Place out of *Attica* whither Death could not come? [m] *Crito*, two Days before his Death, came very early in the Morning to him to the ſame Purpoſe, having by his frequent Viſits and Gifts gained ſome Intereſt in the Jaylor, but finding him aſleep, ſat ſtill by him, admiring in the Soundneſs of his Sleep, the happy Equality of his Mind; as ſoon as he waked, he told him that he came to bring ſad News, if not ſuch to him, yet to all his Friends, that the Ship would certainly be at home to-morrow at furtheſt (ſome that came from *Suniam* affirming they had left it there) but that in all Likelihood it would come that Day, and he ſhould die the next. In good Time be it, anſwered *Socrates*, but I do not believe it will come to-day, for the Day following I muſt die, as they ſay who have the Power in their Hands; but that I ſhall not die to-morrow, but the Day after, I gueſs by a Dream I had this Night, that a Woman very beautiful, in a white Garment, ſaluted me by my Name, ſaying,

Thou, ere three Days are told,
Rich Phthia *ſhalt behold.*

(The ſame Relation, according to *Laertius* [n], he

d Laert. 2. 41. e Xenoph. f Plat. Apol. g Xenoph. Apol. h Conſolat. ad Helv. 14. i Maxim. Tyr. Diſſert. 39.
k Xen. memor. 4. l Plat. Phæd. m Plat. Crit. n Laert. 2. 35.

made

made to *Æschines)* this Occasion *Crito* took to persuade him to save himself, which he prest with many Arguments; 'That his Friends would be accused of Covetousness, as more desirous to spare 'their Wealth than to redeem him; that it might 'be effected with little Trouble and Expence to 'them who were provided for it; that himself was 'rich enough to do it, or if not, *Simmias*, *Cebes*, 'and others would join with him; that he ought 'not voluntarily to thrust himself into Destruction, 'when he might avoid it; that he should leave his 'Children in an uncertain mean Estate; that it 'would not be construed Constancy, but want of 'Courage. Consider well these Reasons, saith he, 'or rather (for it is now no Time to stand consi-'dering) be perswaded, what is to be done must be 'done this Night, or it will be too late. *Socrates* 'answered, that his chearful Readiness to relieve 'him was much to be esteemed, if agreeable to Ju-'stice, otherwise, the less just, the more blameable: 'That Opinion and Censure ought not to be re-'garded, but Truth and Equity; that Wrong 'must not be requited with Wrong; that Faith 'should be kept more strictly with a City than with 'private Persons; that he had voluntarily subjected 'himself to the Laws of his Country, by living 'under their Government, and to violate them at 'last, were great Injustice. That by breaking 'Prison, he should not only draw his Friends into 'many Inconveniencies, but himself also into ma-'ny Dangers, only to live and die in Exile; that 'in such a Condition, he should be nothing more 'capable to bring up his Children well, but dying 'honestly, his Friends would take the more Care 'of them; that whatsoever Inconvenience might 'ensue, nothing was to be preferred before Justice; 'that if he should escape by Treachery, the Re-'mainder of his Life would be never the more hap-'py, nor himself after Death better entertained in 'the next World. These Things (saith he) I hear 'like the *Corybantian* Pipes, the Sound of these 'Words makes me deaf to every Thing else; there-'fore, whatever you shall say to the contrary, will 'be to no Purpose; but if you have any other Bu-'siness, speak. *Crito* answering, he had not any 'else; as for this then (concludes he) speak no 'more of it, let us go the Way which God points 'out to us.

CHAP. XIII.

The Time and Manner of his Death.

THE Time of *Socrates*'s Death is formerly touched; the Marble at *Arundel-House* saith, he died when *Laches* was Archon, aged seventy Years, which (according to *Plato)* were compleat, for he saith τελεία ἑβδομηκοντα. [o] *Demetrius Phalerius* saith, he died the first Year of the ninety fifth Olympiad, having lived seventy Years. [p] *Diodorus Siculus* avers, it was done in that Year, *Laches* being Archon.

Altho' there be not any Thing in the *Greek* Story settled by better Authority, than the Years of *Socrates*; *Leo Allatius* with much Confidence, and little Reason, controverts the received Chronology of his Life and Death, the Occasion is this; the fourteenth of the *Socratick* Epistles published by him, mentioneth an Oration of *Polycrates*, as spoken at the Arraignment of *Socrates*; but the Walls of *Athens* repaired by *Conon* six Years after the Death of *Socrates*, being spoken of in that Oration, the Epistle is thereby rendered suspicious. The Truth seems to be this; after the Death of *Socrates*, it became an ordinary Theme in the Schools of Rhetorick (which was at that Time much studied at *Athens*) to speak for and against *Socrates*. *Polycrates*, a Sophister, to exercise his Wit, wrote an Invective. *Lysius*, a famous Orator, who died about the hundredth Olympiad, had written (as we have already said) an Apologetick, which is by the Scholiast of *Aristides* cited in answer to *Polycrates*. Apologies were in like manner written by *Plato*, *Xenophon* [q], and (long after by) *Libanius*; altho' *Isocrates* admonished *Polycrates* of certain Errors in his Oration against *Socrates*, yet the Anachronism continued, for Chronology was not yet studied in *Athens*; and thence it is that *Plato* himself is in that Respect so much reprehended by *Athenæus*, *Aristides*, *Macrobius*, and others: The Writer of the *Socratic* Epistle admits *Polycrates* as the Accuser at the Trial, and the Oration as then and there spoken, so also doth *Hermippus* whom *Laertius* cites to the same Effect; but *Phavorinus*, a Critick of later Times, when Chronology was more exact, detects the Error by Computation of Times. *Allatius* will by no Means have the Criticism of *Phavorinus* allowed, and labours to introduce an Uncertainty of the Time, to the End he may perswade that *Socrates* lived beyond the Reparation of the Walls of *Athens*. The great Engine wherewith he labours to demolish all that hath been asserted by the Ancients, is the Testimony of *Suidas*, who (I know not upon what Authority) saith, he lived eighty Years: His smaller Artillery are the groundless Emendation of *Meursius*, and the Mistake of *Scaliger* before noted; the absurd Metachronism of the *Chronicum Alexandrinum*, which makes *Socrates* die in the one hundred and fourth Olympiad, and in the ninetieth Year of his Age; the Anistoresy of the unknown Writers of *Aristotle*'s Life, who supposeth him in the seventeenth Year of his Age, to have heard *Socrates* three Years, and which is most ridiculous, the notorious Anachronisms of *Plato* must serve as irrefragable Arguments to im-

o Laert. 2. 44. p Diodor. Sicul. l. 14. q Memorab. lib. 1.

pugn the Truth. With these Proofs, in the sophistical Disguise of a Dialogue, he endeavours to puzzle the unwary Reader.

The Manner of his Death receive from *Plato* in the Person of *Phædo* an Eye-witness; 'Every 'Day (saith he) I went with other Friends of his 'to visit him; we met in the Court where he 'was tried, it being near the Prison; where we 'entertained ourselves with Discourse till the Prison 'was opened, then went in unto him and spent 'many Times the whole Day with him. But that 'Day we met sooner than ordinary, for the Even-'ing before as we came out of the Prison, we heard 'the Ship was come from *Delos*, and thereupon we 'appointed to meet early the next Morning at the 'usual Place, where being come, the Porter came 'out to us, and told us that we must stay a While 'before we could be admitted, for the eleven Offi-'cers were there taking off his Fetters, having 'brought him Word that he must die to-day: 'Not long after he came out again, and told us we 'might go in, where, when we came, we found '*Socrates*'s Fetters newly taken off, and *Xantippe* 'sitting by him with a Child in her Arms; she, 'as soon as she saw us, burst forth into Tears, 'and cried out, Ah, *Socrates*, this is the last Time 'thy Friends shall ever speak to thee, or thou to 'them. *Crito* (saith *Socrates*, addressing himself 'to him) let some Body carry her home; where-'upon some of *Crito*'s Servants led her away ex-'claiming, and beating her Breast. *Socrates* who 'was sitting upon the Bed, drew up his Leg and 'rubbed it, saying the whilst, how strange a Thing, 'Friends, is that which Men call Pleasure, how 'near a-kin to Pain, to which it seems so contra-'ry? They arrive not indeed together, but he that 'takes one, is immediately overtaken by the other, 'as if they were tied together: If *Æsop* had ob-'served this, certainly he would have made some 'Fable of it, as if God willing to compose their 'Difference, had joined them by the End, not be-'ing able to make them absolutely one; so that 'whosoever hath one, must streight have the other 'also, as it happens to me at this Time, the Pain 'my Fetters even now gave me, is now turned to 'a Kind of Pleasure, and tickles me. You have 'opportunely (said *Cebes*) put me in Mind to ask, 'why since your Imprisonment (which you never 'did before) you have writ Poems, a Hymn to '*Apollo*, and *Æsop*'s Fables rendered into Verse; 'many have questioned me about it, particularly '*Euenus*; if he repeat this Demand, what Answer 'shall I give him? Tell him (answers *Socrates*) 'that truly I did it not to contend with him and 'his Verses, but to comply with a Dream (which 'I have had more than once) enjoining me to 'practise Musick; in Obedience whereunto I first 'made Verses in Honour of the God whose Feast 'this was; then, conceiving it essential to a Poet 'to write Fictions, which of myself I use not, I 'made Use of some of *Æsop*'s, which I had in 'Memory, as they first came into Fancy; tell '*Euenus* this, and bid him from me farewel, and 'if he be wise, follow me, for it seems I must go 'hence to-day, the *Athenians* have so ordered it. 'What is that, said *Simmias*, which you bid *Eu-'enus* do? I have often conversed with him, but, 'as far as I understand him, he will not be at all 'ready to be rul'd by you. What, saith he, is he 'not a Philosopher? He seems so, answers *Sim-'mias*; then he will (replied *Socrates*) and so will 'all who deserve that Name; but perhaps he will 'not lay violent Hands upon himself, that is not 'lawful. And as he was speaking thus, he set 'down his Leg again to the Ground, and sitting so, 'continued all the rest of the Dispute. Then *Ce-'bes* asking why, how it could be that it should be 'prohibited to ones self, yet that a Philosopher 'ought to desire to follow a dying Person? He an-'swered, Men are the Possessions of God, would 'you not be angry if your Slave should kill himself 'against your Will, and if it were in your Power 'punish him? We must expect a Summons from 'God, an inevitable Necessity (such as I have at 'this Time) to take us hence. This is Truth, 'replied *Cebes*, but what you asserted even now is 'inconsistent with it; God taking Care of us as 'his Possessions, can a wise Man desire to be out of 'his Protection? He cannot think to mend his 'Condition by freeing himself from so excellent a 'Government. *Socrates* seemed much pleased with 'the Subtlety of *Cebes*, and turning to us said, *Ce-'bes* is always inquisitive, nor will easily admit any 'Thing: To me, said *Simmias*, what he hath 'said seems Reason, how can wise Men endure, 'much less endeavour to part with those that are 'so much better than themselves? But *Cebes* here-'in reflects upon you, who are so ready to leave us, 'and the Gods whom you acknowledge good Go-'vernors: You say well, answers *Socrates*, I sup-'pose you would have me answer as in a Court of 'Judicature; by all Means, saith *Simmias*; well 'then, replies he, I will endeavour to defend my-'self better against you than I did before the Judges. 'Truly, did I not believe I should go to just Gods, 'and to Men better than any living, I were inex-'cusable for contemning Death; but I am sure to 'go to the Gods, very good Masters, and hope to 'meet with good Men, and am of good Courage, 'hoping that something of Man subsists after Death, 'and that it is then much better with the Good 'than with the Bad. Here *Crito* interrupting 'him, told him that he who was to administer the 'Poison, advised him to speak little, and not heat 'himself with Dispute, for it agreed not with that 'Kind of Poison, which some neglecting, had been 'constrained to take it two or three Times. Mind 'him not, said *Socrates*, let him provide as much

'as

'as may ſerve twice or thrice, if Need be.' Then he proceeded in a large Diſcourſe, to declare that the chief Office of a Philoſopher is to meditate on Death; therefore he ought not to fear the Approach of it; That as Death is the Solution of the Soul from the Body, ſo is it the Office of a Philoſopher to free the Soul from corporeal Affections; that if we underſtand the better, the more the Soul is diſengaged from Senſe, we ſhall underſtand moſt perfectly when ſhe is wholly freed from the Body by Death, which Perfection of Knowledge is the ſole End of Philoſophy.

This Part of the Diſcourſe ended, *Cebes* occaſions the renewing of it, by the deſiring him to prove the Immortality of the Soul, which he doth, firſt from the neceſſary Succeſſion of Generation and Corruption as Contraries, the Ground of the *Pythagorean* Tranſmigration; next, from the Soul's Manner of Reaſoning, which being only by Reminiſcence, argues it had a Being before the Body (when it had perfect Knowledge of thoſe Ideas which upon occaſion of ſenſible Objects it recovers) and conſtantly ſhall ſubſiſt after it. Much more is ſpoken by *Plato* under his Name, whereof almoſt all is manifeſtly *Plato*'s own, nor is it poſſible to ſelect that which is not from the reſt; the Concluſion of his Diſcourſe (as contracted by [n] *Cicero*) was, 'That there are two Ways, and a twofold Courſe 'of Souls when they go out of the Body: For 'ſuch as have defiled themſelves with human Vices, 'given over to Pleaſures wherewith they are blinded, according as they are polluted with domeſtick 'Sins, or have uſed inexpiable Deceits to wrong 'the Publick, take a By-way, ſecluded from the 'Counſel of the Gods: But they who have preſerved themſelves intire and chaſte from the leaſt 'Contagion of their Bodies, having always withdrawn themſelves from them, and in human 'Fleſh imitated the Lives of Gods, find a ready 'Way open for them, leading them to thoſe from 'whom they came. And as Swans are (not without Reaſon) ſacred to *Apollo*, becauſe they ſeem 'to have learned Divination from him, whereby 'foreſeeing the Good that is in Death, they die 'with Songs and Delight; ſo ought all good and 'knowing Perſons to do. [o] Let every one therefore prepare for this Journey againſt the Time 'that Fate ſhall call him away; you *Simmias*, 'Cebes, and the reſt here preſent, ſhall go at your 'appointed Hour, me Fate now ſummons (as the 'Tragedian ſaith) and perhaps it is Time that I 'go into the Bath, for I think it beſt to waſh before I take the Poiſon, that I may ſave the Women the Labour of waſhing me when I am dead.

'When he had made an End of ſpeaking, *Crito* 'asked him what Directions he would leave concerning his Sons and other Affairs; and if they 'could do any Thing that might be acceptable to 'him? I deſire no more (ſaith he) than what I 'have often told you, if you take Care of yourſelves, whatſoever you do will be acceptable to 'me and mine, tho' you promiſe nothing; if you 'neglect yourſelves and Virtue, you can do nothing 'acceptable to us, tho' you promiſe never ſo much; 'that, anſwered *Crito*, we ſhall obſerve; but how 'will you be buried? As you think good, ſaith 'he, if you can catch me, and that I give you 'not the Slip. Then with a Smile applying himſelf to us, I cannot perſwade *Crito*, ſaith he, that 'I am any Thing more than the Carcaſs you will 'anon behold, and therefore he takes this Care 'for my Interment; it ſeems that what even now 'I told him, that as ſoon as I have taken the Poiſon, I ſhall go to the Joys of the Bleſſed, hath 'been to little Purpoſe; he was my Bail, bound to 'the Judges for my Appearance, you muſt now 'be my Sureties to him that I am departed; let 'him not ſay that *Socrates* is carried to the Grave, 'or laid under Ground, for know, dear *Crito*, 'ſuch a Miſtake were a Wrong to my Soul; be 'not dejected; tell the World my Body only is 'buried, and that after what Manner thou pleaſeſt. 'This ſaid, he aroſe and retired into an inward 'Room, taking *Crito* with him, leaving us diſcourſing upon our own Miſery, ſhortly to be deprived like Orphans of ſo dear a Father. After 'his Bathing, came his Wife, and the other Women of his Family with his Sons, two of them 'Children, one a Youth; when he had taken Order with theſe about his domeſtick Affairs, he diſmiſt them and came out to us.

'It was now Sun-ſet (for he had ſtaid long within) when the Officer entered, and after a little 'Pauſe ſaid, I have not, *Socrates*, obſerved that 'Carriage in you which I have found in others, but 'as I thought you the moſt generous, the mildeſt and 'beſt of all Men that ever came into this Place, ſo I 'now ſee you hate me not for that whereof others 'are the Cauſe; you know the Meſſage I bring, 'farewel; bear what you cannot remedy. With 'that he departed weeping; and fare thee well, '(ſaid *Socrates*) I will: How civil is this Man? I 'found him the ſame all the Time of my Impriſonment, he would often viſit me, diſcourſe with me, 'uſed me always courteouſly, and now ſee how kindly he weeps for me. But come, *Crito*, let us do as 'he bids us, if the Poiſon be ready, let it be brought 'in. The Sun is yet ſcarce ſet, anſwers *Crito*. Others take it late after a plentiful Supper and full 'Cups; make not ſo much Haſte, there is Time 'enough. He replies, they who do ſo think they 'gain Time, but what ſhall I gain by drinking it 'late? Only deceive myſelf as covetous of Life, 'and ſparing of that which is no longer mine;

[n] Tuſc. quæſt. 1. [o] Plat. Phædon.

'pray, let it be as I say. Then *Crito* sent one of 'the Attendants, who immediately returned, and 'with him the Man that was to administer the Poi- 'son, bringing a Cup in his Hand; to whom *So- 'crates*, Pr'ythee honest Friend (for thou art well 'versed in these Businesses) what must I do? No- 'thing; said he, but as soon as you have drunk, 'walk till you find your Legs begin to fail, then 'lie down, and in so saying he gave him the Cup; '*Socrates* took it chearfully, not changing either 'Countenance or Colour, and looking pleasantly 'upon him, demanded whether he might spill any 'of it in Libation, who answered, he had made no 'more than would just serve; yet, saith *Socrates*, 'I may pray to God, and will, that my Passage 'hence may be happy, which I beseech him to 'grant, and in the same Instant drank it off easily 'without any Disturbance; many of us, who till 'now had refrained from Tears, when we saw him 'put the Cup to his Mouth and drink off the Poi- 'son, were not able to contain any longer; which '*Socrates* observing, *Friends* (saith he) *what mean 'you? For this Reason I sent away the Women 'lest they should be so unquiet: I have heard we 'should die with Gratulation and Applause, be quiet 'then and take it patiently*; These Words made 'us with Shame suppress our Tears; when he had 'walked a while, perceiving his Legs to fail, he 'lay down on his Back as the Executioner directed 'him, who looking on his Feet pinched them hard, 'asked him if he felt it, he answered no, he did 'the like to his Legs, and shewing us how every 'Part successively grew cold and stiff, told us when 'that Chilness came at his Heart he would die; 'not long after he spake these his last Words, *O* 'Crito, *I owe* Æsculapius *a Cock, pay it, neglect 'it not.* It shall be done, saith *Crito*; will you 'have any Thing else? He made no Answer, lay 'still a while, then stretching himself forth; with 'that the Executioner uncovered him, his Eyes 'were set, *Crito* closed them. This (saith *Plato*) 'was the End of the best, the wisest, and most 'just of Men.' A Story which *Cicero* [p] professeth he never read without Tears.

Aristotle saith, that a *Magus* coming from *Syria* to *Athens*, not only reprehended *Socrates* for many Things, but foretold him also that he should die a violent Death. *Laertius* [q] closeth his Life with this Epigram,

Drink Socrates *with* Jove, *next whom enthron'd,*
By Gods, and Wisdom's self as wisest own'd.
Thee, the Athenians *gave a pois'nous Draught,*
But first the same they from thy Lips had quaff'd.

CHAP. XIV.

What happened after his Death.

HE was buried with Tears and much Solemnity, (contrary to his own Direction) by his Friends, amongst whom [r] the excessive Grief of *Plato* is observed by *Plutarch*, and the Mourning Habit of *Isocrates*: As soon as they had performed that last Service, fearing the Cruelty of the Tyrants, they stole out of the City, the greater Part to *Megara* to *Euclid*, where they were kindly received, [s] the rest to other Parts.

[t] Soon after, a *Lacedæmonian* Youth, who had never more Acquaintance with *Socrates* than what Fame gave him, took a Journey to *Athens*, intending to become his Disciple; being come as far as the City Gates, and ready to enter, with Joy to be so near the End at which he aimed, instead of *Socrates*, he mets there the News of his Death, whereat he was so troubled, that he would not go within the City Gates, but enquiring the Place where he was buried, went thither, and breaks forth into a passionate Discourse, accompanied with many Tears, to the enclosed dead Body; when Night was come, he fell asleep upon the Sepulchre; the next Morning, affectionately kissing the Dust that lay upon it, and with much Passion taking Leave of the Place, he returned to *Megara*.

Suidas tells a like Story, (for that there were, more Examples than one in this Kind, *Libanius* implies) of a *Chian* named *Cyrsas*, who coming to *Athens* to hear *Socrates*, went to his Tomb, and slept there, to whom *Socrates* appeared in a Dream, and discoursed with him; with which only Satisfaction he went directly home again.

[u] By these Accidents the *Athenians* were awakened into a Sense of their Injustice, considering they were obnoxious to the Censure of the *Lacedæmonians* by extraordinary Crimes, whose Children were so affectionate to the Philosophers whom they had murdered, as to take such long Journeys to see *Socrates*, whom they would not keep when he was with them; hereat they became so exasperated, that they were ready to tear those wicked Men that were the Occasion of his Death piece-meal with their Teeth, the whole City cried out, they disclaimed the Act, and that the Authors thereof ought to be put to Death. [w] *Antisthenes* furthered their Rage by this Means, *Some young Men of* Pontus *invited to* Athens *by the Fame of* Socrates, *met with* Antisthenes, *who carried them to* Anytus, *telling them he was much wiser than* Socrates; *whereupon those that were present, with much Indignation turned*

p De Nat. Deor. l. 3. q Laert. 2. 45. r Plut. de virt. mor. Plut. vit. des Orat. s Liban. Apol. t Socrat. Epist. 17. u Socrat. Epist. 17. w Laert. vit. Antisth.

Anytus

Anytus *out of the City*. Thence he went to *Heraclea*, where ſome ſay the Citizens alſo expelled him, others [x] that they ſtoned him to Death. *Melitus* was by the *Athenians* condemned and put to Death, others [y] affirm [z] the like of all his Accuſers without Trial. [a] Plutarch, *that they ſo much hated them, as they would not ſuffer them to kindle Fire at their Houſes, they would not anſwer them any Queſtion, they would not waſh with them, but threw away the Water they had touched as impure, until unable to brook this Hatred, they hanged themſelves.*

In further Teſtimony of their Penitence, they called home his Friends to their former Liberty of meeting; they forbad publick Spectacles of Games and wreſtling for a Time; they cauſed his Statue, made in Braſs by *Lyſippus*, to be ſet up in the *Pompeum*; and (a Plague enſuing, which they imputed to the Injuſtice of this Act) they made an Order, that no Man ſhould mention *Socrates* publickly, or on the Theatre, that ſo they might forget what they had done. *Euripides* (reſtrained by this Order from doing it directly) reproached them overtly in a Tragedy named *Palamedes* (in whom he alluded to *Socrates*) particularly in theſe Verſes.

A Philomele, *ne'er Miſchief knew,* [b]
Is ſlain, alas! is ſlain by you.

At which Words, all the Spectators underſtanding they were meant of *Socrates*, fell a weeping.

The Death of this ſole Perſon (ſaith [c] *Eunapius*) *brought a general Calamity upon the City; for it may eaſily be collected by Computation of Times, that from thenceforward the* Athenians *did nothing conſiderable, but the City, by Degrees, decayed, and with it all* Greece.

CHAP. XV.

Of his Perſon and Virtues.

AS to his Perſon, he was [d] very unhandſome, of a melancholy Complection, [e] bald, [f] a flat Noſe, Eyes ſticking out, a ſevere down-caſt Look, difficult in Speech, and [g] too conciſe; his Language rough and careleſs, but more efficacious than all the Eloquence of *Themiſtocles*, *Pericles*, or any other; ſo acute, that he could maintain either Side in any Queſtion, therefore is reproached by *Ariſtophanes*, as having two Languages, whereof one was to defend Wrong; fervent in Diſpute; often ſo tranſported, that he would beat himſelf, and tear his Beard, to the Deriſion of the Standers-by, which he took quietly: Patient to be redargued. [h] Sometimes he covered his Face in Diſcourſe, that he might not be diverted by any Object of Sight: [i] His Conſtitution ſtrong and hardy, [k] which he preſerved ſuch, by taking diligent Care of his Health; [l] well bearing Cold, Hunger, and upon Occaſion, Exceſs of Wine without Diſturbance; [m] his Habit the ſame in Winter as in Summer, having but one Garment a Year; [n] no Shoes; his Diet ſparing. In fine, his Countenance promiſed ſo little, that [o] *Zopyrus*, a Phyſiognomiſt, who undertook to diſcover the Diſpoſitions of Men by their Looks, ſaid he was ſtupid, becauſe there were Obſtructions in his jugular Parts; adding he was given to Women, and many other Vices; whereat *Alcibiades*, and other Friends of his that were preſent, knowing him free from thoſe Imputations, fell a laughing; but *Socrates* juſtified his Skill, anſwering, He was by Nature prone to thoſe Vices, but ſuppreſſed his Inclinations by Reaſon; whence [p] *Alcibiades* uſed to ſay, he reſembled the Image of *Silenus*; [q] (as he did indeed in his Countenance, Baldneſs, and flat Noſe) carved on the outſide of little Boxes, ſitting and playing on a Pipe; for as thoſe Boxes within held Images of the Gods, ſo was he adorned with Chaſtity, Integrity, and all inward Beauty; raviſhed, as [r] *Plutarch* ſaith, with a divine Zeal to Virtue, in all Kinds whereof *Xenophon*, *Laertius*, and others, aſſert theſe Inſtances.

[s] *He was ſo wiſe, that he never erred in judging betwixt better and worſe, nor thereto needed any other Help*; yet he conſtantly profeſs'd, that he only knew that he knew nothing; [t] for which Reaſon he was, by the Oracle of *Apollo* at *Delphi*, declared of all Men the moſt wiſe, in this manner, to *Chærephon*, many Witneſſes being preſent.

[u] *Wiſe* Sophocles, *wiſer* Euripides,
But wiſeſt of all Men is Socrates.

[w] *Apollo* (ſaith *Cicero*) conceiving the only Wiſdom of Mankind to conſiſt in not thinking themſelves to know thoſe Things whereof they are ignorant. [x] This Oracle, though he were nothing exalted with it himſelf, procured him much Envy.

[y] *He was ſo religious, that he never did any Thing without adviſing firſt with the Gods*; [z] *never was known to attempt or ſpeak any Impiety.*

[a] He bare a Reverence to the Gods; not human, but ſuch as tranſcended the greateſt Fear. [b] Some ſay it was out of his great Reverence to the Divinity that he uſed to ſwear by a [c] (Cock) a Dog, and a

x Themiſt. Orat. 2. y Laert. 2. 43. z Diod. Sic. 14. Socratic. Epiſt. a De invid. & odio. b Τὰν δᾶδὰν ἀλγύνασαν ἀηδόνα: For μᾶσαν ſeems to have been ſome Gloſs to explain ἀηδόνα. So Callimach. Epigr. Αἱ δὲ τέαι ζωοῦσιν ἀηδονες. c In Ædes. d Plat. Phæd. Theætet. e Schol. Ariſtoph. f Plat. Phæd. Theætet. g Plat. Protag. h Plut. Phæd. i Sen. Epiſt. 1. 103. k Xenoph. mem. 1. Laert. 2. 32. l Plat. Sympoſ. m Socrat. Epiſt. 6. Liban. n Plat. Phæd. o Cicer. Tuſc. quæſt. 5. de fato. p Plat. conviv. q Schol. Ariſtoph. p. 136. r Adverſ. Colot. s Xenoph. mem. l. 4. t Plat. adverſ. Apol. Liban. Apolog. u Schol. Ariſtoph. w Academ. quæſt. 1. x Laert. 2. 37. y Xen. memor. 4. pag. 818. z Xen. mem. 1. p. 710. a Plat. Philib. b Suid. c Schol. Ariſtoph.

Plain

Plain Tree, (under which they uſed to ſit) though it were interpreted Atheiſm.

[d] *He was conſtant, and a Lover of the Publick Good; as appears in his acquitting the ten Captains, in his denying thirty Tyrants to fetch* Leon *in, his refuſing to eſcape out of Priſon, and reproving ſuch as grieved for his Death.* [e] *Xantippe* uſed to ſay, that when the State was oppreſs'd with a thouſand Miſeries, he always went abroad and came home with the ſame Look, [f] never more chearful, or more troubled; for he bore a Mind ſmooth and chearful upon all Occaſions; far remote from Grief, and above all Fear. In his declining Age, falling ſick, he was asked by one that came to viſit him, how he did? Very well (ſaith he) either Way; if I live, I ſhall have more Emulation; if I die, more Praiſe.

[g] *He was ſo temperate, that he never preferred that which is pleaſant before that which is wholeſome.* He never did eat more than Appetite (which was his Sauce) made delightful; all Drink was pleaſing to him, becauſe he never drank but when he was thirſty, and then with ſuch temperate Caution, that [h] he poured out the firſt Draught of Water upon the Ground; and if he were at any time invited to a Feaſt, he, which to others is very difficult, with much Eaſe took Care not to eat more than conſiſted with his Health, [i] whereof he was very careful, becauſe the Exerciſes of the Soul depend thereon; and in order thereto, uſed to walk conſtantly before Meals; whereupon, being asked by one that obſerved it, what he did? I get Sauce, ſaith he, for my Supper. To this Temperance it is imputed, though [k] *Athens* were often in his Time viſited with the Peſtilence, he alone eſcaped it.

[l] *He was ſo frugal, that how little ſoever he had, it was always enough.* [m] Wanting the Means to live ſplendidly, he taught not anxiouſly how to acquire more, but how to accommodate his Manner of Life to that which he had, [n] wherewith he was ſo contented, that he affirmed himſelf to come neareſt the Gods, becauſe he wanted leaſt. Seeing the great Variety of Things expoſed to Sale, he would ſay to himſelf, *How many Things there are that I need not*; and often had in his Mouth theſe Verſes.

Purple, which Gold and Gems adorn,
Is by Tragedians to be worn.

[o] *Alcibiades*, ambitiouſly munificent, ſent him many great Preſents; *Xantippe* admiring their Value, deſired him to accept them: *We* (anſwered *Socrates*) *will conteſt in Liberality with* Alcibiades, *not accepting, by a kind of Munificence, what he hath ſent us.*

[p] To the ſame, who offered him a large Plot of Ground to build an Houſe upon: *And if I wanted Shoes,* (ſaith he) *would you give me Leather to make them? But deſerve I not to be derided, if I accepted it?*

[q] He ſlighted *Archelaus* King of *Macedonia*, and *Scopas* Son of *Cranonias*, and *Eurilocus* Son of *Lariſæus*, not accepting their Money, nor going to them. [r] *Archilaus* ſending to him to deſire his Company, he ſaid, *He would not go to one from whom he ſhould receive Benefits, which he could not equal with Return.* [s] To *Perdiccas*, who demanded why he would not come to him, he anſwered, *Leſt I die the moſt ignoble Death; that is, leſt I receive a Benefit which I cannot requite.*

[t] Coming home late one Night from a Feaſt, ſome wild young Men knowing of his Return, lay in wait for him, attired like Furies, with Vizards and Torches, whereby they uſed to affright ſuch as they met; *Socrates*, as ſoon as he ſaw them, nothing troubled, made a Stand, and fell to queſtioning them, according to his uſual Manner, as if he had been in the *Lyceum*, or *Academy*.

[u] *He deſpiſed thoſe that cavilled at him.* [w] Being told that ſuch an one had reviled him behind his Back; [x] *Let him beat me*, ſaith he, *whilſt I am not by:* And that another ſpoke ill of him; *He hath not yet learnt*, ſaid he, *to ſpeak well.*

[y] Being kicked by an inſolent young Fellow, and ſeeing thoſe that were with him much incenſed, ready to purſue him, he ſaid, *What if an Aſs kick me, would you have me kick again, or ſue him?* But the Fellow eſcaped not unpuniſhed, for every one reproached him for this Inſolence, and called him the Reviler; ſo that at laſt, for Vexation, he hanged himſelf.

[z] Another ſtriking him a Box on the Year, he ſaid no more, but that it was hard a Man knew not when to go abroad with a Helmet.

[a] Another fell upon him with much Violence, which he endured without the leaſt Diſturbance, ſuffering him to vent his Anger; which he did ſo long, till he made his Face all ſwelled and bruiſed.

[b] Whenſoever he perceived himſelf to grow incenſed with any of his Friends,

Before the Storm aroſe,
He to the Harbour goes.

He uſed to moderate his Voice, to look ſmilingly and moderately upon them, reſerving himſelf untainted with Paſſion, by Recourſe to the contrary.

d Laert. 2. 24. e Ælian. V. H. 9. 7. Cic. Tuſc. quæſt. 3. Offic. 1. f Plin. 7. 19. g Xenoph. mem. 4. 818. h Plut. de Garrul. i Xen. mem. 1. p. 712. k Ælian. 13. 27. l Xenoph. mem. 711. m Liban. 1. n Laert. 2. 25. o Ælian. 9. 29. p Laert. 2. 24. q Laert. 2. 25. r Senec. de benefic. 5. 6. s Anton. vit. lib. 11. t Ælian. 9. 29. u Laert. 2. 26. w Stob. 53. x Laert. 2. 20. y Plut. de educ. liber. z Seneca de ira, l. 3. a D. Baſil. b Plut. de ira, cohib.

c *He*

[c] *He taught not such as conversed with him to be covetous, for he took no Money of his Scholars, therein expressing his own Liberality.*

[d] *Hunger or Want could never force him to flatter any*; yet was he very complaisant and facete in Company. As he one Day openly at Dinner reproved one of his Friends something harshly, *Plato* said to him, *Had not this been better told in private? Socrates* immediately answered, *And had not you done better, if you had told me so in private?* [e] Being demanded what Countryman he was? he answered, *Neither of* Athens, *nor* Greece, *but of the World.* Sometimes he would feast in a fine Robe, as *Plato* describes him; and when the Time allowed, learned to sing, saying, *It was no Shame to learn any Thing which one knew not:* He also danced every Day, conceiving that Exercise healthful; [f] nor was he ashamed to play with little Children.

[g] *He was so just, that he never in the least wronged any Man, but, on the contrary, benefited all such as conversed with him, as much as he could.*

[h] *His Continence was invincible.* He despised the Beauty of *Alcibiades*, derided *Theodota* and *Calliste*, two eminent Courtezans of that Time.

[i] *He took great Delight in the Conversation of good Men; to such he communicated whatsoever he knew; with them he studied the Writings of the ancient wise Men, selecting what was good out of them* (which confirms what was said before in the Life of *Solon*, that Moral Philosophy was commenced by the Sophists) *and esteemed this mutual Friendship which he contracted with them above all Treasure.* [k] Towards this his outward Endeavour was so affected and desired by them, as much as he affected and desired them.

CHAP. XVI.

His Wives and Children.

HE had two Wives; the first *Xantippe*, a Citizen's Daughter of *Athens*, as [l] *Theodoret* affirms, who adds, that she was dishoneſt before he married her, even with himself, besides others: [m] *Athenæus* also saith, that after he was married, he lent her to a Friend, and that *Alcibiades* lay with her. But *Aristoxenus*, and *Porphyrius*, from whom these Aspersions are derived, have been noted of too much Malignity, to be of any Authority.

She was (according to the Character [n] *A. Gellius* gives her) curst, froward, chiding and scolding always, both Day and Night; [o] and for that Reason he chose her, as he profest to *Antisthenes*, from observing, that they who would be excellent in Horsemanship, chose the roughest Horses, knowing, if they are able to manage them, they may easily rule others. He, desirous to use much Conversation with Men, took her to Wife, knowing, if he could bear with her, he might easily converse with all Men. To *Alcibiades*, who said, her Scolding was intolerable, he profest it was nothing to him, being used to it; like such as live in the continual Noise of a Mill. *Besides*, saith he, *cannot you endure the cackling of Hens?* But they (*answered* Alcibiades) bring me Eggs and Chickens: *And my* Xantippe, (replies *Socrates*) *Children.*

Of her Impatience, and his Sufferance, there are several Instances. [p] One Day, before some of his Friends, she fell into the usual Extravagancies of her Passion; whereupon, he not answering any Thing, went forth with them, but was no sooner out at the Door, when she running up into the Chamber, threw down Water upon his Head; whereat, turning to his Friends, *Did I not tell you* (saith he) *that after so much Thunder we should have Rain?*

[q] Another Time, she pulled his Cloak off from his Shoulders in the open *Forum*; some Friends present counselled him to beat her. *Yes*, saith he, *that whilst we Two fight, you may all stand by and cry*, Well done *Socrates*, To him *Xantippe.*

To some other Story of the same kind, [r] *Antoninus* alludes in these Words; *How* Socrates *looked when he was fain to gird himself with a Skin*, Xantippe *having taken his Cloaths away, and carried them forth with her, and what he said to his Friends, who out of a modest Respectfulness, went back, seeing him so attired.*

[s] Having brought *Euthydæmus* from the *Palæstræ*, to dine with him, *Xantippe* running to the Table, angry, overturned it; *Euthydæmus*, much troubled, rose up, and would have gone away, when *Socrates*; *Did not a Hen the other Day*, saith he, *the very same Thing at your House, yet I was not angry thereat?*

[t] *Alcibiades* having sent him a curious Marchpane, *Xantippe* (furiously, as her Manner was) threw it out of the Basket, and trod upon it; whereat *Socrates* laughing, *And shall not you* (saith he) *lose your Share in it?*

[u] Another Time, she offered to go to a publick Show, attired undecently; *Take heed* (said he) *you be not rather the Spectacle than the Spectator.*

[w] With Reason thereof he said, *I had three Evils, Grammar, Poesy, and an ill Wife; two I have shaken off, but my ill Wife I cannot.*

His other Wife was named *Myrto*, [x] Niece to *Lysimachus* Daughter of *Aristides*, not the Just, as [y] *Laertius*, and from him *Suidas* affirms, but another of that Name, the Third from him, as is observed by [z] *Athenæus*; for the two Daughters of

c Xenoph. memor. 1. d Laert. 2. 28. e Plut. de exil. f Senec. de tranquil. g Xenoph. memor. 4. p. 818. h Quintil. 8. 4. i Xen. memor. 3. k Xenoph. mem. 2. p. 752. l Theod. Therapent. 12. m Athen. l. 5. n 1. 17. o Laert. 2. 37. p Laert. ibid. q Laert. 8. 37. r Lib. 2. 26. s Plut. de ira. cohib. t Ælian. var. hist. 11, 12. u Ælian. 7. 10. Stob. 124. w Stob. 183. x Theodoret. Therap. 12. y Laert. 2. 26. z Athen. l. 13.

Ariſtides the Juſt, could not but be of great Age before the 77th Olympiad, wherein *Socrates* was born, long before which Time, *Ariſtides* died an old Man in Exile; for that *Themiſtocles* died the ſecond Year of the 77th Olympiad is certain, and as *Æmilius Probus* affirms, *Ariſtides* died four Years before *Themiſtocles* was baniſhed *Athens*, hereupon *Plutarch* more cautiouſly calls her not the Daughter, but Neice of *Ariſtides*.

Some, becauſe *Xantippe* (as is manifeſt from *Plato*) [a] out-liv'd him, believe he was firſt married to *Myrto*, but that he had both theſe Wives at the ſame Time, which is atteſted by *Demetrius Phalereus*, *Ariſtoxenus* (to whom *Athenæus* ſaith, that *Ariſtotle* gave the Ground) *Caliſthenes* and *Porphyrius*: Whence *Ariſtippus* [b] in his Epiſtle to his Daughter *Myrto*, adviſed her to go to *Athens*, and above all to honour *Xantippe* and *Myrto*, and to live with them as he with *Socrates*.

The Occaſion, whereupon the *Athenians*, who from the Time of *Cecrops* had ſtrictly obſerved ſingle Marriage, allowed Bigamy, in the Time of *Socrates*, was this; in the ſecond Year of the 87th Olympiad, and the third of the 88th, *Athens* was viſited extremely with the Peſtilence, which attended by War and Famine, occaſioned ſo great a Scarcity of Men, that they made an Edict it might be lawful for any that would to take two Wives. *Euripides* made uſe of this Indulgence; and that *Socrates* alſo did ſo, is atteſted by *Satyrus* the peripathetick, and *Hieronymus* the *Rhodian*, who recorded the Order; to which *Athenæus* imputes the Silence of the comick Poets in this Particular, who omited no Grounds of Reproach. *Plutarch* implies, that he took her out of Charity, for ſhe was a Widow [c] (without any Portion or Dowry) extreamly in Want.

[d] *Porphyrus* reports, that when theſe two (*Xantippe* and *Myrto*) quarrell'd, [e] they would at laſt fall both upon *Socrates*, and beat him, becauſe he ſtood by and never parted them, but laughed as well when they fought with him, as with one another.

[f] By *Xantippe* he had a Son, named *Lamprocles*, who could not brook her impatience ſo well as his Father, and being vex'd by her into Diſobedience, was reclaim'd by *Socrates*; he died young, as may be gathered from *Plutarch*, [g] who ſaith, *Timarchus* of *Chæronea*, dying very young, deſired earneſtly of *Socrates* that he might be buried near his Son *Lamprocles*, who died but few Days before, being his dear Friend, and of the ſame Age. It appears from [h] *Plato*, that he had more Sons by her; for in his Apology he mentions Three, two grown Men, the other a Child, which ſeems to be the ſame brought by *Xantippe* to him in Priſon, the Day of his Death, and, as [i] *Plato* deſcribes it, held in her Lap.

By *Myrto* he had two Sons; the eldeſt *Sophroniſcus*, the youngeſt *Menedemus*; or *Menexenus*, tho' ſome ſay he had *Menedemus* by *Xantippe*.

CHAP. XVII.

His Scholars and Auditors.

WHereas (ſaith [k] *Cicero*) *many ſpringing from* Socrates, *by reaſon that out of his ſeveral various Diſputes diffuſed every where, one laid hold of one Thing, another of another; there were ſome, as it were, ſo many ſeveral Families differing amongſt themſelves, much disjoined and diſagreeing; yet all theſe Philoſophers would be called, and conceived themſelves to be* Socraticks: *Of theſe were*

Plato, *from whom came* Ariſtotle *and* Xenocrates; *the firſt taking the Name of* Peripatetick, *the other of* Academic.

Antiſthenes, *who chiefly affected the Patience and Hardineſs in* Socrates *his Diſcourſe; from whom came firſt the* Cynics, *then the* Stoics.

Ariſtippus, *who was more delighted with his more voluptuous Diſputations; from him ſprung the* Cyrenaick *Philoſophy.*

Others there were who likewiſe called themſelves Socraticks, *but their Sects, by the Strength and Arguments of the former are broken, and quite extinct; ſuch were*

Phædo, *an* Elean, *who inſtituted a particular School, from him called* Eliack, *which afterwards was called* Eretriack, *from* Menedemus, *who taught at* Eretria; *from him* Pyrrho; *thence the* Pyrrhonians.

Euclid *of* Megara, *Inſtitutor of the* Megarick *School, ſo named from* Clinomachus *his Diſciple, called the Dialectick, ending in* Zeno *the* Citian, *who introduced the* Stoick.

The Herillians *are named alſo, as a School that would be called* Socratick. To theſe recited by *Cicero*, *Suidas* adds

Bryſo of *Heraclea*; who, together with *Euclid*, invented diſputative Logick.

Theodorus, ſirnamed the Atheiſt, who invented a peculiar Sect called *Theodorean*; the Opinion which he taught was ἀδιαφορία, Indifference.

Other Diſciples of *Socrates* there were, who followed his Philoſophy, not appropriating out of it any particular Sect, and therefore moſt properly deſerve the Title of *Socraticks*, ſuch are *Crito*, *Chærephon*, *Xenophon*, *Æſchines*, *Simmias*, *Cebes*, *Glauco*, and *Terpſion*.

The laſt kind of his Auditors were thoſe who made no Profeſſion of Philoſophy; of whom were

Critias and *Alcibiades*, who afterwards proved the moſt ambitious Spirits of the *Athenians*; but it was diſcovered in neither whilſt they converſed with *Socrates*; either that their Youth was not capable

a Laert. 2. 26. b Socratic. Epiſt. 27. c Laert. ibid. d Theodoret. e Therapent. 12. f Xenoph. l. 2. g Plut. de Genio. h Plato Apol. i Plat. Phæd. k De Orator. lib. 3.

of

of expreſſing their Vice, or that they cunningly complied (as *Xenophon* conjectures) with *Socrates*, in Hopes of being by his Converſation enabled to manage their former Deſigns, which as ſoon as they attempted they left off their Friendſhip with *Socrates*. *Critias* fell from him and converted his Affection into Hate, becauſe he reproved his Love to *Euthydemus*; *Alcibiades* naturally diſſolute, was reclaimed by *Socrates*, and continued ſuch whilſt he converſed with him. He was of Form ſo exquiſite as gave Occaſion to ſome to calumniate the Friendſhip betwixt him and *Socrates*, to which Effect *Ariſtoxenus* is cited by [l] *Laertius* and *Athenæus*, and ſome Verſes of *Aſpaſia* by the latter; his Vindication we refer to *Plato* and *Xenophon*.

Of *Socrates* his Inſtructions to *Alcibiades* there are theſe Inſtances.

[m] He told him he was nothing of what a Man ought to be, that he had no Advantage by the Greatneſs of his Birth above an ordinary Porter; whereat *Alcibiades* much troubled, with Tears beſought him to inſtruct him in Virtue, and to reform his Vices.

[n] Perceiving *Alcibiades* to be exceeding proud of his Riches and Lands, he ſhewed him a Map of the World, and bade him find *Attica* therein; which done, he deſired that he would ſhew him his own Lands, he anſwered, that they were not there. *Do you boaſt* (replies *Socrates*) *of that which you ſee is no (conſiderable) Part of the Earth?*

[o] *Alcibiades* being, by reaſon of his Youth, baſhful and fearful to make an Oration to the People, *Socrates* thus encouraged him; *Do you not eſteem* (ſaith he) *that Shoemaker* (naming him) *an inconſiderable Fellow?* Alcibiades aſſenting; *And ſo likewiſe* (continues he) *that Crier, and that Tent-maker. Alcibiades* granting this, *Doth not* (ſaith he) *the* Athenian *Commonwealth conſiſt of theſe? If you contemn them ſingle, fear them not in an Aſſembly.* To theſe add

[p] The four Sons of *Crito* the Philoſopher; the eldeſt *Critobulus*, [q] exceeding handſome and rich, but by *Socrates* (who valued his own Eſtate at five *Minæ*) [r] demonſtrated to be poorer than himſelf.

The ſecond *Hermogenes*, [s] who falling into Poverty, *Socrates* perſuaded *Diodorus* his Friend to entertain.

The third *Epigenes*, [t] a young Man of an infirm Body, whom *Socrates* adviſed to ſtudy his own Health, as that wherein conſiſted the well-being and Knowledge of his Mind.

The youngeſt *Cteſippus*.

Of Poets, *Euripides* (as the [u] Writer of his Life affirms) and *Euenus*.

Of Orators *Lyſias*, eminent in that kind, [w] eaſy to be underſtood, hard to be imitated, he came to *Athens* in the ſecond Year of the 82d Olympiad. *Lyſis*, whom of refractory he made pliant, and *Iſocrates*, of whom when very young, *Socrates* preſaged great Things. In the Number of his Scholars and Auditors were alſo [x] *Adimantus* and [y] *Glauco* Sons to *Ariſto*, Brothers to *Plato*: And *Charmides* Son of *Glauco*. *Glauco* before he was twenty Years old had taken upon him to be an Orator, and aimed at ſome great Office in the Common-Wealth, not to be wrought off from this Fancy which made him every where appear ridiculous, until addreſs'd by ſome Friends to *Socrates*, who made him acknowledge his own Error and Ignorance of that which he had undertaken. On the contrary, his Son *Glauco* of excellent Parts, fit for any Office in the Common-Wealth, yet timerouſly ſhunning all public Affairs, was by *Socrates* induced to undertake the Magiſtracy.

[z] *Nicoſtratus* Son of *Theodotides* and his Brother *Theodotus*.

[a] *Æantodorus*, and his Brother *Apollodorus*.

Lyſanias, Father of *Æſchines*.

[b] *Chærecrates*, Brother to *Chærephon*, betwixt whom there was a great Quarrel, but reconciled by *Socrates*.

[c] *Paralus*, Son of *Demodocus*, whoſe Brother was *Theages*.

[d] *Antipho*, a *Cephiſiean*, Father of *Epigenes*: with whom he diſcourſes of Self-ſufficience, teaching *gratis*, and of Veracity in [e] *Xenophon*.

Eumares a *Phliaſian*, and *Xenomedes* an *Athenian*.

Beſides theſe, there are with whom *Socrates* diſcourſed and inſtructed.

[f] *Ariſtodemus* ſirnamed *the little*, who would not ſacrifice, pray, or uſe divination, but derided all ſuch as did, was by *Socrates* convinced.

[g] *Ariſtarchus* troubled that he had a Charge of Kindred lying upon him, by *Socrates* converted to a willing Liberality towards them.

[h] *Eutherus*, who returning from Travel, his Lands taken away, his Father having left him nothing, choſe rather to follow a Trade than to apply himſelf to Friends, but diverted by *Socrates*.

[i] *Diodorus*, whom *Socrates* perſwaded to take *Hermogenes*.

[k] *Enthydemus*, who had collected many Sentences of Poets and Sophiſts, though he excelled all his Equals, and hoped no leſs of his Superiors, who was by *Socrates* conſtrained to acknowledge his own Error and Ignorance, and departed much troubled.

l Laert. 2. 23. Athen. l. 5. m Cicer. Tuſc. quæſt. 3. Plat. conviv. n Ælian 3. 28. o Ælian. 2. 1. p Laert. vit. Crit. q Macro. Saturn. 7. 3. r Xenoph. mem. l. 5. s Xenoph. mem. t Xenoph. mem. 4. p. 786. u Εἶτα μαθητὴς ἐν τοῖς ῥητορικοῖς, Σοκράτης δὲ ἐν τοῖς ἠθικοῖς καὶ φιλοσοφικοῖς. w Ὡς ἀναγινωσκόμενον, μὴν ἔχ ὅλον (read ἔυκολον, to which Effect alſo Plutarch) νομίζεσθαι, χαλεπὸν δὲ ἐυρίσκεσθαι ζηλωτὴν πειρομένοις. Dion. Halicarn. in Critio. x Plat. Apol. y Xenoph. mem. 3. p. 772. & p. 774. Laert. 2. 24. z Plat. Apol. a Plat. ibid. b Xenoph. mem. 2. p. 743. c Plat. Apol. d Plat. Apol. e Memor. 1. p. 729, 731, 732. f Xenoph. mem. 1. p. 725. g Xen. mem. 2. h Xen. mem. 2. i Xen. mem. 2. k Xen. mem. 4.

[m] *Hippias*, an *Elean*, with whom *Socrates* discourſed of Juſtice.

[n] *Nicomachides*, *Pericles*, and *Iphicrates*, with whom he diſcourſed concerning the Office of a General. [o] Into the laſt he infuſed Courage, by ſhewing him the Cocks of *Midas* [p] bruſtling againſt thoſe of *Callias*.

[q] *Theætetus* diſputing of Knowledge, he dimiſt, inſpired as it were with divine Wiſdom.

[r] *Euthyphron* who intended to accuſe his own Father, he diſſwaded.

With *Pharrhaſius* a Painter, *Clita* a Statuary, and *Piſtias* an Armourer: He diſputes in [s] *Xenophon* concerning their ſeveral Arts.

CHAP. XVII.

His Writings.

THey who affirm that [t] *Socrates* writ nothing (as *Cicero*, *Plutarch*, *Dion Chryſoſtom*, *Ariſtides*, *Origen*, and others) mean in reſpect to his Philoſophy, in which Kind he never wrote any Thing himſelf, but what he diſcourſed was committed to Writing by *Xenophon*, *Plato*, and others of his Scholars. Hence the Works of *Plato* (particularly *Phædo*) went under the Name of *Socrates*, and are ſo cited by *Ariſtotle*; but that ſome Things were written by *Socrates* himſelf, is evident from thoſe who affirm,

[u] *He writ together with Euripides*, and aided him in making Tragedies, whence *Mneſilochus*,

The Phrygians *is* Euripides' *new Play*;
But Socrates *gave it the beſt Array.*

And again, Euripides *is ſteer'd by* Socrates *and* Callias.

Now thou with Pride and Self-conceit o'erflow'ſt;
But all the Cauſe to Socrates *thou oweſt.*

Hither refer we that of [w] *Cicero*, who ſaith, when *Euripides* made his Play *Oreſtes*, *Socrates* revoked the three firſt Verſes. He writ alſo ſome Fables of *Æſop* in Verſe, not very elegant, mentioned by *Plato*, *Plutarch* and *Laertius*, beginning thus:

To thoſe who dwelt in Corinth, Æſop *ſaid*,
Virtue with vulgar Wiſdom be not weigh'd.

A Pæan or Hymn in Honour of Apollo *and* Diana. One that went under his Name beginning thus.

Dælian Apollo, *and thou fair*,
Diana, *hail*; *immortal Pair.*

is by *Dyoniſidorus* denied to be his: This is mentioned alſo by *Plato*, to which ſome add,

The Encomium [x] *of* Gryllus *Son of* Xenophon, ſlain in the *Mantinean* Fight, which the Diſagreement of Times will not allow; more certain it is he framed

[y] *Dialogues*, which he gave to *Æſchines*, ſeeing him in Want, that he might get Money by them; to theſe add,

Epiſtles, ſome whereof are publiſhed by *Leo Allatius*; that he writ more is implied by *Arrian* and *Athenæus*.

Socrates *his Epiſtles.*

Epiſtle I.

YOU ſeem unacquainted with my Reſolutions, elſe you would not have ſent the ſecond Time, and enlarged your Offers; but you believe Socrates, *as well as the Sophiſts, mercenary of his Counſel,* [z] *and that what I writ before was not real, but only to draw great Overtures from you: Therefore now you promiſe Wonders, in Confidence to oblige me by your many Preſents to quit my Intereſt and Commerce with the* Athenians, *and to come over to you. I think it moſt unſeeming a Philoſopher to ſell his Advice, and extremely contrary to my Practice; for ever ſince by God's Command I firſt entered into Philoſophy, I was never known to take any thing, but keep my Exerciſes in publick,* [a] *for every one to hear that will; I neither lock the Door when I teach, as is reported of* Pythagoras, *nor go abroad to the Multitude, and exact Money of the Hearers, as ſome heretofore have done, and ſome in our Times yet do; I have enough from within myſelf, ſhould I accept of more from others I know not where to depoſite it, nor whom to truſt better than the Givers themſelves, whoſe Faith, if I ſuſpect, I ſhall be thought improvident to confide in; if honeſt, I can receive from them, tho' I lay up nothing with them; for they that would be faithful Keepers of Money, will not be unfaithful Preſervers of their own Gratitude, and they will never go about to defraud me of what they would have given; but receiving that of me* gratis, *for which others take Money, they will* [b] *conſider me when I want. In a Word, if Friends, they will like* [c] *you, impart of their own to us; if not Friends, they will ſeek to deprive us of what is ours.*

Beſides, I have not Leiſure to hoard up Money,

m Xenoph. mem. 4. n Xen. ibid. o Laert. 2. 30. p πλεχόμενοι eſt quod gallinas indicas facere videmus aliquando tumentes & caudam pandentes. q Plat. Theatet. 2. 29. r Laert. s Mem. 3. t Apud Allat. de ſcript. Socrat. u Laert. 2. 28. w Tuſc. quæſt. 4. x Laert. vit. Xenoph. y Laert. vit. Æſchin. z Allatius underſtands this otherwiſe. a Τῷ ἀεὶ ὄντι, καὶ μὴ. In this Senſe the Words are paſſable (ſo is not the Interpretation of Allatius, *æque omnibus audiendi etiamſi nolint poteſtate factâ.*) But I conceive the Words of Socrates were, Τῷ ἀιεῖνλι τε καὶ μή. b Allatius otherwiſe. c For ὡς ὑμῖν reading ὡς ὑμεῖς.

but

but wonder at them that say, they get Riches [d] *for their own Sake, and have a high Opinion of themselves for their Means, who neglect Learning to addict themselves to Gain, and so become admired for their Riches, derided for their Ignorance, esteemed for all Things except themselves.* [e] *But if we so much abhor to have Recourse to Friends,* [f] *to depend on others to eat their Bread, how comes it that we are not ashamed to suffer the same from Money? Do we not know that these Men are respected only for their Wealth, and if Fortune turn, they live in all Disrespect? They are not fully contented when they are in Esteem, because it is not for their own Sakes, but in disesteem are much more discontented, being themselves the Cause of their own Dishonour.*

First therefore, you were mistaken, if you did imagine Socrates *would do that for Money which he would not without, not knowing that many Occasions, but chiefly the Necessities of my Country detain me. Wonder not that I say I discharge my Country's Business, being not employed either in Army or Court, every one ought to apply himself to that which he is capable of;* [g] *Things above his Reach he must leave to others, and perform those that are within his Compass: And in such Cities as this, not only Counsellors, or Commanders for Sea or Land are requisite, but some likewise, that may admonish others in their Offices; for it is* [h] *nothing strange, that they fall, as it were asleep under the Weight of their Charge, and need a Goad to waken them: Over these God hath placed me, for which I become, and not without Cause, odious to them.*

But he, in whom I most confide, will not suffer me to go, he knows better than myself what is good for me; when I resolved to come to thee he with-held me, and when thou sentest the second Time, forbid me; I dare not disobey him. Pindar *taught this Wisdom, saying,* When God points out the Beginning of any Work, it is the direct Way to obtain Virtue, the End glorious. *The Verses are much to this Purpose. Other Poets have said as much of the Gods, that what is undertaken with their Advice succeeds well; but what without God, is unprofitable to the Undertakers. The wisest Cities of* Greece *consult the Oracle of* Delphi, *and as many as follow it have good Success, who do not, most commonly receive Prejudice.*

Yet I shall not wonder, if you give no Faith to what I deliver of the Dæmon, *for I have met with not a few alike incredulous; most of those that were in the* Delian *Fight did not believe me; I was then in Arms, and sallied out of the City with the People to skirmish; many of us were dispersed in Fight, and as we came to a certain Way, the accustomed Sign came upon me; I stopt, and said, in my Opinion, Friends, we should not go this Way, for I heard the* Dæmon's *Voice: The greater Part were angry, as if I had trifled at a Time so serious; some few were persuaded to go along with me another Way, and got safe home; one that came from the others brought word they were all slain: Some Horsemen returning from the Pursuit, had fallen upon them, whom they at first resisted, but being at last enclosed by them, who were more in Number, they gave back, and were in the End oppressed and killed; he that brought this News was dangerously wounded, and escaped only by the Help of his Shield. I have also by Instructions from God foretold many Events to particular Persons.*

You offer Part of your Kingdom, and invite me to it, not as to a changed Government, but to rule both your Subjects and yourself: But I confess, I have not learned to command, and would no more undertake to rule, not knowing how, than to play at Dice, having never been taught: And doubtless, if other Men were of the same Mind, there would be fewer Troubles in Life; whereas now the Confidence of such as are ignorant, undertaking Things they do not understand, occasions these many Disturbances: Hence is it, they make Fortune greater than she is, and by their own Folly increase her Power. Besides, I am not ignorant, that a King ought to be more honoured and admired than a private Person, and as I would not undertake to be a Horseman, having no Skill in Horsemanship, but had much rather be a Footman, tho' the Charge be less honourable: The same is my Opinion as touching Kings and private Persons, nor puffed up by Ambition will I desire more glorious Affections. They who invented the Fable of Bellerophon *seemed to imply something to this Purpose, for he was oppress with Misfortunes, not because he sought to rise higher in Place, but for aiming at Things above him, and being thrown down from his Hopes, led the rest of his Life poorly and ignominiously, driven by Mocks out of Cities into the Wilderness, and shunning Path-ways, not what we commonly call so, but the Freedom wherewith every one orders his Life. But let this be taken how the Poets please, my Resolution you now hear again, that I will not change this Place for that,* [i] *conceiving this fittest for me; nor is God willing I should, who hath been ever until now, my Counsellor and Guide.*

Epistle II.

YOU are not ignorant how great Esteem we have of Chærephon, *who being chosen Ambassador by the City to the* Peloponnesians, *will perhaps come to you; a Philosopher is entertained with small Trouble, but the Journey is dangerous, especially because of the*

d This Interpretation seems to be confirmed by the Particle ἢ before αὐτὰς. e Otherwise Allatius. f Reading περίσθεμα. g Αλλὰ τῶν μὲν ἑτέρων ἔχειν τὴν αἰτίαν, τὰ δεκαθάπαξ αὐτός. Others τῷ μὲν ἑτέρων; by which we may have some Light to find perhaps the true Reading, ἀλλὰ τῷ μὲν ἑτέρος ἀνέχοι τὴν αἰτίαν. h Perhaps ὑδὲν θαυμαζὸν. i Ἀμείνω δοκῶν. Others, ἀμείνειν δοκῶν. Perhaps, ἀμείνον εἶναι δοκῶν. Or ἐμμενεῖν δοκῶν.

Tumults that are there at this Time, from which, if thou protect him, thou wilt preserve our Friend, and infinitely engage us.

Epistle III.

ANeso *of* Amphipolis *was commended to me at* Potidæa, *he is now coming to* Athens, *being thrown out of his House by the People; for at present Affairs are much embroiled and clouded there, but I believe within a little while they will clear up. In assisting him, you will oblige a deserving Person, and benefit both the Cities;* Amphipolis, *lest by rebelling it incur irremediable Danger; ours, lest we be involved in their Troubles, as at this present we are reduced almost to Extremity for* Potidæa.

Epistle IV.

MEeting *with* Critobulus, *I persuaded him to study Philosophy; but I think he is of another Mind, and more addicted to Affairs of State, in which he intends to make Choice of the fittest Method and best Instructor, for the most excellent sojourn now in* Athens, *and with many of them we are intimate. Thus much concerning him; as for us,* Xantippe *and the Children are well, and I continue to do, as when you were with me.*

Epistle V.

WE *hear you are at* Thebes, *and* Proxenus [i] *gone into* Asia, *to take Part with* Cyrus; *whether your Designs will prosper God knows, they are here condemned by many, for it is conceived unfit the* Athenians *should assist* Cyrus, *thro' whose Means they were deprived of Command by the* Lacedæmonians, *and fight for him who fought against them. It is not therefore strange if the State being altered, some be ready of themselves to accuse you of temporising, and the better your Success is, the greater will be their Calumnies; for I am well acquainted with the Dispositions of some. But since we have undertaken this, let us prove ourselves honest Men, and call to Mind what we use to say of Virtue, accounting this one of the best Sentences of the Poet,* Our Father's House must not be discredited. *Know therefore, that to War these two are requisite, Courage and Bounty; for this we are loved of our Friends; for that, feared of our Enemies: Of both, thou hast domestick Precedents.*

Epistle VI.

I *Have taken such Care of your Strangers as you desired, and retained one to plead their Cause before the People,* [k] *a Friend of ours, who professt himself the readier to undertake it, out of his Desire to serve thee.*

As for that which you write in Jest concerning Wealth, and such as are solicitous for it, perhaps it is not unreasonable. First, because whilst others study to be rich, I choose to live meanly. Then, tho' I might receive many Gifts and Legacies from living and dead Friends; yet I freely disclaim them, and for a Man thus inclined, to be by others judged mad, is nothing strange: But we must examine not this only, but the rest of our Life; and since we disagree in the Use, no Wonder that we differ in the Acquisition of [l] *Riches; my Diet is very sparing, my Habit the same in Winter as in Summer: I never wear Shoes, I am not taken with popular Applause, but with the Study of Wisdom and Integrity. But they who are intemperate, luxurious in Meat, not every Year, but every Day putting on new Apparel, are transported with unlawful Delights; and as they who lose their natural Complexion have Recourse to Paint, so these losing the true Glory of Virtue, which every one ought to have, fly to that which depends upon Complaisance with others, courting vulgar Applause with Largesses and Feasts. Hence I suppose it comes, that they need much Wealth; they themselves cannot live upon a little, nor will others admit them into their Society, unless they receive a Salary for commending them.*

But my Life is well as to both these: I will not deny but in some Things I may fail, I know that wisest Men prefer those, most Men these; Reflecting sometimes within myself upon God, I find that he exceeds us, in that he hath Need of nothing; it is the Property of a most excellent Nature not to want any Thing, and to comprehend within himself all that he enjoys. Thus is he wiser than others, who imitates the most wise, [m] *and happier, who resembles the most happy. If Riches could do this, Riches were to be preferred; but since Virtue only can obtain it, it were Folly to forsake the real Good to pursue the seeming. Hence I cannot easily be persuaded but that my Condition is better than theirs.*

[n] *As for Children, who as you say ought to be provided for, the Care that I take for them, all Men may see, I know but one Ground of Happiness, Wisdom. The Fool who reposeth his Trust in Gold, possesseth not that which he hath, and is withal so much more miserable than others, in that they who are oppressed with Poverty may grow wise hereafter. But he, out of an Opinion of his own Happiness, neglecting true Gain, is corrupted with Plenty.* [o] *Besides, that he never yet obtained Man's essential Good, is deprived of Hope thereof for the future. Nor is it possible that such a Man can go on securely to Virtue, who is entangled in the Flatteries of those who*

i Read Προξενὸν δὲ καλαλαβειν τὴν Ἀσίαν, or διαβαλεῖν εἰς τὴν Ἀσίαν. k Perhaps Lysias. l For Χωμάτων read χρημάτων.
m Read καριώταλον ὑπάρχειν, &c. n Perhaps Πρὸς οἷς ἠτυχησεν, ἤδη γε τῶν ὄντως ἀνθρωπινῶν ἀγαθῶν προσαπεσερήται, &c. or, πρὸς οἷς ἠτύχει ἤδη καὶ τῶν ὄντως ἀνθρωπινῶν ἀγαθῶν προσαπεσερήται τὴν ἐπὶ τῶν μέλλ. &c. Certainly Allatius cannot evince πρὸς οἷς to be used for πρὸς or διὰ οἷς. o Others ἐὰν, ἐ λόγοις μόνον, &c. which I choose, reading immediately after for δηλάδαν ἐς, δήλωσαι τις.

are Masters in all insinuating Arts, and in the Charms of Pleasures which glide into the Soul thro' every Sense, and drive out all wise and sound Judgment. How then can he choose but give his Children Occasion of Folly rather than Instruction, who not only in Words but Actions expresseth that in these Things he hath placed his Hope, who not proving good, their Subsistence fails, and they die miserably for Want of Food, justly punished for their Idleness. Parents are by Law enjoined to bring up their Children till they are Men. But you, perhaps some Citizen, may say to his Sons greedy to inherit, spare me not dying, and whilst you live rely for Maintenance upon me, tho' dead not ashamed to lead a Life more lazy than Death; you expect that my Fortunes should extend to others, even after my Decease, but your own are not competent for yourselves whilst you are yet alive. Such rough Speeches happily he will use to his Children, taking the Liberty both of a Father and a Patriot. My Fortunes in the Estimate of other Men are mean, but in the Effect nothing inferior to the Rich. I will not leave my Children Money, but a more honourable Heritage, discreet Friends, whom, as long as they keep they can want as Necessaries, and if they use them ill, doubtless they would use their Money worse.

But if to you, who know the Negligence of Friends, I seem to give ill Advice; I answer, that all Men are not alike affected to their Friends, for some take Care of them after they are dead, and it is likely that ours are not of a neglectful Humour, but pleas'd with the past Advantage they have received by us, no less than with the present of a short Benefit, the Requital is short; lasting Benefits produce a Return equal to their Profit, and I foresee that what is mine, will hereafter appear more gracious to my Friends, and therefore I exact no Rewards of them. I account nothing of equal Value in Exchange with Philosophy but Friendship, nor like the Sophists, have I any Diffidence of those Things that are mine, for being old they renew, and in their decaying [p] *Age flourish, which makes them more acceptable to the Disciples, and their Father more esteemed;* [q] *Living he obtains Honour, dead is thought worthy of Memory, and if he leave a Kinsman behind him, they will respect him like his Nephews and Brethren, and shew him all Kindness, as being allied to him by more than a natural Affinity; neither, if they would, can they neglect him in Misfortunes, no more than we can slight them who are near to us in Blood; for Affinity in Soul forceth them to relieve the Son of the Dead as if he were their own Brother; when they call to mind his Father, whose Dishonour they account their own.*

Now judge if I order my Affairs ill, or take no Care for my Children, so as when I die they shall be destitute of Necessaries, who leave them not Wealth, but such Guardians as will have a Care of them and Wealth. No History makes mention of any Man that hath been made better by Riches; a tried Friend in this is to be preferred before tried Gold, that he is not beneficial to every one who desires him, but to those he loves best. Nor does he supply only the Necessities of Life, but is serviceable as well to the Soul of him that hath him, and is most conducing to Virtue, without which nothing profiteth; but we will consider more exactly upon these Things when we meet; thus much may serve as a cursory Answer to your Demand.

Epistle VII.

I Wonder not at what you write, that you do suspect the thirty continue the same Mind to us since your Departure, which they had when you were here. As soon as you were gone, they began to have a Jealousy of me, and there past amongst them a Murmur that these Things were not done without Socrates; *within few Days they cited me to the Court, where some Complaints were preferred against me, and when I defended myself, they commanded me to go to the* Pyræum *to apprehend* Leon, *their Intention was to put him to Death, that they might enjoy his Estate, and make me Partner in their Injustice; when I refused, and said something to this Effect, that I would never willingly subscribe to an unjust Act.* Charicles *was present and inwardly vexed.* Socrates, *saith he, dost thou think to talk thus peremptorily, and not suffer ten thousand Ills?* Charicles, *said I, but none so heinous as to do unjustly. He answered not a Word, nor any of the rest, but ever since they have liked me the worse.*

As for you, some were then present, reported that your Affairs succeed to your Wish; that the Thebans *in your Exile received you kindly, and will assist your Return to their utmost. Some were troubled at this News, and the more because it lessened their Hopes of Supply from* Lacedæmon; *for they who came along with the Ambassadors, affirmed, that the* Lacedæmonians *were engaged in a great War, and the* Ephori *hearing of these Troubles, were discontented, and said, that the* Lacedæmonians *had not entrusted them with the City to see it destroyed;* [r] *for if they would have done so, it were most easy for them who had the Command, being withal instigated thereunto by the* Corinthians *and* Thebans, *and that the City might be better governed under an* Oligarchy *than a* Democracy. *If all this be true, and your Affairs succeed as they report, there is great Likelihood that upon your coming in with the* Thebans, *the* Lacedæmonians *not aiding these, all Things here may be easily composed. Besides, many of the Natives who now are quiet through Fear, if they perceived never so little that you were firm, will rea-*

[p] Perhaps ἀναθεγεῖσθαι. So Allatius seems to read. [q] For περὶ δν reading περιὼν. [r] Perhaps σφίσιγε κρατῆσαι, περποιηκέναι ἐξάπλους, &c.

dily

dily forſake this Party, becauſe in this Government of the City nothing is left them entire, but through many and continual Enormities all is in Confuſion; the greater Part is revolted as well as you, the reſt, if they had the leaſt Encouragement from abroad would ſuffer the ſame that you have. So that if no other, yet this Example would manifeſt, that the greateſt Unhappineſs of Cities is the Wickedneſs of their Rulers; for they are ſo blinded with ſelf-intereſt, that they will not deſiſt, tho' they ſee all Things go to Ruin, but with what they firſt troubled, think to ſettle Affairs, continuing Baniſhments, Sequeſtrations, and unjuſt Deaths; not conſidering he is an ill Phyſician who preſcribes for a Remedy the Cauſe of the Diſeaſe. But thoſe are incurable; you ſhall do well to have a Care of yourſelf, for all that are here have but this Hope left, if you act wiſely, to be freed from a heavy and grievous Tyranny.

THE CLOUDS OF ARISTOPHANES:

Added (not as a Comical Divertiſement for the Reader, who can expect little in that Kind from a Subject ſo ancient and particular, but) as a neceſſary Supplement to the Life of Socrates.

ACT I. SCENE I.

Strepſiades, Phidippides, Servant.

Strepſ. OH, oh,
Great *Jove*, how long a Night is this, how endleſs!
Will't ne'er be Day? I heard the Cock again,
Yet ſtill my Servants ſnore; 'tis but of late
They durſt do thus: [a] Curſe o' this War that awes me,
And will not ſuffer me to beat the Rogues.
My good Son ſleeps too, wrap'd o'er Head and Ears:
Well, let me try to bear them Company;
Alas, I cannot, ſo perplex'd and tortur'd
With Charges, Bills for Horſe-meat, Intereſt:
All for this hopeful Son, who in's curl'd Locks,
Aids Matches, keeps his Coach, and dreams of Horſes,
Whilſt I (unhappy!) ſee th'unwelcome Moon
Bring on the Quarter-day, and threaten Uſe-money.
Boy, ſnuff the Light, bring my Account-book hither,
That I may ſum my Debts and Intereſt:
Let's ſee, twelve Pound to *Paſia*, ha! twelve Pound
To *Paſia*, how laid out? to buy [b] *Coppatia*:
Would I had paid this Eye for him.
Phid. Hold, *Philo*,
You're out of the Way, begin again.
Strepſ. Ay, this,
This is the Miſery that ruins me;
His very Sleeps are taken up with Horſes.
Phid. How many Courſes will the Manage hold?
Strepſ. Many a weary Courſe thou lead'ſt thy Father.
But how much more owe I than this to *Paſia*?
Three Pound t' *Aminias* for Chariot Wheels.
Phid. Go Sirrah, take that Horſe and turn him out.
Strepſ. Ay, thou haſt turn'd me out of all my Means.
Charges at Law will eat me up, my Creditors
Threaten to ſue me to an Execution.
Phid. Why do you wake all Night, and toſs ſo, Father?
Strepſ. I cannot ſleep, the Scriv'ner doth ſo bite me.
Phid. Yet let me reſt a little longer.
Strepſ. Do ſo.
All theſe will one Day light upon thy Head,
Curs'd be the Hour when I firſt ſaw thy Mother,
I liv'd before moſt ſweetly in the Country,
Well ſtock'd with Sheep and Bees, Olives and Grapes,
Till from the *Megaclean* Houſe took I
This Niece of *Megacles* out of the City,

[a] The Athenians in Time of War with the Lacedæmonians made an Edict, that no Man ſhould beat his Servants, leſt they ſhould go over to the Enemy. Schol. [b] Their Horſes were named from the Marks they had, if a K, Coppatia; if an S, Samphoras, Schol.

Well fashion'd, highly bred, and richly cloathed;
We married, as I said, and lay together:
I smelling strong of Drugs and greasy Wool;
But she of Unguents, *Crocus*, wanton Kisses,
Of vain Expence, Dainties and Luxury;
I will not tell the idle Life she led,
And yet she spun, that I have often told her,
Shewing this Coat, [c] you spin a fair Thread, Woman.
Serv. Sir all the Oil i' th' Lamp is wasted.
Strepsi. Ha!
Why didst thou put in such a drunken Wick?
If thou wert near me I would beat thee.
Serv. Why Sir?
Strepsi. Because the Wick is thicker than the Oil.
Well, my good Wife, and I betwixt us got
At last this Son; about his Name we differ'd;
She'd have it something that belong'd to Horses,
Callippides, *Xantippus*, or *Charippus*;
I from his Grandfather, *Phidonides*.
Long time we wrangled thus, at last agreed
He should be call'd *Phidippides*; this Son
She takes, and stroaking kindly, thus instructs him,
'When thou art grown a Man frequent the City,
'Follow the Fashion, keep a Coach and Horses,
'Like *Megacles* thy Uncle.' No, said I,
'Go in a homely Coat, and drive thy Goats
'Into [d] *Phelleus*, as thy Father doth.
But my Advice prevail'd so little on him,
That now he wastes my Means in keeping Horses,
Which all this Night I have been thinking how
To remedy, and now have found the Way;
To which could I persuade him, I were happy.
Phidippides, *Phidippides*.
Phid. Your Will, Sir?
Strepsi. Kiss me, give me thy Hand.
Phid. Here, Sir.
Strepsi. Dost love me?
Phid. By *Neptune*, God of Horses.
Strepsi. Do not name
That God, for 'tis from him springs all my Sorrow.
But if thou lov'st me truly, heartily,
O Son, be rul'd.
Phid. In what should I be rul'd?
Strepsi. Change without more Delay thy Course of Life,
And do as I would have thee.
Phid. What is that?
Strepsi. But wilt thou do it?
Phid. Yes, by *Bacchus* will I.
Strepsi. Come hither then, seest thou that little Door?
That is the [e] *Phrontisterium* of wise Souls,
Of learned Men that tell us Heaven's an Oven,
And we the Coals inclos'd in the wide Arch:
They, if we give them but a little Money,
Will teach us to gain all Causes, right or wrong.
Phid. Who can these be?
Strepsi. Their Names I know not; good
They are, and busied in continual Study.
Phid. Oh now I know the Wretches that you mean,
The meagre, wan, proud, bare-foot, begging Fellows,
Whose evil Genius's are *Socrates*
And *Chærephon*.
Strepsi. Peace, talk no more so idly;
If you'll obey a Father, let me see you
Give o'er your Horses and turn one of these.
Phid. Not I, by *Bacchus*, no tho' you should tempt me
With all [f] *Legora*'s Breed of Racers.
Strepsi. Dear Son, be rul'd and learn.
Phid. What should I learn?
Strepsi. 'Tis said they have two Tongues, and one of them
Able to prove any Injustice Reason;
Couldst thou but learn that Language, we were made,
And might dispute our stubborn Creditors
Out of the Debts I have incurr'd for thee;
They get not then a Penny more than Words.
Phid. I cannot do't, were I so lean and pale,
I durst not look a Jockey in the Face.
Strepsi. By *Ceres* then, you stay with me no longer.
You, nor your Coach-Horse, nor your *Sampheras*,
But all together pack out of my Doors.
Phidip. My Uncle *Megacles* will neither see
Me nor my Horses want, so long I care not. *Exit.*

SCENE II.

Strepsiades, *Scholar*.

Strepsi. THO' I have fail'd, I'll not give over thus,
But say my Prayers, and go myself to School
To learn this Art: But how can I, by Age
Dull and forgetful, reach such Subtleties?
Yet on I will, why should I doubt? Ho, Friend.
Schol. A Mischief on you, who's that knocks at Door?
Strepsi. *Strepsiades*, *Cecinnian Phædo*'s Son.
Schol. 'Twas rudely done to knock so hard, y'have made
My labouring Brain miscarry of a Notion.
Strepsi. Forgive me, I was bred far off i'th' Country:
But pray what Notion was't that prov'd abortive?
Schol. 'Tis lawful to discover that to none
But Fellow-Scholars.
Strepsi. Then you may tell me,
For I come hither to be one of you.
Schol. I will; so we will value't as a Mystery.
Socrates t'other Day ask'd *Chærephon*

[c] Σπαθᾶν λίαν τευφᾶν ἢ σπαλιλᾶν. Schol. M. S.
[d] A stonny craggy Place in Attica. In such Goats delight most. Schol. M. S.
[e] Ἐν τῷ διλονότι καθήμενοι φροντίζουσι περὶ θεῶν ἢ μεγάλου πράγματος. Schol. M. S.
[f] Ἄριστος ἱππόδρομος. Schol. M. S.

How

How many of her Feet a Flea could leap,
For one by Chance had bit *Cheræphon*'s Eye-brow,
And leapt from thence upon the Head of *Socrates*.
Strepſ. How could he meaſure this?
Schol. Moſt dexterouſly.
Both Feet o' th' Flea he dipt in melting Wax,
Which ſtrait congeals to Shoes; theſe he plucks off,
And with them more exactly meaſures it.
Strepſ. Great *Jupiter*, how ſubtle are theſe Wits!
Schol. If you ſhould hear their other Speculations,
You would ſay ſo indeed.
Strepſ. Pray what was that?
Schol. This *Chærephon* the *Sphetian* ask'd him once,
If a Gnat ſounded from her Mouth or Tail.
Strepſ. And what ſaid he?
Schol. It had a ſtrait thin Gut,
At End of it a Bladder, into which
The Air being forc'd, ſounded in breaking forth.
Strepſ. Then I perceive that a Gnat's Tail's a Trumpet;
How bleſt is this Anatomiſt of Gnats!
Sure he can hide himſelf from purblind Juſtice,
That knows ſo well theſe dark inteſtine Ways.
Why ſhould we cry up *Thales* any longer?
Come open me your *Phrontiſterium*,
And quickly let me ſee this *Socrates*;
I long to learn; open the Door. — [g] O *Hercules*,
What ſtrange Beaſts have we here?
Schol. Why do you wonder?
Whom do they look like, think you?
Strepſ. Like the poor
Lacedæmonian Captives ta'en at [h] *Pylus*.
Why look they ſo intently on the Ground?
Theſe ſeek out Things that appertain to Earth!
Oh they ſeek Leeks; trouble yourſelves no more, Friends,
For I know better where are good and great ones.
Schol. Come let's go in.
Strepſ. Let's ſtay a little while, and talk with 'em.
Schol. No, no, they cannot long endure the Air.
Strepſ. What's this? for Heaven's ſake ſay?
Schol. This is Aſtronomy.
Strepſ. And this?
Schol. Geometry.
Strepſ. But what is it good for?
Schol. To meaſure Land.
Strepſ. What, Arable, or Paſture?
Schol. No, the whole Earth.
Strepſ. A pretty Jeſt indeed!
That were a mighty Help to Husbandmen!
Schol. Here's all the World; and this is *Athens*.
Strepſ. How?
I'll ſcarce believe that; What's become o'th' Judges?
Where the *Cicennians*, my Countrymen?
Schol. Here; this *Eubœa*; ſee how far 'tis ſtretch'd.
Strepſ. Ay, almoſt ſtretch'd in Pieces betwixt us, and *Pericles*; and where is *Lacedæmon*?
Schol. Here.
Strepſ. 'Tis too nigh us, why with all your Skill
Do you not help to thruſt it farther off?
Schol. It is not poſſible.
Strepſ. No? you will rue it then.
But what Man's that hangs yonder in the Basket?
Schol. That's he?
Strepſ. He, what he?
Schol. Socrates.
Strepſ. How, *Socrates*?
Call him.
Schol. Call him yourſelf, I'm not at Leiſure.

SCENE III.

Strepſiades, Socrates.

Strepſ. HO *Socrates*.
Socr. [i] Why doſt thou call me mortal?
Strepſ. Firſt, I would gladly know what thou doſt there?
Socr. I walk i'th' Air, and gaze upon the Sun.
Strepſ. Why in a Basket doſt thou view the Gods,
Not from the Ground?
Socr. I could not elevate
My Thoughts to Contemplation of theſe Myſteries,
Unleſs my Intellect were thus ſuſpended;
Where my thin Thoughts melt into Air (their Likeneſs)
Stood I upon the Ground, I ſhould find nothing,
Though I ſought ne'er ſo ſtrictly up and down;
For the magnetic Virtue of the Earth
Would draw away the Humour of my Brain,
Juſt as we ſee in Noſe-ſmart.
Strepſ. How, how's that?
Doth the Brain draw the Humour out of Noſe-ſmart?
Come down, ſweet *Socrates*, and teach me quickly
The Knowledge of thoſe Things for which I came.
Socr. What cameſt thou for?
Strepſ. To learn the Art of Speaking.
With Debts and Uſury I'm torn in Pieces,
Toſt up and down, forc'd to pawn all my Goods.
Socr. On what Occaſion did you run in Debt?
Strepſ. By Horſes eaten into this Conſumption;
And I would learn of you ſome other Language,
Which teacheth Men to pay nothing; for which,
By all the Gods, I'll give you what you'll ask.
Socr. By all what Gods? We do not here allow
Thoſe Gods the City worſhips.
Strepſ. How then ſwear you?
By Copper Farthings, like the *Byzantines*?
Socr. Wouldſt thou be skilful in divine Affairs?

g The School diſcovered; the Scholars in ſeveral Poſtures: Socrates hanging in a Basket. h Suid. lib. i The Words of Silenus (whom Socrates reſembled for Deformity) in Pindar Schol.

Strepſ.

Strepſ. By *Jove* (if any ſuch there be) I wou'd.
Socr. You muſt be then acquainted with the *Clouds*.
Our reverend Goddeſſes.
Strepſ. With all my Heart.
Socr. Sit down upon this Couch then.
Strepſ. Well.
Socr. Now take
This Garland.
Strepſ. Why a Garland? alas, *Socrates*,
D'ye mean (like *Athamas*) to ſacrifice me?
Socr. No, theſe are Rites that every one performs
At his Admiſſion.
Strepſ. But what ſhall I gain by't?
Socr. Thou ſhalt be made moſt voluble in Speech,
A very Rattle, bolting Words as fine as Flour.
Strepſ. Thou'rt right, by *Jove*; I ſhall be powdered.
Socr. Silence, old Man, and liſten to our Prayer.
'Great King, unbounded Air, whoſe Arms are
'hurl'd
'About the Surface of this pendant World;
'Bright Æther, reverend Clouds, that from your
'Sphere
'Thunder and Lightning dart, riſe and appear.
Strepſ. Not yet, not yet, till I have wrapt myſelf
Cloſe in my Cloak, leſt I be wet: 'twas ill
That I forgat to bring my Riding-hood.
Socr. 'Your Power, great Clouds, make to this
'Suppliant known;
'Whether now ſeated on *Olympus* Throne,
'Or whether you your ſecret Revels keep
'In the wide Gardens of your Sire, the Deep:
'Or of his flowing Chryſtal ſeven-mouth'd *Nile*,
'In golden Ewers wantonly beguile:
'Or in *Mauritian* Marſhes keep your Court;
'Or on the ſnowy Top of *Mimas* ſport.
'Come, to our fervent Vows propitious be,
'Grace with your Preſence our Solemnity.

CHORUS from the *Clouds*.

'We humid fleeting Deities,
'The bright unbounded Clouds thus riſe
'From our old Sire, the grumbling Flood,
'Above the talleſt Hill or Wood,
'To thoſe high Watch-Towers, whence we may
'The hollowed fruitful Ground ſurvey;
'Rivers that in ſoft Murmurs glide,
'And the loud Sea's rebellious Tide;
'From thence Heaven's reſtleſs Eye diſplays
'The Splendor of his glorious Rays,
'Chaſing all duſty Miſts, that we
'In Shapes divine may Mortals ſee.
Socr. Thanks, reverend Clouds, for favouring thus our Prayer.
Did you not hear 'em ſpeak in Thunder to us?
Strepſ. Great Clouds I worſhip too, but am ſo frighted,
I ſcarce can hold from anſwering your Thunder.
Socr. Jeſt not profanely in ſuch ſacred Rites:
Peace, for the Swarm of Gods come ſinging.
Chor. 'Come Virgin Miſtreſſes of Showers,
'Let's viſit *Pallas'* pregnant Bowers,
'The far renown'd *Cecropian* Plain,
'Where ſhines the [k] *Eleuſinian* Fane,
'Where are the moſt retir'd Abodes,
'Statues and Temples of the Gods:
'Where Altars blaze with Incenſe, where
'The Holy-day laſts all the Year;
'Where the briſk Graces every Spring,
'And Youths with Virgins dance and ſing.
Strepſ. Tell me, good *Socrates*, what Things are theſe
That ſpeak ſo finely? Are they Ladies?
Socr. No,
They're *Clouds*, the Deities of idle Men;
From theſe we have our Senſe, Diſcourſe, and Reaſon,
Our high Capricio's, and elaborate Whimſies.
Strepſ. My Soul, methought, did leap, while they were ſpeaking,
And now moſt ſubtly would diſpute of Smoak,
Sharply confute Opinion with Opinion:
Oh how I long to ſee them once again.
Soc. Look yonder towards *Parnes*; look how gently
They glide to Earth.
Strepſ. Where? ſhew me.
Socr. See in Shoals
They creep into the Caverns of the Mountain.
Strepſ. What Things are theſe? I cannot yet behold 'em.
Socr. There in the Entrance, look.
Strepſ. Yet I ſcarce ſee them.
Socr. Either thou ſeeſt them now, or thou art blind.
Strepſ. I do, by *Jove*, great Clouds, for you hold all!
Socr. Didſt thou not know theſe Deities before?
Strepſ. Not I, I thought them only Miſts and Vapours.
Socr. Thou kneweſt not then thoſe who maintain the Sophiſts.
Strepſ. If theſe be Clouds, how comes it that they look
Like Women? For the Clouds have no ſuch Shape.
Socr. No? What Shape have they then?
Strepſ. I know not juſtly;
They look like flying Fleeces, but, by *Jove*,
Nothing at all like Women; theſe have Noſes.
Socr. [l] Anſwer to what I ask.
Strepſ. Ask me quickly.
Socr. Didſt e'er behold a Cloud ſhap'd like a Centaur,
A Leopard, Bull, or Wolf?
Strepſ. I have, What then?

[k] Μυſτοδοκὸς δόμος at Eleuſis in Attica were celebrated the Myſteries of Ceres, to which Athenians only were admitted, not Strangers; if any diſcovered them to Perſons not initiated, they were both put to Death. Schol. M. S. [l] The Socratick way of Diſpute by Queſtion.

Socr. The Clouds can take what Form they liſt, as when
They ſee a hairy Fellow curl'd like *Clitus*,
They mock his Madneſs in a Centaur's Shape.
Strepſ. And when they ſee one that defrauds or plunders
The Commonwealth, like *Simon*, What then do they?
Socr. They do reſemble him, turn ravenous Wolves.
This was the Reaſon Yeſterday, when they
Beheld [m] *Cleonymus*, they fled like Deer:
And ſeeing [n] *Cliſthenes*, are now turn'd Women.
Strepſ. Great Queens, if you are deſign'd to ſpeak to Mortals,
Make me acquainted with your rumbling Voice.
Chor. 'All hail, old Man! who doſt on Wiſdom prey,
'And thou the Prieſt of ſubtle Trifles, ſay,
'What wouldſt thou have with us? To none but thee,
'Of all the Meteor Sophiſts, thus ſtoop we;
'Save *Prodicus*, to him as grave and wiſe;
'To thee, becauſe thou walk'ſt upright, thy Eyes
'Rowling on every Side, thy Look ſevere,
'And barefoot many Miſeries doſt bear.
Strepſ. Good Heavens! What Voice is this? How ſtrange and ſtately!
Socr. Theſe are our Goddeſſes; the reſt are Toys.
Strepſ. Is then Olympian *Jove* no Deity?
Socr. What *Jove?* There's no ſuch Thing, meer Fancy.
Strepſ. How?
Whence then proceeds all [o] Rain?
Socr. Only from theſe.
Didſt thou e'er ſee a Shower without them? Take
The Clouds away, and Heaven muſt rain fair Weather.
Strepſ. By *Phœbus* thou haſt clear'd it well; till now
I thought *Jove* made Water through a Sieve.
But whence comes Thunder? When I'm ſick, that frights me.
Theſe thunder as they tumble up and down,
How can that be?
Socr. [p] When they are full of Water,
By their own Weight driven upon one another,
They roar and break.
Strepſ. But who is it that drives them?
Is not that *Jove?*
Socr. No, an ætherial Whirlwind.
Strepſ. A Whirlwind! hum; I knew not that till now.
But whence comes Lightning then, that glittering Fire
Which terrifies and burns us? *Jupiter*
Uſeth to dart this down on perjur'd Men.
Socr. And how (thou phlegmatick dull Saturnine,
If darted on the perjur'd, how comes *Sinon*,
Theorus, and *Cleonymus* to 'ſcape it?
No; his own Temple, or the *Sunian* Promontory,
Or ſturdy Oaks he ſtrikes; Did they e'er wrong him?
Did the Oak e'er forſwear itſelf?
Strepſ. I know not:
That which you ſay ſeems Reaſon; But what then
Is Lightning?
Socr. When the Winds are ſhut up cloſe,
They ſwell the Clouds like Bladders, and at laſt
Break out with Violence and horrid Noiſes;
And by Contrition kindle one another.
But thou who ſearcheſt amongſt us for Wiſdom,
How happy wilt thou be above all *Grecians*,
If thou conceive well, and remember, and
Canſt ſuffer much, and never wilt be tired,
Standing or walking, nor have Senſe of Froſt;
Nor care for dining, and refrain from Wine,
From Exerciſes, and all other Toys.
Strepſ. O for a ſolid Soul, reſtleſs with Cares;
Sparing, ſelf-torturing, one that can feaſt
Upon a Diſh of Herbs, you never could
Be better fitted; a meer Anvil I.
Socr. Doſt thou believe no God but thoſe we teach?
The Chaos, Clouds, and Tongue, only theſe three?
Strepſ. I'll not ſo much as ſpeak of any other,
Much leſs beſtow an Offering on their Altars.
Chor. 'Say boldly then, ſay what is thy Requeſt?
'For if thou honour us, thou ſhalt be bleſt.
Strepſ. Great Queens, I ſue for a ſmall Matter; that
I may out-talk all *Greeks* a hundred Furlongs.
Chor. 'To thee alone this Gift we will allow;
'None ſpeak ſuch mighty Sentences as thou.
Strepſ. I do not care for mighty Sentences,
But ſubtle ones, to cheat my Creditors.
Chor. 'It is not much thou ask'ſt, and ſhalt obtain it,
'Learn of our Miniſters, and thou ſhalt gain it.
Strepſ. I ſhall, relying on your Promiſe; forc'd
By Want, *Coppatia*, and a luckleſs Match.
Now let 'em uſe me as they liſt; beat, ſtarve me;
Burn, freeze, or fley me, ſo I eſcape my Debts.
I care not though Men call me impudent,
Smooth-tongu'd, audacious, petulant, abominable,
Forger of Words and Lies, contentious Barretour,
Old, winding, bragging, teſty, crafty Fox.
Socr. Said like a Man of Courage: If thou learn
Of me, thy Fame ſhall ſpread wide as the Heavens.
Strepſ. What ſhall I do?
Socr. Thou ſhalt ſpend all thy Time
With me; a Life the happieſt in the World.
Strepſ. I long to ſee that Day.
Socr. Thy Door ſhall always

m Coward. n Effeminately attired. o Whereof Jupiter was the particular Deity; thence ſirnamed Τῆς ὁμβρίδος, p Deriding Socrates, as ignorant in Natural Philoſophy.

Be

Be throng'd with Clients that will come to thee
For Counſel, and diſcourſe of Caſes worth
The Wealth of Kingdoms, to thy Heart's Deſire.
Chor. 'Try this old Man; firſt ſee if he be fit;
'Put him to th' Teſt, and ſound the Depth of 'sWit.
Socr. Come tell me now your Diſpoſition;
That when I know it I may fit my Machines
Accordingly.
Strepſ. You will not undermine me.
Socr. No, I would know if you have any Memory.
Strepſ. Yes, when another owes me any Thing,
I can remember very well; but what
I owe myſelf, I'm ready to forget.
Socr. Haſt thou a natural Faculty in ſpeaking?
Strepſ. No, I can mar Words ſooner far than make 'em.
Socr. How wilt thou learn then?
Strepſ. Fear me not; I tell you
Well, when I make ſome learned deep Diſcourſe.
Socr. [q] You muſt be ſure to catch't up preſently.
Strepſ. What, muſt I ſnap at Learning like a Dog?
Socr. This is a very Fool, an unknown Clown;
I am afraid, old Man, thou wilt need whipping.
What if thou ſhould'ſt be beaten?
Strepſ. Then I am beaten.
Socr. But what would'ſt do?
Strepſ. I would take Witneſs on't,
And ſue them on an Action of Battery.
Socr. Off with your Cloak.
Strepſ. Why, how have I offended?
Socr. No; but our Orders admit none but naked.
Strepſ. I came not hither to ſteal any thing.
Socr. Down with your Cloak; Why doſt thou trifle?
Strepſ. Now
Tell me if I prove apt and diligent,
Of all your Scholars who ſhall I come higheſt?
Socr. Thou may'ſt, perhaps, be like our *Chærephon.*
Strepſ. Alas, alas! What, an Anatomy?
Socr. No, no: But if thou wilt be any thing,
Follow me without more Delay.
Strepſ. I want
A Cake for your *Cerberus*; I go methinks
As if 'twere into the *Trophonian* Cave.
Socr. On, on; Why ſtayeſt thou gazing at the Door?
Chor. 'Go, for thy Courage bleſt; whoſe aged 'Mind
'To Wiſdom ſoars, and leaves the young behind.

ACT II.

Socrates, Strepſiades.

Socr. BY *Chaos*, and this Air I breathe, I never
Met any thing ſo ſtupid as this Fellow,
So clowniſh and oblivious; eaſy Toys
He learns not half ſo faſt as he forgets 'em;
I'll call him forth; what, ho *Strepſiades*;
Come out, and bring your Bed along with you.
Strepſ. The Fleas will hardly let me bring myſelf.
Socr. Quick, down with't there, and mark what I ſay to you.
Strepſ. I am ready.
Socr. What have you moſt Mind to learn?
Meaſures, or Verſe, or Rhyme?
Strepſ. By all means Meaſures;
For I was cheated by a Meal-man lately,
Two Pecks.
Socr. That's not the Thing that I demand;
I'd know which you conceive the faireſt Meaſure;
The *Trimeter*, or the *Tetrameter*.
Strepſ. The faireſt Meaſure, in my mind, is a Buſhel.
Socr. 'Tis nothing that you ſay.
Strepſ. What will you lay,
That your *Tetrameter* holds not a Buſhel?
Socr. Away, away; how dull thou art, and blockiſh.
But thou wilt be, perhaps, more apt at Rhime.
Strepſ. What Help can Rhimes afford me in my Meal?
Socr. Firſt, they will make thee pleaſant in all Company;
Then thou ſhalt know which ſuits with Anapæſtick,
And which with Dactyles.
Strepſ. Dactyles? I know that ſure.
Socr. Why what's a Dactyle?
Strepſ. What, but this ſame Finger?
'T has been a Dactyle e'er ſince I was a Child.
Socr. Th'art an unprofitable Dunce.
Strepſ. I care not
For learning theſe Devices.
Socr. What then wouldſt thou?
Strepſ. That, unjuſt and cheating Sophiſty.
Socr. But there are Things that muſt be learnt before
You come to that; What Creatures are there maſculine?
Strepſ. Sure I know that, or I were mad indeed.
A Ram, a Bull, a Goat, a Dog, a Pidgeon.
Socr. [r] See how thou err'ſt, that call'ſt both
Male and Female
A Pidgeon.
Strepſ. Right, by *Neptune*; How then muſt I?
Socr. Call this a Cock Pidgeon, and that a Hen.
Strepſ. A Pidgeon, Cock and Hen, ha! by this Air,
For this ſole Document, I will repleniſh
Your [s] *Cardopus* with Meal.
Socr. Again th'art wrong;
Thou call'ſt it *Cardopus*, but 'tis *hæc Cardopus*,
And therefore henceforth call it *Cardopa*.

q As the Scholars of Socrates uſed, eſpecially Xenophon and Plato. The Greek Word hath a maſculine Termination, but feminine Article.

r Deriding Socrates, as ignorant in Grammar.

s A Meal-Trough.

Next it is fit you know which Names are masculine,
And which are feminine.
Strepf. I know well which
Are feminine I'm sure.
Socr. Let's hear.
Strepf. *Philina*,
Cletagora, *Demetria*, and *Lysinna*.
Socr. And which are masculine?
Strepf. A World, *Philoxenus*,
Melesias, and *Aminias*.
Socr. Thou art out.
Strepf. Are not these masculine with you?
Socr. [t] By no means.
How if you saw *Aminias*, would you call him?
Strepf. *Aminia*, ho!
Socr. What, make a Woman of him?
Strepf. And Reason good; h' has thrown away his Arms,
And will not fight. But to what Purpose learn I
These common Trifles?
Socr. Not so common neither:
But come, lie down.
Strepf. What must I do?
Socr. Consider
Within yourself the Business that concerns you.
Strepf. Not in this Bed, I thank you: if I must
Lie down, I'll meditate upon the Ground.
Socr. But here's no Room besides.
Strepf. Wretch that I am,
How shall I be tormented with these Fleas!
Socr. Now think into the Depth of thy Affairs;
Try every Turn and Winding, every Double;
And if you stick at any thing, giv't o'er,
And to some other; but be sure you sleep not.
Strepf. Oh! oh!
Socr. How now, the Matter?
Strepf. I am kill'd
By these Blood-suckers, these *Corinthians*.
Socr. Do not torment yourself.
Strepf. How can I chuse,
When I have neither Money left, nor Colour;
Scarce Life, no Shoes, grown almost to a Ghost with watching?
Socr. Now what think you, nothing?
Strepf. Yes,
By *Neptune*.
Socr. What?
Strepf. I'm thinking of the Fleas
Will leave a Piece of me or not.
Socr. Death on thee.
Strepf. You might have spar'd your Curse, I'm dead already.
Socr. Fy, fy, you must not be so tender, [u] cover
Your Face, and study for some subtle Cheat.
Strepf. Would I could learn to cheat these wicked Fleas.
Socr. Let's see what does he? what, asleep, ha'ye thought
Of nothing yet?
Strepf. What would you have me think on?
Socr. What would you learn?
Strepf. I have told you that already
A thousand Times; I'd learn to pay no Use-money.
Socr. Come then, cover yourself, and subtilize
Your Thoughts, dissect your Business into Atoms.
Strepf. Alas!
Socr. Lye still, and if you stick at any Thing,
Pass by it a while, and come to it again.
Strepf. Ho, my dear *Socrates*.
Socr. What is't old Man?
Strepf. I have found out what will do it.
Socr. As how.
Strepf. First tell me
Where I may meet with some *Thessalian* Witch;
For I would steal the Moon one of these Nights,
And having got her, lock her in a Chest
As charily as I would keep a Glass.
Socr. What wilt thou get by that?
Strepf. What, if the Moon
Ne'er rise again, I'm bound to pay no Use.
Socr. How so?
Strepf. 'Cause Use, you know, is paid by th' Month.
Socr. 'Tis well, but I'll propound another Business;
Suppose that you were tied upon a Statute
To pay five Talents, could you raise Figures?
Strepf. I know not, but I'll try.
Socr. You must not limit
Your Thoughts so narrowly within yourself,
But like a Beetle fetter'd in a Thread,
Allow them play, and flutter in the Air.
Strepf. I ha't, I ha't; the rarest Way to cancel
A Deed, as you'll confess when you have heard it.
Socr. What is't?
Strepf. Did you ne'er see at any Grocer's
A clear transparent Stone, with which they use
To kindle Fire?
Socr. You mean a Burning-glass.
Strepf. The very same.
Socr. What wouldst thou do with it?
Strepf. Whilst that the Scriv'ner writes the Deed, d'ye mark,
Thus standing by him with my Burning-glass
Against the Sun, I'll burn out every Letter.
Socr. Wisely, by all the Graces.
Strepf. How I long
To cancel thus a Bond of fifty Pound.
Socr. 'Tis well, now tell me if thy Adversary
Sue thee, and thou art like to be overthrown
For want of Witnesses, how wilt thou void
His Suit?
Strepf. Most easily.

[t] Effeminate Cowards. [u] So Socrates disputes in Plato's Phædrus, that exterior Objects might not divert him; which Aristophanes here derides.

Socr.

Socr. Which Way?
Strepſ. Before
It comes to Judgment, I would hang myſelf.
Socr. Piſh, thou ſayſt nothing.
Strepſ. Yes, by *Jove* there's none
Will proſecute a Suit againſt the Dead.
Socr. Away, thou fool'ſt, I'll teach no more.
Strepſ. Dear *Socrates*
Why?
Socr. Thou forgetſt as faſt as thou canſt learn.
Tell me the firſt Thing thou wert taught to day.
Strepſ. The firſt; ſtay let me ſee; the firſt Thing ſay you?
How call you that we uſe to put our Meal in?
Wretch I have forgot it!
Socr. See, deſerveſt thou not
Forgetful to be puniſh'd for a Dunce?
Strepſ. Alas, what ſhall I do? for if I learn not
The cheating Language, I'm quite undone.
Good Clouds adviſe me what Courſe I ſhall take.
Cho. 'If an ingenious Son thou haſt at home,
'Thou hadſt beſt ſend him hither in thy Room.
Strepſ. I have a Son, and he's ingenious too;
But will not learn, the more my Miſery.
Cho. 'And wilt thou ſuffer it?
Strepſ. Of a promiſing Perſon
His Mother is a Woman of great Spirit:
Once more I'll try; if he refuſe, I'll make
No more ado but turn him out of Doors;
Stay but a while, I'll be quickly back.

ACT III.

Strepſiades, Phidippides, Socrates.

Strepſ. NOW by the Clouds thou ſtay'ſt no longer here?
Hence, and go feed in *Megacles* his Stable.
Phid. Alas, what Fury hath poſſeſt you, Father?
By *Jove* I think you are beſides yourſelf.
Strepſ. See, ſee, he ſwears by *Jove*, art thou not mad
At theſe Years to believe there is a *Jove?*
Phid. Is Truth to be derided?
Strepſ. Well, I ſee
Th'art ſtill a Child, and credit'ſt old Wives Tales.
Come, and I will tell thee what ſhall make thee
A Man, ſo you be ſure to tell it no body.
Phid. Pretty; what is it?
Strepſ. Thou ſwor'ſt e'en now by *Jove.*
Phid. I did ſo.
Strepſ. See how good it is to learn;
There's no ſuch Thing as *Jove.*
Phid. What then?
Strepſ. A Whirl-wind
Hath blown *Jove* quite away, and rules all Heaven.
Phid. What Fooleries are theſe?
Strepſ. They are ſerious Truth, Son.
Phid. Who tells you ſo?
Strepſ. Our *Socrates* the [w] *Melian*,
And *Chærephon*, that trace the Steps of Fleas.
Phid. How are you grown to ſuch a Height of Madneſs
As to believe ſuch melancholly Dreamers?
Strepſ. Good Words: Defame not Men of ſuch deep Wiſdom
And ſubtle Spirits; theſe live ſparingly,
Are never at the Charges of a Barber,
Unguents or Baths, whereas thou waſteſt my Means
As freely as if I were dead already.
Come then, and be their Scholar in my Room.
Phid. What can be learnt that's good of ſuch as they are?
Strepſ. All Things that are accounted Wiſdom, Boy;
And firſt to know thyſelf, and what a Dunce
Thou art, how blockiſh, ruſtick, and forgetful.
But ſtay a little, cover thy Face a While.
Phid. Alas! my Father's mad, what ſhall I do,
Accuſe him to the Court of Folly, or
Beſpeak a Coffin for him, for he talks
Idly, as he were drawing on?
Strepſ. Come on now.
Let's ſee what's that?
Phid. A Pigeon.
Streph. Good; and that?
Phid. A Pigeon.
Strepſ. Both the ſame? ridiculous.
Take Heed you make not ſuch Miſtakes hereafter.
This you muſt call a Cock, and that a Hen.
Phid. A Hen? Is this the goodly Learning, Father,
You got ſince your Admiſſion amongſt theſe Earth-worms?
Strepſ. This and a great deal more; but being old,
I ſoon forget what I am taught.
Phid. I think
'Twas want of Memory made you loſe your Cloak.
Strepſ. No, 'tis hung up upon the Arts and Sciences.
Phid. And where your Shoes?
Strepſ. Loſt for the common Good,
Like *Pericles:* But let's be gone and ſee
You learn to obey me, and to wrong all elſe.
Remember that I bought thee, when thou wert
But ſix Years old, a little Cart to play with.
Phid. Alas, you'll be the firſt that will repent this.
Strepſ. Take you no Care for that, do as I bid you.
Ho, *Socrates*, I've brought my Son at laſt,
Tho' much againſt his Will.
Socr. Ay, that's becauſe
He's rude, untaught, a Child of Ignorance,
And unacquainted with our hungry Baskets.
Phid. Go hang yourſelf in one of them.

[w] As if he ſhould ſay, the Atheiſt: For the Melians were infamous for Atheiſm from Diagoras who profeſt it, Socrates was Scholar to Ariſtagoras a Melian, See Chap. 3.

Strepſ.

Strepſ. How Impudence! doſt thou talk thus to thy Maſter?
Socr. So go hang, with what a ſeeming Grace was that pronounc'd!
How do you think that he ſhould ever learn
To overthrow a nimble Adverſary,
Or win a Judge's Heart with Rhetorick?
Strepſ. Fear not, but teach him; he's ingenious
By Nature; for when he was but a little one,
He'd build you Houſes, and make Leather Coaches,
And Ships, and cut Frogs out of Apple Parings.
What's your Opinion then? Do you not think
He's capable to learn both Languages?
Or if not both, be ſure he learn the worſe.
Socr. Well, we ſhall try what may be done with him.
Strepſ. Farewell, and ſo remember that in all I ſay that's juſt you learn to contradict me.

ACT IV. SCENE I.

Strepſiades.

Strepſ. THE [x] fifth, the fourth, the third, the ſecond! hum;
The moſt abhorr'd and dreadful Day's at Hand,
The old and new; all I owe Money to
Threaten to ſue, and vow my utter Ruin;
Yet I require nothing but what is juſt Reaſon:
My Friend, forbear me till ſome other Time;
But they all anſwer me, Words are no Payment,
Revile me, ſwear they'll put their Bonds in Suit,
And let 'em, what care I, ſo my *Phidippides*
Have learnt the Art of Cheating: I ſhall know ſtreight;
It is but knocking at the School; ho Son!

SCENE II.

Strepſiades, Socrates.

Socr. SAve you, *Strepſiades.*
Strepſ. The like to you.
Firſt [y] take this Bag of Meal, for it is fit
We pay our Duty to our reverend Maſter.
Now tell me, has my Son attain'd the Art
For which I plac'd him with you?
Socr. Yes, exactly.
Strepſ. Thanks to Deceit, the Queen that governs all Things.
Socr. Now you may overthrow all Adverſaries.
Strepſ. What tho' a Witneſs ſwear that I have borrow'd.
Socr. Ay, tho' a thouſand ſwear it.
Strepſ. Io, Io.
Triumph my Boys, woe to you Money-mongers,
You and your Bonds, your Uſe on Uſe may hang now,
You'll trouble me no more! O what a Son
Have I, that fenceth with a two-edg'd Tongue,
My Houſe's Prop and Guardian, my Foes Terror,
Quickly come forth, and meet my glad Embraces,
Come forth and hear thy Father.
Socr. See the Man.
Shrepſ. O my dear Boy!
Socr. Away, and take him with you.

SCENE III.

Strepſiades, Phidippides.

Strepſ. IO my Son! O how I joy to ſee
Thy chang'd Complexion! Thou look'ſt now methinks
As thou wert inſpir'd with Contraction,
I read croſs Queſtions in thy very Face,
Thy very Eyes methinks ſay, how, how's that?
Thou can'ſt perſwade the World that thou art wrong'd,
When thou art he that does the Wrong. I ſee't
I plainly ſee't; a very *Attick* Mien;
Now let it be thy Study to recover
Him, whom thou almoſt haſt undone.
Phid. Why, what
Is't that you fear?
Strepſ. The old and the new Day.
Phid. Can one and the ſame Day be old and new?
Strepſ. I know that: I'm ſure my Creditors
By Joint-conſent that Day threaten to ſue me.
Phid. They'll loſe by it if they do: For, 'tis impoſſible
To make two Days of one.
Strepſ. How is't impoſſible?
Phid. As for a Woman to be old and young
At once.
Strepſ. But Law has ſo determin'd it.
Phid. But theſe Men know not what the Law doth mean.
Strepſ. Why, what's the Meaning of it?
[z] *Phid.* Ancient *Solon*
Was naturally a Lover of the People.
Strepſ. What's that to this?
Phid. He did appoint two Days,
The laſt Day of the old Month for Citation,
The firſt o'th' new for Payment of the Money.
Strepſ. But why the laſt Day for Citations?
Phid. That
The Debtor having thus one Day of Warning
Might fly and ſhun the Trouble of the next.
Strepſ. Why do the Magiſtrates then take all Forfeits
Upon the old and new Day?
Phid. They are hungry,
And taſte their Meat before they ſhould fall too.
Strepſ. Io, ye Fools that ſit ſtill and do nothing,
We that are wiſe and quick have done the Buſineſs;
Ye Blocks, ye Stones, ye Sheep, ye empty Bubbles;
Let me congratulate this Son of mine,

x From the twentieth Day of the Month they reckoned backward. See the Life of Solon. y Such Gifts Socrates ſometimes accepted, tho' not Money. z See the Life of Solon.

Myſelf and my good Fortune in a Song.
'Now *Strepſiades* th'art bleſt,
'Of the moſt diſcreet the beſt,
'What a Son thou haſt, now may
'All my emulous Neighbours ſay,
'When they hear that he alone
'Hath my Creditors o'erthrown.'
But come my Boy, now thou ſhalt feaſt with me.

SCENE IV.

Paſias, Strepſiades, Witneſs.

Paſ. AND muſt a Man be outed of his own thus?
Better take any Courſe than ſuffer this.
You muſt aſſiſt me in this Buſineſs, Neighbour,
That I may call my Debtor to account;
There's one Friend made a Foe; yet I'll not ſhame
My Country, e'er I do it, I'll give him Warning.
Strepſiades.
Strepſ. How now, what would you have?
Paſ. The old and new Day's come.
Strepſ. Bear Witneſs, Friend,
He nam'd two Days. What Sum is't you demand?
Paſ. Twelve Pounds you borrow'd when you bought your Son
A Race-Horſe; with the Intereſt.
Strepſ. A Race-Horſe!
You know I ne'er car'd for 'em in my Life.
Paſ. And ſwore by *Jove* and all the Gods to pay it.
Strepſ. By *Jove?* 'Twas then before my Son had learnt
The all-convincing Speech.
Paſ. You'll not deny it.
Strepſ. What have I got but that for all this Learning?
Paſ. Dar'ſt thou deny it, if I ſhould put thee to
Thy Oath, and make thee call the Gods to witneſs it?
Strepſ. What Gods d'ye mean?
Paſ. *Jove*, *Mercury* and *Neptune*.
Strepſ. By *Jove?* Yes that I will, I hold thee Three-pence.
Paſ. Curſe on thee for this Impudence.
Strepſ. If thou wert rubb'd with Salt, 'twould make thy Wit the quicker,
Paſ. D'ye laugh at me?
Strepſ. Thou wilt take up ſix Buſhels.
Paſ. So help me, *Jupiter*, and all the Gods,
I will be even with you for this Scorn.
Strepſ. I'm extremely taken with your Gods,
And this fame *Jupiter* you ſwear by, they
Are excellent Paſtime to a knowing Man.
Paſ. Well, you will one Day anſwer for theſe Words.
But tell me whether I ſhall have my Money
Or not, give me my Anſwer, and I am gone.
Strepſ. Stay but a little, I will anſwer preſently,
And plainly.
Paſ. Sure he's gone to fetch the Money.
Strepſ. Where is the Man that comes to ask me Money?
Tell me, what's this?
Paſ. That which it is, a *Cardopus*.
Strepſ. You ask for Money, and ſo very a Dunce!
I'll never whilſt I live pay him a Penny,
That calls a *Cardopa* a *Cardopus*.
Paſ. You will not pay then?
Strepſ. Not for ought I know:
You'll ſtay no longer, pray about your Buſineſs.
Paſ. Yes, I'll be gone, but in the mean time know
I'll have my Money, if I live this Day.
Strepſ. You may chance to go without it; yet I'm ſorry
You ſhould be puniſh'd ſo for a Miſtake,
For ſaying *Cardopus* for *Cardopa*.

SCENE V.

Amynias, Strepſiades, Witneſs.

Amyn. OH, oh, alas!
Strepſ. Who's that keeps ſuch a Bawling?
What art thou? one of [a] *Karkinus*'s Sons?
Amyn. 'Tis I, unhappy I!
Strepſ. Keep it to thyſelf.
Amyn. Unlucky Chance, oh cruel Deſtiny,
To ſpoil at once my Cart and all my Horſes!
Oh [b] *Pallas*, how unkindly haſt thou uſed me?
Strepſ. What Hurt did ever *Tlepolemus* do thee?
Amyn. Deride me not, but rather bid your Son
Pay the Money which he had of me,
For I was never in more Need of it.
Strepſ. What Money, Man?
Amyn. That which he borrowed of me.
Strepſ. Then I perceive you're in a ſad Condition.
Amyn. I had a ſcurvy Fall driving my Horſes.
Strepſ. Thou doſt but jeſt, 'twas driving an Aſs rather.
Amyn. I do not jeſt when I demand my Money.
Strepſ. Upon my Word thou art not right.
Amyn. How ſo?
Strepſ. Thy Brain, methinks is troubled.
Amyn. Either pay me
My Money ſtrait, or I will trouble you.
Strepſ. Tell me, Doth *Jove* beget and ſend down Rain,
Or doth the Sun exhale it from the Sea?
Amyn. I neither know nor care.
Strepſ. What? are you fit
To receive Money, and ſo ignorant
Of theſe ſublime and ſubtle Myſteries?
Amyn. Well, if you cannot let me have the Principal,
Pay me the Intereſt.

[a] Which were Xenocles, Xenotimus, and Demotimus, Tragick Poets and Actors. [b] This and the following Line are taken from Xenocles the Tragedian, which is the Reaſon of Strepſiades his Anſwer.

Strepſ. Intereſt, what Kind
Of Creature's that?
Amyn. What, but the Increaſe of Money
By Months and Days, as Time runs on.
Strepſ. 'Tis well.
And do you think the Sea is fuller now
Than 'twas at firſt?
Amyn. No, not a Drop, it is
Not fit it ſhould.
Strepſ. The Sea by your Confeſſion
Is nothing grown; then with what Conſcience
Can you deſire your Money ſhould increaſe.
Go get you from my Doors, fetch me a Whip there.
Wit. Well, I'll bear Witneſs for him.
Strepſ. Why d'ye not go, will you move [c] *Samphoras?*
Amyn. Is not this riotous?
Strepſ. Will you be gone?
Or ſhall I lead you in a Chain, and make you
Shew Tricks? If you ſtay but a little longer,
I'll ſend you and your Cart and Horſes packing.
Chor. 'Now, obſerve what 'tis to bend
'Studies to an evil End.
'This old Man, that is intent
'Creditors to circumvent,
'Fooliſhly himſelf hath croſt,
'And will find ſo to his Coſt;
'That in this falſe Art his Son
'Hath attain'd Perfection:
'Juſtice cunning to refute,
'That at laſt he'll wiſh him mute.

ACT V. SCENE I.

Strepſiades, Phidippides.

Strepſ. O Neighbours, Kinſmen, Countrymen, help, help,
I'm beat, all, all over, oh my Head, my Back!
Thou ſtrick'ſt thy Father, Rogue.
Phid. I do ſo, Father.
Strepſ. See, ſee, he ſtands in't too.
Phid. I do indeed.
Strepſ. Thief, Villain, Parricide.
Phid. More I beſeech you,
I am much taken with theſe pretty Titles.
Strepſ. Raſcal.
Phid. Pray ſtick me fuller of theſe Roſes:
Strepſ. Doſt beat thy Father?
Phid. Yes, by *Jove*, and juſtly.
Strepſ. Oh Rogue, what Juſtice can there be in that?
Phid. I will demonſtrate it by Argument.
Strepſ. By Argument?
Phid. Moſt eaſily, which Language ſhall I diſpute in?
Strepſ. Language?
Phid. Yes, the greater
Or leſſer?
Strepſ. I have bred thee well indeed
If thou canſt make this good, that any Son
May beat his Father.
Phid. You'll confeſs as much
If I ſo prove it, that you cannot anſwer it.
Strepſ. Well, I will hear for once what you can ſay.

SCENE II.

Chorus, Strepſiades, Phidippides.

Chor. OLD Man, it much concerns you to confute
'Your Son, whoſe Confidence appears to ſuit
'With a juſt Cauſe; how happen'd this Diſpute?
Strepſ. I ſhall relate it from the firſt; as ſoon
As we had dined, I took a Lute and bid him
Sing the Sheep-ſhearing of *Simonides*:
He told me 'twas an old and ugly Faſhion
To ſing at Dinner like a Miller's Wife.
Phid. And was not this ſufficient to deſerve
A Beating; when you'd make Men chirp like Graſs-hoppers? [d]
Strepſ. Juſt ſo he ſaid within; and added that,
Simonides was an unpleaſant Poet.
I muſt confeſs I hardly could forbear him;
But then I bid him take a Myrtle-branch
And act ſome Piece of *Æſchylus*: That *Æſchylus*,
Saith he, is of all Poets the abſurdeſt,
The harſheſt, moſt diſorderly, and bombaſt.
Did not my Heart pant at this Language think you?
Yet I repreſt it; then ſaid I, rehearſe
A learned Speech out of ſome modern Wit;
He ſtrait repeats out of *Euripides*
A tedious long Oration, how the Brother
(Good Heavens) did violate the Siſter's Bed.
Here I confeſs I could contain no longer
But chid him ſharply; to diſpute we went,
Words upon Words, till he at laſt to Blows,
To ſtrike, to pull, to tear me.
Phid. And not juſtly?
You that would diſcommend *Euripides*,
The wiſeſt of all Poets.
Strepſ. Wiſeſt? ah
What did I ſay? I ſhall be beat again.
Phid. By *Jove* and you deſerve it,
Strepſ. How, deſerve it?
Ungrateful Wretch, have I not brought thee up,
Fed and mantain'd thee from a little one,
Supply'd thy Wants? How then can I deſerve it?
Chor. 'Now I believe each youthful Breaſt
'With Expectation poſſeſt,
'That if the Glory of the Day
'Be from the Plaintiff born away,
'By this Example they may all
'Upon the old Men heavy fall;

[c] The Horſe's Name which he bought of him.

[d] At Noon. Virg. Ecl. 2.

'What

‘ What you have done with utmoſt Art,
‘ To juſtify is now your Part.
Phid. How ſweet it is to ſtudy, ſage new Things;
And to contemn all fundamental Laws!
When I applied my Mind to Horſe-courſing
I could not ſpeak three Words but I was out;
Now ſince I gave it o'er, I am acquainted
With ponderous Sentences, and ſubtle Reaſons,
Able to prove I ought to beat my Father.
Strepſ. Nay, follow Racing ſtill, for I had rather
Maintain thy Horſes, than be beaten thus.
Phid. I will begin where you did interrupt me,
And firſt will ask, Did you not beat me when
I was a Child?
Strepſ. But that was out of Love.
Phid. 'Tis very right, tell me then, ought not I
To recompence your Love with equal Love?
If to be beaten be to be belov'd,
Why ſhould I ſuffer Stripes, and you have none?
I am by Nature born as free as you;
Nor is it fit the Sons ſhould be chaſtiz'd,
And not their Parents.
Strepſ. Why?
Phid. You urge the Law,
That doth allow all Children to be beaten:
To which I anſwer, old Men are twice Children,
And therefore ought, when they offend, be puniſhed
As well as we.
Strepſ. But there's no Law that ſays
The Parents ſhould be puniſhed.
Phid. Was not he
Who made that Law, a Man as you and I?
He form'd a Law, which all the old Men follow'd.
Why may not I as well preſcribe another,
And all the young Men follow my Advice?
But all the Blows before this Law was made
Muſt be forgiven without all Diſpute.
Beſides, mark how the Cocks and other Creatures
Fight with their Sires, who differ not at all
From us, ſave only that they make no Laws.
Strepſ. Why then if you will imitate the Cocks,
Do you not dine upon a Dunghill, and
Lodge in a Hen-rooſt?
Phid. 'Tis not all one Caſe,
Our *Socrates* doth not approve ſo far.
Strepſ. Approve not then their Fighting, but in this
Thou pleadeſt againſt thyſelf.
Phid. How ſo?
Strepſ. Becauſe
Th'Authority I exerciſe o'er thee
Will be thine own, when e'er thou haſt a Son.
Phid. But if I ne'er have any, then I never
Shall have Authority, and you will go
To th'Grave deriding me.
Strepſ. 'Tis too much Reaſon.
Phid. Hear now another Argument.

Strepſ. I'm loſt.
Phid. And then perhaps you'll take the Blows I give you
Not half ſo ill.
Strepſ. What Good ſhall I get by them?
Phid. I'll beat my Mother too?
Strepſ. What ſayſt thou?
Why this is worſe than t'other.
Phid. What if I
Prove by the ſecond Language that I ought?
Strepſ. Why then you will have nothing more to do
But prove that you, and your wiſe *Socrates*,
And wiſer Language may hang all together.
O Clouds, all this I ſuffer through your Means,
For I in you wholly repos'd my Truſt.
Chor. ‘ Thyſelf art Author of this Miſery,
‘ Becauſe to ill thou didſt thy Mind apply.
Strepſ. Why did you then give me no Warning of it?
You know I was a rude and aged Man.
Chor. ‘ This is our Cuſtom whenſo'er we find
‘ Any to Malice or Deceit inclin'd,
‘ Into ſome dreadful Miſchief ſuch we thruſt,
‘ That they may fear the Gods, and learn what's juſt.
Strepſ. Alas, this is a Miſchief, and a juſt one,
For ought I not, when I had borrowed Money,
To ſeek out Ways t'avoid reſtoring it.
Come then, my Son, let's be reveng'd
Upon that wicked *Socrates* and *Chærephon*,
Who have abus'd us both.
Phid. I will not wrong
My Maſters.
Strepſ. Reverence Celeſtial *Jove*.
Phid. Celeſtial *Jove*, ſee how you rave now Father:
There's no ſuch Thing as *Jove*.
Strepſ. There is.
Phid. [e] A Whirl-wind
Hath blown *Jove* quite away, and rules all Heaven.
Strepſ. No Son, he's not expell'd, I was but fool'd
To worſhip in his Room a fictile Deity.
Phid. Nay, if you will needs be mad, be mad alone.

SCENE III.

Strepſiades.

Strepſ. MAD that I was to truſt in *Socrates*, and caſt off all our Gods; good *Mercury*,
Be not diſpleas'd, or puniſh, but forgive me,
That took ſuch Pains, and ſtudied to talk idly,
And tell me what I'd beſt do with theſe Fellows,
Sue them or puniſh 'em ſome other Way—
Th'art in the Right, I will not ſue them then,

[e] Act III.

But as thou bidſt me, ſet their Neſt on Fire;
Come *Xanthias*, come, a Fork and a Ladder quickly.
Get up and pluck the Houſe about their Ears,
Quick, if thou loveſt thy Maſter; one of you
Go light a Torch, and bring it hither ſtrait,
Proud as they are I mean to bring 'em lower.

SCENE IV.

Scholar, Strepſiades, Socrates, Chærephon.

Schol. OH, oh!
Strepſ. Torch to thy Work; ſet Fire apace.
Schol. What art thou doing, Man?
Strepſ. That which I am doing;
Diſputing ſomewhat hotly with your School here.
Schol. Alas, who's this that ſets our Houſe on Fire?
Strepſ. He whom you coſen'd of his Cloak.
Schol. Thou kill'ſt,
Thou kill'ſt us, Man.
Strepſ. That is the Thing I mean,
If my Fork hold, and Ladder do not fail me.
Socr. How now, what do you make on our Houſe-ridge.
Strepſ. [f] I walk in the Air and gaze upon the Sun.
Socr. Alas, I'm choak'd.
Strepſ. Why doſt thou ſcorn the Gods then?
Chær. Oh me, I burn;
Strepſ. Now you may calculate
The Motions of the Moon; tear, pluck, beat, burn 'em.
For many Reaſons they deſerve the Flame,
But moſt becauſe they did the Gods diſclaim.

f Act. II. Scene III.

XENOPHON.

CHAP. I.

His Country, Parents, and following of Socrates.

XEnophon [g] was an *Athenian*, Son of *Cryllus*, of the *Erchiean* Tribe. The Time of his Birth is no where expreſly delivered. [h] *Steſiclides* affirms, *he died the firſt Year of the one hundred and fifth Olympiad.* [i] Lucian *that he outlived ninety Years:* Whence it is evident he was born at or before the firſt Year of the eighty ſecond Olympiad, which if the learned *Caſaubon* had obſerved, he had not [k] altered *Athenæus* upon Suppoſition that he was but ten Years old, the 4th Year of the eighty ninth Olympiad (the Time of his *Sympoſium*) whereas he was then no leſs than thirty-ſix Years of Age *Laertius* [l] ſaith, *he flouriſhed the fourth Year of the ninety-fourth Olympiad.* (*Suidas* reads *of the ninety eight*) or, according to others, that *he flouriſhed in the eighty ninth Olympiad with the reſt of the* Socratick *Philoſophers*; of whom he became one upon this Accident.

[m] Meeting *Socrates* in a narrow Lane, he ſtopt him with his Staff, and asked him where all Kind of Meats were to be ſold; to which *Socrates* made a ſerious Anſwer: And then demanded of him, where it was that Men were made good and virtuous? Whereat *Xenophon* pauſing, *follow me then*, ſaith he, *and learn.* From thence forward he became a Diſciple of *Socrates*.

In the Time of that great War betwixt the *Lacedemonians* and *Athenians*, called the *Peloponneſian War*, (the natural Forwardneſs of his Spirit, being perhaps excited by the Example of his Maſter *Socrates*) he was perſonally engaged in the Fight before *Delium*, the firſt Year of the 89th Olympiad, wherein the *Bœotians* overcame the *Athenians*; in which Defeat [n] *Xenophon* in the Flight, unhorſed and thrown down, *Socrates* (who, his Horſe being likewiſe ſlain under him, fought on Foot) took him upon his Shoulders, and carried him many Furlongs, until the Enemy gave over the Purſuit. This was the firſt Eſſay of his Military Profeſſion, which he afterward reſumed upon this Occaſion.

CHAP. II.

Upon what Occaſion he followed Cyrus *into* Aſia.

ARtaxerxes [o] ſucceeded *Darius* his Father, in the Kingdom of *Perſia*, *Cyrus* his younger Brother having been ſent for out of his Government of *Lydia* upon his Father's Sickneſs, which is that firſt ἀνάβασις, plac'd by the *Arundelian* Stone in the ſecond Year of the 93d Olympiad (confounded by a learned [p] Perſon with the latter, ſix Years after) was impriſoned by his Brother upon the Accuſation of *Triſſaphernes*, but releaſed by the Mediation of his Mother *Paryſatis*. Being returned to his Go-

g Laert. 2. 48. h Ibid. 2. 56. i De Longæv. k Animadv. 5. 12. l Laert. 2. 56. m Ibid. 2, 48. n Strab. 1. 9. Laert. 2. 23. o Xenoph. expedit. Cyr. lib. 1. p Marſham ad Græc. Epoc. can. Chronog. pag. 113.

vernment,

vernment, he uſed all ſecret Means to ſtrengthen himſelf. The *Ionian* Cities were delivered to *Tiſſaphernes* by *Artaxerxes*, but revolted to him, all except *Myletus*. His Pretences for levying Forces were, the garriſoning of thoſe Cities, and his oppoſing *Tiſſaphernes*. *Clearchus* likewiſe raiſed for him many in *Cherſoneſus*, upon Pretence of warring againſt the *Thracians*. He privately alſo kept an Army on Foot in *Theſſaly* under *Ariſtippus*: And *Proxenus* of *Bœotia* brought him Forces as againſt the *Piſidians*; this *Proxenus* (who had been Scholar to *Gorgias* the *Leontine*, and [q] Gueſt to *Xenophon*) ſent to invite him to *Cyrus*, aſſuring him he ſhould be of more Eſteem with him than of his own Country. *Xenophon* conſulted with *Socrates* about this Letter, who doubting that if he took Part with *Cyrus*, the *Athenians* ſhould be diſpleaſed with him (*Cyrus* having before aided the *Lacedæmonians* againſt them) counſelled him to ask the Advice of the *Delphian* Oracle, *Xenophon* went thither, and demanded of *Apollo* to which of the Gods he ſhould addreſs his Vows, and ſacrifice for the good Succeſs of his intended Journey. He was anſwered, that he ſhould ſacrifice to thoſe Gods to whom it was due. Returning to *Athens*, he imparted this Oracle to *Socrates*, who blam'd him, becauſe he had not demanded whether it was beſt to ſtay or no, but (as already determined to go) how he might beſt perform his Journey. Nevertheleſs (ſaith he) ſince you have ſo propoſed your Demand, you muſt do as the Gods command. *Xenophon* having ſacrificed according to the Oracle's Direction, took Shipping, and at *Sardis* found *Proxenus* and *Cyrus* ready for their Expedition into *Aſia*; and was immediately recommended to *Cyrus*, being by both earneſtly intreated to ſtay. He continued with him [r] not in any Command, but as a Voluntier. [s] In which Condition he did not any Thing misbeſeeming a Soldier, whereupon he was in the Number of thoſe whom *Cyrus* eſteemed moſt.

[t] *Cyrus* having drawn all his Forces together, marched up and gave Battle to *Artaxerxes* (in the Beginning of the fourth Year of the ninety-fourth Olympiad, when *Xenenetus* was *Archon*) at *Cunaxa*, five hundred Stadia from *Babylon*, by the River *Euphrates*. Whilſt he was viewing both Armies, he told *Xenophon*, who rode up to him, that the Sacrifices were auſpicious; then *Xenophon* gave him the *Grecians* Word, *Jupiter the Preſerver*. The *Greeks* prevailed againſt *Tiſſaphernes*, but *Cyrus* aſſaulting, the King was through his too much Forwardneſs ſlain. The *Grecians* thinking themſelves Maſters of the Field, and *Cyrus* to be alive, returned to their Camp, which they found rifled by the Enemy. [u] The next Day the King ſending *Phalinus* to them to deliver their Arms, *Xenophon* anſwered, *That they had nothing left but their Arms and Valour; as long as they kept their Arms, they might uſe their Valour, ſurrendering them, they were not Maſters of themſelves. It were Indiſcretion* (ſaith he) *to ſurrender what we have left, ſince thereby perhaps we may make ourſelves Maſters of what you have.* Phalinus ſmiling, replied, *Young Man, you look and ſpeak like a Philoſopher; but aſſure yourſelf your Valour will not over-maſter the King's Power.* *Clearchus* returned this Anſwer for the whole Army: *If we be eſteemed Friends, it will be better for him that we are armed, if Enemies, better for ourſelves.* *Tiſſaphernes* having made a Truce with *Clearchus*, perfidiouſly got him with four other Commanders, *Proxenus*, *Menon* ([w] with whom *Xenophon* had particular Enmity) *Agias* and *Socrates*, twenty Captains of Cohorts, and two hundred common Soldiers into his Power; and delivering them up to the King, they were beheaded. The *Greeks* being ſummoned to lay down their Arms, pretending that *Clearchus* was executed for Treaſon diſcovered by *Menon* and *Proxenus*, who were very highly rewarded, *Xenophon* required to have them ſent who were fitteſt to direct them, being Friends to both; whereto the *Perſians* not able to anſwer, departed.

CHAP. III.

How he brought off the Grecians *Army.*

THE [x] *Greeks* finding themſelves in ſuch a Strait, were in Deſpair ever to ſee their Country again. *Xenophon* calling together the Officers of *Proxenus*, told them, *They were not to expect any Mercy from the King, who had ſhewn none to the Body of his dead Brother, having faſtened his Head and Hand to a Gibbet, and that they muſt reſolve to put their Safety in their Arms.* *Apollonides* a *Bœotian* alledged, that there was no Means of Safety but in the King's Favour, and began to reckon the Dangers wherewith they were ſurrounded. *Xenophon* anſwered, *That when upon the Death of* Cyrus *they marched up to the King's Armies, he laboured for a Ceſſation, but when their Captains went to him unarmed, he abuſed them; and that* Apollonides *deſerved to be caſhiered, as the Diſhonour of his Nation.* *Agaſthias* replied, (which Words [y] *Laertius* aſcribes to *Xenophon*) *he was an inconſiderable Fellow, whoſe Ears were bored as the Slaves of* Lydia. So they turned him out. Having called together all the Commanders, *Xenophon* adviſed them to chooſe new in the Room of thoſe that were loſt, of whom he was elected in the Place of *Proxenus*: Hereupon he put on his richeſt Habit, as fitteſt either for Death or Victory, for his [z] greateſt Delight was in fair poliſhed Arms, affirming, that if he overcame, he deſerved ſuch; if he were overcome, and died in the Field, they would decently expreſs

q Xen. lib. 3. r Ibid. s Chio. Epiſt. ad Metrid. t Xenoph. lib. 1. Laert. 2. 55. u Xenoph. lib. 2. w Laert. 2. 55. x Xenoph. lib. 3. y Laert. 2. 50. z Ælian. var. hiſt. 3. 27.

his Quality, and were the fitteſt ſepulchral Ornaments of a valiant Man. His Shield was of *Argos*, his Breaſt-plate of *Attica*, his *Helmet* of *Bœotia*, his Horſe of *Epidaurium*; whereby *Ælian* argued the Elegance of the Perſon, in chooſing ſuch Things as were fair, and eſteeming him worthy of ſuch. Thus adorned, he made an Oration to the Army, adviſing them (from the Examples of their late Commanders) not to truſt the Enemy, but in order to their Return, to burn their Carriages and Tents. This Advice was put in Execution; *Cheriſophus* a *Lacedæmonian* had Charge of the Van, *Xenophon* of the Rear, choſen (ſaith [a] *Chio*) as well for his Courage as Wiſdom, being in both excellent. Betwixt theſe two there grew ſo great a Friendſhip, that in all the Time of the Retreat, they never had but one Difference. Their March was directed towards the Heads of thoſe great Rivers which lay in their Way, that they might paſs them where they were fordable. Having croſſed the River *Zathe*, *Mithridates* came up to them, and galled the Rear with Shot, which the *Greeks* not able to requite, *Xenophon* provided two hundred Slings, and finding fifty Horſes fit for Service, employed among the Carriages, mounted Men upon them, whereby having fruſtrated the ſecond Attempt of *Mithridates*, they marched to *Lariſſa*, ſeated upon *Tygris*, thence to *Miſpila*. In their March from thence, *Tiſſaphernes* overtook them with a great Army, but was twice worſted; whereupon (as the ſecureſt Courſe) he ſeized on a Mountain under which they muſt of Neceſſity paſs; *Xenophon* with a Party gained by another Way the Top of that Mountain, not without much Difficulty of Paſſage and Trouble; and to animate his Soldiers, one of them, named *Soleridas*, murmured that he was on Horſeback, whereas himſelf marched on Foot, oppreſſed with the Weight of his Shield; which *Xenophon* hearing, alighted, took his Shield from him, and thruſting him out of his Rank, marched (notwithſtanding he had alſo a Horſeman's Cuiraſs) in his Room: But the Soldiers beat and reviled *Soleridas*, till they conſtrained him to take again his Shield and Place. When they had gained the Top, the Enemy, being prevented, fled, and ſet Fire on the Villages. [b] The *Grecians* (intercepted by the River *Tygris*) marched over the Mountains into the Country of the *Carduchi*, a People Enemies to the *Perſians*, rough and warlike, from whom they found ſuch Oppoſition, that in ſeven Days March through their Country, they were put to continual Fights, and ſuffered more Diſtreſſes than the *Perſian* had put them to. Fording the River *Kentrites*, which bounds that Country, they paſſed into *Armenia*, where having put to Flight ſome Troops of Horſe, raiſed by the King's Deputies in theſe Parts to oppoſe their Paſſage, they marched without Diſturbance to the Heads of *Tygris*, which they paſſed; thence to the River of *Teleboa* in *Weſt Armenia*, moleſted with extreme Snows, loſing many by Extremity of Cold, till they came to the River *Phaſis*, near which lived the *Phaſiani*, *Tacchi*, and the *Chalybes*. The *Tacchi*, into whoſe Country they firſt came, conveying their Proviſions into ſtrong Holds, reduced the *Greeks* to great Want, until with much Pains they forced one of them, where they took as much Cattle as maintained them in their Paſſage through the Country of the *Chalybes*, a ſtout Nation, of whom they could get nothing but Blows: Thence they marched to the River *Harpaſus*, ſo to the *Scythini*, where the Lord of *Gymnias*, a Town in thoſe Parts, led them through the Enemy's Country (which he willed them to burn as they went) to the Mountain *Theches*, from whence they might behold the Sea, to the great Joy of the Soldiers. Paſſing friendly through the Country of the *Macrones*, to the *Colchian* Mountains, diſcomfiting the *Colchi*, who oppoſed them, they arrived at *Trapezond*, a City upon the *Euxine* Sea, where was a *Greek* Colony: Here they ſacrificed and celebrated Games. [c] *Cheriſophus* they ſent to *Anaxibius*, the *Lacedæmonian* Admiral, (with whom he was intimate) to procure Ships for their Tranſportation home. Whilſt they ſtaid in Expectation of his Return, they maintained themſelves by Incurſions upon the *Colchi* and *Drylani*; but he not coming, and their Proviſion failing, *Xenophon* perſuaded the Cities adjoining to clear them a Paſſage by Land, which they took to *Ceraſus*, a *Greek* City, where muſtering their Men, they found but eight thouſand ſix hundred left of ten thouſand that went up with *Cyrus*, the reſt conſumed by Enemies, Snow, and Sickneſs. They ſhared the Money that had been made by the Sale of Captives, reſerving a Tenth for an Offering to *Apollo* and *Diana*. *Xenophon* preſerved his to be diſpoſed at *Delphi* and *Epheſus*. From *Ceraſus* they paſſed through the Country of the *Moſynæci*, a barbarous People, divided into Factions; the ſtronger Part deſpiſing their Friendſhip, they joined with the weaker, whom they left Maſters of all: Then they marched to the *Chalybes*, thence to the *Tibarenes*, paſſing quietly through their Country to *Cotiora*, a *Greek* Town and Colony of the *Sinopians*. Thus far the Army marched on Foot; the Diſtance of the Place where they fought with *Artaxerxes* to *Cotyora*, being one hundred twenty two Encampings, ſix hundred twenty Paraſangs, ten thouſand eight hundred twenty Furlongs, the Time eight Months.

Thoſe of *Cotyora* refuſing to afford them a Market, or Entertainment for their Sick, they entered the Town by Force, and took Proviſion, partly out of *Paphlagonia*, partly out of the Territory of

[a] Chion. Ep. 3. ad Metrid. [b] Xenophon. lib. 4. [c] Ibid. lib. 5.

the *Cotiorites*; whereupon the City of *Sinope*, to which *Cotiora* was tributary, ſent Ambaſſadors to them, complaining of this Dealing, and threatning to join with *Corilas* and the *Paphlagonians*: whereto *Xenophon* anſwered, *That they feared not, if need were, to War againſt them both, but could, if they pleaſed, gain the Friendſhip of* Corilas *and the* Paphlagonians *as well as they.* Upon which Anſwer, the Ambaſſadors growing calm, promiſed them all Friendſhip from the State of *Sinope*, and to aſſiſt them with Shipping for the whole Army; it being impoſſible to go by Land, by reaſon of the Rivers *Thermodon*, *Halis*, *Iris*, and *Parthenius*.

Xenophon had deſigned to plant a Colony there, but his Intention being divulged by *Silanus*, a Soothſayer, thoſe of *Sinope* and *Heraclea* ſent to the *Grecians*, promiſing them not only a ſufficient Fleet, but deſiring under-hand *Timaſian*, a *Greek* Commander, to promiſe the Army a good Sum of Money to convey them to *Troas*; which Offers *Xenophon* (who only deſired the common Good) perſwaded them to accept, and to engage mutually not to forſake one another, till they were all in Safety. Thoſe of *Heraclea* ſent Shipping, but not the Money; whereupon *Timaſion*, and other Commanders, fearing the Soldiers, deſired *Xenophon* the Army might go to *Phaſis*, which he refuſed; but thereby was occaſioned a Suſpicion that he ſhould plot to deceive the Army, and to bring them back to *Phaſis*, whereof he acquitted himſelf. Here a general Inquiſition was made of all Offences ſince the Death of *Cyrus*, and they were puniſhed: Some accuſed *Xenophon* for beating them, all which proved for juſt Cauſes; one for offering to bury his ſick Companion alive; ſome for forſaking their Ranks; others for lying on the Ground in the Snow, or lingring behind. Thus were all Things quietly ſettled.

CHAP. IV.

End of the Retreat.

[d] THE *Greeks*, as ſoon as their Fleet was ready, ſet Sail for *Harmene*, the Port of *Sinope*, when *Chiriſophus* met them with ſome Gallies from *Anaxibius*, who promiſed them Pay as ſoon as they ſhould come into *Greece*. The Army deſirous of a General, intreated *Xenophon* (with extraordinary Teſtimony of Affection) to accept that Command: *Xenophon* refuſed; either diſſwaded by inauſpicious Sacrifice, or unwilling to diſpleaſe the *Lacedæmonians*, in putting by *Chiriſophus*, who was thereupon choſen, but ſoon after depoſed, for refuſing to extort a great Sum from *Heraclea*, a *Greek* City, their Friends. *Xenophon* alſo denying to be employed therein, the Army thereupon became divided; they choſe ten Captains out of themſelves; with *Chiriſophus* remained two Thouſand one Hundred, with *Xenophon* two Thouſand Foot and Forty Horſe. *Chiriſophus* went by Land to meet *Cleander* Governor of *Byzantium*, at the Mouth of the River *Calphas*, leaving ſuch Shipping as he had to *Xenophon*, who landing in the Confines of *Thrace*, and of the *Heraclean* Country, marched quietly through the midſt of the Land. The Mutineers landing at *Calphas*, ſurprized and ſpoiled the Country thereabout: The *Thracians* riſing up againſt them, cut off two Regiments, and beſieged the Hill where the reſt encamped. *Xenophon* on the Way being inform'd of the deſperate Condition of theſe *Greeks*, went directly to the Place, ſetting on Fire as he went all that was combuſtible; the Enemy fearing to be ſet upon in the Night, ſtole away, as did the *Greeks* alſo; whom *Xenophon* overtaking in the Way to the Port of *Calphas*, they embraced him with great Joy, and arriving at the Haven, made a Decree that it ſhould be Death for any Man to propound to divide the Army, and that they ſhould depart the Country in their firſt Order. The former Commanders being reſtored in the Room of *Chiriſophus*, who died, they ſubſtituted *Neon*, who going forth with two Thouſand Men to pillage the Country, was diſcomfited by *Pharnabazus*, Lieutenant to the King of *Perſia*, and loſt five hundred Men; the reſt reſcued by *Xenophon*, the Army, by his Encouragement, marched through a large Foreſt, defeating *Pharnabazus*, who oppoſed their Paſſage there. *Cleander* came over to them, and having expreſſed much Kindneſs to *Xenophon*, and contracted Hoſpitality with him, departed. The Army marched through *Bythinia* to *Chryſopolis*, in the Territories of *Chalcedon*. [e] Thence *Anaxibius*, the *Lacedæmonian* Admiral, tranſported them to *Byzantium*, where he had promiſed they ſhould, as ſoon as they arrived, receive Pay, without which he ſent them out of the City; whereat the Soldiers incenſed, returned and entred the City by Force, intending to ſpoil it; but *Xenophon* thruſting himſelf amongſt the Crowd, diſſwaded them, and appeaſed the Tumult; as is particularly atteſted by [f] *Chio*, an Eye-witneſs. By this Means they were brought to depart the City quietly, which as ſoon as they had done, *Xenophon* deſirous to go Home, took Leave of the Army, and returned to *Byzantium* with *Cleander*. *Anaxibius* being put out of the Admiralſhip, and thereupon ſlighted by *Pharnabazus* (at whoſe Inſtigation he had treated the *Greeks* ſo hardly) deſired *Xenophon* to return to the Army, to lead 'em to *Perinthus*, whence they ſhould be tranſported into *Aſia*; the Army received him with much Joy. When they came to *Perinthus*, *Ariſtarchus* the Governor would not ſuffer them to be tranſported. *Seuthes* King of *Thrace* had invited them to aid him againſt *Medocus*, Uſurper of his Kingdom, with large Offers of Money

d Xenoph. lib. 6. e Xenoph. lib. 7. f In Epiſtola ad Metridem.

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to every Soldier, of his Daughter to *Xenophon*. To him therefore, not knowing where to winter, they went. At Supper, every one (according to the Cuſtom) drank to the King, and made him a Preſent. *Xenophon*, who ſat next him, riſing up, and taking the Cup, told him, *He gave himſelf and all his Companions to be his faithful Friends, and ready Servants in the Recovery of his Kingdom:* Herein their Aſſiſtance did much advantage *Seuthes*. The Army wanting Pay, *Xenophon* reproved *Heraclides* for not taking Order about it; who thereupon endeavoured to work him out of Favour with *Seuthes*, to whom he brought the reſt of the Commanders, counſelling them to ſay, that if need were, they could lead the Army upon Service as well as *Xenophon*; but they jointly proteſted unto *Seuthes*, they would not ſerve at all without him. So he ſent for *Xenophon* alſo, and being agreed to proceed, they marched towards the Country of the *Melinophagi*, as far as *Salmydeſſon*; which Places having reduc'd, they returned to the Plains of *Selybria:* Thither came *Charminus* a *Lacedæmonian*, *Polinicus* ſent from *Thymbro*, who told them that the *Lacedæmonians* had deſigned War againſt *Tiſſaphernes*, the Charge thereof was committed to *Thymbro*, who deſired this Army of *Greeks* to aſſiſt them, promiſing them good Pay. *Seuthes* willingly yielded the Army into their Hands. They ſent *Xenophon* to demand their Arrears, which not without much Importunity he obtained. Thence they ſailed to *Lampſacus*, where *Euclides*, a Soothſayer of *Xenophon*'s Acquaintance, asked him, How much Gold he had brought? *Xenophon* proteſted he had not enough to carry him Home, but that he ſold his Horſe and other Things which he had about him. The next Day they marched to *Ophrynium*, whither came *Brito* and *Euclides*, to pay the Army; they being *Xenophon*'s Friends, reſtored (refuſing the Price of Redemption) his Horſe which he much loved, and had pawn'd at *Lampſacus*. Then marching forward by *Attramittium* and *Certonium*, not far from *Alarna*, to the Plain of *Caicus*, they reached *Pergamus*, a City of *Lydia*. Here *Hellas*, Wife of *Gongylus* an *Eretrian*, Mother of *Gorgion*, and *Gongylus*, entertained *Xenophon*. By her Information *Xenophon* ſurprized *Aſidates* a rich *Perſian*, with his Wife and Children, and all his Goods. Returning to *Pergamus*, the *Lacedæmonians*, Captains and Soldiers, by Agreement gave him alſo an extraordinary Share of Horſes, Oxen, and other Things. Then came *Thymbro*, and taking the Army, join'd it to the reſt of the *Grecian* Forces, wherewith he made a War againſt *Tiſſaphernes*.

Of the King's Provinces, through which they paſſed, the Governors were theſe; *Artimas* of *Lydia*, *Artacamus* of *Phrygia*, *Mithridates* of *Lacaonia*, and *Cappadocia*; of *Cicilia*, [g] *Syenneſis*; of *Phœnicia* and *Arabia*, *Dernes*; of *Syria* and *Aſſyria*, *Beleſis*; of *Babylonia*, *Roparas*; of *Media*, *Arbacas*; of the *Phaſiani* and *Heſperita*, *Teribazus*; the *Carduchi*, *Chalybes*, *Chaldæas*, *Macrones*, *Colchi*, *Moſynœchi*, *Cœti*, and *Tibareni*, are free Nations. *Paphlagonia* governed by *Corylas*, the *Bithynians* by *Pharnabazus*, the *European Thracians* by *Seuthes*. The total Number of the Aſcent and Deſcent is two hundred and fifteen Encampings, one thouſand one hundred and fifty Paraſangs, thirty four thouſand two hundred fifty five Furlongs; the Time of the Aſcent and Deſcent, one Year and three Months.

CHAP. V.

His following of Ageſilaus, *and Baniſhment.*

[h] *After this Expedition, the Defeat in* Pontus, *and Breach of Promiſe of* Seuthes *King of the* Odryſians, Xenophon *went into* Aſia *with* Ageſilaus *King of the* Lacedæmonians, *to whom he delivered, for a Sum of Money, the Soldiers of* Cyrus, *and beloved infinitely,* ἐις ὑπερβολὴν. [i] Æmilius Probus ſaith, *he converſed intimately with him:* Cicero, that *he inſtructed him.* [k] Plutarch affirms, that *by his Advice* Ageſilaus *ſent his Sons to be educated at* Sparta, *to learn and art them, which none was more excellent, how to obey and command. Ageſilaus* paſſed into *Aſia*, the firſt Year of the 96th Olympiad. He warr'd ſucceſsfully with the *Perſian*, but the Year following was called Home by the *Lacedæmonians*, to help his Country, invaded by the *Thebans*, and their Allies, whom the *Perſian* had corrupted; thereby to withdraw the War out of his Country. *Xenophon*, in his returning with *Ageſilaus* out of *Aſia* into *Bœotia*, apprehending the Danger of the War they were entring into, when he came to *Epheſus*, left one Half of the Gold [l] which he had reſerved for an Offering out of his Share (of the Money which the Army divided at *Ceraſunt*, in their Return from the Expedition of *Cyrus*) with *Megabyzus*, *Diana*'s Prieſt, willing that if he eſcaped the Danger of that War, it ſhould be reſtored to him; if he miſcarried, conſecrated to *Diana*, and either made into an Image dedicated to the Goddeſs, or diſpoſed ſome way that he ſhould conceive moſt acceptable to her. The other Half he ſent an Offering to the *Athenian* Treaſury at *Delphi*, [m] inſcribing thereon both his own Name, and that of *Proxenus*, his Predeceſſor in the Command of that Regiment. *Ageſilaus* returning, waſted *Bœotia*, and overcame the *Thebans* and their Allies in a great Battle at *Coronea*, [n] particularly deſcribed by *Xenophon*, who was there preſent.

During the Abſence of *Xenophon* out of his own Country, the *Athenians* (becauſe he took Part againſt the King of *Perſia*, their Friend, and followed *Cyrus*, who had aſſiſted the *Lacedæmonians* againſt

g Which perhaps was a common Name to the Kings of that Country, as Ptolomy to thoſe of Egypt. See Thales, chap. h Laert. 2. 51.
i In Vit. Ageſ. de Orat. l. 3. k In Vit. Ageſ. l Laert. ſupr. chap. 3. m Xenoph. lib. 5. n Ageſil.

them,

them, [o] supplying *Lysander* their General with Money for a Navy) proclaimed a Decree of Baniſhment againſt him. [p] *Iſter* ſaith, he was baniſhed by the Decree of *Eubulus*, and called home by the ſame. *Laertius*, that he was baniſhed for *Laconiſm*, upon his going to *Ageſilaus*. Some place this Decree in the third Year of the 96th Olympiad; but the Writer of the Hiſtory of *Cyrus* his Expedition implieth, that it was before his firſt Return out of *Aſia*; affirming, that before the Delivery of the Army to *Thymbro*, *Xenophon*, ignorant of this Decree, intended to have gone Home.

CHAP. VI.

How he lived at Scilluns, *and at* Corinth.

THE *Lacedæmonians*, [q] to requite him for ſuffering in their Cauſe, maintain'd him at the publick Charge; and chaſing *Scilluns* of the *Eleans*, built a Town there, and beſtowed a fair Houſe and Land upon *Xenophon*; whereupon he left *Ageſilaus*, and went thither, carrying with him his Wife named *Phileſia*, and his two Sons which he had by [r] her, *Diodorus* and *Gryllus*, called the *Dioſcuri*. [s] Thither *Pelopidas*, a Spartan, ſent him Captives for Slaves from *Dardanus* for a Preſent, to diſpoſe of them as ſhould pleaſe him.

[t] *Scilluns* was near *Olympia*, eminent for Celebration of the Games, which *Megabyzus* coming to ſee, reſtored to *Xenophon* the Money which he had left in his Cuſtody, wherewith, [u] by Advice of the Oracle, he purchaſed a Portion of Land, and conſecrated it to *Diana*, in a Place deſigned by *Apollo*, through which ran the River *Selinus*, of the ſame Name with that at *Epheſus*, running by *Diana*'s Temple. The River was ſtored as well with Shell-Fiſh as others; the Land with all kind of Beaſts for Game. He built alſo a Temple, and after, with the conſecrated Money offering the Tythes of the Fruits of the Land to *Diana*, all the Citizens and Neighbours, Men and Women, were invited to the Feaſt; where they had from the Goddeſs's Allowance, Bread, Wine, and Part of the Fleſh of ſuch Beaſts as were either taken out of the conſecrated Ground, and ſacrificed, or killed in hunting with the Sons of *Xenophon*, and other Citizens, exerciſed againſt the Time of the Feaſt out of the ſacred Ground; and out of *Phaloe* were taken wild Boars, Goats, and Stags. The Place lies in the Way betwixt *Lacedæmonia* and *Olympia*, twenty *Stadia* from the Temple of *Olympian Jupiter*. In the ſacred Ground were Woods and Hills, ſtored with Trees ſufficient to maintain Swine, Goats, and Sheep, whereby the Beaſts of Carriage of ſuch Merchants as come to the Feaſt are maintained plentifully. About the Temple a Grove of Fruit-trees of all Sorts. The Temple was an Imitation in little of that at *Epheſus*. An Image of Cypreſs here reſembling that of Gold there. A Pillar near the Temple bare this Inſcription; GROUND SACRED TO *DIANA*. HE WHO POSSESSETH IT, LET HIM PAY THE TYTHE OF HIS YEARLY INCREASE, AND WITH THE SURPLUSAGE MAINTAIN THE TEMPLE: IF HE NEGLECT, THE GODDESS WILL TAKE ORDER FOR IT. [w] At this Place of Retirement *Xenophon* employed his Time in Hunting, and writing Hiſtories, inviting his Friends thither; [x] of whom, amongſt others, came *Phædo* and *Ariſtippus*, much delighted with the Situation, Building, and Trees planted by the Hand of the Owner.

[y] At length, a War ariſing betwixt the *Eleans* and *Lacedæmonians*, the *Eleans* invaded *Scilluns* with a great Army; and before the *Lacedæmonians* came to their Relief, ſeized on the Houſe and Lands of *Xenophon*. His Sons, with ſome few Servants, got away privately to *Lepreum*; *Xenophon* firſt to *Elis*, then to *Lepreum* to his Sons, and laſtly with them to *Corinth*, where he took a Houſe, and continued the reſt of his Life. During this Time, the *Argives*, *Arcadians*, and *Thebans*, jointly oppoſed the *Lacedæmonians*, and had almoſt oppreſs'd them, when the *Athenians* made a publick Decree ([z] mentioned by *Xenophon*) to ſuccour them. *Xenophon* ſent his Sons upon the Expedition to *Athens*, to fight for the *Lacedæmonians*; for (as *Diocles* affirms) they had been educated at *Sparta*, in the Diſcipline of that Place.

This Enmity ended in a great Battle at *Mantinea*, in the 2d Year of the hundred and fourth Olympiad. *Diodorus*, without acting any Thing memorable, gave off ſafe, and had afterwards a Son of his Brother's Name. *Gryllus* was rank'd oppoſite to the *Theban* Horſemen. The *Thebans* having by the Valour of their General *Epaminondas*, got the better of the Day, a reſolute Company of *Spartan* Horſemen broke in upon him; of whom was *Gryllus*, who ſlew *Epaminondas* with his own Hand, as *Pauſanias* affirms to have been atteſted both by the *Athenians* and the *Thebans*; adding, that he had ſeen at *Athens* a Picture of the Battle at *Mantinea*, confirming the ſame; and that at *Mantinea* was erected a Pillar, with the Statue of *Gryllus* on Horſe-back. In this noble Action [a] *Gryllus* loſt his Life; the News of whoſe Death came to *Xenophon* at *Corinth*, as he was ſacrificing, crown'd with a Garland. As ſoon as he heard his Son was ſlain, he took off his Garland, and laid it aſide; then demanding after what Manner he died, it was anſwered, fighting ſtoutly in the midſt of his Enemies; of whom having ſlain many, he fell at laſt himſelf. Hereupon *Xenophon* took again his Garland, and

o Pauſan. Eliac. 6. p Laert. 2. 51. q Laert. 2. 52. r Suid. s Laert. ibid. t Xenoph. de exped. Cyr. 5. Laert. u Strab. 8. w Laert. ibid. x Epiſt. Socratic. 18. y Laert. ibid. z Græc. hiſt. ultim. a Laert. Ælian. var. hiſt. 3. 3. D. Hieron. Epitaph. Nepot. ad Heliod. Stob. Serm. 106.

putting

putting it upon his Head, proceeded to ſacrifice, not ſo much as ſhedding one Tear; only ſaying, *I knew that I had begot a Mortal*; [b] and calling the Gods to whom he ſacrificed, to witneſs, that the Virtue of his Son gave him more Content, than his Death Sorrow. [c] Innumerable were the Epitaphs and Encomiums that were written upon *Gryllus* to pleaſe *Xenophon*, whence may be collected in how great Eſteem he was.

That he made a Viſit to *Dionyſius*, Tyrant of *Sicily*, (but at what Time is uncertain) is implied by [d] *Athenæus*, who relateth, That being at a Feaſt of his, compelled by the Cup-bearer to drink, he called the Tyrant by Name; *What is the Matter*, Dionyſius, *(ſaith he) your Cook, though excellent in that Art, doth not enforce us to eat againſt our Inclination?*

CHAP. VII.

His Death, Perſon, Virtues.

XENOPHON being [e] *full of Years* (which according to [f] *Lucian* exceeded Ninety) died at *Corinth*, in the firſt of the Hundred and fifth Olympiad, *Callidemus*, or *Callimedes* being *Archon*, at what Time *Philip*, Son of *Amintus*, began his Reign in *Macedonia*. He had an ingenious modeſt Look, long thick Hair, handſome (to uſe the Words of *Laertius)* beyond Expreſſion; *adroit in every Thing; particularly addicted to Horſes and Hunting; skilful in Tacticks, as his Writings atteſt; devout; a great Lover of Sacrifices, skilful in interpreting them; an exact Imitator of* Socrates; *temperate, as appears from his ſaying*, that [g] *It is pleaſant, hungry, to eat Herbs; thirſty, to drink Water.* So candid and ingenious, that [h] when he might have ſtolen the Writings of *Thucydides*, which lay concealed, he choſe rather to publiſh them with Honour.

In a Word; he was a Perſon every Way abſolute, as well for Action as Contemplation. Xenophon (ſaith [i] *Eunapius) was the only Man of all the Philoſophers who adorned Philoſophy with his Words and Actions. He deſcribes Moral Virtue in his Diſcourſes and Writings. In his Actions he was ſingular. As to his Conduct, a moſt excellent General.* Alexander *had not been Great, if* Xenophon *had not ſaid, Even the perfunctory Actions of valiant Perſons ought to be recorded.*

[k] He was the firſt that committed the Diſputes of *Socrates*, his Maſter, to Writing; and that with much Fidelity, not inſerting Excurſions of his own, as *Plato* did; whom for that Reaſon, as [l] *A. Gellius* obſerves, he argueth of Falſhood. That there was a great Enmity betwixt theſe Two is affirmed by the ſame Author; who, as a Proof thereof, alledgeth, that neither of them names the other in any of their Writings. [m] *Voſſius* only obſerves, that *Xenophon* mentions *Plato* once in his [n] ἀπομνημονεύματα, overſeen by *A. Gellius*. This Enmity is further acknowledged by [o] *Athenæus* and *Laertius*, confirmed by the Epiſtle of *Xenophon* to *Æſchines*, wherein he condemns *Plato*, that not being ſatisfied with the Doctrine of *Socrates*, he went to the *Pythagoreans* in *Italy*, and to the *Ægyptian* Prieſts; Arguments of a Mind not conſtant to *Socrates*. That he was at Difference with [p] *Ariſtippus* alſo, argued from his Writings.

[q] *Laertius* hath two Epigrams concerning him, the firſt upon his going with *Cyrus* into *Upper Aſia*.

Great Xenophon *at once made two Aſcents,*
To Aſia *in Perſon, and to Heaven by Fame:*
His Stile and Action (laſting Monuments)
Lay to Socratick *Wiſdom equal Claim.*

The other upon his Baniſhment.

Thee the Cecropians, *noble* Xenophon,
Baniſh'd their Land 'cauſe Cyrus *thou didſt aid;*
But Strangers prov'd far kinder than thy own:
What Athens *ow'd thee, was by* Corinth *paid.*

[r] *Laertius* reckons ſeven *Xenophons*. This the firſt. The ſecond an *Athenian*, Brother to *Nicoſtratus*, Author of the *Theſes*; beſides many other Things, he wrote the Lives of *Pelopidas* and *Epaminondas*. The third a Phyſician of *Coos*. The fourth, Writer of the Hiſtory of *Hannibal*. The fifth, Writer of fabulous Monſters. The ſixth, of *Paros*, a Statuary. The ſeventh, an old comick Poet. *Suidas* reckons three more; one of *Antioch*, the ſecond of *Epheſus*, the third of *Cyprus*, Hiſtorians, or rather Writers of Romances; that of the firſt called *Babylonica*; of the ſecond *Epheſica*, in ten Books; of the third *Cypriaca*: The Story of *Cynarus*, *Myrrha*, and *Adonis*.

CHAP. VIII.

His Writings.

DIONYSIUS *Halicarnaſſeus* [s] ſaith, that *Xenophon* was a ſtudious Emulator of *Herodotus*, both in Words and Language. His Stile (according to *Cicero* [t]) *ſoft and ſweet* [u] (melle dulcior) *far differing from the Noiſe of Orators in the Forum. In his Voice, the* [w] *Muſes ſeem to ſpeak*; whence he was ſirnamed *the Attick Muſe*; or according to others, *the Attick Bee*, a Title formerly conferred on [x] *Sophocles*. His Stile and Manner of Writing is at large diſ-

b Val. Max. 5. 10. c Laert. citing Ariſtotle. 2. 55. d Deipnoſ. lib. 10. e Laert. 2. 56. f De longæv. g Athen. deipn. 4. h Laert. 2. 57. i Procem. k Laert. 2. 48. l Lib. 14. 3. m De hiſtor. Grec. 1. 5. n Lib. 3. o Deipnoſ. 11. p Laert. vit. Ariſtipp. q Laert. 2. 58. r Laert. 2. 59. s De Vit. Script. vet. t Brut. & de Oratore. lib. 2. u Orator. c. 19. w Cic. Orat. x Vit. Sophocl.

courſed

courſed upon by *Ariſtides Adrianenſis* in an expreſs Tract, erroneouſly aſcribed to *Hermogenes*.

The Books of *Xenophon* (which [y] *Scipio Africanus* had always in his Hand, and [z] *Cicero* adviſeth to read, as very profitable in many Things) were (as reckoned by [a] *Laertius*) Forty, which ſeveral Perſons diſtinguiſh ſeverally; the general Titles theſe.

Κύρου παιδεία; *the Life and Diſcipline of* Cyrus (as *Cicero* renders it) in eight Books, written *non ad hiſtoriæ fidem* (though [b] *Diodorus Siculus* ſeems to take it in that Quality) *ſed ad effigiem juſti imperii; not as a faithful Hiſtory, but the Deſcription of an exact Prince.* Whence [c] *Auſonius* ſaith, *in relating the Virtues of* Cyrus, *he hath given rather a Wiſh than a Hiſtory, deſcribing not what he was, but what he ought to have been.* Κύρου ἀνάβασις; *the going up of* Cyrus *the younger into* Aſia, in ſeven Books; each of which (as [d] *Laertius* obſerves) hath a Procem, the whole none. *Maſius* ſuſpects that *Xenophon* was not the Author of this Book; the Biſhop of [e] *Armagh* aſcribes it to *Themiſtogenes*, though own'd as *Xenophon*, by *Plutarch*, *Cicero*, *Dionyſius Halicarnaſſus*, *Hermogenes*, *Laertius*, *Athenæus*, and others.

Ἑλληνικά; *the Greek Hiſtory*, in ſeven Books, continuing where *Thucydides* left. The ſame was done by *Theopompus*, but he went no further than ſixteen Years, *Xenophon* to forty eight.

Ageſilaus, of which Piece *Cicero* ſaith, [f] that *Ageſilaus would not ſuffer his Picture or Statue to be made, this Book alone ſurpaſſeth all Pictures or Images in his Praiſe.*

The Republick of the Lacedæmonians, *and the Republick of the* Athenians, which [g] *Demetrius* denieth to be *Xenophon*'s.

The Defence of Socrates, *and the Memorials of* Socrates, which perhaps is that *Hiſtory of Philoſophers* mentioned by *Suidas*.

Oeconomicks, the laſt Book of the memorable Diſcourſes, wherewith [h] *Cicero* was ſo much delighted, that in his younger Years he tranſlated it.

Sympoſium, accommodated to the fourth Year of the Eighty ninth Olympiad, for which Reaſon reprehended by [i] *Athenæus*, as erroneus in Chronology; vindicated by the learned *Caſaubon*.

Hiero, Or, *of a Kingdom.*
The Accounts of Revenues.
Of Horſes.
Of Horſemanſhip.
Of Hunting.
Epiſtles.

Beſides theſe which are extant, *Xenophon* ſeems to have written other Things; [k] *Valerius Maximus* and [l] *Pliny* cite his *Periplus*.

There is a Treatiſe of *Æquivokes* under *Xenophon*'s Name, but made and impoſed upon the World by *Annius*.

XENOPHON's Epistles.

To *ÆSCHINES*.

EPIST. I.

[m] MEeting with *Hermogenes*, amongſt other things, I asked him what Philoſophy you followed; he anſwered, the ſame as *Socrates*. For this Inclination I admired you, when you lived at *Athens*, and now continue the ſame Admiration for your Conſtancy above other Students of Wiſdom; the greateſt Argument to me of your Virtue, is your being taken with that Man, if we may call the Life of *Socrates* mortal. That there are Divine Beings over us, all know. We worſhip them, as exceeding us in Power; what they are is neither eaſy to find, nor lawful to enquire. It concerns not Servants to examine the Nature and Actions of their Maſters, their Duty is only to obey them; and which is moſt conſiderable, the more Admiration they deſerve who buſy themſelves in thoſe Things which belong to Man, the more Trouble this brings them, who affect Glory in vain unſeaſonable Objects. For when, *Æſchines*, did any Man hear *Socrates* diſcourſe of the Heavens, or adviſe his Scholars to Mathematical Demonſtrations? We know he underſtood Muſick no farther than the Ear, but was always diſcourſing to his Friends of ſomething excellent. What is Fortitude and Juſtice, and other Virtues? Theſe he called the proper Good of Mankind; other Things, he ſaid, Men could not arrive at, or they were of kin to Fables, ſuch ridiculous Things as are taught by the ſupercilious Profeſſors of Wiſdom. Nor did he only teach this; his Practice was anſwerable; of which I have written at large elſewhere, what I hope will not be unpleaſing to you (though you know it already) to peruſe. Let [n] thoſe who are not ſatisfied with what *Socrates* delivered, give over upon this Conviction, or confine themſelves to what is probable. Living, he was atteſted wiſe by the Deity; dead, his Murderers could find no Expiation by Repentance; but theſe extraordinary Perſons affect *Ægypt*, and the prodigious Learning of *Pythagoras*, which unneceſſary Study argueth them of Inconſtancy towards *Socrates*, as doth alſo their Love of Tyrants, and preferring the Luxury of a *Sicilian* Table before a frugal Life.

y Cicer. Tuſc. quæſt. 3. z De ſenect. a Laert. 2. 56. b Lib. 15. c Grat. act. d Laert. 2. 57. e Annal. ad Annal. 3603. f Epiſt. ad Familiar. l. 5. Ep. 92. g Laert. 2. 57. h Offic. 2. i Athen. l. 5. k 8. 13. l 7. 48. m Ex. Alatii Ep. Socrat. n Meaning Plato, who added much of his own to the Diſcourſes of Socrates, and went to Ægypt, Italy, and Sicily.

To *Crito*. Epiſt. II.

[o]*Socrates* often told us, that they who provide much Wealth for their Children, but neglected to improve them by Virtue, do like thoſe that feed their Horſes high, and never train them to the Manage: By this Means their Horſes are the better in Caſe, but the worſe for Service, whereas the Commendations of a Horſe conſiſts not in his being fat, but ſerviceable in War. In the ſame Kind err they who purchaſe Lands for their Children, but neglect their Perſons; their Poſſeſſions will be of great Value, themſelves of none, whereas the Owner ought to be more honourable than his Eſtate. Whoſoever therefore breeds his Son well, though he leave him little, gives him much. It is the Mind which makes him great or ſmall; whatſoever they have, to the Good ſeems ſufficient, to the Rude too little. You leave your Children no more than Neceſſity requires, which, they being well educated, will eſteem plentiful. The Ignorant, though free from preſent Trouble, have nothing the leſs Fear for the future.

To *Sotira*. Epiſt. III.

[p]DEath, in my Opinion, is neither good nor ill, but the End of the Life; not alike to all, for as ſtronger or weaker from their Birth, their Years are unequal; ſometimes Death is haſtned by good or evil Cauſes: *And again:* [q] Neither is it fitting to grieve ſo much for Death, knowing that Birth is the Beginning of Man's Pilgrimage, Death the End. He died as all Men (though never ſo unwilling) muſt do: But to die well, is the Part of a willing and well educated Perſon. Happy was *Gryllus*, and whoſoever elſe chooſeth not the longeſt Life, but the moſt virtuous; though his (it pleaſed God) was ſhort.

To *Lamprocles*. Epiſt. IV.

[r]YOU muſt firſt approve the excellent Aſſertion of *Socrates*, that *Riches are to be meaſured by their Uſe*. He called not large Poſſeſſions Riches, but ſo much only as is neceſſary: In the Judgment whereof he adviſed us not be deceived, theſe he called truly rich, the reſt poor, labouring under an incurable Poverty of Mind, not Eſtate.

[s] *Epiſt.* V.

THEY who † write in Praiſe of my Son *Gryllus*, did as they ought; and you likewiſe do well in writing to us the Actions of *Socrates*; we ought not only to endeavour to be good ourſelves, but to praiſe him who lived chaſtly, piouſly, and juſtly, and to blame Fortune, and thoſe who plotted againſt him, who ere long will receive the Puniſhment thereof. The *Lacedemonians* are much incenſed at it, (for the ill News is come hither already) and reproach our People, ſaying, they are mad again, in that they could be wrought upon to put him to Death whom *Pythia* declared the wiſeſt of Men. If any of *Socrates*'s Friends want thoſe Things which I ſent, give me notice, and I will help them, for it is juſt and honeſt: You do well in keeping *Æſchines* with you, as you ſend me Word. I have a Deſign to collect the Sayings and Actions of *Socrates*; which will be his beſt Apology, both now and for the future, not in the Court where the *Athenians* are Judges, but to all who conſider the Virtue of the Man. If we ſhould not write this freely, it were a Sin againſt Friendſhip, and the Truth. Even now there fell into my Hands a Piece of *Plato*'s to that Effect, wherein is the Name of *Socrates*, and ſome Diſcourſes of his not unpleaſant. But we muſt profeſs that we heard not, nor can commit to writing any in that Kind, for we are not Poets as he is, though he renounce Poetry; for amidſt his Entertainments with beautiful Perſons, he affirmed that there was not any Poem of his extant, but one of *Socrates*, young and handſome. Farewell, both, deareſt to me.

Epiſt. VI.

[t]INtending to celebrate the Feaſt of *Diana*, to whom we have erected a Temple, we ſent to invite you hither; if all of you would come, it were much the beſt, otherwiſe, if you ſend ſuch as you can conveniently ſpare to aſſiſt at our Sacrifice, you will do us a Favour. *Ariſtippus* was here (and before him) *Phædo*, who were much pleaſed with the Situation and Structure, but above all, with the Plantation which I have made with my own Hands. The Place is ſtored with Beaſts convenient for hunting, which the Goddeſs affects; let us rejoice and give Thanks to her who preſerv'd me from the King of the *Barbarians*, and afterwards in *Pontus* and *Thrace* from greater Evils, even when we thought we were out of the Enemies reach. Though you come not, yet am I obliged to write to you. I have compoſed ſome Memorials of *Socrates*, when they are perfect you ſhall have them. *Ariſtippus* and *Phædo* did not diſapprove of them; ſalute in my Name *Simon* the Leather-dreſſer, and commend him that he continueth *Socratick* Diſcourſes, not diverted by Want, or his Trade, from Philoſophy, as ſome others, who decline to know and admire ſuch Diſcourſes and their Effects.

o Stob. ſerm. 101. p ibid 892. q ibid 278. r ibid. s Epiſt. Socratick. 18. † Allatius otherwiſe. t Epiſt. Socr. 21.

Epiſt.

Epiſt. VII.

[u]COme to us, dear Friend, for we have now finiſhed the Temple of *Diana*, a magnificent Structure, the Place ſet with Trees, and conſecrated, what remains will be ſufficient to maintain us; for as *Socrates* ſaid, if they are not fit for us, we will fit ourſelves to them; I write to *Gryllus*, my Son and your Friend, to ſupply your Occaſions; I write to *Gryllus*, becauſe, of a little one, you have profeſs'd a Kindneſs for him.

To *Xantippe*. Epiſt. VIII.

[w]TO *Euphron* of *Megara* I delivered ſix Meaſures of Meal, eight Drachms, and a new Raiment for your Uſe this Winter: Accept them, and know, that *Euclid* and *Terpſion* are exceeding good honeſt Perſons, very affectionate to you and *Socrates*. If your Sons have a Deſire to come to me, hinder them not, for the Journey to *Megara* is neither long nor incommodious. Pray forbear to weep any more, it may do Hurt, but cannot help. Remember what *Socrates* ſaid; follow his Practice and Precepts. In grieving you will but wrong yourſelf and Children; they are the young ones of *Socrates*, whom we are obliged not only to maintain, but to preſerve ourſelves for their Sakes; leſt if you or I, or any other, who after the Death of *Socrates* ought to look to his Children, ſhould fail, they might want a Guardian to maintain and protect them. I ſtudy to live for them, which you will not do, unleſs you cheriſh yourſelf. Grief is one of thoſe Things which are oppoſite to Life, for by it the Living are prejudiced. *Apollodorus*,[x] ſirnamed *the ſoft*, and *Dion* praiſe you, that you will accept nothing from any, profeſſing you are rich; it is well done, for as long as I and other Friends are able to maintain you, you ſhall need none elſe. Be of good Courage, *Xantippe*, loſe nothing of *Socrates*, knowing how great that Man was; think upon his Life, not upon his Death; yet that to thoſe who conſider it will appear noble and excellent. Farewel.

To *Cebes* and *Simmias*. Epiſt. IX.

[y]IT is commonly ſaid, nothing is richer than a poor Man. This I find true in myſelf, who have not ſo much; but whilſt you, my Friends, take Care of me, ſeem to poſſeſs much; and it is well done of you to ſupply me as often as I write. As concerning my Commentaries, there is none of them but I fear ſhould be ſeen by any in my Abſence, as I profeſt in your Hearing, at the Houſe where *Euclid* lay. I know, dear Friends, a Writing once communicated to many is irrecoverable. *Plato*, though abſent, is much admired throughout *Italy* and *Sicily* for his Treatiſes; but we cannot be perſuaded they deſerve any Study. I am not only careful of loſing the Honour due to Learning, but tender alſo of *Socrates*, leſt his Virtue ſhould incur any Prejudice by my ill Relation of it. I conceive it the ſame Thing to calumniate, or not praiſe to the full thoſe of whom we write. This is my Fear, *Cebes* and *Simmias*, at preſent, until my Judgment ſhall be otherwiſe informed. Fare ye well.

u Epiſt. Socr. 19. w Epiſt. Socr. 21. x The Reaſon manifeſt from Xenophon and Laertius, who deſcribe him ſuch. Xenophon calls him εὐήθης, Apolog. Socrat. in all Things but his Affection to Socrates. Leo Allatius is much perplexed concerning this Appellation. y Epiſt. Socr. 22.

ÆSCHINES.

CHAP. I.

His Life.

[z]ÆSCHINES was Son of *Charinus* ἀλλαντοποιῷ, or as [a] *Plato*, and others, of *Lyſanias*, an *Athenian*, of the *Sphettian* Tribe. He was from his Childhood very induſtrious. Addreſſing himſelf to *Socrates*, he ſaid to him, *I am poor, and have nothing to give you but myſelf. Do you not know*, anſwered *Socrates*, *that you have made me a rich Preſent?* He was the moſt diligent of all his Scholars, and never quitted him; whereupon *Socrates* ſaid, that he only, ὁ ἀλλαντοποιῷ valued him. He was not beloved of *Plato*, nor *Ariſtippus*. *Idomeneus* ſaith, it was he who counſelled *Socrates* to eſcape out of Priſon, which *Plato* aſcribes to *Crito*. Being very poor, *Socrates* bad him take ſome of his Dialogues, and make Money of them; which *Ariſtippus* ſuſpecting when he read them at *Megara*, derided him, ſaying, *How came you by theſe, Plagiary?* Another Time [b], *Ariſtippus* falling out with him, was queſtioned, What became of his Friendſhip? He anſwered, *It is aſleep, but I will wake it*; and meeting with *Æſchines*, *Do I ſeem ſo inconſiderable to you*, ſaid he, *and unfortunate, as not to deſerve Correction? It is no wonder*, anſwers *Æſchines*, *if your Nature, exceeding mine in every Thing, find out firſt what is expedient.*

z Laert. 2. 60. a Lucanicarum fartoris. b Plut de ira cohib.

[c] Inſtigated

[c] Instigated by Poverty, he went to *Sicily*, to *Dionysius* the Tyrant, at what Time *Plato* and *Aristippus* were there. *Plato* being out of Favour with the Tyrant, took Occasion, by presenting *Æschines*, to ingratiate himself. [d] *He desired he might be admitted to speak with him, which the Tyrant granted, supposing he would alledge something in Defence of himself. As soon as he came into his Presence he began thus: If you knew*, Dionysius, *of any that came with a hostile Intent to do you Hurt, tho' he fail'd of the Occasion, would you suffer him to depart unpunished? Nothing less, answered* Dionysius: *For not only the ill Actions, but Designs of Enemies deserve to be chastised. Then (replies* Plato) *if any Man should come hither out of an Intent to do you a good Office, and you not give him leave, ought you to neglect and despise him?* Dionysius *demanded who he meant*; Æschines, *(said he) a Person of as great Integrity as any of* Socrates *his Friends, able to reform those with whom he converseth, who having undertaken a great Voyage by Sea to come hither, and discourse philosophically with you, is neglected.* Dionysius *was so pleased at this, that he embraced* Plato, *admiring his Candour and Greatness of Spirit, and entertained* Æschines *bountifully and magnificently.* Thus *Plutarch*; but [e] *Laertius* saith, that *Æschines* coming thither, was despised by *Plato*, and recommended by *Aristippus*, the latter, the *Socratick* Epistle confirms. To *Dionysius* he imparted some Dialogues, and was gratified by him, with whom he lived until he was deposed, and *Dion* brought into the Kingdom; then returned to *Athens*, where not daring to profess his Philosophy, because the Names of *Plato* and *Aristippus* were so great, he taught and [f] took Money privately, at last applied himself to framing Orations for the *Forum*, in which *Timon* saith, he was very persuasive. *Lysius* wrote one Oration in answer to him, intitled, περὶ Συκοφαντίας, according to [g] *Athenæus*, πρὸς Αἰσχίνην τὸν Σωκρατικὸν ῥήτορα, wherein he aspersed him for many Things, which are not any Way probable, as (besides patronising an unjust Cause, and borrowing without Intent to restore) for pretending to sell Unguents contrary to the Laws of *Solon*, and Precepts of *Socrates*, and for injuring *Hermæus* his Wife and Children. See *Athenæus*. *Aristotle* sirnamed ὁ Μῦθος was his intimate Friend. [h] *Laertius* reckons eight of this Name; the first, this *Æschines* the Philosopher; the second wrote of Rhetorick; the third an Orator, contemporary with *Demosthenes*; the fourth an *Arcadian*, Scholar to *Isocrates*; the fifth of *Mitilene*, sirnamed *Rhetoromastix*; the sixth a *Neopolitan*, an Academick Philosopher, Disciple to *Melanthius* a *Rhodian*; the seventh a *Milesian*, who wrote *Politicks*, Friend to *Cicero*; the eighth a Statuary.

CHAP. II.

His Writings.

HE wrote *Dialogues*, *Orations*, and *Epistles*. By the first [i] *Athenæus* affirms, he gained a great Esteem of Temperance, Humanity, and Integrity. *Menedemus* accuseth him of owning many Dialogues of *Socrates*, which he had of *Xantippe*. *Panetius* believes them to be his own, not counterfeit. Those (saith [k] *Laertius*) which express the *Socratic* Habit, are seven; the first, *Miltiades*, written in a lower Stile; the second, *Callias*, wherein he is blamed by *Athenæus* for treating of the Enmity betwixt *Callias* and his Parents, and for deriding *Anaxagoras* and *Prodicus* in their Scholars, *Theramenes*, *Philoxenus*, and *Ariphrades*; the third, *Rhinon*; the fourth, *Aspasia*, cited by *Athenæus* and *Harpocration*; the fifth *Alcibiades*, cited also by *Athenæus* [l]; the sixth *Axiochus*, wherein (saith [m] *Athenæus*) *he traduceth* Alcibiades *as given to Wine and Women*; which Particular not being to be found in that *Axiochus* extant amongst the spurious *Platonick* Dialogues, argues contrary to the Opinion of *Vossius*, that it is not the same; the last *Telauges*, the Scope whereof was a satyrical Derision of the Vices of that Person, as appeareth from *Demetrius Phalereus*, and [n] *Athenæus*.

[o] There were seven other Dialogues, stiled ἀκέφαλοι, which went under the Name of *Æschines*, very loose, and not expressing enough the *Socratick* Severity; whence *Pisistratus* the *Athenian* denied that they were his, and *Perseus* saith, the greatest Part were written by *Pasiphon* of *Eretria*, falsely mingled with the Dialogues of *Æschines*; their Names (according to *Suidas*) *Phædon*, *Polyænus*, *Dracon*, *Erixias*, (perhaps that which is extant) *of Virtue*, *Erasistratus*, the *Scythians*.

[p] His *Orations* gave full Testimony of his Perfection in *Rhetorick*, in Confirmation whereof *Laertius* instanceth, that in *Defence of the Father of* Phæacus *the General*, and those *wherein he chiefly imitated* Gorgius *the* Leontine, of [q] *Philostratus*, cites that concerning *Thargelia*.

Of his *Epistles*, one to *Dionysius* the Tyrant, is mentioned by *Laertius*, as extant in his Time. Another there is under his Name amongst the [r] *Socratick* Epistles in these Words:

As soon as I arrived at Syracuse, Aristippus *met me in the Forum, and taking me by the Hand, carried me immediately to* Dionysius, *to whom he said*, Dionysius, *if a Man should come hither to insinuate*

c Laert. 2. 60. Philostrat. vit. Apollon. and from him Suidas. d Plutarch adulat. & amici. discrim. e Laert. 2. 61. f Laert. Hesych. Illustr. g Athen. l. 13. h Laert. 2. 60. i Athen. l. 13. k Laert. 2. 60. l Lib. 14. m Lib. 5. n Lib. 5. upon which see Casaubon. cap. 20. o Laert. 2. 60. p Laert. 2. 63. q Epist. ad Jul. August. r Epist. 23.

Folly into you, did he not aim at your Hurt? To which Dionyſius conſenting, *What then, continues* Ariſtippus, *would you do to him? The worſt, anſwers* Dionyſius, *that could be: But if any one, ſaith he, ſhould come to improve you in Wiſdom, did he not aim at your good?* which Dionyſius acknowledging; *Behold then (continues he) Æſchines, one of* Socrates's *Diſciples come hither to inſtruct you, he aims at your Good, therefore on him confer the Benefits you confeſs due to ſuch.* Dionyſius *(ſaid I, interrupting him)* Ariſtippus *expreſſeth an admirable Friendſhip in this Addreſs, but we are Owners only of ſo much Wiſdom as reſtrains us from abuſing thoſe with whom we converſe.* Dionyſius *hereat pleaſed, commended* Ariſtippus, *and promiſed to make good what he had confeſt due to me. He heard our* Alcibiades, *and delighted, it ſeems, therewith, deſired, if we had any other Dialogues, that we would ſend them to him, which we promiſed to do, and therefore, dear Friends, we intend to be ſhortly with you. Whilſt I read,* Plato *was preſent (which I had almoſt forgot to tell you) and whiſpered ſomething in my Behalf privately to* Dionyſius, *by Reaſon of* Ariſtippus; *for as ſoon as he was gone out, he told me that he never ſpoke freely when that Man (naming* Ariſtippus) *was preſent; but for what I ſaid to* Dionyſius *concerning you, I refer myſelf to him: The next Day* Dionyſius *in the Garden confirmed his Speech as ſaid of me, with many ſportive Sayings (for they were no better) I adviſed* Ariſtippus *and* Plato *to ceaſe their Emulation, becauſe of their general Fame; for we ſhall be moſt ridiculous, if our Actions correſpond not with our Profeſſion.*

CRITO.

CRito was an *Athenian* [s], Scholar to *Socrates*; whom he loved ſo entirely that he never ſuffered him to want Neceſſaries, of which more hath been ſaid in the Life of *Socrates*. [t] Being much troubled and ſued by thoſe who had not received any Injury from him, but abuſed the Quietneſs of his Diſpoſition, which would ſooner part with Money upon no Ground than go to Law, *Socrates* adviſed him to entertain one of the ſame buſy, troubleſome Humour, to keep off the reſt; *Crito* in purſuit of this Counſel, made Choice of *Archidamus*, an excellent Lawyer, but poor, who being obliged by his Gifts and Kindneſs, perſecuted eagerly all ſuch as moleſted not him only, but any of his Friends. *Crito* wrote ſeventeen Dialogues compriſed in one Volume, thus reckoned by *Laertius* [u]; *That the Good are not made ſuch by Learning*; *Of having moſt*; *What is expedient, or the Politician*; *Of Honeſty*; *Of Wickedneſs*; *Of Security*; *Of Law*; *Of Divinity*; *Of Arts*; *Of Converſation*; *Of Wiſdom*; Protagoras, *or the Politick*; *Of Letters*; *Of Poetry*; *Of what is honeſt*; *Of Learning*; *Of Knowing or Science*; *What it is to know.* He writ alſo *an Apology for* Socrates.

[w] He had four Sons, *Critobulus*, *Hermogenes*, *Epigenes*, and *Cteſippus*, all Auditors of *Socrates*; of whom already.

[x] *Suidas* reckons three more of his Name. One wrote *Getic* Stories. The ſecond was of *Pieria*, a City in *Macedonia*. The third of *Naxus*, both Hiſtorians.

SIMON.

SImon was an *Athenian* [y], a Leather-dreſſer. *Socrates* coming to his Shop, and diſputing there, he committed to Writing all that he remembered thereof, whence his Dialogues were called σκυτικοί. They were three and thirty, all in one Volume: Of Gods; of Good; of Honeſt; what is Honeſt; of Juſt, the firſt; the ſecond of Virtue; that it cannot be taught; of Fortitude, the firſt, ſecond, third; of Law; of Popularity; of Honour; of Poetry; of Health; of Love; of Philoſophy; of Knowledge; of Muſick; of Poetry; what is honeſt; of Doctrine; of Diſputation; of Judgment; of that which is; of Number; of Diligence; of Labour; of Avarice; of Boaſting; of Honeſty; or according to others, of Counſel; of Diſcourſe; of Expedients; of doing ill. He is reported the firſt that uſed the *Socratick* Diſcourſes. *Pericles* promiſing that if he would come to him, he ſhould want nothing, he anſwered, that he would not ſell his Freedom of Speech. There is extant amongſt the *Socratick* Epiſtles, this under his Name, as in anſwer to *Ariſtippus*.

I hear that you [z] *deride our Learning to* Dionyſius; *I confeſs I am a Leather-dreſſer, and work upon that Trade to the* [a] *Reproof of indiſcreet Perſons, who think to follow* Socrates, *yet live luxuriouſly. As for your Children,* Antiſthenes *will correct them, to whom you writ ſcoffing at my Manner of Life: But of this Mirth enough, only be mindful of me and of Thirſt: Theſe conduce much to the wiſe.*

GLAUCO.

GLauco was an *Athenian* [b]. He writ nine Dialogues, compriſed in one Book: *Phidylus*,

s Suid. t Xen. l. 2. u Laert. 2. 121. w Suid. x Laertius. y Laert. 2. 122. z Perhaps παθάζειν rather θαυμάζειν. a Παίδευσιν; which Allatius renders *Inſtructionem*. b Laert. 2. 174.

Euripides,

Euripides, *Amynticbus*, *Euthias*, *Lyſithides*, *Ariſtophanes*, *Ephalus*, *Anaxiphemus*, *Menexenus*. There are two and thirty more falſely aſcribed to him.

SIMMIAS.

Simmias[c] was a *Theban*. He writ three and twenty Dialogues in one Book; Of Wiſdom; of Ratiocination; of Muſick; of Verſe; of Fortitude; of Philoſophy; of Truth; of Letters; of Doctrine; of Art; of Conduct; of Decency; of what is to be choſen, and what to be ſhunned; of Friendſhip; of Knowledge; of the Soul; of Well-living; of Poſſibility; of Wealth; of Life; what is honeſt; of Induſtry; of Love.

CEBES.

Cebes[d] was of *Thebes*, a Philoſopher, Diſciple to *Socrates*. He writ three Dialogues. The Tablet (which is extant) the ſeventh. *Phrynichus*, he writ alſo *an infernal Narrative*, and other Things. Theſe are the Philoſophers who did not diſtract the Doctrine of their Maſter into Sects, in which Reſpect they may more properly be termed *Socratick*, tho' the reſt alſo aſſume that Title.

c Laert. 2. 174. d Ibid. 2. 125.

A CHRO-

A

CHRONOLOGY.

Olympiads.	Archontes.	
xxxv		*Thales* Born. *Laert.*
2	Damasias 1. *Halic.*	*Solon* born about this Time: By Compute from his Death.
3		
4		*Phryno* Victor in all the Olympick Exercises, *Eusеb.*
xxxvi		probably the same with whom *Pittacus* fought.
2		
3		
4		
xxxvii		
2		
3		
4		
xxxviii		*Periander* began to reign at *Corinth.*
2		
3		
4		
xxxix	Draco *Tatian. Clem. Suid.*	*Draco* makes Laws at *Athens.*
2		
3		
4		
xl		
2		*Arion*'s Story. *Eusеb.*
3		
4		
xli	Heniochides *Hal.*	
2		
3		*Pittacus* flourished. *Laert.*
4		
xlii		*Alyattes* King of *Lydia* began to reign. *Anaximander*
2	Aristocles *Marm.*	born. *Laert.*
3		
4		
xliii		
2		
3		
4		
xliv		
2		
3		
4		
xlv		
2	Critias 1. *Marm.*	
3		
4		
xlvi		
2	Philombratus. *Plat. Sol.*	*Epimenides* lustrates the City of *Athens. Laert. Epi-*
3	Solon. *Laert.*	*menides* born. *Suid.*
4	Dropides. *Phil. in Critia.*	*Solon* made Archon. His Laws.

xlvii	Eucrates. *Laert.*		*Anacharsis* came to *Athens* to visit *Solon*. *Laert.*
2	Simon. *Marm.*		
3			
4			
xlviii	Philippus. *Clem.*		
2			
3			
4			*Periand.* died, having reigned 40 Years. *Arist. Polit.* 5. *Laert.*
xlix			
2			
3	Damasias. *Marm.*	1	The Attribute of *Wise* conferred on *Thales* and the
4		2	other six.
l		3	About this Time *Thespis* began to present his Tra-
2		4	gedies. *Anaximander* found the Obliquity of the
3	Archestratides. *Hal.* 4.	5	Zodiack. *Plin.*
4		6	
li		7	
2		8	
3		9	
4		10	
lii		11	
2		12	
3	Aristomenes. *Laert.*	13	*Pittacus* died. *Laert.*
4		14	
liii		15	
2		16	
3		17	
4		18	
liv		19	
2		20	*Pythagoras* visits *Thales*. Collected from *Jamblic.*
3		21	
4		22	
lv	Conias. *Plut. Sol.*	23	
2	Hegestratus. *Plut.*	24	
3		25	
4		26	
lvi	Euthydemus. *Laert.*	27	*Chilon* was *Ephorus*. *Laert.*
2		28	*Anaximenes* flourished.
3		29	*Eusebius.*
4		30	
lvii		31	
2		32	
3		33	
4		34	
lviii		35	*Thales* died. *Laert.*
2	Erxiclides. *Paus.*	36	
3		37	
4		38	*Cyrus* takes *Sardys* and *Crœsus*.
lix		39	
2		40	
3		41	
4		42	
lx		43	
2		44	
3		45	
4		46	

lxi		47	
2		48	
3		49	
4	Heraclides. *Hal.* 4.	50	
lxii		51	
2		52	
3		53	
4		54	
lxiii		55	*Piſiſtratus* died, having reigned 17 Years. *Ariſt.*
4		56	*Polit.* 5.
2		57	
3		58	
lxiv	Miltiades. *Hal.* 7.	59	
2		60	
3		61	
4		62	
lxv		63	*Darius* began his Reign.
2		64	
3		65	
4		66	
lxvi		67	
2		68	
3		69	
4		70	
lxvii		71	
2		72	
3		73	
4		74	
lxviii	Lyſagoras. *Marm.*	75	
2		76	
3		77	
4		78	
lxix	Aceſtorides. 11. *Hal.* 5.	79	
2		80	
3		81	
4		82	
lxx	*Myrus. Hal.* 5.	83	*Anaxagoras* born. *Laert.* by compute.
2		84	
3		85	
4		86	*Pythagoras* died. *Euſeb.*
lxxi	Hipparchus. *Hal.* 6.	87	
2	Pithocritus. *Marm.*	88	
3		89	
4		90	
lxxii	Diognetus. *Hal.* 6.	91	The *Marathonian* Fight.
2	Hybrilides. *Hal.* 7. *Pauſ.*	92	
3	Phænippus. *Plut. Ariſt.*	93	
4		94	
lxxiii	Anchiſes. *Hal.* 8.	95	
2		96	
3	Ariſtides. *Marm.*	97	*Darius* died. *Xerxes* ſucceeded.
4	Philocrates. *Marm.*	98	
lxxiv	Leoſtratus. *Hal.* 8.	99	
2	Nicodemus. *Hal.* 8.	100	
3		101	
4		102	
lxxv	Calliades. *Marm.*	103	*Xerxes* croſs'd the *Helleſpont.* The Fight at *Sala-*
2	Xantippus. *Marm.*	104	*mis. Anaxagoras* went to *Athens.*
3	Timoſthenes. *Marm.*	105	
4	Adimantus. *Marm.*	106	

lxxvi	Phædon. *Diod. Sic.*	107	
2	Dromoclides	108	
3	Aceſtorides	109	
4	Menon	110	
lxxvii	Chares	111	
2	Praxiergus	112	
3	Demotion	113	
4	Apſephion	114	*Socrates* Born.
lxxviii	Theagenides	115	A Stone fell down from Heaven at *Ægos Potamus*;
2	Lyſiſtratus	116	foretold by *Anaxagoras*.
3	Lyſanias	117	
4	Lyſitheus	118	
lxxix	Archidemides	119	
2	Tlepolemus	120	
3	Conon	121	
4	Euippus	122	
lxxx	Phraſiclides	123	
2	Philocles	124	
3	Bion	125	
4	Mneſithides	126	
lxxxi	Callias 1.	127	
2	Soſiſtratus	128	
3	Ariſton	129	
4	Lyſicrates	130	*Xenophon* Born about this Time.
lxxxii	Chærephanes. *Hal.*	131	
2	Antidotus	132	*Anaxagoras* (having profeſs'd Philoſophy 30 Years
3	Euthydemus	133	at *Athens*) condemned and baniſhed; collected
4	Pedicus	134	from *Laert.*
lxxxiii	Philiſcus. *Hal.*	135	
2	Timarchides	136	
3	Callimachus	137	
4	Lyſimachides	138	
lxxxiv	Praxiteles	139	
2	Lyſanias	140	
3	Diphilus	141	
4	Timocles	142	
lxxxv	Murichides	143	
2	Glaucides	144	
3	Theodorus	145	
4	Euthemenes	146	
lxxxvi	Nauſimachus	147	
2	Antilochides	148	
3	Chares	149	
4	Apſeudas. *Ptol.*	150	
lxxxvii	Pythodorus. *Thuc.*	151	
2	Euthidemus. *Athen.* 5.	152	1 Year of the *Peloponneſian* War. *Thucid. lib.* 2.
3	Apollodorus. *Athen.* 5.	153	2
4	Epaminondas	154	3
lxxxviii	Diotimus	155	4 *Anaxagoras* died, by Compute from *Laert.*
2	Euclides	156	5
3	Euthydemus	157	6
4	Stratocles	158	8 The Fight at *Delium*, wherein *Socrat.* and *Xen.* fought;
lxxxix	Iſarchus	159	The *Clouds* of *Ariſtophanes* acted.
2	Amynias	160	9 The *Clouds* of *Ariſtophanes* acted the ſecond Time.
3	Alcæus	161	10
4	Ariſton	162	11 The Time of *Xenophon*'s ſympoſium.
xc	Ariſtophilus	163	12
2	Archias	164	13
3	Antiphon	165	14
4	Euphemus	166	15
			16

xci Ariſtom-

xci	Ariſtomneſtus	167	17
2	Chabrias	168	18
3	Piſander	169	19
4	Cleocritus	170	20
xcii	Callias	171	21 *Thucydides* ends his Hiſtory; *Xenophon* begins where he left.
2	Theopompus	172	
3	Glaucippus	173	23
4	Diocles	174	24
xciii	Euctemon. *Marm.*	175	25 The firſt Aſcent of *Cyrus* into *Aſia*. *Marm.*
2	Antigenes. *Marm.*	176	26 *Dionyſ.* made K. of *Syrac. Diod.* The Fight at
3	Callias. *Marm.*	177	27 *Arginuſe*. The ten Captains put to Death.
4	Alexias	178	The thirty Tyrants. *Theramenes* put to Death.
xciv	Pythodorus. *Athen.*	179	
2	Euclides	180	
3	Micon	181	The Aſcent of *Cyrus* into *Aſia* againſt his Brother. His
4	Exenætus	182	Death. *Xen.* retreats with the Army. The 50 Ty-
xcv	Laches	183	rants put down.
2	Ariſtocrates	184	*Socrates* put to Death. *Thimbro* ſent into *Aſia* againſt *Tiſſa-*
3	Ithicles	185	*phernes* by the *Lacedemonians*; and of *Xenophon*'s Re-
4	Lyſiades	186	treat.
xcvi	Phormio	187	*Ageſilaus* goes into *Aſia* againſt the *Perſian.*
2	Diophantus	188	*Ageſilaus* called home; fights with the *Boœtians* at *Co-*
3	Eubulides	189	*ronæa.*
4	Demoſtratus	190	*Conon* re-edifies the Walls of *Athens.*
xcvii	Philocles	191	
2	Nicoteles	192	
3	Demoſtratus	193	
4	Antipater	194	
xcviii	Pyrrhion	195	
2	Theodorus	196	
3	Miſtichides	197	
4	Dexitheus	198	
xcix	Diotrephes	199	*Ariſtotle* Born. *Laert.*
2	Phanoſtratus	201	
3	Menander	202	
4	Demophilus	203	
c	Pytheus. *Marm.*	204	
2	Nicon. *Hal.*	205	
3	Nauſinicus. *Hal.*	206	
4	Callias. *Hal.*	207	
ci	Chariander	208	
2	Hippodamus	209	
3	Socratides	210	
4	Aſteius. *Pauſ.*	211	
cii	Alciſthenes. *Hal.*	212	
2	Phraſiclides. *Marm.*	213	
3	Diſcinetus. *Pauſ.*	214	
4	Lyſiſtratus	215	
ciii	Nauſigenes. *Marm.*	216	
2	Polyzelus. *Hal.*	217	
3	Cephiſodorus. *Hal.*	218	
4	Chion	219	
civ	Timocrates. *Hal.*	220	
2	Cariclides	221	
3	Molon. *Hal. dinar.*	222	
4	Nicophemus	223	*Xenophon* died. *Laert.*
cv	Callimedes	224	
2	Euchariſtus	225	
3	Cephiſodotus	226	
4	Agathocles. *Pauſ. Marm.*	227	

cvi	Elpines	228	
2	Calliſtratus. *Marm.*	229	
3	Diotimus	230	
4	Eudemus	231	
cvii	Ariſtodemus	232	
2	Theſſalus	233	
3	Apollodorus	234	
4	Callimachus. *Athen.*	235	
cviii	Theophilus. *Pauſ. Athen.*	236	*Plato* died 82 Years old. *Athen. lib.* 5.
2	Themiſtocles	237	
3	Archias	238	
4	Eubulus	239	*Ariſtotle* went to *Mitilene*. *Laert.*
cix	Liziſcus	240	
2	Pithodorus	241	*Ariſtotle* went to King *Philip*; *Alexander* being fifteen Years old. *Laert.*
3	Soſigenes	242	
4	Nicomachus	243	
cx	Theophraſtus	244	
2	Lyſimachides	245	
3	Charonidas	246	
4	Phrynichus	247	
cxi	Pythodorus. *Arr.*	248	
2	Euænetus	249	*Ariſtotle* teacheth in the *Lycæum* 13 Years.
3	Æſicles	250	
4	Nicocrates	251	
cxii	Niceratus	252	
2	Ariſtophanes. *Arr.*	253	
3	Ariſtophon. *Arr.*	254	
4	Cephiſophon	255	
cxiii	Euthycritus	256	
2	Hegemon. *Hal. Arr.*	257	
3	Chremes	258	
4	Anticles	259	
cxiv	Hegeſias. *Arr.*	260	
2	Cephiſodorus	261	
3	Philocles. *Laert.*	262	*Ariſtotle* went to *Chalcis*, and died there near 63
4	Archippus. *Laert.*	263	Years old. *Laert. Theophraſtus* ſucceeded.
cxv	Neæchmus. *Hal.*	264	
2	Apollodorus	265	
3	Archippus	266	
4	Demogenes	267	
cxvi	Democlides	268	*Polemo*, Preſident of the Academy.
2	Praxibulus	269	
3	Nicodorus	270	
4	Theophraſtus	271	
cxvii	Polemo	272	
2	Simonides	273	
3	Hieromnemon	274	
4	Demetrius Phalereus	275	
cxviii	Carinus	276	
2	Anaxicrates	277	
3	Coræbus	278	
4	Xenippus	279	
cxix	Phericles. *Hal.*	280	
2	Leoſtratus	281	
3	Nicocles	282	
4	Calliarchus	283	
cxx	Hegemachus. *Laert.*	284	
2	Euctemon	285	
3	Mneſidemus	286	
4	Antiphanes	287	

cxxi	Nicias	286
2	Nicoſtratus	287
3	Olympiodorus	288
4	Philippus	289
cxxii		290
2		291
3		292
4		293
cxxiii		294
2		295
3		296
4		297
cxxiv		298
2		299
3		300
4		301
cxxv		302
2		303
3		304
4		305
cxxvi		306
2		307
3		308
4		309
cxxvii	Pytharatus. *Cic.*	310
2		311
3		312
4		313
cxxviii		314
2		315
3		316
4		317
cxxix	Diognetus. *Marm.*	318
2		319
3		320
4		321
cxxx		322
2		323
3		324
4		325
cxxxi		326
2		327
3		328
4		329
cxxxii		330
2		331
3		332
4		333
cxxxiii		334
2		335
3		336
4		337
cxxxiv		338 *Lacydes* Preſident of the Academy 26 Years.
2		339 *Laert.*
3		340
4		341

cxxxv	342	
2	343	
3	344	
4	345	
cxxxvi	346	
2	347	
3	348	
4	349	
cxxxvii	350	
2	351	
3	352	
4	353	
cxxxviii	354	
2	355	
3	356	
4	357	
cxxxix	358	
2	359	
3	360	
4	361	
cxl	362	
2	363	
3	364	
4	365	*Lacydes* resigns the School to *Evander* and *Telecles*. *Laert.*
cxli	366	
2	367	
3	368	
4	369	
cxlii	370	
2	371	
3	372	*Charneades* born.
4	373	

THE

THE

HISTORY

OF

PHILOSOPHY.

THE FOURTH PART,

Containing the *Cyrenaick*, *Megarick*, *Eleack*, *Eretriack* Sects.

The *Cyrenaick* Sect.

ARISTIPPUS.

CHAP. I.

His Country and Parents.

THE Eſtimation which Philoſophers had daily gain'd among the *Grecians* about this Time, cauſed it exceedingly to multiply, whilſt every Profeſſor, ambitious to be held wiſer than his Maſter, and teaching ſomething new, deſired to have the Honour to be Author of a Sect.

The Succeſſion of the *Ionick* Philoſophy, which before *Socrates* was ſingle, after him was divided into many Schools, whereof ſome were but of ſhort Continuance; others had longer Succeſſion. Of the leſs durable were the

Cyrenaick.
Megarick.
Eleack.
Eretriack.

ſo called from the Places where the Profeſſors flouriſhed. Others of longer Succeſſion, the

Academick, *Cynick*, } out of which came the { *Peripatetick.* *Stoick.*

We ſhall firſt diſpatch thoſe which were of ſhorteſt Continuance, whether that they were founded upon leſs Reaſon, and *were in ſhort Time broken, as* Cicero [a] ſaith, *and quite extinct by the Strength and Arguments of the others*; or that being inſtituted and founded in more obſcure Parts, they were not ſo laſting as thoſe which were profeſſed in the moſt flouriſhing City of *Athens*.

Ariſtippus a Diſciple of *Socrates*, after his Death returned home into his Country at *Cyrene* in *Africa*, from whence the Doctrine which his Scholars retained had the Name of *Cyrenaick*. [b] He was Son of *Aretades* of [c] *Cyrene*.

CHAP. II.

How he went to Athens, *and heard* Socrates.

FRom *Cyrene Ariſtippus* went firſt to *Athens*, invited by the Fame of [d] *Socrates*, *concerning whom he fell into Diſcourſe with* Iſchomachus, *meeting him caſually at the* Olympick *Games, and enquiring what Diſputes they were wherewith* Socra-

a De oratore lib. 3. b Suid. c Laert. 1. 65. d Plut. de curioſit.

tes

ties *prevailed so much upon the young Men, he received from him some little Seeds and Scatterings thereof, wherewith he was so passionately affected, that he grew pale and lean, till, to assuage his fervent Thirst, he took a Voyage to* Athens, *and there drunk at the Fountain, satisfying himself with the Person, his Discourse and Philosophy, the End whereof was to know our Evils, and to acquit ourselves of them.* Aristotle [e] said, *Philosophy doth Harm to those who misinterpret Things well said.* Aristippus [f] *chiefly delighted with the more voluptuous Disputes of* Socrates, asserted Pleasure to be the ultimate End wherein all Happiness doth consist. [g] *His Life was agreeable to the Opinion, which he employed in Luxury, sweet Unguents, rich Garments, Wine and Women*; maintained by a Course as different from the Precepts and Practice of *Socrates* as the Things themselves were. For, notwithstanding he had a good Estate (and three Country Seats) [h] he first of the *Socratick* Disciples took Money for teaching. Which *Socrates* observing, asked him *how he came to have so much?* He replied, *How came you to have so little?* A further Dislike of this Course *Socrates* expressed, when *Aristippus* sending him twenty *Minæ*, he returned it, saying, *his* Dæmon *would not suffer him to take it.*

CHAP. III.

How he went to Ægina.

LEaving *Socrates*, [i] he went to *Ægina*, where he lived with more Freedom and Luxury than before. *Socrates* sent Exhortations to reclaim him, frequent but fruitless, and to the same End published that Discourse which we find in *Xenophon*. Here he became acquainted with *Lais*, the famous *Corinthian* Courtezan, [k] who came thither yearly at the Feast of *Neptune*, and was as constantly frequented by *Aristippus*, for whose Sake [l] *Hermesianax* saith, he took a Voyage to *Corinth* (mentioned among his *Apophthegms*.)

To Corinth *Love the* Cyrenæan *led,*
Where he enjoyed Thessalian Lais' *Bed*;
No Art the subtile Aristippus *knew*
By which the Power of Love he might eschew.

[m] Whilst he was upon his Voyage to *Corinth*, a great Tempest arose, whereat he was much troubled; one of the Passengers saying unto him, *We ordinary People are not afraid, but you Philosophers fear* (or as [n] *Ælian*, *are you afraid like other People?*) [o] *our Souls*, answered he, *are not of equal Value,* [*] *you hazard a wicked and unhappy Life, I Felicity and Beatitude.*

[p] To those who blamed him for frequenting *Lais*, *I possess her*, saith he, *not she me.* [q] *Lais*, in Emulation of *Phryne* gave Admittance to all Sorts of People, Rich and Poor; whereupon *Aristippus*, reprehended by his Servant for bestowing so much on her, who entertained *Diogenes* the Cynick *gratis*, *I give her Money*, saith he, *that I may enjoy her, not that others may not.* [r] *Diogenes* reproached him for frequenting the Company of *Lais*, saying, *Aristippus, you and I converse with the same Woman, either give over, or be like a Cynick. Do you think it absurd*, saith he, *to dwell in a House wherein others lived before, or to sail in a Ship that hath carried other Passengers? It is no more absurd to affect a Woman whom others have enjoyed.*

At *Ægina* he continued till the Death of *Socrates*, as (besides the Testimony of [s] *Plato*) appeareth by this [t] Epistle of his written upon that Occasion.

Of the Death of Socrates, *I and* Cleombrotus *have received Information, and that when he might have escaped from the eleven Officers, he said he would not, unless he was acquitted by Law; for that were as much as in him lay to betray his Country. My Opinion is, he being unjustly committed, he might have got his Liberty any Way, conceiving that all which he could do ill or inconsiderately must be just. From whence again I blame him not, as if he had done ill even in this. You write me word that all the Friends and Disciples of* Socrates *have left* Athens, *out of Fear the like should befal any of you; it is well done; and we being at present at* Ægina *will continue here a while, then come to you, and wherein we are able, serve you.*

CHAP. IV.

His Institution of a Sect.

ARistippus returning at length to his own Country *Cyrene*, professed Philosophy there, and instituted a Sect called [u] *Cyrenaick* from the Place, by some [w] *Hedonick*, or voluptuous from the Doctrine. They [x] who followed the Institution of *Aristippus*, and were called *Cyrenaick*, held thus:

They rejected Physick and natural Disquisitions, from the seeming Incomprehensibility thereof. *Logick* they handled because of its great Usefulness. But *Meleager* and *Clitomachus* affirm they despised both Physick and Dialectick alike, as unuseful; for that without these, a Man who hath learned what Things are good, what evil, is able to discourse well, and to shake off Superstition and the Fear of Death.

Sect. I. *Of Judgment and Judicatories.*

THey [y] held, *that the Senses inform not always truly*, [z] *that nothing extrinsical can be perceived,*

e Cic. de nat. Deor. f Cic. de Orat. 3. g Athen. Deipn. 12. h Laert. 2. 65. i Athen. deipn. 12. k Ibid. l Ibid. m Laert. 2. 71. n Var. hist. 9. 20. o A. Gell. 19. 1. * Ælian. ibid. p Laert. 2. 75. q Athen. deipn. 13. r Athen. deipn. 13. s In Phædone. t Socratic. Epist. 16. u Laert. Proem. w Galen. Hist. Phil. x Laert. 2. 92. y Ibid. 2. 95. z Cicer. Acad. quæst. lib. 4. 7.

those Things only can be perceived which are felt by inward Touch, as Grief and Pleasure, neither know we what Colour any Thing is, nor what Sound it makes, but only that we feel ourselves affected after such a Manner; [a] *that Passions are comprehensive, that Objects are not comprehensive. That nothing judgeth but by interior Promotion, and the Judgment of true and false consists of inward Touch.*

[b] *Sextus Empericus* more fully. They assert that Passions or Affections are the Judges and the only Things that may comprehend, and not *fallacious*, but of those Things which cause Passions, there is nothing which is comprehensible, or that may not deceive us. For, that we are made white, or affected with sweet, may be said expresly and firmly, but that the Thing which causeth this Affection is white or sweet, cannot in like Manner be asserted. For it is possible that we be affected with whiteness from a Thing that is not white, and with sweetness from a Thing that is not sweet, as to him who is dim-sighted or hath the Yellow-Jaundice, all Things seem yellow to one, duskish to the other, and he who pincheth his Eye, thinketh he sees Things double, he who is mad fancies two *Thebes*'s, two Suns; in all these, they that are so affected, to wit, with Yellowness or Duskishness, or Duplicity, is true, but that the Thing which moveth them is yellow or duskish, or double, is conceived to be false: So it is most consonant to Reason, that we comprehend nothing more than our own Passions. For we must hold that the Things seen are either the Passions themselves, or the Causes of those Passions; if we say our Passions are the Things seen, we must likewise affirm all Things seen, to be true and comprehensive: If we say the Things seen are the Causes of those Passions, we must confess all Things seen to be false and incomprehensible. For that Passion which happeneth to us, sheweth us itself and nothing more, so that to speak truly, the Passion or Affection itself is the only Thing that is apparent to us, and for that Reason, in their proper Affections none err, but in the external Object, all. The first are comprehensive, the second incomprehensive, the Soul being weak in the Discernment thereof, by Reason of Places, Intervals, Motions, Mutations, and many other Causes.

Hence they assert, that there is not in Man any one common Thing which judgeth, but they impose common Names on the Judgments; all commonly name white and sweet, but something common that is white and sweet they have not, for every Man apprehends his own Affection. Now whether the same Affection happeneth to any one, and to him that is next him, from white, neither is he able to say, as not receiving the Affection of the other, neither can the other that is next him say, as not receiving his Affection. There being therefore no common Affection in us, it were a rash Thing to assert, that whatsoever seemeth such to me, seemeth also such to him that is next me; for perhaps my Constitution is such as to be whitened from that which externally incurreth, another hath his Sense so ordered, as that he is affected otherwise. That therefore which is seen and appeareth is not common.

That by Reason of the differing Constitutions of the Sense we are not moved alike, nor in the same Manner, is manifest from those who have the Jaundice, and those that are pur-blind, and those that are affected according to Nature. For, as from the same Object, some are so affected as to be black, others red, others white; so is it likewise consonant to Reason, that they who are affected according to Nature, by Reason of the different Constitution of Senses, are not moved alike by the same Things, but one Way the white, another Way the black, another Way he whose Eyes are blue, another Way he whose Eyes are black; whence we impose common Names on Things, having ourselves proper and particular Affections.

Sect. 2. *Of the End, or chief Good.*

TO these Assertions (continueth *Sextus Empericus*) concerning the Judicatories, agreeth what they assert concerning Ends.

Of Affections, some are pleasant, some harsh and troublesome, some mean; the harsh and troublesome are ill, whose End is Grief; the pleasant, Good, whose End, which cannot be deceived, is Pleasure The Mean are neither good nor ill, whose End is neither good nor ill, which is an Affection between Pleasure and Grief. Affections therefore are the Judges and Ends of all Things, and we live, say they, observing Evidence and Liking, Evidence in the rest of the Affections, Liking in Pleasure.

Laertius saith [c], they assert two Passions or Affections, Grief and Pleasure: Pleasure, a soft, smooth Motion; Grief, a harsh Motion. One Pleasure differeth not from another Pleasure, nor is one Pleasure sweeter than another Pleasure: This Pleasure is coveted by all living Creatures, the other shunned.

They assert [d] corporeal Pleasure to be our ultimate End, as *Panætius* saith in his Book of *Sects*, not catastematick permanent Pleasure, which consisteth in Privation of Grief, and a Quiet void of all Disturbance, which *Epicurus* held.

The End differeth from Beatitude [e], for the End is some particular Pleasure: Beatitude is that which consisteth of all particular Pleasures, wherein are included both the past and future. Again, particular Pleasure is expetible in itself, Felicity, not in itself, but for particular Pleasures.

a Laert. 2. 92. Cic. Acad. quæst. lib. 4. 7. b Adv. Mathem. c Laert. 2. 86. d Ibid. 2. 87. e Ibid. 2. 88.

That Pleasure is our chief End is manifest, in that from our first Infancy, without any Instruction of others, we naturally aim thereat, and having obtained it, seek nothing else. Moreover, we avoid not any Thing so much as its contrary, Grief.

Pleasure is good, tho' proceeding from the most sordid dishonest Thing, as *Hippobotus* in his Book of *Sects*; for, altho' the Action be dishonest, yet the Pleasure thereof is expetible in itself, and good.

Indolence, which *Epicurus* held, they esteem not Pleasure, nor want of Pleasure Grief; for both these consist in Motion, but Indolence and want of Pleasure consists not in Motion, for Indolence is like the State of a sleeping Man.

They hold, that some Men may not desire Pleasure, through Perversity of Mind.

All spiritual Pleasures and Pains arise not from corporeal Pleasures and Pains: For from the simple Prosperity of our Country or ourself, we are affected with Joy.

But neither the Remembrance of past Goods, nor Expectation of future compleat Pleasure, as *Epicurus* thought, for by Time and Expectation the Motion of the Soul is dissolved. [f] Pleasure, according to *Aristippus*, is μονόχρονον, *consisteth only in one Part of Time*, the present: For the Remembrance of past Pleasures, or Expectation of the future, is vain and frivolous, and nothing appertaineth to Beatitude: But that only is good which is present. With those Pleasures which he received heretofore, or shall receive hereafter, *Aristippus* said, he was nothing at all moved, the first being gone, the other not yet come, and what it will prove when it is come, is uncertain. Hence [g] he argued, that Men ought not to be sollicitous either about Things past or future, and that not to be troubled at such Things is a Sign of a constant clear Spirit. He also advised to take Care only for the present Day, and in that Day, only of the present Part thereof, wherein something was done or thought: For he said, the present is only in our Power, not the past or future, the one being gone, the other uncertain whether ever it will come.

[h] Neither do Pleasures consist merely in simple Sight or Hearing, for we hear with Delight those who counterfeit Lamentation, and those who lament truly, we hear with Displeasure. This Privation of Pleasure and Grief they called *mean States*.

The Pleasures of the Body are much better than those of the Soul, and the Pains or Griefs thereof much worse; for which Reason those who offend actually, are most grievously punished.

To grieve is more unnatural to us, to delight, more natural; for which Reason, much more Care is requisite for the ordering of one than of the other, yet, many Times we reject Things which effect Pleasure, as being grievous, so that the Concurrence of Pleasures which effecteth Beatitude, is very difficult.

Moreover they hold [i], that every wise Man doth not live pleasantly, nor every wicked Man unpleasantly, but so for the most Part: For it is enough that a Man be affected and reduced by Incidence of one single Pleasure.

They held, that [k] Grief is the greatest Ill; that Grief is not effected by every Ill, but by the unexpected and unforeseen; that one Man is more grieved than another.

They assert, that Riches are efficient Causes of Pleasure [l], yet not expetible in themselves.

Sect. 3. *Of Virtue.*

ALL good consisteth in Pleasure [m], Virtue itself is only laudable, as being an efficient Cause of Pleasure.

[n] Nothing is just, honest, or dishonest by Nature, but by Law and Custom; yet a good Man will do nothing that is evil, because of the Censure or Esteem which would fall upon his Actions, and that [o] such a one is wise.

Prudence is a good, yet not expetible in itself, but for the Sake of those Things which proceed from it.

A Friend is to be embraced for the Use we may have of him, as the Body cherisheth every Part thereof as long as it remaineth sound.

Of Virtues, some are in the unwise.

Corporeal Exercise conduceth to the Acquisition of Virtue.

A wise Man is not subject to Envy, Love, or Superstition, for all these proceed from the Vanity of Opinion; but he is subject to Grief or Fear, as being natural Accidents.

CHAP. V.

How he went to Dionysius *his Court.*

ABout this Time *Dionysius* the *Sicilian* Tyrant flourished, [p] to whom resorted many Philosophers, amongst the rest *Aristippus*, invited by his sumptuous Magnificence. [q] *Dionysius* asked him the Reason of his coming: He answered, *To give what I have, and to receive what I have not*, or, as others, *when I wanted Wisdom, I went to* Socrates, *now I want Money, I come to you.* He soon insinuated into the Favour of *Dionysius*, for he could conform himself to every Place, Time, and Person, act any Part, construe whatsoever happened to the best; and thus enjoying present Pleasure, never troubled himself for the absent. As *Horace* [r],

f Athen. deipn. 12. g Æl. var. hist. lib. 14. 6. h Laert. 2. 90. i Ibid. 2. 91. k Cic. Tusc. quæst. 2. 6. l Laert. 2. 92. m Cic. de Offic. 3. 33. n Laert. 2. 93. 99. o So Casaubon reads, but doubtless there is a Defect in the Text. p Philostr. vit. Apol. 1. 35. q Laert. 2, 78. r Lib. 1. Ep. 17.

Every

Every Condition, Habit, and Event,
With Ariſtippus *ſuits, with all content.*

Of his Compliance with *Dionyſius*'s Humour there are theſe Inſtances. [s] *Dionyſius* at a Feaſt commanded, that all ſhould put on Purple Robes; *Plato* refuſed, ſaying,

I will not with a formal Robe diſgrace
My ſelf, who am a Man of manly Race.

But *Ariſtippus* took it, and beginning to dance, ſaid,

If it come pure, a mirthful Feaſt
Never corrupts a modeſt Breaſt.

[t] Another Time ſuing to *Dionyſius* in the Behalf of his Friend, he would not hear him; at laſt he threw himſelf at his Feet, and his Petition was granted; for which being reprehended, *Blame not me*, ſaith he, *but* Dionyſius, *whoſe Ears are in his Feet.*

[u] *Dionyſius* ſhewed him three Courtezans, bidding him take his Choice; he leading them all three away, ſaid, Paris *was puniſhed for preferring one before the other two.* But, having brought them to the Door, he diſmiſt them, as ready to contemn as accept: Whereupon *Strato* (or as others *Plato*) told him, *You can only wear old Garments and Rags*, for which likewiſe they admired him that he would wear a Threadbare, and a rich *Mileſian* Cloak with equal Decorum, accommodating himſelf to both.

[w] When *Dionyſius* did ſpit upon him, he took it patiently; for which being reproved, *Fiſhermen* ſaid he, *ſuffer themſelves to be wet all over that they may catch* [κώβιον] *a Gudgeon, and ſhall I be troubled at a little Spittle, who mean to take* [x] *βλένον?*

[y] He begged Money of *Dionyſius*, who ſaid to him, you told me a wiſe Man wanted nothing: Give me, and we will talk of this afterwards. When *Dionyſius* had given it him, *Now*, ſaith he, *you ſee I do not want.*

By this Complaiſance he gained ſo much upon *Dionyſius*, that he had a greater Eſteem for him than all the reſt of the Philoſophers, tho' ſometimes he ſpoke ſo freely to *Dionyſius*, that he incurred his Diſpleaſure.

[z] To *Dionyſius* asking why Philoſophers haunted the Gates of rich Men, but rich Men not thoſe of Philoſophers: *Becauſe*, ſaith he, *the one knows what he wants, the other not.*

[a] To *Dionyſius*, urging him to treat of Philoſophy; *It is ridiculous*, ſaith he, *if you learn of me what it is, to teach me when it ſhould be ſaid.* Whereat *Dionyſius* diſpleaſed, bad him take the loweſt Place, which he did quietly, ſaying, *You have a Mind to make this Seat more honourable.* [b] The next Day the Tyrant asked him what he thought of that Place wherein he then ſate, in reſpect of that wherein he ſate the Night before? He anſwered, they were alike to him: To-day, ſaith he, becauſe I left it, it is contemned, what Yeſterday was eſteemed the moſt honourable, that where I ſit To-day eſteemed moſt honourable, which Yeſterday, without me, was accounted the loweſt.

[c] Being asked why *Dionyſius* fell out with him, he anſwered, for the ſame Reaſon he falleth out with others.

[d] *Dionyſius*'s ſaying, (out of *Sophocles* as *Plutarch* affirms, who aſcribes this to *Zeno.*)

Whoe'er goes to a Tyrant, he
A Servant is, tho' he came free.

He immediately anſwered,

No Servant is if he came free.

Dionyſius offering *Plato* a great Sum of Money, which he refuſed; *Ariſtippus* being at the ſame time in the Court of *Dionyſius*, ſaid, *Dionyſius* beſtows his Liberality upon good Grounds, to us who ask much, he giveth little, to *Plato*, who requireth nothing, he offereth much.

[e] Another Time *Helicon* of *Cyzicus*, one of *Plato*'s Friends, having foretold an Eclipſe of the Sun, which when it fell out accordingly, he was much honoured for it: *Ariſtippus* jeſting with other Philoſophers, ſaid, he could foretel a ſtranger Thing. They demanding what it was: I prognoſticate, ſaith he, that *Plato* and *Dionyſius* will ere long be at Variance, and ſo it happened.

CHAP. VI.

His Emulators.

THis Favour which he found with *Dionyſius*, was perhaps the Occaſion, for which he was maligned by the reſt of the Philoſophers, amongſt whom was,

[f] *Xenophon*, who out of Ill-will to him, publiſhed the [g] Diſcourſe between him and *Socrates* about Pleaſure.

[h] *Plato* likewiſe, through the ſame Diſaffection, tacitely reprehends him, in *Phædone*, for being in *Ægina* at the Time of *Socrates* his Death. [i] *Plato* being in *Dionyſius*'s Court, when he was there, reproved his ſumptuous Life: Whereupon *Ariſtippus*

s Laert. 2. 78. t Ibid. 2. 79. u Ibid. 2. 67. w Ibid. 2. 68. x Which being pronounced, is equivocal; for, βλένος ſignifieth a Fiſh like a Gudgeon, and βλένος a Tyrant; as I find in a MS. Lexicon communicated by my learned Friend Mr. John Pearſon, βλένος ὁ τύραννος, βλενος ὁ ἰχθύς; and again, Βαυανιχθύς ὁ ἢ κλένος (read βλένος) παραπλήσιος κωβίῳ, confirmed by Athenæus, deipn. 7. 10. y Laert. 2. 82. z Ibid. 2. 68. a Ibid. 2. 73. b Athæn. deipn. 12. citing Hegeſander. c Laert. 2. 73. d Ibid. Plut. in vit. Pomp. e Plut. vit. Dion. f Laert. 2. 65. g Memorab. lib. 2. h Laert. 2. 65. i Ibid. 2. 69.

asked him, whether he thought *Dionyſius* a good Man, or not. *Plato* affirmed, he thought him good; *Yet be*, replied *Ariſtippus*, *liveth much more ſumptuouſly; therefore it is not incompatible with Goodneſs.*

[i] *Phædo* likewiſe ſeemed to deride him, demanding who it was that ſmell'd ſo ſtrong of Unguents; *It is I, unhappy Man that I am*, anſwer'd *Ariſtippus*, and the *Perſian* King, *Who is more unhappy than I?* But as other Things are not the worſe for this, neither is a Man. [k] A Curſe on thoſe effeminate Perſons who brought a Scandal upon ſo good a Thing. [l]

[m] *Æſchines* alſo, and he, were ſometimes at Difference. Once, after ſome falling out betwixt them, *Ariſtippus* ſaid to him, *Shall we not be Friends? Shall we not give over Fooling? Or do you expect ſome Body ſhould kick us into Kindneſs? Willingly*, anſwered *Æſchines*. *Now*, ſaith *Ariſtippus*, *remember, that though I am the Elder, yet I yielded firſt. Æſchines* replied, *And juſtly, for you are better than I; I begun the Enmity, you the Reconcilement.* [n] *Plutarch* relates it thus. Being fallen out with *Æſchines*, he met one who asked him, *Where is now your old Friendſhip*, Ariſtippus? *It is aſleep*, ſaith he, *but I will wake it:* And going ſtrait to *Æſchines*, *Am I ſo unhappy*, ſaith he, *and ſo inconſiderable in your Eſteem, as not to deſerve Correction? Æſchines* anſwer'd, *It is nothing ſtrange that, exceeding by Nature in all Things, you ſhould firſt know what is fit to be done.*

Antiſthenes is to be numbered alſo amongſt thoſe who were diſpleaſed at his Manner of Life, as appeareth by an Epiſtle of his to that Effect, extant amongſt the *Socratick* Epiſtles; to which *Ariſtippus* returned this Anſwer.

[o] Ariſtippus *to* Antiſthenes.

[p] *WE are*, Ariſtippus, *unhappy beyond Meaſure. How can we be otherwiſe, living with a Tyrant, daily eating and drinking deliciouſly, perfumed with choiceſt Unguents, attired in rich looſe Garments brought from* Tarentum; *and none will deliver me from the Cruelty of* Dionyſius, *who detains me, not as a rude Perſon, but one that is verſed in* Socratick *Learning; ſupplying me (as I ſaid) with Meat, Unguents, Garments, and the like; fearing neither the Judgments of Gods nor Men. And now the Misfortune is much increaſed. He hath beſtowed on me three* Sicilian *Virgins of extraordinary Beauty, and many Utenſils of Silver; and when this Man will give over doing ſuch Things, I know not; you do well therefore to be concerned for the Miſeries of others; in the Requital whereof I rejoice in your Happineſs, and return you Thanks. Farewel.*

The Figs which you have, lay up againſt Winter, and the Cretan *Meal; for theſe Things ſeem to be better than* [q] *Riches. Waſh and drink of the Fountain of* Enneacrunus; *wear the ſame Garment in Winter as in Summer, and that ſordid, as becomes a free Perſon living under the* Athenian *Democracy. As for me, I knew as ſoon as I came into the City and Iſland governed by a Monarch, I ſhould ſuffer thoſe Ills of which you write to me. Now the* Syracuſians, Agrigentines, Geloans, *and the reſt of the* Sicilians, [r] *compaſſionately admire me; but* [s] *for my Madneſs in coming inconſiderately to theſe unſeemly Things, I wiſh this Curſe to fall upon me, that I may never be quit of theſe Evils; becauſe being of Years of Diſcretion, and pretending to Wiſdom, I would not undergo Hunger and Cold, nor contemn Glory, nor wear a long Beard. I will ſend you ſome great white Lupines to eat, after you have acted* Hercules *to the Boys; of which Things it is reported you eſteem it not abſurd to diſcourſe and write. But if any Man ſhould ſpeak of Lupines to* Dionyſius, *I think it were againſt the Rules of Tyranny. Of the reſt, go and diſcourſe with* Simon *the Leather-dreſſer, than whom you eſteem nothing more wiſe; for I am not allowed Familiarity with Artificers, becauſe I live under Obedience to others.*

Notwithſtanding this jarring betwixt them, *Ariſtippus* was nothing backward in employing the Intereſt he had at Court, for ſome Friends of *Antiſthenes*, to preſerve them from Death; as this Letter of his to *Antiſthenes* doth manifeſt.

[t] *The* Locrian *young Man, of whom you write to me, will be ſet at Liberty, neither put to Death, nor fined, though they were very near Death.* [u] *Let not* Antiſthenes *know I have ſaved his Friends, for he loves not to converſe with Tyrants, but with Mealmen and Victuallers; ſuch as ſell Meat and Drink at* Athens, *without Fraud; and ſuch as ſell thick Cloaths in cold Weather, and ſuch as ſerve* [w] Simon; *theſe are not Riches.*

Diogenes followed the Example of his Maſter *Antiſthenes*, in deriding *Ariſtippus*, calling him *the Court Spaniel.* As *Ariſtippus* paſſed by, *Diogenes* buſied about waſhing Herbs, called to him, ſaying, *If you had learned to do thus, you needed not have followed the Courts of Princes. And you*, ſaid he, *if you had known how to converſe with Men, needed not to have waſhed Herbs.* Thus expreſſed by [x] *Horace.*

Diog. *On Herbs if* Ariſtippus *could have din'd,*
The Company of Kings he had declin'd.

i Laert. 2. 76. k Laert. ibid. l Senec. de benefic. Clem. Alex. m Laert. 2. 82. n De ira cohib. o Socratic. Epiſt. 9. p Ironically anſwering a former Letter of Antiſthenes. q For χωμαῖος reading χεάμαλος inſtead of χείμαλος, ας χεᾶμα, the laſt Word of the following Epiſtle, ἀνλι χειμαίων, Scepticè. r Make a Point at γελάφεις, and read νῦν δὲ ἐλεοῦνλες με περιβλέπονλα, Dorice; a ridiculous and acute Irony; for περιβλέπειν ſignifieth to look on a Thing with Admiration, which is not proper to Compaſſion. s Read τᾶς δὲ μανίας πέρι, ἃς ἐμάνην. Perhaps ὅλι δὲ. t Socratic Epiſt. 11. u The Letter ſeems to be written to Antiſthenes; and this meant ironically. w The Leather-dreſſer. x Epiſt. 1. 17.

Arist. *He who derides me, had he Wit to use*
The Company of Kings, would Herbs refuse.
I mine own Jester; thou the People's art;
My Choice is of the better, nobler Part;
I, by a King maintained, on Horseback ride;
Thou by the meanest People art supply'd,
Than those that do maintain thee thou art less;
Yet to want nothing vainly dost profess.

[y] *Theodorus*, in his Book of Sects, reproached *Aristippus*; and [z] *Alexis* the comick Poet, in his *Galatea*, bringeth in a Servant speaking thus of one of his Disciples.

My Master young on Rhetorick first intent,
Next to Philosophy his Study bent.
A Cyrenæan *liv'd at* Athens *then,*
Nam'd Aristippus, *justly, first of Men*
Esteem'd for Subtlety and Luxury,
A Talent him my Master gave, to be
His Scholar; but of Arts he none was taught,
Save only Cookery, that away he brought.

CHAP. VII.
His Apothegms.

OF Apothegms (in [a] which Kind he was conceived to have an Acuteness beyond all the other Philosophers) these are remembered.

[b] He once gave fifty Drachms for a Partridge; for which being reproved by another; *You would have given a Penny for it*, saith he; which the other granting; *So much*, saith he, *are fifty Drachms to me.*

[c] Being demanded what was the greatest Benefit he had received by Philosophy, he answered; *To converse freely with all Men.*

[d] Being reproached for living high; *If Magnificence were a Sin*, saith he, *it would not be practised upon Days of Festival to the Gods.*

[e] To one who asked, wherein Philosophers excelled other Men; *Though all Laws were abolished*, saith he, *we should lead the same Lives.*

[f] Being demanded how the Learned differ from the Unlearned, he answered; *as Horses unback'd, from such as are well managed.*

[g] Going into the House of a Courtezan, a young Man of the Company blushed, to whom he said, *It is not ill to go in, but not to be able to come out.*

[h] To one who desired him to resolve a Riddle; *Thou Fool*, saith he, *why wouldst thou have me resolve that which unresolved finds us such Entertainment?*

He said, *It is better to be a Beggar than unlearned; for one wants only Riches, the other Humanity.*

Being reviled, he went aloof off; he that reviled, asked why he fled; *Because*, saith he, *to speak ill is in your Power, not to hear is in mine.*

One saying, he saw Philosophers at the Gates of rich Men; *And Physicians*, saith he, *at the Gates of the Sick; but no Man would for that Reason chuse to be sick rather than a Physician.*

To one who boasted he learned much: *As they*, saith he, *who eat and exercise much, are not better than those who eat only to satisfy Nature; neither are they Learned, who make large, but profitable Collections.*

An Orator pleading for him, and gaining the Cause, asked him, *What are you the better for* Socrates? *So much*, saith he, *as that I make good those Things which you alledged in my Defence.*

He instructed his Daughter *Arete*, *to contemn all that is too much.*

To one who demanded, what his Son would be the better for Learning; *If in nothing else, in this*, saith he, *that in the Theatre one Stone shall not sit upon another.*

Of one who would have preferred his Son to him, he demanded 500 Drachms; *For so much*, saith the other, *I can buy a Slave: Do so*, answered he, *and then you will have Two,* [i] *your Son, and him you buy.*

He said he took Money of his Friends, not to make Use of it himself, but to let them know the right Use of it.

Being reproached for entertaining an Orator to plead his Cause; *And when I would feast*, saith he, *I hire a Cook.*

[k] To one who boasted of his Swimming; *Are not you ashamed*, saith he, *to glory in the Property of a Dolphin?*

Being demanded, wherein the Learned differ'd from the Unlearned; *Send them naked to Strangers*, saith he, *and you shall see.*

To one who boasted he could drink much, without being drunk; *So*, saith he, *can a Mule.*

Being blamed that he took Money, being the Disciple of *Socrates*; *And justly*, saith he; *for* Socrates, *when they sent him Wheat and Wine, took a little for his present Use, and sent back the rest; the chief of all the* Athenians *were his Purveyors, mine* Eutichydes, *a mercenary Servant.*

Being reproved by *Plato*, † for buying a great Quantity of Fish; *They cost me*, saith he, *but an Obolus; Would not you have given so much for them?* To which *Plato* assenting; *It is not that I am profuse then*, saith he, *but that you are covetous.*

[l] *Simon*, Pantler to *Dionysius*, a *Phrygian*, a Man of ill Conditions, brought him to his House, paved curiously with Marble; *Aristippus* spits in his Face,

y Laert. 2. 65. z Athen. Deipn. 12. a Suid. b Laert. 2. 66. c Laert. 2. 68. d Ibid. e Ibid. f Laert. 2. 69. g Ibid. h Laert. 2. 70. i Plut. de puer. educ. k Laert. 2. 73. &c. † Athen. Deipn. 13. l Laert. ibid.

whereat

whereat the other growing angry; *I could not find*, saith he, *a fitter Place.*

Being demanded how *Socrates* died [m]; *As I would wish to do*, saith he.

Polyxenus the Sophist coming to his House, and seeing there Women, and a great Feast, reproved him. *Aristippus* gave him Way, and after a little Pause; *Will you dine with me*, saith he? whereto he consenting; *Why then*, continues he, *do you reprove me? 'Tis not the Feast, but the Cost which you condemn.*

His Servant being upon a Journey, weary with carrying of Money; *Throw away*, saith he, *what is too much, and carry as much as you can.*

[n] *He bad his Slaves away his Money throw,*
Because o'ercharg'd with Weight, they went too slow.

[o] Being at Sea, and understanding the Owners of the Vessel were Pirates, he took his Money, and counted it, then let it fall into the Sea, as unwillingly, and sighed. Some affirm, that he said, *It is better these perish for* Aristippus, *than* Aristippus *for them.*

[p] He reproved Men for *looking upon Goods exposed to Sale, and taking no Care to furnish their Minds.* Others ascribe this to *Diogenes.*

[q] Living in *Asia*, he was seized by *Artaphernes*, the King's Lieutenant; whereupon, one saying to him, *And where is now your Confidence? When*, said he, *you Fool, should I be confident, if not now, when I shall meet with* Artaphernes?

Those who, being endowed with the Liberal Arts, forsook Philosophy, to apply themselves to Mechanical Sciences, he compared to the Suitors of *Penelope*; *They could get the Good-wills of* Melantho, Polydora, *and others of the Servants, but could not obtain the Mistress in Marriage.* Not unlike is that of *Aristo*, [r] who said, that *Ulysses*, when he went to Hell, saw all the Dead, and spoke to them, but could not come so much as to the Sight of the Queen.

[s] Being demanded what Boys ought to learn; *That*, saith he, *which they ought to practise when they are Men.*

[t] To one who accused him for going from *Socrates* to *Dionysius: To* Socrates, saith he, *I went for* παιδεία, *Education*; to *Dionysius* for παιδία, Recreation.

[u] To a Courtezan who told him she was with Child by him; *You know that no more*, said he, *than if passing through a Bush, you should say this Thorn pricked you.*

To one who blamed him, that he took Money of *Dionysius*, *Plato* a Book; he answered, *I want Money*, Plato *Books.*

[w] Having lost a great Farm, he said to one, who seemed excessively to compassionate his Loss; *You have but one Field, I have three Left; Why should not I rather grieve for you? It is Madness* (adds *Plutarch*) *to lament for what is lost, and not rejoice for what is left.*

[x] When one told him, the Land is lost for your Sake; *Better*, saith he, *is it that the Land be lost for me, than I for the Land.*

[y] Seeing one angry vent his Passion in Words; *Let us not*, saith he, *suit Words to our Anger, but appease our Anger with Words.*

[z] Seeing a little Woman exceeding fair; *This*, saith he, *is a little Evil, but a great Beauty.* They who invert these Words, and read, *A little fair one, but great Evil*, mistake the Meaning of *Aristippus*, who plays upon that ordinary Saying, applying the Inversion to his own luxurious Humour.

[a] To one, who demanded his Advice, whether he should marry or no; he said, *No, if you take a fair Wife*, saith he, *she will be common; if foul, a Fury.*

[b] He used to advise young Men to *carry such Provision, as in a Shipwrack they might swim away withal.*

[c] *As a Shoe that is too big is unfit for Use, so is a great Estate; the Bigness of the Shoe troubles the Wearer; Wealth may be used upon Occasion, either wholly, or in Part.*

CHAP. VIII.

His Writings.

[d] SOME affirm, (of whom is *Soficrates*) that he wrote nothing at all; others, that he wrote,

The Libyan History, three Books, dedicated to *Dionysius.*

Dialogues, twenty five (or rather twenty three; for the Number seems corrupt) in one Book; some in the *Attick* Dialect, others in the *Dorick.* Their Titles these; 1. *Artabazus.* 2. *To the Shipwreck'd.* 3. *To Exiles.* 4. *To a poor Man.* 5. *To Lais.* 6. *To Porus.* 7. *To Lais, concerning a Looking-Glass.* 8. *Hermias.* 9. *The Dream.* 10. *To the Cup bearer.* 11. *Philomelus.* 12. *To Servants.* 13. *To those who reproved him for using old Wine, and common Women.* 14. *To those who reproved him for Feasting.* 15. *An Epistle to* Arete. 16. *To the Olympick Exercises.* 17. *An Interrogation.* 18. *Another Interrogation.* 19. [e] *A Chria to* Dionysius. 20. *Another on an Image.* 21. *Another on* Dionysius's *Daughter.* 22. *To one who conceived himself dishonoured.* 23. *To one who endeavoured to give Advice.*

Exercitations six Books.

[f] *Of Pleasure*, mentioned by *Laertius* in the Life of *Epicurus.*

m Laert. 2. 76. n Horat. Sat. 2. 3. o Laert. 2. 77. Cic. de invent. p Ibid. q Laert. 2. 79. r Laert. 2. 80. s Ibid. t Ibid. u Ibid. w Plut. de tranq. anim. x Stob. Eth. 35. y Stob. Eth. 76. z Stob. Eth. 123. a Stob. ibid. b Stob. Eth. 134. c Stob. Eth. 92. d Laert. 2. 84. e A Chria is a short Commemoration, aptly relating the Speech or Action of some Person. The third of these (viz. to Dionysius's Daughter) Vossius inserts amongst the Greek Histories: If that were Historical, it is likely this to Dionysius was of the same Nature. f Laert. 10. 4.

Of Phiſiology, out of which *Laertius* cites, that *Pythagoras* was ſo named, becauſe he ſpake no leſs Truth than *Pythius*.

Of the Luxury of the Ancients, four Books; containing Examples of thoſe who indulged to Love and Pleaſure; as the Love of [g] *Empedocles* to *Pauſanias*, in the firſt Book; of *Craten* to her Son *Periander*; of *Ariſtotle* to the Concubine of *Hermias*, in the Fourth; of *Socrates* to *Alcibiades*, *Xenophon* to *Clineas*, *Plato* to *Aſter*, *Xenocrates* to *Ptolemo*. But theſe latter Inſtances ſhew, that theſe Books were not writ by this *Ariſtippus*.

Epiſtles, four are extant under his Name, in the *Socratick* Collection, put forth by *Leo Allatius*.

[h] *Socion* and *Panætius* reckon his Treatiſes thus.

Of Diſcipline.
Of Vertue; an Exhortation.
Artabazus.
The Shipwreck'd.
The Baniſh'd.
Exercitations, ſix.
Chria, three.
To Lais.
To Porus.
To Socrates.
Of Fortune.

CHAP. IX.

His Death.

HAving lived long with *Dionyſius*, at laſt his Daughter *Arete* ſent to him, to deſire him that he would come to *Cyrene* to her, to order her Affairs; for that ſhe was in Danger of Oppreſſion by the Magiſtrates. *Ariſtippus* hereupon took Leave of *Dionyſius*, and being on his Voyage, fell ſick by the Way, and was forced to put in at *Lipara*, an *Æolian* Iſland, where he died; as may be gathered from this Epiſtle, which he then ſent to his Daughter.

[i] Ariſtippus *to* [k] Arete.

I *Received your Letter by* Teleus, *wherein you deſire me to make all poſſible Haſte to* Cyrene, *becauſe your Buſineſs with the Prefects goeth not to your Mind, and your Husband is unfit to manage your domeſtick Affairs, by reaſon of his Baſhfulneſs, and being accuſtomed to a retired Life, remote from the Publick. Wherefore, as ſoon as I got Leave of* Dionyſius, *I ſail'd towards you; and being upon my Journey, fell ſick by the way, at* Lipara, *where the Friends of* Sonicus *provide carefully for me, with ſuch Humanity as is needful for one near Death. As for your Demand, what Reſpect you ſhould give thoſe whom I manumiſed, who profeſs they will never deſert* Ariſtippus *whilſt they have Strength, but ever ſerve him and you; truſt them in all Things; they have learned from me not to be falſe. For yourſelf, I adviſe you to apply yourſelf to the Magiſtrates, which Counſel will profit you, if you affect not rather to have much. You will live moſt at Eaſe, if you contemn Exceſs; for they cannot be ſo unjuſt as to leave you in Want. You have two Orchards left ſufficient to maintain you plentifully. And that Poſſeſſion in* Bernicia, *if alone left you, were ſufficient to ſupply you fully. I do not counſel you to neglect ſmall Things, but not to be troubled for ſmall Things, ſince Vexation is not good even for great. If when I am dead, you want my Advice for the Education of young* Ariſtippus, *go to* Athens; *and above all, eſteem* Xantippe *and* Myrto, *who have often ſpoke to me, to bring you to the* Eleuſinian *Feſtivals. Whilſt you lead this pleaſant Life with theſe, let the* Cyrenæan *Præfects be as unjuſt as they pleaſe, in your natural* [l] *End they cannot prejudice you. Endeavour to live with* Xantippe *and* Myrto, *as I did heretofore with* Socrates, *compoſing yourſelf to their Converſation; for, Pride is not proper in that Place. If* [m] Tyrocles, *the Son of* Socrates, *who lived with me at* Megara, *come to* Cyrene, *it will be well done to ſupply him, and to reſpect as your own Son. If you will not nurſe a Daughter, becauſe of the great Trouble it gives you, ſend for the Daughter of* Eubois, *to whom you have heretofore expreſs'd ſo much Kindneſs, and named after my Mother, and I have alſo often called her my Friend. Above all, take Care of little* Ariſtippus, *that he may be worthy of us, and of Philoſophy. For this I leave him, as his true Inheritance, the reſt of his Eſtate finds the* Cyrenæan *Magiſtrates Adverſaries. But you writ me not Word, that any offered to take that away from you. Rejoice, dear Daughter, in the Poſſeſſion of thoſe Riches which are in your Power, and make your Son poſſeſs 'em likewiſe. I wiſh he were my Son; but, being diſappointed of that Hope, I depart with this Aſſurance, that you will lead him in the Paths trodden by good Men. Farewell, and grieve not for us.*

[n] Of his Children, beſides this *Arete* his Daughter, whom he educated in Philoſophy, is remembered alſo a Son, whom, for his Stupidity, he diſinherited, and turned out of Doors; for which being reproved by his Wife, who alledged, that he came from himſelf; he, ſpitting, ſaid, [o] *This comes from me too, but profiteth me nothing.* Or, as *Laertius*; *We caſt* τὸ φλέγμα καὶ τὰς φθειρας, *all unneceſſary Things as far as we can from us.*

[p] *Arete* had a Son named from his Grandfather *Ariſtippus*, and from his Mothers inſtructing him in Philoſophy, ſirnamed μητροδίδακτος.

g Laert. in vit. Emped. Periand. Ariſtot. &c. h Laert. 2. 83. i Socr. Epiſt. 27. k So ſupplied by Leo Allatius. l Pleaſure. m Leo Allatius reads Lamprocles; but that cannot be; for Lamprocles was dead long before. See Life Socratic. chap. 16. n Stob. Eth. 74. o Laert. 2. 81. p Laert. 2. 85.

Beſides

[q] Besides these two (*Aristippus* the Grandfather, and the Grandson) *Laertius* reckons two more of the same Name; one writ the History of *Arcadia*, the other was of the new Academy.

CHAP. IX.

His Disciples and Successors.

OF the Auditors of *Aristippus*, [r] besides his Daughter *Arete*, (whom he taught with much Care, and brought up to great Perfection in Philosophy) are remembered *Æthiops* of *Ptolomais*, and *Antipater* of *Cyrene*.

Arete communicated the Philosophy she received from her Father, to her Son *Aristippus the younger*. *Aristippus* transmitted it to *Theodorus the Atheist*, who instituted a Sect, called *Theodorean*.

[s] *Antipater* communicated the Philosophy of *Aristippus* to *Epitimides*, his Disciple; *Epitimides* to *Paræbates*; *Paræbates* to *Hegesias* and *Anniceris*; these Two last improving it by some Additions of their own, obtained the Honour each of them, to have a Sect named after them, *Hegesiack* and *Annicerick*.

q Laert. 2. 83. r Laert. 2. 85. s Laert. 2. 86.

HEGESIAS.

CHAP. I.

His Life.

HEGESIAS, Disciple to *Paræbates*, was sirnamed πειθανάτος, *Death's Orator*, from a [t] Book he writ, intitled, Αποκαρτερῶν, upon Occasion of one who had famished himself nigh to Death, but was call'd back to Life by his Friends; in Answer to whom, he, in this Book demonstrated, that Death takes us away from ill Things, not from good; and reckoned up the Incommodities of Life, and represented the Evils thereof [u] with so much Rhetorick, that the sad Impression thereof penetrated so far into the Breasts of many Hearers, that it begot in them a Desire of dying voluntarily, and many laid violent Hands upon themselves. Whereupon he was prohibited by *Ptolomy* the King to discourse any more upon this Subject in the Schools.

CHAP. II.

His Philosophy.

HIS Disciples were from him called *Hegesians* [w] They held the same chief Good and Evil with the *Cyrenæans*; further asserting,

That 'Kindness, Friendship, and Benevolence, 'are in themselves nothing; not expetible, but in 'respect of those Benefits which cannot consist without those Persons.

That 'Perfect Felicity is absolutely impossible, 'because the Body is disordered by many Troubles, 'in which the Soul shares, and most of those Things 'which we hope are prevented by Chance.

That 'Life and Death are in our Choice.

That 'nothing is by Nature pleasant or unpleasant, but by the Rarity and Unusualness of Things, 'or Satiety; some are delighted therewith, others 'not.

That 'Poverty and Wealth confer nothing to 'Pleasure; neither are the Rich affected with more 'exquisite Pleasure than the Poor. Servitude and 'Liberty, Nobility and Meanness, Glory and Ignominy differ nothing in this Respect.

That 'to live is advantagious for a Fool, indifferent to a wise Man.

That 'a wise Man ought to do all Things in 'Consideration of himself, and prefer none before 'himself, for though possibly he may receive Benefits from others, very great in outward Appearance, 'yet are they nothing in Comparison of those which 'he dispenseth.

That 'Sense confers nothing to certain Knowledge, for all act by the Rules of their own Reason.

That 'Offences ought to be pardoned; for no 'Man offends willingly, but compell'd by some Affection.

That 'we should hate no Man, but instruct him 'better.

That 'a wise Man should not insist so much upon Choice of good Things, as upon evil; making 'it his Scope and End to live neither in Labour nor 'Grief; which they do, who are inclined neither 'Way to the Objects of Pleasure.

t Cic. Tusc. qu. 1. 34. u Val. Max. 8. 9. w Laert. 2. 91.

ANNICE-

ANNICERIS.

CHAP. I.

His Life.

ANNICERIS [x] was of *Cyrene*, Disciple to *Paræbates*. *Suidas* saith, he was an *Epicurean*, and that he lived in the Time of *Alexander*. He [y] was excellent in Chariot-racing, of which one Day he gave a Testimony before *Plato*, and drove many Courses round the *Academy*, so exactly, that his Wheels never went out of the Tract, to the Admiration of all that were present, except *Plato*, who reprehended his too much Industry, saying, It was not possible but that he who employed so much Pains about Things of no Value, must neglect those of greater Concernment, which are truly worth Admiration.

[z] When *Plato*, by the Command of *Dionysius*, was sold as a Slave in *Ægina*, *Anniceris* fortuned to be present, who redeemed him for twenty, or according to others, thirty *Minæ*, and sent him to *Athens* to his Friends, who presently returned the Money to *Anniceris*, but he refused it, saying, They were not the only Persons that deserved to take Care of *Plato*.

[a] He had a Brother named *Nicoteles*, a Philosopher; he had likewise the famous *Posidonius* to be his Disciple.

CHAP. II.

His Philosophy.

HIS Disciples were called *Annicerians*. [b] They, as the rest, placed all good in Pleasure, and conceived Virtue to be only commendable as far as it produced Pleasure. [c] They agreed in all Things with the *Hegesians*, but they abolished not Friendship, Good-will, Duty to Parents, and Actions done for our Country. They held,

That altho' a wise Man suffer Trouble for those Things, yet he will lead a Life nothing the less happy, tho' he enjoy but few Pleasures.

That the Felicity of a Friend is not expetible in itself; for to agree in Judgment with another, or to be raised above, and fortified against the general Opinion, is not enough to satisfy Reason, but we must accustom ourselves to the best Things, because of our innate vicious Inclinations.

That a Friend is not to be entertained out of useful or necessary Ends, nor when such fail, is to be cast off, but out of an intimate good Will, for which we must also undergo Trouble. For tho' they placed (as the rest) the chief End and Good in Pleasure, and professed to be grieved at the Loss thereof, yet they affirm that we ought to undergo voluntarily Labours, out of Love to a Friend.

x Laert. 2. 85. y Æl. var. hist. 2. 27. z Laert. vit. Plat. a Suid. b Cic. de offic. 3. c Laert. 2. 96.

THEODORUS.

CHAP. I.

His Life.

THEODORUS [d] heard *Anniceris*, *Dionysius* the Logician, *Zeno* the [e] Cittiean, and *Pyrrho* the Ephectick. He was called the *Atheist*, because [f] he held there was no God, and wrote a Treatise (*Suidas* saith many) wherein he endeavoured to refel all Arguments to the contrary, out of which *Epicurus* borrowed much. Afterwards was abusively called Θεὸς, upon Occasion of a Dispute with *Stilpo* to this Effect: [g] *Do you believe*, saith *Stilpo*, *you are whatsoever you affirm yourself to be? Theodorus* granting; *Then*, continues *Stilpo*, *if you should say you were a God, were you so?* To which *Theodorus* assenting, *Stilpo* replied; *Then impious Man, you are a Bird, or any Thing else by the same Reason.*

He was ejected out of *Cyrene* [h] by the Citizens, whereupon he said pleasantly; *You do not well*, Cyreneans, *to thrust me out of* Lybia *into* Greece. Thence he went to *Athens*, where he should have been cited to the Court of *Areopagus*, and lost his Life, but that he was freed by *Demetrius Phalereus*. Being likewise banished thence, he went to *Ptole-*

d Laert. 2. 98. e Suid. f Plut. plac. phil. 17. Cic. de nat. deor. 1. g Laert. 2. 101. h Ibid. 2. 104.

my the Son of *Lagus*, with whom he lived, and was by him sent on an Embassy to *Lysimachus*, to whom, speaking atheistically; *Lysimachus* said, *Are you not that* Theodorus *that was banished* Athens? He answered, *It is true, the* Athenians *when they could bear me no longer, as* Semele Bacchus, *cast me out.* *Lysimachus* replied, *See that you come no more to me.* *No*, answered he, *unless* Ptolomy *send me.* *Mythro*, Son of *Lysimachus* being present, said, *You seem not only ignorant of Gods but of Kings.* *How*, saith he, *Am I ignorant of the Gods, who believe you an Enemy to them?* *Lysimachus* threatened him with Death [i]: *You glory*, saith he, *in a great Matter, a Cantharides can do as much.* Or as *Stobæus*, *I knew not that you had not the Power of a King but of Poison.* Hereat incensed, he commanded he should be crucified. *Threaten*, saith he, *those Things I pray to your purple Nobles, it is all one to* Theodorus *whether he rot above or under Ground.*

[k] Finally, he went to *Cyrene*, and lived with *Marius* in much Repute, in that City out of which he was first ejected.

[l] Disputing with *Euryclides* a Priest, he asked, what Persons those were who defile Mysteries: *Euryclides* answered, *Those who communicate them to Persons not initiated.* *Then*, replied he, *you do impiously in declaring them to such.*

[m] What others ascribe to *Aristippus* and *Diogenes*, some attribute to *Theodorus* and *Metrocleus*, a *Cynick*, who saying, *You would not want Disciples if you washed Herbs:* *Theodorus* answered, *Neither would you wash Herbs, if you knew how to converse with Men.*

[n] He said of *Hipparchia* the Wife of *Crates*, *This is she who hath given over the Shuttle to put on a Cloak.*

CHAP. II.

His Philosophy.

HE taught all Manner of Learning, and instituted a Sect, called *Theodorean.* [o] He asserted *Indifference, that there is no Difference of Things.*

[p] *That our End, or chief Good and greatest Ill, are Joy and Sorrow; one consisting in Prudence, the other in Imprudence.*

That Prudence and Justice are good Things, the contrary Habits ill, the mean, Pleasure and Grief.

He took away Friendship, because it is neither in Fools nor wise Men; those being incapable to make Use of it, the Thing itself vanisheth; these not needing it, as being sufficient to themselves.

That it is reasonable that a wise Man expose not himself to Danger for his Country; Wisdom ought not to be lost for the Preservation of Fools.

That the World is our Country.

That a Man upon Occasion may commit Theft, Adultery and Sacrilege, there being nothing in these naturally evil, if that Opinion were taken away which is built upon the Agreement of Fools.

That a wise Man may publickly without Shame ἑταιρεύσεσθαι χρηστῶν.

He used such Inductions as these: *Is not a Woman that is skilful in Grammar, profitable in that Respect as a Grammarian? Yea.* *Is not the same of a Youth? Yes.* *Is not a beautiful Woman then profitable, as being handsome? Yes.* *Then she who makes right Use of it doth not amiss.* In these Kinds of Questions he was very subtle.

CHAP. III.

His Death, Writings, &c.

AMphicrates saith, [q] that he was condemned by the Law for Atheism, and drunk Hemlock.

He wrote, besides that which appertained to his Sect, many other Things.

Laertius reckons twenty of this Name. The *first* a *Samian*, Son of *Rhœcus*, who advised to lay the Foundation of the Temple at *Ephesus* upon Embers: For, the Place being wet, he said, that Coals, when they forsake the Nature of Wood, acquire a Solidity not to be violated by Moisture.

The *second* of *Cyrene*, a *Geometrician*, whose Disciple *Plato* was.

The *third* this Philosopher.

The *fourth* writ of exercising the Voice, a famous Book.

The *fifth* writ of Lawgivers, beginning with *Terpander.*

The *sixth* a Stoick.

The *seventh* writ the *Roman* History.

The *eighth* a *Syracusian*, writ Tacticks.

The *ninth* a *Byzantine*, a Sophist [r], eminent for civil Pleas.

The *tenth* of the same Country, mentioned by *Aristotle* in his Epitome of Orators.

The *eleventh* of *Thebes*, a Statuary.

The twelfth a Painter, mentioned by *Polemon.*

The *thirteenth* of *Athens*, a Painter, of whom writes *Menodotus.*

The *fourteenth* of *Ephesus*, a Painter, of whom *Theophanes* in his Treatise of Painting.

The *fifteenth* a Poet, who wrote Epigrams.

The *sixteenth* wrote of Poets.

The *seventeenth* a Physician, Disciple to *Athenæus.*

The *eighteenth* of *Chios*, a Stoick.

The *nineteenth* of *Miletus*, a Stoick.

The *twentieth* a Tragick Poet.

i Sen. de tranq. anim. 6. Cic. Tusc. qu. 1. Plut. an. vitios. ad infel. suff. k Laert. 2. 103. l Ibid. 2. 101. m Ibid. 2. 103. n Ibid. 6. 98. o Suid. in Socrat. p Laert. 2. 96. q Ibid. 2. 101. r Suid.

B I O N.

CHAP. I.

His Life.

OF the *Theodorean*[s] Sect was *Bion*, a *Boriſthenite*. What his Parents were, and what his Employments, he diverting himſelf to Philoſophy, related to *Antigonus*, King of *Macedonia*, in this Manner. *Antigonus* asked, *Whence art thou? Who thy Parents? What thy Town? Bion* perceiving himſelf to be reproached, anſwered thus, my Father was a Freeman, τῷ ἀγκῶνι ἀπομυσιόμενος, implying he was a Seller of Salt-Fiſh, a *Boriſthenite*; he had not a Face, but inſtead thereof a Brand-mark, which declared the ill Diſpoſition of the Owner: My Mother he married out of a common Brothel-houſe; [[t] *a* Lacedæmonian *Courtezan, named* Olympia] being ſuch a Woman as ſuch a Man could get. My Father for couzening the State, was ſold, and all our Family, for Slaves. I being a young likely Youth, was bought by an Orator, who died, and left me all he had. I tore and burnt his Papers, went to *Athens*, and there applied my ſelf to Philoſophy.

This is the Blood and Race I boaſt to own. Thus much concerning myſelf. Let *Perſeus* therefore, and *Philonides* forbear to enquire after theſe Things, and look you upon me, as I am in myſelf. You do not uſe, O King, when you ſend for Archers, to enquire of what Parentage they are; but ſet them up a Mark to ſhoot at; even ſo of Friends, you ſhould not examine whence, but what they are.

[u] *Bion* indeed, ſetting this aſide, was of a verſatile Wit, a ſubtle Sophiſt, and gave many Furtherances to the Exerciſers of Philoſophy: In ſome Things he was magnificent, and not altogether free from Pride.

He firſt heard *Crates* the Academick; but, deſpiſing that Sect, took a ſordid Cloak and Scrip, and became a Cynick. To which [w] *Laertius* aſcribes his Conſtancy, expert of Perturbation. Then he followed *Theodorus* the Atheiſt, who profeſſed all Manner of Learning; to whoſe Opinions he addicted himſelf, and was called a *Theodorean*: Afterwards he heard *Theophraſtus* the Peripatetick.

CHAP. II.

His Apophthegms.

HE left many Memorials[x], and profitable Apophthegms; as, being reproved for not endeavouring to catch a young Man; New Cheeſe, ſaith he, will not ſtick to the Hook.

Being demanded what Man is moſt perplexed? He, ſaith he, who aims at the higheſt Content.

To one who asked his Advice whether he ſhould marry or not (for this ſome aſcribe to *Bion*, which *A. Gellius* to *Bias*, the Miſtake perhaps grounded upon the nearneſs of their Names) he anſwered, if you take a foul Wife, ſhe will be a Torment; if a fair, common.

He ſaid, *That Age is the Haven to which all Ills have Recourſe; That Glory is the Mother of Years; That Beauty is a Good which concerns others, not ourſelves; That Riches are the Sinews of Things.*

To one who had conſumed his Patrimony, *Earth*, ſaith he, *devoured* Amphiaraus, *but you devour Earth.*

He ſaid, *It is a great Ill, not to be able to bear ill.*

He reproved thoſe who burn Men, as having no Senſe, and again burn them as having Senſe.

He uſed to ſay, It is better to yield our own Youth and Beauty to others, than to attempt another's; for he that doth ſo, injures both his Body and Soul.

He vilified *Socrates*, ſaying, If he could enjoy *Alcibiades* and did not, he was a Fool; if he could not, he did no great Matter.

He ſaid the Way to the next World is eaſy, for we find it blindfold.

He condemned *Alcibiades*, ſaying, When he was a Boy, he drew away Husbands from their Wives; when a Man, Wives from their Husbands.

At *Rhodes*, whilſt the *Athenians* exerciſed Rhetorick, he taught Philoſophy; for which being reproved, I bought Wheat, ſaith he, and ſhall I ſell Barley?

He ſaid, they who are puniſhed below would be more tormented if they carried Water in whole Veſſels than in Veſſels full of Holes.

One that was extremely talkative deſiring his Aſſiſtance in a Buſineſs, I will do what I can for you, ſaith he, if you ſend a Meſſenger to me, and come not yourſelf.

Travelling with very ill Company, they fell amongſt Thieves; we ſhall be undone, ſaith he, unleſs we be known.

He ſaid, Arrogance is the Obſtruction of Virtue.

s Laert. 4. 46. t Athen. deipn. 13. u Laert. 4. 47. 4. 53. w Ibid. 4. 51. x Laert. 4. 47.

Of a rich Man covetous; he hath not Money, ſaith he, but Money him.

He ſaid, covetous Perſons keep their Wealth ſo ſtrictly, that they have no more Uſe of their own than of another's.

He ſaid, when we are young, we uſe Courage, when old, Wiſdom. Wiſdom excels other Virtues as the Sight the other Senſes.

He ſaid, no Man ſhould be reproached for old Age, that being a Condition all pray they may arrive at.

To an envious Man ſad, I know not, ſaith he, whether ſome Ill hath befaln you, or ſome Good another.

He ſaid, Impiety is an ill Companion to bold Language;

For tho' his Speech be free,
To Bondage yield muſt he.

That Friends, whatſoever they prove, ought to be retained: Leſt we ſeem to have converſed with wicked Perſons, or to ſhun good.

Being demanded if there were any Gods, he ſaid, *Old Man, wilt thou not drive this Crowd away.*

He conceived that he might make a Field fertile ſooner by praiſing than by manuring it.

He ſaid, they who love to be flattered, are like Pots carried by the Ear.

To one who asked him what Folly is, he ſaid the Obſtruction of Knowledge.

He ſaid, good Men, tho' Slaves, are free, but wicked Men, tho' free, are Slaves to many Pleaſures.

He ſaid, Grammarians whilſt they enquire after the Errors of *Ulyſſes*, mind not their own, nor ſee that they themſelves go aſtray as well as he, in taking Pains about uſeleſs Things.

He ſaid, Avarice is the Metropolis of all Evil.

[y] Seeing a Statue of *Perſæus*, under which was written, ΠΕΡΣΑΙΟΣ ΖΗΝΩΝΟΣ Ο ΚΙΤΤΕΥΣ, *Perſæus, of Zeno, a Citteian*, he ſaid, the Writer miſtook; for it ſhould be, ὀπαδεύς, *Zeno*'s Servant; as indeed he was.

CHAP. III.

His Death.

AT laſt falling ſick [z] (as thoſe of *Chalcis* ſay, for he died there) he was perſuaded to ſuffer Ligatures (by Way of Charm) he recanted and profeſt Repentance for all he had ſaid offenſive to the Gods. He was reduced to extreme Want of ſuch Things as are moſt neceſſary to ſick Perſons, until *Antigonus* ſent to him two Servants, and himſelf followed in a Litter, as *Phavorinus* affirms in his various Hiſtory; of that Sickneſs he died: On whoſe Death thus *Laertius.*

Bion *the* Boriſthenite,
By his Birth to Scythia *known,*
Did Religious Duties ſlight,
Gods affirming there were none.

If to what he then profeſt,
Firm he had continued ſtill,
Then his Tongue had ſpoke his Breaſt;
And been conſtant, tho' in Ill.

But the ſame who Gods deny'd,
He who ſacred Fanes deſpis'd,
He who Mortals did deride,
When to Gods they ſacrific'd;

Tortur'd by a long Diſeaſe,
And of Death's Purſuit afraid,
Gifts their Anger to appeaſe
On their Hearts and Altars laid.

Thus with Smoke and Incenſe tries
To delight their ſacred Scent;
I have ſinn'd, not only cries,
And what I profeſt repent:

But unto an old Wife's Charms
Did his willing Neck ſubmit,
And about his feeble Arms
Caus'd them Leather Thongs to knit.

And a youthful Sprig of Bays
Did ſet up before his Gate:
Every Means and Way eſſays
To divert approaching Fate.

Fool to think the Gods might be
Brib'd with Gifts, their Favours bought,
Or the ſacred Deity,
Were, and were not, as he thought.

But his Wiſdom's Titles (now
Turn'd to Aſhes) not avail
With ſtretched Arms, I know not how,
Hail he cry'd, great Pluto, *hail.*

Of this Name *Laertius* reckons ten. The *firſt* contemporary with *Pherecydes* the *Syrian* of *Proconneſus*, who writ two Books extant in his Time.

The *ſecond* a *Syracuſian*, wrote of the Art of Rhetorick.

The *third* this Philoſopher.

The *fourth* an *Abderite*, of the Family of *Democritus*, a Mathematician. He wrote in the *Attick* and *Ionick* Dialect. He firſt ſaid there were ſome habitable Parts of the Earth, where it was ſix Months Day and ſix Months Night.

[y] Athen. 1. 4. [z] Laert. 2. 54.

The

The *fifth* of *Soleis*. He wrote the *Æthiopick* History.

The *sixth* an Orator, who wrote nine Books, intitled by the Names of the Muſes.

The *ſeventh* a Lyrick Poet.

The *eighth* a *Mileſian* Statuary mentioned by *Polemon*.

The *ninth* a Tragick Poet, one of thoſe who were called *Tarſici*.

The *tenth* a Statuary of *Clazomene* or *Chios*, mentioned by *Hipponax*.

The *Megarick* Sect.

EUCLID.

CHAP. I.

His Country and Maſters.

EUCLID [a], (Inſtitutor of the *Megarick* Sect) was born at *Megara*, a Town adjacent upon the *Iſthmus*, tho' others ſay at *Geta*, a City of *Sicily*.

He firſt ſtudied the Writings of *Parmenides*, then went to *Athens* to hear *Socrates*: Afterwards the [b] *Athenians* made an Order, that *if any Citizen of* Megara *came into the City of* Athens, *he ſhould be put to Death*: So great was the Hatred the *Athenians* bore to the *Megarenſes*. [c] *Thucydides* mentions this Decree, whereby the *Megarenſes* were prohibited *to make Uſe of any Laws within the* Athenian *Juriſdiction, or the* Attick *Forum*; which Order the *Lacedæmonians* requiring to be repealed, and not prevailing, the *Peloponneſian* War enſued thereupon, the crueleſt and longeſt that ever was amongſt the *Grecians*.

Euclid [d], who was of *Megara*, and before that Decree uſed to go to *Athens*, and hear *Socrates*, after it was promulgated, came by Night in a long Woman's Gown, and Cloak of ſeveral Colours, his Head attired in a Woman's Veil (ſo *Varro* expounds *Rica*) from his Houſe in *Megara* to *Athens*, to *Socrates*, that he might be in that Time Partaker of his Counſel and Inſtructions, and went back again before that Day in the ſame Habit twenty thouſand Paces.

[e] Upon the Death of *Socrates*, *Plato* and the reſt of the Philoſophers, fearing the Cruelty of the Tyrants, went to *Megara* to him, who entertained him kindly.

CHAP. II.

His Inſtitution of a Sect.

HE [f] affected litigious Diſputes, and [g] was therefore told by *Socrates*, that he *knew how to contend with Sophiſts, but not with Men.* Suitable to his contentious Humour, he inſtituted a Sect, [h] firſt called *Megarick*, from the Place, afterwards *Eriſtick*, from the litigious, ſophiſtical Nature thereof: Whence [i] *Diogenes* ſaid, it was not σχολὴ, a *School*, but χολὴ, *Anger*: Thus reproved by *Timon* [k],

Of all theſe Trifles, I not value ought,
Which Phædo *nor litigious* Euclid *caught,*
Who the Megareans *mad Contention taught.*

Laſtly, it was called Dialectick; which Name *Dionyſius*, a *Carthaginian*, firſt gave them, becauſe their Diſcourſe conſiſted of Queſtion and Anſwer.

He affirmed, *That there is but one Good, which is called by ſeveral Names, ſometimes Prudence, ſometimes God, ſometimes the Mind, and the like.* He took away all Things oppoſite to good, ſaying, *there was no ſuch Thing.*

He uſed Arguments not by Aſſumption, but by Inference.

He took away Diſputation by Similitude, ſaying, that it conſiſted either of like or unlike; if of like, it were better to examine the Things themſelves to which they are like; if of unlike, the Compariſon is to no Purpoſe.

CHAP. III.

His Apophthegms, Writings.

HE was famous in the Schools (ſaith [l] *Plutarch*) foraſmuch as hearing his Brother in a Rage, ſay, *Let me periſh if I be not revenged*: He anſwered, *And I, unleſs I perſuade you to lay aſide your Anger, and love me as at firſt.* If [m] *Hierocles* (who relates the ſame Story) for τῷ Σωκράτει writ not as *Plutarch* τῷ Σωκρατικῷ, that Epithet occaſioned the Miſtake.

a Laert. 2. 106. b A. Gel. 6. 10. c Lib. 1. d A. Gel. 6. 10. e Laert. 2. 106. f Ibid. g Laert. vit. Socr. 2. 30. h Laert. 2. 24. i Laert. vit. Diog. 6. 107. k Laert. ibid. l De fraterno amore. m Stob. ſerm. 82.

He

He said [n], *That there is one Kind of Sleep, a young pliant Deity, easy to be driven away; the other gray and aged, chiefly frequenting old Men, pertinacious and inexorable; from this God, if he once come, it is hard to get loose; Words avail nothing, for he is deaf, nor can you shew him any Thing that may move him, for he is blind.*

[o] Being demanded what the Gods are, and wherein they delight? *Of all Things else concerning them,* saith he, *I am ignorant, but of this, I know they hate curious Persons.*

[p] He wrote (besides other Things) six Dialogues. ([q] *Panætius* doubts whether they were genuine or spurious) Titles these,

Lamprias.
Æschines.
[r] *Phœnix*; or (as *Suidas*) *the Phœnixes.*
Crito.
Alcibiades.
The Erotick.

Of the same Names are numbered

Euclid the Mathematician, a *Megarean* also, whence confounded by [s] *Valerius Maximus* with the Philosopher: *Plato* (saith he) *sent the Undertakers of the sacred Altar (who came to confer with him concerning the Manner and Form thereof) to* Euclid *the Geometrician, yielding to his Skill and Profession.* That these Undertakers came to *Plato*, is evident from the Testimony of many others; but, that he remitted them to *Euclid* the Geometrician, or that *Euclid* the Philosopher own'd that Profession, is no where to be proved. On the contrary, *Proclus* [t] affirms, that *Euclid* the Mathematician was of the *Platonick* Sect; and that [u] *Ptolomy* King of *Egypt* asking if there were any shorter Way to Geometry, he answered, *Not any King's High-way.* From the Death of *Socrates* to the first of the *Ptolomys* are 95 Years. So that *Euclid* the Mathematician was much later than the Philosopher.

Euclid the Archon, in the second Year of the 88th Olympiad, according to [w] *Diodorus Siculus*; but *Aristotle* [x] names the *Archon* for that Year *Euclees*, confirmed by his Commentators, and by [y] *Suidas*, who only errs a little in the Distance of Years betwixt him and *Euclid* the other *Archon*. [z] *Salmasius* not knowing the Name *Euclees* to be any where found amongst the *Archontes*, and expressly affirming the contrary, endeavours to corrupt the Text of *Suidas* reading *Diocles.*

Euclid the *Archon*, in the second Year of the 94th Olympiad.

Euclid the Southsayer, Friend to *Xenophon*, who mentions him [a].

Euclid the Stone-cutter, named in [b] *Plato*'s Will.

n Stob. 6. o Ibid. Eth. 37. p Laert. 2. 106. q Laert. vit. Æschin. r In vote Euclides. s Lib. 8. cap. 13. t In Euclid. lib. 2. cap. 4. u The Text is imperfect, read Καὶ μέν τοι καὶ φασὶν ὅτι Πτολεμαῖος ἤρετο ποῦ ἐὐλὸν εἴ τις ἐπὶ περὶ γεωμέλειαν τῆς στοιχειώσεως βραχίων μέθοδος; ὐδεμία φησὶν ὦ βασιεῦ πρὸς γεωμέλειαν βασιλικὴ ὁδὸς νεώτερος, &c. and (so well nigh) Barocius. w Lib. x Meteor. 1. 6. y Σαμίων ὁ δημος. z Inscript. p. 235. a Exped. Cyr. lib. 7. b Laert. vit. Plat.

EUBULIDES.

EUBULIDES [c] a *Milesian* succeeded *Euclid.* Some affirm, that *Demosthenes* the Orator was his Scholar, and that *Demosthenes* not being able to pronounce the Letter *R*, he taught him by continual Exercise to do it. He was a great Enemy to *Aristotle*, and much aspersed him.

In *Dialectick* he invented many Kinds of Interrogation or Argument, ψευδόμενον, *the Lying*; διαλανθάνουσα, *the occult*; ἠλέκτραν, *Electra*; ἐγκεκαλυμμένον, *the Vailed*; σωρείτην, *Sorites*; κερατινὴν, *the Horned*; φαλακρὸν, *the Bald*: ——

Of which thus a comick Poet,

The Orators sharp Eubulides knows
With subtle forked Questions how to pose,
Speech from Demosthenes *not sweeter flows.*

These are several Kinds of Sophisms, which [d] *Aristotle* in general defines *Eristick Syllogisms*; from this School, borrowed and enlarged afterwards by the Stoicks.

Ψευδόμενος, termed by [e] *Athenæus* ψευδιόλογος, by [f] *Cicero mentiens*, is a captious Reasoning, not to be dissolved; named, as most of the rest, not from the Form, but Matter; the ordinary Example being this, [g] *If you say that you lye when you speak Truth, you lye: But you say that you lye when you speak Truth; therefore you lye.* Such is that in [h] Africanus, *a Man having four hundred (Crowns) disposeth in Legacies three hundred; next he bequeaths to you a Piece of Ground worth* 100 *Crowns; provided his Will be not liable to the* Falcidian *Law* [by which all Legacies are made void, if the surplusage

c Laert. 2. 108. d Top. 8. 4. e Deipn. 8. f Divinat. 2. g Cic. Lucul. h Lib. 5. quæst.

remaining

remaining for the Heirs, amount not at leaſt to the fourth Part of the Goods] *The Queſtion is, what Right you have? I ſay the Queſtion is not to be reſolved, being of that Kind which the* Dialecticks *call* ψευδόμενος, *what Part ſoever we take for true will prove falſe. If we ſay the Legacies are valid, the Will comes within Compaſs of the* Falcidian *Law, whereby the Condition being defective, the Legacy is invalid. Again, if becauſe the Condition is defective, the Legacies are valid, it is not liable to the* Falcidian *Law; and if the Law take not Place upon the Condition, you are not to have what was bequeathed you.* So much was this *Sophiſm* eſteemed, that [i] *Seneca* affirms many Books to have been written upon it.

[k] *Laertius* reckons ſix diſtinct Treatiſes of *Chryſippus.* [l] *Athenæus* and *Suidas* aver, that *Philetus* a *Choan*, died of a Conſumption, occaſioned by exceſſive Study upon this Queſtion only.

Electra, named (likewiſe) from the chief Examples; of which thus *Lucian:* [m] Electra *the illuſtrious Daughter of* Agamemnon, *knew and knew not the ſame Thing.* Oreſtes *unknown ſtanding by her, ſhe knew that* Oreſtes *was her Brother, but ſhe knew not that he was* Oreſtes.

Ἐγκεκαλυμμένος, *the Vailed*; named alſo from the Matter, thus inſtanced by *Lucian.* CHR. *Anſwer me, Do you know your Father?* MERC. *Yes.* CHR. *What if I ſhould bring one unto you vailed, what would you ſay, that you know him or not?* MERC. *That I did not know him.* CHR. *And yet that Man proves to be your Father, therefore if you knew not the Man, you knew not your Father.* MERC. *No truly; but pull off his Vail, and I ſhall diſcover the Truth.* Of the ſame Kind is that of the *Sophiſts*, which [n] *Ariſtotle* affirms *Socrates* (in *Plato's Meno*) vainly labours to reſolve; *Do you know all Pairs are even or not? The other anſwering he knew it. The Sophiſt brings forth a Pair of ſomething which he had held hidden under his Cloak, and asks, did you know that I had this even Pair or not? The other confeſſing he knew not; then, ſaith he, you know and know not the ſame Thing.*

Sorites, by *Cicero* termed [o] *Acervalis*, who defines it to be [p] *when any Thing by Degrees is added or taken away: As a Heap* (Σωρὸς) *is made by adding a Grain*, or rather as [q] *Julianus, when from Things evidently true, by very ſhort Mutations the Diſpute is led to ſuch Things as are evidently falſe*; the ſame [r] *Ulpian*, the common Example mentioned by [s] *Cicero*, [t] *Laertius*, [u] *Sextus Empiricus*, and others in this: *Are not two a few? Are not three ſo likewiſe? Are not four the ſame? So on to ten. But two are a few, and therefore ten.*

Κερατίνη, *the Horned*, denominated as the reſt from the Example, *What you loſt not you have, you loſt not Horns, therefore you have Horns.* Repeated by *Seneca*, *A. Gellius* and others. Of this Kind St. *Hierom* [w] obſerves that to be which the Phariſees objected to our Saviour. *He came* (ſaith he) *from* Galilee *to* Judea, *wherefore the Faction of Scribes and Phariſees asked him whether it were lawful for a Man to put away his Wife for any Cauſe, that they might entrap him by a horned* Syllogiſm, *whatſoever he would anſwer being liable to Exception: If you ſhould ſay, a Wife might be put away for any Cauſe, and another taken, he being a Profeſſor of Modeſty, ſhould contradict himſelf; but if he ſhould anſwer, a Wife ought not to be put away for any Cauſe, he ſhould be accounted guilty of Sacrilege, and judged to do contrary to the Doctrine of* Moſes, *and by Moſes of God. Our Lord therefore ſo tempers his Anſwer, that he paſſeth by their Trap, alledging for Teſtimony the ſacred Scripture and natural Law, oppoſing the firſt Sentence of God to the ſecond, which was granted not from the Will of God, but Neceſſity of Sin.* The ſame Father inſtances another of the ſame Kind propoſed to him, [x] *I was aſſaulted at* Rome *by a very eloquent Perſon, with that which they called Horned Syllogiſm, ſo as which Way ſoever I turned I was more entangled. To marry a Wife,* ſaith he, *is it a Sin or not? I plainly, not thinking to avoid his Ambuſh, ſaid, it is not a Sin; he then propounded another Queſtion in Baptiſm. Are good Works remitted or Evil? I with the like Simplicity anſwered, Sins are remitted. When I thought myſelf ſecure, Horns began to bud out on each Side of me, and the hidden Forces to diſcover themſelves. If, ſaith he, to marry a Wife be not a Sin, and that Baptiſm remitteth Sins, whatſoever is not remitted is reſerved.*

i Epiſt. 6. 45. k Vit. Chryſip. l Deipn. 8. m Lucian Vit. Auct. n Analyt. poſter. 1. 1. o Divin. 2. p Cic. Lucul. q Digeſt. lib. 15. r Lib. 48, ad Sabin. in tit. de verb. & rer. ſignific. s In Lucullo. t In Chryſip. u Adv. Logic. w Lib. 3. in Mat. x Epiſt. 83.

ALEXINUS.

AMongſt the many Diſciples [y] of *Eubulides* was *Alexinus* an *Elean*, a great Lover of Contention, and therefore called Ελέγξινος from redarguing; he moſt oppoſed *Zeno*.

Hermippus ſaith, he went to *Olympia*, and there profeſſed Philoſophy. His Diſciples queſtioning why he lived there; he anſwered, he meant to inſtitute a Sect, and call it *Olympick*, but his Diſciples wanting Subſiſtence, and diſliking the Air, departed. He continued there ſolitary with one Servant only, and ſwimming in the River *Alphæus*, was hurt with a Reed, whereof he died.

He wrote againſt other Philoſophers beſides *Zeno*, and againſt *Ephorus* the Hiſtorian.

y Laert. 2. 109.

EUPHANTUS.

FRom [z] *Alexinus* came *Euphantus* an *Olinthian*, Maſter to King *Antigonus*, Father of *Demetrius*, Grandfather of *Antigonus Gonatas*. He died of Age. He writ,

The Hiſtory of that Time.

Tragedies many, which upon their publick Repreſentations were much applauded.

An Oration upon a Kingdom, to *Antigonus*, very celebrious.

z Laert. 2. 110.

APOLLONIUS CRONUS.

OF the [a] Diſciples of *Eubulides*, was *Apollonius Cronus*; [b] *Strabo* ſaith, he was a *Cyrenæan* by Birth, and calls him *Cronus Apollonius*, implying the latter to be a Sirname, from *Apollonia*, a Town of *Cyrene*.

a Lacrt. 2. 110. b Lib. 14.

DIODORUS.

CHAP. I.

His Life.

DIODORUS [c] was of *Yaſus* a City of *Caria*, Son of *Aminias*. *Laertius* ſaith, he heard *Eubulides*; [d] *Strabo* that he heard *Apollonius Cronus*, after whom he was called *Cronus*, *the Name of the Maſter being tranſmitted to the Diſciple, by Reaſon of the Obſcurity of the true* Cronus. [e] Of *Diodorus* thus *Callimachus*;

——— *Ev'n* Momus *writ*
Upon the Walls, Cronus *hath Wit.*

He lived with *Ptolomeus Soter*, in whoſe Preſence being queſtioned by *Stilpo* in ſuch Things as upon the ſudden he could not anſwer, he was not only

c Laert. 2. 111. d Lib. 14. & 17. e Laert. 2. 111.

punished by the King, but reproached with the Name of *Cronus*; whereupon he went from the Feast, and having written an Oration upon that Question, died of Grief.

CHAP. II.

His Philosophy.

[f] *Strabo* and *Laertius* affirm he was a *Dialectick*. *The* Dialecticks (saith [g] *Cicero*) *teach in their Elements, whether a Connex* (a Proposition which hath the Conjunction *if*) *be true or false; as this, if it be Day, it is Light, how much is it controverted?* Diodorus *is of one Opinion*, Philo *of another*, Chrysippus *of a third*. That *Diodorus* laboured much herein, appears from an Epigram of *Callimachus*, cited and explained by [h] *Sextus Empericus*.

Concerning these Propositions, the Disagreement of *Diodorus* from *Philo* and *Chrysippus*, (already mentioned by *Cicero*) is thus explained by [i] *Sextus Empiricus*. *But when*, saith he, *or how it followeth, they disagree among themselves; and those Things whereby they determine a Consequence to be judged, oppugn one another. As* Philo *said; It is a true Connex, when it beginneth not from true, and ended in false; so that, according to his Opinion, a true Connex may be true several Ways, a false only one Way. For when it beginneth from true, and endeth in true, it is true; as this; If it be Day, it is light. Again, when it beginneth from false and endeth in false, it is true. As this, If the Earth flies, the Earth hath Wings. Likewise, that which beginneth from false and endeth in true, is true. As this, If the Earth flies, it is Earth. That only is true which beginneth from true, and endeth in false. Such is this, If it be Day it is Night; for if it be Day, that it is Day is true, which is the Antecedent; but that it is Night is false, which was the Consequent.* Diodorus *saith, that is a true Connex which is not contingent, beginning from true, and ending in false. This is contrary to the Opinion of* Philo; *for such a Connex as this; if it be Day I discourse, and if at present it be Day, and I discourse, is, according to* Philo's *Opinion, a true Connex; for it begins from true, it is Day, and ends in true, I discourse. But according to the Opinion of* Diodorus, *it is false; for it may so happen, that though it begin from true, to wit, it is Day, yet it may end in false; to wit, that I discourse when I am silent. Thus by Contingency it may begin in true, and end in false; for before I began to discourse, it began from true; to wit, it is Day, but ended in false, to wit, I discourse.*

And again, [k] *for that we examine not many Opinions concerning a Connex, let us say that Connex is in itself right, which beginneth not from true, and endeth in false. This; if there be Motion, there is Vacuity, according to* Epicurus's *Opinion; beginning from true, to wit, there is Motion, and ending in true, will be true. According to the* Peripateticks, *beginning from true, to wit, there is Motion, and ending in false, to wit, there is Vacuity, will be false; according to* Diodorus, *beginning from false, to wit, there is Motion, and ending in false, to wit, there is Vacuity, will be true; for the Assumption, to wit, there is Motion, he denies as false.*

[l] Some affirm, he invented *the vailed and horned Arguments* (of which already in the Life of *Eubulides*) [m] *Alexander Aphrodiscus*, saith he, *used* Κυριευοντα λόγον, *the dominative Argument*; of whose Original and Efficacy thus [n] *Epictetus*. *The dominative Argument seems to have been interrogated and collected upon such like Occasions as these; for, there being a common Fight amongst these three Propositions to one another. The first, that every Thing past is necessarily true. The second, that Possibility follows not Impossibility. The third, that what is not possible, neither is nor shall be true. This Fight* Diodorus *observing, made use of the two first, to prove, that nothing is possible which is not, nor shall be. And* [o] Alexander; *for that I be at* Corinth, *is possible, if that I have been, or ever shall be there; but if neither, it is not possible. It is possible, that a Child be made a Grammarian, if he be made such, in Confirmation hereof* Diodorus *interrogated by the Dominative Argument.*

He held, that nothing is moved, [p] arguing thus. *If a Thing be moved, it is neither moved in the Place wherein it is, or in the Place wherein it is not, but not in that wherein it is, for it resteth in the Place wherein it is; nor in that wherein it is not, for where a Thing is not, there it can neither act, nor suffer; therefore nothing is moved, and* [q] *consequently nothing is corrupted or perisheth.*

[r] He asserted, that the Principles of Things are least indivisible Bodies, in [s] Number infinite, in Magnitude finite.

f Laert. lib. 14. g Acad. Quest. 4. 47. h Adverf. Gram. i Pyrrh. Hyp. 2. k Cap. eodem. l Laert. 2. 111. m In lib. 1. Prior. n Lib. 2. cap. 19. o In lib. 1. Prior. p Sext. Empir. Pyrrhon. hyp. 3. 8. q Sext. Empir. adverf. Gram. r Sext. Empir. Pyrrh. hyp. 3. 4. s Stob. Eclog. phyf. 13.

ICHTHYAS.

[t] ICHTHYAS, Son of *Metallus*, an eminent Person, is remembered amongst these Philosophers that are derived from *Euclid*. To him *Diogenes* the *Cynick* dedicated a Dialogue.

t Laert. 112.

CLINOMACHUS.

AMongst these descended from *Euclid*, was likewise *CLINOMACHUS*, a *Thurian*. He first wrote concerning Axioms, [Propositions] Catogorems, [that Part of a Proposition which is predicated of the other] and the like.

u Laert. 2. 112.

STILPO.

CHAP. I.

STILPO *his Life.*

w STILPO was of *Megara* in *Hellas*. He lived in the Time of the first *Ptolomy*. Of the Masters which he heard are reckoned,

Euclid, the Founder of this School. But this agrees not with his Time, as was before observed.

Some Followers of *Euclid*.

Thrasymachus of *Corinth*, Friend to *Ichthyas*. So *Heraclides* attesteth.

x *Diogenes* the *Cynick*.

Pasicles, a *Theban*, who heard *Crates* the *Cynick*, his own Brother.

Dioclides of *Megara*.

y *Cicero* saith, he was very acute, much approved by those Times. His Friends (saith he) writ, he was much inclined to Wine and Women, yet relate not this in his Dispraise, but rather in his Commendations, that he by Learning so subdued and repress'd his vicious Nature, that none ever saw him drunk, none ever discovered any Lasciviousness in him. z *Plutarch* magnifies his Height of Courage, mixed with Meekness and Temperance.

a He was much addicted to Civil Affairs. Besides his Wife, he kept Company with *Nicarete*, a Courtezan. He had a Daughter of ill Fame, whom *Simmias*, a *Syracusian*, his intimate Friend, married. She living incontinently, one told *Stilpo* she was a Dishonour to him; *No more*, saith he, *than I am an Honour to her.*

b *Ptolomeus Soter* much esteemed him; and when he took Possession of *Megara* by Conquest, gave him Money, and invited him along with him to *Egypt*. Of the Money he took a little, but absolutely refused the Journey. Going to *Ægina*, he stayed there till *Ptolomy*'s Return. *Demetrius*, Son of *Antigonus*, upon the taking of *Megara*, gave Order that his House might be preserved, and whatsoever belonged to him restored; and bidding him give them an Inventory of such Things as he had lost, he said that he had lost nothing that belonged to him, for none had taken away his Learning; his Learning and Knowledge were both left.

With *Demetrius* he disputed of Humanity so efficaciously, that he became a studious Auditor of him.

c Concerning *Minerva*'s Statue, carved by *Phidias*, he asked a Man, whether *Minerva*, Daughter of *Jove*, were a God; he affirmed she was. But this, saith he, is not of *Jove*, but of *Phidias*; to which the other assented. Then, saith he, she is not a God. Hereupon, being cited to the Court of *Areopagus*, he denied it not, but justified it, averring she was not a God, but a Goddess. But the *Areopagites*, nothing satisfied with this Evasion, ordered that he should depart the City. Hereupon *Theodorus*, sirnamed θεὸς, said in Derision, *How came* Stilpo *to know this? Did he put aside her Veil, and look upon her Breast?* *Theodorus* was bold of Speech, but *Stilpo* reserved; insomuch, as being demanded by *Crates*, whether the Gods delighted in bent Knees and Prayers; *Thou Fool*, saith he, *do not question me in publick, but when we are alone together.*

d He was sincere and plain, void of all Artifice. *Crates* the *Cynick*, not answering him, but ἀποπαίξαντος, *I knew*, saith he, *you would speak any thing rather than that which is decent.*

Crates, in propounding a Question, delivered a Fig to him, which he took and eat; *Crates* presently cried out, that he had lost his Fig. *Yes*, saith he, *and your Question also, of which that was an Earnest.*

e Seeing *Crates* half frozen in cold Weather; *Crates*, saith he, *methinks you want* ἱματίῳ καινῷ, (which one Way implies a *new Garment*, another Way, *both a Garment and Wit*) *Crates*, ashamed, answered thus.

w Laert. 2. 113. x Laert. 6. 76. vit. Diogenis. y De fato. z Plut. adv. Colo. a Laert. 2. 114. b Ibid. 2. 115. c Laert. 2. 116. d Laert. 2. 177. e Ibid.

Stilpo *at* Megara *I saw oppreſs'd,*
Where vaſt Typhœus *lies with Weight oppreſs'd.*
To hear him wrangle many Scholars came;
Fair Truth to chaſe away was all their Aim.

[f] At *Athens* he wrought ſo much upon the People, that they would run out of their Shops to ſee him. *They wonder at thee*, Stilpo (ſaid one to him) *as a Monſter. No*, ſaith he, *but as a true Man.*

As he was ſpeaking with *Crates*, in the midſt of their Diſcourſe he went away to buy Fiſh; *Crates* purſued him, crying out, that he gave over the Diſcourſe. *No*, ſaith he, *I carry along the Diſcourſe with me, but I leave you, the Diſcourſe will ſtay, the Fiſh muſt be bought.*

[g] Being asked, what is harder than a Stone, he anſwered, *A Fool.*

CHAP. II.
His Philoſophy.

[h] HE was Maſter of the *Megarick* School, excellent in *Eriſtick* Diſputes, by his ſubtle Tenets and Diſcourſes beautifying himſelf, his Country and Friends.

[i] He took away all Species (Univerſals) affirming, that he who ſaith, a Man, denotes not any Man, the Term being not proper to this or that Perſon; for why to one rather than to another, therefore not to this; and again, that which we ſee is not an Herb, for an Herb was many Years ago, therefore this was not an Herb.

[k] He likewiſe denied one Thing to be predicated of another, arguing thus; *If running be predicated of an Horſe, the Subject is not the ſame with the Predicate; the Definition of Man is one Thing, that of Good another. So an Horſe is a differing Thing from running, for upon Demand, we give ſeveral Definitions of each; for if a Man, and good, or an Horſe, and running were the ſame, how could Good be predicated of Food or Phyſick, and running of a Horſe, which are Things ſo different?* Thus he admitted no Conjunction with the Subject, in Things which are in a Subject, or predicated of a Subject, but conceived that both theſe, unleſs they be the very ſame with the Subject, cannot be predicated of it, even not as an Accident. This, though it were one of thoſe little Sayings which *Stilpo* ſportively uſed to caſt out amongſt the Sophiſters, *Colotes* the Epicurean oppoſed ſo eagerly, that he framed a large Diſcourſe againſt *Stilpo*, grounded only upon this Aſſertion, (which yet he neither refelled nor reſolved) affirming, that by holding one Thing is not predicated of another, he takes away good Life: *But* that *Stilpo* (ſaith *Plutarch*) *was offended only at ſome Words, and oppoſed the Manner of Speaking, but took not away the Courſe of Life, or aboliſhed Things, is moſt evident.*

[l] He aſſerted the chief Good to be a Mind not ſubject to Paſſion.

CHAP. III.
His Diſciples.

[m] HE ſo far exceeded others in fluent Diſcourſe and Learning, that he converted almoſt all *Greece* to the *Megarick* Sect. *Philippus* of *Megara* ſaith he drew

Metrodorus, ſirnamed the *Theoretick*, and *Timagorus* the *Geloan*, from *Theophraſtus*.

Clitarchus and *Simmias*, from *Ariſtotle* the *Cyrenæan*.

Of Dialecticks, *Pæonius*, from *Ariſtides*.

Diphilus, Son of *Euphantus*; and *Myrmex*, Son of *Exenætus*, coming to diſpute againſt him, became both Followers of him. Thus far *Philippus*. He likewiſe attracted

Phræſidemus the *Peripatetick*, excellent in Natural Philoſophy.

Alcimus, the moſt eminent Orator at that Time in *Greece*.

Zeno the *Phœnician*, an Epicurean Philoſopher.

Crates, and others. In a Word, whomſoever he would himſelf.

Heraclides ſaith, that *Zeno* the *Citiean*, Founder of the Stoical Sect, was his Diſciple.

CHAP. IV.
His Death, Writings.

HErmippus affirmeth, [n] that he died of Age; but drank a Draught of Wine to haſten his End.

Suidas ſaith, he wrote twenty Dialogues; *Laertius* but Nine; and thoſe not very efficacious; their Titles theſe.

Moſchus,
Ariſtippus, or *Callias.*
Ptolemæus.
Chærecrates.
Mitrocles.
Anaximenes.
Epigenes.
To his Daughter.
Ariſtotle.

He had a Son named *Dryſo*, a Philoſopher alſo.

f Laert. 2. 119. g Stob. Serm. 4. h Plut. adv. Colot. i Laert. 2. 119. k Plut. ibid. l Senec. Epiſt. 9. m Laert. 2. 113. n Laert. 2. 120.

THE ELEACK and ERETRIACK *SECTS.*

PHÆDO.

[o]THE *Eleack* Sect was instituted by *Phædo*, an *Elean* of a noble Family. It chanced that he was taken by Thieves or Pirates, and sold to a House of common dishoneſt Resort; where being forced to sit at the Door, he was observed by *Socrates* in passing, who noting the Ingenuity of his Countenance (which was extraordinary) perswaded (as *Laertius* saith) *Alcibiades* or *Plato* (as [p]*A. Gellius*) *Cebes* to buy him; from which Time he addicted himself diligently to Philosophy, and was a constant Disciple of *Socrates*; so much affected by *Plato*, that he called that most excellent Discourse of the Immortality of the Soul, after him, *Phædo*.

He instituted a Sect called from him *Eleack*. The Dialogues ascribed to him were,

Zopyrus,
Medus,
Simon,
Antimachus, or the *Old Man*,
Nicias,
Simmias,
Alcibiades,
Critolaus.

[q]*Panætius* doubts whether any of these were written by *Phædo*. *Medus* is, by some, ascribed to *Æschines*, and by others to *Poliænus*; as are also *Antimachus*, and the *Scythian* Discourses.

o Laert. 2. 105. p Gell. 2. 18. q Laert. vit. Æsch.

PLISTHENES.

[r]THE *Eleack* Sect was continued by *Plisthenes*, an *Elean*, Successor to *Phædo*. *Plisthenes* was succeeded by *Menedemus* and *Asclepiades*.

r Laert. ibid.

MENEDEMUS.

CHAP. I.

His Country, Parents, Teachers.

[s]*Menedemus* was one of those Philosophers that continued the School of *Phædo*, which hitherto was called *Eleack*, but from *Menedemus* was termed *Eretriack*. He was an *Eretrian*, Son of *Clisthenes*. *Clisthenes* was of the Family of the *Theopropidæ*; yet tho' noble by Descent, Mechanick by Profession, and indigent. Some affirm, he was a Maker of Tents, (*Hesychius Illustris* terms him an Architect) adding, that he taught both Arts to his Son *Menedemus*; so that when *Menedemus* wrote a Decree, an *Alexinian* Philosopher reproved him, saying, *It becomes not a wise Man to frame both Tents and Decrees.*

Menedemus being sent by the *Eretrians* with a Command of Soldiers to *Megara*, went from thence to *Athens*, to hear *Plato* at the Academy, with whom he was so taken, that he gave over his Military Employment.

By *Asclepiades*, a *Phlyasian*, his intimate Friend, he was carried to *Stilpo* at *Megara*, whom they

s Laert. ibid.

both

both heard. Thence taking a Journey to *Elis*, they met with *Anchypillus* and *Moschus*, who belonged to the School of *Phædo*.

Some affirm, he despised *Plato* and *Xenocrates*, and *Paræbates* the *Cyrenean*, but admired *Stilpo*; concerning whom being demanded his Opinion, he only answered, that *he was free*.

CHAP. II.

His School and Philosophy.

[t] BEing returned home to *Eretria*, he set up a School, and taught Philosophy there. The *Eliack* School being thus transferred to *Eretria*, was from thenceforward call'd *Eretriack*.

In his School there was no Order of Place, no Seats round about it; but as every Man chanced to be sitting, or standing, or walking, in the same Postures they heard him.

He held, that *there was but one Virtue and Good*, reprehending those who asserted more. Whence of one who held there were many Gods, he demanded ironically *how many?* and *whether he thought there were more than an Hundred?*

He was of a versatile Wit, and in Composure of his Speech a difficult Adversary. He turned himself every Way, and found something to say for every Thing. He was very litigious, as *Antisthenes*, in his Successions, affirms, and used this Question; *What is not the same, is different from that with which it is not the same?* Yes. *To benefit is not the same with Good, therefore Good doth not benefit.* He took away *Negative Propositions*, leaving only the *Affirmative*; and of these he admitted the Simple only; but rejected those which were *not simple*, calling them *conjoined* and *complex*.

Heraclides saith, he was a *Platonick*, and derided *Dialectick*. *Hexinus* asking, whether he had given over beating his Father; *I neither did beat him*, saith he, *nor have given over*. The other replied, *Either say yes or no, to dissolve the Ambiguity*. *It is ridiculous*, saith he, *to follow your Laws, when a Man may withstand them in the very Entrance*.

[u] He writ not, or composed any Thing, because (saith *Antigonus Carystius*) he was of no certain Opinion, yet in Dispute he was so vehement, that he many Times went away with black and blue Eyes.

CHAP. III.

His Manner of Living.

[w] HE contracted a strict Friendship with *Asclepiades*, nothing inferior to that of *Pilades* to *Orestes*. *Asclepiades* was the Elder, whence there went a common Saying, that he was the Poet, *Menedemus* the Player.

[x] When they were yet both young Philosophers, and indigent, they were cited to the Court of *Areopagus*, to give Account ([y] according to *Solon*'s Law) by what Means (spending the whole Day amongst Philosophers, without any Labour, and having no Estate) they subsisted, and were in so good a Condition. They desired that one of the Masters of the common Prison might be sent for; who, when he came, attested, that they went down every Night into the Prison, where the common Malefactors ground, and did there grind, and in Pay of their Labour, received two Drachms. At which the *Areopagites* much wondring, bestowed, as an honourable Reward upon them, Two Hundred Drachms.

[z] They had other Patrons that bestowed Gifts upon them. *Archepolis* gave them three Thousand Pieces of Silver. They both contended which should receive last; and in Conclusion, neither accepted it. The chief Persons that received them were *Hipponicus* a *Macedonian*, and *Ægetor* a *Lamiean*. *Ægetor* gave each of them thirty *Minæ*. *Hipponicus* gave *Menedemus* two thousand Drachms towards the Marriage of his Daughters; which, as *Heraclides* saith, were three, by his Wife *Oropia*.

For *Asclepiades* and *Menedemus* took each of them a Wife. *Asclepiades* married the Daughter, *Menedemus* the Mother. *Asclepiades*'s Wife dying, he took the Wife of *Menedemus*. *Menedemus* being made a chief Magistrate, married a rich Wife; notwithstanding, he allow'd his first Wife an equal Interest in the Government of the House. *Asclepiades* having lived with *Menedemus* in great Plenty, yet with great Temperance, died old at *Eretria*. At that Time, one, whom *Asclepiades* much loved, coming late at Night, intending to have feasted with him, the Servants shut him out of Doors. But *Menedemus* bad them let him in, saying, *Asclepiades* would admit him even under Ground.

[a] *Menedemus* was much given to Entertainments; and, because the Country was unwholesome, made many Feasts. What Order he observed therein is thus delivered by *Antigonus Carystius*, and out of him (though not cited) by *Laertius*. He dined but with one or two Companions at the most. If any came to him, they were admitted after Dinner was ended; if they came sooner than the set Time, they walked short Turns before the Door, and demanded of the Servants what Course was carried in; if they told them Fish-broth (with which they began their Dinner) they went away; if any Flesh, they went into a Room prepared for that Purpose. In Summer-time, *Menedemus* had the Couches or Beds of his Dining-room cover'd with Flags and Rushes, in Winter with Sheep-skins. Every Guest brought a Cushion; the Cup they had was no bigger than

t Laert. 2. 130. u Laert. 2. 136. w Laert. 2. 137. x Athen. Deip. 4. y See Life of Solon. z Laert. 2. 137. a Laert. 2. 133.

a large

a large Spoon; instead of Sweet-meats, they had *Lupines* and Beans; sometimes such Fruit as the Season afforded; in Summer, Pomegranates; in Spring, Pulse; in Winter, Figgs. This *Lycophron* the *Chalcidian* confirms in his Satyrical Comedy upon *Menedemus*, where *Silenus* speaks thus to the Satyrs.

Sons impious of a pious Father, I
(You see) with your Delights and Sports comply:
But never by the Gods at such a Feast
In Caria, Rhodes, *or* Lydia, *was a Guest.*
How plentiful!

And not long after,
A little Pot half full of Water clear,
Rated at Farthings five, a Boy did bear
To every Guest; about vile Lupines went,
With which the Beggar's Table's scarce content.

Whilst they drank (after the Feast) *Menedemus* proposed Questions, and instead of a Desert, gave them Discourse, which excited all to Temperance and Continence. These continued sometimes 'till the Crowing of the Cock broke them off, much against the Will of his Guests, who never thought they had enough of them.

CHAP. IV.

His Civil Employments.

[b] HE was first contemn'd by his Countrymen, and called Dog and Fool; but at last so much honoured by them, that they committed the Government of the Commonwealth to his Charge, and paid him yearly two Hundred Talents, whereof he sent back fifty.

After he applied himself to Civil Business, he was so thoughtful, that going to put Incense into a Censer, he put it besides. *Crates* reproaching him for undertaking publick Employments, he sent him to Prison; whereupon, as he chanced to pass by, *Crates* rose up and saluted him with the Title of *Agamemnonian*, *Leader of the City.*

He was sent Ambassador from the *Eretrians* to *Ptolomy*, and to *Lysimachus*, (much honoured wheresoever he came) and to *Demetrius*, all three Kings of *Macedonia*, of whom *Demetrius* first reigned, then *Lysimachus*, and after him (*Pyrrhus* intervening) *Ptolomy*.

[d] Some accused him to *Demetrius*, that he would betray his City to *Ptolomy*; of which Charge he acquitted himself by an Epistle, beginning thus; *Menedemus to King* Demetrius, *Health. I hear that you are informed many Things concerning us*, &c. advising him to take heed of one of those that were his Enemies, by Name *Æschylus*. When he was on Embassy to *Demetrius*, he spoke very earnestly and effectually concerning *Oropus*.

[e] *Antigonus* also, King of *Macedonia*, loved him exceedingly, and profess'd himself his Disciple. In his Behalf he made a Decree, clear and void of Ostentation, beginning thus. *Forasmuch as King* Antigonus, *having overcome the Barbarians in Fight, returneth into his own Country, having good Success in all his Undertakings; the Senate and People have thought good*, &c.

CHAP. V.

His Virtues and Apothegms.

[f] MENEDEMUS was of exceeding Gravity, for which *Crates* deriding him, said,

Æsclepiad the *Philiasian*, and the *Eretrian* Bull and *Timon*,
Going to speak, he swells with Pride, and with rude grinning.

In Severity he was so awful, that *Eurylocus* being invited by *Antigonus*, together with *Clippides*, a Youth of *Cyzicum*, refused to go, fearing *Menedemus* should know it.

[g] In Reproof he was bitter and bold; of which *Laertius* instanceth his Sayings to a young Man over-confident, to *Hierocles*, &c. to an Adulterer boasting, *&c.* to a young Man crying, *&c.*

Antigonus asking, whether he should go to a luxurious Banquet; not speaking whether he should go or not, he bad him send them Word that he was a King's Son.

One who intruded himself upon him, and discoursed very absurdly, he asked if he had a Farm; he answered, *Many. Go then*, saith he, *and look after them, lest in losing your Rusticity, you lose them also.*

To one asking, whether a good Man may take a Wife, he said, *Do you think I am good, or not?* The other assenting; *But I*, saith he, *have taken one.*

Not able to limit the Prodigality of one who invited him to Supper, he silently reproved him, eating nothing but Olives.

This Freedom brought him into Danger when he was in *Cyprus* with *Nicocreon*, together with his Friend *Asclepiades*; for, the King having invited him with the rest of the Philosophers to a Monthly Feast, *Menedemus* said, *This Convention, if it be good, ought to be every Day; if otherwise, this Day is too much.* The Tyrant answered, that he had set apart that Day to converse with Philosophers. *Menedemus* persisting in his Assertion, demonstrated from what he had said of the Sacrifice, that Philosophers ought to be heard at all Times. Where-

b Laert. 2. 140. c Laert. 2. 131. d Laert. 2. 140. e Ibid. f Laert. 2. 129. g Laert. 2. 127, 128, &c.

upon,

upon, if one of the Muſicians had not helped them to eſcape, they had been put to Death; whence the Ship being endangered by a Storm, *Aſclepiades* ſaid, that the Humanity of the Muſician preſerved them, the Roughneſs of *Menedemus* had undone them.

He was negligent, and (as we ſaid) careleſs in every Thing that concerned the Order of his School; likewiſe high-minded, and covetous of Glory; inſomuch that when he and *Aſclepiades* firſt exerciſed the Trade of Building, *Aſclepiades* was ſeen upon the Houſe-top, carrying Clay; but *Menedemus*, if he eſpied any Man paſſing by, hid himſelf.

He was ſomewhat inclined to Superſtition. Having eaten, in a Cook's Shop, the Fleſh of ſomething that had died of itſelf, ignorantly with *Aſclepiades*, as ſoon as he knew it, he grew ſick, and looked pale, 'till *Aſclepiades* reproved him, ſaying, *He was not ſick of the Meat, but of Fancy.*

In all other reſpects he was a Perſon of a great and free Soul; in Strength, even in his old Age, equal to thoſe who wreſtled in Exerciſe; ſtrong made, ſwarthy of Complexion, fat and corpulent; but of indifferent Stature, as appears (ſaith *Laertius*) by his Statue in *Eretria*, in the *Old Stadium*, ſo exactly carved, that it expreſſed the naked Proportion of his Limbs.

He loved *Aratus*, and *Lycophron* the Tragick Poet, and *Antagoras* the *Rhodian*; but above all, he was ſtudious of *Homer*; next of the *Lyricks*; then of *Sophocles*. In Satyrs he aſſigned the ſecond Place to *Achæus*; the firſt to *Æſchylus*, whence to thoſe in the State who defended the contrary Part, he ſaid thus.

The Swift, in Time, out-ſtript are by the Slow;
A Tortoiſe thus an Eagle may outgo.

Theſe are Verſes of *Achæus*; they therefore are miſtaken, who ſay he read nothing but the *Medea* of *Euripides*, which is put among the Poems of *Neophron* the *Sicyonian*.

Of *Bion*, who ſpoke with much Diligence againſt Prophets, he ſaid, *He murdered the Dead.*

To one who ſaid, *The greateſt Good is to enjoy thoſe Things which we deſire*; *It is a much greater*, ſaith he, *to deſire thoſe Things which are fitting.*

He was violent (as we ſaid) in Controverſy, but moſt affable in Converſation and Action. *Alexinus*, whom in Diſpute he had often circumvented, and bitterly derided, he gratified in Deed; taking Care for the ſafe Conduct of his Wife from *Delphi* to *Chalcis*, the Way being much infeſted with Thieves.

He was an excellent Friend, as is manifeſt from his Affection to *Aſclepiades*, of which we have already ſpoken; only to *Perſæus* he was conſtantly a profeſs'd Enemy; for it was known, that when *Antigonus*, for *Menedemus* his ſake, would have reſtored the *Eretrians* to their firſt Liberty, *Perſeus* withſtood it. Whereupon, at a Feaſt, *Menedemus* openly inveighed againſt him, uſing, amongſt many others, this Expreſſion; *He is indeed a Philoſopher, but of all Men that are, were, or ever ſhall be, the moſt wicked.*

CHAP. VI.

His Departure from Eretria, *and Death.*

[h] THE Friendſhip he held with *Antigonus*, made him ſuſpected by his own Countrymen, as if he meant to betray the City to him; of which being accuſed by *Ariſtodemus*, he fled, and lived awhile at *Oropus* in the Temple of *Amphiaraus*. Thence ſome golden Cups chancing to be ſtolen, he was, by a publick Decree of the *Beotians*, forbidden to ſtay there any longer; whereupon he returned privately into his Country, and taking his Wife and Children along with him, went from thence to *Antigonus*, where he died of Grief.

But [i] *Heraclides*, on the contrary, affirmeth, that whilſt he was Præfect of the *Eretrians*, he often defended his Country againſt thoſe who would have made *Demetrius* Tyrant thereof; neither would he therefore have betray'd it to *Antigonus*; but that was falſely laid to his Charge. He afterwards went to *Antigonus*, petitioning that he would reſtore his Country to their Liberties; which *Antigonus* denying, he, out of Grief, faſted ſeven Days, and ſo died. The ſame Relation is delivered by *Antigonus Caryſtius*. *Heraclides* ſaith, he lived eighty four Years.

h Laert. 2. 142. i Laert. 2. 143.

THE

THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY.

THE FIFTH PART,

Containing the *Academick* Philoſophers.

PLATO.

CHAP. I.

The Country, Parents, and Time of PLATO.

THE moſt eminent of all the Sects derived from *Socrates* was the *Academick*, ſo called from the *Academy*, a Place in *Athens*, where the Profeſſors thereof taught. This Sect was inſtituted by *Plato*, continued by *Speuſippus*, *Xenocrates*, *Polemon*, *Crates*, *Crantor*; thus far called the *firſt or old Academy*. *Arceſilaus*, ſucceeding *Crantor*, inſtituted the *middle Academy*, continued by *Lacydes*, *Telecles*, *Evander*, and *Hegeſinus*. *Carneades* founded the *new Academy*, of which was alſo *Clitomachus*. Some reckon a *fourth Academy*, inſtituted by *Philo* and *Charmidas*. A fifth by *Antiochus*.

[a] *Plato* was out of doubt an *Athenian*. Nor are they to be credited who relate him [b] a *Theban*, born at *Cynocephalus*. [c] *Antileon* affirms his Parents to be of *Collyttus*. [d] He was born (according to *Phavorinus*) in the Iſland *Ægina*, in the Houſe of *Phidiades*, *Son of* Thales. His Father ſent with others thither at the Diviſion of the Land (upon their Defection from, and Subjection by the *Athenians*, at the Beginning of the *Peloponneſian* War) and returned to *Athens*; at what Time thoſe *Athenians* were ejected by the *Lacedæmonians*, in Aid of the *Æginetæ*.

[e] He was of an eminent Family; his Father *Ariſto* (Son of *Ariſtocles*) of the Race of *Codrus*, Son of *Melanthus*, who (as *Thraſilus* affirms) derived themſelves from *Neptune*. *Melanthus* flying *Meſſana*, came to *Athens*; where afterwards, by a Stratagem, killing *Xanthus*, he was made King after *Thymoetes*, the laſt of the *Theſeidæ*. His Mother *Perictione*, by ſome called *Potone*, whoſe Kindred with *Solon* is thus deſcribed by *Laertius* and [f] *Proclus*. *Execiſtides* had two Sons, *Solon* and *Dropides*: *Dropides* had *Critias*, mentioned by *Solon* in his Poems.

Bid fair-hair'd Critias *his Sire obſerve*;
A wand'ring Mind will from his Leader ſwerve.

Critias had *Calleſchrus*; *Calleſchrus* had *Critias*, one of the thirty Tyrants, and *Glaucon* (whom [g] *Apuleius* calls *Glaucus*) *Glaucon* had *Charmides* and *Perictione*; *Perictione* by *Ariſto* had *Plato*, the ſixth from *Solon*: *Solon* was deſcended from *Neptune* and *Neleus*, [Father of *Neſtor*.] Thus *Laertius*, from whom *Proclus* diſſents only in that, that he makes *Glaucon*, Son of the firſt *Critias*, Brother to *Calleſchrus*, which *Critias* manifeſtly (ſaith he) in *Plat. Charmides* confirms; calling *Glauco* (Father of *Charmides*) his Uncle. Thus was *Plato* deſcended both ways from *Neptune*.

a Laert. 3. 1. b Tzetz. Chiliad 11. 390. c Laert. 3. 3. d Laert. ibid, Suid. e Laert. 3. 1. Apul. Suid. f In Timæum. g Apul. de Dogm. Plat.

There

There are (saith [h] *Apuleius*) *who assert* Plato *of a more sublime Race.* Aristander, *followed by many* Platonists, *thinks, he was begotten on his Mother by some Spectrum in the Shape of* Apollo. [i] *Speusippus*, in his Treatise, entitled *Plato*, or περὶ δείπνου, *Clearchus* in his Eulogy of *Plato*; *Anaxilides*, in his second Book of Philosophers; *Plutarch*, *Suidas*, and others, affirm it to have been commonly reported at *Athens*, that he was the Son of *Apollo*, who appearing in Vision to her (being a Woman of extraordinary Beauty) [k] *Perictione se miscuit*; she thereupon conceived. *Ariston* (her Husband) having often attempted to enjoy her, but in vain; at last, *Apollo* appearing to him in a Vision or Dream, and a Voice commanding him to refrain the Company of his Wife for ten Months, until her Delivery were past, he forbore; whence *Tyndarus*.

He did not issue from a mortal Bed;
A God his Sire, a God-like Life he led.

Some thereupon (as [m] Saint *Hierom* saith) affirmed, he was born of a Virgin; and it was a common Speech among the *Athenians*, that *Phœbus* begat *Esculapius* and *Plato*; one to cure Bodies, the other Souls.

[n] *Ariston* had afterwards by *Perictione* two Sons, *Adimaretus* and *Glauco*, and a Daughter *Potone*, Mother to *Speusippus*. These Relations of *Plato* will be more conspicuous in this Genealogical Table.

Neptune —— [o] *Chloris*
| Daughter of *Tiresias*
Periclimenes
|
[p] *Penthilus*.
|
Borus.
|
Andropompus.
|
Melanthus.
|
Codrus —— an *Athenian* Woman.
|
Neleus
|
[q] *Execestides*.
|
Solon. *Dropides*.
|
Critias.
|
Callæschrus.
|
Glauco. *Critias*.
Aristocles | one of the thirty Tyrants.
Ariston.—*Perictione*. *Charmides*.
|
Plato. *Adimantus*. *Glauco*. *Potone*.—*Eurymedon*.
|
Perhaps *Adimantus* the younger, *Plato*'s Heir. | *Speusippus*. *Plato*'s Successor.

h Dogm. Plat. i Laert. 2. 2. τῷ ἐπιγεγραφομένῳ Πλάτωνος περὶ δείπνου. Perhaps it should be Πλάτων, ἢ περὶ δείπνου. Amongst the Writings of Speusippus is mentioned Πλάτωνος ἐγκώμιον. k Sympos. 8. 1. l Apul. dogm. Plat. m Adversus Govinian. n Laert. 3. 4. Suid. o Apollodor. lib. 3. p Pausan. Corinth. q Laert. Procles.

For the Year of his Birth (to omit the Miſtakes of *Euſebius*, who placeth it in the fourth Year of the eighty eighth Olympiad, in the Archonſhip of *Stratocles*, and of the *Chronicon Alexandrinum*, that placeth it the Year following) *Laertius* ſaith, *He was born, according to the Chronology of* Apollodorus, *in the eighty eighth Olympiad*, which ſeems to be towards the Beginning of the firſt Year, whilſt *Aminias* was yet Archon. For *Laertius*[r] elſewhere ſaith, That *he was ſix Years younger than* Iſocrates; for *Iſocrates* (ſaith he) *was born when* Lyſimachus, Plato, *when* Aminias *was Archon, under whom* Pericles *died.* In the third Year of the *Peloponneſian* War. This *Aminias* is, by the [s] *Scholiaſt* of *Euripides*, called *Ameinon*; by [t] *Athenæus*, *Epaneimon*; by [u] *Diodorus Siculus*, *Epaminondas.* The various reading, occaſioned either by Addition or Detraction of the Prepoſition ἐπὶ, but by which of theſe two cannot eaſily be evinced. [w] *Salmaſius* endeavouring to prove the Name to be Ἀμείνων, poſitively affirms, that the *Greeks* never name an Archon without the Prepoſition ἐπὶ. But that Error [x] *Petavius* confutes, whoſe Opinion is confirmed by the ancient Marble at *Arundel Houſe*, which addeth not the Prepoſition to the Names of the Archons.

Neither is the Opinion of [y] *Athenæus* much different, who affirms, *Plato* was born the Year before, *Apollodorus* being Archon; who ſucceeded *Euthydemus*, who was Archon the third Year of the 87th Olympiad; and that under *Euphemus*, in the fourth Year of the 90th Olympiad, he was fourteen Years old. For both *Laertius* and *Athenæus* agree in the Year of his Death, *viz.* in the firſt of the 108th Olympiad, when *Theophilus*, the Succeſſor of *Callimachus*, was Archon. *Athenæus* only differeth in this, that, computing 82 Archons, he attributes ſo many Years to *Plato*'s Life; whereas 'tis certain, he lived but eighty one.

The Day of his Birth, [z] according to *Apollodorus*, was the ſeventh of *Thargelion*, at which time the *Delians* did celebrate the Feaſt of *Apollo.* So likewiſe *Florus*, cited by [a] *Plutarch*, who adds, that the Prieſts and Prophets call *Apollo* ἑβδομαγένης, as being born upon this ſeventh Day; whence perhaps was occaſioned the Fiction, that he was the Son of *Apollo*, which *Plutarch* eſteems no Diſparagement to his Deity. In the firſt Year of the 88th Olympiad, the *Neomenia* of *Hecatombæon* fell upon *Auguſt* the ſecond; and (upon thoſe Hypotheſes which we laid down formerly in the [b] Life of *Socrates*) the Dominical Letter for that Year being *E.* the ſeventh of *Thargelion* will (according to the *Julian* Account, taken proleptically) fall upon *Friday* the thirtieth of *May*; according to the *Gregorian*, upon *Friday* the ninth of *June*, in the Year of the *Julian* Period, 4286.

This is according to the Faith of the Hiſtorians, with whom the Aſtrologers do not agree; for * *Julus Firmicus* hath erected the Scheme of his Nativity after this Manner.



If the Aſcendent, ſaith he, *ſhall be* ♐, ♂, ☿, *and* ♀ *therein poſited; and if* ☽ *then be placed in the ſeventh, having* ♌ *for his Sign, and in the ſecond the* ☉ *in* ♓ *and the* ☾ *in* ♊ *in the fifth Houſe beholding*

r Laert. 2. 4. s Argum. Hippol. t Deipn. 5. u Lib. 13. w Plin. Exercit. p. 157. x Doctr. temp. c. 8. y Deipn. 5.
z Laert. 3. 2. a Sympoſ. 8. 1. b Cap. 1. * Aſtron. l. 6.

the Ascendent with a △ Aspect, and ♄ in the ninth from the Ascendant in ♎. This Geniture renders a Man Interpreter of divine and heavenly Institutions, who endued with instructive Speech, and the Power of divine Wit, and formed in a Manner by a celestial Institution, by the true License of Disputations shall arrive at all the Secrets of Divinity. Thus *Firmicus*, whose Scheme agreeth not with the other Calculation, as being betwixt the midst of *February* and of *March*, during which Time the ☉ is in ♓.

Hence will appear the great Anachronism of those who affirm, that *Plato* went to *Egypt*, in the time of the Prophet *Jeremiah* [z] (whom *Eusebius* placeth in the thirty sixth Olympiad) and heard him there. *Jeremiah* at the Captivity of the *Jews* into *Babylon*, was carried by *Johanan* Son of *Careah* into *Ægypt*. The *Jews* were carried away by *Nebuchadnezzar*, at what Time *Tarquinius Priscus* reigned at *Rome*, *Vaphres* in *Egypt*, to whom the rest of the *Jews* fled, which was in the forty seventh Olympiad, 160 Years before *Plato* was born. This Opinion, [a] once held, was afterwards retracted by St. *Augustine*, in his Book of Retractions, and confuted *de Civit. Dei*, 8. 11.

CHAP. II.

His first Education, Exercise, and Studies.

WHilst [b] *Plato* was yet an Infant, carried in the Arms of his Mother *Perictione*, *Ariston* his Father went to *Hymettus* (a Mountain in *Attica*, eminent for abundance of Bees and Honey) to sacrifice to the Muses or Nymphs, taking his Wife and Child along with him; as they were busied in the divine Rites, she laid the Child in a Thicket of Myrtles hard by; to whom, as he slept ([c] *in cunis dormienti*) came a Swarm of Bees, Artists of *Hymettian* Honey, flying and buzzing about him, and (as it is reported) made a Honey-comb in his Mouth. This was taken for a Presage of the singular Sweetness of his Discourse; his future Eloquence foreseen in his Infancy.

His Parents (saith [d] *Alexander*) named him *after his Grandfather*, Aristocles: [e] Speusippus *(instituted in his Domestick Documents) extolleth his sharpness of Apprehension, whilst yet a Child, and the admirable Modesty of his Disposition* ([f] which was such, that he was never, even all those Years, seen to laugh immoderately) *affirming, that the Beginnings of his Youth were seasoned with Labour and Love of Study; which Virtues increased and met with all the rest when he came to Man's Estate.*

[g] Of *Dionysius* the Grammarian (mentioned in his ἀνηγραὶ) he received the first Rudiments of Learning. Of *Ariston*, an *Argive*, he learned the Art of Wrestling (at that Time much in esteem, as being one of the Olympick Exercises) wherein he became so great a Proficient, that some affirm he wrestled at the *Isthmus* in the *Pythian* Games.

[h] As in Years and Virtue, so likewise he increased extraordinarily in outward Proportion and Shape, insomuch that *Ariston* named him *Plato* (which implieth Latitude) in Allusion to the largeness of his Person; others say, to the Wideness of his Shoulders; *Neanthes* of his Forehead; some to his large Eloquence. Whatsoever the Occasion were, this Name wore out and displaced the other. That he was called also *Sarapis*, is affirmed by [i] *Hesychius*. There was not any Imperfection throughout his Person, except a Gibbosity in the hinder Part of his Head, and (as *Timotheus* affirms) a Kind of [j] Hesitation in his Speech.

[k] He learned also (as *Dicæarchus* relates) to paint. He addicted himself much to Poetry, and wrote many Poems: First, *Dithyrambs*; then Epick Poetry; which comparing with *Homer*, and finding far short of him, he burnt. Then he betook himself to writing Tragedies. He made a compleat Tetralogy (four Drama's as the Manner was, when they contested, to be presented at four several Festivals, *Lenæan*, *Panathæan*, *Chytræan*, the fourth Satyrical) and gave it to the Players to be acted, intending to contest for the Palm upon the Olympick Theatre: But the Day before it should have been presented, chancing to hear *Socrates* discourse at the Olympick Theatre ([l] before the *Bacchanals*) he was so taken with that *Syren*, that he not only forebore to contest at that Time, but wholly gave over all Tragick Poesy, and burnt all his Poems, [m] saying that of *Homer*,

Vulcan *come hither*, Plato *needs thy Aid.*

From that Time (the twentieth Year of his Age, which falls about the 4th of the 92d Olympiad) he became a Follower of *Socrates*, and studied Philosophy.

Some affirm (of the Truth of which Report, *Ælian* [n] justly doubts) *he was driven by Poverty to betake himself to the Wars, but intercepted by* Socrates, *and instructed in that which concerns Mankind, he sold his Arms, and through his Persuasion, addicted himself to Philosophy.*

That he fought for his Country is certain, express'd in his Answer to [o] *Crobylus* the Sycophant. *Aristoxenus* [p] and *Ælian* affirm he was engaged thrice; *first at* [q] Tanagara; *the second Time at* Corinth; *and lastly at* Delium, *where he fought best of all the Soldiers.* Thus *Aristoxenus*. But that this is false, may be easily evinced by Computation of

z Jerem. chap. xlix. a De Doctr. Christ. 2. 28. b Elian. var. hist. 10. 21. c Cic. divinat. lib. 1. d Laert. 3. 4. e Apul. dogm. Plat. f Laert. 3. 26. g Ibid. 3. 4. h Ibid. i In verbo Σαραπὶς Laert. j ἰσχνόμενον, which (besides λεπτοφωνία, smallness of Voice, in which Sense it is here taken by the Interpreters and Phioinus) signifieth an Imperfection of Speech by stammering. Arist. Frob. 11. 30. unless there and here we would read ἰσχόφωνον. k Laert. 3. 5. l Ælian. var. Hist. 2. 30. m Laert. 3. 6. n Var. Hist. 3. 27. o Afterwards cap. 11. p Laert. 3. 24. q Var. Hist. 7. 14.

Times. The first Fight of the *Athenians* at *Tanagra*, was in the 4th Year of the 80th Olympiad, 17 Years before *Plato* was born; the second, in the first of the 89th, when he was but six Years old. The Fight at *Delium* was in the first of the 89th, at what Time he was but four Years old; from the last Words of *Aristoxenus*, ἔνθα ἠξιώσθησαι (implying, that *at* Delium *he had the Prize for fighting best*) may be conjectured that this was meant of *Socrates*, who was thrice personally engaged, and at [r] *Delium* should have had the Prize for fighting best, but that his Modesty procured it to be conferred upon *Alcibiades*.

CHAP. III.

His Masters in Philosophy, and his Travels to that End.

Socrates [s], the Night before *Plato* was recommended to him, dreamed, that a young Swan fled from *Cupid*'s Altar in the Academy, and sate in his Lap, thence fled up to Heaven, it delighted both Gods and Men with its Musick. As *Socrates* [the next Day] was relating this to some of his Auditors, *Ariston* came at the same time, and presented his Son *Plato* to him to be his Disciple. As soon as *Socrates* saw him, reading in his Looks his Ingenuity, Friends, saith he, this is the Swan of *Cupid*'s Academy.

Eight Years he lived with *Socrates*, in which time, he committed (as others of his Disciples) the Effect of his Master's Discourse to Writing: Hereof he composed Dialogues, but with so great Additions of his own, [t] that *Socrates* hearing him recite his *Lysis*, cried out, Oh! *Hercules*, how many Things doth this young Man feign of me? For not a few Things (adds *Laertius*) of those which he writ, *Socrates* never spoke.

At the Time of *Socrates*'s Arraignment, the first Year of the 95th Olympiad, he was one of the Senate, the youngest of the Convention. That he was a Senator, implies he was full thirty Years old at that Time, according to *Solon*'s Law. This argues [u] *Hermodorus* of a Mistake, who saith, he was twenty eight Years old when he fled to *Megara*, upon the Death of *Socrates*, and subverts the Accounts of those who under-reckon his Birth. The [w] Judges being much displeased with *Socrates*, *Plato* went up into the Orator's Chair, intending to plead in his Defence, and begun thus: *Tho' I* (Athenians) *am the youngest of those that come up into this Place.* But all the Senate crying out, *of those who go down*, he was thereupon constrained to do so. *Socrates* being condemned, *Plato* offered him to procure so much Money as might purchase his Liberty, but *Socrates* refused the Offer. [x] About that Time, Socrates's *Friends being together to condole his Death*, Plato *encouraged them, and bid them not despair, for that himself was capable to govern the School; and in so saying, drank to* Apollodorus, *who answered, he would sooner take up the Cup of Poison from the Hand of* Socrates, *than pledge him upon that Condition.* Upon the Death of *Socrates*, *Plato* (whose excessive Grief upon that Occasion is observed by [y] *Plutarch*) with others of his Disciples, fearing the Tyranny of those Persons who put their Master to Death [z] fled to *Euclid* at *Megara*, who friendly entertained them, till the Storm was blown over.

[a] *Apuleius* saith, that before he came to *Socrates*, *he was initiated in the Sect of* Heraclitus. But more likely is that which is affirmed by *Laertius*, that after *Socrates*'s Death he applied himself to *Cratylus*, a Follower of *Heraclitus*, and to *Hermogenes*. *He conceived*, saith [b] St. *Austine*, *That his own Invention and* Socrates's *Instructions came short of the true Aim of Philosophy. He considered with himself what Course he should take to benefit himself most; for this Purpose, he determined to travel to any Place, where Report told him he might drink of the Spring of Learning, even to the farthest Parts of the Earth, saith* [c] Cicero.

[d] *First*, to *Italy*, where he addicted himself to the Discipline of *Pythagoras*, which, tho' he saw repleniſhed with curious and high Reason, yet he chiefly affected to imitate the Continence and Chastity thereof, tho' the [e] *Pythagoreans* themselves affirm he had all his natural Philosophy from thence.

[f] Perceiving the Knowledge of the *Pythagoreans* to be assisted with other Disciplines, he went to *Cyrene*, to learn Geometry of *Theodorus* the Mathematician: Thence to *Egypt* (which was then under the Empire of *Artaxerxes Mnemon*) [g] under Pretence of selling Oil; but the Scope of his Journey was to fetch Astrology from thence: *To learn Arithmetick and celestial Speculations of the Barbarians*, (saith *Cicero* [h]) *and* [i] *to be instructed in the Rites of the Prophets.* [k] *He travelled over the Country, informing himself all the Way by their Priests, of the multiplicious Proportions of Geometry, and the Observation of celestial Motions. At what Time young Students at* Athens *were enquiring for* Plato *to instruct them, he was busied in surveying the inexplicable Banks of* Nilus, *the vast Extent of a barbarous Country, and the winding Compass of their Trenches, a Disciple to the* Egyptian *old Men.* [l] Having taken a full Survey of all the Country, he at last settled himself in the Province of *Sais*, *learning of the wise Men there, what they held concerning the Universe, whether it had a Beginning, and whether it is moved at present,*

r See Socrates's Life, cap. 7. s Apul. dogm. Plat. Laert. 3. 5. Suid. t Laert. 3. 35. u Laert. 2. 42. w Laert. vit. Socr. x Athen. deipn. lib. 11. y De virtut. moral. z Laert. 2. 6. a Dogm. Plat. b De civ. Dei. lib. 8. cap. 4. c De finib. 5. d Apol. dogm. Plat. e Porphyr. vit. Pythag. f Apul. ibid. g Plut. in Solon. h De finib. 5. i Apul. ibid. k Val. Max. 8. 7. l Epist. Socr. 26.

wholly or in Part, according to Reason. From these, *Pausanias* [m] affirms, he learned the Immortality of the Soul, which that they held, as likewise the Transmigration thereof into several Bodies, is affirmed by [n] *Herodotus*. [o] Some say, that *Euripides* followed him to *Egypt* and falling sick, was cured by the Priests with Sea-water, whereupon he said,

The Sea doth wash away all Ills of Man.

But this agrees not with the Time of his Death, which was before that of *Socrates*, *viz.* in the 93d Olympiad.

From *Egypt* *Plato* returned to *Tarentum* in *Italy*, at what Time *L. Camillus* and *P. Claudius* were Consuls at *Rome*, as [p] *Cicero* affirmeth. What *Fasti* he used, I know not, for in those which are now with us received as authentick, there are no such Consuls during the whole Life of *Plato*. And indeed, in those Times, *Rome* was for the most Part governed by Tribunes. [q] Here he conversed with *Eurytus* of *Tarentum*, the Elder, *Archytas* the Elder (at whose Discourse concerning Pleasure he was present) and with the rest of the *Pythagoreans*, *Echecrates*, *Timæus*, *Acrio* (corruptly in *Valerius Maximus*, *Ario*) and *Coetus*, *Locrians*. Thus to the Learning of *Socrates* he added that of *Pythagoras*, and informed himself in those Things which *Socrates* neglected: He would have gone also to the *Indians* and to the *Magi*, but that the Wars which at that Time were in *Asia* hindered him.

CHAP. IV.

What Authors he followed.

Eugubinus affirms [r], that *Plato* borrowed the mystick Part of his Philosophy from *Hermes Trismegistus*; particularly that concerning the divine Goodness; which, I suppose, he rather asserts from his own Conjecture, in regard *Plato* had been long in *Egypt*, than from any good Authority. He was induced thereunto by those Books which are now commonly, but falsely, vented under the Name of *Hermes Trismegistus*; whereas the learned *Casaubon*, in his [s] Exercitations upon *Baronius*, hath sufficiently taught us the Forgery of those Books, which seem by some Impostor, to have been compiled out of the Works of *Plato*, and the divine Scripture.

That *Plato* received some Light from *Moses*, is affirmed with much greater Authorities of several Nations and Religions: Of *Jews* by [t] *Aristobulus*, *Plato* (saith he) *followed our Law in many Things, his various Allegations evince him a curious Observer thereof; for the Volumes of* Moses *were translated before* Alexander's *Time*. And [u] *Josephus*; Plato *chiefly followed our Lawgiver. Of Philosophers*; by Numenius, [w] *What is* Plato (saith he) *but* Moses *speaking* Greek? *Of Fathers*, by [x] *Justin Martyr*, *Clement* [y] *Alexandrinus*, [z] *Eusebius*, *Theodoret*, St. *Augustine* [a], &c.

[b] When *Plato* went to *Sicily*, he bought the Books of *Philolaus*, a *Pythagorean*, which were three, *of natural Philosophy*, the first that ever were published out of that School. Some say, he had them of *Dionysius*'s Friends, for four *Alexandrian Minæ*; others, that *Dionysius* had them of a young Man, one of *Philolaus*'s Disciples, and gave them to *Plato*; others, that he sent to *Dion* at *Syracuse* to buy them for him, which he did for 100 *Minæ*. [c] *A. Gellius* saith, ten thousand Denaries. For having received of *Dionysius* above eighty Talents, he was very full of Money. Out of these, he is said (as *A. Gellius* and *Laertius* affirm) to have taken a great Part of his *Timæus*, for which derided by *Timon* (*in Sillis*) thus:

You (Plato) *with the same Affections caught,*
With a great Sum a little Treatise bought,
Where all the Knowledge, which you own, was taught.

[d] *Alcimus* in his four Books to *Amintas*, affirms, that *Plato* borrowed much from the Writings of *Epicharmus*, the Comick Poet: In the first Book he hath these Words; *In Sensibles* (saith *Plato*) *neither Magnitude nor Quality is permanent, but in continual Fluxion and Mutation; as if we should substract Number from them, which are neither equal, nor certain, nor quantitive, nor qualitative; these are they where Generation is always, their Essence never. To Insensibles nothing can be added, nothing can be taken away. This is the Nature of eternal Beings, the like and same ever.* Thus *Plato* cited by *Alcimus*. Indeed he teacheth this in many Places, particularly in *Timæo*, where he at large explaineth what is that which never is, and never had Beginning, and that which hath Beginning but no Being. He concludes the first comprehensible, by the Intellect with Reason, the other by Sense and Opinion. But the Citation of *Alcimus* seems to refer to *Plato*'s *Theætetus*, the Subject of which Dialogue is *Science*. There he examines some Definitions of Science by the Ancients, amongst the rest, the Assertion of *Protagoras*, that *Science is Sense*; against which he disputes largely; the Sum this: That the Soul apprehends some Things by Mediation of the Body, others without: Of the first Kind are Things *warm*, *light*, *dry*, *sweet*, &c. of the other, *Essence, and not Being*, *Similitude and Dissimilitude*,

m Messen. n Lib. 2. o Laert. ibid. p Cat. Major. q Cic. Apul. ibid. r Peren. Philos. 1. 27. & 5. 2. s Exercit. 1. num. 18. t Euseb. præp. Evang. 9. 6. u Contra Appion. lib. 2. w Clem. Alex. Strom. 1. x Strom. 1. Suid. y Paræn. z Strom. 1. a Præpar. Evang. lib. 11. b Civ. Dei, 8. 11. c 3. 17. d Laert. 3. 9.

Identity

Identity and Diverſity, Unite and Number. Hence it follows, that Senſe apprehends not Eſſences, and conſequently not Truth, for Eſſence and Truth are convertible. This Aſſertion of *Plato* [e] *Alcimus* deduceth from *Epicharmus, who,* (ſaith he) *hath plainly ſpoken of Things ſubject to Senſe and Reaſon, in theſe Words:*

Gods always were, to be, deſiſted never,
Like them eternal, ſtill the ſame perſever.
Chaos *the firſt begotten Deity*
Is ſtil'd; of ſomething, how can nothing be?
Thence not the firſt nor ſecond nothings are,
How we eſteem of thoſe we thus declare:
If we can even or uneven ſum
Alter, by adding or ſubtracting one,
Seems it to you the ſame? To me not ſo,
If a continu'd Meaſure ſhrink or grow,
It is not the ſame Meaſure; ſuch the Lives
Of Men are, one decays, another thrives;
That Nature, which new Being ever takes
Is different from the Being it forſakes,
Not Yeſterday the ſame were I and you,
Nor ſhall To-morrow be what we are now.

[f] Again, *Alcimus, The wiſe ſay, that the Soul apprehends ſome Things by Mediation of the Body, as when ſhe hears or ſees; others ſhe conceiveth within herſelf, without uſing the Body, whence of Beings, ſome are ſubject to Senſe, others, comprehenſible by the Intellect. Therefore* Plato *ſaith, that they who deſire to know the Principles of the Univerſe, muſt firſt diſtinguiſh the Ideas in themſelves, as* Similitude, Unity, Multitude, Magnitude, Reſtauration. *Secondly, add in itſelf,* honeſt, good, juſt, and the like. *Thirdly, examines what Ideas cohere mutually with one another, as Science, Magnitude, Power; and withal, to think that thoſe who are amongſt us, becauſe they participate of them, ſhould be called by the ſame Name, as for Inſtance, juſt Things are thoſe which participate of juſt, honeſt which of honeſt; one of every Species is eternal, perceptible by the Mind, and conſequently free from Perturbation. Wherefore he aſſerts Ideas in Nature as Exemplars, after whoſe Likeneſs other Things are made.* Thus *Alcimus*; the firſt Part whereof ſeems to be taken out of *Plato*'s *Theætetus*, the latter out of his *Parmenides*. The Words of *Epicharmus* concerning Gods and Ideas, to which *Alcimus* refers this of *Plato*, are theſe:

Is Muſick then a Thing? It is; the Man
Muſick? No. What then? a Muſician
A Man or not? He is the ſame of good,
Good from the Thing a Part is underſtood.
Whoever learns good by that Art is made,
Who Muſick, Muſician; of each Trade,
As Dancing, Weaving, and the like the ſame,
The Art and Artiſt have a different Name.

[g] Again, *Alcimus:* Plato *in his Opinion of Ideas ſaith thus; If there is Memory there muſt be alſo Ideas; for Memory is of a quiet permanent Thing, but nothing is permanent except Ideas, for how,* ſaith he, *could living Creatures be preſerved unleſs by their Idea, and receiving a natural Mind? Now they remember Similitude and their Nouriſhment; ſhewing that all Creatures have an innate Underſtanding of their own Similitude, and therefore perceive Things belonging to their Kind.* Thus *Alcimus*; What Place of *Plato* he means I know not, [h] *Scaliger* reads, Πλάτων ἐν τῇ περὶ ἰδεῶν ὑπολήψει φησὶν ἅπερ ἐστὶ; τὰς ἰδέας, &c. omitting μνήμην, as if he made a Doubt whether that both of the Opinions of Ideas were *Plato*'s; but I rather think *Alcimus* meant not the Title of any Book, having named none in the reſt of his Citations, but what himſelf abſtracts out of *Plato*'s Opinion concerning Ideas. *Plato* in *Philebo*, teacheth this concerning Memory, that Senſe is a Motion common to the Soul and Body; this ſuffering from external Senſes, the other acting and dijudicating; that Memory is a Conſervatory or Repoſitory of the Senſes. For the Soul, as oft as ſhe in herſelf, or by Aſſiſtance of the Body, calls to Mind what ſhe hath ſuffered, ſhe is ſaid to remember. To *Plato*'s Aſſertion, *Alcimus* applieth this of *Epicharmus:*

Eumæus *Wiſdom's not to one confin'd;*
Various in every living knowing Mind.
The Hen firſt doth not living Things beget,
But ſits and hatches with enlivening Heat:
This Wiſdom only Nature's Friend diſcerns,
Of whom (her Miſtreſs) ſhe this Leſſon learns.

And again,

This is not ſtrange, for every Thing we find
Is to its proper Species moſt enclin'd;
To Dogs a Bitch ſeems faireſt, and to Kine
A Bull, an Aſs to Aſſes, Swine to Swine.

Theſe Things *Laertius* [i] cites out of *Alcimus*, adding, *that there are more of the ſame Kind in thoſe four Books, whereby he intimates the Help that* Plato *received by the Writings of* Epicharmus, *neither was* Epicharmus *himſelf ignorant of his own Wiſdom, as may be collected from theſe Verſes, predicting that he ſhould have a Follower:*

This I aſſert, and what I now maintain,
Shall Monuments to future Times remain,
Some one hereafter will my Verſe review,
And cloathing it in Language rich and new
Invincible himſelf, others ſubdue.

[e] Laert. 3. 10. [f] Ibid. [g] Ibid. 3. 14. [h] Ariſt. de Animal. [i] Laert. 3. 16.

More-

[k] Moreover *Ariſtoxenus* alledgeth the whole Form of *Plato*'s Common-wealth in *Protagoras*'s Antilogicks; others ſay, he borrowed his Politicks from *Socrates*.

[l] Laſtly, it is related, that much of *Plato*'s Morality was in the Books of *Sophron* the Minograph, which having been long neglected, were by him firſt brought to *Athens*, and were found lying under his Head when he was dead.

CHAP. V.

His School.

BEing [m] returned to *Athens* from his Journey to *Egypt*, he ſettled himſelf in the Academy, a *Gymnaſium* or Place of Exerciſe in the Suburbs of that City, beſet with Woods, taking Name from *Ecademus* one of the Heroes, as *Eupolis*.

In ſacred Hecademus *ſhady Walks.*

And *Timon*,

The fluent ſweet-tongu'd Sage firſt led the Way,
Who writes as ſmoothly as from ſome green Spray
Of Hecademy, *Graſhoppers chirp their Lay.*

Hence it was firſt called *Ecademy*; the Occaſion of his living here, was, that he was poor, and had nothing but one Orchard, in or adjoining to the Academy, which was the leaſt Part enjoyed by his Succeſſors. This Orchard at firſt yielded but three *aurei nummi* of yearly Rent to the Owners, afterwards the whole Revenue amounted to a thouſand or more. It was in proceſs of Time much enlarged by Well-willers and ſtudious Perſons, who dying, bequeathed by Will ſomething to the Profeſſors of Philoſophy, their Riches, to maintain the Quiet and Tranquillity of a Philoſophical Life.

Plato (the Academy being ſaid to be a ſickly Place, and Phyſicians adviſing him to transfer his School to the *Lyceum*) would not be perſuaded, but anſwered, I would not live on the Top of *Athos* to linger my Life. The unwholeſomeneſs of the Place brought him to a quartan Ague, which laſted eighteen Months; but at length by Sobriety and Care he maſter'd it, and recover'd his Strength more perfect than before.

Firſt, he taught Philoſophy in the Academy, and after in the Gardens of *Colonus*. At the Entrance of his School in the Academy was written, *Let none ignorant of Geometry enter here*, meant, not only of the Meaſure and Proportion of Lines, but alſo of the inward Affections.

CHAP. VI.

How he inſtituted a Sect.

HAving thus ſettled himſelf in the Academy, he began out of the Collection he had made from others, and his own Invention, to inſtitute a Sect, called from the Place where he taught, *Academick*. He [n] mixed the *Heraclitian* Diſcourſes with the *Socratick* and *Pythagorick*, following in Senſibles *Heraclitus*, in Intelligibles *Pythagoras*, in Politicks *Socrates*. *Whereas Philoſophy*, [o] ſaith St. *Auguſtine*, *concerns either Action or Contemplation (thence aſſuming two Names, Contemplative and Active) the Active conſiſting in Practice of moral Actions, the Contemplative, in Penetration of abſtruſe Phyſical Cauſes, and the Nature of the Divinity*; Socrates *excelled in the Active*, Pythagoras *in the Contemplative. But* Plato *joined them into one perfect Kind, which he ſubdivided into three ſeveral Parts*; *Moral, conſiſting chiefly in Action, Natural, in Contemplation, Rational in Diſtinction of true and falſe, which, tho uſeful in both the other, yet belongeth more particularly to Contemplation. So that this* Trichotomy *contradicts not the other* Dichotomy, *which includeth all within Action and Contemplation.* And [p] as of old in Tragedy, the *Chorus* acted alone, then *Theſpis* making ſome Intermiſſions of the *Chorus* introduced one Actor, *Æſchilus* a ſecond, *Sophocles* a third: In like Manner Philoſophy was at firſt but of one Kind, Phyſick; then *Socrates* added *Ethick*; thirdly, *Plato* inventing *Dialectick*, made it perfect.

Of theſe three Parts as they were held by *Plato*, and the reſt of the old Academy, we cannot have a general better Account than this of [q] *Cicero*.

Sect. 1. *Ethick.*

The firſt, concerning Well-living they ſought in Nature, affirming that ſhe ought to be obeyed; *and that in nothing elſe but Nature was to be had that chief Good whereto all Things ſhould be referred*; *that the ultimate Being of deſirable Things, and End of all Good in the Mind, Body and Life were acquired by Nature. Thoſe of the Body they placed in the whole, and in the Parts: Health, Strength, Beauty in the whole*; *in the Parts, ſound Senſe, and a certain Excellence of particular Parts, as in the Feet Swiftneſs, Strength in the Hands, Clearneſs in the Voice, in the Tongue Plainneſs of Expreſſion. Of the Mind were thoſe which are proper to comprehend the Power of Wit, which they divided into Nature and Manners. To Nature they aſcribed Quickneſs*

k Laert. 3. 37. l Ibid. 3. 18. m Ibid. 3. 7. n Ibid. 3. 8. o De civit. Dei lib. 8. 4. p Laert. 3. 56. q Acad. quæſt. 1. 5.

of

of Apprehenſion and Memory, both proper to the Mind and Wit; to Manners belonged Study and a Kind of Wiſdom, formed partly by a continual Exerciſe, partly by Reaſon, in which conſiſted Philoſophy itſelf, wherein that is begun and not perfected, is called Progreſſion to Virtue, what is perfected, Virtue; Perfection of Nature of all Things in the Mind the moſt excellent. Thus of Minds. The Adjuncts of Life, that was the third, they aſſerted ſuch Things as conduced to the Practice of Virtue.

Sect. 2. *Phyſick.*

Of Nature (for that was next) they ſo treated as to divide it into two Things: One the efficient, the other giving itſelf to this, that, therefore might be made ſomething. In that they conceived to be a Power, in this a certain Matter to be effected; in both, Matter could not cohere, unleſs contained by ſome Power, nor the Power without ſome Matter, for there is nothing which is not enforced to be ſomewhere; that which conſiſts of both, they called Body and Quality. Of Qualities, ſome are primary, others ariſing from theſe; the primary are uniform and ſimple; thoſe which ariſe from theſe are various, and as it were multiform. Air, Fire, Water, and Earth are primary; of theſe ariſe Forms of living Creatures, and of thoſe, Things which are made of the Earth. Theſe Principles are called Elements, of which Air and Fire have a Faculty to move and effect; the other Parts, Water and Earth, to ſuffer. To all theſe there is ſubjected a certain Matter without Form, deſtitute of Quality, out of which all Things are expreſſed and formed. It is capable of admitting all; and of changing all Manner of Ways, in the whole, and in every Part. This reſolves nothing to nothing, but into its own Parts, which are diviſible into infinite, there being in Nature no leaſt which cannot be divided. Thoſe which are moved, are all moved by Intervals, which Intervals likewiſe may be divided infinitely, and that Power which we call Quality, being moved and agitated every Way, they conceive the whole Matter to be throughly changed, and by that Means thoſe Things which they call Qualitative, to be produced, of which, in all coherent Nature continued with all its Parts, was effected the World, beyond which there is not any Part of Matter or Body. The Parts of the World are all Things therein, kept together by a ſenſitive Nature, wherein is likewiſe perfect Reaſon. It is alſo ſempiternal, for there is nothing more ſtrong whereby it may be diſſolved. This Power they call the Soul of the World, God, a certain Providence over all Things ſubjected to him, regarding in the firſt Place heavenly Things, next on the Earth thoſe Things which appertain to Man. The ſame they ſometimes call Neceſſity, becauſe nothing can be otherwiſe than is by him ordained; a fatal immutable Continuation of eternal Order; ſometimes Fortune, as producing many Things not foreſeen or expected by us, by Reaſon of the Obſcurity and our Ignorance of the Cauſes.

Sect. 3. *Dialectick.*

Of the third Part of Philoſophy, conſiſting in Reaſon and Diſſertation, they treated thus. Tho' Judgment ariſe from the Senſe, yet the Judgment of Truth is not in the Senſes. The Mind they affirmed to be Judge of Things, conceiving her only fit to be credited, becauſe ſhe alone ſeeth that which is ſimple, and uniform, and certain: This they called Idea. All Senſe they conceived to be obtuſe and ſlow, and no Way able to perceive thoſe Things which ſeem ſubject to Senſe, which are ſo little as that they cannot fall under Senſe, ſo moveable and various, that nothing is one, conſtant, nor the ſame, becauſe all Things are in continual Alteration and Fluxion. All this Part of Things they call Opinative. Science they affirmed to be no where but in the Reaſons and Notions of Mind, whence they approved Definitions of Things, and applied them to all whereon they diſcourſed. They approved likewiſe Explications of Words by Etymologies. They uſed Arguments and Marks for Things, to prove and conclude what they meant to explain: In this conſiſted all the Diſcipline of Dialectick, that is, of Speech concluded by Reaſon.

This Account in general *Cicero* gives of the old Academy: *Plutarch*, *Laertius*, *Apuleius*, and others, have made Collections more particular, we ſhall make Choice of that of *Alcinous*, as moſt full and perfect, which, by Reaſon of the Length is referred as an Appendix to *Plato*'s Life.

CHAP. VIII.

His Inventions.

HE added much to Learning and Language by many Inventions, as well of Things as of Words. To omit *Dialectick*, of which we treated laſt, [r] *Phavorinus* attributes to his Invention, *diſcourſing by Way of a Queſtion:* But *Ariſtotle* aſcribes it to *Alexamenus*, a *Stirian* or *Teian*, and it appears by the Dialogues of *Plato*, that *Socrates* alſo uſed that Form of arguing. *Laertius* informs us, *that* Zeno Eleates *was the firſt Compoſer of Dialogues, yet in my Opinion*, ſaith he, Plato *hath ſo much refined the Form thereof, that he deſerves to be preferred before all others, as well for Invention as Reformation.*

More properly may be attributed to him the Invention of [s] *Analytical Method, which reduceth the Thing ſought unto its Principle, the beſt of Methods.* He taught it to *Leodamas*, and by it found out many Things in Geometry: *Analyſis*, as defined by

r Laert. 3. 24. & 3. 48. s Laert. 3. 24. Procl. in Euclid. lib. 3.

the

the [t] Scholiaſt upon *Euclid, is a Sumption of the Thing ſought, by the Conſequents, (as if it were already known) to find out the Truth.* Examples thereof we find in the five firſt Propoſitions of the 13th Book of *Euclid*, beſides ſeveral others, that occur in *Apollonius Pergæus*, and *Pappus Alexandrinus*.

Amongſt his Geometrical Inventions alſo muſt be remembered *the Duplication of a Cube*, the Occaſion and Mrnner whereof is related by [u] *Plutarch* and [w] *Philoponus*. The *Delians* afflicted with the Peſtilence conſulted the Oracle of *Apollo*, he anſwered, the Plague would ceaſe if they doubled their Altar, which was of a Cubick Figure. *Plutarch* ſaith, that hereupon the Overſeers of the Altar, made all the four Sides double to what they were before, ſo inſtead of doubling the Altar, they made it octuple to what it was. *Philoponus* ſaith, they cauſed another Cube of the ſame Bigneſs with the former to be ſet upon it, whereby they changed the Figure of the Altar, which was no longer a Cube, but Δόκις, *a quadrilateral Pillar*. The firſt Way it was Cubical, but not double; the ſecond Way double, but not cubical. The Plague not ceaſing, they conſulted the Oracle again. *Apollo* anſwered, they had not fulfilled his Command, which was to build a cubical Altar as big again as the former. Hereupon they went to *Plato*, as moſt skilful in Geometry, to learn of him the Oracle's Meaning, and how they ſhould find out the Way of doubling a Cube, retaining the cubick Figure. *Plato* anſwered, that the God mocked the *Grecians* for their Neglect of Philoſophy and Learning, inſulting over their Ignorance, that he commanded them ſeriouſly to addict themſelves to Geometry, that this could not be done any other Way, than by finding out two mean Proportionals between two right Lines in a duple Proportion. (*Plato*'s particular Method is delivered by *Eutochius* in his Comment upon the firſt Propoſition of the ſecond Book of *Archimedes, de Sphæra & Cylindro.*) He added, that *Eudoxus* the *Gnidian*, or *Helico* the *Cyzicene* would do it for them. That the God needed not this Duplication of his Altar, but commanded all the *Grecians*, that avoiding War, and the Miſeries wherewith it is attended, they ſhould apply themſelves to the Muſes; and having ſettled the turbulent Commotions of their Minds, converſe harmleſly and beneficially with one another. *Philoponus* adds, that *Plato expounded this Problem to his Diſciples, who writ much upon this Subject, tho' nothing thereof be extant.* Of the Ancients, laboured in this Problem beſides *Plato*, *Archytas* the *Tarentine*, *Menæchemus*, *Eratoſthenes*, *Philo* of *Byzantium*, *Hero*, *Apollonius Pergæus*, *Nicomedes*, *Diocles* and *Sporus*. [x] *Valerius Maximus* ſaith, that *Plato remitted the Overſeers of the ſacred Altar to* Euclid *the Geometrician, as ſubmitting to his Science and Profeſſion*; but this is an Error, becauſe *Euclid* the Geometrician was much later than *Plato*, and the other *Euclid*, *Plato*'s Contemporary, nothing eminent in Mathematicks, as hath been before me obſerved by Sir [y] *Henry Savile*.

That *Plato* invented many other Things in the Mathematicks, (more than appears from thoſe Writings of his that are extant) and was moſt eminent therein, may be argued from the tree Books of *Theon Smyrnæus*, the firſt *Arithmetick*, the ſecond, *Harmonicks*, the laſt, (not yet publiſhed) *Aſtronomy*. Thoſe Books contained many Things, ſingular and Choice, not to be met with elſewhere. The Deſign is acknowledged by the Author, to be as an Introduction neceſſary to the underſtanding of *Plato*'s Writings.

There are alſo divers Words of which he is eſteemed to be the firſt Author, [z] as *Antipodes*, a Word by him firſt introduced into Philoſophy, to ſignify thoſe People whoſe Feet are diametrically oppoſite.

[a] Στοιχεῖον, *Element*, until his Time was confounded with ἀρχὴ, *Principle*, by all Philoſophers from *Thales*. *Plato* diſtinguiſhed them thus, Ἀρχὴ, *Principle*, is that which hath nothing before it whereof it might be generated; στοιχεῖα, *Elements*, are compounded.

[b] The Word *Poem* alſo, tho' ſince very trivial, was not uſed by any before him.

[c] He firſt uſed this Term, τῷ ἀριθμῷ τὸν προμηκῆ, *oblong Number*, [*in Theæteto*] thereby ſignifying the Product of a greater Number multiplied by a leſſer.

[d] He alſo firſt introduced the Word Ἐπιφανεία, *Superficies*, for which before was uſed ἐπίπεδον a *Plane*. Thus *Laertius*, tho' [e] *Proclus* implies, that neither *Plato* nor *Ariſtotle* uſe the Word, but for it, ἐπίπεδον. Divine *Plato*, ſaith he, *calls Geometry the Contemplatrix of Planes, oppoſing it to Stereometry, as if Plane and Superficies were the ſame. So likewiſe doth* Ariſtotle. *But* Euclid, *and thoſe who ſucceeded him, make Superficies the Genus, Plane a Species thereof.*

[f] Θεῶ προνοία, *Divine Providence*, a Word ſince much uſed by Chriſtians, was firſt the Expreſſion of *Plato*.

[g] He firſt of Philoſophers wrote againſt *Lyſias*, Son of *Cephalus*, in *Phædro*.

[h] He firſt conſidered the Force and Efficacy of Grammar.

[i] He firſt wrote againſt all that were before him, whence it is wondered at, that he never mentions *Democritus*.

CHAP. VIII.

His Diſtinctions.

OF his Diſtinctions *Ariſtotle* made this Collection in ſome Pieces not extant, cited by *Laertius* [k].

t Lib. 13. u De ei Delph. w In Anal. poſt. lib. 1. cap. 7. x 8. 13. y Prel. 1. z Laert. 3. 24. a Ibid. b Ibid. c Ibid. d Ibid. e In Euclid. lib. 2. f Laert. 3. 24. g Ibid. h Ibid. i Ibid. k Laert. 3. 81, &c.

Good is threefold.
- *In the Soul*, as Juſtice, Prudence, Fortitude, Temperance, and the like.
- *In the Body*, as Beauty, good Habit.
- *External*, as Friends, Proſperity of our Country, Wealth.

Friendſhip is threefold.
- *Natural*, which Parents bear to their Children, and Kindred to one another; which Kind alſo is amongſt Beaſts.
- *Sociable*, begotten by Converſation, without any Relation of Kindred; ſuch as was that betwixt *Pylades* and *Oreſtes*.
- *Hoſpitable*, towards Gueſts, or wherewith we affect Strangers, even upon Letters of Recommendation.
- Some add a fourth Kind, *Amatory*.

Government is of five Kinds.
- *Democratical*, a Democracy is that wherein the People rules, and have Power to make Magiſtrates and Laws.
- *Ariſtocratical*, an Ariſtocracy is that wherein neither Rich nor Poor nor Nobles govern, but the beſt Perſons of the whole City.
- *Olygarchical*, an Oligarchy is when Governors are elected by the Votes of Magiſtrates, for they are fewer than the Poor.
- *Regal*,
  - *Elective by Law*, as that of the *Carthaginians*, for it is Civil.
  - *Succeſſive in a Family*, as that of the *Lacedæmonians* and *Macedonians*, who confine themſelves to a certain Race.
- *Tyrannical*, Tyranny is that wherein Men are brought to Subjection either by Fraud or Force.

Juſtice is threefold.
- *Towards the Gods*, they who ſacrifice as the Law requires, and perform the divine Rites, are juſt towards the Gods.
- *Towards Men*, they who reſtore what was lent or committed to their Truſt, are juſt towards Men.
- *Towards the Dead*, they who take Care of Sepulchres are juſt towards the Dead.

Science is threefold.
- *Practice*, as playing on the Flute, Lute, and the like, which affect nothing viſible.
- *Mechanick*, as Architecture of Houſes, Ships, or the like, which produceth a viſible Effect.
- *Theoretick*, as Geometry, Harmonick Aſtronomy, which act not, neither produce any Thing. The Geometrician conſiders the Proportion of Lines to one another, Harmonick Sounds: Aſtronomy, Stars, and the World.

Medicine is of five Kinds.
- *Pharmaceutick*, cureth Diſeaſes by Application of Medicine.
- *Chyrurgick*, by Inciſion or cauteriſing.
- *Diætetick*, by Diet.
- *Noſognomonick*, diſcerns Diſeaſes.
- *Boethetick*, removeth Diſeaſes.

Law is twofold.
- *Written*, ſuch are thoſe by which States are governed.
- *Not written*, grounded upon Cuſtom; as that no Man ſhall go naked into the *Forum*, habited like a Woman, is not forbidden by any written Law, but foreborn becauſe of the unwritten.

Speech is of five Kinds.
- *Political*, uſed in Orations by ſuch as govern States.
- *Rhetorical*, uſed by Lawyers in Pleading, either to confirm, praiſe, diſpraiſe or accuſe.
- *Vulgar*, uſed by People in common Diſcourſe.
- *Dialectical*, uſed by ſuch as diſcourſe in ſhort Queſtions and Anſwers.
- *Artificial*, uſed by Tradeſmen in their ſeveral Profeſſions.

Muſick is threefold.
- *Of the Voice only.*
- *Of the Voice and Hands*, as ſinging to the Lute.
- *Of the Hand only*, as the Harp.

Nobility is of four Kinds.
- If the Predeceſſors were upright, juſt and honeſt.
- If the Predeceſſors were Rulers of Princes.
- If the Predeceſſors acquired Honours, as the Command of an Army, or were crown'd in publick Games, thoſe who are deſcended from ſuch as we call Noble.
- If a Man be endued with a generous Mind; this is the beſt Kind of Nobility.

Beauty is threefold.
- *Commendable*, as a fair Form.
- *Uſeful*, as an Inſtrument, Houſe, or the like.
- *Beneficial*, as all that belongs to the Inſtitution of Laws.

The Soul hath three Parts.
- *Rational*, the Principle whereby we judge, diſcourſe, and the like.
- *Concupiſcible*, whereby we deſire Meat, Coition, and the like.
- *Iraſcible*, whereby we are emboldened, joyed, grieved, enraged.

Perfect Virtue hath four Kinds.
- *Wiſdom*, the Principle of doing Things right.
- *Juſtice*, the Principle of doing Things equal in private Converſation and publick Affairs.
- *Fortitude*, the Principle of not flying Danger through Fear, but meeting it.
- *Temperance*, the Principle of ſubduing Deſires, and yielding to no Pleaſures, but living moderately.

Government is of five Kinds.
- *By Law*, thoſe who are choſen Magiſtrates in a City governed by Law.
- *By Nature*, the Males not only of Mankind, but of moſt other Creatures are predominant over the Females by Nature.
- *By Cuſtom*, as that which Maſters have over their Diſciples.
- *By Deſcent*, as the *Lacedæmonian* Kings, who ſucceed out of one Family; and in *Macedonia* they uſe the ſame Cuſtom.
- *By Force*, as thoſe who rule a Kingdom againſt the Will of the People.

Of Rhetorick are ſix Kinds.
- *Adhortation*, as when we perſwade a War againſt any.
- *Dehortation*, as when we diſſwade from War.
- *Accuſation*, when we declare that we have been injured by one whom we prove Cauſe of our Misfortune.
- *Defence*, when a Man proves he did not any Injury or Offence.
- *Encomium*, when we ſpeak well of another.
- *Vituperation*, when we declare a Man to be wicked.

Of right Speaking are four Kinds: when we ſpeak
- *What is requiſite*; thoſe Things which will benefit both the Hearer and Speaker.
- *As much as is requiſite*; if we ſpeak neither more nor leſs than concerns the Buſineſs.
- *To thoſe to whom it is requiſite*; as when we ſpeak to old Men that have done amiſs, in ſuch Terms as are fit for old Men; or to young, as becomes young.
- *When it is requiſite*; neither too ſoon, nor too late; for if that be not obſerved, nothing can be ſpoken aright.

Beneficence is of four Kinds.
- *In Wealth*; when we relieve the Wants of any, according to our Means.
- *In Body*; when we ſuccour thoſe who are beaten.
- *In Knowledge*; when we inſtruct, cure, teach any Good.
- *In Speech*; he who pleadeth in Defence of another, helpeth him in Words.

The *End* of Things is of four Kinds.
- *Legal*; impoſing an End to Things by Decree.
- *Natural*; ſuch as Days, Years, and Hours have.
- *Artificial*; as the building of a Houſe.
- *Accidental*; by Chance, unexpected.

Of *Powers* are four Kinds.
- One *in the Mind*, to think and conjecture.
- Another *of the Body*, to walk, give, receive, and the like.
- A third, conſiſting in a Multitude of Soldiers, and ſtore of Wealth; in which Reſpect Princes are called Powerful.
- The fourth, as to ſuffer Good or Evil to be done to us; as to be capable of Sickneſs, Learning, Health, or the like.

Of *Humanity* are three Kinds.
- *In Calling*; as those who call all they meet, and salute them, taking them by the Hand.
- *In relieving*; in relieving the Misfortunes of another willingly.
- *In Feasting and Conversation.*

Felicity is divided into five Parts.
- *Prudent Counsel*; acquired by Learning and Experience.
- *Soundness of Senses*; consisting in the Parts of the Body; as to see with the Eyes, to hear with the Ears, to smell and taste.
- *Prosperity of Affairs*; when those Things which a Man intendeth, he performeth fully.
- *Good Reputation*, among Men; when a Man is well spoken of.
- *Plenty of Riches*, and Things necessary to Life, so as to be able to supply Friends, and to perform Works of publick Magnificence. He who hath all these five Kinds is perfectly happy.

Arts are of three Kinds.
- The first diggeth out Metals, and fells Wood.
- The second gives Variety of Shape to Things, as Wood-work and Iron-work.
- The third maketh use of these; as Horsemanship of Bridles, Soldiery of Arms, Musick of Instruments.

Good is of four Kinds.
- One, as when we call a Man good, from his proper Goodness.
- A second, as we call Virtue and Justice itself good.
- A third, as we say, Food, Exercise, and Medicines are beneficial.
- The fourth Good we call the Act of playing on Musick, or acting in a Play.

Of Things, some are
- *Ill*, always capable to do Hurt; as Ignorance, Imprudence, Injustice, and the like.
- *Good*, the contrary to the former.
- *Indifferent*, which sometimes may benefit, sometimes hurt; as walking, sitting, eating; or cannot do Hurt at all, being neither good nor bad.

Good Government is three-fold.
- If the Laws be good.
- If the Laws be well kept.
- If without Laws the People live orderly by Custom.

Ill Government is three-fold.
- If the Laws be bad for Natives and Foreigners.
- If the Laws in Being are not observed.
- If there are no Laws at all.

Contraries are of three Kinds.
- *Good to Ill*; as Justice to Injustice, Wisdom to Imprudence, and the like.
- *Ill to Ill*; as Prodigality to Avarice, unjust Torments to just.
- *Neither to neither*; as heavy to light, swift to slow, black to white.

Good is of three Kinds.
- Some we have, as Justice and Health.
- Of some we participate; as Good itself cannot be had, but may be participated.
- Some are fixed, which we can neither have, nor participate; as, to be virtuous and just.

Consultation is threefold.
- *From the Past*, by Example; as what befel the *Lacedæmonians* through overmuch Confidence.
- *From the Present*, as considering the Timorousness of Men, Weakness of Walls, Scarcity of Provision, and the like.
- *From the Future*; as that Ambassadors should not be injured upon Suspicion, lest it cast Infamy upon all *Greece*.

Voice is
- *Animate*, of living Creatures.
  - *Articulate*, of Men.
  - *Inarticulate*, of Beasts.
- *Inanimate*, Sounds and Noise.

Things

Things are
- *Divisible*, compounded as Syllables, Symphonies, living Creatures, Water, Gold.
- *Indivisible*, compounded of nothing; as a Point, Sound.

Homogeneous, consist of similar Parts, differing from the whole only in Number; as Water, Gold, and all Liquid Things.
Heterogeneous, consist of dissimular Parts.

Things are
- *Absolute*, requiring nothing else to express them; as, a Man, a Horse, and other Creatures.
- *Relatives*, which imply another Thing; as greater (than others) swifter, fairer, and the like; for what is greater relates to something lesser, and the like.

These, according to *Aristotle*, were *Plato*'s Division of first Things.

CHAP. IX.

His three Voyages to Sicily.

[l] PLATO made three Voyages to *Sicily*; the first to see the fiery Ebullitions of *Ætna*, [m] and to improve the Knowledge of States and Philosophy, which he got by his other Travels. This was about the 40th Year of his Age, [n] at what Time *Dionysius* the elder, Son of *Hermocrates*, reigned in *Syracuse*; [o] *Plutarch* saith, he was led thither by Providence, not Fortune, and that some good Genius, designing afar off the Liberty of the People of *Syracuse*, brought him acquainted with *Dion*, then very young, who entertained him as his [p] Guest. He much disliked the Luxury of that Place, Feasting, Nocturnal Lucubrations, and the like; conversed frequently with *Dion*; discoursed with him of those Things which were best in Man, and with his best Arguments exhorted him thereto; by which he seemed to lay Grounds for the Subversion of that Tyranny which afterwards happened. [q] *Dion*, tho' young, was the most ingenious of all *Plato*'s Followers, and most eager in Pursuit of Virtue, as appears as well by the Testimony of *Plato*, as his own Actions. Though he had been brought up by the King in an effeminate luxurious kind of Life; yet, as soon as he tasted of Philosophy, the Guide to Virtue, his Soul was inflamed with Love thereof; and from his own Candour and Ingenuity, was persuaded that *Dionysius* would be no less affected therewith; and therefore desired him, when he was at Leisure, to admit and hear *Plato*. Hereupon, the Tyrant sent for him; at that Meeting, all their Discourse was concerning Fortitude. *Plato* affirmed none was further from that Virtue than a Tyrant; and proceeding to speak of Justice, asserted the Life of the Just to be happy; of the Unjust, miserable. *Dionysius* was displeased at this Discourse (as reflecting upon himself) and with the Standers-by for approving it; at last, much exasperated, he asked *Plato*, *why he came into* Sicily? *Plato* answered, *To seek a good Man. It seems*, replied *Dionysius*, *you have not yet found him.* *Laertius* saith, [r] *Plato* disputed with him concerning Tyranny, affirming, that is not best which benefits ourselves, unless it be excellent also in Virtue; whereat *Dionysius* incensed, said to him, *Your Discourse savours of Old Age: And yours*, answered *Plato*, *of Tyranny.* *Dionysius*, enraged, commanded him to be put to Death. *I will have*, said he, *your Head taken off.* At which Words, *Xenocrates* being present, answered, *He that doth it must begin with mine.* But *Dion* and *Aristomenes* wrought with him to revoke that Sentence. *Dion* thinking his Anger would have proceeded no farther, sent *Plato* away at his own Request in a Ship which carried *Pollis* (whom *Laertius* [s] calls *Polis*, *Ælian*, *Pôlis*) a *Lacedæmonian* Captain (who at that Time had been sent Embassador to *Dionysius*) back to *Greece*. *Dionysius* secretly desired *Pollis* to kill him whilst he was on Ship-board; or if not, by all means to sell him, alledging, it would be no Injury to *Plato*, for he would be as happy in Bondage as at Liberty, as being a just Man. Some affirm, the Occasion of *Dionysius* his Anger was, because, that when he asked what was the best Brass, *Plato* answered, *That whereof the Statues of* [t] Aristogiton *and* Harmodius *were made.* Others, that it was because he was over-master'd in Learning. But *Tzetzes* rejecting these as idle Fictions of Philosophers, and Falsifiers, affirms the true Reason to have been, that he perceived he advised *Dion* to possess himself of the Kingdom. *Pollis* transported him to *Ægina*; there *Charmander*, Son of *Charmandrites*, accused him, as meriting Death, by a Law they had made, that the first *Athenian* that should come to that Island, should, without being suffered to speak for himself, be put to Death. Which Law, as *Phavorinus* affirms, he himself made. One that was present, saying in Sport, *He is a Philosopher*, they set him at Liberty. Some say, they brought him to the publick Assembly, to plead for himself, where he would not speak a Word, but underwent all with a great Courage. Then they altered their Intent of putting him to Death, and agreed to sell him for a Slave. *Plutarch* saith, that upon a Decree of the

[l] Laert. 3. 18. [m] Plat. Epist. [n] Laert. ibid. [o] In Dion. [p] Plat. Epist. 3. & 7. [q] Plut. in Dione. [r] Laert. 3. 18. [s] Laert. 4. 11. [t] Who slew Hipparchus, Brother of Hippias the Tyrant of Athens; upon which the Pisistratidæ were expelled.

Æginetæ,

Ægiuetæ, that all the *Athenians* taken in that Island, ſhould be ſold for Slaves, *Pollis* ſold him there. *Anniceris*, a *Cyrenaick* Philoſopher, being accidentally preſent, redeemed him for twenty, or as others, thirty *Minæ*, and ſent him to *Athens* to his Friends. They immediately returned the Money to *Anniceris*, but he refuſed it, ſaying, They were not the only Perſons concerned in *Plato*'s Welfare. Some ſay, *Dion* ſent the Money, which he would not accept, but bought therewith a little Orchard in the Academy. *Pollis* was defeated by *Chabrias*, and afterwards drowned in *Elice*. The Report goes, that an Appariuon told him, he ſuffer'd thoſe Things for the Philoſopher's ſake. *Dionyſius* underſtanding what had happened, writ to *Plato*, to deſire him not to ſpeak ill of him; *Plato* returned Anſwer, that he had not ſo much Time vacant from Philoſophy, as to remember *Dionyſius*. To ſome Detractors who upbraided him, ſaying, *Dionyſius* hath caſt off *Plato*: *No*, ſaith he, *but* Plato Dionyſius.

Dion continued to live, not according to the ordinary Luxury of the *Sicilians* and *Italians*, but in Virtue, until *Dionyſius* died, for which he was maligned by thoſe who lived after Tyrannical Inſtitutions. Then conſidering, that theſe Documents were not practiſed by himſelf alone, but by ſome others, tho' few, he entertained a Hope, that *Dionyſius* the younger, who ſucceeded his Father in the Government, might become one of thoſe, to the extraordinary Happineſs of himſelf, and the reſt of the *Sicilians*. To this End he uſed many Exhortations to invite him to Virtue, intermixed with ſome Sentences of *Plato*, with whom *Dionyſius*, upon this Occaſion, became extreamly deſirous to be acquainted. To that Effect, many Letters were ſent to *Athens* to him; ſome from *Dionyſius*, others from *Pythagoreans* in *Italy*, deſiring *Plato* to go to *Syracuſe*, who, by prudent Counſel, might govern the young Man, tranſported by his own Power to Luxury. *Plato*, as himſelf affirmeth, fearing to be thought a Perſon only of Words, and not willing to engage in Action, and withal, hoping, by purging one principal Part, to cure the Diſeaſe of all *Sicily*, yielded. [w]*Laertius* ſaith, upon a Promiſe made to him by *Dionyſius*, of a Place and People that ſhould live according to the Rules of his Commonwealth, which he made not good. Hence *Athenæus* accuſed *Plato* of *Ambition*. In the mean time, the Enemies of *Dion* fearing a Change in *Dionyſius*, perſwaded him to call home from Baniſhment *Philiſtus* (a Perſon very rational, but educated in tyrannical Principles) as an Antidote againſt *Plato*'s Philoſophy; but *Dion* hoped, the coming of *Plato* would regulate the licentious Tyranny of *Dionyſius*.

[x]*Plato*, at his Arrival in *Sicily*, (placed by *A. Gellius*, betwixt the Beginning of *Philip*'s Reign, four hundred Years from the building of *Rome*, and the *Chæronean* Fight) was received by *Dionyſius* with much Reſpect. One of the King's magnificent Chariots ſtood ready to receive him as ſoon as he landed, and carried him to the Court. The King offered Sacrifice to the Gods for his coming, as a great Bleſſing upon his Government. The Temperance of their Feaſts, Alteration of the Court, Meekneſs of the King, gave the *Syracuſians* great Hopes of Reformation. The Courtiers addicted themſelves to Philoſophy ſo much, that the Palace was full of Sand (wherein they drew Geometrical Figures.) Not long after *Plato*'s coming, at a Sacrifice in the Caſtle, the Herald, according to the uſual Manner, made a ſolemn Prayer, that the Gods would long preſerve the Kingly Government. *Dion* ſtanding by, ſaid, *Will you never give over praying againſt me?* This troubled *Philiſtus* and his Friends, who feared *Plato* would inſinuate into the Favour of *Dionyſius* ſo much, as that they ſhould not be able to oppoſe him; ſince in ſo ſhort Time, he had effected ſo great an Alteration in him. Hereupon they all jointly accuſed *Dion*, that he wrought upon *Dionyſius*, by the Eloquence of *Plato*, to reſign his Government, that it might be transferred to the Children of his Siſter, to quit his Command for the Academy, where he ſhould be made happy by Geometry, reſigning his preſent Happineſs to *Dion*, and his Nephews. With theſe and the like Inſtigations, *Dionyſius* was ſo incenſed, that he cauſed *Dion* to be unexpectedly carried on Shipboard in a little Bark; giving the Mariners Order to land him in *Italy*. This happened four Months after *Plato*'s coming. [y]*Plato*, and the reſt of *Dion*'s Friends, feared to be put to ſome Puniſhment, as Partakers of his Offence. A Report was raiſed, that *Plato* was put to Death by *Dionyſius*, as Author of all that happened; but, on the contrary, *Dionyſius* doubting leſt ſomething worſe might happen from their Fear, treated them all kindly, comforted *Plato*, bid him be of good Chear, and intreated him to ſtay with him. [z]He cauſed him to be lodged in his Caſtle, [a]in the Orchards adjoining to his Palace, where not the Porter himſelf could go out without *Dionyſius* his Leave; thus cunningly, under Pretence of Kindneſs, he watch'd him, that he might not return into *Greece*, to give *Dion* Notice of the Wrong done to him. *Dionyſius*, by frequent Converſation with *Plato*, (as wild Beaſts are tamed by Uſe) fell into ſo great liking of his Diſcourſe, that he became in Love with him; but it was a tyrannical Affection, for he would not that *Plato* ſhould love any but him; offering to put the Power of the Kingdom into his Hands, if he would value him above *Dion*. With this Paſſion, troubleſome to *Plato*, *Dionyſius* was ſometimes ſo far tranſported, as Men jealous of their Miſtreſſes, that he would upon the ſudden fall out with him, and as

w Laert. 3. 21. x Lib. 17. 21. y Plat. Epiſt. ad Dion. z Plutarch. in Dione. a Plat. Epiſt. 7.

ſuddenly

ſuddenly be reconciled, and ask him Pardon. He had indeed a great Deſire of *Plato*'s Philoſophy; but a great Reſpect likewiſe on the other Side for thoſe who diſſwaded him from it, telling him, that it would ruin him to be too far engaged therein. [b] In the mean Time, there happening a War, he ſent *Plato* home, promiſing, that the next Spring (as ſoon as there was Peace) he would ſend back for him and *Dion* to *Syracuſe*; but he kept not his Promiſe, for which he deſired *Plato* to excuſe him, proteſting the War to be the Occaſion thereof, and that as ſoon as it were ended, he would ſend for *Dion*, whom he deſired in the mean Time to reſt ſatisfied, and not attempt any thing againſt him, nor to ſpeak ill of him to the *Grecians*. This *Plato* endeavoured to effect; he inſtructed *Dion* in Philoſophy, in the Academy. *Dion* lay in the City at the Houſe of *Calippus*, with whom he had been long acquainted. He purchaſed a Country-Houſe for Pleaſure, whither he ſometimes went; this he beſtowed afterward, at his Return to *Sicily*, upon *Speuſippus*, with whom he converſed moſt intimately, as being ſo adviſed by *Plato*, who knew the chearful Humour of *Speuſippus* to be a fit Divertiſement for the reſerved Diſpoſition of *Dion*. *Plato* had undertaken the Expence of ſome Plays and Dances by ſome Youths; *Dion* took the Pains to teach them, and paid the whole Charge. By this Liberality which *Plato* ſuffered him to confer upon the *Athenians*, he gained more Love than *Plato* Honour.

In the mean Time, *Dionyſius*, to acquit himſelf of the Diſeſteem he had gained amongſt Philoſophers in *Plato*'s Cauſe, invited many learned Men; and in a vain Oſtentation of Wiſdom, applied improperly the Sentences he had learned of *Plato*. Hereupon he began to wiſh for *Plato* again, and to blame himſelf for not knowing how to uſe him well when he had him, and that he had not learned ſo much of him as he might; and being, like a Tyrant, tranſported with uncertain Paſſions and Changes, a ſudden vehement Deſire came upon him of ſeeing *Plato* again. [c] The Peace being now concluded, he ſent to *Plato* to come to him (but not, as he had promiſed, to *Dion*) writing to him, that he would have him to come immediately, and that afterwards he would ſend for *Dion*. Hereupon, *Plato* refuſed to go, notwithſtanding the Intreaties of *Dion*; alledging for Excuſe, his old Age, and that nothing was done according to their Agreement. In the mean Time, *Architas*, whom, with others of *Tarentum*, *Plato*, before his Departure, had brought into the Acquaintance of *Dionyſius*, came to *Dionyſius*. There were alſo others there, Auditors of *Dion*. *Dionyſius* being refuſed upon a ſecond Invitation, thought his Honour deeply concerned, and thereupon ſent the third Time a Galley of three Banks of *Oars* ([d] trimmed with Fillets) and other Ships; and with them *Archidemus*, whom he conceived *Plato* moſt affected of all his Friends in *Sicily*, and ſome *Sicilian* Noblemen. [e] He had by all Means obliged *Archytas* the *Pythagorean*, to let *Plato* know, he might come without Danger, and that he would engage his Word on it. [f] As ſoon as they came to *Plato*, they all proteſted, that *Dionyſius* was much inclined to Philoſophy, and delivered an Epiſtle from him to this Effect.

Dionyſius to *Plato*.

(After the accuſtomed way of Preface.)

NOthing (ſaith he) *ſhould you do ſooner, than come to* Sicily *at my Requeſt. Firſt, as concerning* Dion, *all ſhall be done as you will; for I think you will only moderate Things, and I will condeſcend. But, unleſs you come, you ſhall not obtain any Thing which you deſire for* Dion, *nor in any Thing elſe; not in thoſe which chiefly concern your own particular.*

[g] Other Epiſtles were ſent from *Archytas*, and other *Italians* and *Tarentines*, praiſing *Dionyſius* for his Love of Learning; adding, that if *Plato* came not, it would reflect upon his Friends, as well as on himſelf. [h] Many Letters and Intreaties were ſent to *Dion* from his Wife and Siſter. [i] To theſe were joined the Importunities of ſome Friends of *Plato*'s at *Athens*, [k] inſomuch that *Dion* brought it to paſs, that *Plato* ([l] leſt he ſhould deſert him and the *Tarentines*) yielded to *Dionyſius*, without any Excuſe; and, as he writeth himſelf, was driven the third Time to the *Sicilian* Straits,

Once more Charybdis' *Dangers to eſſay.*

At his Arrival in *Sicily*, *Dionyſius* met him with a Chariot, drawn by four white Horſes, [m] whereinto he took him, and made him ſit, whilſt himſelf plaid the Coachman. Whereupon, a facete *Syracuſian*, well verſed in *Homer*, pleaſed with the Sight, ſpoke theſe Verſes out of the Iliads, with a little Alteration.

The Chariot groan'd beneath its Weight,
Proud that the beſt of Men there ſate.

And as *Dionyſius* was much joyed at his coming, ſo were the *Sicilians* put in great Hopes; being all deſirous, and endeavouring, that *Plato* might ſupplant *Philiſtus*, and ſubvert Tyranny by Philoſophy. The Ladies of the Court entertained *Plato* with all Civility. But above all, *Dionyſius* ſeemed to repoſe more Confidence in him than in any of his Friends; for whereas he was jealous of all others,

b Plat. Epiſt. c Plat. Epiſt. 3. d Plin. Nat. Hiſt. 7. 31. e Plut. in Dione. f Plat. Epiſt. 7. g Plat. Epiſt. h Plutarch. ibid. i Plat. Epiſt. k Plut. ibid. l Plat. Ep. m Ælian. var. Hiſt. 4. 18.

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he had so great Respect for *Plato*, that he suffered him only to come to him unsearch'd (n though he knew him to be *Dion*'s intimate Friend) and offer'd him great Sums of Money, but *Plato* would not accept of any. (o yet *Onetor* saith, he received eighty Talents of him, wherewith enriched, he purchased the Books of *Philolaus*) whence *Aristippus* the *Cyrenæan*, who was at the same Time in the Court, said, *Dionysius bestowed his Bounty on sure Grounds; he gives little to us who require much, and much to* Plato *who requireth nothing.* And being blamed that he received Money of *Dionysius*, *Plato* Books; *I want Money*, saith he, *Plato* Books. So untrue it is, as p *Xenophon* aspersеth him, that he went thither to share in the *Sicilian* Luxury. Or, as q *Tzetzes*, that *he studied the Art of Cookery, and lived with* Dionysius *as his Pensioner and Parasite.* So far was he from any sordid Compliance, that at a Feast, r *Dionysius* commanding every one to put on a Purple Gown, and dance, he refused, saying,

I will not with Female Robe disgrace
Myself, who am a Man, of manly Race.

Some likewise ascribe this to him, which others to *Aristippus*, that *Dionysius* saying,

Whoe'er comes to a Tyrant, he
A Servant is, though he came free.

He answered immediately,

No Servant is, if he came free.

s *Plato*, after a while, began to put *Dionysius* in mind of the City he had promised him to be governed by his Rules; but *Dionysius* retracted his Promise. He moved him also in the Behalf of *Dion*. *Dionysius*, at the first, delay'd him; afterwards fell out with him, but so secretly, that none saw it, for he continued to confer as much Honour on him as he could possibly, thereby to make him forsake his Friendship to *Dion*. *Plato*, from the Beginning, perceived there was no Trust to be reposed in what he said or did, but that all was Deceit; yet conceal'd that Thought, and patiently suffered all, pretending to believe him. Thus they dissembled with each other, thinking they deceived the Eyes of all Men besides. *Helicon* of *Cyzicum*, a Friend of *Plato*, foretold an Eclipse of the Sun, which falling out according to his Prediction, the Tyrant much honoured him, and gave him a Talent of Silver. Then *Aristippus* jesting with other Philosophers, said, *He could tell them of a stranger Thing that would happen.* They desiring to know what that was: *I foretell*, saith he, Plato *and* Dionysius *will be at Difference, ere long*; and it came to pass t. *Dionysius* detained *Dion*'s Rent, which he used to send yearly to him to *Peloponnesus*, pretending he kept it for his Nephew, *Dion*'s Son. *Plato* discontented hereat, desired he might go home, saying, he could not stay, *Dion* being used so ignominiously. *Dionysius* spoke kindly to him, desiring him to stay. He thought it not convenient to let *Plato* go so soon to divulge his Actions; but being not able to prevail with him, he told him, he would provide a Means for his Passage. *Plato* had designed to go with the Passage-boats. *Dionysius* seeing him bent upon his Voyage, the next Day spoke thus kindly to him, *That the Differences betwixt* Dion *and me may be composed, I will for your Sake condescend thus far*; Dion *shall receive his Revenues living in* Peloponnesus, *not as a banished Person, but as one that may come hither when he and I, and you his Friends, shall think convenient. The Trustees for this Business shall be yourself, and your and his Friends who live here*; Dion *shall receive his Rents, but through your Hands, otherwise I shall not dare to trust him; in you and yours I have more Confidence; stay for this Reason a Year here, and then you shall carry along with you his Money, wherein you will do* Dion *a great Courtesy.* To this *Plato*, after a Day's Deliberation, consented; and writ to that Effect to *Dion*; but as soon as the Ships were gone, that *Dionysius* saw he had no Means to get away, forgetting his Promise, he made Sale of *Dion*'s Estate.

u At this Time happened a Mutiny amongst the Soldiers of *Dionysius*, of which *Heraclides*, a Friend of *Plato*'s, was reported the Author. *Dionysius* laid out to take him, but could not light on him. Walking in his Garden he called *Theodotes* to him; *Plato* being accidentally walking there at the same time; after some private Discourse with *Dionysius*, *Theodotes* turning to *Plato*, *Plato*, saith he, *I persuade* Dionysius *that I may bring* Heraclides *to him to answer the Crimes wherewith he is charged, and then, if* Dionysius *will not suffer him to live in* Sicily, *that he at least permit him to take his Wife and Children along with him to* Peloponnesus, *and live there, and whilst he shall not plot any Thing against* Dionysius, *that he may there enjoy his Revenues. With this Assurance I have sent to* Heraclides, *and will send again to him to come hither*; *but if he come either upon the first or second Notice, I have made an Agreement with* Dionysius, *and obtained a Promise from him, that he shall receive no Harm, either in or without the City*; *but, if he be so resolved, that he send him away beyond the Confines of this Country, until he shall be better satisfied with him*; *Do not you*, Dionysius, *consent hereto*, saith he? *I do*, answered *Dionysius*, *neither if he*

n Ælian. var. Hist. 4. 18. o Laert. 3. 9. p Epist. ad Æschin. q Chiliad. r Laert. vit. Aristip. s Plat. Epist. Plut. ibid. t Plat. Epist. u Plat. Epist. 7.

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be in your Houſe, ſhall he receive any Prejudice. The next Day, (about twenty Days before *Plato* left *Sicily*) came *Euribius* and *Theodotes* to *Plato* in much Haſte and Trouble; *Plato*, ſaid *Theodotes*, *you were Yeſterday preſent at the Agreement betwixt* Dionyſius *and me, concerning* Heraclides. *I was ſo*, anſwered *Plato*, *but ſince*, continues *Theodotes*, *he hath ſent out Officers to apprehend him, and I fear he is ſomewhere very nigh; therefore go along with us to* Dionyſius, *and let us uſe our utmoſt Endeavour with him.* They went; when they came before him, *Plato* (the reſt ſtanding ſilent by, and weeping) began thus, *Theſe Men*, Dionyſius, *are afraid leſt you ſhould do ſomething againſt* Heraclides *contrary to the Agreement you made Yeſterday, for I ſuppoſe he is come near hereabouts.* *Dionyſius* at this grew angry, his Colour often changed with Rage; *Theodotes* fell at his Feet, and taking him by the Hand, beſought him not to do any ſuch Thing: *Plato* continuing his Speech; *Be of good Chear*, ſaith he, Theodotes, *for* Dionyſius *will not do any Thing contrary to the Promiſe he made Yeſterday.* *Dionyſius*, looking ſeverely upon *Plato*, *To you*, ſaith he, *I made no Promiſe*; *Yes, by the Gods*, anſwered *Plato*, *you promiſed not to do thoſe Things which* Theodotes *now beſeecheth you not to do.* *Archidemus* and *Ariſtocratus* being preſent, he told *Plato*, (as he had done once before, when he interceded for *Heraclides*) that he cared for *Heraclides* and others more than for him; and asked him before them, whether he remembered that when he came firſt to *Syracuſe*, he counſelled him to reſtore the *Grecian* Cities? *Plato* anſwered he did remember it, and that he ſtill thought it his beſt Courſe, and withal asked *Dionyſius* whether that were the only Counſel he had given him? *Dionyſius* returned an angry contumelious Reply, and asked him, laughing ſcornfully, whether he taught him thoſe Things as a School-boy? To which *Plato* anſwered, *You well remember.* *What*, replies he, *as a Maſter in Geometry, or how?* *Plato* forbore to reply, fearing it might occaſion a Stop of his Voyage, but immediately went away. *Dionyſius* reſolved to lay wait for *Heraclides*; but he eſcaped to the *Carthaginian* Territories.

From this Diſpleaſure againſt *Plato* [w], *Dionyſius* took Occaſion to forbear to ſend for *Dion*'s Money; and firſt ſent *Plato* out of his Caſtle, where, till then, he had lain next the Palace, pretending that the Women were to celebrate a Feaſt ten Days in the Gardens where he dwelt: For that time he commanded *Plato* to live without the Caſtle with *Archedemus*; during which Time *Theodotes* ſent for him, and complained to him of *Dionyſius*'s Proceedings. *Dionyſius* receiving Information that *Plato* had gone to *Theodotes*, took a new Occaſion of Diſpleaſure againſt him, and ſent one to him, who asked him whether he had gone to *Theodotes*. *Plato* acknowledged that he had, then, ſaith the Meſſenger, *Dionyſius* bad me tell you, you do not well to prefer *Dion* and his Friends before him. Never from that Time did he ſend for *Plato* to the Court, looking upon him as a profeſt Friend to *Theodotes* and *Heraclides*, and his profeſt Enemy. [x] *Plato* lived without the Caſtle amongſt the Soldiers of the Guard; who, as *Dionyſius* well knew, had born him Ill-will long, and ſought to murder him, becauſe he counſelled *Dionyſius* to give over the Tyranny, and live without a Guard. [y] Some, who came to viſit him, gave him Notice that Calumnies were ſpread againſt him amongſt the Soldiers, [z] as if he excited *Dion* and *Theonides* to reſtore the Iſland to Liberty, and that ſome of them threatened, when they could light upon him to kill him. Hereupon *Plato* began to think of ſome Means of Eſcape, which he effected in this Manner; he ſent to *Archytas* at *Tarentum*, and to other Friends, advertiſing them of the Danger wherein he was; they, under Pretence of an Embaſſy in the Name of the Country, ſent *Lamaſcus* (whom *Laertius* calls *Lamiſcus*) one of their Party, with a Galley of three Banks of Oars to redemand *Plato*, declaring that his coming to *Syracuſe* was upon the Engagement of *Archytas*. His Letter was to this Effect.

Archytas to *Dionyſius*, Health.

WE all, Plato's *Friends*, *have ſent* Lamiſcus *and* Photides *to redemand the Man according to your Agreement with us: You will do well to conſider with what Importunity you prevailed with us to invite* Plato *to you, promiſing to yield to all Things, and to give him Liberty to go and come at his Pleaſure; remember how much you prized his coming, and preferred him before all others. If there hath happened any Difference betwixt you, it will befit you to treat him courteouſly, and reſtore him ſafe to us. This if you do, you will do juſtly, and oblige us.*

[a] *Dionyſius*, to excuſe himſelf, and to ſhew he was not angry with *Plato*, feaſted him magnificently, and then ſent him home with great Teſtimonies of Affection: One Day, amongſt the reſt, he ſaid to him, *I am afraid*, Plato, *you will ſpeak ill of me when you are amongſt your Friends. The Gods forbid*, anſwered *Plato* ſmiling, *they ſhould have ſuch Scarcity of Matter in the Academy, as to be conſtrained to diſcourſe of you.* *Dionyſius* at his Departure deſired him to find out whether *Dion* would be much diſpleaſed if he ſhould diſpoſe of his Wife to another, there being at that Time a Report that he did not like his Match, and could not live quietly with his Wife. *Plato* in his Return came to *Peloponneſus*, at what Time the Olympick Games were celebrated; where the Eyes of all the

w Plato Epiſt. 7. x Plut. in Dion. y Plat. Epiſt. z Laert. 3. 21. a Plut. vit. Dion.

Grecians were taken off from the Sports, and fixed upon him as the more worthy Object. Here he found *Dion* beholding the Exercises, to whom he related what had happened. *Dion* protested to revenge the Discourtesy of *Dionysius* towards *Plato*, from which *Plato* earnestly dissuaded him. Being come home to *Athens*, he wrote to *Dionysius*, and gave him a plain Account of every Thing, but that concerning *Dion*'s Wife, he set it down so darkly, that he alone to whom the Letter was directed could understand him; letting him know that he had spoken with *Dion* about the Business which he knew, and that he would be very much displeased if *Dionysius* did it. So that at that time, because there was great Hopes of Reconciliation between them, the Tyrant forbore a while to dispose of his Sister *Arete*, *Dion*'s Wife, as soon after, when he saw the Breach irreconcileable, he did, marrying her against her Will to one of his Friends named *Timocrates*. *Dion* thenceforward prepared for War against *Plato*'s Advice, who endeavoured to dissuade him from it, as well for Respect of *Dionysius*'s good Reception of him, as for that *Dion* was well in Years; tho' *Ælian* saith, [b] he put *Dion* upon that War, which *Plutarch* imputes to the Instigations of *Speusippus*.

CHAP. X.

His Authority in Civil Affairs.

AT home he lived quietly in the Academy, [c] not engaging himself in publick Affairs; (tho' he was a Person very knowing therein, as his Writings manifest) because the *Athenians* were accustomed to Laws different from his Sense.

[d] His Fame spreading to the *Arcadians* and *Thebans*, they sent Ambassadors earnestly to request him to come over to them, not only to instruct their young Men in Philosophy, but which was of higher Concernment, to ordain Laws for *Megalopolis*, a City then newly built by the *Arcadians*, upon Occasion of the great Defeat given them by the *Lacedæmonians*, in the first Year of the 103d Olympiad. *Plato* was not a little pleased at this Invitation, but asking the Ambassadors how they stood affected to a Parity of Estates, and finding them so averse from it, as not to be by any Means induced thereto, he refused to go; but sent *Aristonimus* his familiar Friend.

[e] The *Cyrenæans* likewise sent to him, desiring him to send them Laws for their City, but he refused, saying, it was difficult to prescribe Laws to Men in Prosperity.

Yet to several People upon their Importunities he condescended.

To the *Syracusians* he gave Laws upon the Ejection of their King.

To the *Cretans*, upon their building of *Magnesia*, he sent Laws digested into twelve Books.

To the *Eleans* he sent *Phormio*; to the *Pyrrhenians*, *Mededimus* (his familiar Friends) upon the same Design.

This is enough to justify him against those who accuse [f] him of having written a Form of Government which he could not persuade any to practise, because it was so severe: And that the *Athenians*, who accepted the Laws of *Draco* and *Solon*, derided his.

CHAP. XI.

His Virtues and Moral Sentences.

HE lived single, yet soberly and chastly, insomuch as in his old Age (in Compliance with the vulgar Opinion) he sacrificed to Nature, to expiate the Crime of his Continence. So constant in his Composure and Gravity, that a Youth brought up under him, returning to his Parents, and hearing his Father speak aloud, said, *I never found this in* Plato. He eat but once a Day, or if the second time, very sparingly; he slept alone, and much discommended the contrary Manner of Living. Of his Prudence, Patience, Magnanimity, and other Virtues, there are these Instances.

[g] *Antimachus* a *Colophonian*, and *Niceratus* a *Heracleot*, contending in a poetick Panegyrick of *Lysander*, the Prize was bestowed upon *Niceratus*: *Antimachus* in Anger tore his Poem. *Plato*, who at that Time was young, and much esteemed *Antimachus* for his Poetry, comforted him, saying, *Ignorance is a Disease proper to the Ignorant, as Blindness to the Blind.*

[h] His Servant having offended him, he bad him put off his Coat, and expose his Shoulders to be beaten, intending to have corrected him with his own Hand; but perceiving himself to be angry, he stopt his Hand, and stood fix'd in that Posture; a Friend coming in asked him what he was doing, *punishing an angry Man*, saith he.

[i] Another Time being displeased at his Servant for some Offence, *Do you* (saith he to *Speusippus*, or as *Laertius* [k], to *Xenocrates*, accidentally coming in) *beat this Fellow, for I am angry.* And another Time to his Servant he said, *I would beat thee if I were not angry.* [l] Fearing to exceed the Limits of Correction, and thinking it unfit the Master and Servant should be alike faulty.

[m] *Chabrias* the General being arraigned for his Life, he alone shewed himself on his Side, not one of the Citizens else appearing for him. *Crobulus* the Sycophant met him, accompanying *Chabrias* to the Tower, and said unto him, *Do you come to help others, you know not that the Poison of* Socrates *is reserved for you? Plato* answered, *When I fought for*

b Var. Hist. 3. 17. c Laert. 3. 23. d Ælian. var. hist. 2. 41. e Plutarch ad princip. inerudit. f Athen. 11. g Plut. in Lysand. h Senec. de ira. 3. 12. i Senec. ibid. k Laert. 3. 38. l Val. Max. 4. m Laert. 3. 23.

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my Country I hazarded my Life, and will now in Duty to my Friend.

[n] At the Olympick Games, he fell into Company with ſome Strangers, who knew him not, upon whoſe Affections he gained much by his affable Converſation, dining and ſpending the whole Day with them, not mentioning either the Academy or *Socrates*, only ſaying, his Name was *Plato*. When they came to *Athens*, he entertained them courteouſly. *Come*, Plato, ſaid the Strangers, *ſhew us your Nameſake*, Socrates *his Diſciple*; *bring us to the Academy, recommend us to him, that we may know him.* He ſmiling a little, as he uſed, ſaid, *I am the Man*; whereat they were much amazed, having converſed ſo familiarly with a Perſon of that Eminence, who uſed no Boaſting or Oſtentation; and ſhewed, that beſides his Philoſophical Diſcourſe, his ordinary Converſation was extremely winning.

When he went out of the School, he always ſaid, *See (Youths) that you employ your idle Hours uſefully.*

At a Feaſt he blamed thoſe that brought in Muſicians to hinder Diſcourſe.

Seeing a young Man play at Dice [o], he reproved him; he anſwered, *What, for ſo ſmall a Matter? Cuſtom* (replies *Plato*) *is no ſmall Thing.*

Being demanded [p], whether there ſhould be any Record to Poſterity of his Actions or Sayings, as of others before him? *Firſt*, ſaith he, *we muſt get a Name, then many Things will follow.*

Getting on Horſeback [q], he immediately lighted again, ſaying, he feared leſt he ſhould be carried away ἱπποτυφία by a high wilful Conceit, a Metaphor taken from a Horſe.

[r] He adviſed drunken and angry Men to look in a Glaſs, and it would make them refrain from thoſe Vices.

[s] He affirmed, that to drink to the Exceſs of Drunkenneſs was not allowable at any Time, unleſs upon the Feſtival of that God who gives Wine.

[t] Sleep alſo much diſpleaſed him, whence he ſaith in his Laws, *No Man ſleeping is worth any Thing.*

[u] That Truth is more pleaſing to all than any feigned Story, ſo of Truth he ſaith, *de legibus: Truth, O Gueſt, is an excellent Thing and durable, but to this we are not eaſily perſuaded.*

[w] Being told that *Xenocrates* had ſpoken many unjuſt Things againſt him, he preſently rejected the Accuſation; the Informer perſiſting, asked why he would not believe him? He added, it was not probable, that he whom he loved ſo much ſhould not love him again. Finally, the other ſwearing it was thus; he, not to argue him of Perjury, affirmed, that *Xenocrates* would never have ſaid ſo, but that there was Reaſon for it.

[x] He ſaid, *No wiſe Man puniſheth in reſpect of the Fault paſt, but in Prevention of the future.*

[y] Seeing the *Agrigentines* magnificent in Building, luxurious in Feaſting, *Theſe People* (ſaith he) *build as if they were to live for ever, and eat as if they were to die inſtantly.*

Hearing a wicked Perſon ſpeak in the Defence of another, [z] *This Man*, ſaith he, *carries his Heart in his Tongue.*

Being told that ſome ſpake Ill of him, he anſwered, [a] *'Tis no Matter, I will live ſo that none ſhall believe them.*

[b] Seeing a young Man of a good Family, who had waſted all his Means, ſitting at the Door of an Inn, feeding upon Bread and Water, he told him, *If you had dined ſo temperately, you would never have needed to ſup ſo.*

[c] To *Antiſthenes*, making a long Oration, *You know not*, ſaith he, *that Diſcourſe is to be meaſured by the Hearer, not the Speaker.*

[d] Seeing a Youth over bold with his Father, *Young Man*, ſaith he, *will you undervalue him who is the Cauſe you overvalue yourſelf?*

To one of his Diſciples who took too much Care of his Body, he ſaid, *Why do you labour ſo much in building your own Priſon?*

Of a Priſoner fettered, he ſaid, *That Man is dead in his own Body, he lives in another.*

He ſaid, *That whoſoever neglected himſelf for another, was the moſt happy of all Perſons, for he enjoyed neither.*

One *Leo*, an eminent Citizen, being blamed for loud and immoderate Clamour in the Senate, *This is*, ſaith he, *to be a Lyon indeed.*

His Diſciples wondering, that *Xenocrates*, ſevere all his Life-time, had ſaid ſomething that was pleaſant, *Do you wonder*, ſaith he, *that Roſes and Lilies grow among Thorns?*

[e] *Xenocrates*, by Reaſon of his ſevere Converſation, he adviſed to ſacrifice to the Graces.

He uſed to ſay, *Prefer Labour before Idleneſs, unleſs you eſteem Ruſt above Brightneſs.*

He exhorted the young Men to good Life thus: *Obſerve the different Nature of Virtue and Pleaſure; the momentary Sweetneſs of the World is immediately followed by eternal Sorrow and Repentance, the ſhort Pain of the other by eternal Pleaſure.*

He ſaid, *That it was a great Matter in the Education of Youth, to accuſtom them to take Delight in good Things; otherwiſe, he affirmed Pleaſure to be the Bait of Evil.*

He affirms *Philoſophy to be the true Help of the Soul, the reſt Ornaments; that nothing is more plea-*

n Ælian. var. Hiſt. 4. 9. o Laert. 3. 39. p Ibid. 3. 38. q Ibid. 3. 39. r Ibid. s Ibid. t Ibid. u Ibid. w Val. Max. 4. 1. x Senec. de ira. 1, 16. y Ælian, 13. 29. z Stob. Serm. 54. a Ibid, b Ibid, c Ibid. 36. d Ibid. 77. e Laert. vit. Xen.

ſing to a ſound Mind, than to ſpeak and hear Truth, than which nothing is better or more laſting.

To ſome, who demanded what Kind of Poſſeſſions were beſt to be provided for Children? *Thoſe*, ſaith he, *which fear neither Storms, nor Violence of Men, nor* Jove *himſelf.*

To *Demonicus* asking his Advice concerning the Education of his Son; *The ſame Care*, ſaith he, *that we have of Plants, we muſt take of our Children; the one is Labour, the other Pleaſure. But we muſt take Heed that in this we be not too ſecure, in that too vigilant.*

To *Philedonus*, who blamed him that he was as ſtudious to learn as to teach, and asked him *how long he meant to be a Diſciple? As long*, ſaith he, *as I am not aſhamed of growing better and wiſer.*

Being demanded, *What Difference there is betwixt a learned Man and an unlearned? The ſame*, ſaith he, *as betwixt a Phyſician and a Patient.*

He ſaid, *Princes had no better Poſſeſſions than the Familiarities of ſuch Men who could not flatter; That Wiſdom is as neceſſary to a Prince, as the Soul to the Body; That Kingdoms would be moſt happy, if either Philoſophers rule, or the Rulers were inſpired with Philoſophy; for nothing is more pernicious than Power and Arrogance, accompanied with Ignorance; That Subjects ought to be ſuch as Princes ſeem to be; That a Magiſtrate is to be eſteemed a publick, not a private Good; That not a Part of the Commonwealth, but the whole, ought to be principally regarded.*

[f] Being deſirous to take off *Timotheus* Son of *Conon*, General of the *Athenians*, from ſumptuous military Feaſts, he invited him into the Academy to a plain moderate Supper, ſuch as quiet pleaſing Sleeps ſucceed, with a good Temper of Body. The next Day *Timotheus* obſerving the Difference, ſaid, *They who feaſted with* Plato *were the better for it the next Day*; and meeting *Plato* ſaid unto him, *Your Supper*, Plato, *is as pleaſant the next Morning as over Night*, alluding to the excellent Diſcourſe that had paſt at that Time.

Hence appears the Truth of the Poet's Saying, who being derided for acting a Tragedy, none being preſent but *Plato*, anſwered, *but this one Perſon is more than all the* Athenians *beſides.*

CHAP. XII.

His Will and Death.

THus continuing a ſingle Life to his End, not having any Heirs of his own, he bequeathed his Eſtate to young *Adimantus* (probably the Son of *Adimantus* his ſecond Brother) by his Will; thus recited by *Laertius* [g].

Theſe Things Plato *hath bequeathed and diſpoſed; the* Hepheſtidian *Grounds bordering North on the High-way from the* Cephiſian *Temple, South on the Heracleum of the* Hepheſtiades, *Eaſt on* Archeſtratus *the* Phrearian, *Weſt* Philip *the* Cholidian; *this let it not be lawful for any Man to ſell or alienate, but let young* Adimantus *be Poſſeſſor thereof in as full and ample Manner as is poſſible. And likewiſe the* Eneriſiadæan *Farm which I bought of* Callimachus, *adjoining on the North to* Eurymedon *the* Myrrinuſian, *on the South to* Demoſtratus Xypeteron, *on the Eaſt to* Eurymedon *the* Myrrinuſian, *on the Weſt to* Cephiſſus; *three* Minæ *of Silver; a golden Cup weighing* 160 *Drachms, a Ring of Gold, and an Ear-ring of Gold, both together weighing four Drachms and three Oboli*; Euclid *the Stone-cutter oweth me three* Minæ; Diana *I remit freely*; *I leave my Servants*, Ticho, Bictas, Apolloniades *and* Dionyſius, *the Goods whereof* Demetrius *keepeth an Inventory. I owe no Man any Thing. I appoint Executors*, Softhenes, Speuſippus, Demetrius, Hegias, Eurimedon, Callimachus, Thraſippus.

[h] If this Will be not forged, that of *Apuleius* is falſe, who avers, *the Patrimony he left was a little Orchard adjoining to the Academy, two Servants, and a Cup wherein he ſupplicated to the Gods; Gold no more than he wore in his Ear when he was a Boy, an Emblem of his Nobility.*

[i] He died in the 13th Year of the Reign of *Philip* King of *Macedon*, in the firſt of the 108th Olympiad, the 81ſt (according to *Hermippus*, *Cicero*, *Seneca*, and others) of his Age (not as *Athenæus* the 82.) which Number he compleated exactly, dying that very Day whereon he was born; For which Reaſon the Magi at *Athens* ſacrificed to him, as conceiving him more than Man, who fulfilled the moſt perfect Number, nine multiplied into itſelf.

[k] He died only of Age, which *Seneca* aſcribes to his Temperance and Diligence; *Hermippus* ſaith, at a Nuptial Feaſt; *Cicero* ſaith [l], as he was Writing; they therefore who affirm he died (as *Pherecydes*) of Lice, do him much Injury; upon his Tomb theſe Epitaphs [m].

The firſt.

Whoſe Temperance and Juſtice all envies,
The fam'd Ariſtocles *here buried lies;*
If Wiſdom any with Renown endued,
Here was it moſt, by Envy not purſued.

The ſecond.

Earth in her Boſom Plato's *Body hides,*
His Soul amongſt the deathleſs Gods reſides.
Ariſto's *Son whoſe Fame to Strangers ſpread,*
Made them admire the ſacred Life he led.

f Plut. Sympoſ. 6. præfat. Ælian. var. hiſt. 2. 18. g Laert. 3. 41. h Dogm. Plat. i Laert. 3. 40. k Epiſt. 1. 58. l De Senect. m Laert. 3. 40.

Another later.

Eagle, why art thou perch'd upon this Stone,
And gazeſt thence on ſome Gods ſtarry Throne?
I Plato's *Soul to Heaven flown repreſent,*
His Body buried in this Monument.

Phavorinus ſaith, that *Mithridates* the *Perſian* ſet up *Plato*'s Statue in the Academy with this Inſcription;

MITHRIDATES SON OF *RHODOBATES*, THE *PERSIAN*, DEDICATED THIS IMAGE OF *PLATO*, MADE BY *SILANION*, TO THE MUSES.

CHAP. XIII.

His Diſciples and Friends.

THE Fame of this School attracted Diſciples from all Parts: Of whom were

[m] *Speuſippus*, an *Athenian*, *Plato*'s Siſter's Son, whom he is ſaid to have reformed by the Example of his own Life.

Xenocrates, a *Chalcedonian*, *Plato*'s beloved Diſciple, an Imitator of his Gravity and Magnanimity: *Athenæus* ſaith, he was firſt the only Diſciple of *Æſchines*, and Relief of his Poverty, ſeduced from him by *Plato*.

[n] *Ariſtotle*, a *Stagyrite*, whom *Plato* uſed to call a Colt, foreſeeing that he would ungratefully oppoſe him, as a Colt, having ſuck'd, kicks at his Dam: *Xenocrates* was ſlow, *Ariſtotle* quick in Extremity, whence *Plato* ſaid of them, *What an Aſs have I, and what a Horſe to yoke together!*

Philippus, an *Opuntian*, who tranſcribed *Plato*'s Laws in Wax; to him ſome aſcribe *Epinomis*.

Heſtiæus a *Perinthian*.

Dion a *Syracuſian*, whom *Plato* exceedingly affected, as is evident from his Epigrams; ſeeing him in the Height of Honour, all Mens Eyes fix'd upon his noble Actions, he adviſed him to take Heed of that Vice, which makes Men care only to pleaſe themſelves; a Conſequent of Solitude.

Amyclus (or, as *Ælian*, *Amyclas*) a *Heracleote*.
[o] *Eraſtus* and *Coriſcus*, *Scepſians*.
Timolaus a *Cyzicene*.
Euæmon a *Lampſacene*.
Pithon, whom *Ariſtotle* calls *Paron*, and *Heraclides*, *Ænians*.
Hippothales and *Calippus*, *Athenians*.
Demetrius of *Amphipolis*.
Heraclides of *Pontus*.

Two Women, *Laſthenia* a *Mantinean*, and *Axiothia* a *Phliaſian*, who went habited like a Man.

Theophraſtus, as ſome affirm.

Orators, [p] *Hyperides*, *Lycurgus*, *Demoſthenes*. *Lycurgus* (ſaith *Philiſtus*) was a Perſon of great Parts, and did many remarkable Things, which none could perform, who had not been *Plato*'s Auditor. *Demoſthenes*, when he fled from *Antipater*, ſaid to *Archias*, who counſelled him to put himſelf into his Hands, upon Promiſe to ſave his Life; *Far be it from me to chooſe rather to live ill, than to die well*; *having heard* Xenocrates *and* Plato *diſpute of the Soul's Immortality*.

Meneſiſtratus a *Thaſian*.

To theſe reckoned by *Laertius*, [q] add *Ariſtides*, a *Locrian*.

Eudoxus a *Gnidian*, who, at a great Feaſt made by *Plato*, firſt found out the Manner of ſitting in a circular Form.

[r] *Hermodorus*, of whom the Proverb; Hermodorus *trafficks in Words*.

Heracleodorus, to whom *Demoſthenes* writing, reprehends him, that having heard *Plato*, he neglected good Arts, and lived diſorderly.

[s] *Euphrates*, who lived with *Perdiccas* King of *Macedonia*, in ſo great Favour, that he, in a manner, ſhared Command with him.

[t] *Euagon* of *Lampſacum*.
[u] *Timæus* of *Cyzicum*.
[w] *Chæron* of *Pellene*.

[x] *Iſocrates* the Orator, with whom *Plato* was very intimate. *Praxiphanes* publiſhed a Diſcourſe they had together, in a Field of *Plato*'s, who at that Time entertain'd *Iſocrates* as a Gueſt.

Aſter, *Phædrus*, *Alexis*, *Agato*, young Men, whom *Plato* particularly affected, as appears by his Epigrams.

[y] *Ariſtonymus*, *Phormio*, *Mededimus*, his familiar Friends, already mentioned.

CHAP. XIV.

His Emulators and Detractors.

AS *Plato*'s eminent Learning gained on one Side many Diſciples and Admirers, ſo on the other Side, it procured him many Emulators, eſpecially amongſt his Fellow Diſciples, the Followers of *Socrates*; amongſt theſe,

[z] *Xenophon* was exceedingly diſaffected towards him; they emulated each other, and writ both upon one Subject, a Sympoſium; *Socrates* his Apology, Moral Commentaries: One writ of a Commonwealth, the other, the Inſtitution of *Cyrus*; which Book [a] *Plato* notes as commentitious, affirming *Cyrus* not to have been ſuch a Perſon as is there ex-

m Laert. 3. 4. n Laert. 5. 2. o See alſo Stob. lib. 13. p Lucian Demoſthen. Encom. q Laert. 8. 86. r Zenob. s Athen. deipn. lib. 11. t Ibid. u Ibid. w Ibid. x Laert. 3. 8. y Cap. 10. z Laert. 3. 33. a De legib. l. 3.

preſs'd.

preſs'd. Though both writ much concerning *Socrates*, yet neither makes mention of the other, except *Xenophon* once of *Plato*, in the third of his Commentaries.

Antiſthenes being about to recite ſomething that he had written, deſired *Plato* to be preſent; *Plato* demanding what he meant to recite, he anſwered, *That to contradict is not lawful. How came you*, ſaith *Plato*, *to write upon that Subject?* And thereupon demonſtrating that he contradicted himſelf, *Antiſthenes* writ a Dialogue againſt him, entitled, *Satho*.

Ariſtippus was at Difference with him; for which Reaſon (in *Phædone*) he covertly reproves *Ariſtippus*, [b] that being near at *Ægina* when *Socrates* died, he came not to him. He writ a Book of the Luxury of the Ancients. Some aſcribe the amatory Epigrams to his Invention, his Deſign in that Treatiſe being to detract from eminent Perſons; amongſt the reſt, from *Socrates* his Maſter, and *Plato* and *Xenophon* his Fellow-Diſciples.

Æſchines and *Plato* alſo diſagreed. Some affirm, that when *Plato* was in Favour with *Dionyſius*, *Æſchines* came thither very poor, and was deſpiſed by *Plato*, but kindly entertain'd by *Ariſtippus*.[c] But the Epiſtle of *Æſchines*, put forth by *Allatius*, expreſſeth the contrary. The Diſcourſe which *Plato* relates, betwixt *Crito* and *Socrates* in Priſon, *Idomeneus* ſaith, was betwixt *Socrates* and *Æſchines*; by *Plato*, out of Ill will to *Æſchines*, attributed to *Crito*. But of *Æſchines* he makes not any mention in all his Works, except twice ſlightly; once in *Phædone*, where he names him amongſt the Perſons preſent at *Socrates* his Death; and again in his Apology, ſpeaking of *Lyſanias*'s Father.

Phædo, if we credit the Detractions of [d] *Athenæus*, was ſo much malign'd by *Plato*, as that he was about to frame an Indictment againſt him, to reduce him to that Condition of Servitude, out of which, by the Procurement of *Socrates*, he had been redeemed; but his Deſign being diſcovered, he gave it over. Beſides his Condiſciples,

Diogenes the *Cynick* derided his Laws, and Aſſertion of Ideas. Concerning the firſt, he asked if he were writing Laws; *Plato* aſſented. *Have you not written already a Commonwealth*, ſaith *Diogenes? Yes*, anſwered *Plato*. *Had that Commonwealth Laws*, ſaith *Diogenes? Plato* affirm'd it had. *Then*, replied *Diogenes*, *what need you write new?* [e] Another Time, *Diogenes* ſaying, *He could ſee the Things of the World, but not Ideas: Plato* anſwer'd, *That is no Wonder, for you have and uſe thoſe Eyes, which behold ſuch Things; but the Mind, which only can ſee the other, you uſe not.*

[f] *Molon*, in Detraction from him, ſaid, *It was not ſtrange* Dionyſius *ſhould be at* Corinth, *but that* Plato *ſhould be at* Sicily.

From theſe private Differences aroſe many ſcandalous Imputations, forged and ſpread abroad by ſuch as envied or maligned him; as, [g] That he profeſs'd one Thing, and practiſed another; That he loved inordinately *Aſter*, *Dion*, *Phædrus*, *Alexis*, *Agatho*, and *Archeanaſſa*, a Courteſan of *Colophe*; [i] That he was a Calumniator, envious, proud, a gluttonous Lover of Figgs; [k] That he was the worſt of Philoſophers, a Paraſite to Tyrants; and many other Accuſations, alike improbable. From theſe the Comick Poets, and others, took Liberty to abuſe him. [l] *Theopompus* in *Autochare*.

——— *for One is none,*
And Two (as Plato *holds) is hardly One.*

Anaxandrides in *Theſeo*;

When Olives he (as Plato*) doth devour.*

Timon.

As Plato *feigns, in framing Wonders skill'd.*

Alexis *in* Meropide,

Aptly thou comeſt, I walking round could meet
(Like Plato*) nothing wiſe; but tir'd my Feet.*

And in Achilione.

Thou ſpeak'ſt of Things thou underſtand'ſt not; go
To Plato, *thence* Nile *and Onions know.*

Amph. *in* Amphicrate.

What Good from hence you may expect to riſe,
I can no more than Plato's *Good compriſe.*

And in Dexidemide.

Plato, *thou nothing know'ſt, but how*
To look ſevere, and knit the Brow.

Cratylus *in* Pſeudobolymæo.

A Man thou art, and haſt a Soul, but this
With Plato *not ſure, but Opinion is.*

Alexis *in* Olympiodoro.

My Body mortal is grown dry,
My Soul turn'd Air, that cannot die;
Taught Plato *this Philoſophy?*

And in Paraſito.

Or thou with Plato *raveſt alone.*

b Laert. vit. Ariſtip. c In Ep. Socratic. d Athen. 11. e Laert. vit. Diog. f Laert. 3. 34. g Senec. de vit. beat. h Laert. 3. 31. i Athen. 11. k Tretz. Chiliad. 10. l Laert. 3. 26.

m *Ephippus*

[m] *Ephippus* in *Naufrago* objects to *Plato*, and ſome Friends of his, *That, corrupted with Money, they detracted from many Perſons; that they went proudly habited; and they took more Care of their outward Beauty, than the moſt luxurious.* See *Athenæus*, Lib. 11.

CHAP. XV.

His Writings.

THE Writings of *Plato* are by way of Dialogue. Of the Invention of Dialogue we have already ſpoken; now of the Nature thereof.

A Dialogue is compoſed of Queſtions and Anſwers, Philoſophical or Political, aptly expreſſing the Characters of thoſe Perſons that are the Speakers in an elegant Stile. Dialectick is the Art of Diſcourſe, whereby we confirm or confute any Thing by Queſtions and Anſwers of the Diſputants.

Of *Platonick* Diſcourſe there are two Kinds, *Hyphegetick*, and *Exegetick*, ſubſcribed thus;

- *Hyphegetick*
  - *Theoretick*
    - *Logick*
    - *Phyſick*
  - *Practick*
    - *Ethick*
    - *Politick*
- *Exegetick*
  - *Gymnaſtick*
    - *Majeutick*
    - *Phyſick*
  - *Agoniſtick*
    - *Endeictick*
    - *Anatreptick*

[n] We know there are other Diviſions of Dialogues; as, into Dramatick Narrative mix'd. But that Diviſion is more proper to Tragedy than to Philoſophy.

Of *Plato*'s Dialogues are

- *Phyſick*
  - *Timæus.*
- *Logick*
  - The Politick,
  - *Cratylus,*
  - *Parmenides,*
  - The Sophiſt.
- *Ethick*
  - Apology of *Socrates,*
  - *Crito,*
  - *Phædo,*
  - *Phædrus,*
  - *Sympoſium,*
  - *Menexemus,*
  - *Clitophon,*
  - *Epiſtles,*
  - *Philebus,*
  - *Hipparchus,*
  - *The Rivals.*
- *Politick*
  - *The Commonwealth,*
  - *The Laws,*
  - *Minos,*
  - *Epinomis,*
  - *The Atlantick.*
- *Majeutick*
  - *Alcibiades,*
  - *Theages,*
  - *Lyſis,*
  - *Laches.*
- *Piraſtick*
  - *Euthyphron,*
  - *Menon,*
  - *Ion,*
  - *Charmides,*
  - *Theætetus.*
- *Endeictick*
  - *Protagoras.*
- *Anatreptick*
  - *Euthydemus,*
  - *Hippias* 1.
  - *Hippias* 2.
  - *Gorgias* 1.
  - *Gorgias* 2.

[o] It being much controverted (continueth *Laertius*) whether *Plato* doth dogmatize, ſome affirming, others denying it; it will be neceſſary to ſay ſomething thereupon. Δογματίζειν, to dogmatize, is to impoſe a Doctrine; as νομοθέτειν, to impoſe a Law, a Doctrine is taken two Ways, either for that which is decreed, or the Decree itſelf; that which is decreed is a Propoſition, the Decree itſelf an Impoſition. *Plato* expounds thoſe Things which he conceiveth true; confutes thoſe which are falſe; ſuſpends his Opinion in thoſe which are doubtful: He aſſerts what he conceiveth true under one of theſe four Perſons; *Socrates*, *Timæus*, an *Athenian* Gueſt, an *Ælian* Gueſt. The Gueſts are not, as ſome conceive, *Plato* and *Parmenides*, but imagined nameleſs Perſons; as what *Socrates*, *Timæus* ſpeak, are the Decrees of *Plato*. Thoſe whom he argueth of Falſehood, are *Thraſymachus*, *Callicles*, *Polus*, *Gorgias*, *Protagoras*, *Hippias*, *Euthydemus*, and the like.

[p] In Argument he often uſed Induction of both Sorts. Induction is a Diſcourſe, which from certain Truths collects, and inferreth a Truth like to thoſe. Of Induction there are two Kinds; one from Contraries, another from Conſequents: From Contraries, as when he who is queſtioned, anſwereth in all Things contrary to himſelf, as thus; *My Father is either the ſame with yours, or not the ſame; if therefore thy Father be not the ſame with mine, he is not my Father.* And again, *If a Man be not a living Creature, he is Stone, Wood, or the like; but he is neither Stone nor Wood; for he hath a Soul,*

m Athen. lib. 11. n Laert. 2. 50. o Laert. 3. 51. p Laert. 3. 58.

and

and moveth himſelf, therefore he is a living Creature; if a living Creature, a Dog and an Ox. This Kind of Induction by Contraries, ſerves not for Aſſertion, but Confutation. Inductions by Conſequents are two-fold; one, when a ſingular being ſought, is concluded from a Singular, the firſt proper to Orators, the ſecond to Logicians; as in the firſt, the Queſtion is, Whether ſuch an one were a Murtherer, it is proved from his being bloody at the ſame Time. This Induction is rhetorical, for Rhetorick is converſant in Singulars, not in Univerſals; it enquireth not after Juſtice, but after the ſeveral Parts thereof. The other is Dialectick, whereby Univerſals are concluded from Singulars, as in this Queſtion; Whether the Soul be immortal, and whether the Living are of the Dead? which is demonſtrated in his Book of the Soul, by a general Maxim, that Contraries proceed from Contraries; this being general, is proved by Singulars, as waking ſucceeds ſleeping, the greater the leſſer, and ſo on the contrary. Thus he uſeth to confirm what he aſſerts.

[q] *Thraſyllus* ſaith, he publiſhed his Dialogues according to the tragick Tetralogy. His genuine Dialogues are fifty ſix; his Commonwealth divided into ten, they make nine Tetralogies, reckoning his Commonwealth one Book, his Laws another. The firſt Tetralogy hath a common Subject, declaring what is the proper Life of a Philoſopher. Every Book hath a two-fold Title; one from the principal Perſon, the other from the Subject.

The Firſt,
- *Euthypron*, or of Piety. *Piraſtick.*
- *Socrates* his Apology. *Ethick.*
- *Crito*, or of that which is to be done. *Ethick.*
- *Phædo*, or of the Soul. *Ethick.*

The Second,
- *Cratylus*, or, of right naming. *Logick.*
- *Theætetus*, or, of Science. *Piraſtick.*
- *The Sophiſt*, or, of Ens. *Logick.*
- *The Politick*, or, of a Kingdom. *Logick.*

The Third,
- *Parmenides*, or, of Ideas. *Logick.*
- *Philebus*, or, of Pleaſure. *Ethick.*
- *The Sympoſium*, or, of Good. *Ethick.*
- *Phædrus*, or, of Love. *Ethick.*

The Fourth,
- *Alcibiades* 1. or of Human Nature. *Majeutick.*
- *Alcibiades* 2. or, of Prayer. *Majeutick.*
- *Hipparchus*, or, the Covetous. *Ethick.*
- *The Rivals*, or, of Philoſophy. *Ethick.*

The Fifth,
- *Theages*, or, of Philoſophy. *Majeutick.*
- *Charmides*, or, of Temperance. *Piraſtick.*
- *Laches*, or, of Fortitude. *Majeutick.*
- *Lyſis*, or, of Friendſhip. *Majeutick.*

The Sixth,
- *Euthydemus*, or, the Litigious. *Anatreptick.*
- *Protagoras*, or, the Sophiſt. *Endeictick.*
- *Gorgias*, or, of Rhetorick. *Anatreptick.*
- *Menon*, or, of Virtue. *Piraſtick.*

TheSeventh,
- *Hippias* 1. or, of Honeſt. *Anatreptick.*
- *Hippias* 2. or, of Falſe. *Anatreptick.*
- *Io*, or, of Ilias. *Piraſtick.*
- *Menexenus*, or, the Funeral Oration. *Ethick.*

The Eighth,
- *Clitophon*, or, the Exhortation. *Moral.*
- *The Commonwealth*, or, of Juſt. *Politick.*
- *Timæus*, or, of Nature. *Phyſick.*
- *Critias*, or, the Atlantick. *Ethick.*

[q] Laert. 3. 56.

The

The Ninth, { *Minos*, or, of Law. *Politick.*
Laws, or, of Legiſlation. *Politick.*
Epinomis, or, the Nocturnal Convention; or, the Philoſophers. *Politick.*
Epiſtles thirteen, *Ethick*; in the Inſcriptions whereof he uſeth εὖ διαγεν. *Cleon.* χαίρειν. To *Ariſtodemus* one; to *Architas* two; to *Dionyſius* four; to *Hermias*, *Eraſtus*, and *Coriſcus* one; to *Leodamus* one; to *Dion* one; to *Dion*'s Friends two. Thus *Thraſyllus.*

Others, of whom is *Ariſtophanes* the Grammarian, reduce his Dialogues to Trilogies, placing in

The Firſt, { *The Common-wealth.*
Timæus.
Critias.

The Second, { *The Sophiſter.*
The Politick.
Cratylus.

The Third, { *Laws.*
Minos.
Epinomis.

The Fourth, { *Theætetus.*
Euthyphron.
Apology.

The Fifth, { *Crito.*
Phædo.
Epiſtles. The reſt ſingle, without Order.

Some, as we ſaid, begin with *Alcibiades Major*, others from *Theages*, others from *Euthyphron*, others from *Clitiphon*, others from *Timæus*, others from *Phædrus* (which they ſay was the firſt Dialogue he wrote, as the Subject itſelf ſeemeth to confirm, which favours of Youth; and therefore *Dicearchus* condemns it as too light. To which Cenſure [r] *Cicero* agreeth, as conceiving he aſcribed too great a Power to Love), others begin with *Theætetus*, many with his Apology.

He mentions not himſelf in all his Writings, except once in his *Phædo*, and another Time in his Apology for *Socrates*. At the Recital of his *Phædo*, all but *Ariſtotle* roſe, and went away. The Efficacy of that Dialogue which treats of the Immortality of the Soul, is evident from *Cleombrotus* of *Ambracia*, who, as ſoon as he had read it, was ſo diſaffected to Life, that he threw himſelf from a high Wall into the Sea; upon whom thus [s] *Callimachus*;

Cleombrotus *cries out*, *Farewell this Light*;
And headlong throws himſelf int' endleſs Night.
Not that he ought had done, *deſerving Death*;
But Plato *read*, *and weary grew of Breath.*

The Dialogues generally noted as ſpurious (not to ſay any thing of his *Epinomis*, tho' ſome aſcribe it to *Philippus* the *Opuntian*) are theſe,

Midon, or the Horſe-courſer,
Erixias, or *Eraſiſtratus*,
Alcyon.
Acephali, or the *Siſyphi.*
Axiochus.
Phæaces.
Demodochus.
Chelidon.
The ſeventh.
Epimenides.

Of theſe *Alcion* is aſcribed by *Phavorinus* to *Leon.*

His Stile, *Ariſtotle* ſaith, is betwixt Proſe and Verſe. He uſeth Variety of Names, that his Works may not eaſily be underſtood by the Unlearned. He conceiveth Wiſdom properly to be of Intellectual Things, Knowledge of real Beings converſant about God, and the Soul ſeparate from the Body. *Properly*, he calleth *Philoſophy Wiſdom*, being the Appetition of Divine *Knowledge*; but, *commonly*, he calleth all Skill Knowledge, as an Artificer, a wiſe Man. He likewiſe uſed the ſame Names in divers Significations; φαῦλον, which properly ſignifies Evil, he uſeth for of ſimple; as *Euripides* in his *Lycimnius* of *Hercules*,

φαῦλον ἄκομπον τὰ μέγιστ' ἄγαθον.

r Cicer. Tuſc. quæſt. 2. s Epigr.

The same Words *Plato* sometimes takes for *Honest*, sometimes for *Little*. He likewise useth divers Names to signify the same Thing. *Idea* he useth both for Species and Genus; Exemplar, both Principle and Cause. Sometimes he useth contrary Expressions to signify the same Thing. Sensible he calleth a Being and no Being; a Being, as having been produced; no Being, in respect of its continual Mutation. Idea neither moveable nor permanent, the same both one and many. The like he useth often in other Things.

[t] The Method of his Discourse is three-fold; first, to declare what that is which is taught; then for what Reason it is asserted, whether as a principal Cause, or as a Comparison; and whether to defend the Tenent, or oppugn the contrary. Thirdly, whether it be rightly said.

The Marks which he usually affixed to his Writings, are these.



Denotes *Platonick* Words and Figures.

διπλῆ, Doctrines and Opinions proper to *Plato*.

περιεσιγμένον, choice Expressions.

διπλῆ περιεσιγμενη, Corrections.

ἀβελῶ περειεσιγμένῳ, Things superfluous.

ἀνλισίγμα περειεσιγμενον, Double Signification or Use.

μεραύνιον, Philosophical Institution.

ἀσέρισκῳ, Agreement of Opinions.

ὄβελῳ, Improbation. Hitherto *Laertius*.

[u] There are two Epistles under *Plato*'s Name, besides those in his Works already mentioned, one in *Laertius* his Life of *Architas*.

Plato *to* Architas. ἐυπρέπειν.

THE Commentaries which came from you, we received with extraordinary Content, infinitely admiring the Writer, who appears to us a Person worthy of those ancient Predecessors; for those Men are said to be Myræans *of those* Trojans *which were banished in the Time of* Laomedon; *good Men, as Tradition speaks them. Those Commentaries of mine, concerning which you write, are not yet polished; however, as they are, I have sent them to you. In the keeping of them we agree both, so as I need not give you any Directions. Farewell.*

Another published by *Leo Allatius*, amongst the *Socratick* Epistles.

I Had not any of those Things to send to Syracuse, *which* Architas *desired to receive by you; as soon as possible I will send to you. Philosophy hath wrought in me, I know not whether good or bad, a Hatred of conversing with many Persons; justly, I think, since they err in all kind of Folly, as well in private as publick Affairs; but if unjustly, yet known I can hardly live and breathe otherwise. For this Reason I have fled out of the City, as out of a Den of Wild Beasts, living not far from the* Ephestiades, *and the Places thereabouts. I now see, that* Timon *hated not Men; he could not affect Beasts, therefore he lived alone by himself; perhaps, not without Danger. Take this as you please; my Resolution is to live far from the City, now and for ever hereafter, as long as God shall grant me Life.*

[w] In Poesy he writ,

[x] *Dithyrambs.*
An Epick Poem.
Four Tragedies, all which (as we said) he burnt.

[y] *The Atlantick Story*, of which thus *Plutarch*: Solon *began the Atlantick Story (which he had learn'd of the Priests of* Sais, *very proper for the* Athenians) *but gave it over by Reason of his old Age and the largeness of the Work.* Plato *took the same Argument, as a waste Piece of fertile Ground fallen to him by hereditary Right: He manured it, refined it, enclosed it with large Walls, Porches and Galleries, such as never any Fable or Poem had before; but because he undertook it late, he was prevented by Death. The more Things written delight us, the more their not being perfected is a Loss to us. For as the* Athenian *City left the Temple of* Jupiter, *so* Plato's *Wisdom, amongst many excellent Writings, left the Atlantick alone imperfect.*

Epigrams, of which these are extant in *Laertius*, *Athenæus*, *Aulus Gellius*, and the Anthology.

Upon one named *Aster*.

[z] *The Stars, my Star, thou viewest; Heaven I would be,*
That I with thousand Eyes might gaze on thee.

Upon his Death.

[a] *A* Phosphor *'mongst the Living, late wert thou,*
But shin'st among the Dead a Hesper *now.*

Epitaph on *Dion*, engrav'd on his Tomb at *Syracuse*.

t Laert. 3. 65. u Laert. 8. 81. w Laert. 3. 5. x Ælian. Var. Hist. 2. 30. y In vitâ Solon. z Laert. 3. 29. Anthol. 3. 6. 27. a Laert. ibid.

Old

[b] *Old* Hecuba *the* Trojan *Matron's Years*
Were interwoven by the Fates with Tears;
But thee with blooming Hopes my Dion *deck'd,*
Gods did a Trophy of their Power erect.
Thy honour'd Reliques in their Country rest,
Ah Dion! *whose Love rages in my Breast.*

On *Alexis.*

[c] *Fair is* Alexis, *I no sooner said,*
When every one his Eyes that Way convey'd:
My Soul (as when some Dog a Bone we show,
Who snatcheth it) lost we not Phædrus *so?*

On *Archæanassa.*

[d] *To* Archæ'nassa, *on whose furrow'd Brow*
Love sits in Triumph, I my Service vow;
If her declining Graces shine so bright,
What Flames felt you who saw her Noon of Light?

On *Agathon.*

[e] *My Soul, when I kiss'd* Agathon, *did start*
Up to my Lip, just ready to depart.

To *Xantippe.*

[f] *An Apple I (Love's Emblem) at thee throw,*
Thou in Exchange thy Virgin-zone bestow.
If thou refuse my Suit, yet read in this,
How short thy Years, how frail thy Beauty is.
I cast the Apple, loving those love thee,
[g] Xantippe *yield, for soon both old will be.*

[h] On the *Eretrians* vanquish'd by the *Persians.*

[i] *We in* Eubœa, *born* Eretrians *are*
Buried in Susa *from our Country far.*

Venus and the *Muses.*

[k] *Virgins (said* Venus *to the* Muses) *pay*
Homage to us, or Love shall wound your Hearts:
The Muses answer'd, take these Toys away,
Our Breasts are Proof against his childish Darts.

Fortune exchang'd.

[l] *One finding Gold, in Change, the Halter quits,*
Missing his Gold, t'other the Halter knits.

On *Sappho.*

[m] *He, who believes the Muses nine, mistakes,*
For Lesbian Sappho *ten their Number makes.*

Time.

[n] *Time all Things brings to pass, a Change creates*
In Names, in Forms, in Nations and in States.

Death.

[o] *That is a Ploughman's Grave, a Sailor's this;*
To Sea and Land alike Death common is.

On one ship-wreck'd.

[p] *The cruel Sea, which took my Life away,*
Forbore to strip me of my last Array:
From this a covetous Man did not refrain,
Acting a Crime so great for so small Gain;
But let him wear it to the Shades, and there
Before great Pluto *in my Cloaths appear.*

Another.

[q] *Safely (O Sailors) press the Land, and Wave*
Yet know, ye pass'd a ship wreck'd Person's Grave.

On the Statue of *Venus.*

[r] Paphian Cythera *swimming cross the Main,*
To Gnidos *came her Statue there to see;*
And from on high, surveying round the Plain
Where could Praxiteles *me spy? (saith she)*
He saw not what's forbidden mortal Eyes,
'Twas Mars's *Steel that* Venus *did incize.*

Another.

[s] *Not carv'd by Steel, or* Praxitele's *fam'd Hand:*
Thus naked before the Judges didst thou stand.

Love sleeping.

[t] *Within the Covert of a shady Grove*
We saw the little red-cheek'd God of Love.
He had not Bow nor Quiver, those among
The neighbouring Trees upon a Bough were hung:
Upon a Bank of tender Rose-buds laid
He (smiling) slept; Bees with their Noise invade
His Rest, and on his Lips their Honey made.

Pan piping.

[u] *Dwell awful Silence on the shady Hills,*
Among the bleating Flocks and purling Rills,
When Pan *the Reed doth to his Lip apply,*
Inspiring it with sacred Harmony,
Hydriads and Hamadryads at that Sound,
In a well order'd Measure beat the Ground.

b Laert. ibid. Anthol. 4. 33. 26. c Ibid. 3. 33. 44. d Laert. 3. 30. e Ibid. f Ibid. g Anthol. 7. h Herod. lib. 6. i Laert. 3. 30. k Laert. ibid. l Laert. ibid. Anthol. 84. 1. m Anth. 1. 67. 13. n Anth. 1. 90. o Anth. 3. 22. 3. p Ibid. 3. 22. 4. q Ibid. 3. 22. 7. r Ibid. 4. 12. 8. s Ibid. 4. 12. 9. t Ibid. 4. 12. 56. u Ib. 4. 12. 76.

On the Image of a Satyr in a Fountain, and *Love* sleeping.

[w] *A skilful Hand this Satyr made so near*
To Life, that only Breath is wanting here:
I am Attendant to the Nymphs; before
I fill'd out purple Wine, now Water pour;
Whoe'er thou art com'st nigh, tread softly, lest
You waken Love out of his pleasing rest.

Another.

[x] *On horned* Lyæus *I attend,*
And pour the Streams these Nayads lend,
Whose Noise Love's Slumber doth befriend.

Another.

[y] *This Satyr* Diodorus *did not make,*
But charm asleep; if prick'd he will awake.

On a Seal.

[z] *Five Oxen grazing in a flowry Mead,*
A Jasper Seal done to the Life doth hold,
The little Herd away long since had fled,
Wer't not inclos'd within a Pale of Gold.

w Anth. 4. 12. 92. x Ibid. 4. 12. 93. y Ibid. 4. 12. 98. z Ibid. 4. 18. 6.

THE DOCTRINE OF PLATO; Delivered by ALCINOUS.

CHAP. I.

Of Philosophy, and how a Philosopher must be qualified.

SUch a Summary as this may be given of the Doctrine of *Plato*. *Philosophy* is the Desire of Wisdom, or Solution of the Soul from the Body, and a Conversion to those Things, which are true and perceptible by Intellect. *Wisdom*, σοφία, is the Science of Things divine and human. A *Philosopher* is he who takes Denomination from Philosophy, as a Musician from Musick. He who is to be a Philosopher, must be thus qualified: First, He must have a natural Capacity of all such Learning as is able to fit and bring him to the Knowledge of that Essence which is perceptible by Intellect, not of that which is in continual Fluxion or Mutation. Then he must have a natural Affection to Truth, and an Aversion from receiving Falshood; and besides this, temperate in a manner by Nature; for those Parts which use to be transported with Passions, he must have reduced to Obedience by Nature. For whosoever hath once embraced those Disciplines which are conversant in Consideration of such Things as truly exist, and hath addicted all his Study thereunto, little valueth corporeal Pleasure. Moreover, a Philosopher must have a liberal Mind, for the Estimation of mean Things is contrary to a Man who intendeth to contemplate the Truth of Things. Likewise, he must naturally love Justice, for he must be studious of Truth, Temperance and Liberality. He must also have an acute Apprehension, and a good Memory, for these inform a Philosopher; those Gifts of Nature, if improved by Discipline and Education, make a Man perfect in Virtue, but neglected are the Cause of the worst

worſt Ills. Theſe *Plato* uſed to call by the ſame Names with the Virtues, *Temperance*, *Fortitude* and *Juſtice*.

CHAP. II.

That Contemplation is to be preferred before Action.

WHereas Life is twofold, *Contemplative* and *Active*, the chief Office of the Contemplative conſiſteth in the Knowledge of Truth, as of the Active, in the Practice of thoſe Things which are dictated by Reaſon. Hence the Contemplative Life is firſt, after which as neceſſary followeth the Active. That it is ſo, may eaſily be proved thus. Contemplation is an Office of the Intellect, in the underſtanding of Intelligibles. Action is an Operation of the rational Soul, performed by Mediation and Service of the Body. For the Soul, when it contemplateth the Divinity and the Notions thereof, is ſaid to be beſt affected. This Affectation is called φρόνησις, *Wiſdom*, which is nothing elſe but an Aſſimulation to the Deity. This therefore ought to be eſteemed the firſt and principal, as being moſt expetible and proper to Man; for there are no Impediments that can hinder it from being within our Power, and it is Cauſe of our propoſed End. But active Life, and the Practice thereof, chiefly making Uſe of the Mediation of the Body, are many Times obſtructed; whereof thoſe Things which the contemplative Life conſiders in order to the Reformation of the Manners of Men, a Philoſopher, as often as Neceſſity requireth, ſhall transfer to Action. Then ſhall a good Man apply himſelf to the Adminiſtration of civil Affairs, when he ſeeth them ill managed by others. He muſt look upon the Leading of an Army, Adminiſtration of Juſtice and Embaſſies, as Things neceſſary. The Inſtitution of Laws, ordering the Common-wealth, the Compreſſure of Seditions, Education of Youth in Diſcipline, are the chiefeſt, and, amongſt thoſe Things which relate to Action, of greateſt Conſequence. Hence it is manifeſt, that a Philoſopher muſt not only be perſeverant in Contemplation, but alſo cheriſh and increaſe it, ſometimes giving himſelf to Action as an Attendant upon Contemplation.

CHAP. III.

The three Parts of Philoſophy.

THE Study of a Philoſopher ſeemeth, according to *Plato*, to be converſant chiefly in three Things, in the *Contemplation* and Knowledge of Things, in the Practice of Virtue, and in *Diſputation*. The Science of Things that are, is called *Theoretick*; of thoſe which pertain to Action, *Practick*; the diſputative Part *Dialectick*.

Dialectick is divided into *Diviſion*, *Definition*, *Induction* and *Syllogiſm*; *Syllogiſm* into the *Apodeictick*, which concerneth neceſſary Ratiocination; and *Rhetorical*, which concerneth *Enthymeme*, called an imperfect Ratiocination; and laſtly into *Sophiſms*. This the Philoſopher muſt look upon, not as the chiefeſt but a neceſſary Part.

Of *Practick* Philoſophy, one Part is converſant about *Manners*, another orders *Families*, the laſt takes Care of a *Common-wealth*. The firſt called *Ethick*, the ſecond *Oeconomick*, the third *Politick*.

Of *Theoretick* Philoſophy, one Part enquires into Things immutable and divine, and the firſt Cauſes of Things; this is called *Theology*; another the Motion of the Stars, the Revolution and Reſtitution of Cœleſtial Bodies, and the Conſtitution of the World. This is called *Phyſick*. That whereby we enquire geometrically, and thoſe other Diſciplines which are called μαθήματα, is termed *Mathematick*.

Philoſophy being thus divided, we muſt firſt, according to *Plato*, ſpeak of the *Dialectick* Part, and in that, firſt of the *Judiciary*.

CHAP. IV.

DIALECTICK.

Of the Judiciary Part.

WHereas there is ſomething that judgeth, ſomething which is judged, it is neceſſary alſo that there be ſomething which is made of both theſe, properly called *Judgment*. This Judgment may not unfitly be termed Judiciary, but more commonly that which judgeth. This is twofold; one, *from which*, another *by which* Judgment is made. That is Intellect; this the natural Organ accommodated for Judgment; primarily of *true* Things; ſecondarily of *falſe*; neither is it any Thing but natural Reaſon. To explain this more fully, of Things which are, a Philoſopher who judgeth the Things themſelves, may be called a *Judge*; Reaſon likewiſe is a *Judge*, by which Truth is judged, which even now we called an Organ.

Reaſon is twofold, one *incomprehenſible* and true; the other is *never deceived* in the Knowledge of thoſe Things which are. The firſt is in the Power of God, not of Man; the ſecond in that of Man alſo. This likewiſe is twofold, the firſt *Science*, and Scientifick Reaſon; the ſecond *Opinion*. The firſt hath *Certitude* and *Stability*, as being converſant in Things certain and ſtable. The ſecond *Similitude of Truth and Opinion*, as being converſant in Things ſubject to Mutation. Of Science in Intelligibles, and Opinion in Senſibles, the Principles are *Intellection* and *Senſe*.

Senſe is a Paſſion of the Soul by the Mediation of the Body, firſt, declaring a paſſive Faculty; when through the Organs of Senſe, the Species of Things are impreſſed in the Soul, ſo as they are not defaced by Time, but remain firm and laſting, the Conſervation thereof is called *Memory*.

Opinion is the Conjunction of Memory and Senſe;

Senſe; for, when ſome Object occurreth, which can firſt move the Senſe, thereby Senſe is effected in us, and by Senſe, the Memory. Then again is the ſame Thing objected to our Senſe, we join the precedent with the conſequent Senſe, and now ſay within ourſelves, *Socrates*, a Horſe, Fire, and the like: This is termed Opinion, when we join the precedent Memory with the late Senſe; when theſe agree within themſelves, it is a *true Opinion*, if they diſagree, a *falſe*; for, if a Man, having the Species of *Socrates* in his Memory, meet with *Plato*, and think, by Reaſon of ſome Likeneſs betwixt them, he hath met *Socrates* again, and afterwards join the Senſe of *Plato*, which he took, as it were, from *Socrates*, with the Memory which he preſerved of *Socrates*, there will ariſe a falſe Opinion.

That wherein Senſe and Memory are formed, *Plato* compareth to *a Tablet of Wax*, but when the Soul by Cogitation reforming theſe Things, which are conceived in Opinion by Memory and Senſe, looketh upon theſe as Things from which the other are derived; *Plato* ſometimes calleth this a *Picture and Phantaſy*. *Cogitation*, he calleth *the Soul's Diſcourſe within herſelf*. *Speech*, that which floweth from the Cogitation through the Mouth by Voice. *Intellection* is an Operation of the Intellect, contemplating firſt Intelligibles. It is two-fold, one of the Soul, beholding Intelligibles before ſhe cometh into the Body; the other of the ſame, after ſhe is immers'd in the Body: The firſt is properly called *Intellection*; the other, whilſt ſhe is in the Body, is termed *Natural Knowledge*, which is nothing but an Intellection of the Soul confined to the Body. When we ſay, Intellection is the Principle of Science, we mean not this latter, but the other, which is competible to the Soul in her ſeparate State, and as we ſaid, is then called Intellection, now natural Knowledge. The ſame *Plato* termeth *ſimple Knowledge the Wing of the Soul*; ſometimes *Reminiſcence*.

Of theſe ſimple Sciences conſiſteth *Reaſon*; which is born with us, the efficient of natural Science; and as Reaſon is two-fold, Scientifick, and Opinionative, ſo Intellection and Senſe. It is likewiſe neceſſary that they have their Objects, which are *Intelligibles* and *Senſibles*: And for as much as of *Intelligibles*, ſome are *Primary*, as Ideas, others *ſecundary*, as the Species that are in Matter, and cannot be ſeparated from it. *Intellection* likewiſe muſt be two-fold, one *of Primaries*, the other of *Secundaries*. Again, for as much as in *Senſibles*, ſome are *primary*, as Qualities, Colour, Whiteneſs, others by *Accident*, as white coloured, and that which is concrete, as Fire: In the ſame Manner is *Senſe*, firſt of *Primaries*, ſecond of *Secondaries*. Intellection judgeth primary Intelligibles, not without ſcientifick Knowledge, by a certain Comprehenſion without Diſcourſe. Secondaries the ſame ſcientifick Reaſon judgeth, but not without Intellection. Senſibles, as well primary as ſecondary Senſe, judgeth, but not without opinionative Reaſon. That which is concrete, the ſame Reaſon judgeth, but not without Senſe. And ſince the Intelligible World is the primary Intelligible, the ſenſible ſomething concrete, the firſt Intellection judgeth with Reaſon; that is, not without Reaſon; the other opinionative Reaſon not without Senſe, whereas there is both Contemplation and Action; right Reaſon diſcerneth not in the ſame Manner thoſe which are ſubject to Contemplation, and thoſe which are ſubject to Action: In Contemplation, it conſidereth what is true, what falſe; in Things that belong to Action, what is proper, what improper, what that is which is done. For having an innate Knowledge of that which is good and honeſt, by uſing Reaſon, and applying it to thoſe natural Notions, as to certain Rules, we judge whether every Thing be good or bad.

CHAP. V.

The Elements and Office of Dialectick.

OF Dialectick, the firſt and chiefeſt Element, according to *Plato*, is, firſt to conſider the *Eſſence* of every Thing; next the *Accidents* thereof. *What a Thing is*, it conſiders, either from its Superiors, by *Diviſion* and *Definition*, or contrarywiſe by *Analyſis*. *Accidents* which adhere to Subſtances, are conſidered, either from thoſe Things which are contained by *Induction*, or from thoſe which do contain by *Syllogiſm*.

Hence the Parts of *Dialectick* are theſe, *Diviſion*, *Definition*, *Analyſis*, *Induction*, *Syllogiſm*.

Of *Diviſions*, one is a Diſtribution of the Genus into Species, and of the whole into Parts; as when we divide the Soul into the rational Part and the irrational; and the latter, into the concupiſcible and the iraſcible. Another is of a Word into divers Significations, when the ſame may be taken ſeveral Ways. A third of Accidents, according to their Subjects; as when we ſay of Good, ſome belong to the Soul, ſome to the Body, ſome are external. The fourth of Subjects, according to their Accidents; as of Men, ſome are good, ſome ill, ſome indifferent. Diviſion of the Genus into its Species, is firſt to be uſed, when we examine the Eſſence of a Thing, this cannot be done but by Definitions.

Definition is made by Diviſion in this Manner, we muſt take the Genus of the Thing to be defined, as that of Man, living Creature; that we muſt divide by the next Differences, deſcending to its Species, as rational and irrational, mortal and immortal. Thus, by adding the firſt Difference to the Genus, is made the Definition of Man.

Of *Analyſis* there are three Kinds, one by which we aſcend from Senſibles to primary Intelligibles; another, whereby we aſcend by Demonſtrates and Subdemonſtrates, to indemonſtrable immediate Propoſitions.

positions. The last, which from Supposition proceedeth to those Principles which are taken without Supposition.

The first Kind is thus; as if from that Beauty which is in the Body, we should proceed to that of the Mind, from that to another conversant in the Offices of Life, thence to that of Laws, and so at last to the vast Ocean of Beauty, that by these Steps, as it were, we may arrive at the Sight of the supreme Beauty.

The second Kind of *Analysis* is thus; we must suppose that which we seek, and consider those which are precedent, demonstrating them by Progression, from Inferiors to Superiors, until we arrive at that which is first and generally granted. From which, beginning anew, we return synthetically to that which was sought. As for Example, I enquire whether the Soul be immortal, and supposing it to be so, I enquire whether it be always moved. This being demonstrated, I again enquire, whether that which is always moved, is moved by itself, which being again demonstrated, we examine, whether that which is moved by itself, be the Principle of Motion. Lastly, whether a Principle is ingenerate; this, as most certain, is admitted by all. That which is ingenerate, is also incorruptible; whence, as from a Thing most certain, we collect this Demonstration. If a Principle be ingenerate and incorruptible, that which is moved by itself, is the Principle of Motion; but the Soul is moved by itself, therefore the Soul is incorruptible, ingenerate and immortal.

The third Kind of *Analysis* upon Supposition, is this; he who enquireth after a Thing, first supposeth that Thing, then observes what will follow upon that Supposition. If a Reason for the Supposition be required, assuming another Supposition, he enquireth, whether that which was first supposed, follow again upon another Supposition: This he always observeth, until he come at last to that Principle, which is not taken upon Supposition.

Induction is every Method by Reason, which proceedeth either from like to like, or from Singulars to Universals: It is of great Efficacy to excite natural Notions.

CHAP. VI.

Of Propositions and Argumentations.

OF that Speech which we call *Proposition*, there are two Kinds; *Affirmation* and *Negation*; *Affirmation*, as *Socrates* walketh; *Negation*, as *Socrates* walketh not.

Of affirmative and negative Propositions, some are *universal*, others *particular*; a *particular Affirmative* is thus, Some Pleasure is good; a *particular Negative* is, Some Pleasure is not good; an *universal Affirmative*, All dishoneſt Things are ill; an *universal Negative*, No dishoneſt Thing is good.

Of Propositions, some are *Categorical*, some *Hypothetical*; the *Categorical* are simple, as every just Thing is good; *Hypothetical* import Consequence or Repugnance.

Syllogisms are used by *Plato*, either to *confute* or *demonstrate*; to confute what is false by Interrogation, to demonstrate what is true by Declaration. *Syllogism* is a Speech, wherein some Things being laid down, another Thing besides those which are laid down, is necessarily inferred from them.

Of *Syllogisms*, some are *Categorical*, some *Hypothetical*, some *mix'd*: *Categorical* are those whose Sumptions and Conclusions are simple Propositions. *Hypothetical* are those which consist of *Hypothetical* Propositions; *Mix'd*, which conclude both.

Plato useth *demonstrative* Arguments in those Dialogues, wherein he explaineth his own Doctrine; *probable*, against Sophists and young Men; *litigious* against those who are properly called *Eristick*, as *Euthydemus* and *Hippias*.

Of *Categorical Syllogisms* there are three *Figures*; the first is, that wherein the common Extreme is first the Predicate, then the Subject. The second, when the common Extreme is predicate in both; the third wherein the common Extreme is subject in both. *Extremes* are the Parts of a Proposition, as in this, *a Man is a living Creature*, *Man* and *living Creatures* are the Extremes. *Plato* often argueth in the first, second, and third Figures; in the first, as in *Alcibiades*;

Just Things are honest,
Honest Things are good,
Therefore just Things are good.

In the *second*, as *in Parmenides* as,

That which hath no Parts is neither streight nor crooked,
But whatsoever hath Figure is either streight or crooked,
Therefore, whatsoever hath not Parts, hath not Figure.

In the *third* thus, in the same Book,

Whatsoever hath Figure is qualitive,
Whatsoever hath Figure is finite,
Therefore, whatsoever is qualitative is finite.

Likewise by *Hypothetical Syllogism*, *Plato* often disputeth, chiefly in *Parmenide* thus:

If one hath not Parts, it hath neither Beginning, End nor Middle.
But if it have neither Beginning, End, nor Middle, it hath no Bound, and if no Bound, no Figure,
Therefore, if one hath no Parts, it hath no Figure.

In

In the *second* Hypothetical Figure, ordinarily called the *third*, wherein the common Extreme is subject in both, he argueth thus:

If one hath not Parts, it is neither streight nor crooked,
If it hath a Figure, it is either streight or crooked,
Therefore, if it hath no Parts, it hath no Figure.

In the *third* Figure, by some called the second, wherein the common Extreme twice precedes the other two, he thus argues, in *Phædone*,

If having the Knowledge of Equality we forget it not, we know, but if we forget it, we have Recourse to Reminiscence, &c.

Mix'd Syllogisms, which conclude by Consequence, he useth thus;

If one is whole and finite, that is, having Beginning, Middle and End, it hath Figure also;
But the Antecedent is true,
Therefore the Consequent.

Of those also which overthrow by Consequence, the Differences may be gathered out of *Plato*.

Thus, when a Man hath diligently understood the Faculties of the Mind, the various Differences of Men, the several Kinds of Reasoning which may be accommodated to this or to that, and to what Persons such and such Reasons are to be used, he, meeting with an Opportunity suiting with his Purpose, will become a perfect Orator.

The Reasons of *Sophisms* and captious Arguments are, if we observe narrowly, expressed by *Plato* in *Euthydemo*; for there is declared which are in Words, which in Things, and how they are to be solved.

The ten *Prædicaments* are touched by *Plato* in *Parmenide*, and in his other Dialogues; the Place of Etymologies is fully set down in *Cratylo*. To conclude, he was singularly admirable for Division and Definition, wherein the greatest Force of Dialectick consisteth.

The Sum of that which he saith in *Cratylo*, is this. He enquireth whether *Names* are by the Power and Reason of *Nature*, or by *Imposition*. He concludeth, that the Rectitude of Names is by a certain Imposition, not temerarious, or casual, but seemingly to follow the Nature of the Things themselves; for Rectitude of Names is nothing but an Imposition consonant to the Nature of the Thing. Hence every Imposition of Names is not sufficient for Rectitude; neither the Nature nor first Sound of the Voice, but that which is composed of both; so as every Name is conveniently and properly applied to the Thing. For any Name applied to any Thing will not signify rightly; as if we should impose the Name of Horse upon Man. To speak is a kind of Action: Not he that speaketh any way speaketh rightly, but he who speaketh so as the Nature of the Thing requireth. And forasmuch as Expression of Names is a Part of Speaking, as Noun is a Part of Speech, to name rightly, or not rightly, cannot be done by any Imposition of Names, but by a natural Affinity of the Name with the Thing itself. So that he is a right Imposer of Names who can express the Nature of the Things in their Names; for a Name is an Instrument of the Thing; not every inconsiderate Name, but that which agreeth with its Nature. By this Benefit we communicate Things to one another; whence it followeth, that it is nothing else but an Instrument accommodated to the teaching and discerning of a Thing, as a Weaver's Shuttle to his Web. It belongeth therefore to a Dialectic to use Names aright; for, as a Weaver useth a Shuttle rightly, knowing the proper Use thereof, after it hath been made by the Carpenter; so the Dialectick rightly useth that Name which another hath made. And as to make a Helm, is the Office of a Ship-wright, but to use it rightly, of a Pilot; so he who frameth Names, shall impose them rightly, if he do it as if a Dialectick were present, who understandeth the Nature of those Things which are signified by the Names. Thus much for Dialectick.

CHAP. VII.

Of Theoretick Philosophy.

WE come next to *Theoretick* Philosophy, whereof one Part is *Theologick*, another *Physick*, a third *Metaphysick*. The End of *Theology* is the Knowledge of primary Causes. Of *Physick*, to understand the Nature of the Universe, what kind of Creature Man is, what Place he holdeth in the World, whether there be a Divine Providence over all Things, to which there are other Gods subordinate; how Men are in respect of them. The End of *Mathematicks* is, to know the Nature of a Superficies and a Solid; and to consider the Motion and Revolution of Cœlestial Bodies; the Contemplation whereof must first be proposed in brief. Thus *Plato* used to confirm the Acuteness of the Mind; for it sharpneth the Understanding, and rendereth it more ready towards the Contemplation of Divine Things. That which considereth *Numbers*, being likewise a Part of Mathematicks, conferreth not a little to the understanding of Things that are; it frees us from the Error and Ignorance which attend sensible Things, and conduceth to the right Knowledge of the Essence of Things. It likewise renders a Man expert in Military Affairs, especially towards the ordering of an Army by the Science of *Tactick*. *Geometry* also conferreth much towards the understanding of Good itself, if a Man pursue it not only for mechanical Dimension, but that he may, by the

Help thereof, aſcend to Things which are not; buſying himſelf about thoſe which are in continual Generation and Motion. *Stereometry*, likewiſe, is exceeding uſeful; for, after the ſecond Acretion, followeth this Contemplation, which holdeth the third Room. *Aſtronomy* alſo is uſeful, as a fourth Diſcipline, whereby we conſider the Motions of the Heavens and the Stars, and the Author of Night and Day, Months and Years. Thus, by a familiar kind of Way, finding out him who made all theſe; and by theſe Diſciplines, as from certain Rudiments or Elements, proceeding to Things more ſublime. Likewiſe *Muſick* is to be learnt, which relateth to hearing; for, as the Eyes are created for Aſtronomy, ſo are the Ears for Harmony. And as when we apply ourſelves to Aſtronomy, we are led from viſible Things, to the divine inviſible Eſſence; ſo when we receive the Harmony of Voice in at our Ears, from audible Things, we aſcend by Degrees to thoſe which are perceived by Intellect. Unleſs we purſue Mathematical Diſciplines to this End, the Contemplation thereof will be imperfect, unprofitable, and of no Value. We muſt therefore preſently proceed from thoſe Things which are perceived by the Eyes and Ears, to thoſe which Reaſon only diſcerneth; for Mathematick is only a Preface to divine Things. They who addict themſelves to Arithmetick and Geometry, deſire to arrive at the Knowledge of that which is; which Knowledge they obtain no otherwiſe than as by a Dream, but really they cannot attain it, becauſe they know not the Principles themſelves, nor thoſe Things which are compounded of the Principles. Nevertheleſs, they conduce to thoſe Things which we mentioned; wherefore *Plato* will not have ſuch Diſciplines to be called Sciences. Dialectick Method proceeds in ſuch Manner, that by Geometrical Hypotheſes, it aſcendeth to firſt Principles, which are not taken upon Hypotheſis. For this Reaſon he calleth Dialect a Science; but neither Mathematick, nor Opinion, becauſe it is more perſpicuous than ſenſible Things; nor a Science, becauſe 'tis more obſcure than firſt Intelligibles. But, the Opinion of Bodies, the Science of Primaries, the Contemplation of Mathematicks.

He likewiſe aſſerteth *Faith* and *Imagination*. *Faith*, of Things ſubject to *Senſe*; *Imagination* of Images and Species.

Becauſe Dialectick is more efficacious than Mathematick, as being converſant about Divine Eternal Things, therefore it is put before all Mathematicks, as a Wall and Fortification of the reſt.

CHAP. VIII.

Of Firſt Matter.

WE muſt next give a brief Account of *Principles*, and thoſe Things which belong to *Theology*, beginning at the firſt, and from thence deſcending to the Creation of the World, and Contemplation thereof, whereby, at laſt, we come to the Creation and Nature of Man.

To begin with *Matter*; this he calleth the *Receptacle*, *Nurſe*, *Mother*, *Place*, and *Subject of all Images*; affirming that *it is touched without Senſe, and comprehended by an adulterate Kind of Reaſon*. The Property thereof is to undergo the Generation of all Things, and to cheriſh them like a Nurſe, and to admit all Forms; being of her own Nature expert of all Form, Quality, and Species. Theſe Things are imprinted and form'd in her as in a Table, and ſhe admitteth their Figures, not having of herſelf any Figure or Quality. For, ſhe could not be fit to receive the Impreſſions of ſeveral Forms, unleſs ſhe were wholly void of all Quality, and of thoſe Forms which ſhe is about to receive. They who make ſweet Unguents of Oil, make Choice of that Oil which hath the leaſt Scent; they who would imprint any Figures in Wax, firſt ſmooth and poliſh the Matter, defacing all former Figures. It is requiſite that Matter, capable of all Things, if it muſt receive all Forms, muſt not have the Nature of any one of them, but muſt be ſubjected to all Forms, without any Quality or Figure; and being ſuch, it is neither a Body, nor incorporeal, but a Body potentially; as Braſs is potentially a Statue, becauſe then it becomes a Statue, when it puts on the Form thereof.

CHAP. IX.

Of Ideas.

WHereas Matter is a Principle, *Plato* likewiſe introduceth other Principles beſide Matter. One as an *Exemplar*, Ideas; another *Paternal*, God, the Father and Author of all Things. *Idea*, as to God, is the *Notion* of God, as to us, the *primary Intelligible*; as to Matter, a *Manner*; as to this ſenſible World, an *Exemplar*; as to itſelf, *Eſſence*. For whatſoever is made with Underſtanding, muſt neceſſarily be referred to ſomething, as if ſomething be made from another; as my Picture from me, the Exemplar thereof muſt be preſuppoſed; and if there be nothing Eternal, every Artiſt conceiveth it firſt within himſelf, then transferreth the Forms thereon into Matter.

They define *Idea* an Eternal Exemplar of Things which are according to Nature; for the greater Part of Platoniſts will not allow an *Idea* to be of Things that are made by Art, as of a Shield, or Lute; nor of Things that are preternatural, as of a Fever, or unnatural Choler; nor of Singulars, as of *Socrates* or *Plato*; nor of vile abject Things, as of Filth, or Straws; nor of Relatives, as of greater and longer: For *Idea's* are the Eternal Notions of God, perfect in themſelves.

That there are *Ideas*, they prove thus. Whether God be Intellect or ſomething Intelligent, he muſt

have his Intelligibles, and those Eternal and Immoveable; if so, there are *Idea's*. For if Matter itself be in itself void of Measure, it is necessary that it receive Measure from some Superior, that is wholly remote from Matter: But the Antecedent is true, therefore the Consequent; and if so, there are *Idea's*, certain Measures void of Matter. Again, if the World were not made by Chance, it must not only be made of something, but by something; and not only so, but after the Likeness of something; but, that after whose Likeness it was made, what is it but an *Idea*? Whence it followeth, that there are *Idea's*. Again, if Intellect differ from true Opinion, that which is Intelligible differeth from that which is Opinionable; and if so, there are Intelligibles distinct from Opinionables, wherefore there are first Intelligibles, as well as first Sensibles, whence we conclude there are *Idea's*.

CHAP. X.
Of God.

WE come next to speak of the third Principle, which *Plato*, though he think it almost ineffable, conceiveth may be expressed in this Manner. If there are Intelligibles, and those neither Sensibles, nor coherent with Sensibles, but adherent to first Intelligibles, then are there first simple Intelligibles, as there are first Sensibles; the Antecedent is true, therefore the Consequent. But Men subject to Perturbation of Sense, when they would contemplate something intelligible, presently fall upon the Thought of something sensible, whereby at the same Time they imagine Magnitude, or Figure, or Colour, and therefore cannot understand this sincerely. But the Gods being void of corporeal Mixion, understand purely and sincerely. Now because the Intellect is better than the Soul, and that Intellect which is always in Act, and at once understandeth all Things, is better than that Intellect which is in Power; and of these, that is most excellent which is the Cause of the other, and superior to all. This can be nothing else but God, whom we call the First, as being the Cause that the Intellect of the World always acteth. He, being himself immoveable, acteth upon the Intellect of the World, as the Sun upon the Eye, when it turneth towards him. And as that which is desired moveth the Appetite, itself remaining immoveable; so doth this Intellect move the Intellect of all Heaven. Now this first Intellect being most fair, must have the most fair Intelligible; but nothing is fairer than itself, therefore it always understandeth itself, and its own Notions, which Act is called Operation.

Moreover, *God is first, eternal, ineffable, perfect in himself*; that is, needing none; *and ever perfect*; that is, absolute in all Times, and *every way perfect*; that is, absolute in every Part, *Divinity, Essence, Truth, Harmony, Good*. Neither do we so name these, to distinguish one from the other, but rather by them all to understand one. He is said to be *Good*, because he bestoweth his Benefits upon all according to their several Capacities, and so is the Cause of all good *Fair*, because he is in his Essence both more and equal. *Truth*, because he is the Principle of all Truth, as the Son of all Light; and *Father*, as being Cause of all Things, and adorning the Mind of Heaven, and Soul of the World, after his own Exemplar and Notions. For according to his own Will he filled all Things with himself, exciting the Soul of the World, and converting it to himself; for he is Cause of that Intellect, which being adorned by the Father, adorneth also the Nature of all this World. He is likewise *ineffable*, and, as we said, can only be perceived by the Mind; for he is neither Genus nor Species, nor Difference; neither can any Accident be applied to him. He is *not Ill*, for that it were Impiety to affirm; *nor Good*, for so he should be termed if he were meanly or highly participant of Goodness. Nor *Difference*, for that cannot be made according to the Notion of him; nor qualited, for he is not made that which he is by Quality, nor perfected thereby; nor *void of Quality*, for he is not deprived of any Quality that appertaineth to him; *nor Part* of any Thing, *nor as a whole* constituted of Parts; *nor as the same, or divers*, for nothing can happen to him whereby he may be distinguished from others; neither doth he *move*, or is he *moved*.

Hence the first Apprehension of him is by *Abstraction* from these Things, as we understand a Point by Abstraction from Sensibles; considering first a Superficies, then a Line, then a Point. The second is by *Analogy* in this Manner. As the Sun is to Sight and visible Things, himself not being Sight, yet affording the one to see, the other to be seen; so is the first Intellect to that Intellect which is in our Soul, and to those Things which it understandeth. For itself is not the Intellect, yet it perfecteth in these the Act of Intellection, to those it affordeth that they are understood, enlightning that Truth which is in them. The third Way to understand him is thus: When a Man beholdeth that Beauty which is in Bodies, he proceedeth to that which is in the Soul, then to that which is in Offices and Laws: Lastly, to the vast Ocean of Beauty; after which, he considereth that which is good itself, amiable itself, expetible itself, which shineth like a Light, and meeteth the Soul, that which ascends unto it by these Degrees. By this he comprehendeth God himself through Reason of that Excellence, which consisteth in Adoration of him. He considereth God void of Parts; for nothing was before him a Part, and that of which something consisteth is precedent to that whereof it is Part; for a Superficies is before a Body, and a Line before a Superficies. Moreover, God not having many Parts, can neither be locally moved,

nor

nor altered by Qualities; for if he be altered, it must be done by himself, or some other; if by some other, that other must be of greater Power than he; if by himself, it must be either to better or to worse, both which are absurd.

From all these it followeth, that *God is incorporeal*, which may likewise be proved thus. If God were a Body, he should consist of Matter and Form, for every Body consisteth of Matter, and its Form joins to that Matter, which is made like unto the *Idea*'s, and in an ineffable Manner participant of them; but that that should consist of Matter and Form is absurd; for then he could not be either simple or a Principle; therefore he is incorporeal. Again, if he be a Body, he consisteth of Matter, and consequently is either Fire or Air, or Earth or Water, or something made out of these; but none of these is Principle by itself; besides, he must then be later than Matter, as consisting of it, which being absurd, it is necessary that God be incorporeal. Moreover, if he were a Body, it would follow, that he must be generable, corruptible, mutable, which to affirm of God were intolerable.

CHAP. XI.

Of Qualities.

THAT *Qualities* are *incorporeal*, may be proved thus. Every Body is a Subject; Quality is not a Subject, but an Accident, therefore Quality is not a Body. Again, no Body is in a Subject; every Quality is in a Subject, therefore Quality is not a Body. Again, Quality is contrary to Quality, but no Body as no Body is contrary to a Body; therefore Qualities are not Bodies. To omit, that is most agreeable to Reason, that as Matter is void of Quality, so Quality should be void of Matter; and if Quality be void of Matter, it must likewise be void of Corporeity: For, if Qualities were Bodies, two or three Bodies might be together in the same Place, which is absurd.

Qualities being incorporeal, the Maker of them must be incorporeal also. Moreover, there can be no Efficients, but in Corporeals; for Bodies naturally suffer, and are in Mutation, not continuing always in Manner, nor persevering in the same State. For whensoever they seem to effect any Thing, we shall find that they suffer it long before. Whence as there is something which wholly suffereth, so must there be something which wholly acteth; but such only is incorporeal.

Thus much concerning Principles, as far as they relate to Theology; we proceed next to Physical Contemplations.

CHAP. XII.

Of the Causes, Generation, Elements, and Order of the World.

FOrasmuch as of sensible and singular Things there must of Necessity be some Exemplars, *viz.* Idea's, of which are Sciences and Definitions (for besides all particular Men, we conceive a Man in our Mind, and besides all particular Horses a Horse, and likewise besides all living Creatures, a living Creature immortal and unbegotten. As from one Seal are made many Prints, and of one Man there may be many Pictures, of all which, the *Idea* itself is Cause that there are such as itself is) 'tis necessary that this Universe, the fairest Fabrick of God's making, be so made by God, that in the making thereof he looked upon an *Idea* as its Exemplar, whilst by a wonderful Providence and most excellent Design, God applied himself to the building of this Frame, because he was good.

God therefore made it of all Matter, which being before the Generation of Heaven, disorderly scattered; he from a deformed Confusion reduced to beautiful Order, and adorned every Way the Parts thereof with fit Numbers and Figures, until at last he so distinguished them, as now they are; Fire and Earth to Air and Water, of which there were then only the Footsteps, and a certain Aptitude to admit the Power of Elements, and so without any Reason or Order, they justled Matter, and were justled again by Matter.

Thus God framed the World of four entire Elements, of whole Fire and Earth, Water, and Air; omitting no Power or Part of any of them. For, he saith, it must be corporeal and generated, and subject to Touch and Sight; but without Fire and Earth nothing can be touched or seen; wherefore justly he framed it of *Fire and Earth*, and because it was requisite there should be some Chain to unite these, there is a divine Chain, which according to the Proportion of Reason, maketh one of itself, and those Things which are united to it, and the World could not be plain (for then one Medium would have served) but Sphœrical, therefore there was need of two Mediums to the Constitution thereof. Betwixt Fire and Earth, by the Prescription of this Reason, is interposed *Air* and *Water*, that as Fire is to Air, so is Air to Water, and as Air is to Water, so is Water to Earth: And again, as Earth is to Water, so is Water to Air; and as Water is to Air, so is Air to Fire.

There being nothing remaining beyond the World, God made the World *one*, conformable to this *Idea*, which is one. He likewise made it such, as that is *uncapable of Sickness or Age*. For, besides that nothing can befal it whereby it may be corrupted, it is so sufficient to itself, that it hath not need of any exterior Thing. He bestowed upon it a *Spherical* Figure, as being the fairest, the most capacious and aptest to Motion, and because it needeth not Hearing or Sight, or the rest of the Senses, he gave it not any Organs of Senses. He denied all kinds of Motion to be competible to it, except the circular, which is proper to the Mind and to Wisdom.

CHAP. XIII.

Of the Convenience of Figures, with the Elements and World.

THE World thus conſiſteth of two Parts, a Soul and a Body; this viſible and corruptible, that neither ſubject to Sight nor Touch. The Power and Conſtitution of each is different, the Body conſiſteth of Fire, Earth, Water, and Air; which four, the Maker of the Univerſe (there being until then nothing more confuſed than the Elements) formed in a *Pyramid*, a *Cube*, an *Octaedron*, and an *Icoſaedron*; but chiefly in a *Dodecaedron*. Matter, as far as it put on the Figure of a *Pyramid*, became *Fire*, and mounted upward: For, that Figure is the moſt apt to cut and to divide, as conſiſting of feweſt Triangles; and therefore is the rareſt of all Figures. As far as it is an *Octaedron*, it took the Quality of *Air*; where it took that of an *Icoſaedron*, it became Water; the Figure of a *Cube Earth*, as being the moſt ſolid and ſtable of all the Elements; the Figure of a *Dodecaedron*, he uſed in the Fabrick of the *Univerſe*; *Superficies* come nigher the Nature of Principles than all theſe, for they are before Solids. Of its Nature, the two Parents (as it were) are two *Triangles* moſt fair and rectangular; one a *Scalenum*, the other an *Iſoſceles*; a *Scalenum* is a Triangle having one Right-angle, the other of two Thirds, the laſt of one Third. A *Scalenum* therefore is the Element of a *Pyramid*, and an *Octaedron*, and an *Icoſaedron*. A *Pyramid* conſiſteth of four Triangles, having all Sides equal to one another, each whereof is divided, as we ſaid, into ſix ſcalenous Triangles. The *Octaedrons* conſiſt of eight like Sides, whereof each is divided into ſix *Scalenums*. The *Icoſaeders*, of twenty in the ſame Manner; but the Element of a *Cube* is an *Iſoſceles Triangle*, for four ſuch Triangles concurring make a Square, and ſix Squares a *Cube*. God made Uſe of a *Dodecaedron* in the Conſtruction of the Univerſe, whence there are twelve Figures of living Creature in the *Zodiack*, whereof each is divided into thirty Parts. Likewiſe in a *Dodecaedron*, which conſiſteth of twelve *Pentagons*, if each be divided into five Triangles, there are in every one ſix Triangles, ſo that in the whole *Dodecaedron*, there will be 360 Triangles, as many as there are Degrees in the *Zodiack*.

When Matter was put into thoſe Figures by God, firſt it was moved rudely without Order, until at laſt he reduced it to Order, each being conjoined to one another, and compoſed in due Proportion. Neither are theſe diſtinct in Place, but are in perpetual Motion, which they give likewiſe into Matter. For being ſtraitened by the Compaſs of the World, and agitated by mutual Juſtlings, they are driven, the Rare always into the Region of the Solid, whence nothing is left vacuous, nothing void of Body. The Inequality which remaineth amongſt them cauſeth Convulſion, for Matter is agitated amongſt them, and they reciprocally by Matter.

CHAP. XIV.

Of the Soul of the World, the Spheres and Stars.

FRom Bodies he alloweth that we collect the Powers of the Soul; for ſeeing that we diſcern all Things by the Soul, he juſtly placed the Principles of all Things therein, that whatſoever ſhould occur, we might contemplate it by that which is of Kin and Neighbour unto it, and attribute an Eſſence thereunto conſonant to the Functions. Then therefore he called one Subſtance intelligible and indiviſible; he placed another diviſible amongſt Bodies, to ſignify that the Knowledge as well of the one as of the other may be had by Intellect. And knowing that in Things intelligible and ſenſible, there is Identity and Diverſity, he fitly compoſed the Soul out of all theſe. For, either the like is known by the like, as the *Pythagoreans* hold, or as *Heraclitus the Naturaliſt*, unlike always by unlike.

That he would that the World ſhould be *generate*, we muſt not ſo underſtand as if there ſhall be any Time wherein the World is not, but in as much as it always periſheth in Generation, and declareth, that there is ſome more excellent and principal Cauſe of its Eſſence.

The Soul of the World which was from all Eternity, was not made by God, but only adorned by him, in which reſpect he is ſometimes ſaid to have made it, for that he exciteth it, and converteth the Mind thereof, as out of a profound Sleep, unto himſelf, that beholding his Intelligibles, and affecting his Notions, it ſhould from thence receive Species and Form; whence it is manifeſt, that the World was endued by God, both with a Soul and Mind. For intending it to be the beſt, he muſt have made it animate and intelligent, ſince an animate Thing is more excellent than an inanimate, and an intelligent than an unintelligent; perhaps the Mind alſo could not ſubſiſt without a Soul.

This Soul, being diffuſed from the Centre of the World to the Extremes, *comprehendeth* the whole Body of the World, ſo as it is extended throughout the Univerſe, and in that Manner joineth and conſerveth the whole. The external preſide over the Internal, for they are not divided, but theſe are divided into ſeven Circles; from the firſt diſtributed according to duple and triple Intervals. That which is comprehended by the indiviſible Sphere is correſpondent to it, that which is divided to the other. For the Motion of Heaven, which comprehendeth all Things, being not uncertain, is one and ordinate, but that of the Things within it, is changeable, varied by riſing and ſetting, whence called *Planetary*. The outermoſt Sphere moveth to the Right-Hand from Eaſt to

West, the innermost contrariwise, to the Left-Hand from West to East, meeting the World.

God framed also the Stars and Constellations; some *fixed* for the Ornament of Heaven and might, very many in Number. The *Erratick* are seven, serving for Number and Time, and the Illumination of all Things; for Time is an Interval of the Motion of the World, as an Image of Eternity, which is the Measure of the State of the eternal World. The Planets are not of equal Power, the *Sun* is the Leader of all, who illuminateth, and sheweth all Things to the Eye. Next the *Moon*, which in respect of her Power hath the second Place. The rest of the Planets each according to their several Proportions. The Moon maketh the Measure of a Month, in that Space compleating its Circle, and overtaking the Sun. The Sun measureth the Year, for running through the Circle of the Zodiack, he compleateth the Seasons of the Year. Of the other Stars each hath its proper Revolution, with which all Men are not acquainted, but only the Learned. By all those Revolutions, *the absolute Number of Time is compleated*, when coming all to the same Point, they are in such Order, as if we should imagine a right Line to be drawn from the Sphere of fixed Stars to the Earth, the Centers all would be seen in that Line.

There being seven Orbs in the planetary Sphere, the Maker of the World framed in them seven conspicuous Bodies of Matter for the most Part fiery, and inserted them into the Spheres belonging to the other *Erratick* Circle. The *Moon* he placed in that Circle which is next the Earth, the *Sun* in the second, the *Morning Star*, and the sacred Star of *Mercury*, in that *Orb* which is equal in Swiftness with the Sun; the rest higher, each in its proper Sphere. That of *Saturn*, the slowest of all, he placed in that Orb which is next to the fixed Stars. Second to this is that which they call the Sphere of *Jupiter*, next that of *Mars*; the eighth, which is the *supreme Power*, includeth all. These are all living intelligent Creatures, and Gods endued with a Spherical Figure.

CHAP. XV.

Of Dæmons *and Elements.*

THere are other *Dæmons* also, which we may call intelligent Gods, in each of the Elements, partly visible, partly invisible, in the *Æther*, Fire, Air and Water, that there be not any Part of the World void of Soul, or of an animate Creature, more excellent than human Nature. Below these are all earthly sublunary Things; God is Maker of the World, of all Gods and *Dæmons*. This Universe, by his divine Will shall not be dissolved. Over the rest his *Sons* preside, who by his Command and Example order whatsoever they do. By these *Lots*, *Nocturnal Visions*, *Dreams*, *Oracles*, *and whatsoever Men refer to Divination*, is artificially wrought.

The *Earth* is fixed in the Midst of all, round about the Axle-tree, which passeth through the Midst of the World. It is the Observer of Night and Day, the most ancient of all Gods in Heaven. Next the Soul of the World, it affordeth us most Nutriture; about it the Heavens move, and itself is a Kind of Star: It remaineth in its proper Place, which by Reason of its even Weight is the Centre; the Æther exterior is divided into the Sphere of fixed Stars, and that of Planets. Next to these is the Air, in the midst of the Earth with its Humidity.

CHAP. XVI.

Of the younger Gods, Makers of Men.

AFter that all these were framed, there remained three Kinds of living Creatures, which were to be mortal, *Volatile*, *Aquatile*, and *Terrestrial*; the Generation whereof he committed to his *Son*, lest if he himself had begotten them, they should have been immortal as well as the rest. They borrowing some little Parts from first Matter for a certain Time, formed mortal living Creatures, and because of Mankind, as being next to the Gods, both the Father of all Things, and his Sons likewise, have a particular Care, the Maker of all Things sent down himself their Souls into the Earth, equal in Number to the Stars, and having imposed each one his proper Star, as a *Vehiculum*, like a Lawgiver, he pronounced Decrees unto them, that he himself might be inculpable, which was that there should arise mortal Affections from the Body, first Senses, next Pleasure, then Grief, and Fear and Anger, which those Souls that should overcome, and not suffer themselves to be transported by them, should justly be accounted Victors, and at the last return to their proper Star, though they which should be transported by Injustice, should in the second Generation undergo the Lives of Women, wherein, if they ceased not from their Wickedness, they should at last transmigrate into the Nature of Brute Beasts, the End of these Labours shall then be, when they have overcome the innate Affections of the Body, and then return to their proper Habit.

CHAP. XVII.

Of the Body, and Parts of Man, and Powers of the Soul.

THe Gods first formed Man of Earth, Fire, Air, and Water, borrowing some Parts from Matter (to be restored in their due Time) which they so connected to one another by secret Ties, as that of all these they framed one Body. The most excellent Part of the Soul that was sent down from Heaven, they placed in the *Head*, for which, as a manured

manured Field they prepared the *Brain*. About the Face they disposed Organs proper for Sense; *Marrow* they made of smooth straight Triangles, of which the Elements were formed, that it should be the Origin of prolifick Seed. *Bones* they formed of Marrow and Earth, the Earth moistened, and often dipt in Water and Fire. *Flesh* is compounded of Salt and sharp, as of a Kind of Ferment. Marrow they enclosed with *Bones*, Bones with *Sinews* instead of Chains, that by these Inflexions the knitting of the Joints might be pliant. Over these as a Cover is extended the *Skin*, partly white partly black, for Beauty and Use. Of these likewise consist the internal *Bowels*, and the Belly, and the Intestines every where rolled about it. And from the Mouth, above the *Aspera Arteria* and the *Æsophagus*, of which one cometh down to the Stomach, the other to the Lungs. Meat is digested in the Belly by Spirit and Heat, and thence distributed to the whole Body according to their several Constitutions. The two Veins passing along the Spine of the Back, meet, and cross at the Head, where they spread into many Parts.

Thus, when the Gods had made Man, and given him a Soul as the Mistress of his Body, they placed the principal Part of that Soul to which Reason appertaineth, in the Head. Whence is derived Marrow and Sinews, and by the different Affection of this, the Mind likewise is altered. Moreover, they gave him Senses, as the Attendants of Reason, and the Power of judging and contemplating with Reason. Those Parts of the Soul, which are moved by meaner Affections, they seated in lower Places; the irascible Part in the Heart, the concupiscible about the Belly, and the Parts next to the Navel, of which hereafter.

CHAP. XVIII.

Of Sight.

AFter that the Gods had placed the Eyes (Conduits of Light) in the Face, they included in them a fiery Light, which being smooth, and in some Manner thick, they conceived of Kin to diurnal Light. This breaketh forth every where at the Eyes, but chiefly through the Eye-calls, as being there most pure and clear. This agreeing with the external Light, as like with like, affordeth the Sense of Sight, whence in the Night, when the Light vanisheth and is obscured, this Ray of ours no longer mingleth with the immediate Air, but, on the contrary, withdrawing itself inward, smooths and diffuses the Motions that are in us, and so bringeth on Sleep, whereby the Eye-lids are shut. If it bring much Rest, the Sleep is little disturbed with Dreams, but if there remain any Motions behind, we are troubled with many Illusions. In this Manner, Phantasies, whether true or false, arise. Of the same Nature are Images, which we see in Glasses, or other smooth pellucid Bodies, which exist only by Reflection. For, as the Glass is concave or convex, or oblong, the Object is differently represented to the Beholder. The Light being reflected to other Parts, those which are dispersed in Convex meet in the Concave, for in some, the right and left Sides seem quite inverted, in others alike; in others, those which are upwards seem downwards, and on the contrary, those which are downwards, upwards.

CHAP. XIX.

Of the rest of the Senses.

HEaring is given for the Perception of Voice, it ariseth from a Motion made about the Head, and setteth in the Liver. Voice is that which passeth through the Ear, Brain, and Blood, to the Soul. A sharp Voice is that which is moved swiftly, deep which slowly, great which much, small which little.

Next felloweth the Sense proper to the Nostrils, perceptible of Odour. Odour is an Affection which passeth from the Veins of the Nostrils to the Parts of the Navel. The Species thereof have no Name, except the two that are most common, pleasant and unpleasant, commonly called sweet and stinking. All Odour is more thick than Air, more thin than Water; for Odour is properly said to be of those Things which have not yet received perfect Mutation, but consist of a Communion of Air and Water, as Smoke and Mists. For, by the Resolution of these into one another, the Sense of Smelling is made.

Taste was made by the Gods to be Judge of different Savours. Hence are Veins extended to the Heart, by which several Savours are examined. These Veins, by dilating or contracting themselves severally, according to the Sapors presented to them, discern the Differences. The Differences of Sapors are seven, sweet, sharp, sour, picquant, salt, acid, bitter; the Nature of sweet Sapor is contrary to all the rest, for by its Power it footheth and pleaseth the Moisture of the Tongue, whereas of the rest, some disturb and dispel it, as acute Sapors; some heat and fly upwards, as the Hot; others being abstersive, dissolve it; as the Bitter; others are by Degrees purgative and abstersive, as the Salt. Of these some contract the Passages; they which do it more roughly are called acid, they which more gently, austere.

The Sense of Touching was formed by the Gods, to discern hot and cold, soft and hard, light and heavy, smooth and rough, and to judge the Differences of each of these; *yielding* Bodies we call those which yield to the Touch; *resisting*, those which yield not; this proceedeth from the Bases of Bodies: Those which have large Bases are firm and solid, these which have narrow Bases are yielding, soft

ſoft and eaſily changed: Rough is that which is uneven and hard, ſmooth; that which is plain and thick; as warm and cold Qualities are moſt oppoſite, ſo they proceed from the moſt different Cauſes. That which cutteth by the Acuteneſs and Roughneſs of its Parts, begetteth a hot Affection, that which is more thick in Penetration, a cold, whilſt the more rare are expelled, and the more dénſe compelled to penetrate into their Room. Thence ariſeth a Concuſſion and Trepidation, and (an Affection which is from hence begotten in Bodies) Rigor.

CHAP. XX.

Of Heavy and Light.

HEavy and Light ought not to be defined by higher or lower Place, nothing is high or low; for Heaven being abſolutely round, and its convex Extremity even, we cannot term any Thing higher or lower, yet we may call that heavy, which is hardly drawn to a Place different from its Nature; Light which eaſily, or Heavy is that which conſiſteth of moſt Parts, Light of feweſt.

CHAP. XXI.

Of Reſpiration.

WE breathe after this Manner; the external Air compaſſeth us round about, and paſſeth in at our Mouth, Noſtrils, and inviſible Pores of the Body, where being warmed, it floweth back again to the external Air, by that Part out of which it flowed, it again thruſteth the external Air to the interior. Thus there is an unintermitted Succeſſion of Inſpiration and Expiration.

CHAP. XXII.

Of the Cauſes of Diſeaſes.

OF Diſeaſes *Plato* alledgeth many Cauſes. The firſt is Defect, or Exceſs of the Elements, and a Change of Places which agree not with their Nature. The ſecond a prepoſterous Generation of homogeneal Parts, as when of Fleſh is made Blood, or Choler, or Phlegm; for all theſe are nothing but Colliquation, or Putrefaction. Phlegm is a new Colliquation of Fleſh; Sweat and Tears are a Kind of Serum of Phlegm. Phlegm intercepted in the outward Parts, begetteth Scurf and Leproſy, in the inward being mingled with Melancholly, it cauſeth the Falling-ſickneſs. Sharp and ſalt Phlegm engender thoſe Affections which conſiſt in Rigour, for all Bodies that are enflamed with Choler muſt ſuffer that. A World of various Diſeaſes are engendered by Choler and Phlegm. As concerning Fevers, *Plato* conceived that a continual Fever proceedeth from Exceſs of Fire, a Quotidian from Exceſs of Air, a Tertian from Exceſs of Water, a Quartan from Exceſs of Earth. It remaineth that we here begin to ſpeak of the Soul, tho' not without ſome Danger of repeating the ſame Things.

CHAP. XXIII.

Of the three principal Powers of the Soul.

THE Gods, the Makers of mortal Creatures, having received from the firſt God the Soul of Man immortal, added unto it two mortal Parts; yet leſt the immortal Divine Part might be infected with mortal Extravagances, they ſeated as Prince of all in the Tower, as it were of the Body, the Head, in Figure reſembling the Univerſe. The reſt of the Body they appointed as a Vehiculum to ſerve this. To each mortal Part they aſſigned its proper Habitation, placing the iraſciple in the Heart, the concupiſcible in the Midſt betwixt the Navel and the Diaphragma, binding it there as a furious ſavage Beaſt. They framed the Lungs in reſpect of the Heart, ſoft, bloodleſs, hollow and ſpungy, that the Heart being ſomewhat heated with Anger, might thereby be refrigerated and aſſwaged; the Liver to excite and allay the concupiſcible Part, having both Sweetneſs and Bitterneſs, as likewiſe for the clearing of Divinations which are given by Dreams; for as much as in it by Reaſon of its Smoothneſs, Shining and Brightneſs, the Power which proceedeth from the Mind doth ſhine forth. The Spleen was made for the Benefit of the Liver, to purge and cleanſe it; ſo that thoſe Corruptions, which by ſome Diſeaſes, are contracted about the Liver, retire thither.

CHAP. XXIV.

Of the Diſtinction of the Parts of the Soul.

THat the Soul and Parts thereof, according to their proper Faculties are three-fold; every Part appointed by Reaſon their ſeveral Places, is manifeſt from hence. Thoſe Things which are ſeparated by Nature, are divers; paſſionate and reaſonable are ſeparated by Nature; this being converſant in Intelligibles, that in Things ſad or joyful, to omit the paſſive Part, which is common likewiſe to Brute Beaſts. Now theſe two being diſtinct by Nature, muſt likewiſe be diſtinguiſhed by Place, becauſe for the moſt Part they diſagree, and are repugnant to one another; but nothing can be repugnant to itſelf, neither can thoſe Things which are contrary to one another conſiſt together in the ſame. In *Medea* Anger ſeemeth to conteſt thus with Reaſon;

I know what I intend is ill,
But Anger over-rules my Will.

In *Laius* when he raviſhed *Chryſippus*, Concupiſcence conteſted with Reaſon; for ſo he ſaith,

Men

Men to this Crime the Gods confine,
To know the Ill that they decline.

That the rational Power is different from the paſſive, is evident from this, that they are ordered by ſeveral Means, one by Diſcipline, the other by habitual Practice.

CHAP. XXV.

Of the Immortality of the Soul.

THat the Soul is immortal *Plato* proveth by theſe Arguments: The Soul to every Thing, wherein it is, conferreth Life, as being naturally innate in herſelf, but that which conferreth Life to others, never admitteth Death, but what is ſuch is immortal.

The Soul being immortal, is likewiſe incorruptible, for it is an incorporeal Eſſence, which cannot be changed ſubſtantially, and is only perceptible by the Intellect, not by the Eyes, and is uniform. Hence it muſt be ſimple, neither can be at any Time diſſolved or corrupted. The Body is contrary, for it is ſubject to Sight and other Senſes, and as it is compounded, ſo ſhall it again be diſſolved, and it is multiform. When the Soul adhereth to thoſe Things which are perceptible by Intellect, it acquieſceth: Now, to that by whoſe Preſence ſhe is diſturbed, ſhe cannot poſſibly be like, wherefore ſhe is more like to thoſe Things which are perceptible by Intellect; but what is ſuch, is ſuch by Nature, incorruptible and periſhable.

Again, the Soul doth naturally preſide over the Body, not the Body over the Soul, but that which by Nature ruleth and commandeth is of Kin to Divinity, wherefore the Soul being next unto God, muſt be immortal, not ſubject to Corruption.

Again, Contraries which have no *Medium*, not by themſelves, but by ſome Accident are ſo ordered by Nature, that they may be mutually made of one another. But that which Men call Life is contrary to that which they call Death; as therefore Death is a Separation of the Soul from the Body, ſo is Life a Conjunction of the Soul with the Body, pre-exiſtent to the Body. But if ſhe be pre-exiſtent, and ſhall ſubſiſt after the Body, it followeth that ſhe be ſempiternal, for there cannot any Thing be imagined whereby ſhe may be corrupted.

Again, if Learning be Reminiſcence, the Soul muſt be immortal, but that it is Reminiſcence we prove thus. Learning cannot otherwiſe conſiſt than by Remembrance of thoſe Things we formerly knew. For, if from *Singulars* we underſtand *Univerſals*, how could we diſcourſe by Singulars which are Infinite? Or how from a few perceive Univerſals? We ſhould therefore neceſſarily be deceived, as if we judged that only to be a living Creature which breatheth: Or how could the Notions themſelves have the Reaſon of Principles? By Reminiſcence therefore, from ſome few which we have conceived in our Mind, we underſtand the reſt, and from ſome occurrent Particulars we remember thoſe which we knew long before, but were then given over to Oblivion, when the Soul firſt deſcended into the Body.

Again, if the Soul be not corrupted by its own proper Ill, neither can it be deſtroyed by that or any other, nor ſimply by any Ill, and being ſuch, ſhall remain uncorrupted.

Again, that which is moved in itſelf, as being the Principle of Motion in thoſe Things which are moved, is always moved; that which is ſuch is immortal; but the Soul is moved of itſelf; that which is moved of itſelf is the Principle of all Motion and Generation; and a Principle is expert of Generation and Corruption, wherefore the Souls of Men, and of the Univerſe itſelf are ſuch, for both partake of the ſame Miſtion. He affirmeth the Soul to be moveable in herſelf, becauſe it hath an innate Life, always operating by its Power.

That rational Souls are immortal, may clearly be aſſerted out of *Plato*; but whether the irrational be ſuch ſeemeth doubtful; yet is it probable, that being guided only by Phantaſy, not endued with Reaſon or Judgment, neither do they contemplate any Thing, or diſcern, or collect from it; nor can they diſcern Ills, but generally underſtand nothing, nor are of the ſame Nature with thoſe Souls which have Intellect and Reaſon, but are capable of dying, and being corrupted. Foraſmuch as they are immortal, it followeth, that they are put into Bodies, being planted into the formed Nature of Embrio's, and tranſmigrate into ſeveral Bodies, as well human as others, either according to ſome certain Numbers which they expect, or by the Will of the Gods, or for Intemperance of Life, or for Love of the Body. For the Body and Soul have a Kind of Affinity, as Fire and Brimſtone.

Moreover, the Souls of the Gods have a dijudicative Faculty, called Gnoſtick, and impulſive to ſome Action, called Paraſtatick; which Faculties being likewiſe in human Souls, become changed as ſoon as they come into the Body; the Aſſiſtent into the Concupiſcible, the Impulſive into the Irraſcible.

CHAP. XXVI.

Of Fate and Free-will.

COncerning *Fate*, *Plato* held thus. All Things are in Fate, yet all Things are not decreed by Fate. For Fate, though it be like a Law, yet it uſeth not to ſpeak in this Manner, that this Man ſhall do thus, and to that Man, that ſhall befal (which were to proceed into infinite, there being an infinite Generation of Men, and infinite Accidents happening daily to them; beſides that this would take

take away our Free-will, our Praiſe or Diſpraiſe, and whatſoever is of that Kind) but rather thus: Whatſoever Soul chooſeth ſuch a Life, and doth ſuch Things, theſe ſhall follow, the Soul therefore is free, and it is left within its Power to do or not to do, without any Compulſion or Neceſſity. But that which followeth the Action is performed by Fate. As from *Paris*'s raviſhing of *Helene* (which it is within his Power to do, or not to do) ſhall follow that the *Grecians* contend with the *Trojans* about *Helene*. Thus *Apollo* foretold *Laius*;

If thou beget a Son, that Son ſhall kill thee.

In the Oracle are comprehended both *Laius*, and the begetting of a Son; that which ſhall follow upon the begetting of the Son depends on *Plato*.

That which may be done is of a middle Kind, betwixt true and falſe; and being ſo indefinite by Nature. That which is in our Power, is carried on as it were unto it. That which is done by our Election, is preſently either true or falſe. That which is in Power is different from that which is ſaid to be in Habit and Act. That which is in Power, declareth an Aptitude in that Thing, wherein the Habit is not yet perfect. So a Boy may be ſaid to be a Grammarian, a Muſician, a Carpenter in Power. He is in Habit of one or more of theſe when he hath acquired that Habit. He is ſaid to be in Act, when he operateth according to that acquired Habit. That which we call poſſible to be done, is none of theſe. Indeterminate is that which is in our Power, and to which Part ſoever it inclineth, will be true or falſe.

CHAP. XXVII.

ETHICK.

Of the chief Good, and of Virtues.

WE muſt next give a ſhort Account of *Plato*'s *Ethicks*. That which is worthy of all Honour, and is the Supreme Good, he conceived not eaſy to be found; and if found, not ſafe to be declared. For this Reaſon, he communicated the Contemplation of the chief Good to very few, and thoſe of his moſt intimate Acquaintance, of whom his Judgment made Choice for this Purpoſe. But our Good, if we examine his Books diligently, we ſhall find he placed in the Knowledge of the firſt Good, which may rightly be called God, and the firſt Mind. For all Things which Men call Good, he conceiveth to be called Good in this Reſpect; foraſmuch as they derive ſomething from that Good, as all ſweet and hot Things are termed ſuch from ſome Participation of the firſt ſweet, and the firſt hot. Of thoſe Things which are in us, only the Mind and Reaſon have a Similitude of the firſt Good. Wherefore he calleth our Good, Fair, Venerable, Amiable, Proportionate, and laſtly, Beatitude. Of thoſe which are commonly called good, as Health, Beauty, Strength, there is none good, unleſs it be employed towards the Practice of Virtue. For being ſeparated from Virtue, they are like Matter only; and to thoſe who make ill Uſe of them, only ill. Yet theſe *Plato* ſometimes calleth mortal Goods. Beatitude he reckoneth not amongſt human Goods, but amongſt the Divine and Immortal. Whence he aſſerteth that the Souls of true Philoſophers are repleniſhed with vaſt admirable Goods, and after the Diſſolution of their mortal Body, are admitted to the Table of the Gods, and with them walk over and ſurvey the Field of Truth, becauſe they did ſee they uſed the utmoſt Endeavours of their Souls to know it, and eſteemed it the moſt precious of all Things, by the Benefit whereof they illuſtrated, and excited their Mind as a loſt or blinded Sight, preferring the Conſervation thereof before many corporeal Eyes. Fooliſh Men are like thoſe who lead all their Life in ſome Cave under Ground, where they never ſaw the Light of the Sun, but only ſome empty thin Shadows of ſuch Bodies as are with us upon the Earth, which ſeeing, they think they ſee true Bodies. As theſe, if ever they ſhould be brought out of Darkneſs into the clear Light, would queſtionleſs deſpiſe all Things which they ſaw before, and themſelves much more, as having been abſolutely deceived; ſo they who riſe up out of the Darkneſs of this Life, to thoſe Things which are divine and fair, in all Likelihood, will contemn what before they moſt eſteemed, and love more vehemently this Contemplation. Thus it appeareth, that only what is good is honeſt, and that Virtue ſufficeth to Felicity.

Moreover, that good and fair conſiſt in Knowledge of the firſt Good, he declareth in whole Volumes. As concerning thoſe which are good by Participation, he ſpeaketh thus in his firſt Book of Laws. Good is two-fold, Human and Divine, *&c.* If any Thing be disjoined from the firſt Good, and void of the Eſſence thereof, that is called Good by the Fooliſh, which in *Enthydemo*, he affirmeth to be a greater Ill to the Poſſeſſor.

That he conceiveth the Virtues to be eligible in themſelves, is manifeſt; inaſmuch as he affirmeth that only to be Good which is Honeſt, which he demonſtrateth in many Dialogues, particularly in thoſe of the Commonwealth.

Hence he conceiveth that Man to be moſt happy and bleſſed, who hath attained the Science we mentioned; yet not in Reſpect of the Honours which attend ſuch a Perſon, nor of any other Reward; for though he be unknown to all Men, and ſuch Things as are commonly accounted Ills, as Diſhonour, Baniſhment, and Death happen unto him; he is notwithſtanding happy. On the contrary, a Man who wants this Knowledge, though he poſſeſs all Things commonly eſteemed good, Riches, Power, Health,

Strength, and Beauty, he is nothing the more happy.

He asserteth an ultimate End, conformable to all these which is to be made like unto God, as far as Humanity is capable of being such. This he expounds variously; sometimes, as in *Theæteto*, he affirms our Resemblance to God to consist in being Prudent, Just, and Holy; wherefore we must endeavour to fly with all possible Celerity from hence to those. This Flight is the Resemblance to God, as much as is possible. The Similitude consisteth in Prudence, Justice, and Sanctity; sometimes in Justice only, as in his last Book of the Commonwealth. For a Man is never deserted by God, whilst he endeavoureth to be just, and by the very Act of Virtue, as much as a Man is capable of, he is render'd like unto God. In *Phædone* he asserteth, that this Resemblance to God is acquired by Temperance and Justice, thus. *Are not they blessed and happy, and from hence shall go into the best Place, who have practised the popular civil Virtue which they call Temperance and Justice?* Again, sometimes he affirmed, that the End of Life is to be like unto God, sometimes to follow God, as when he saith, God indeed, according to the old Saying, *containing the Beginning, Middle, and End of all Things*, &c. Sometimes he joineth both together, as when he saith, *The Soul following God, and being rendered like unto him*, &c. The Principle of Utility is good itself; but this is said of God, therefore the End, conformable to the Principle, is to become like unto God, to the Celestial, or rather Supercelestial God, who hath not Virtue, but is more excellent than all Virtue. Wherefore it is rightly said, that κακοδαιμονία, Misery, is a Perversity of the Genius, εὐδαιμονία, Beatitude is a good Habit of the Genius.

This Similitude to God we shall obtain, if we enjoy convenient Nature in our Manner, Education and Sense, according to Law, and chiefly by Reason and Discipline, and Institution of Wisdom; withdrawing ourselves as much as possible from human Affairs, and being conversant in those Things only which are understood by Contemplation. The Way to prepare, and, as it were, to cleanse the Dæmon that is in us, is to initiate ourselves into higher Disciplines, which is done by Musick, Arithmetick, Astronomy, and Geometry; not without some Respect of the Body, by Gymnastick, whereby it is made more ready for the Actions, both of War and Peace.

CHAP. XXVIII.

The Definition and Kinds of Virtue.

VIrtue being divine, is the perfect and best Affection of the Soul, which adorneth a Man, and rendereth him more excellent and ready, as well for Speech as Action, whether he do it alone, or with others.

Of the Virtues, some are placed in the rational Part, some in the irrational. For whereas the Nature of the rational Part is one, that of the irascible another, that of the concupiscible another, the Perfection of these must likewise be different. That of the rational is *Prudence*; of the irascible, *Fortitude*; of the concupiscible, *Temperance*.

Prudence is the Science of Things, good, bad, and betwixt both.

Temperance is an apt Moderation of Desires and Appetites; when we call Temperance a Moderation and Obedience, we mean only this, that it is a Faculty causing all Appetites to be subjected unto it, in decent Order and submiss Obedience to be commanded by Nature. This is the rational Part.

Fortitude is a lawful Observation of Command, difficult, or not difficult; that is, it is a Faculty which keepeth a lawful Precept.

Justice is an Agreement amongst all these, which causeth that the three Parts of the Soul agree with one another, and that each be worthily conversant in those Things which are proper, and belong unto it.

Thus it is a common entire Perfection of these three Virtues, *Prudence*, *Fortitude*, and *Temperance*, in such manner that Reason commandeth, and the rest of the Parts each according to its several Property, are restrained by Reason, and obey it.

Hence it followeth that the Virtues are mutually consequent to one another; Fortitude being the Conservation of a lawful Precept, it is likewise conservative of right Reason. Right Reason proceedeth from Prudence; Prudence cohereth with Fortitude, for it is the Knowledge of good Things; but no Man can discern that which is good, if he be distracted by Fear, or involved in the like Troubles. In like Manner, neither can any Man be wise and intemperate, for then he is overcome by Affections. If a Man do something contrary to Reason, *Plato* affirmeth he doth through Ignorance and Imprudence, so that none can be prudent that is intemperate or fearful. Whence it followeth, that the perfect Virtues cohere to one another, and are inseparable.

CHAP. XXIX.

Of Virtues, Vices, and their Differences.

THE Gifts of Nature and Progress in them are called Virtues also, by Reason of their Similitude with the perfect Virtues, assuming the same Name. In this Sense we call all Soldiers stout, and sometimes call imprudent and rash Persons stout, when we speak not of the perfect Virtues, for the perfect neither increase nor decrease; but Vices are intended and remitted. One Man is more impru-

imprudent and more unjuſt than another, neither do all the Vices follow one another, for they are certain Contraries which are not competible to the ſame. Such is Fury to Cowardice, and Prodigality to Covetouſneſs, nor can there be any Man at once poſſeſſed of all Vices, no more than a Body tormented by all Diſeaſes.

Moreover, there is a mean Affection which inclineth not plainly either to Vice or Virtue, for it is not neceſſary that all Men muſt be good or bad; they are ſuch, who have arrived at the Height of theſe; for it is not eaſy to paſs ſuddenly from Virtue to Vice, becauſe betwixt Extremes there is a great Interval and Diſtance.

Of Virtues ſome are principal, others concomitant; principal are thoſe which are in the rational Part of the Soul, and by which the other Virtues are perfected. Concomitant are thoſe which are in the other Part which are ſubject to Affections. Theſe act honeſt Things according to Reaſon, not that which is in them, for they have none, but that which they receive from Prudence, which is confirmed in them by Cuſtom and Exerciſe.

Now, for as much as neither Science nor Art conſiſteth in any Part of the Soul, but in the Rational, thoſe Virtues which are in the other Part, that is ſubject to Affections, cannot be taught, becauſe they are neither Arts nor Sciences, neither have they a peculiar Doctrine. Prudence is a Science, which preſcribeth unto every one what is proper to him, as a Pilot, or Maſter of a Ship, to inferior ignorant Sailors. The like in a common Soldier and a General.

For as much as Ills are intended and remitted, Offences cannot be equal, but ſome muſt be greater, others leſſer, for which Reaſon, they who make Laws, puniſh ſome more gently, others more ſeverely. And tho' Virtues are certain Heights, as being perfect, and like unto that which is right, yet in another Reſpect they are called Mediocrities, becauſe all or the moſt of them are placed betwixt two Vices, whereof one ſinneth in Exceſs, the other in Defect; as on one Side of *Liberality* is *Covetouſneſs*, on the other *Prodigality*. For in Affections we recede from the Mean, when we relinquiſh that which is placed in Virtue, either by Exceſs or Defect. But neither he, who beholding his Parents wronged is nothing moved thereat, nor he who is incenſed at the ſmalleſt Matters, void of Paſſion, or moderate, but the quite contrary. He who at the Death of his Parents grieveth not, is void of Paſſion; he who deſtroyeth himſelf with grieving is over paſſionate and immoderate; he who grieveth moderately is moderately paſſionate. In like manner, he who feareth upon all Occaſions, and more than needs, is timorous; he who feareth nothing is raſh; he only is ſtout that can keep a Mean betwixt Fear and Raſhneſs; the like in all the reſt. And for as much as that which is mean in Affections is likewiſe beſt, and Mediocrity is nothing but a Mean betwixt Exceſs and Defect, there are theſe Virtues termed Mediocrities, becauſe in human Perturbations and Paſſions they affect us a middle Kind of Way.

CHAP. XXX.

That Virtue is voluntary, Vice involuntary.

VIrtue being chiefly of thoſe Things which are in our Power, not compulſive (for it could not deſerve Praiſe, if it came either by Nature or divine Decree) it followeth, that Virtue is voluntary, begotten by a fervent, generous, and firm Impulſion.

From this, that Virtue is voluntary, it followeth that Vice is involuntary. For, who, in the moſt excellent Part of himſelf would ever voluntarily chooſe that which is the greateſt of all Ills? When a Man is carried on to Vice, he firſt inclineth to it, not as if it were ill, but good, and if he fall into Ill, doubtleſs he is deceived with thinking, that this Way, by a leſſer Ill, he may arrive at a greater Good, and goeth in this Manner unwillingly to it. For, it is not poſſible a Man ſhould purſue Ill as it is Ill, without any Hope of Good, or Fear of a greater Ill. All ill Things therefore, which an ill Man doth, are involuntary; for Injuſtice being involuntary, to act unjuſtly is ſo much more involuntary, as the Action of Vice is beyond the idle Habit thereof. Yet, tho' wicked Actions are involuntary, the Wicked nevertheleſs ought to be puniſhed, and that not after one Manner, but according to the Variety of Hurt which they do to thoſe they wrong. That which is involuntary conſiſteth in Ignorance of Perturbations, all which may be diverted, either by Reaſon, or civil Cuſtom, or Diligence.

CHAP. XXXI.

Of Love and Friendſhip.

FRiendſhip, properly ſo termed, is made by a mutual reciprocal Benevolence. This is, when either is as much concerned for the Happineſs of the other, as of his own, which Equality is preſerved only by Similitude of Manners: For, the like is Friend to its like, if they be both moderate; but the Intemperate cannot agree, either with themſelves or the Moderate.

There are other Things which are thought Friendſhips, but are not ſuch, in which there appeareth ſome Shew of Virtue. Of theſe, is the natural Good-will of Parents to their Children, and of Kindred one to another, as alſo that which is called civil and ſociable; theſe are not always accompanied with mutual Benevolence. Likewiſe, the amatory Art is a Kind of Friendſhip. That which is honeſt is proper to a generous Soul, diſho-

neſt to a perverſe, mean to one meanly affected. For, as the Habit of the rational Soul is threefold, Right, Diſhoneſt and Mean, ſo many different Kinds are there of Love, which appeareth moſt clearly in the Difference of the Ends they propoſe unto themſelves. The Diſhoneſt aims only at corporeal Pleaſure, and therefore is abſolutely brutiſh. The Honeſt conſidereth the Mind only, as far as Virtue appeareth in it. The Mean deſireth both the Beauty of the Soul and of the Body; of which Love, he who is worthy is mean likewiſe; that is, neither abſolutely Honeſt nor Diſhoneſt. Hence that Love which aimeth only at the Body, ought to be termed a *Demon* (rather than a Deity, which never deſcendeth to an human Body) tranſmitting divine Things to Men, and human to God.

Of the three Kinds of Love, that which is proper to a good Man, being remote from vicious Affections, is artificial, whence it is placed in the rational Part of the Soul. The Contemplations thereof are theſe, to diſcern who is worthy of Love, and to contract Friendſhip with him, and enjoy it. This Diſcernment is made from his Aims or Deſires, whether they are generous, and directed to a good End, or violent and fervent. The Contraction, or Acquiſition of Friendſhip, is made, not by wanton exceſſive Praiſe, but rather by Reprehenſion, ſhewing him, that it is not convenient he ſhould live in that manner he doth; when he enjoyeth the Love of him whom he affects, he muſt always exhort him to thoſe Things, by Exerciſe whereof, he may arrive at perfect Habit. Their End is that of Lover and Beloved, they may at laſt become Friends.

CHAP. XXXII.

Of Paſſions.

INjuſtice is ſo great an Ill, that it is better to ſuffer Wrong than to do wrong; for one belongeth to a wicked Man, the other to a weak Man; both are diſhoneſt, but to do wrong is worſe, by how much it is more diſhoneſt. It is as expedient that a wicked Man be puniſhed, as that a ſick Man ſhould be cured by a Phyſician; for all Chaſtiſement is a Kind of Medicine for an offending Soul.

Since the greater Part of Virtues are converſant about Paſſions, it is neceſſary that we define Paſſion. Paſſion is an irrational Motion of the Soul, ariſing out of ſome good or ill; it is called an irrational Motion, becauſe neither Judgments nor Opinions are Paſſions, but Motions of the irrational Parts of the Soul. For in the irrational Part of the Soul, there are Motions, which tho' they are done by us, are yet nothing the more in our Power. They are often done therefore contrary to our Inclination and Will; for ſometimes it falleth out, that though we know Things to be neither pleaſing nor unpleaſing, expetible nor avoidable, yet we are drawn by them, which could never be, if ſuch Paſſions were the ſame with Judgment. For we reject Judgment when we diſapprove it, whether it ought to be ſo or otherwiſe. In the Definition is added, ariſing from ſome Good or ſome Ill, becauſe of that which is mean or indifferent betwixt theſe, no Paſſion is ever excited in us. All Paſſions ariſe from that which ſeemeth good or ill. If we ſee Good preſent, we rejoice, if future, we deſire. On the contrary, if Ill be preſent, we grieve, if imminent, we fear.

The ſimple Affections, and, as it were, Elements of the reſt, are two; *Pleaſure* and *Grief*; the reſt conſiſt of theſe. Neither are Fear and Deſire to be numbered among the principal Paſſions, for he who feareth is not wholly deprived of Pleaſure, nor can a Man live the leaſt Moment, who deſpaireth to be freed or eaſed of ſome Ill. But it is more converſant in Grief and Sorrow, and therefore he who feareth, ſorroweth. But he who deſireth, like all thoſe who deſire or expect ſomething, is delighted, inſomuch as he is not abſolutely confident; and having not a firm Hope he is grieved. And if Deſire and Fear are not principal Paſſions, it will doubtleſs follow, that none of the other Affections are ſimple; as Anger, Love, Emulation and the like; for in theſe, Pleaſure and Grief are manifeſt, as conſiſting of them.

Moreover, of Paſſions, ſome are rough, others mild; the Mild are thoſe which are naturally in Men, and if kept within their Bounds, are neceſſary and proper to Man, if they exceed vicious. Such are Pleaſure, Grief, Anger, Pity, Modeſty; for it is proper to Man to delight in thoſe Things which are according to Nature, and to be grieved at their Contraries. *Anger* is neceſſary to repel and puniſh an Injury. *Mercy* agreeth with Humanity. *Modeſty* teacheth us to decline ſordid Things. Other Paſſions are rough and preternatural, ariſing from ſome depraved or perverſe Cuſtom. Such are exceſſive Laughter, Joy in the Misfortunes of others, Hatred of Mankind. Theſe, whether intenſe or remiſs, after what Manner ſoever they are, are always erroneous, and admit not any laudable Mediocrity.

As concerning Pleaſure and Grief, *Plato* writeth thus. Theſe Paſſions are excited in us by Nature. Grief and Sorrow happen to thoſe who are moved contrary to Nature; Pleaſure to thoſe who are reſtored to the proper Conſtitution of their Nature. For he conceiveth the natural State of Man to conſiſt in a Mean betwixt Pleaſure and Grief, not moved by either, in which State we live longeſt. He aſſerteth ſeveral Kinds of Pleaſure, whereof ſome relate to the Body, others to the Soul. Again, of Pleaſures ſome are mix'd with Grief, ſome are pure. Again, ſome proceed from the Remembrance of Things paſt, others from Hope of Things to come. Again, ſome are diſhoneſt, as being intemperate and

and unjuſt; others *moderate*, and joyned with Good, as Joy for good Things, and the Pleaſure that followeth Virtue. Now, becauſe moſt Pleaſures are naturally diſhoneſt, he thinks it not to be diſputed whether Pleaſure can be ſimply and abſolutely a Good, that being to be accounted poor, and of no Value, which is raiſed out of another, and hath not a principal primary Eſſence; for Pleaſure cohereth even with its contrary Grief, and is joyned with it; which could not be, if one were ſimply good, the other ſimply ill.

CHAP. XXXIII.

Of the Forms of Common-Wealths.

OF the Forms of Common-wealths; ſome are ſuppoſed only, and conceived by Abſtract from the reſt: Theſe he delivers in his Book of a Common-wealth; wherein he deſcribeth the firſt Concordant, the ſecond Diſcordant; enquiring which of theſe is the moſt excellent, and how they may be conſtituted; he alſo divideth a Common-wealth, like the Soul, in Three Parts, *Keepers*, *Defenders*, and *Artificers*. The Office of the Firſt is to counſel, to adviſe, to command; of the Second, to defend the Common-wealth, upon Occaſion, by Arms, which anſwereth to the Iraſcible Power: To the laſt belong Arts and other Services. He will have Princes to be Philoſophers, and to contemplate the firſt Good, affirming, that ſo only they ſhall govern rightly: For Mankind can never be freed from ill, unleſs either Philoſophers govern, or they who govern be inſpired with Philoſophy after a Divine Manner. A Common-wealth is then governed beſt, and according to Juſtice, when each Part of the City performeth its proper Office; ſo that the Prince give Laws to the People; the Defenders obey them, and fight for them; the reſt willingly ſubmit to their Superiors.

Of a Common-wealth he aſſerteth five Kinds; the firſt, *Ariſtocracy*, when the Beſt rule; the ſecond, *Timocracy*, when the Ambitious; the third, *Democracy*, when the People; the fourth, *Olygarchy*, when a few; the laſt, *Tyranny*, which is the worſt of all.

He deſcribeth likewiſe other ſuppoſed Forms of Common-wealth, as that in his Book of Laws; and, that which reformeth others, in his Epiſtles, which he uſeth for thoſe Cities that in his Book of Laws he ſaith are ſick: Theſe have a diſtinct Place, and ſelect Men out of every Age, as according to the Diverſity of their Nature and Place; they require different Inſtitution, Education, and Arms. The Maritime People are to ſtudy Navigation and Sea-fight; the Iſland fighting on Foot; thoſe in mountainous Countries to uſe light Armour, thoſe on the Shore heavy; ſome of theſe to exerciſe fighting on Horſe-back: In this City he alloweth not a Community of Women. Thus is Politick a Virtue, converſant both in Action and Contemplation; the End whereof is to conſtitute a City good, happy, and convenient to itſelf. It conſiders a great many Things; amongſt the reſt, whether War be to be waged or not.

CHAP. XXXIV.

Of a Sophiſt.

HItherto we have ſpoken of a *Philoſopher*, from whom a *Sophiſt* differeth; in *Manners*, becauſe he teacheth young Men for Gain, and deſireth rather to *ſeem* than to *be* good. In *Matter*; for a Philoſopher is converſant in thoſe Things which always are, and continually remain in the ſame manner; but a Sophiſt in that which is not; for which Reaſon he ſeeketh Darkneſs, that he may not be known to be what he is. To Things that are, that which is not, is not oppoſed as contrary; for it neither exiſteth, nor is participant of any Eſſence, nor can be underſtood; ſo that if any Man endeavour to expreſs it in Words, or comprehend it by Thought, he is deceived, becauſe he putteth together Things contrary and repugnant; yet that which is not, as far as it is ſpoken, is not a pure Negation of that which is, but implieth a Relation to another, which in ſome manner is joyned to *Ens*; ſo that unleſs we aſſume ſomething from that which is, to that which is not, it cannot be diſtinguiſhed from other Things; but thus, as many Kinds as they are of *Ens*, ſo many are there of *Non-Ens*, becauſe that which is not an *Ens* is a *Non-Ens*.

Thus much may ſerve for an Introduction into *Plato*'s Philoſophy; ſome Things, perhaps, are ſaid orderly; others diſperſedly, or confuſedly; yet is all ſo laid down, that by thoſe which we have delivered, the reſt of his Aſſertions may be found out and contemplated.

After

After so serious a Discourse, it will not be amiss to give the Reader a Poetical Entertainment upon the same Subject:

BEING A

Platonick DISCOURSE,

Written in ITALIAN

By *JOHN PICUS* Earl of *Mirandula*,

In Explication of a SONNET,

By *HIERONIMO BENIVIENI.*

The FIRST PART.

SECT I.

IT is the Principle of the Platonists, *that every created Thing hath a three-fold Being; Casual, Formal, Participated. In the Sun there is no Heat, that being but an Elementary Quality, not of Cœlestial Nature; yet is the Sun the Cause and Fountain of all Heat. Fire is hot by Nature, and its proper Form. Wood is not hot of it self, yet is capable of receiving that quality by Fire. Thus hath Heat its casual, being in the Sun; its formal in the Fire, its participated in the Fuel. The most noble and perfect of these is the Casual; and therefore* Platonists *assert, That all Excellencies are in God after this manner of being; that in God is nothing, but from him all things; that Intellect is not in him, but that he is the original Spring of every Intellect. Such is* Plotinus's *Meaning, when he affirms,* [a] God neither understands nor knows; *that is to say, after a formal Way, as* Dionysius Areopagita, God is neither an intellectual nor intelligent Nature, but unspeakably exalted above all Intellect and Knowledge.

Sect. II.

PLatonists *distinguish Creatures into three Degrees; the first comprehends the Corporeal and Visible, as Heaven; Elements, and all compounded of them: The last the Invisible, Incorporeal, absolutely free from Bodies, which properly are called Intellectual (by Divines Angelical) Natures: Betwixt these is a mid Nature, which tho' incorporeal, invisible, immortal, yet moveth Bodies, as being obliged to that Office, called, the Rational Soul; inferior to Angels, superior to Bodies, subject to those, regent of these; above which is God himself, Author and Principal of every Creature, in whom Divinity hath a casual Being; from whom, proceeding to Angels, it hath a formal Being, and thence is derived into the rational Soul by Participation of their Lustre: Below which, no Nature can assume the Title of Divine.*

Sect. III.

THAT the first of these three Natures cannot be multiplied, who is but one; the Principal and Cause of all other Divinity is evidently proved by Platonists, Peripateticks, *and other Divines. About the second, (viz. the Angelick and Intellectual)* Platonists *disagree. Some (as* Proclus, Hermias, Syrianus, *and many others) betwixt God and the rational Soul, place a great Number of Creatures; part of these they call* νοητὰ νοερά, *Intelligible, part Intellectual; which Terms* Plato *sometimes confoundeth, as in his* Phædo. Plotinus, Porphyrius, *and generally the most refined* Platonists, *betwixt God and the Soul of the World, assign only one Creature, which they call the Son of God, because immediately produced by him. The first Opinion complies most with* Dionysius Areopagita, *and Christian Divines, who assert the Number of Angels to be in a manner Infinite. The Second is the more philosophick, best suiting with* Aristotle *and* Plato, *whose Sense we only purpose to express; and therefore will decline the first Path (tho' that only be the Right) to pursue the latter.*

[a] Ennead. 6. lib. 7. c. 3.

Sect.

Sect. IV.

WE therefore, according to the Opinion of Plotinus, *confirmed not only by the beſt* Platoniſts, *but even by* Ariſtotle, *and all the* Arabians, *eſpecially* Avicenna, *affirm, that God, from Eternity, produced a Creature of incorporeal and intellectual Nature, as perfect as is poſſible for a created Being; beyond which he produced nothing; for, of the moſt perfect Cauſe, the Effect muſt be moſt perfect; and the moſt perfect can be but one: For, of two or more, it is not poſſible but that ſhould be more or leſs perfect than the reſt, otherwiſe they would not be two, but the ſame. This Reaſon for our Opinion, I rather chooſe, than that which* Avicen *alledges, founded upon this Principle, that from one Cauſe, as one, can proceed but one Effect. We conclude therefore, that no Creature, but this firſt Mind, proceeds immediately from God; for, of all other Effects iſſuing from this Mind, and all other ſecond Cauſes, God is only the mediate Efficient. This by* Plato, Hermes, *and* Zoroaſter, *is called the* Daughter of God, *the* Mind, Wiſdom, Divine Reaſon, *by ſome interpreted* the Word; *not meaning (with our Divines) the Son of God, he not being a Creature, but one Eſſence, co-equal with the Creator.*

Sect. V.

ALL underſtanding Agents have in themſelves the Form of that which they deſign to effect; as an Architect hath in his Mind a Figure of the Building he undertakes, which, as his Pattern, he exactly ſtrives to imitate. This Platoniſts *call the Idea, or Exemplar, believing it more perfect than that which is made after it; and this manner of Being, Ideal, or Intelligible, the other Material and Senſible. So that when a Man builds a Houſe, they affirm there are two, one Intellectual in the Workman's Mind; the other ſenſible, which he makes in Stone, Wood, or the like; expreſſing in that Matter the Form he hath conceived. To this* Dante *alludes.*

—— None any Work can frame,
Unleſs himſelf become the ſame.

Hereupon they ſay, tho' God produced only one Creature, yet he produced all, becauſe in it he produced the Ideas and Forms of all, and that in their moſt perfect Being, that is, the Idea; for which Reaſon, they call this Mind, the Intelligible World.

Sect. VI.

AFter the Pattern of that Mind, they affirm this ſenſible World was made; and the Exemplar being the moſt perfect of all created Things, it muſt follow, that this Image thereof be as perfect as its Nature will bear. And ſince Animate Things are more perfect than the Inanimate; and of thoſe, the Rational than the Irrational; we muſt grant, this World hath a Soul perfect above all others. This is the firſt Rational Soul, which, tho' Incorporeal, and Immaterial, is deſtined to the Function of governing and moving Corporeal Nature. Not free from the Body, as that Mind whence from Eternity it was derived, as was the Mind from God. Hence Platoniſts *argue, the World is eternal; its Soul being ſuch, and not capable of being without a Body, that alſo muſt be from Eternity. As likewiſe the Motion of the Heavens, becauſe the Soul cannot be without moving.*

Sect. VII.

THE antient Ethnick Theologians, who caſt Poetical Veils over the Face of their Myſteries, expreſs theſe three Natures by other Names. Cœlum *they call God in himſelf; he produced the firſt Mind,* Saturn; Saturn, *the Soul of the World,* Jupiter. Cœlum *implies Priority and Excellence, as in the Firmament, the firſt Heaven.* Saturn *ſignifies Intellectual Nature, wholly employed in Contemplation.* Jupiter, *active Life; conſiſting in moving and governing all ſubordinate to it. The Properties of the two latter agree with their Planets.* Saturn *makes Men contemplative,* Jupiter *imperious. The Speculative buſied about Things above them, the Practick beneath them.*

Sect. VIII.

WHich three Names are promiſcuouſly uſed upon theſe Grounds. In God we underſtand firſt his Excellence, which, as Cauſe, he hath above all his Effects; for this he is called Cœlus. *Secondly, the Production of thoſe Effects, which denotes Converſion towards Inferiors; in this reſpect he is ſometimes called* Jupiter; *but with an Addition,* Optimus Maximus. *The firſt Angelick Nature hath more Names, as more Diverſity. Every Creature conſiſts of Power and Act; the firſt,* Plato *in* Philebo, *calls infinite; the ſecond, finite. All Imperfections in the Mind are by reaſon of the firſt; all Perfections, from the latter. Her Operations are threefold. About Superiors, the Contemplation of God; about the Knowledge of herſelf; about Inferiors, the Production and Care of this ſenſible World: Theſe three proceed from Act. By Power ſhe deſcends to make inferior Things; but in either Reſpect is firm within herſelf. In the two firſt, becauſe Contemplative, ſhe is called* Saturn; *in the third,* Jupiter, *a Name principally applied to her Power, as that Part from whence is derived the Act of Production of Things. For the ſame Reaſon is the Soul of the World, as ſhe contemplates herſelf or Superiors, termed* Saturn; *as ſhe is employed in ordering worldly Things,* Jupiter; *and ſince the Government of the World belongs properly to her; the Contemplation to*

the Mind; therefore is the one absolutely called Jupiter, *the other* Saturn.

Sect. IX.

THIS World therefore (as all other Creatures) consisteth of a Soul and Body. The Body is all that we behold, compounded of the four Elements. These have their casual Being in the Heavens (which consist not of them, as sublunary Things; for then it would follow, that these inferior Parts were made before the cœlestial; the Elements in themselves being simple, by Concourse causing such Things as are compounded of them: Their former being from the Moon down to the Earth; their participate and imperfect under the Earth, evident in the Fire, Air, and Water, Experience daily finds there; evinced by Natural Philosophers: To which the ancient Theologians *ænigmatically allude by their four infernal Rivers,* Acheron, Cocytus, Styx, *and* Phlegeton.

We may divide the Body of the World into three Parts; cœlestial, mundane, infernal. The Ground why the Poets feign the Kingdom of Saturn *to be shared betwixt his three Sons,* Jupiter, Neptune, *and* Pluto; *implying only the three-fold Variation of this corporeal World; which as long as it remains under* Saturn, *that is, in its Ideal Intellectual Being, is one and undivided, and so more firm and potent; but falling into the Hands of his Sons, that is, changed to this material Being, and by them divided into three Parts, according to the triple Existence of Bodies, is more infirm, and less potent, degenerating from a Spiritual to a Corporeal Estate. The first Part, the Heavenly, they attribute to* Jupiter; *the last and lowest to* Pluto; *the middle to* Neptune. *And because in this Principality is all Generation and Corruption, the* Theologians *express it by the Ocean, ebbing or flowing continually; by* Neptune *understanding the Power or Deity that presides over Generation. Yet must we not imagine these to be different Souls, distinctly informing these three Parts; the World herself being one, can have but one Soul; which as it animates the subterraneal Parts, is called* Pluto; *the sublunary,* Neptune; *the cœlestial,* Jupiter. *Thus* Plato *in* Philebo, *avers by* Jove, is understood a Regal Soul, *meaning the principal Part of the World which governs the other. This Opinion, tho' only my own, I suppose is more true than the Exposition of the* Grecians.

Sect. X.

NExt that of the World, Platonists *assign many other rational Souls. The eight principal are those of the Heavenly Spheres, which, according to their Opinion, exceeded not that Number; consisting of the seven Planets, and the Starry Orb. These are the nine Muses of the Poets;* Calliope *(the universal Soul of the World) is first, the other Eight are distributed to their several Spheres.*

Sect. XI.

PLATO *asserts,* [a] *That* the Author of the World made the mundane, and all other rational Souls, in one Cup, and of the same Elements; the universal Soul being most perfect, ours least; *whose Parts we may observe by this Division. Man, the Chain that ties the World together, is placed in the midst; and as all Mediums participate of their Extreams, his Parts correspond with the whole World; thence called* Microcosmus. *In the World is, first, Corporeal Nature, eternal in the Heavens; Corruptible in the Elements, and their Compounds; as Stones, Metals,* &c. *Then Plants. The third Degree is of Beasts. The fourth, rational Souls. The fifth, Angelical Minds. Above these is God, their Origin. In Man are likewise two Bodies, one eternal, the Platonists* Vehiculum Cœleste, *immediately informed by the rational Soul; the other corruptible, subject to Sight, consisting of the Elements: Then the vegetative Faculty, by which generated and nourished. The third Part is Sensitive and Motive. The fourth, Rational; by the Latin* Peripateticks *believed the last and most noble Part of the Soul: Yet, above that is the Intellectual and Angelick; the most excellent Part whereof we call the Soul's Union, immediately joining it to God, in a Manner resembling him; as in the other Angels, Beasts, and Plants. About these* Platonists *differ;* Proclus *and* Porphyrius *only allow the rational Part to be immortal;* Zenocrates *and* Speusippus *the sensative also;* Numenius *and* Plotinus, *the whole Soul.*

Sect. XII.

IDEAS have their casual Being in God, their Formal in the first Mind, their Participated in the rational Soul. In God they are not, but produced by him in the Angelick Nature; through this communicated to the Soul, by whom illuminated, when she reflects on her intellectual Parts, she receives the true Forms of Things, Ideas. *Thus differ the Souls of Men from the cœlestial; these in their bodily Functions recede not from the Intellectual, at once contemplating and governing, Bodies ascend to them, they descend not. Those employed in Corporeal Office are deprived of Contemplation, borrowing Science from Sense, to this wholly inclined, full of Errors. Their only Means of Release from this Bondage, is, the amatory Life; which by sensible Beauties, exciting in the Soul a Remembrance of the Intellectual, raiseth her from this terrene Life, to the eternal; by the Flame of Love refined into an Angel.*

[a] In Timæo.

The

The Second PART.

SECT. I.

THE apprehenſive Faculties of the Soul are employed about Truth and Falſhood; aſſenting to one, diſſenting from the other. The firſt is Affirmation, the ſecond Negation. The Deſiderative converſe in good and ill, inclining to this, declining to that. The firſt is Love, the ſecond Hate. Love is diſtinguiſhed by its Objects; if of Riches, termed Covetouſneſs; of Honour, Ambition; of heavenly Things, Piety: of Equals, Friendſhip: Theſe we exclude, and admit no other Signification, but the Deſire to poſſeſs what in itſelf, or at leaſt in our Eſteem is fair; *of a different Nature from the Love of God to his Creatures, who comprehending all, cannot Deſire or want the Beauty and Perfections of another, and from that of Friends which muſt be reciprocal. We therefore with* Plato *define it,* ὄρεξις τοῦ καλοῦ, the Deſire of Beauty. *Deſire is an Inclination to real or apparent Good. As there are divers Kinds of Good, ſo of Deſire. Love is a Species of Deſire, Beauty of Good. Deſire is natural or knowing. All Creatures have a particular Perfection by Participation of the divine Goodneſs. This is their End, including that Degree of Felicity whereof they are capable, to which Centre they tend. This Deſire we call natural; a great Teſtimony of divine Providence, by which they are unwittingly (as an Arrow by the Archer) directed to their Mark. With this all Creatures deſire God, as being the original Good imprinted, and participating in every Particular. This is in every Nature, as more or leſs capable; addreſſed to Ends more or leſs noble; yet, is the ultimate End of all the ſame, to enjoy God, as far as they may: Thus, as the Pſalmiſt,* Every Thing worſhips and praiſeth God; *like Suppliants,* turning and offering themſelves up to him, *ſaith* Theodoret.

Sect. II.

THE other Species of Deſire is employed only about Things known, given by Nature, that to every apprehenſive Faculty, there might be a deſiderative; to embrace what it judgeth good, to refuſe what it eſteemeth evil; in its own Nature inclined to good. None ever deſires to be miſerable; but the apprehenſive Virtue many Times miſtaking evil for good, it oft falls out that the deſiderative (in itſelf blind) deſires evil. This in ſome Senſe may be ſaid voluntary, for none can force it; in another Senſe, not voluntary, deceived by the Judgment of its Companion. This is Plato's *Meaning, when he ſaith,* [a] No Man Sins willingly.

Sect. III.

IT is the Property of every deſiderative Virtue, that he who deſires, poſſeſſeth in Part the Thing he deſires, in Part not; for, if he were wholly deprived of its Poſſeſſion, he would never deſire it: This is verified two Ways. Firſt, nothing is deſired unleſs it be known; and to know a Thing is in ſome Part to poſſeſs it. So Ariſtotle, [b] The Soul is all, becauſe it knows all. *And in the Pſalmiſt God ſaith,* All Things are mine, I know them. *Secondly, there is always ſome Convenience and Reſemblance betwixt the Deſirer and Deſired; every Thing delights and preſerves itſelf by that, which by natural Affinity is moſt conformable to it; by its Contrary is grieved and conſumed. Love is not betwixt Things unlike; Repugnance of two oppoſite Natures is natural Hate; Hate is a Repugnance with Knowledge. Hence it followeth, that the Nature of the Deſired, is in ſome manner in the Deſirer, otherwiſe there would be no Similitude betwixt them; yet imperfectly; elſe it were vain for it to ſeek what it intirely poſſeſſeth.*

Sect. IV.

AS Deſire generally follows Knowledge, ſo ſeveral Knowings are annexed to ſeveral deſiring Powers. We diſtinguiſh the Knowing into three Degrees, Senſe, Reaſon, Intellect, attended by three deſiderative Virtues, Appetite, Election, Will. Appetite is in Brutes, Election in Men, Will in Angels. The Senſe knows only corporeal Things, the Appetite only deſires ſuch; the Angelick Intellect is wholly intent on Contemplation of ſpiritual Conceptions, not inclining to material Things, but when diveſted of Matter, and ſpiritualiz'd, their Will is only fed with intemporal ſpiritual Good. Rational Nature is the Mean betwixt theſe Extremes; ſometimes deſcending to Senſe, ſometimes elevated to Intellect; by its own Election complying with the Deſires of which ſhe pleaſeth. Thus it appears, that corporeal Objects are deſired, either by ſenſual Appetite, or Election of Reaſon inclining to Senſe; Incorporeal by Angelick Will, or the Election of Reaſon, elevated to intellectual Height.

Sect. V.

BEauty in general, is, a Harmony reſulting from ſeveral Things proportionably concurring to

[a] In Timæo, Κακὸς μὲν γὰς ἑκὼν οὐδεὶς

[b] De anima, 3. 9.

conſtitute a Third. *In reſpect of which Temperament, and Mixture of various Natures, agreeing in the Compoſition of one, every Creature is fair; and in this Senſe no ſimple Being is beautiful, not God himſelf; this Beauty begins after him, ariſing from Contrariety, without which is no Compoſition; it being the Union of Contraries, a friendly Enmity, a diſagreeing Cocord; whence* Empedocles *makes Diſcord and Concord the Principles of all Things; by the firſt underſtanding the Variety of the Natures compounding; by the ſecond, their Union; adding, that in God only there is no Diſcord, he not being the Union of ſeveral Natures; but, a pure uncompounded Unity. In theſe Compoſitions the Union neceſſarily predominates over the Contrariety, otherwiſe the Fabrick would be diſſolved. Thus in the Fictions of the Poets,* Venus *loves* Mars; *this Beauty cannot ſubſiſt without Contrariety; ſhe curbs and moderates him, this Temperament allays the Strife betwixt theſe Contraries. And in Aſtrology,* Venus *is placed next to* Mars, *to check his deſtructive Influence; as* Jupiter *next* Saturn, *to abate his Malignity. If* Mars *were always ſubject to* Venus *(the Contrariety of Principles to their due Temper) nothing would ever be diſſolved.*

Sect. VI.

THis is Beauty in the largeſt Senſe, the ſame with Harmony; whence God is ſaid to have framed the World with muſical harmonious Temperament. But Harmony properly implies a melodious Agreement of Voices; and Beauty in a ſtrict Acceptation relates to a proportionable Concord in viſible Things, as Harmony in audible. The Deſire of this Beauty is Love; ariſing only from one knowing Faculty, the Sight; and that gave Plotinus, *(Ennead. 3. lib. 5. 3.) occaſion to derive* ἔρως Love, *from* ὄρασις Sight. *Here the* Platoniſt *may object, If Love be only of viſible Things, how can it be applied to* Ideas, *inviſible Natures? We anſwer, Sight is twofold, corporeal and ſpiritual; the firſt is that of Senſe, the other the intellectual Faculty, by which we agree with Angels; this* Platoniſts *call Sight, the corporeal being only an Image of this. So* Ariſtotle, Intellect is that to the Soul which Sight is to the Body. *Hence is* Minerva *(Wiſdom) by* Homer *called* γλαυκῶπις, *Bright-ey'd. With this Sight* Moſes, *St.* Paul, *and other Saints, beheld the Face of God; this Divines call* intellectual, intuitive Cognition, the beatifical Viſion, the Reward of the Righteous.

Sect. VII.

AS Sight, ſo Beauty (its Object) is twofold, the two Venus's *celebrated by* Plato [Sympoſ.] *and our Poet) ſenſible, called Vulgar* Venus. *Intellectual in* Ideas *(which are the Object of the Intellect, as Colour of Sight) named* Celeſtial *Venus. Love alſo is twofold, Vulgar and Celeſtial; for as* Plato *ſaith* [Sympoſ.] There muſt neceſſarily be as many Lovers as *Veuus's.*

Sect. VIII.

VEnus *then is Beauty, whereof Love is generated; properly his Mother, becauſe Beauty is the Cauſe of Love, not as productive Principle of this Act, to love, but as its Object; the Soul being the efficient Cauſe of it, as of all his Acts; Beauty the material. For in Philoſophy, the efficient is aſſimilated to the Father, the material to the Mother.*

Sect. IX.

CEleſtial Love is an intellectual Deſire of ideal Beauty: Ideas *(as we ſaid before) are the Patterns of Things in God, as in their Fountain; in the Angelick Mind, eſſential; in the Soul by Participation, which with the Subſtance partakes of the Ideas and Beauty of the firſt Mind. Hence it follows, that Love of celeſtial Beauty in the Soul, is not celeſtial Love perfectly, but the neareſt Image of it. Its trueſt Being is with the Deſire of ideal Beauty in the firſt Mind, which God immediately adorns with Ideas.*

Sect. X.

LOve (ſaith Plato) *was begot on* Penia, *by Porus (the Son of* Metis) *in* Jupiter's *Orchard, being drunk with Nectar, when the Gods met to celebrate* Venus's *Birth. Nature in itſelf inform, when it receives Form from God is the Angelick Mind; this Form is Ideas, the firſt Beauty; which in this Deſcent from their divine Fountain, mixing with a different Nature, become imperfect. The firſt Mind, by its Opaciouſneſs eclipſing their Luſtre, deſires that Beauty which they have loſt; this Deſire is Love; begot when* Porus *the Affluence of Ideas mixed with* Penia, *the Indigence of that inform Nature we termed* Jupiter, (1. 8.) *in whoſe Garden the Ideas are planted, with thoſe the firſt Mind adorned, was by the Ancients named* Paradiſe; *to which contemplative Life and eternal Felicity* Zoroaſtres *inviting us, ſaith,* Seek, ſeek Paradiſe. *Our Divines transfer it to the* Cœlum Empyreum, *the Seat of the happy Souls, whoſe Bleſſedneſs conſiſts in Contemplation and Perfection of the Intellect, according to* Plato. *This Love begot on* Venus's *Birth-day, that is, when the ideal Beauty, tho' imperfectly, is infuſed into the Angelick Mind;* Venus *yet as a Child, not grown to Perfection.* All the Gods aſſembled at this Feaſt, *that is, their Ideas; (as by* Saturn *we underſtand both the Planet and his Idea) an Expreſſion borrowed from* Parmenides. *Theſe Gods then are thoſe Ideas that precede* Venus *(ſhe is the Beauty and Grace reſulting from their Variety.)* Invited to a

Banquet

Banquet of Nectar and Ambrosia. *Those whom God feasts with Nectar and Ambrosia, are eternal Beings, the rest not; these Ideas of the Angelick Mind, are the first Eternals;* Porus *was drunk with Nectar, this ideal Affluence fill'd with Eternity; other Ideas were not admitted to the Feast, nor endued with Immortality.*

Orpheus *upon the same Grounds saith, Love was born before all other Gods, in the Bosom of Chaos: Because Nature full of indistinct imperfect Forms (the Mind repleniſhed with confuſed Ideas) desires their Perfection.*

Sect. XI.

THE Angelick Mind desires to make these Ideas perfect, which can only be done by Means opposite to the Causes of their Imperfection, these are Recession from their Principle, and Mixtion with a contrary Nature. Their Remedy, Separation from the unlike Nature, and Return and Conjunction (as far as possible) with God. Love, the Desire of this Beauty, excites the Mind to Conversion and Re-union with him. Every Thing is more perfect as nearer its Principle; this is the first Circle. The Angelick Mind, proceeding from the Union of God, by Revolution of intrinsical Knowledge, returneth to him. Which with the Ancients is Venus adulta, *grown to Perfection. Every Nature that may have this Conversion, is a Circle; such alone are the Intellect and Rational, and therefore only capable of Felicity, the obtaining their first Principle, their ultimate End and highest Good. This is peculiar to immortal Substances, for the material (as both* Platonists *and* Peripateticks *grant) have not this Reflection upon themselves or their Principle. These (the Angelick Mind and rational Soul) are the two intelligible Circles; answerable to which in the corporeal World are two more; the tenth Heaven immovable Image of the first Circle; the celestial Bodies that are moveable, image of the second. The first* Plato *mentions not, as wholly different and irrepresentable by corporeal Nature. Of the second* in Timæo *he saith,* That all the Circles of this visible Heaven *(by him distinguished into the fixed Sphere and seven Planets)* represent as many Circles in the rational Soul.

Some attribute the Name of Circle to God; by the ancient Theologists called Cœlus; *being a Sphere which comprehends all, as the utmost Heaven includes the World.*

In one respect this agrees with God, in another not; the Property of beginning from a Point and returning to it, is repugnant to him, who hath no Beginning, but is himself that indivisible Point from which all Circles begin, and to which they return. And in this Sense it is likewise inconsistent with material Things, they have a Beginning, but cannot return to it.

In many other Properties it agrees with God; he is the most perfect of Beings, this of Figures; neither admit Addition. The last Sphere is the Place of all Bodies, God of all Spirits. The Soul (say Platonists) is not in the Body, but the Body is in the Soul, the Soul in the Mind, the Mind in God, the utmost Place; who is therefore named by the Cabalists, מקום.

Sect. XII.

THE three Graces are Handmaids to Venus; Thalia, Euphrosyne, Aglaia; *Viridity, Gladness, Splendor; Properties attending Ideal Beauty.* Thalia *is the Permanence of every Thing in its entire Being; thus is Youth called green, Man being then in his perfect State, which decays as his Years encrease, into his last Dissolution.* Venus *is Proportion, uniting all Things; Viridity, the Duration of it. In the Ideal World, where is the first* Venus, *is also the first Viridity; for no Intelligible Nature recedes from its Being by growing old. It communicates this Property to sensible Things, as far as they are capable of this* Venus, *that is, as long as their due Proportion continues. The two other Properties of Ideal Beauty are Illustration of the Intellect,* Aglaia; *Repletion of the Will with Desire and Joy,* Euphrosyne.

Of the Graces, one is painted looking toward us: The Continuation of our Being is no reflex Act. The other two with their Faces from us, seeming to return; the Operations of the Intellect and Will are reflexive. What comes from God to us, returns from us to God.

Sect. XIII.

VEnus *is said to be born of the Sea. Matter, the Inform Nature whereof every Creature is compounded, is represented by Water, continually flowing, easily receptable of any Form. This being first in the Angelick Mind, Angels are many Times expres'd by Water, as in the Psalms,* The Waters above the Heavens praise God continually, *so interpreted by* Origen; *and some* Platonists *expound the Ocean (stiled by* Homer, *Father of Gods and Men) this Angelick Mind, Principle, and Fountain of all other Creatures;* Gemistius, Neptune; *as Commander of all Waters, of all Minds, Angelical and Human. This is that living Fountain, whereof he that drinketh shall never thirst; these are the Waters whereon* (David *saith) God hath founded the World.*

Sect. XIV.

POrus *(the Affluence of* Ideas *proceeding from God) is stiled by* Plato *the Son of* Metis, *(Counsel) in Imitation of the Scripture; whence our Saviour, by* Dionysius Areopagus, *is termed* the Angel of Counsel, *that is,* the Messenger of God the Father. *So* Avicen *calls the first Cause conciliative, the Mind not having* Ideas *from itself, but from God, by whose*

Counsel she receiveth Knowledge and Art to frame this visible World.

Sect. XV.

LOVE, [a] *according to* Plato, *is* Youngest and Oldest of the Gods. *They, as all other Things, have a two-fold Being, Ideal, and Natural. The first God in his natural Being was Love, who dispensed theirs to all the rest; the last in his Ideal. Love was born in the Descent of the* Ideas *into the Angelick Mind, which could not be perfect 'till they, its Essence, were made so by Love's Conversion to God. The Angelick Mind owing its Natural Being to* Love, *the other Gods who succeeded this Mind, necessarily are younger than He in their natural Being, though they precede him in their Ideal, as not born till these* Ideas, *though imperfectly, were joined to the informed Nature.*

Sect. XVI.

[b] THE Kingdom of Necessity is said to be before that of Love. *Every Creature consists of two Natures, Material, the imperfect, (which we here understand by Necessity) and Formal, the Occasion of Perfection. That whereof it most partakes is said to be prodominant, and the Creature to be subject to it. Hence is Necessity (Matter) supposed to reign when the* Ideas *were imperfect, and all Imperfections to happen during that Time. All Perfections after Love began his Reign; for, when the Mind was by him converted to God, that which before was imperfect in her, was perfected.*

Sect. XVII.

[c] *VENUS* is said to command Fate. *The Order and Concatenation of Causes and Effects in this sensible World, called Fate, depends on the Order of the Intelligible World, Providence. Hence* Platonists *place Providence (the ordering of* Ideas) *in the first Mind, depending upon God, its ultimate End, to which it leads all other Things. Thus* Venus, *being the Order of those* Ideas, *whereon Fate, the World's Order, depends, commands it.*

Fate is divided into three Parts, Clotho, Lachesis, *and* Atropos. *That which is one in Providence, indivisible in Eternity, when it comes into Time and Fate, is divisible into Past, Present, and Future. Others apply* Atropos *to the fixed Sphero,* Clotho *to the seven Planets,* Lachesis *to sublunary Things.*

Temporal, Corporeal Things only are subjected to Fate; the Rational Soul being Incorporeal, predominates over it, but is subjected to Providence, to serve which is true Liberty; by whom the Will (obeying its Laws) is led to the Acquisition of her desired End. And as often as she endeavours to loose herself from this Servitude, of Free, she becomes a Servant and Slave to Fate, of whom before she was the Mistress. To deviate from the Laws of Providence, is to forsake Reason to follow Sense and Irrational Appetite, which being corporeal, are under Fate. He that serves these, is much more a Servant than those he serves.

Sect. XVIII.

AS from God Ideas *descend into the Angelick Mind, by which the Love of Intellectual Beauty is begot in her, called* Divine Love; *so the same Ideas descend from the Angelick Mind into the Rational Soul, so much the more imperfect in her, as she wants of Angelical Perfection. From these springs* Human Love. Plato *discourseth of the first,* Plotinus *of the latter; who by the same Argument whereby he proves Ideas not Accidental, but Substantial in the* Angelick *Mind, evinceth likewise the specifical Reasons, the* Ideas *in the Soul to be substantial, terming the Soul* Venus, *as having a specious splendid Love, in Respect of these specifical Reasons.*

Sect. XIX.

VULGAR Love is the Appetite of sensible Beauty through corporeal Sight. The Cause of this Beauty is the visible Heaven by its moving Power. As our motive Faculty consists in Muscles and Nerves (the Instruments of its Operation) so the Motive Faculty of Heaven is fitted with a Body proper for Circular Sempiternal Motion; through which Body the Soul (as a Painter with his Pencil) changeth this inferior Matter into various Forms. Thus vulgar Venus (*the Beauty of material Forms*) *hath her casual Being from the moving Power of the Heavens, her Formal from Colour, enlighten'd by the visible Sun, as* Ideas *by the Invisible: her Participate in the Figure and just Order of Parts communicated to Sight by Mediation of Light and Colour, by whose Interest only it procures Love.*

Sect. XX.

AS when the Ideas *descend into the Mind, there ariseth a Desire of enjoying that from whence this Ideal Beauty comes, so when the Species of sensible Beauty flow into the Eye, there springs a two-fold Appetite of Union with that, whence this Beauty is derived, one sensual, the other rational, the Principles of beastial and humane Love. If we follow Sense, we judge the Body wherein we behold this Beauty, to be its Fountain, whence proceeds a Desire of Coition, the most intimate Union with it. This is the Love of irrational Creatures. But Reason knows, that the Body is so far from being its Original, that it is destructive to it, and the more it is severed from the Body, the more it enjoys its own Nature and Dignity. We must not fix with the Species of Sense*

a Sympos. b Plat. Sympos. c Plat. Sympos.

in

in the Body, but refine that Species from all Reliques of corporeal Infection.

And because Man may be understood by the Rational Soul, either considered apart, or in its Union to the Body. In the first Sense, humane Love is the Image of the Celestial; in the second, Desire of sensible Beauty; this being by the Soul abstracted from Matter, and (as much as its Nature will allow) made Intellectual. The greater Part of Men reach no higher than this; others more perfect, remembring that more perfect Beauty which the Soul (before immersed in the Body) beheld, are inflamed with an incredible Desire of reviewing it; in Pursuit whereof, they separate themselves as much as possible from the Body, of which the Soul (returning to its first Dignity) becomes absolute Mistress. This is the Image of celestial Love, by which Man ariseth from one Perfection to another, till his Soul (wholly united to the Intellect) is made an Angel. Purged from material Dross, and transformed into spiritual Flame by this Divine Power, he mounts up to the Intelligible Heaven, and happily rests in his Father's Bosom.

Sect. XXI.

VUlgar Love is only in Souls immersed in Matter, and overcome by it, or at least hindered by Perturbations and Passions. Angelick Love is in the Intellect, eternal as it. Yet but inferr'd, the greater Part turning from the Intellect to sensible Things, and corporeal Cares. But so perfect are these celestial Souls, that they can discharge both Functions, rule the Body, yet not be taken off from Contemplation of Superiors. These the Poets signify by Janus *with two Faces, one looking forward upon sensible Things, the other on intelligible. Less perfect Souls have but one Face, and when they turn that to the Body, cannot see the Intellect, being deprived of their Contemplation; when to the Intellect, cannot see the Body, neglecting the Care thereof. Hence those Souls that must forsake the Intellect, to apply themselves to corporeal Government, are by Divine Providence confined to caduque, corruptible Bodies; loosed from which, they may in a short Time, if they fail not themselves, return to their Intellectual Felicity. Other Souls, not hindered from Speculation, are tied to eternal incorruptible Bodies.*

Celestial Souls then (designed by Janus *as the Principles of Time, Motion intervening) behold the Ideal Beauty in the Intellect, to love it perpetually; and inferior sensible Things, not to desire their Beauty; but to communicate this other to them. Our Souls, before united to the Body, are in like manner double-faced; but are then, as it were, cleft asunder, retaining but one; which, as they turn to either Object, sensual or intellectual, is deprived of the other.*

Thus is vulgar Love inconsistent with the celestial; and many, ravished at the Sight of intellectual Beauty, become blind to sensible; implied by Callimachus, Hymn 5. *in the Fable of* Tyresias, *who viewing* Pallas *naked, lost his Sight; yet, by her, was made a Prophet, closing the Eyes of his Body, she opened those of his Mind; by which he beheld both the present and future. The Ghost of* Achilles, *which inspired* Homer *with all Intellectual Contemplations in Poetry, deprived him of corporeal Sight.*

Though celestial Love liveth eternally in the Intellect of every Soul, yet only those few make use of it, who declining the Care of the Body, can, with St. Paul, *say,* Whether in the Body, or out of the Body they know not. *To which State a Man sometimes arrives, but continues there but a while, as we see in* Ecclesiastes.

Sect. XXII.

THus in our Soul (naturally indifferent to sensible or intelligible Beauty) there may be three Loves; one in the Intellect, Angelical; the second Human; the third Sensual. The two latter are conversant about the same Object, corporeal Beauty; the sensual fixeth its Intention wholly in it; the human separates it from Matter. The greater Part of Mankind go no further than these two; but they whose Understandings are purified by Philosophy, knowing sensible Beauty to be but the Image of another more perfect, leave it, and desire to see the celestial, of which they have already a Taste in their Remembrance, if they persevere in this mental Elevation, they finally obtain it; and recover that, which tho' in them from the Beginning, yet they were not sensible of, being directed by other Objects.

The Sonnet.

I.

LOve, (whose Hand guides my Heart's strict Reins,
Nor, tho' he govern it, disdains
To feed the Fire with pious Care
Which first himself enkindled there.)
Commands my backward Soul to tell
What Flames within her Bosom dwell;
Fear would persuade her to decline
The Charge of such a high Design;
But all her weak Reluctance fails,
'Gainst greater Force no Force avails.
Love to advance her Flight will lend
Those Wings by which he did descend
Into my Heart, where he to rest,
For ever, long since built his Nest:
I, what from thence he dictates, write,
And draw him thus by his own Light.

II.

LOve, flowing from the sacred Spring
Of uncreated Good, I sing;
When born; how Heaven he moves; the Soul
Informs, and doth the World controul;

How

How closely lurking in the Heart,
With his sharp Weapons subtle Art
From heavy Earth he Man unties,
Enforcing him to reach the Skies.
How kindled, how he flames, how burns,
By what Laws guided now he turns
To Heav'n, now to the Earth descends,
Now rests 'twixt both, to neither bends.
Apollo, thee I invocate,
Bowing beneath so great a Weight.
Love, guide me through this dark Design,
And imp my shorter Wings with thine.

III.

WHen from true Heaven the sacred Sun
Into th' Angelick Mind did run,
And with enliven'd Leaves adorn,
Bestowing Form on his First-born;
Inflaming by innate Desires,
She to her chiefest Good aspires;
By which Reversion her rich Breast
With various Figures is impress't;
And by this Love exalted turns
Into the Sun for whom she burns,
This Flame, rais'd by the Light that shin'd
From Heaven into th' Angelick Mind,
Is eldest Love's religious Ray,
By Wealth and Want begot that Day,
When Heav'n brought forth the Queen, whose Hand
The *Cyprian* Sceptre doth command.

IV.

THis born in amorous *Cypris* Arms,
The Sun of her bright Beauty warms.
From this our first Desire accrues,
Which in new Fetters caught, pursues
The honourable Path that guides
Where our eternal Good resides.
By this the Fire, through whose fair Beams
Life from above to Mankind streams,
Is kindled in our Hearts, which glow
Dying, yet dying greater grow;
By this immortal Fountain flows,
Which all Heaven forms below, bestows;
By this descends that Shower of Light
Which upwards doth our Minds invite;
By this th' eternal Sun inspires,
And Souls with sacred Lustre fires.

V.

AS God doth to the Mind dispence
Its Being, Life, Intelligence,
So doth the Mind the Soul acquaint
How t'understand, to move, to paint;
She thus prepar'd the Sun that shines
In the eternal Breasts Designs,
And here what she includes diffuses,
Exciting every Thing that uses
Motion and Sense (beneath her State)
To live, to know, to operate.
Inferior *Venus* hence took Birth;
Who shines in Heaven, but lives on Earth,
And o'er the World her Shadow spreads:
The elder in the Sun's Glass reads
Her Face, through the confused Skreen
Of a dark Shade obscurely seen;
She Lustre from the Sun receives,
And to the other Lustre gives;
Celestial Love on this depends,
The younger, vulgar Love attends.

VI.

FOrm'd by th' eternal Look of God,
From the Sun's most sublime Abode,
The Soul descends into Man's Heart,
Imprinting there with wond'rous Art
What Worth she borrow'd of her Star,
And brough in her celestial Car;
As well as human Matter yields,
She thus her curious Mansion builds;
Yet all those Flames from the divine
Impression differently decline:
The Sun, whose figur'd here, his Beams
Into another's Bosom streams;
In whose agreeing Soul he stays,
And gilds it with his virtuous Rays,
The Heart in which Affection bred,
Is thus by pleasing Error fed.

VII.

THE Heart where pleasing Error reigns,
This Object as her Child maintains,
By the fair Light that in her shines
(A rare celestial Gift) refines;
And by Degrees at last doth bring,
To her first Splendors sacred spring:
From this divine Look, one Sun passes
Through three refulgent Burning-glasses,
Kindling all Beauty, which the Spirit,
The Body, and the Mind inherit.
The rich Spoils, by th' Eye first caught,
Are to the Soul's next Hand-maid brought,
Who there resides: She to the Breast
Sends them; reform'd but not express'd:
The Heart from Matter Beauty takes,
Of many one Conception makes;
And what were meant by Nature's Laws
Distinct, she in one Picture draws.

VIII.

THE Heart by Love allur'd to see
Within herself her Progeny;
This, like the Sun's reflecting Rays
Upon the Water's Face surveys;
Yet some divine, tho' clouded Light
Seems here to twinkle, and invite

The

The pious Soul, a Beauty more
Sublime, and perfect to adore,
Who sees no longer his dim Shade
Upon the Earth's vast Globe display'd,
But certain Lustre of the true
Sun's truest Image now in View.
The Soul thus entring in the Mind,
There such Uncertainty doth find.
That she to clearer Light applies
Her Aims, and near the first Sun flies:
She by his Splendor beauteous grows,
By loving whom all Beauty flows

Upon the Mind, Soul, World, and all
Included in this spacious Ball.

IX.

BUT hold! Love stops the forward Course
That me beyond my Scope would force.
Great Power! If any Soul appears
Who not alone the Blossoms wears,
But of the rich Fruit is possest,
Lend him thy Light, deny the rest.

The THIRD PART.

TO treat of both Loves belongs to different Sciences; vulgar Love to natural or moral Philosophy; divine, to Theology or Metaphysicks. *Solomon* discourseth excellently of the first in *Ecclesiastes*, as a natural Philosopher; in his *Proverbs* as a moral; of the second in his *Canticles*, esteemed the most divine of all the Songs in Scripture.

Stanza I.

The chief Order established by divine Wisdom in created Things, is, that every inferior Nature be immediately governed by the superior, whom, whilst it obeys, it is guarded from all Ill, and led, without any Obstruction, to its determinate Felicity; but, if through too much Affection to its own Liberty, and desire to prefer the licentious Life before the profitable, it rebel from the superior Nature, it falls into a double Inconvenience. First, like a Ship given over by the Pilot, it lights sometimes on one Rock, sometimes on another, without Hope of reaching the Port. Secondly, it loseth the Command it had over the Natures subjected to it, as it hath deprived its Superior of his. Irrational Nature is ruled by another, unfit for its Imperfection to rule any. God by his ineffable Excellence provides for every Thing, himself needs not the Providence of any other. Betwixt the two Extremes, God and Brutes, are Angels and rational Souls, governing others, and governed by others. The first Hierarchy of Angels immediately illuminated by God, enlighten the next under them; the last (by *Platonists* termed *Dæmons*, by the *Hebrews* ב'ש', as Guardians of Men) are set over us as we over Irrationals. So *Psal.* viii. Whilst the Angels continued subject to the divine Power, they retained their Authority over other Creatures; but when *Lucifer* and his Companions, through inordinate Love of his own Excellence, aspired to be equal with God, and to be conserved, as he, by their own Strength, they fell from Glory to extreme Misery; and when they lost the Priviledge they had over others, seeing us freed from their Empire, enviously every Hour insidiate our Good. The same Order is in the lesser World, our Soul: The inferior Faculties are directed by the Superior, whom following they err not. The imaginative corrects the Mistakes of outward Sense; Reason is illuminated by the Intellect, nor do we at any Time miscarry, but when the imaginative will not give Credit to Reason, or Reason, confident of itself, resists the Intellect. In the Desiderative the Appetite is governed by the Rational, the Rational by the Intellectual, which our Poet implies, saying,

[*Love, whose Hand guides my Heart strict Reins.*]

The Cognoscitive Powers are seated in the *Head*, the Desiderative in the *Heart*. In every well ordered Soul, the Appetite is governed by intellectual Love, implied by the Metaphor of *Reins*, borrowed from *Plato* in his *Phædrus*.

[*Love to advance my Flight, will lend*
The Wings by which he did ascend
Into my Heart———]

When any superior Virtue is said to *descend*, we imply not that it leaves its own Heighth to come down to us, but draws us up to it self; its descending to us, is our ascending to it; otherwise such Conjunction would be the Imperfection of the Virtue, not the Perfection of him who receives it.

II.

[*Love flowing from the sacred Spring*
Of uncreated Good——]

From the Fountain of Divine Goodness into our Souls, in which that Influx is terminated.

[*When born*, &c.]

The

The Order, Participation, Converſion of Ideas. See Part 2. Sect.

[——*how Heaven he moves, the Soul*
Informs, and doth the World controul.]

Of theſe three Properties, Love is not the Efficient. God produceth the Ideas in the Angelick Mind, the Mind illuſtrates the Soul with ideal Beauty; Heaven is moved by its proper Soul; but without Love, theſe Principles do not operate; he is the Cauſe of the Mind's Converſion to God, and of the Soul's to the Mind; without which the Ideas would not deſcend into the One, nor the ſpecifick Reaſons into the Other; the Soul not illuminated by theſe, could not elicite this ſenſible Form out of Matter by the Motion of Heaven.

III.

When the firſt Emanation from God (the Plenty of Ideas) deſcended into the Angelick Mind, ſhe, deſiring their Perfection, reverts to God, obtaining of him what ſhe covets; which the more fully ſhe poſſeſſeth, the more fervently ſhe loves. This Deſire (Celeſtial Love) born of the obſcure Mind and Ideas, is explained in this *Stanza:*

[—*true Heaven*—]

God who includes all created Beings, as Heaven all ſenſible, *lib.* 2. Sect. only ſpiritual Things, according to *Platoniſts*, are *true* and real, the reſt but Shadows and Images of theſe.

[——*the ſacred Sun*——]

The Light of Ideas ſtreaming from God.

[——*enlivened Leaves*——]

The Metaphor of *Leaves* relates to the Orchard of *Jupiter*, where theſe Ideas were planted, 2. 10. *Enlivened*, as having in themſelves the Principle of their Operation; Intellection, the nobleſt Life, as the Pſalmiſt, *Give me Underſtanding, and I ſhall live*; ſo the *Cabaliſt* to the ſecond *Sephira*, which is *Wiſdom*, attributes the Name of *Life*.

[—*adorn beſtowing Form*—]

To *Adorn* denotes no more than accidental Perfection; but Ideas are the Subſtance of the Mind; and therefore he adds *beſtowing Form*; which, tho' they come to her from without, ſhe receives not as Accidents, but as her firſt intrinſical Act; which our Author implies, terminates her *Deſires innate*.

[*And by this Love exalted turns*
Into the Sun, for whom ſhe burns.]

Love tranſforms the Lover into the Thing loved.

[—*Wealth and Want*—]

Porus and *Penia*, 2. 10.

IV.

The Properties of Celeſtial Love are in this *Stanza* diſcovered.

[—*In new Fetters caught*—]

The Soul being oppreſs'd by the Body, her Deſire of Intellectual Beauty ſleeps; but awakened by Love, is, by the ſenſible Beauty of the Body, led at laſt to their Fountain, God.

[———*which glow*
Dying, yet glowing greater grow.]

Motion and Operation are the Signs of Life, their Privation Death; in him who applies himſelf to the intellectual Part, the Rational and the Senſitive fail; by the Rational he is Man, by the Intellectual communicates with Angels; as Man he dies, revived an Angel. Thus the Heart dies in the Flames of Intellectual Love; yet conſumes not, but by this Death *grows greater*, receives a new and more ſublime Life. See in *Plato* the Fables of *Alceſtes* and *Orpheus*.

V.

This *Stanza* is a Deſcription of Senſible Beauty.

[*The Elder in the Sun's Glaſs reads*
Her Face thro' the confuſed Screen
Of a dark Shade obſcurely ſeen.]

Senſible Light is the Act and Efficacy of Corporeal; ſpiritual Light, of Intelligible Beauty. Ideas in their Deſcent into the inform Angelick Mind, were as Colours and Figures in the Night. As he who by Moon-light ſeeth ſome fair Object, deſires to view and enjoy it more fully in the Day; ſo the Mind, weakly beholding in herſelf the Ideal Beauty dim and opacous (which our Author calls the *Screen of a dark Shade*) by reaſon of the Night of her Imperfection, turns, like the Moon, to the eternal Sun, to perfect her Beauty by him; to whom, addreſſing herſelf, ſhe becomes intelligible Light, clearing the Beauty of celeſtial *Venus*, and rendring it viſible to the Eye of the firſt Mind.

In

In Senſible Beauty we conſider firſt the Object in itſelf, the ſame at Midnight as at Noon. Secondly, the Light, in a manner the Soul thereof. The Author ſuppoſeth, that as the firſt Part of the Senſible Beauty (corporeal Forms) proceeds from the firſt Part of Intellectual Beauty (ideal Forms) ſo ſenſible Light flows from the Intelligence deſcending upon Ideas.

VI, VII, VIII.

Corporeal Beauty implies, firſt, the material Diſpoſition of the Body, conſiſting of Quantity in the Proportion and Diſtance of Parts; of Quality in Figure and Colour. Secondly, a certain Quality, which cannot be expreſs'd by any Term better than Gracefulneſs, ſhining in all that is fair. This is properly *Venus*, Beauty, which kindles the Fire of Love in Mankind; they who affirm it reſults from the Diſpoſition of the Body, the Sight, Figure, and Colour of Features, are eaſily confuted by Experience. We ſee many Perſons exact and unaccuſtomable, in every Part, deſtitute of this Grace and Comelineſs; others leſs perfect in thoſe particular Conditions, excellently graceful and comely. Thus *Catullus:* Epig. 87.

Many think Quintia *beauteous, fair, and tall,*
And ſtreight ſhe is, apart I grant her all:
But altogether beauteous I deny;
For not one Grace doth that large Shape ſupply.

He grants her Perfection of Quality, Figure and Quantity; yet not allows her handſome, as wanting this Grace. This then muſt, by conſequence, be aſcrib'd to the Soul; which when perfect and lucid, transfuſeth even into the Body ſome Beams of its Splendor. When *Moſes* came from the Divine Viſion in the Mount, his Face did ſhine ſo exceedingly, that the People could not behold it, unleſs veiled. *Porphyrius* relates, that when *Plotinus*'s Soul was elevated by Divine Contemplation, an extraordinary Brightneſs appeared in his Looks. *Plotinus* himſelf avers, that there was never any beautiful Perſon wicked; that this Gracefulneſs in the Body is a certain Sign of Perfection in the Soul. *Prov.* xvii. 24. *Wiſdom ſhineth in the Countenance of the Wiſe.*

From Material Beauty, we aſcend to the firſt Fountain by ſix Degrees. The Soul, through the Sight, repreſents to herſelf the Beauty of ſome particular Perſon, inclines to it, is pleaſed with it; and while ſhe reſts here, is, in the firſt, the moſt imperfect material Degree. 2. She reforms, by her Imagination, the Image ſhe hath received, making it more perfect as more ſpiritual; and ſeparating it from Matter, brings it a little nearer Ideal Beauty. 3. By the Light of the Agent Intellect, abſtracting this Form from all Singularity, ſhe conſiders the Univerſal Nature of Corporeal Beauty by itſelf. This is the higheſt Degree the Soul can reach, whilſt ſhe goes no further than Senſe. 4. Reflecting upon her own Operation, the Knowledge of Univerſal Beauty; and, conſidering that every thing founded in Matter is particular, ſhe concludes this Univerſality proceeds not from the outward Object, but her intrinſical Power; and reaſons thus: If, in the dim Glaſs of material Phantaſms, this Beauty is repreſented by virtue of my Light, it follows, that beholding it in the clear Mirror of my Subſtance, diveſted of thoſe Clouds, it will appear more perſpicuous. Thus turning into herſelf, ſhe finds the Image of Ideal Beauty communicated to her by the Intellect, the Object of Celeſtial Love. 5. She aſcends from this Idea in herſelf, to the Place where celeſtial *Venus* is, in her proper Form; who in Fulneſs of her Beauty, not being comprehenſible by any particular Intellect, ſhe, as much as in her lies, endeavours to be united to the firſt Mind; the chiefeſt of Creatures, and general Habitation of Ideal Beauty, obtaining this, ſhe terminates and fixeth her Journey. This is the ſixth and laſt Degree. They are all imply'd in the 6th, 7th, and 8th *Stanza's.*

[*Form'd by th'eternal Look*, &c.]

Platoniſts affirm ſome Souls are of the Nature of *Saturn*, others of *Jupiter*, or ſome other Planet; meaning, one Soul hath more Conformity in its Nature with the Soul of the Heaven of *Saturn*, than with that of *Jupiter*, and ſo on the contrary; of which there can be no internal Cauſe aſſigned. The External is God, who (as *Plato* in his *Timæus*) *ſoweth and ſcattereth Souls; ſome in the Moon, others in other Planets and Stars, the Inſtruments of Time.*

Many imagine the rational Soul deſcending from her Star, in her *Vehiculum Cæleſte*, of herſelf forms the Body; to which, by that Medium, ſhe is united. Our Author, upon theſe Grounds, ſuppoſeth, that into the *Vehiculum* of the Soul, by her endued with Power to form the Body, is infuſed from her Star a particular formative Virtue, diſtinct, according to that Star. Thus the Aſpect of one is *Saturnina*, of another *Jovial, &c.* in their Looks were read the Nature of their Souls.

But becauſe inferior Matter is not ever obedient to the Stamp, the Virtue of the Soul is not always equally expreſs'd in the viſible Effigies. Hence it happens, that two of the ſame Nature are unlike; the Matter whereof the one conſiſts being leſs diſpoſed to receive that Figure than the other; what in that is compleat, is in this imperfect. Our Author infers, that the Figures of two Bodies being formed by Virtue of the ſame Star, this Conformity begets Love.

[*From the Sun's most sublime Abode.*]

The Tropick of *Cancer*, by which Souls, according to the *Platonists*, descend, ascending by *Capricorn*. *Cancer* is the House of the Moon, who predominates over the vital Parts; *Capricorn*, of *Saturn*, presiding over Contemplation.

[*The Heart in which Affection's bred*
Is thus by pleasing Error fed.]

Frequently, if not always, the Lover believes that which he loves more beauteous than it is; he beholds it in the Image his Soul hath formed of it; so much fairer, as more separate from Matter, the Principle of Deformity. Besides, the Soul is more indulgent in her Affection to this Species, considering it is *her own Child*, produc'd in her Imagination.

[———*one Sun passes*
Thro' three refulgent Burning-Glasses.

One Light flowing from God, beautifies the Angelick, the Rational Nature, and the Sensible World.

[———*the Soul's first Hand-maid*—]

The Imaginative.

[——*to the Breast.*]

The *Breast* and *Heart* here taken for the Soul, because her nearest Lodging; the Fountain of Life and Heat.

[*Reform'd, but not express'd.*]

Reform'd, by the Imagination, from the Deformity of Matter, yet not reduc'd to perfect Immateriality; without which, true Beauty is not express'd.

SPEUSIPPUS.

CHAP. I.

His Life.

SPeucippus [a] was an *Athenian*, born at *Mirrhynus* [which belonged to the *Pandionian* Tribe] his Father named *Eurymedon*, his Mother *Potone*, Sister to *Plato*.

[b] He was brought up in the domestick Documents of his Uncle *Plato*; [c] who (as he used to say) *reformed* Speusippus's *Life after the Pattern of his own.*

[d] *Plato* had four Kinswomen, Daughters of his Nieces; the Eldest of these he married to *Speusippus*, with a small Portion, thirty *Minæ*, which *Dionysius* had sent him. To this Sum, *Chio*, glad of the Occasion, added a Talent, which *Speusippus* earnestly refused; until at last he was overcome by the just Importunities of the other, to receive it; alledging, that he gave it not as Money, but as Kindness; that such Gifts were to be entertained; for they encreased Honour, the rest were dishonourable; that he ought to accept of the Good-will, tho' he despised the Money. The rest of those Virgins were married richly to *Athenians*, only *Speusippus*, who best deserved, was poor. With these Arguments *Speusippus* was induced to accept of *Chio*'s Gift; whereat *Chio* much congratulated his own good Fortune, as having laid hold of an Occasion, *such as, perhaps*, saith he, *I shall not meet again in all my Life.*

[e] When *Dion* came to *Athens*, *Speusippus* was continually in Company with him, more than any other Friend there, by *Plato*'s Advice, to soften and divert *Dion*'s Humour, with a facile Companion, such as he knew *Speusippus* to be; and that withal, he knew discreetly how to observe Time and Place in his Mirth; whence *Timon (in Scillis)* calls him *a good Jester.*

The last Time that *Plato*, upon the Importunity of *Dionysius*, went to *Sicily*, *Speusippus* accompanied him. Whilst they lived at *Syracuse*, *Speusippus* kept more Company with the Citizens than *Plato* did; and insinuating more into their Minds, at first they were afraid to speak freely to him, mistrusting him to be one of *Dionysius*'s Spies. But, within a while, they began to confide in him, and all agreed in this, to pray *Dion* to come to them, and not to take Care for Ships, Men, or Horses, but to hire a Ship for his own Passage; for the *Sicilians* desired no more, than that he would lend them his Name and Person against the Tyrant.

Speusippus, at his Return to *Athens*, persuaded *Dion* to War against *Dionysius*, and deliver *Sicily*

a Laert. 4. 1. b Apul. dogm. Plat. c Plut. de adulat. & amici discrim. d Chio. Epist. 3. e Plut. vit. Dion.

from the Bondage of Tyranny; aſſuring him, the Country would receive him gladly. *Dion*, upon this Information, receiv'd ſuch Encouragement, that he began ſecretly to levy Men. The Philoſophers much advanc'd his Deſign. When he went to *Sicily*, he beſtowed a Country-houſe, which he had purchaſed ſince his coming to *Athens*, upon *Speuſippus*.

CHAP. II.

His Profeſſion of Philoſophy.

[f] *PLATO* dying in the firſt Year of the 108th Olympiad, *Theophilus* being Archon, *Speuſippus* ſucceeded him in the School of the Academy, [g] whom he followed alſo in his Doctrine.

He firſt, as *Theodorus* affirms, look'd into the Community, and mutual Aſſiſtance of Mathematical Diſciplines, as *Plato* did into that of the Philoſophical.

[h] He firſt, according to *Cenæus*, declared thoſe Things, which *Iſocrates* conceived not to be divulged; the fame, perhaps, which [i] *Cicero* calls ἀνεσθήκιον of *Iſocrates*.

[k] He affirmed, that the Mind was not the ſame, either with *Good* or *One*, but of a peculiar Nature proper to itſelf.

[l] He ſet up in the School, which *Plato* had built, the Images of the Graces.

He exacted Money of his Diſciples, contrary to the Cuſtom of *Plato*.

The two Women, who were *Plato*'s Auditors, *Laſthenia* the *Mantinean*, and *Axiothea* the *Philaſian*, heard *Speuſippus* likewiſe.

[m] Having continued *Maſter* of the School eight Years, he, at laſt, by reaſon of his infirm Diſpoſition, much debilitated by the Palſy, ſent to *Xenocrates*, deſiring him to come and take from him the Government of the School, which *Xenocrates* did.

CHAP. III.

His Writings.

HE wrote [n] many Things, chiefly in Philoſophy, Commentaries and Dialogues, of which were,

Ariſtippus *the* Cyrenaick.
Of Riches 1.
Of Pleaſure 1.
Of Juſtice 1.
Of Philoſophy 1.
Of Friendſhip 1.
Of the Gods 1.
The Philoſopher 1.
To Cephalus 1.
Cephalus 1.
Clinomachus, or Lyſias 1.
The Citizen 1.
Of the Soul 1.
To Gryllus 1.
Ariſtippus 1.
The Confutation of Arts 1.
Commentary Dialogues.
Artificial 1.
Dialogues of Likeneſs in Things 10.
Diviſions and Arguments to Things like.
Of the Genus's and Species of Examples.
To Amartirus.
Encomium of Plato.
Epiſtles to Dion, Dionyſius, Philip.
Of Law.
The Mathematician.
Mandrobulus.
Lyſias.
Definitions, of all theſe Writings the only extant.
Orders of Commentaries.
Verſes.

[o] *Phavorinus*, in the ſecond of his Commentaries, ſaith, That *Ariſtotle* paid three Talents for his Books.

CHAP. IV.

His Death.

HE was (as [p] *Timotheus* ſaith) very infirm of Body, [q] inſomuch that he was fain to be carried up and down the Academy in a Kind of a running Chair. Riding in this Manner, he one Day met *Diogenes*, whom ſaluting, he ſaid, Joy be with you: But not with you, anſwered *Diogenes*, who can endure to live, being in that Condition. At length he died willingly through Grief, as *Laertius* affirms, who elſewhere citing *Plutarch*, in the Lives of *Lyſander* and *Scylla*, ſaith, he died of the *Phthiriaſis*; but there is no ſuch Thing extant in *Plutarch*.

[r] Tho' he followed *Plato* in his Opinions, yet he did not imitate his Temper; for he was auſtere, cholerick, and had not ſo great Command over his Pleaſures. In Anger he threw a Dog into a Well, and indulging to Pleaſure, he went to the Marriage of *Caſſander* in *Macedonia*. He was alſo ſo great a Lover of Money, that ſome Poems which he had written, not very good, he ſung publickly for Gain; for which Vices, *Dionyſius* writing to him, thus derides him: *And we may learn Philoſophy from our* Arcadian *She-Scholar.* Plato *took no Money of his Scholars, you exact it whether they are willing or not.* *Athenæus* [s] cites the ſame Epiſtle, after he had reproached him for Avarice and Voluptuouſneſs, he

[f] Laert. 4. 1. [g] Ibid. 4. 2. [h] Ibid. [i] Epiſt. ad At. 2. 1. [k] Stob. Phyſ. 1. 1. [l] Laert. 4. 1. 2. [m] Ibid. 4. 3. [n] Laert. ibid. Suid. [o] Ibid. [p] Laert. 4. 3. [q] Ibid. [r] Ibid. 4. 1. [s] Deipn. lib. 7.

objects his Collections of Money from many Persons; his Love to *Lasthenia* the *Sardian* Courtezan; after all this adding, *Why do you accuse us of Avarice, who yourself admit not any sordid Way of Gain? Did not you, after* Hermias's *Debt was satisfied, make Collections in his Name amongst his Friends, to your own Use?*

To a rich Man in love with a deformed Person *What need you her*, saith he, *for ten Talents you may have a handsomer* [t].

To him *Simonides* wrote Histories, wherein he related the Actions of *Dion* and *Bion*.

There was another *Speusippus*, a Physician of *Alexandria*.

t Laert. 4. 4.

XENOCRATES.

CHAP. I.

His Country, Parents, and living with Plato.

Xenocrates was of *Chalcedon*, Son of [u] *Agatho*, or [w] *Agathenor*. From the Years of his Life 82, which in all Probability ended when *Polemo* succeeded in the School, the first Year of the 116th Olympiad. It may be gathered, that he was born in the fourth Year of the 95th Olympiad. He heard *Plato* from his Childhood. He was dull of Apprehension; whence *Plato* comparing him *Aristotle*, said *One needs a Spur, the other a Bridle; what an Ass and what a Horse have I to yoke together!* He was severe, and had a sad Look, for which Reason *Plato* oft said to him, *Xenocrates, Sacrifice to the Graces*, which was an usual Phrase to melancholly People. [x] Another Time *Plato* sharply reprehended the Roughness of his Disposition, which he took quietly and unmoved, saying to one that instigated him to reply in his own Defence, *No, this is an Advantage to me.*

[y] He accompanied *Plato* in his Voyage to *Sicily*, where [z] at a drinking Feast, with *Dionysius*, being honoured with a Wreath of Gold, instead of a Garland of Flowers, which were bestowed upon the Guests upon such Occasions, when he went away, he put it upon the Statue of *Mercury*, where they used to leave their ordinary Garments.

[a] When *Dionysius* fell out with *Plato*, and threatened to find one that should cut off his Head, *Xenocrates* made Answer, *not before he hath cut off this*, shewing his own.

[b] *Ælian* saith, that *Xenocrates* having taken a Journey into his own Country, *Aristotle* with his Disciples came to *Plato*. *Speusippus* was at that Time sick, and therefore could not be with *Plato*. *Plato* being fourscore Years old, (which falls upon the fourth Year of the 107th Olympiad, the Year before his Death) his Memory through Age much decay'd, *Aristotle* fell upon him with subtle sophistical Questions, whereupon *Plato* gave over walking in publick, and retired with his Friends to his own House. At the End of the three Months *Xenocrates* returning from his Travel, finds *Aristotle* walking where he had left *Plato*, and seeing that he and his Friends, when they went out of the School went not to *Plato*, but to some other Part of the City, he asked one there present, what was become of *Plato*, thinking he had been sick; the other answered, he is not sick, but *Aristotle* hath molested him, and driven him out of the School, so that now he teacheth Philosophy in his own Garden. *Xenocrates* hearing this, went immediately to *Plato*, whom he found discoursing to his Disciples, Persons of great Worth and Eminence. As soon as he had ended his Discourse, he saluted *Xenocrates*, as he used, very kindly, and *Xenocrates* him. When the Company was dismist, *Xenocrates*, without speaking a Word of it to *Plato*, getting his Friends together, after he had chid *Speusippus* for permitting *Aristotle* to possess the School, made a Head against *Aristotle*, and opposed him with his utmost Force, until as last he re-instated him in the School. Thus *Ælian*. But this Story, which he acknowledgeth to have taken upon no better Authority than vulgar Report, disagrees with many Circumstances of *Aristotle*'s Life, supported by far more credible Testimonies.

CHAP. II.

His Profession of Philosophy.

After *Speusippus* had held the School eight Years, finding himself not able to continue that Charge any longer, he sent to *Xenocrates*, intreating him to take it upon him, which *Xenocrates* did [c] in the second Year of the 110th Olympiad, *Lysimachides* being Archon, not without Emulation and Dissention with the Peripateticks, for [d] *Aristotle*, at his

u Laert. 4. 6. w Suid. x Ælian. 14. 9. y Laert. 4. 1. z Ath. Deipn. a Laert. 4. 11. b Var. hist. 3. 19. c Laert. 4. 3. d Laert. vit. Arist.

Return

Return out of *Macedonia*, finding *Xenocrates* poſſeſſed of the Academy, inſtituted a School in Oppoſition to him, in the *Lycæum*, ſaying,

Silent to be now moſt diſgraceful were,
And ſee Xenocrates *poſſeſs the Chair.*

[e] Some affirm, that *Alexander* falling out with *Ariſtotle*, to vex him, ſent a Preſent to *Xenocrates* of [f] fifty Talents, whereof *Xenocrates* took but 3000 Atticks, and ſent back the reſt, ſaying, *That he needed it moſt that was to maintain ſo many.* Or as [g] *Stobæus* relates it, having entertained the Meſſenger after his uſual Faſhion, *Go and tell* Alexander, ſaith he, *that after the Rate I live, I ſhall not need fifty Talents in all my Life.* [h] The Money being brought back to *Alexander*, he asked, if *Xenocrates* had not any Friend, adding, that as for his own Friends, the Wealth of *Darius* was too little for them.

[i] He aſſerted *Unity* and *Duality* to be *Gods*; the firſt as it were Maſculine, in the Nature of a Father, reigning in Heaven, whom he called alſo *Jupiter*, the *Odd*, and the *Mind*. The other, as it were female, and the Mother commanding all Things under Heaven. This he called the Mind of the Univerſe. He likewiſe aſſerts Heaven to be divine, and the fiery Stars to be Olympian Gods, the reſt ſublunary inviſible Deities, which permeate through the Elements of Matter, whereof that which paſſeth through the Air is called *Juno*, that which through the Water *Neptune*, that which through the Earth *Ceres*. This the Stoicks borrowed from him, as he the former from *Plato*.

[k] He continued Maſter of the School twenty five Years, until the firſt Year of the hundred and ſixth Olympiad; then his Diſciple *Polemo* ſucceeded him. During that Time, he lived very retired in the Academy; and if at any Time he went into the City, all the Tradeſmen and other People thronged to ſee him.

CHAP. III.

His Virtues and Apothegms.

AMongſt his other Virtues, he was [l] very remarkable for his Continence, of which there is this Inſtance: *Phryne*, a famous *Athenian* Courtezan, having laid a Wager with ſome young Men his Diſciples, that he could not reſiſt her Enticements, ſtole privately into his Bed. The next Morning being queſtioned and laught at by his Diſciples, ſhe ſaid, the Wager they laid was of a Man, not of a Stone. To this End he uſed to mortify himſelf by Inciſion, and cauteriſing of his Fleſh.

[m] His Wiſdom and Sanctity was much reverenced by the *Athenians*; for being to give his Teſtimony, and to ſwear, as the Cuſtom was, that he ſpoke nothing but Truth, the Judges all roſe up, and cried out, that he ſhould not ſwear, indulging that to his Sincerity which they did not allow to one another.

[n] Being ſent with others to *Philip* on an Embaſſy, the reſt received Gifts from him, and went to treat in private with him; *Xenocrates* did neither, and for that Part was not invited by him. The Ambaſſadors returning to *Athens* ſaid, that *Xenocrates* went along with them to no Purpoſe: Whereupon the *Athenians* were ready to impoſe a Mulct upon him; but when they underſtood by him, that they were at that Time to conſider chiefly concerning the Commonwealth, *Philip* having corrupted the reſt with Gifts, and that he would not accept any, they beſtowed double Honours upon him. *Philip* ſaid afterwards, that of thoſe who came to him, only *Xenocrates* would not take any Gifts.

Being ſent in the Time of the *Lamiack* War (which was about the ſecond Year of the hundred and fourth Olympiad) Ambaſſador to *Antipater*, about the Redemption of ſome *Athenian* Priſoners, *Antipater* invited him to ſit down to Supper, whereto he anſwered in the Words of *Ulyſſes* in *Homer*:

O Circe, *what Man is there that is good,*
Before his Friends are freed, can think of Food.

Antipater was ſo pleaſed with the ingenious Application of theſe Verſes, that he cauſed the Priſoners immediately to be ſet at Liberty.

[o] His Clemency, ſaith *Ælian*, extended not only to Men, but, often to irrational Creatures; as once, when a Sparrow, purſued by a Hawk, flew to his Boſom, he took it, much pleaſed, and hid it till the Enemy were out of Sight; and when he thought it was out of Fear and Danger, opening his Boſom, he let it go, ſaying, that he had not betrayed a Suppliant.

[p] *Dion* deriding him, he refuſed to make any Anſwer in his own Defence; for, a Tragedy, ſaith he, being mocked by a Comedy, needs not a Reply.

To one, who tho' he neither had learned Muſick, Geometry, nor Aſtronomy, yet deſired to be his Diſciple; *Away*, ſaith he, *you have not the Handles of Philoſophy.* Some affirm he ſaid, *I teach not to card Wool.*

Antipater coming to *Athens*, met and ſaluted him; which Salute he returned not, until he had made an End of the Diſcourſe he was about.

[q] He was nothing proud. He aſſigned a particular Buſineſs to every Part of the Day; a great Part thereof to Meditation; one Part to Silence.

e Laert. vit. Ariſt. f Laert. vit. Xen. g Ethick. Serm. 37. h Stob. Eth. Serm. 74. i Stob. Eth. Phyſ. 58. k Laert. 4. 14. l Laert. 4. 7. Val. Max. 4. 3. m Val. Max. 2. 10. Cic. ad Attic. 1. 16. n Laert. 4. 8. o Æl. var. hiſt. 30. 3. Laert. p Laert. 4. 10. q Laert. ibid. Stob. Eth. 23.

When-

[r] Whenſoever he pierced a Veſſel of Wine, it was ſoured before he ſpent it, and the Broths that were made for him, were often thrown away the next Day; whence proverbially was uſed, *the Cheeſe of* Xenocrates, of Things that laſt well, and are not eaſily conſumed.

[s] Holding his Peace at ſome detractive Diſcourſe, [t]hey asked him why he ſpoke not? Becauſe, [f]aith he, I have ſometimes repented of ſpeaking, but never of holding my Peace.

Yet this Man, ſaith *Laertius*, becauſe he could not pay the Fine impoſed upon Aliens, the *Athenians* ſold. *Demetrius Phalerius* bought him, contenting both Parties, the *Athenians* with their Tribute, *Xenocrates* with his Liberty.

CHAP. IV.

His Writings.

HE [t] left many Writings, Verſes, Exhortations, and Orations, their Titles theſe.

Of Nature 6 Books.
Of Wiſdom 6.
Of Riches 1.
Arcas 1.
Of Indefinite 1.
Of a Child 1.
Of Continence 1.
Of Profitable 1.
Of Free 1.
Of Death 1. which ſome conceive to be the ſame with that which is extant amongſt the ſpurious *Platonick* Dialogues, under the Title of *Axiochus*.
Of Voluntary 1.
Of Friendſhip 2.
Of Equity 1.
Of Contrary 2.
Of Beatitude 2.
Of Writing 1.
Of Memory 1.
Of Falſe 1.
Callicles 1.
Of Prudence 2.
Oeconomick 1.
Of Temperance 1.
Of the Power of Law 1.
Of a Common-wealth 1.
Of Sanctity 1.
That Virtue may be taught 1.
Of Ens 1.
Of Fate 1.
Of Paſſions 1.
Of Lives 1.
Of Concord 1.
Of Diſciples 2.
Of Juſtice 1.
Of Virtue 2.
Of Species 1.
Of Pleaſure 2.
Of Life 1.
Of Fortitude 1.
Of One 1.
Of Ideas 1.
Of Art 1.
Of Gods 2.
Of the Soul 2.
Of Science 1.
Politick 1.
Of Scientificks 1.
Of Philoſophy 1.
Of Parmenides's Opinions 1.
Archidemus, or of Juſtice 1.
Of Good 1.
Of Things which pertain to Intellect 8.
Solutions concerning Speech 1.
Phyſical Auſcultation 6.
A Summary 1.
Of Genus's and Species 1.
Pythagorean Aſſertions 1.
Solutions 2.
Diviſions 8.
Poſitions 3.
Of Dialectick 14, & 15, & 16.
Of Diſciplines concerning Diſtinctions 9.
Concerning Ratiocination 9.
Concerning Intelligence 4.
Of Diſciplines 6.
Concerning Intelligence 2.
Of Geometry 5.
Commentaries 1.
Contraries 1.
Of Numbers 1.
Theory of Arithmetick 1.
Of Intervals 1.
Aſtrologick 6.
Elements, to Alexander *concerning a Kingdom* 4.
To Arybas.
To Hephæſtion.
Of Geometry 2.
Verſes 345.

CHAP. V.

His Death.

HE [u] died in the 82d Year of his Age, by a Fall in the Night into the Baſin (wherein he was drowned) probably in the firſt Year of the 116th Olympiad, for in that Year *Polemo* his Succeſſor took upon him the School.

Laertius ſaith, there were ſix more of his Name, but mentions only five. One, very ancient, skilful in Tacticks; another of the ſame City and Family with this Philoſopher, Author of the Oration

r Sob. Serm. 39. s Val. Max. 7. 2. t Laert. 4. 11. u Ibid. 4. 15.

upon

upon the Death of *Arſinoe*; the fourth, ſaith he, a Philoſopher, who writ in Elegiack Verſe, but not happily, perhaps the ſame, who, *Suidas* ſaith, was nothing inferior to this *Xenocrates* for Continence; the fifth, a Statuary; the ſixth a Writer of Songs, as *Ariſtoxenus* affirms.

POLEMO.

[w] POLEMO was an *Athenian* of *Oea*, (a Town belonging to the *Oenian* Tribe) his Father *Philoſtratus* who (according to [x] *Antigonus Caryſtius*) was a Citizen of great Account, and kept a Chariot and Horſes.

[y] *Polemo*, in his Youth, was very intemperate and diſſolute. He frequently took a Sum of Money, and hid it in a private Corner of ſome Street, to ſupply his Extravagancies upon Occaſion. Even in the Academy were found three *Oboli*, which he had hid under a Pillar, upon the ſame Account. This Wildneſs cauſed Diſcontent betwixt him and his Wife, who, thinking herſelf not well uſed by him, accuſed him ὡς μειρακίοις ὁμιλοῦντα.

[z] Neither did he delight (ſaith *Valerius Maximus*) in Luxury only, but even in the Infamy thereof. On a Time, coming from a Feaſt, not after the ſetting but riſing of the Sun; and ſeeing the Door of *Xenocrates* the Philoſopher open, full of Wine, ſmelling ſweet of Unguents, crowned with Garlands, richly attired, he ruſhed into his School, which was filled with a Crowd of learned Perſons. Not contented with ſo rude an Intruſion, he ſat down alſo, intending to make Sport at his excellent Eloquence, and prudent Precepts. Hereupon, all were offended as the Affront deſerved; only *Zenocrates*, continuing the ſame Countenance and Geſture, fell from the Diſcourſe in which he was, and began to ſpeak of Modeſty and Temperance; with the Gravity of whoſe Diſcourſe, *Polemo* being reduced to Repentance, firſt took his Garland off from his Head, and flung it on the Ground. Soon after, he withdrew his Arm within his Cloak; next, he laid aſide the Cheerfulneſs of that Look which he had formerly, when he affected Feaſting. Laſtly, he wholly diveſted himſelf of Luxury, and being thus cured by the wholeſome Medicine of one Diſcourſe, he, from an infamous Prodigal, became a moſt excellent Philoſopher; being [a] from that Time forward ſo addicted to Study, that he ſurpaſſed all the reſt, and ſucceeded *Zenocrates* in the Government of the School, which he began in the firſt Year of the 116th Olympiad.

After he began to ſtudy Philoſophy, he had ſuch a conſtant Behaviour, that he retained always the ſame Countenance, and kept the ſame Tone in all his Speech, whereby *Crantor* was taken with him. A mad Dog having bit him by the Knee, he alone of all the Company ſeem'd to be unconcerned in it, and a Tumult happening thereupon in the City, he asked, without any Diſturbance, what was the Matter? In the Theatres alſo, he was nothing moved. When *Nicoſtratus* the Poet, ſirnamed *Clytemneſtra*, recited ſomething to him and *Crates*, *Crates* was much taken therewith, but he made no more Show than as if he had heard nothing, and was altogether ſuch as *Melanthius* the Painter, in his Books of Picture, hath deſcribed him; for he ſaith, in his Actions was expreſſed a Stubbornneſs and Hardneſs.

Polemo uſed to ſay, we ought to exerciſe ourſelves in Things, not in Dialectick Diſciplines, leſt, ſatisfying ourſelves with the Taſte and Meditation of the ſuperficial Parts of Science, we become admired for Subtilty in Diſcourſe, but contradict ourſelves in the Practice of our Life.

He was facete and ingenious, ſhunning that which *Ariſtophanes* imputes to *Euripides*, Sowerneſs and Harſhneſs. He taught, not ſitting, but walking. The *Athenians* much honour'd him for his great Integrity. He took great Delight in Solitude, whence (for the moſt Part) he dwelt in a Garden, about which his Diſciples built themſelves little Lodges, near to his School. He was a ſtudious Imitator of *Xenocrates* (who, *Ariſtippus* ſaith, much loved him) always remembring his Innocence, Severity, and Gravity; to which, like a Dorick Meaſure, he conformed his own Steps.

Antigonus Caryſtius ſaith [b], that from the thirtieth Year of his Age to his Death, he drank nothing but Water.

[c] He held, that the World is God.

He much affected *Sophocles*, chiefly in thoſe Places where (to uſe the Phraſe of the Comick Poet) *a Moloſſian Dog ſeemeth to have written together with him.* And whereas *Phrynicus* ſaith he was

Not ſweet, nor flat, but gently ſmooth; he ſaid, that *Homer* was an Epick *Sophocles*, *Sophocles* a Tragick *Homer*.

He died very old of a Conſumption, and left behind him many Writings. *Laertius* hath this Epigram upon him.

w Laert. 4. 16. x Laert. 4. 17. y Laert. ibid. z 6. 7. a Laert. 4. 16. b Ath. Deipn. lib. 2. c Stob. Phyſ. 1. 3.

Wert thou not told, that Polemo *lies here,*
On whom ſlow Sickneſs (Man's worſt Paſſion) prey'd?
No, 'tis the Robe of Fleſh he us'd to wear,
Which, e'er to Heaven he mounted, down he laid.

Of his Diſciples are remember'd, *Crates*, *Zeno* the Stoick, and *Arceſilaus*.

CRATES.

CRATES [d] was a *Thriaſian*, Son of *Antigenes*. He was an Auditor of *Polemo*, and loved by him. He ſucceeded him in the Government of his School. They both profited ſo much by one another, that, living, they not only followed the ſame Inſtitutes, but, even to their laſt Ends, were alike; and, being dead, were buried in the ſame Sepulchre. Upon which Occaſion, *Antagorus* writ thus upon them both.

Whoe'er thou art, ſay, e'er thou paſſeſt by,
Crates *and* Polemo *here buried lie.*
Both for their mutual Love no leſs admir'd,
Than for their Eloquence, by which inſpir'd,
O'th' Wiſdom they profeſs'd the Age was proud,
Yet gladly to their ſacred Precepts bow'd.

Hence *Arceſilaus*, when he went from *Theophraſtus*, and applied himſelf to them, ſaid, *They were Gods, or certain Reliques of the Golden Age.*

They were nothing popular, but what *Dionyſiodorus*, an ancient Muſician, was wont to ſay, may be applied to theſe, when he boaſted, that none had ever heard him ſing, as they had *Iſmenius*; nor had ever ſeen him in a Ship, or at the Fountains.

Antigonus ſaith, that he ſojourned at *Crantor*'s, when he and *Arceſilaus* lived moſt friendly, and that *Arceſilaus* dwelt with *Crantor*, *Polemo* with *Crates*, together with *Lyſicles*, who was one of the Citizens; and truly, *Polemo*, as is before mentioned, loved *Crates*; *Crantor*, *Arceſilaus*. But *Crates* dying, as *Apollodorus* in the third of his Chronicle, left Books which he had written, partly of Philoſophy, partly of Comedy; Orations ſuited for publick Pleading, or Embaſſy.

He had many eminent Diſciples; of whom was *Arceſilaus*, and *Bion* the *Boriſthenite*, afterwards called a *Theodorean*, from that Sect.

There were ten of this Name. The *Firſt* an ancient Comick Poet.

The *Second*, an Orator, of the Family of *Iſocrates*.

The *Third*, an Engineer, that went along with *Alexander* in his Expeditions.

The *Fourth*, a Cynick.

The *Fifth*, a Peripatetick.

The *Sixth*, this Academick.

The *Seventh*, a Grammarian.

The *Eighth* writ of Geometry.

The *Ninth*, an Epigrammatick Poet.

The *Tenth*, of *Tarſis*, an Academick Philoſopher.

[d] Laert. 4. 21.

CRANTOR.

CRANTOR [e] was of *Soli*, much admired in his own Country. He came to *Athens*, where he heard *Xenocrates*, and ſtudied with *Polemo*.

He writ Commentaries, 3000 Verſes, whereof ſome aſcribe Part to *Arceſilaus*.

Being asked how he came to be taken with *Polemo*, he anſwered, from the Tone of his Speech, never exalted nor depreſſed.

Falling ſick, he went to the Temple of *Æſculapius*, and walked there; where many reſorted to him from ſeveral Parts, not thinking he ſtayed in reſpect of his Sickneſs, but that he meant to erect a School in that Place. Amongſt the reſt came *Arceſilaus*, whom, tho' he loved him very much, he recommended to *Polemo*, whom he himſelf, after his Recovery, heard alſo, and was extreamly taken with him.

He bequeathed his Eſtate, amounting to twelve Talents, to *Arceſilaus*, who asking him where he would be buried, he anſwered,

In Earth's kind Boſom happy 'tis to lie.

[e] Laert. 8. 24.

He is said to have written Poems, and to have depositeed them, sealed up in his own Country, in the Temple of *Minerva*. Of him thus *Theætetus*.

Pleasing to Men, but to the Muses more,
Crantor *too soon of Life was dispossest;*
Earth his cold Body we to thee restore;
That in thy Arms he peacefully may rest.

Crantor, above all, admired *Homer* and *Euripides*, saying, It was hard, in proper Language, to speak at once tragically and passionately; and quoted this Verse out of his *Bellerophon*.

Alas, yet why alas,
Through such Fate Mortals pass,

Antagoras the Poet alledgeth these Verses, as written by him.

[f] *My Soul's in Doubt, for doubtless is his Race,*
Whether I Love first of all Gods shall place;
Which drew from Erebus *their old Descent,*
And Night beyond the Ocean's vast Extent:
Or whether to bright Venus, *or to Earth,*
Thou ow'st thy double Form, and sacred Birth.

He was very ingenious in imposing apt Names. He said of an ill Poet, that his Verses were full of Moths; and of *Theophrastus*, that his Theses were written in a Shell.

He wrote a Treatise concerning Grief, which was generally much admired, as *Cicero* and *Laertius* attest.

He died before *Polemo* and *Crates*, of the Dropsy.

f Read Ἐν δοῖῃ μοι θυμὸς, ὅπποι, &c. as Callimachus, hymn. 1. Ἐν δοιῇ μάλα θυμὸς, ἐπεὶ γένος ἀμφήριστον, one doubtless imitating the other, which both the Interpreters not observing, have strangely rendered this Place.

ARCESILAUS.

CHAP. I.

His Country, Parents, Teachers.

[g] ARcesilaus (whom *Cicero* calls *Acesilas*) was a *Pitanean* of *Æolis*. His Father, according to *Apollodorus*, in the third of his Chronologicks, named *Seuthus*, or, as others, *Scythus*. He was the youngest of four Brethren, two by the same Father, only the other by the same Mother; the eldest was named *Pylades*. Of those who had the same Father, the eldest was *Mæreas*, Guardian to his Brother *Arcesilaus*.

He was born, by Computation from his Death, (which was in the fourth Year of the [h] hundred thirty and fourth Olympiad, the seventy fifth of his Age) in the first Year of the hundred and sixteenth Olympiad.

He first heard *Autolychus* the Mathematician, his Countryman, before he came to *Athens*, with whom he travelled to *Sardis*.

Next he heard *Xanthus* an *Athenian*, a Master of Musick.

He heard also *Hipponicus* the Geometrician, who, excepting his Skill in that Art, was otherwise a gaping dull Fellow; for which *Arcesilaus* deriding him, said, *Geometry flew into his Mouth as he gaped.* Of *Hipponicus* falling mad, he took so great Care, that he brought him to his own House, and kept him there until he was quite cured.

He likewise, by the Compulsion of his Brother, studied Rhetorick, and being by Nature vehement in Discourse, and of indefatigable Industry, he addicted himself likewise to Poetry. There is an Epigram of his extant upon *Attalus*, to this Effect.

For Arms and Horses oft hath been the Name
Of Pergamus *through* Pisa *spread by Fame;*
But now shall (if a Mortal may divine)
To future Times with greater Glory shine.

There is another Epigram of his upon *Menodorus*, Son of *Eudemus*.

Far hence is Thyatire, *far* Phrygian *Earth,*
Whence Menodore *thou didst derive thy Birth.*
But down to Acheron *unpierc'd by Day,*
From any Place thou knew'st the ready Way.
To thee this Tomb Eudemus *dedicates,*
Whom Love hath wealthy made, tho' poor the Fates.

Although his Brother *Mæreas* would have had him professed Rhetorick, yet was he naturally more inclined to Philosophy; to which End, he first became a Hearer of *Theophrastus*; in which Time, *Crantor* being much taken with him, spoke that Verse of *Euripides* to him, out of his *Andromeda*.

g Laert. 4. 28. h Aldobrandinus his Edition reads the 130.

Maid, if I save thee, wilt thou thankful be?

He answered in the following Verse.

Stranger, for Wife or Slave accept of me.

From thence forward they lived in intimate Friendship; whereat *Theophrastus* troubled, said, *He had lost a Youth of extraordinary Wit, and Quickness of Apprehension.*

He emulated *Pyrrho*, as some affirm, and studied Dialectick, and the Eretriack Philosophy, whence *Aristo* said of him;

Pyrrho *beyond*, Plato *before*,
And in the Middle Diodore.

And *Timon*,

Next leaden Menedemus *he pursues*,
And Pyrrho *doth, or* Diodorus *chooses*.

And soon after maketh him say thus;

I'll swim to Pyrrho, *and crook'd* Diodore.

He was a great Admirer of *Plato*, whose Books he had.

CHAP. II.

Upon what Occasion he constituted the Middle Academy.

[i] *CRATES* dying, *Arcesilaus* took upon him the Government of the School, which was yielded to him by *Socratides*. Being possessed of that Place, he altered the Doctrine and Manner of Teaching, which had been observed by *Plato* and his Successors, upon this Occasion.

Plato and his Followers, down to *Arcesilaus*, held, (as was said) That there are two Kinds of Things, some perceptible by *Sense*, others perceptible only by [k] *Intellect*. That from the latter ariseth *Science*, from the former *Opinion*. That the *Mind* only seeth that which always is simple, and in the same Manner, and such as it is, that is, *Ideas*. But that the *Senses* are all dull and slow, neither can they perceive those Things which seem subjected to Sense, because either they are so little, that they cannot fall beneath Sense, or so moveable and transient, that not one of them is constant, or the same, but all are in continual Lapse and Fluxion. Hence they called all this Part of Things *Opinionable*, affirming that Science is no where, but in the Notions and Reasons of the Mind.

[l] Yet did they profess against those who said, the Academy took away all Sense; for they affirmed not, that there was no such Thing as Colour, or Taste, or Sapor, or Sound; but only maintained, there was no proper Mark of true and certain in the Senses, there being no such any where.

[m] Hence they allowed, that we make Use of the Senses in Actions, from the Reason that appeareth out of them; but, to trust them as absolutely true and infallible, they allowed not.

Thus held the *Academicks* down to *Polemo*, [n] of whom *Arcesilaus* and *Zeno* were constant Auditors; but *Zeno* being older than *Arcesilaus*, and a very subtile Disputant, endeavoured to correct his Doctrine; not that, as *Theophrastus* saith, he did enervate Virtue, but, on the contrary, he placed all Things that are reckoned among the Good, in Virtue only; and this he called *Honest*, as being simple, sole, one Good. Of the rest, though neither Good nor Evil, he held that some were *according to Nature*, others *contrary to Nature*, others *mediate*. Those which are according to Nature, he held to be *worthy Estimation*, the contrary *contrary*; the Neuter he left *betwixt both*, in which he placed no Value. Of those which are eligible, some were of more Estimation, some of less; those which were of more he called *preferred*, those of less *rejected*. And as in these he did not change so much the Things themselves as the Words, so betwixt a *Rectitude* and a *Sin*, an *Office* and a *Præter-Office*. He placed some Things mediate, holding that Rectitudes consisted only in good Actions, Sins in Evil; but Offices either performed or omitted, he conceived mediate Things. And whereas the Philosophers of the *old Academy* did not hold all Virtue to consist in Reason, but some Virtues to be perfected by Nature or Custom; *Zeno*, on the contrary, placed all Virtue in Reason: And whereas the *Academicks* held, (as we said in the Life of *Plato*) That all those Virtues may be separated, *Zeno* maintained that could not be, averring, that not only the Use of Virtue (as the *Academicks* held) but the Habit thereof was excellent in itself, neither had any one Virtue, who did not always make Use of it. And whereas the *Academicks* took not away Passion from Man, affirming that we are subject to Compassion, Desire, Fear, and Joy, by Nature; but only contracted them, and reduced them within narrower Limits; *Zeno* affirmed, that from all these, as from so many Diseases, a wise Man must be free. And whereas they held, that all Passions were natural and irrational, and placed in one Part of the Soul, Concupiscence, in the other Reason. Neither did *Zeno* herein agree with them, for he asserted, that Passions are voluntary, that Opinions are taken up by Judgment, that immoderate Intemperance is the Mother of all Passion. Thus much for *Ethicks*.

[o] As to *Physick*, he did not allow that Fifth Nature, besides the Four Elements, of which the *Academicks* held Sense and Mind to be effected

i Laert. 4. 32. k Cicero Acad. quæst. lib. 1. 8. l Cic. Acad. quæst. 4. 32. m Plut. cont. Colot. n Cic. Acad. quæst. 1. 10.
o Cic. ibid.

fo

for he asserted Fire to be that Nature which begeteth every thing, both Mind and Sense. *He* likewise dissented from *them*, in that he held, Nothing can be made by a Thing which hath no Body (of which Nature *Xenocrates*, and the *old Academicks*, thought the Soul to be) and that whatsoever made any Thing, or was of itself made, must, of Necessity be a *Body*.

[p] He likewise asserted many Things in the *Third Part of Philosophy*; wherein he asserted some Things new of the Senses themselves, which he conceived to be joined by a certain extrinsical Impulsion, which he call'd *Phantasy*. To these Phantasies, received by the Senses, *he* added *Assent* of the Mind, which he held to be placed in us, and voluntary. *He* did not allow all Phantasies to be faithful, and worthy Credit, but only those which have a proper Declaration of those Things which they seem; which Phantasy, when it is seen, is call'd *Comprehensible*; when received and approved, he calleth it *Comprehension*. That which was comprehended by Sense, he calleth *Sense*; and if it were so comprehended, that it could not be pulled away by Reason, *Science*; if otherwise, *Ignorance*; of which kind was Opinion, infirm, and common to false or unknown Things. Betwixt Science and Ignorance he placed that Comprehension we mentioned, not reckoning it among the Good, nor the Bad, but affirming that only was to be credited; whence he likewise attributed Faith to the Senses, for as much as he conceived the Comprehension made by the Senses to be true and faithful; not that it comprehended all Things that are in Being, but that it omits nothing that can fall beneath it; as also, because Nature hath given it as a Rule of Science and Principle of itself; whence Notions are afterwards imprinted in the Mind; from which, not only Principles, but certain larger Ways, towards the Invention of Reason, are found out. Error, Timerity, Ignorance, Opination, Suspicion, and, in a Word, whatsoever is not of firm and constant Assent, he took away from Virtue and Wisdom. In these Things consisteth almost all the Change and Dissention of *Zeno* from the *old Academicks*.

Zeno thus maintaining many Things contrary to *Plato*, as, that the Soul is mortal, and that there is no other World but this, which is subject to Sense. *Arcesilaus* perceiving this Doctrine to spread, and take much, prudently concealed the Doctrine of the Academy, lest the Mysteries of *Plato* being divulged, and made too common, should become despicable; and therefore (saith [q] St. *Augustine*) *he thought it fitter to unteach the Man that was not well taught, than to teach those whom, by Experience, he found not to be docile enough.*

[r] Hereupon *Arcesilaus* undertook to oppose and contest with *Zeno*, not out of any Pertinacity or Desire of Glory, but led thereunto by that Obscurity of Things, which had brought *Socrates* to a Confession of his own Ignorance; as likewise *Democritus*, *Anaxagoras*, *Empedocles*, and almost all the ancient Philosophers; who affirmed, *That* nothing could be understood, nothing perceived, nothing known. *That* the Senses are narrow, our Minds weak, our Lives short, and *Truth* (as *Democritus* saith) *drowned in an Abyss*. That all Things are held by Opinion and Institution, nothing left to Truth; and finally, *That* all Things are involved in Darkness.

[s] Thus *Arcesilaus* deny'd there is any thing that can be known, not so much as that which *Socrates* reserved, [*that he knew nothing*] conceiving all Things to be hid in such Darkness, that there is nothing which can be seen or understood: For these Reasons we ought not to profess or affirm any thing, or to approve any thing by Assent; but always to restrain and with-hold our Hastiness from Error, which then proveth great, when it approveth a Thing false or unknown; neither is there any thing more vile, than by Assent and Approbation, to prevent Knowledge and Perception.

[t] He did, as was agreeable to this Tenet, dispute against all Assertions and Doctrines; and having found, that in the same thing the Reasons of two Opinions, directly opposite, were of equal Weight, he thence inferred, that we ought to with-hold our Assents ([u] ἐπέχειν) from both. [This *Laertius* means, when he saith, that *he took away Propositions, by reason of the Repugnance of Speech, and was the first that taught to argue on both Sides.*] And that neither the Senses nor Reason are to be credited. He therefore praised that Apophthegm of *Hesiod*.

The Gods all Knowledge have conceal'd from Men.

But this, [w] St. *Augustine* affirms, was only done to conceal mysteriously the Meaning of *Plato*; but they nevertheless had and held his Doctrines and Decrees, which they used to unfold to those who liv'd with them till they were old.

He likewise, as *Laertius* saith, *first altered the Manner of Disputing which* Plato *delivered, and made it more litigious by Question and Answer*; of which thus [x] *Cicero*; *Socrates* used to find out, by Question and Answer, the Opinions of those with whom he discoursed; that if there were Occasion, he might say something upon that which they answered. This Custom, not retained by his Successors, was taken up by *Arcesilaus*; who instituted, that they who would learn of him, should not question him, but themselves tell him what they thought;

p Cic. ibid. q Contra Acad. lib. r Cic. Acad. quæst. 1. s Cic. ibid. t Cic. ibid. u Euseb. Præp. 14. 4.
w Contra Acad. x De finib. l. 2.

thought; which, when they had done, he disputed against it; but his Auditors were to maintain their own Opinion as much as they could possibly. This Course took *Arcesilaus*, contrary to all other Philosophers; amongst whom, he that would learn held his Peace; which Course, saith *Cicero*, is at this Time held in the Academy, where, he that will learn, speaks in this manner: Pleasure seems to be the chief Good; whereupon, in a long Oration, it is disputed against it, whereby may easily be understood, that they who say a Thing seemeth to me to be so, are not really of that Opinion, but desire to hear the contrary maintained.

This School, constituted by *Arcesilaus*, was call'd the *Second Academy*, in relation to its Descent from *Plato*, or the *Middle Academy*, in respect to the *new* one, which was afterwards set up by *Carneades*; tho' [y] *Cicero* seemeth to make no Distinction between this and that, but calleth this the New Academy. But tho' 'tis likely that it was not at first so call'd, yet upon the Introduction of a newer, it was afterwards more generally known by the Title of the *Middle*, or *Second Academy*.

These *Academicks* differ from the *Scepticks*, in as much as tho' they affirmed, that nothing can be comprehended; yet they took not away *true* or *false* from Things. On the contrary they held, that some Phantasies were true, others false; but the *Scepticks* hold, that they are both indifferent, alike defensible by Reason. The *Academicks* assert some Things to be wholly improbable, some more probable than others; and that a wise Man, when any of these occur, [z] may answer *Yes* or *No*, following the Probability, provided that he with-hold from assenting. But the *Scepticks* hold all Things to be alike indifferent, not admitting Judgment, nor allowing that either our Senses or Opinions can perceive true or false; and therefore no Faith is to be given to them; but we ought to persist firm and unmoveable, without Opinion, or saying of any thing that it is, any more than that it is not.

CHAP. III.

His Virtues *and* Apophthegms.

[a] HE preferred *Homer* above all Writers; of whom he constantly read some Piece before he went to Bed, and as soon as he rose in the Morning. When he went to read any thing in him, he said he went to his *Mistress*.

Pindar also, he said, was proper to raise the Voice, and give us supply of Words.

He was sententious and succinct in Speech, often using Expressions of doubtful Meaning. He used to reprehend, and chide sharply, and freely; whence *Timon* saith of him,

When thou chid'st young Men, think thou once wert young.

In this kind *Laertius* instances his Sayings to a young Man, speaking confidently, *&c.* to an immodest young Man, *&c.*

Emo a *Chian*, who, tho' very deformed, thought himself very handsome, asking him, as he put on a rich Cloak, Whether he thought a wise Man might not love? *Arcesilaus* answered, Do you mean if he be as handsome, and as fine as you.

To an effeminate Person, upbraiding him, as it were, of Pride, he spoke this Verse,

Shall we demand, Great Sir, or silent be?

He immediately answered,

Woman, why speakest thou these harsh Words to me?

Being troubled with the Talk of an inconsiderable mean Person, he said,

The Sons of Slaves intemperately speak.

Of another, who talk'd impertinently and loudly, he said he had a peevish Nurse; for some he would make no answer at all.

To an Usurer, who said there was something he knew not, he answered in these Verses, out of *Sophocles*'s *OEnomaus*.

The Course of Storms hid from the Bird doth lie,
Until the Time that she must lay draw nigh.

To a Dialectick Philosopher of *Alexinus*'s School, who was not able to say any thing worthy *Alexinus*, he related what *Philoxenas* did to a Maker of Bricks, who over-hearing him sing his Verses false, trod upon his Bricks and broke them, saying, *As you spoil mine, so I yours.*

He was angry at those who learned not the liberal Sciences in due Time.

In Dispute he used this Word, *I say, and will not such a one* (naming the Person) *assent to this?* which many of his Disciples affected to imitate, as also his manner of Speaking and Gesture.

He was most acute in answering appositely, and converting his Discourse to the present Subject, and fitting it for every Time.

He was very efficacious in Persuasion, whence many Disciples resorted to him, tho' sometimes he sharply touched them, which they took patiently.

He was very good, and much excited Hope in his Auditors.

y Acad. quæst. 1. 12. z Euseb. præp. Evang. ib. 14. 4. a Laert. 5. 31.

As

As to the Neceſſaries of Life, he was liberal and communicative, ready to do good, and much endeavouring to conceal it, avoiding all that kind of vain Glory. Viſiting *Cteſibus*, who was ſick, and perceiving him to be poor, he privately put a Purſe under his Pillow, which, when he found, *This*, ſaith he, *is the Sport of* Arceſilaus. Another Time he ſent him 1000 Drachms. [b] *Plutarch* relates this as done to *Apelles* the *Chian* Painter, whom *Arceſilaus*, beſides many other Teſtimonies of Kindneſs, coming to viſit as he lay ſick, and perceiving how poor he was, departed; and returning ſoon after, bringing twenty Drachms with him; then ſitting cloſe to *Apelles*'s Bed-ſide, *Here is nothing*, ſays he, *beſides Empedocles*'s Four Elements, *Fire, Water, Earth, and Æther mounting high; but methinks you lie not at your Eaſe*; and, with that, taking Occaſion to remove his Pillow, he convey'd the Purſe privately under it; which, when the old Woman that tended him found, and wondering, ſhewed to *Apelles*, he laughing ſaid, *This is one of* Arceſilaus's *Thefts.*

[c] He recommended *Archias*, an *Arcadian*, to *Eumenes* King of *Pergamus*, by whom he was exalted to great Dignity.

He was very liberal, and free from Covetouſneſs, as appeared by his Utenſils of Silver, and vying with *Athecrates* and *Callicrates*. He had many Veſſels of Gold, which he lent unto many, upon Occaſion of Feaſting. Theſe Silver Veſſels a certain Man borrowed to entertain his Friends withal; *Arceſilaus*, knowing him to be poor, would never ſend for them back; others report he lent them to him on purpoſe; and when he brought them back, becauſe he was poor, he freely beſtowed them on him.

He had a fair Eſtate at *Pitane*, from which *Pylades*, his Brother, continually ſupplied him. *Eumenes* alſo, Son of *Phileterus*, gave him many large Preſents; whence to him only, of all Kings, he apply'd himſelf.

When *Antigonus* was much followed, and many Perſons thronged to his Houſe, he forbore declining his Acquaintance. He was intimate with *Hierocles*, the Governor of *Munichia* and *Pireum*, and conſtantly, on Holidays, went thither to viſit him. *Hierocles* often entreated him to viſit *Antigonus*, but he refuſed, and went along with him as far as the Door, and there parted with him. After *Antigonus*'s Fight at Sea, many writing Conſolatory Epiſtles to him, *Arceſilaus* was ſilent. Being ſent by his Country on an Embaſſy to *Antigonus* at *Demetrias*, he return'd fruſtrate of his Deſign.

He lived the greateſt Part of his Time in the Academy, avoiding to meddle with publick Buſineſs; but ſometimes went to the *Pireum*, as we ſaid, out of Love to *Hierocles*; for which ſome reproved him.

He was very magnificent (indeed a ſecond *Ariſtippus*) in the Entertainment of his Friends. He openly profeſſed Love to *Theodote* and *Philota*, Curtezans of *Elis*, for which being reprehended, he rehearſed the *Chrias* of *Ariſtippus*. He was very amorous, and much affected the Company of young Men, whence *Ariſto*, of *Chios*, a Stoick, call'd him a Corrupter of Youth, temerarious, and impudent. Of thoſe whom he affected are mention'd, *Demetrius* and *Leochares*. *Demochares*, Son of *Laches*, and *Pythocles*, Son of *Bugerus*, much affected him.

For theſe Things he was much inveighed againſt at the Houſe of *Hieronymus* the *Peripatetick*, who had invited his Friends to celebrate the Birth-day of *Alcyoneus*, Son of *Antigonus*; for the Keeping of which Feaſt, *Antigonus* ſent yearly much Money. At this Feaſt *Arceſilaus* would not diſpute amidſt the Cups; and when *Aridelus* propounded a Queſtion to him, requiring, that he would ſay ſomething to it, he anſwer'd, *It is the beſt Property of a Philoſopher to know the Seaſons of all Things.*

But he was ſo free from Pride, that he counſelled his Diſciples to go and hear other Maſters; and when a certain *Chian* Youth of his School declared, that he was not pleaſed with what he ſaid, ſo much as with the Diſcourſes of *Hieronymus*, he took him by the Hand and led him to the Philoſopher, deſiring him to cheriſh him according to his Quality.

To one that ask'd, Why Men went from other Sects to the *Epicureans*, but never from the *Epicureans* to other Sects. *Becauſe*, ſaith he, *of Men, ſome are made Eunuchs, but of Eunuchs never any are made Men.*

[d] He ſaid, *Where there are many Medicines, and many Phyſicians, there are moſt Diſeaſes; and where there are many Laws, there is moſt Iniquity.*

[e] *He adviſed to ſhun Dialectick, becauſe it turneth all Things upſide down.*

[f] *He compared Logicians to Gameſters that play at Dice, who take Delight whilſt they are coſened.*

[g] He affirmed, *that Poverty is rugged as* Ithaca, *but good to bring up a Child, in that it inureth to Frugality and Abſtinence, and is generally a good School of Virtue.*

CHAP. IV.

His Death.

WHen he drew [h] nigh the End of his Life, he bequeathed all his Eſtate to his Brother *Pylades*; to which End, *Mæreas* not knowing it, he ſent him firſt to *Chios*, and from thence ſent him back again to *Athens*. He ſent three Copies of his Will, one to *Amphicritus* at *Eretria*, another to ſome Friends of his at *Athens*, the third to *Thaumaſias* his near Kinſman, to be kept by them; with the laſt he ſent this Letter.

b Quom. diſcern. adul. ab amic. c Laert. 4. 34. d Stob. Ser. 143. e Stob. Ser. 212. f Stob. Ser. 473. g Stob. Ser. 93. h Laert. 4. 43.

Arceſilaus to *Thaumaſias*, Health.

I *Gave* Diogenes *my Will to bring to you, for being often ſick and infirm of Body, I thought fit to make my Will, leſt if any ſudden Accident ſhould befal me, I ſhould depart this Life with ſome Injury done to you, whom I have found ſo bountiful towards me. I deſire that you, the moſt faithful of all my Friends, will take it into your Cuſtody. Approve your ſelf juſt to that extraordinary Truſt which I have repoſed in you, that it may appear I have made a right Choice.*

He died, as *Hermippus* ſaith, in a Kind of Phrenzy, after he had drunk much Wine, 75 Years old, in the fourth Year of the 134th Olympiad, as may be conjectured from the Succeſſion of *Lacydes*, in the School which began at that Time. The *Athenians* buried him with ſuch Solemnity as never was any before.

He took not any Women into the Houſe with him, neither had he any Children. He flouriſhed, according to *Apollodorus*, in the 120th Olympiad.

There were three more of this Name, one an ancient comick Poet, the ſecond an elegiack Poet, the third a Statuary.

LACYDES.

Lacydes ſucceeded [i] *Arceſilaus*; he was a *Cyrenean*, (his Father named *Alexander*) a Perſon of much Gravity, and had many Emulators. He was from his Youth much given to Study, poor, but pleaſing to all Company, and of a delightful Converſation.

As concerning his managing his Houſhold Affairs, it is reported that when he took any Thing out of the Place where he kept his Proviſions, he locked the Door, and threw the Key in at a Hole, that none might ſteal ought from him; which his Servants obſerving, frequently took it, and opening the Door, carried away what they thought good, and then put it into the ſame Place again, in which Fact they were never diſcovered.

But the moſt pleaſant Part of the Story is, that (as [k] *Numenius* affirms) he was thereby perſuaded to be of the Opinion of the middle Academicks; that nothing is comprehended by Senſe, arguing thus; *Why ſhould I think that Senſe can comprehend any Thing certainly, when I know that my own Senſes are ſo often deceived; for when I go abroad, I think that I ſee with my Eyes thoſe Things which I leave in my Storehouſe, when I return I find none of them; which could not be, unleſs our Senſes were fallible and uncertain.*

Lacydes upon the Death of *Arceſilaus*, being made Maſter of the School in the fourth Year of the 134th Olympiad, taught in the Academy, in the Gardens which were made by *Attalus* the King, which from him were called the *Lacydean* Gardens. *Laertius*, and, from him, *Suidas*, make him Inſtitutor of the new Academy; but erroneouſly. He continued this Charge 26 Years, at the End whereof he reſigned it, whilſt he was yet alive, to *Telecles*, *Evander*, and *Phocian* his Diſciples, in the ſecond Year of the 141ſt Olympiad.

Attalus ſending for him to come to him, he returned him Anſwer, *That Pictures make the beſt Shew at a Diſtance.*

Studying Geometry in his old Age, one ſaid to him, *Is it now Time?* He anſwered, *When, if not now?*

Athenæus ſaith, *That* Lacydes *and* Timon *Philoſophers, being invited by one of their Friends to an Entertainment of two Days, and deſirous to ſuit themſelves to the Company, drank very freely.* Lacydes *went away firſt, half drunk, and perceiving* Timon *to ſteal away too, ſaid out of* Homer [l],

To our great Glory *Hector* we have ſlain.

The next Day meeting Timon *again at the ſame Place, and ſeeing him not able to take off his Cup at once, made a Pauſe when he put it to his Mouth the ſecond Time, he ſaid out of another Place of* Homer [m],

Thoſe are unhappy who conteſt with me.

[n] *Ælian* likewiſe numbers theſe two amongſt the great Drinkers, and perhaps not unjuſtly; for by Exceſs of Wine he fell into the Palſy, of which he died in the ſecond Year of the 141ſt Olympiad.

He wrote Philoſophicks, and of Nature.

In the School he was ſucceeded [o], as is ſaid by *Evander*; *Evander* by his Diſciple *Egeſinus*, whom *Clemens Alexandrinus* calleth *Hegeſilaus* of *Pergamus*; *Egeſinus*, by *Carneades*.

i Laert. 4. 59. k Euſeb. præp. Evang. lib. 14. 7. l Il. χ. m Il. ζ. n Var. hiſt. 2. 41. o Strom. l. 1.

CARNEADES.

CHAP. I.

His Country, Parents, Time, Maſters.

Carneades (Succeſſor of *Egeſinus*) was of *Cyrene* [p], whence [q] *Cicero* ſaith, he was an acute Perſon, as being an *African*. He was Son of *Epicomus*, or *Philocomus*. *Apollodorus*, as cited by *Laertius*, affirmeth he died in the 162d Olympiad; but there is a Miſtake in the Text; for the Words of *Apollodorus* relate doubtleſs to the Time of his Birth, which upon that Authority, we may affirm to have been in the firſt Year of the 162d Olympiad. *Florus* (cited by [r] *Plutarch*) adds, he was born on the ſeventh Day of *Thargelion*, at what Time the *Carnean* Feſtivals were celebrated at *Cyrene*, whence perhaps he took his Name.

This Time falling after the *Callippical* Period, we ſhall compute it according to [s] *Petavius*'s Method, which, altho' it be not exempt from Queſtion, yet it is better than that of *Scaliger*, whoſe Method is not reconcilable to *Ptolomy*'s Obſervations.

The 4th of the 164th Olympiad was Of the *Julian* Period	4585
Epoche of the *Callippick* Period	4383
Which ſubducted, there remains	202
Subduct two Periods more	152
Remains	50

The Year propounded therefore is the 50th of the third Period. The *Neomenian* of *Hecatombæon*, *June* 26. which is 177th Day of the *Julian* Year; the 7th of *Thargelion* (according to *Petavius*) at that Time was the 302d of the *Attick* Year.

To	177
add	302
Sum	479
Subduct	365
Remains	114

The 114th Day of the *Julian* is the 24th of *April*, on which fell the 7th of *Thargelion*; which, the *Dominical* Letter being *B.* fell on *Sunday*, proleptically taken.

[t] He was Diſciple to *Egeſinus* the *Academick*, and learned [u] Logick of *Diogenes* the *Stoick*, whence in arguing he would many Times ſay, *If I have concluded right, the Cauſe is my own; if not right*, Diogenes *muſt return the* Mina *he had of me*; which was the Price the Dialectick Philoſophers took.

CHAP. II.

How he conſtituted the new Academy.

He [w] ſucceeeded *Egeſinus* in the School, and is by *Cicero* reckoned the fourth from *Arceſilaus*, (who conſtituted the *middle Academy*, introducing a Suſpenſion of Aſſent, grounded upon the Uncertainty of Things) *Carneades* conſtituted the *new Academy*, maintaining the ſame Kind of Suſpenſion with no leſs Eagerneſs; yet upon more moderate Grounds: [x] For he held, that the Incomprehenſibility of Things proceeded not from the Nature of the Things themſelves, as *Arceſilaus* maintained; for as much as every Thing really exiſteth in itſelf, and if any Thing be affirmed or denied of another, it is true or falſe as to the Thing itſelf; but the Things themſelves remaining firm, we derive from them a Phantaſy and Similitude, which for the moſt Part, like falſe Meſſengers lie and deceive us. To all true Things there are ſome falſe adjoined, and thoſe ſo like, that there is no certain Note of Judication and Aſſent, whereof we cannot perceive any Thing to be true.

But he was nothing leſs rigid as to the Academical Suſpenſion, for [y] he denied that any Thing could be perceived, not ſo much as that very Maxim, *Nothing can be perceived*; arguing thus: All Phantaſms are of two Kinds; the firſt included the perceptible and imperceptible; the ſecond Kind, the probable, and the improbable. Thoſe which are contrary to Senſe and Evidence pertain to the former Diviſion; againſt the latter we ought not to ſay any Thing. Wherefore there is no Phantaſy followed by Perception, but by Approbation many; for it were contrary to Nature that nothing ſhould be probable.

More fully [z] *Sextus Empericus*. *Carneades*, ſaith he, *did not only oppoſe the Stoicks, but all that went before him, as to Judgment. His firſt and common Argument againſt all, is that by which he ſheweth abſolutely, that there is nothing from which Truth can be judged; not* Reaſon, *not* Senſe, *nor* Phantaſy, *nor*

p Laert. 4. 62. q Acad. quæſt. 4. r Sympoſ. quæſt. 6. 7. s Doctr. temp. t Laert. 4. 62. u Cic. Acad. quæſt. 4. w Cic, quæſt. 4. 6. x Numen. apud Euſeb. Præp. 14. 8. y Cic. Acad. quæſt. 4. 31. z Adv. Mathem.

nor any Thing, for all these, in a Word, deceive us. His second Argument is that whereby he shews, that altho' there be something that doth judge, yet it cannot exist without an Affection from Evidence. For an Animal differeth from inanimate Things by the sensitive Faculty, it apprehendeth thereby both itself and external Things; but Sense remaining immoveable, impassible, and immutable, is not Sense, nor apprehendeth any Thing, but being changed, and after some Manner affected by Incursion of Evidences, then it declareth Things. In that Affection therefore of the Soul which ariseth from Evidence, we are to seek that which judgeth. This Affection is declared when that appeareth from which it proceedeth, which Affection is nothing else but Phantasy. Phantasy therefore is a certain Affection in an Animal, which sheweth both itself and some others, as when we see any Thing, our Sight is affected in some Manner, so as it was not before that Act of seeing. By this Alteration we apprehend two Things: First, the Alteration itself, that is the Phantasy; secondly, that from which this Alteration proceeds, the Thing visible. The like in the rest of the Senses. As therefore Light manifesteth itself and all Things in it, so Fancy being the chief Guide of Knowledge in an Animal, must like unto Light, manifest both itself, and that evident Object which effecteth it. But because it doth not always shew that which is true, but often erreth, and differeth from the Thing whence it proceedeth, like ill Messengers, it necessarily followeth that all Phantasies cannot leave a Judgment of Truth, but only if it be true. Again, because there is no Phantasy so true, but it may be false; and of all Phantasies that seem true, there are some false, which differ little from them; that which judgeth must consist in common Phantasy of true and false. But the common Phantasy of these comprehendeth not, and if it comprehendeth not, neither is there any Thing that judgeth. And if Phantasy have not a judicative Power, neither can Reason judge, for that is derived from Phantasy and justly; for that whereof it judgeth, ought first to appear unto it, but nothing can appear but through Sense void of Reason, nor Reason itself is that which judgeth.

Thus disputeth *Carneades* against all other Philosophers, to shew there is not any Thing that judgeth. But being demanded what judgeth, as to the leading of Life, and Acquisition of Beatitude, he hath Recourse to *probable* Phantasy; and together with *probable*, *undistracted* and *circumcurrent*, their Differences these: Phantasy is the Phantasy of something, *viz.* of that which it is made, and of that in which it is made: That of which it is made is the external sensible Object; that in which, the Man. It hath two Relations, one to the Object fansied, the other to the Phantasm derived from that Object. From the Relation to the Object, it is either true or false; true, when it agreeth with the Object; false, when it disagreeth. From its Relation to the Phantasm, there is one which seemeth true, another false. That which seemeth true is by the Academicks called *Emphasis* and *Probability*, and *probable Phantasy*; that which seemeth not true, is called *Apemphasis*, *Improbability*, and *not-probable Phantasy*. For, neither that which seemeth false, and is such; nor that which is true, and seemeth not such, have any Thing in their Nature persuasive. But, of these Phantasies, that which is manifestly false, and seemeth not true, limiteth the Judicatory, but is not that which judgeth, as likewise produceth from that which is, but differs from it, such as was that of the Fury proceeding from *Electra* to *Orestes*. Of that which seemeth true, one Kind is *tenuious*, as that which is in a Thing so little, as that it is not visible, either because it takes not up Room enough, or by Reason of the Weakness of Sight, which receiveth Things confusedly and not distinctly. The other is that which hath this common Property with the true, that it seemeth to be very true. Now, of these, the tenuious, loose remiss Phantasy cannot be that which judgeth; for that which cannot clearly manifest itself, nor the Thing that effected it, cannot attract us, nor invite Assent; but that which seemeth true, and is manifest enough, that, according to *Carneades*, is the Judge of Truth.

This being that which judgeth, it hath a great Latitude, and being extended into another Species, hath a more probable and vehemently affected Phantasy. Probable is taken three Ways; first, for that which is true, and seemeth true; secondly, for that which is false and seemeth true; thirdly, for that which is true, common to both. Whence that which judgeth must be that Phantasy which seemeth true, which the Academicks call *probable*. Sometimes the false incurreth; so that it is necessary to use the common Phantasy of true and false; yet not because that more seldom incurreth, I mean that which imitateth the Truth, we are not to give Credit to that which is for the greater Part true, whereby it happeneth our Judgment and Actions are for the most Part directed.

That which first and commonly judgeth, *Carneades* held to be this. But forasmuch as Phantasy sometimes is not of one Kind, but like a Chain, one dependeth on another, there must therefore be a second Judge, which is *probable* and *undistracted* Phantasy. As he who receiveth the Phantasy of a Man necessarily receiveth the Phantasy of such Things as are about him, and without him; of the Things about him, as Colour, Magnitude, Figure, Motion, Speech, Clothing, Shoes; of Things without him, as Air, Light, Day, Heaven, Earth, Companions, and the like. When therefore none of these Phantasies seem false, but all agree in seeming true, we credit it the more. That such a one is *Socrates* we believe, because he hath all those Things which *Socrates* useth to have, as Colour,

Mag-

Magnitude, Figure, Geſture, Cloak, in none of theſe diſagreeing with itſelf. And as ſome Phyſicians argue a Man to be in a Fever, not from one Symptom, as from a high Pulſe, or great Heat, but from the Concurrence of that Heat with the Pulſe, as alſo from ulcerous Touch, Redneſs, Thirſt, and the like, all agreeing together. So the *Academick* maketh a Judgment of Truth, from a Concurrence of Phantaſies, and when none of all his Phantaſies that join in the Concurrence retract him as falſe, he ſaith that which incurreth is true.

That there is a credible *undiſtracted* Concurrence, is manifeſt from *Menelaus:* Having left in his Ship an Image of *Helen* which he had brought from *Troy*, as if it had been *Helen* herſelf, landing at the Iſland *Pharos*, he there met with the true *Helen*, and from her attracted a true Phantaſy, but would not believe that Phantaſy, being diſtracted by the other, which told him that he had left *Helen* in the Ship. Such is undiſtracted Phantaſy therefore, which likewiſe ſeemeth erroneous, foraſmuch as there are ſome more undiſtracted than others. Of *undiſtracted* Phantaſies, that is moſt credible and perfect which maketh a Judgment.

Moreover, there is a *circumcurrent* Phantaſy, the Form whereof is next to be declared. In the *undiſtracted* we only enquire whether none of thoſe Phantaſies which join in Concurrence, attract us as falſe, but that they all ſeem true, and not improbable. But in that which is made by Concourſe, which uſeth *Circumcurrence*, ſtrictly examines every Phantaſy which is in that Concurrence; as in Aſſemblies, when the People take Account of every particular Perſon that ſtands for the Magiſtracy, whether they deſerve that Power and Right of judging. In the Place of Judgment, there is that which judgeth, and that by which the Judgment is made, the Diſtance and Interval, Figure, Time, Manner, Affection, and Operation, each of which we examine ſtrictly. That which judgeth, whether the Sight be dim; for if it be, it is too weak for Judgment; that which is judged, whether it be not too little; that through which whether the Air be obſcure; the Diſtance, whether it be too great; the *Medium*, whether confuſed; the Place, whether too wide and vaſt; the Time, whether too ſudden; the Affection, whether not phrenetick; the Operation, whether not unfit to be admitted. For if all theſe be in one, that which judgeth is *probable* Phantaſy, and together, *probable*, *undiſtracted*, and *circumcurrent*. Wherefore, as when in Life we enquire concerning ſome little Thing, we examine of Witneſs; when we enquire into ſomething of greater Conſequence, we examine more; but when of a Thing moſt neceſſary, we examine each of the Witneſſes by the joint Teſtimony of all. So, ſaith *Carneades*, in light inconſiderable Matters we make uſe of *probable* Phantaſy, only for Judgment; in Things of ſome Moment, of *undiſtracted* Phantaſy; in Things that concern well and happy living, *circumcurrent* Phantaſy.

And as in Things of great Moment they take divers Phantaſies, ſo in different Circumſtances they never follow the ſame; for they ſay, they attend only probable Phantaſy in ſuch Things wherein the Circumſtance of Time alloweth not a ſtrict Examination; as for Inſtance. The Enemy purſues a Man; he coming to a Cave, takes a Phantaſy, that there are ſome Enemies there lying in wait: Tranſported by this Phantaſy, as probable, he ſhunneth and flieth from the Cave, following the Probability of that Phantaſy, before he accurately and diligently examine whether there really be any Enemies in Ambuſh in that Cave, or no. *Probable* Phantaſy is followed by *circumcurrent*, in thoſe Things in which Time allows a curious Examination of each Particular, to uſe Judgment upon the incurring Thing. As a Man coming into a dark Room, and ſeeing a Rope rolled up, thinking it to be a Serpent, he flies away; but afterwards returning, he examines the Truth, and perceiving it not to ſtir, begins to think it is not a Serpent; but withal conſidering, that Serpents are ſometimes frozen or nummed with the Cold, he ſtrikes it with his Staff. And having thus by *Circumcurrence* examined the Phantaſy which incurred to him, he aſſenteth that the Phantaſy he had taken of that Body as a Serpent, is falſe. And again, as I ſaid, when we manifeſtly behold, we aſſent that this is true, having firſt over-run in our Thoughts that our Senſes are all entire, and that we behold this waking, not in a Dream; that the Air is perſpicuous, and a convenient Diſtance from the Object. Hereby we receive a creditable Phantaſy, when we have Time enough to examine the Particulars concerning the Thing ſeen. It is the ſame in *undiſtracted* Phantaſy, which they admit, when there is nothing that can retract us, as we ſaid of *Menelaus*. Hitherto *Sextus*.

[a] Yet though nothing can be perceived, a wiſe Man may conſent to that which is not perceived; that is, he may *opinionate*; but ſo as he knoweth himſelf to opinionate, and that there is nothing which can be comprehended and perceived.

[b] He aſſerted the ultimate End to be the Enjoyment of Natural Principles, which, ſaith *Cicero*, he maintained, not that he really thought ſo, but in Oppoſition to the *Stoicks*.

[c] He read the Books of the *Stoicks* very diligently, and diſputed againſt them with ſo good Succeſs, that it gave him Occaſion to ſay; *If* Chryſippus *had not been, I had not been.*

[d] *Clitomachus* uſed to ſay of him, he could never underſtand what he really held; for he would ſometimes argue on one Side, ſometimes on the other;

a Cic. Acad. quæſt. 4. 18. b De fin. lib. 2. 11. c Laert. 4. 62. d Cic. Acad. quæſt. 4. 45.

and by the *Calumny* of his Wit, ſaith *Cicero*, many Times deride the beſt Cauſes. Of the *Sorites* uſed by him, ſee *Sextus Empiricus*.

CHAP. III.

Upon what Occaſion he was ſent on an Embaſſy to Rome.

THE *Athenians* being fined by the *Romans* about 500 Talents, at the Suit of the *Oropians* and *Sicyonians*, for deſtroying *Oropus*, a City of *Bœotia*, ſent three Philoſophers on an Embaſſy to the *Roman* Senate, to procure a Mitigation of this Fine, which had been impoſed upon them without hearing their Defence *Carneades*; the *Academick*, *Diogenes* the *Stoick*, and *Critolaus* the *Peripatetick*. About the Time of this Embaſſy, there is much Diſagreement amongſt Authors. *A. Gellius* ſaith, they came after the ſecond *Punick* War, and maketh *Ennius* later than their coming, which *Petavius* juſtly conceiveth to be falſe; foraſmuch as *Ennius* died in the 585th Year from the building of the City. But *Cicero* affirmeth this Embaſſy to have been when *P. Scipio* and *M. Marcellus* were Conſuls, which was the 599th Year. *Pauſanius* reckoneth it upon the 603d Year of the City, which *Caſaubon* approveth.

Each of theſe Philoſophers, to ſhew his Learning, made Choice of many eminent Parts of the City, where they diſcourſed before great Multitudes of People, to the Admiration of all. The Eloquence of *Carneades* was violent and rapid; that of *Critolaus*, neat and ſmooth; that of *Diogenes*, modeſt and ſober. *Carneades*, one Day, diſputed copiouſly concerning Juſtice, before *Galba* and *Cato*, the greateſt Orators of that Time. [f] The next Day, he ſubverted all he had ſaid before, by contrary Arguments, and took away that Juſtice which he had ſo much commended. This he did the better to confute thoſe that aſſerted any Thing. That Diſpute whereby he overthrew Juſtice, is recorded in *Cicero*, by *L. Furius*.

[g] To theſe three Philoſophers reſorted all the ſtudious young Men, and frequently heard and praiſed them. Chiefly the Sweetneſs of *Carneades*, which was of greateſt Power, and no leſs Fame than Power, attracting eminent and benign Hearers, filled the City with Noiſe like a great Wind; and it was reported, that a *Grecian* Perſon, qualified to Admiration, attracting all, had infuſed a ſerious Affection into the young Men, whereby forgetting other Diverſiſements and Pleaſures, they were carried on as it were with a Kind of Madneſs to Philoſophy. This pleaſed all the *Romans*, who gladly beheld their Sons inſtructed in *Greek* Learning by ſuch excellent Men. Only *Cato*, at the firſt Noiſe of Admiration of the *Greek* Learning, was troubled, fearing the young Men ſhould apply themſelves that way, and ſo prefer the Glory of Eloquence before Action and Military Diſcipline. The Fame of Philoſophers increaſing in the City, and *C. Acilius* (whom *A. Gellius* and *Macrobius* call *Cecilius*) an eminent Perſon, having, at his own Requeſt, been the Interpreter of their firſt Oration to the Senate; *Cato* (who was then very old) under a fair Pretence, moved, that theſe Philoſophers might be ſent out of the City, and coming into the Senate-Houſe, blamed the Magiſtrates, that they had ſo long ſuffered ſuch Ambaſſadors to continue amongſt them without any Anſwer, who were able to perſuade them to any Thing. Wherefore he firſt deſired that ſomething might be determined concerning their Embaſſy, that they might be ſent back again to their own Schools, and inſtruct the Sons of *Grecians*, and that the *Roman* Youth might, as they did before, apply themſelves to the Obſervance of their own Laws and Magiſtrates. This he did, not out of Anger to *Carneades*, as ſome thought, but out of an ambitious Emulation of the *Greek* Humanity and Literature.

CHAP. IV.

His Virtues and Apophthegms.

[h] HE was a Perſon infinitely induſtrious, leſs converſant in Phyſick than Ethick, and ſo ſtudious, that he neglected to cut his Hair and Nails. *Valerius Maximus* ſaith, he was ſo ſtudious, that when he lay down at Meals, his Thoughts were ſo fixed, that he forgot to put his Hand to the Table; and that *Meliſſa*, who lived with him as his Wife, was fain to put him in mind thereof, and help him.

He was ſo eminent for Philoſophy, that the Orators themſelves would many Times break up their Schools, and come and hear him.

He had a great and loud Voice; whereupon the *Gymnaſiarch* ſent to him not to ſpeak ſo loud; whereto he anſwering, *Send me the Meaſure by which I ſhould ſpeak*; the other wiſely and appoſitely replied, *You have a Meaſure, your Hearers.*

He was ſharply invective, and in Argument almoſt invincible. He avoided Feaſting, out of the Reaſon we mentioned, his great Studiouſneſs.

One named *Mentor*, a *Bithynian*, as *Phavorinus* ſaith, who had endeavoured to ſeduce a Miſtreſs that he kept, coming into the School, he preſently jeſted at him, in turning theſe Words of *Homer*.

Hitherto comes one oppreſs'd with hoary Years,
Like Mentor *in his Voice and Looks appears,*
Who from the School I charge you turn away.

The other riſing up, replied;

He thus proclaim'd, the reſt did ſtrait obey.

e Plut. vit. Cat. A. Gel. 7. 14. Macr. Satur. l. 5. f Lactant. Inſt. lib. 5. 14. g Plut. ibid. h Lib. 8. c. 7.

Being

Being to dispute with *Chrysippus*, he purged himself by white Hellebore, to sharpen his Wit, lest any corrupt Humours in his Stomach might oppress the Vigour and Constancy of his Mind.

[i] He compared *Dialectick* to the Fish *Polypus*, which when its Claws grow long, bites them off; so Logicians, growing subtle, confute their own Assertions.

[k] He advised Men in their greatest Prosperity to be mindful of a Change, for that which is unexpected is most grievous.

[l] He said, *The Sons of Rich Men and Kings learn nothing well but Riding, for their Masters flatter them; they who conteſt with them, willingly yield to them, but a Horse considers not whether a private Man or a Prince, a poor Man or a rich, be on his Back; but if he cannot rule him, he throws his Rider.*

[m] He seemed to be extreamly averse from Death; whence he often said, *The same Nature which hath put us together will dissolve us*; and hearing that *Antipater* died by drinking Poison, he was a little animated by his Constancy in Death, and said, *Then give me too*; they asking what; *Wine*, saith he.

[n] In the midst of the Night he was struck blind, and knew not of it; but waking, bid his Servant bring a Light; the Servant did so, telling him he had brought one; *Then*, said he, *read you.*

CHAP. V.

His Death and Writings.

HE lived, according to *Laertius*, 85 Years, or, according to *Cicero*, 90. The Words of [o] *Apollodorus*, that he died in the fourth Year of the 162d Olympiad, which falleth upon the 626th Year from the building of *Rome*, may easily be evinced to be false, by the greatest Part of the Circumstances of his Life; particularly from this; that *Antonius* in *Cicero* saith, when he went Pro-consul into *Asia*, he found *Carneades* the *Academick* at *Athens*, who opposed all in Dispute, according to the Manner of his Sect. The Year of *Antonius*'s Pro-consulship was the 652d Year from the building of *Rome*. But this Account, as we said before, is to be applied to the Time of his Birth, from which the 85th falleth upon the first Year of the 184th Olympiad, the 90th upon the second of the 185th.

Laertius saith, *At his Death there was a great Eclipse of the Moon, which some interpreted to proceed from a Sympathy with his Loss.* Upon this Eclipse I conceive *Petavius* grounded his Computation of *Carneades*'s Death, when he saith, [p] *It was upon the first Year of the 163d Olympiad. May 2. fer. 2. hora 5. 46. at Athens.* But there being a Mistake of the Year, there is consequently a greater in the Account of the *feria* and Hour.

Carneades, as *Cicero* saith, wrote four Books *of Suspension of Assent*. He wrote likewise *Epistles* to *Ariarathes*, King of *Cappadocia*, the only Monument left behind him, extant in *Laertius*'s Time. Whatsoever else went under his Name, [q] *Laertius* saith, was written by his Disciples, of whom he had many, the most eminent *Clitomachus*.

There are remembered two more of this Name, one a Philosopher, Disciple to *Anaxagoras*, mentioned by *Suidas*, the other an *Epigrammatick* Poet, mentioned by *Laertius*.

i Stob. Ser. 81. k Plut. de tranq. anim. l Plut. de adul. & Am. dis. m Laert. 4. 64. n Laert. 4. 66. o Laert. 4. 65. p Doct. temp. q Laert. 4. 63.

CLITOMACHUS.

Clitomachus was a *Carthaginian*, Son of *Diogenetus*. He was first call'd *Asdrubal*, as [s] *Plutarch* and *Laertius* affirm, [t] and professed Philosophy in his own Country, and native Language. Being forty Years old, he went to *Athens*, and heard *Carneades*, who being much taken with his Industry, instructed and exercised him in Philosophy. With *Carneades*, *Cicero* saith, he lived until he was old, and succeeded him in the School, and chiefly illustrated his Doctrines by his Writings, the Number of which Books being above four hundred, were a sufficient Testimony of his [u] Industry, and that he had no less Wit, than *Carneades* of Eloquence. He was well versed in three Sects, the *Academick*, *Peripatetick*, and *Stoick*.

Of his Books are remembred by *Cicero*, one [w] *Of Consolation* to his Captive Countrymen, *Carthage* being then subdued by the *Romans*; another to [x] *Caius Lucilius* the Poet; wherein he explained and defended the *Academick* Suspension of Assent, having written before of the same Things to *L. Censorinus*, who was Consul with *M. Manilius*. The Sum of which Discourse was this;

[y] *The* Academicks *hold, there are such Dissimilitudes of Things, that some seem probable, others on the contrary. But this is not Ground enough to say,*

r Laert. 4. 67. s De Fortuna Alex. t Laert. ibid. u Cic. Acad. Qu. l. 4. Laert. ibid. w Cic. Tusc. Qu. 3. 22. x Cic. Acad. Qu. 4. 32. y Cic. Acad. 4. 32.

That some Things may be perceived, others cannot; because there are many false that are probable, but no false can be perceived and known. Those therefore extremely err, who affirm, the Academicks *to take away Sense, for they say not, there is no* Colour, Sapor, *or* Sound, *but dispute, That there is not an proper inherent* Note *in these of true and certain*; (which having expounded, he adds) *A wise Man suspends Assent two Ways; one, when [as we know] he absolutely refuseth to assent to any Thing; another, when he with-holds from answering, either in Approbation or Improbation of something; so that he neither denieth nor asserteth it. In the first Way, he assents to nothing, in the Second he will follow Probability, and according as he finds it, or not, answers Yes or No. He who with-holdeth his Assent from all Things, is yet moved, and acteth something. He reserves, therefore, these Phantasies by which we are excited to Action; and those of which being questioned, we may answer on either Part, only as of a Thing that seemeth to us so, but without Assent; neither are all such Phantasies approved, but only those which are not obstructed by any Thing.*

[z] In asserting Good, he joined Pleasure with Honesty, as *Callipho* also did.

[a] He was a great Enemy to *Rhetorick*, as *Critolaus* the *Peripatetick*, and *Charmidas* were also. Arts they did not expel out of Cities, knowing them to be very profitable to Life, no more than they would drive *Oeconomick* out of Houses, or Shepherds from their Flocks; but they all persecuted, and every where ejected the Art of Speaking, as a most dangerous Enemy.

[b] He compared Dialectick to the Moon, which is in continual Encrease or Decrease.

[c] Falling sick, he was taken with a Fit of a Lethargy; out of which he no sooner came, but he said, *Love of Life shall flatter me no longer*; and thereupon, with his own Hands, ended his Life.

z Cic. Tusc. quæst. 5. 30. a Sext. Empir. adv. Matth. b Stob. Ser. 80. c Stob. Ser. 160.

PHILO.

[d] PHILO was of *Larissa*, he heard *Clitomachus* many Years, and is nam'd by *Sextus Empericus* as Constitutor of a *Fourth Academy*; but *Cicero* affirms he disallowed the Distinction of Academies, and wrote expresly to prove the *first* and the *new* Academy to be both one. [e] Whilst he lived, the Academy wanted not a Patron. [f] The *Romans* admir'd him, as *Plutarch* affirms, above all *Clitomachus*'s Scholars, for his excellent Discourse, and loved him for the Sweetness of his Disposition. *Cicero* no sooner went out of the first Schools, and Rudiments of Learning, but he became an Auditor of *Philo*, as he acknowledgeth himself.

Amongst other excellent Things (saith [g] *Stobæus*) he gave this Division of *Philosophy: He compared* Philosophy *to a* Physician. *As the Office of a Physician is, first to persuade the sick Person to permit himself to be cured; next, to confute the Reasons of his Adversary; so is it of a Philosopher, both which consist in Exhortation. Exhortation is a Discourse inciting to Virtue; whereof one Part explaineth its great Use, the other refelleth Adversaries, or such as any way calumniate Philosophy.* The Comparison holds, in a second Manner, thus: *As the Part of a Physician, after he hath persuaded the Patient to admit of Cure, is to apply the Means thereof, as well to remove the Causes of the Disease, as to induce and settle Health; so is it in this Science. After Exhortation, he endeavoureth to apply the Cure, by removing false Opinions, wherewith the Soul is infected, and by substituting true. In the second Place therefore, it treats of Good and Evil, for the Sake of which, the Exhortation was made.* Thirdly, the Comparison holds thus: *As all Medicines refer to one End, Health, so all Philosophy to Beatitude. That Part which treats of Ends, is joined with another, which treats of Life; for, as in Medicine, it is not sufficient to restore Health, unless it likewise deliver Rules by which it may be preserved; so in Life, some Precepts are required for Conservation of the End; and this Part also is two-fold, Private or Common. One considers the Affairs of particular Persons; as, Whether a wise Man should manage a Common-wealth? whether he may live with Princes? whether he may marry? The other considers the Business of all in general; as, What Common-wealth is best? How Magistrates are to be chosen? This Common Part is called* Politick, *and is treated of distinctly by itself, as being of greatest Latitude. Now, if all were wise Men, there would be no need of more Places, for the more subtle Divisions would emerge from the Precedent. But because there must likewise be a Care of the middle Sort of Men, who*

d Stob. Eclog. Ethic. ibid. e Cicer. Acad. quæst. 4. 6. f Plut. vit. Cic. g Eclog. Ethic. 160.

cannot

cannot apply themſelves to long Diſputations, either thro' want of Time, or Diverſion of Buſineſs, there muſt not be omitted a Treating of Precepts, which delivereth ſhort Rules concerning the Uſe of each.

[h] As to the *Stoical* Judicatory, *Comprehenſive Phantaſy*, he held all Things to be Incomprehenſible; as to the Nature of Things themſelves, Comprehenſible. Thus he took away the *Comprehenſive Phantaſy* aſſerted by *Zeno*.

[i] He held that to be a good Connex, which beginneth from true, and endeth in falſe; as (if it be Day, and I diſpute) this, *If it is Day, I diſpute*. According to which Tenet, there may be true Axioms three Ways, a falſe, only one Way; for, when it beginneth from true, and endeth in true, it is true; as, *If it is Day, it is Light*. And when it beginneth from falſe, and endeth in falſe, it is true; as, *If the Earth flies, the Earth hath Wings*. Likewiſe, if it beginneth from falſe, and endeth in true, it is true; as, *If the Earth flies, it is Earth*. That which is falſe, is that which beginneth from true, and endeth in falſe; as, *If it is Day, it is Night*; for, the Antecedent, *it is Day*, is true; but the Conſequent, *it is Night*, is falſe.

[k] He appointed, that the Precepts of Orators ſhould be delivered at one Time, thoſe of Philoſophers at another.

h Sext. Emp. Pyrrh. Hyp. 1. 33. i Sext. Emp. Pyrr. Hyp. 2. 11. k Tuſc. Qu. l. 2. 3.

ANTIOCHUS.

ANtiochus was an *Aſcalonite*, [l] Brother of *Ariſtus*, Diſciple of *Philo*. He lived with *L.* [m] *Lucullus* the Quæſtor and General; he was alſo a great Friend to [n] *Atticus*, whom he invited to the Academy. He is named by [o] *Sextus Empericus*, as Conſtitutor of a *Fifth Academy*; for, as [p] *Plutarch* ſaith, he fell off from the Sect of *Carneades*, either moved by the Evidence of Senſe, or, as ſome thought, by Ambition, and Diſſention with the Diſciples of *Clitomachus* and *Philo*; ſo that with ſome little Alteration, he made uſe of the Doctrines of the *Stoicks*; and [q] tho' he were called an *Academick*, he had been, but for ſome Alterations, an abſolute *Stoick*; [r] whence it was ſaid of him, *He taught the Stoical Philoſophy in the Academy*; for he manifeſted, that the Doctrines of the *Stoicks* were in *Plato*. In his old Age, ſaith [s] *Cicero*, he betook himſelf to the *Old Academicks*, forſaking the *New*, [t] and diligently enquiring into the Opinion of the Antients, [u] endeavoured to follow *Ariſtotle* and *Xenocrates* [w], profeſſing, that the *Stoicks* and *Peripateticks* agreed in the Thing, and differed only in Words. To which Effect *Cicero* mentions a Book which he ſent to *Balbus*; he wrote alſo another againſt his Maſter *Philo*, intitled, *Soſus*. [x] *Cicero* being at *Athens*, heard him, and was much taken with the Eloquence and Volubility of his Diſcourſe, ([y] declaring him to be the moſt polite and acute of all Philoſophers in his Time) [z] but not with the new Doctrine which he introduced.

Thus far there is a continued Series of the *Academick* Philoſophers.

l Plut. vit. Cicer. m Cic. Ac. qu. 1. 3. n Acad. Qu. 4. 43. o Cic. de Leg. lib. 2. p Vit. Cicer. q Cic. Acad. quæſt. 4. 43. r Sext. Empir. Pyrrh. Hypot. 1. 33. s Acad. quæſt. 4. 22. t Cic. de finib. lib. 5. u Acad. quæſt. 4. 45. w Cic. de nat. Deor. l. 1. x Cic. Acad. quæſt. 4 y Plut. vit. Cicer. Cic. Acad. quæſt. 4. 4. z Plut. in vit. Cicer.

THE

THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY.

THE SIXTH PART,

Containing the *Peripatetick* Philosophers.

ARISTOTLE.

CHAP. I.

His Country, Parents, and Time of his Birth.

UPON the Death of *Plato*, his Disciples separated themselves into two Sects. The first continued in the same School, where he taught, the *Academy*: The other possessed the *Lyceum*. The first was known by the general Name of *Academicks*, or [a] *Peripateticks of the Academy*; the other by the general Name of *Peripaticks*, or more particularly, *Peripateticks of the Lycæum*. Of the first we have discoursed already; we come now to the other, of which *Aristotle* was the Head.

[b] *Aristotle* was born at *Stagira*, a City of *Thrace*, according to [c] *Herodotus*, [d] *Thucydides*, [e] *Pausanias*, and *Suidas*, by others placed in *Macedonia*, to take from him the Imputation of a Barbarian. It was seated upon *Strymon*, a River which parts those two Countries, having a Haven called κάπρος, and a little Island of the same Name belonging to it. This Place, to which *Aristotle* owed his Birth, he afterwards requited with extraordinary Gratitude.

[f] His Father was named *Nicomachus*, descended from *Nicomachus*, Son of *Machaon* (whose Skill in Medicine is celebrated by *Homer*) Son of *Æsculapius*, from whom *Nicomachus*, *Aristotle*'s Father, derived not only his Pedigree, but his Art also, for he was a Physician. *Suidas* saith, he wrote six Books of Medicine, and one of Physick. [g] *Galen* alledgeth a Plaister of one *Nicomachus*, either this or the elder. This *Nicomachus* (whom some affirm to have been Grandson to *Hippocrates* the Physician) lived in the Time of *Amintas* King of *Macedonia*, (Father of *Philip*) a Prince (as [h] *Justin* witnesseth) eminent for all Royal Virtues. To him *Nicomachus* was not only Physician, but Friend and Favourite. [i] *Tzetzes* forgot these Relations of *Aristotle* (as *Nunnesius* observes) when he affirmed that he was called an *Æsculapian* figuratively, in respect of his Skill in Medicine, tho' it be true also that he did profess that Art.

His Mother, *Laertius* and *Suidas* name *Phæstias*, *Dionysius* [k] *Halicarnassæus* and *Ammonius*, *Phæstis*. *Ammonius* [l] saith, she also was descended from *Æsculapius*, alledging in Testimony thereof this Epigram,

His Mother Phæstis, *Sire* Nicomachus,
Descended both from Æsculapius.

a Ammon. sub finem. comment. in procem. Porphyr. b Laert. 5. 1. c Polymn. d Lib. 4. & 5. e Eliac. f Laert. Ammon. g De compos. medicam. h Just. 7. 4. i Chiliad. k Epist. ad Ammæum. l Vit. Arist. if he were the Author.

But *Dionyſius Halicarnaſſæus* ſaith, ſhe was Daughter of a *Chalcidian*, one of the Colony which was ſent from *Chalcis* to *Stagira*. Her Picture, *Ariſtotle*, in Piety to her Memory, cauſed to be made by *Protogenes*, an eminent Painter of that Time, which Picture [m] *Pliny* reckons amongſt the choiceſt Pieces of that Maſter.

Ariſtotle (as *Suidas* affirms) had a Brother named *Arimneſtas*, and Siſter *Arimneſte*. His Brother died before him without Iſſue, as appears by his Will.

Ariſtotle was born, according to the Teſtimonies of [n] *Apollodorus*, [o] *Dionyſius Halicarnaſſæus* and others, in the firſt Year of the 99th Olympiad, at what Time *Diotrephes* was Archon at *Athens*, 44 Years after the Birth of *Plato*, as [p] *Athenæus* accounts more juſtly than *Ammonius* and *Suidas*, who reckon but 42 before the Birth of *Demoſthenes*, three Years. [q] *Agellius* affirms, he was born the ſeventh Year after the Recovery of the City of *Rome* from the *Gauls* by *Camillus*; [r] but becauſe (as *Plutarch* ſaith) it is hard to find out on what Year the City was taken, it will be hard alſo to find upon what Year it was recovered. The Recovery was ſeven Months after its Taking, but in the following Year, for it was taken in *July*, recovered in *February*. If therefore as *Valerius Flaccus*, *Agellius*, and *Caſſius Hemine* account, the Taking of the City was in the 363d Year from the Building thereof, it was recovered in the 364th. Thus *Ariſtotle* was born in the firſt Year of the 99th Olympiad, the 370th from the Building of *Rome*.

But, if as *Livy* affirms, the taking of *Rome* was in the 365th Year from the Building thereof, and its Recovery in the 366th, *Ariſtotle*, according to that Account muſt have been born in the third Year of the 99th Olympiad, in the 372d Year from the Building of the City. Again, if the City were taken in the 364th Year after the Building thereof, and recovered in the 365th Year, as *Varro*, *Pliny*, *Dionyſius Halicarnaſſæus* account, whom *Scaliger* followeth, *Ariſtotle* muſt have been born in the ſecond Year of the 99th Olympiad, the 371ſt from the Building of the City, reckoning always ten Months for a Year, and not caſting them off, as *Pliny* and others ſeem to do, and beginning immediately the next Year, which Months being reckoned, the Account will agree with ours; hitherto *Nunneſius*.

CHAP. II.

His firſt Education and Studies.

Nicomachus [s] and *Phæſtis* the Parents of *Ariſtotle* being both dead, he was brought up by *Proxenus* an *Atarnean*, during which Time, being yet very young, he learned the liberal Sciences, as appeareth, ſaith *Ammonius*, from thoſe Writings of his which partly concern Poetry, partly the Poets themſelves, as likewiſe from his *Homerical Queſtions*, and ſeveral Books concerning the Art of *Rhetorick*.

[t] In Gratitude for this Care taken by *Proxenus* in his Education, *Ariſtotle* afterwards, not only bred up in like Manner *Nicanor*, the Son of *Proxenus*, in all Kinds of Learning, but adopted him his Son, and with his Eſtate bequeathed his Daughter to him. [u] He likewiſe cauſed the Statues of *Proxenus* and his Wife to be made and ſet up in Honour of them, as is manifeſt by his Will.

[w] *Athenæus* (citing an Epiſtle of *Epicurus*) and *Elian* [x] relate, that having conſumed the Inheritance left by his Father in Prodigality and Luxury; he betook himſelf to the Wars, wherein having ill Succeſs, he profeſſed Medicine, and by Chance coming into *Plato*'s School, and hearing their Diſputes, being of a Wit far beyond the reſt, he addicted himſelf to Philoſophy, and became famous therein. But this agrees not well with the Circumſtance of his Story, as related by Authors of greater Credit, and leſs Prejudice.

CHAP. III.

How he heard Plato.

HAving [y] attained the Age of ſeventeen Years, he went (in Obedience to the *Pythian* Oracle, which adviſed him to addict himſelf to Philoſophy) to *Athens*, *Laertius* ſaith (out of *Apollodorus*) that he was then but ſeventeen Years old, in which Year *Nauſigenes* was Archon, *Dionyſius Halicarnaſſæus* ſaith, it was the Year following, at what Time *Polyzelus* was Archon, perhaps it was upon *Nauſigene*'s going out of his Office, whom *Polyzelus* ſucceeded. But [z] *Eumenus* is much miſtaken, who ſaith, he was thirty Years old when he came firſt to *Plato*, perhaps (as *Nunneſius* conjectures) becauſe he had read in *Plato*, that Dialectick ought not to be ſtudied till the thirtieth Year. And no leſs err *Ammonius*, (if he be Author of that Life) and *Olympiodorus*, who affirm, that *Ariſtotle* coming to *Athens* in the ſeventeenth Year of his Age, heard *Socrates* three Years, whereas *Socrates* was put to Death when *Laches* was Archon, thirty two Years before *Nauſigenes*, under whom *Ariſtotle* was ſeventeen Years old.

Being recommended to *Plato*, he became his Diſciple, and ſo continued twenty Years, as an Epiſtle of his to *Philip* (cited by the old Interpreter of his Life) did teſtify.

Plato much loved him, and admired his Acuteneſs of Apprehenſion, and Diligence in Study; for which (*Philoponus* [a] ſaith) *Plato* uſed to call him

m Lib. 35. c. 9. n Laert. 5. 11. o Epiſt. ad Ammaeum. Ariſtot. repeated by Schottus in vit. comparat. Ariſt. & Demoſth. p Deipn. lib. 5. q Lib. 17. cap. 21. r Nunnes. in vit. w Deipn. l. 8. x Var. hiſt. 5. 9. y Ammon. vit. Ariſt. s Ammon. vit. Ariſt. t Ibid. u Laert. in Teſtam. Ariſt. z Laert. 5. 6. a De mundi æternit.

the

the Mind of the School, and when [b] he was not at his Lectures, he would say, *The Intellect is not here*; or, as *Rhodiginus*, *the Philosopher of Truth is absent*. And comparing his Acuteness with the Dulness of *Xenocrates*, *Plato* was wont to say, [c] *What an Horse and what an Ass have I to yoke together?* Xenocrates *needs a Spur*, Aristotle *a Bit*.

[d] Whilst he lived with *Plato*, he was extremely studious, and given to Reading, insomuch that *Plato* called his House, *the House of the great Reader*, and would often say, [e] *Let us go to the great Reader's House*. This may be confirmed by that great Number of ancient Authors which are cited in his Works. And tho' [f] *Laertius* (either in his own, or *Carneades*'s Words) saith, that *Aristotle* hath thrust in as many Sentences of old Authors in his Writings, as both *Zeno* and *Chrysippus*; yet every one that is acquainted with the Writings of *Aristotle*, knoweth how judiciously and concisely he giveth an Account of their Opinions, not for Ostentation, but Disquisition.

Some report there was a great Enmity betwixt *Plato* and *Aristotle* [g] which first arose from *Plato*'s Dislike of his Manner of Habit: For *Aristotle* wore rich Garments, and rich Shoes, and contrary to *Plato*'s Rule, cut his Hair short, and wore Rings. He had likewise (say they) a scornful Derision in his Look, and tenacious Contradiction in his Discourse, which *Plato* not approving, preferred before him *Xenocrates*, *Speusippus*, *Amyclas* and others, to whom he communicated his Doctrine and many Favours, but repudiated *Aristotle*, who thereupon, [h] whilst *Plato* was yet alive, set up a School in Opposition to him, in the *Lycæum*; at which Ingratitude, *Plato* much troubled, said, *Aristotle kicks at us as young Colts at the Dam that foaled them, when they have sucked their Fill*, and for [i] that Reason usually called *Aristotle* the Colt.

[k] They add, that *Xenocrates* being gone into his Country, and *Speusippus* not well, *Aristotle* came into *Plato*'s School with some of his Followers, and circumvented him with fallacious Arguments, whereupon *Plato* retired to his own House, and there taught privately, leaving *Aristotle* in Possession of the School, which he kept till *Xenocrates* returning, ejected him, and re-instated *Plato*. The chief Author of this Report seems to have been *Aristoxenus*, cited by [l] *Eusebius*, who as [m] *Suidas* observes, as soon as *Aristotle* was dead, cast many Aspersions upon him, out of a malicious Revenge, because *Aristotle* preferred *Theophrastus* before him in the Succession of the School, notwithstanding that *Aristoxenus* had gained a great Name and Credit among the Disciples.

But as *Ammonius* argues, it is not likely that *Aristotle*, if he would, could have ejected *Plato* out of the School, or have obtained License to erect a new one in Opposition to him, for as much as at the same time *Chabrias* and *Timotheus*, *Plato*'s Kinsmen, were in great Power, and Generals of the *Athenian* Forces. Yet some there are who affirm this, grounding it only on *Aristotle*'s contradicting of *Plato* in many Things; to which *Ammonius* answers, that *Aristotle* doth not simply contradict *Plato*, but those who misinterpret his Writings. For if he do sometimes contradict *Plato*, what Wonder? Seeing that therein he followeth *Plato* his Author, whose Saying it was, *that Truth ought to be preferred before all Things*; as also that Saying, Socrates *indeed is dear, but Truth most dear*. And elsewhere: *What* Socrates *saith, we must not so much regard, as we ought to be solicitous concerning Truth*. The same Course *Aristotle* took, if at any Time he confuted *Plato*'s Assertion, therein obeying him by following the Truth; and it is observed by [n] some, that he is very sparing in naming him, where he opposeth his Doctrine, and that thrice he makes honourable Mention of him in his *Rhetorick* [o], his Book *of the World*, (if that be his) and his [p] *Problems*.

True therefore it is, ([q] as *Apollodorus*, *Dionysius Halicarnassæus*, but especially *Aristotle* himself, in his [r] Epistle to *Philip*, affirm) that he was a constant, sedulous Hearer of *Plato* twenty Years, [s] unto the thirty seventh of his Age, even until *Plato* died, and then was so great an Honourer of his Memory, that in Testimony of his extraordinary Affection, he erected an Altar to him, bearing this Inscription:

[t] *This Altar* Aristotle's *Hand did raise*
To Plato, *whom the Impious must not praise.*

[u] *Olympiodorus* speaking of the Honour which *Aristotle* gave to his Master, confirmeth it by this Argument, that he writ a whole Oration in Commendation of *Plato*, wherein he first made a Relation of his Life, then praised him. He adds, that *Aristotle* in his Elegies to *Eudemus*, extols him thus:

And coming to the fam'd Cecropian *Town,*
In Sign of Friendship did an Altar raise
To him, whom impious Persons must not praise:
Who straying Man to Virtue did restore
Much by his Precept, by Example more.
One to the Gods so pious, good to Men,
No future Age must think to see again.

[w] Some affirm, that whilst he lived with *Plato*, he professed Medicine, and kept a Shop: But those *Aristocles* [x] confutes.

b Vet. Interp. apud Nunnes. c Laert. 10. 26. d Ammon. ibid. e Interp. f Vit. Epic. g Ælian. 3. 19. h Laert. 5. 2. i Ælian. var. hist. 5. 9. Helladius, apud Photium, in Biblioth. k Ælian. l Præpar. Evang. lib. 15. m In Aristox. n Licetus de piet. Aristot. Rhet. 1. o Lib. 1. c. 17. p Probl. 1. 30. q Laert. 5. 9. r Vet. Interp. s Ibid. t Ammon. vit. Arist. u Comment. in Gorg. Plat. w Athen. deipn. 8. Ælian. 9. 22. & 5. 9. x Euseb. præp. Evang. 15. 2.

CHAP. IV.

How he lived with Hermias.

Plato [y] dying in the first Year of the 108th Olympiad, and *Speusippus* his Nephew succeeding in the School, *Aristotle* went to *Hermias* the Eunuch, King of *Atarna*, a City of *Mysia* in *Asia*, who heretofore had been his Fellow-Disciple under *Plato*, and had a particular Kindness for him. *Hermias* received him with great Testimonies of Love and Respect. With him he lived three Years [z instructing him in Philosophy] at the End whereof, *Hermias* was (as *Strabo* saith) surprised by *Memnon* a *Rhodian*, and sent to *Artaxerxes*, King of *Persia*, who put him to Death. *Pythais* his Sister, a Woman of extraordinary Virtue, (whom *Hermias*, having no Children, had designed his Heir) being upon this Accident reduced to great Extremities and Afflictions, *Aristotle*, in a pious Gratitude to the Memory of his Friend, (as his own [b] Letter to *Antipater* attesteth) took her to Wife, and [c] set up the Statue of *Hermias* in the Temple of *Delphi*, with this Inscription.

This Man the Persian *King against all right*
A Sacrifice to his fierce Anger made;
Not like a Foe by martial Arms in Fight;
But as a Friend by Shew of Love betray'd.

He wrote likewise a Hymn to *Virtue*, in Memory of his Friend, to this Effect:

Virtue, whom we all obtain
With much Labour, but more Gain,
For your Sake to die would please,
Toil and Torments were but Ease.
You direct Men in Pursuit
Of immortal sacred Fruit,
Richer far than Gold refin'd,
Soft as Sleep, as Parents kind;
Great Alcides *for your Sake*
Labours vast did undertake:
Leda's *valiant Twins made known*
More your Glories than their own;
Ajax *and* Achilles *too*
Only dy'd for Love of you;
Ah! for you Atarna's *Pride,*
Hermias *untimely dy'd.*
But his Name we will revive,
That our Muse shall keep alive,
Paying hospitable Jove
Pious Thanks for a Friend's Love.

There wanted not those who cast many Aspersions and Calumnies upon this virtuous Friendship. Some affirm that *Hermias* lov'd *Aristotle* inordinately (an Imputation not well suiting with an Eunuch) and that for this Reason he gave him *Pythais* to Wife, whom *Suidas* and the *Greek* Etymologist affirm to have been his Daughter, either by Nature or Adoption, *Demetrius Magnesius*'s Niece, *Aristippus*'s Concubine, so little do they agree in their Relation. They add, that *Aristotle* was so passionately in love with her, that he sacrificed to her after the same Manner as the *Athenians* to *Ceres* at *Eleusis*. This *Laertius* relates as done whilst she was alive; but *Lyco*, first Author of this Calumny, that it was after her Death. Moreover that *Aristotle* in a thankful Acknowledgment of his Bounty, wrote a *Pæan* in Praise of *Hermias*, meaning the Hymn last mentioned, which [d] *Athenæus* proveth against the Calumniations of *Demophilus*, not to be a sacred Hymn or *Pæan*, but a *Scholion* or Festival Song. Hence *Theocritus* the *Chian* derides him in this Epigram.

To the Slave Eunuch who Atarna *sway'd*
An empty Tomb empty Aristotle *made,*
Who from the Academy did retire
To wallow in vain Pleasure's faithless Mire.

In answer to these Calumnies (first raised by *Lyco*, dispersed further by *Aristippus*, and continued by those that malign the Memory of *Aristotle*) *Apelleio* writ certain Books wherein he accurately confutes those who durst in this Manner impudently blaspheme (such are his Words) the Name of *Aristotle*; so much Prejudice and Malice being in the Accusation, as might easily argue the Falseness thereof.

[e] Upon the Death of *Hermias*, *Aristotle* [f] (with *Xenocrates*) fled from *Atarna* to *Mytelene*, as *Apollodorus* and *Dionysius Halicarnassæus* affirm, in the fourth Year of the 108th Olympiad, *Eubulus* being Archon.

CHAP. V.

How he lived with Philip *and* Alexander.

About this Time *Philip* King of *Macedonia*, Father of *Alexander*, taking Care for the Education of his Son, now growing towards Man's Estate, and unwilling (saith [g] *Plutarch*) to commit his Education to Professors of Musick, or any other of the liberal Sciences, as knowing him fit for higher Designs, sent to *Aristotle*, the most famous and learned of Philosophers, to come and instruct him. *Agellius* [h] recites his Epistle, which was to this Effect.

Philip to *Aristotle*, Health.

Know that I have a Son, I render the Gods many Thanks: Not so much for his Birth as that he

y Laert. 5. 4. Suid. z Suid. a Lib. 13. b Euseb. cont. Philos. c Lasrt. d Deipn. l. 15. e Laert. ibid. f Strab. l. 13. g Vit. Alex. h Lib. 9. c. 2.

was born in your Time, for I hope that being educated and instructed by you, he will become worthy both of us, and the Kingdom which he shall inherit.

Aristotle at this Request of *Philip*, went to *Macedonia* to him, in the 4th Year of the 108th Olympiad, as [j] *Apollodorus* and *Dionysius Halicarnassæus* affirm, at what Time *Alexander* was fifteen Years old.

[k] He lived there infinitely esteemed and beloved of *Philip* and *Olympia* his Wife, *Alexander*'s Mother. [l] They caused his Statue to be made, and set up in honour of him. *Philip* had a Kindness so particular for him, that he allowed him, in a manner, an equal Share in the Government of the Kingdom; which Interest, *Ammonius* saith, he employed to the Advantage, as well of private Persons as of the Publick, as appeareth (saith the *Latin* Interpreter of his Life) by his Epistles to *Philip*. [m] *Plutarch* affirms, that *Philip*, as a recompence to *Aristotle*, re-edified the Town where he was born, *Stagira*, which he had before laid waste. He likewise assigned him a School and Study near *Mieza*, a Town of *Macedonia*, not far from thence, where, unto this Day (saith *Plutarch*) they shew the stony Seats and shady Walks of *Aristotle*.

[n] He instructed *Alexander* in the deepest Parts of Learning, not only in *Ethicks* and *Politicks*, but his most reserved and solid Doctrines, call'd *Acroatick* and *Epoptick*, never communicated to the Vulgar.

That he taught him likewise the *Art of Medicine*, *Plutarch* argueth, forasmuch as *Alexander* was not only exceedingly delighted with the Theory thereof, but practised it successfully upon many of his Friends, to whom he prescribed Receipts and Diets, as appeareth, saith he, by his Epistle.

[o] Perceiving *Alexander* to be much taken with *Homer*'s Iliads, as conceiving, and calling it, *The best Institution of Military Virtue*, he took much Pains in correcting and restoring the Text, and then gave it to *Alexander*, which Copy he infinitely prized.

He writ a Book to *Alexander*, entitled, *Of a Kingdom*, mentioned by *Laertius* and *Ammonius*, wherein he instructed him how to rule.

[p] So much did he incline the Mind of *Alexander* to do good, that he us'd to say, if any Day pass'd, wherein he had not conferr'd some Benefit, *I have not reigned to Day.*

[q] *Alexander* so much affected him, that he profess'd he admir'd and lov'd him no less than his Father; because his Father, he said, only gave him being, but *Aristotle* well-being.

The Love which *Philip* and *Alexander* bore him was so great, that *Theocritus* the *Chian* cast the same Aspersion upon it, as he did on his Friendship with *Hermias*.

In the first Year of the 111th Olympiad, *Pythodorus* being Archon, *Philip* died, and was succeeded by his Son *Alexander*, whose active Spirit, soon after his coming to the Crown, designed an Expedition against the King of *Persia*. Hereupon, *Aristotle* having now liv'd with *Alexander* eight Years, tho' *Justin* saith but five, which some interpret of the Time before *Philip*'s Death, but not without some Violence (for that was above seven) preferring the Quiet of a Contemplative Life before the Troubles of War, took Leave of him, return'd to *Athens*, leaving in his room *Callisthenes* an *Olynthian*, his Kinsman (Son of his Cousin *Hero*) and Disciple, [r] whom, before his Departure, observing to speak with too much Liberty and Obstinacy to the King, he reproved in these Words,

Son, if thou thus employ thy Tongue,
Thy Thread of Life cannot be long.

And so it came to pass, not long after, upon this Occasion. *Hermolaus*, Son of *Sopolis*, a Youth of a Noble Family, that study'd *Philosophy* under *Callisthenes*, hunting the Wild Boar with *Alexander*, prevented the King, by casting his Dart first at him; for which he was, by the King's Command, punish'd with many Stripes. Troubled at the Ignominy thereof, he conspired with *Sostratus*, *Antipater*, and some other Companions of his, to murther *Alexander*; which Treason being discover'd by *Epimenes*, one of the Conspirators, they were all put to Death. *Aristobulus*, and *Ptolemæus*, Son of *Lagus*, affirm, they accus'd *Callisthenes* as him who instigated them to this Attempt. Hereupon *Callisthenes* was put into an Iron Cage, and so carry'd up and down in a miserable sordid Condition; and at last, as *Laertius* relates, (tho' others otherwise) thrown to the Lions and devour'd.

CHAP. VI.

His School and Manner of Teaching.

THUS *Aristotle* having liv'd eight Years with *Alexander*, returned to *Athens*, as [s] *Apollodorus* and [t] *Dionysius Halicarnassæus* affirm, in the second Year of the hundred and eleventh Olympiad, *Pythodorus* being Archon, where he found *Xenocrates* teaching in the Academy, which Place was resign'd unto him by *Speusippus* in the fourth Year of the hundred and ninth Olympiad.

Hence it appeareth, that [u] *Hermippus* erreth, in affirming, that *Xenocrates* took upon him the School of *Plato*, at what Time *Aristotle* was sent by the *Athenians* on an Embassy to *Philip*; for, as [w] *Patricius* hath observed, it can no way agree in Time, it being certain, as *Laertius* attests, that *Speusippus* succeeded *Plato* in the School, in the first Year of the hundred and eighth Olympiad, immediately

i Laert. 5. 10. k Ammon. l Vet. Interp. m Vit. Alex. n Plut. ibid. o Plut. ibid. p Vet. Interp. q Plut. vit. Alex. r Laert. 5. 5. s Laert. 5. 10. t Epist. ad Ammon. u Laert. 5. 2. w Discuss. Perip. T. 1.

upon

upon *Plato*'s Death, and continued therein eight Years, that is, to the End of the hundred and ninth Olympiad; in the second Year of which Olympiad, *Aristotle*, as we said, went to *Philip*, not on an Embassy, but upon his Invitation, to educate *Alexander*.

Neither is the Author of *Aristotle*'s Life less mistaken, who saith, *That upon the Death of* Speusippus, *the* Athenians *sent to* Aristotle, *and that both of them*, Aristotle *and* Xenocrates, *took upon them* Plato's *School*, Xenocrates *in the* Academy, Aristotle *in the* Lyceum. But this Error is easily detected by the same Computation; for, at the Time of *Speusippus*'s Death, *Aristotle* was with *Alexander*, nor did he leave him until six Years after; all which Time *Xenocrates* professed *Philosophy* in the *Academy*.

[x] The *Academy* being prepossess'd by *Xenocrates*, *Aristotle* made choice of the *Lyceum*, ([y] a Place in the Suburbs of *Athens*, built by *Pericles* for the Exercising of Soldiers.) Here he taught and discours'd of *Philosophy* to such as came to him, *walking* constantly every Day till the Hour of Anointing, which the *Greeks* usually did before Meals, whence he and his Followers are call'd ἀπὸ τῦ περιπατεῖν, *from walking*, *Peripateticks*. Others say, he was call'd *Peripatetick*, from walking with *Alexander*, newly recover'd of a Sickness; in which Manner he used to discourse of *Philosophy* with him.

[z] The Number of his Auditors encreasing very much, he gave over Walking, and taught Sitting, saying,

Now to be silent most disgraceful were,
And see Xenocrates *possess the Chair.*

Tho' *Cicero* and *Quintilian* affirm he used this Verse against *Isocrates*, in Emulation of whom, he taught *Rhetorick* to his Disciples every Morning. [a] So many Disciples resorted to him, that he made Laws in his School, as *Xenocrates* did in the *Academy*, creating *Archons* that ruled ten Days.

[b] The Discourse and Doctrine which he deliver'd to his Disciples was of two Kinds; One he call'd *Exoterick*, the other *Acroatick*. *Exoterick* were those who conduced to *Rhetorick*, *Meditation*, *nice Disputes*, *and the Knowledge of Civil Things*. *Acroatick*, those in which *more remote and subtle* Philosophy *was handled*, *and such Things as pertain to the Contemplation of Nature and Dialective Disceptations*. *Acroatick* Discipline he taught in the *Lyceum* in the Morning, not admitting every one to come and hear them, but those only of whose Wit and Principles of Learning, and Diligence and Study he had before made Trial. His *Exoterick* Lectures were in the Afternoon and Evenings; these he communicated to all young Men, without any Distinction, calling the latter his *Evening Walk*, the former his *Morning Walk*.

CHAP. VII.

His Philosophy.

IN *Philosophy* (saith [c] *Ammonius*) he seems to have done more than Man; for there's not any Part of Philosophy, whereof he treated, but he doth it most accurately; and many Things he himself (such was his Sagacity and Acuteness) finding out, compleated and finished.

[d] In *Logick* it was his Invention, that he separated the Precepts of Disputation from the Things themselves of which we dispute, and taught the Manner and Reason of Disputation; for, they who went before, tho' they could demonstrate, yet they knew not how to make a Demonstration; as they who cannot make Shoes, but only wear 'em. *Alexander Aphrodisæus* affirms, that he first reduced Syllogisms to *Mood* and *Figure*. *Philoponus*, that he invented all *Dialectick Methods*, whence *Theodorus* calls him *both Inventer and Perfecter of Logick*, which he indeed, in a manner, challengeth (but modestly) to to himself, in the last Chapter of his *Elenchs*, affirming, nothing had been done in that Kind before, but what the *Eristicks* and *Sophists* taught. As for the *Categories*, the Invention whereof some ascribe to the *Pythagoreans*, it is much more probable that they were wholly his own; for those Books intitled, καθόλε λόγοι, under the Name *Archytas*, from which some conceive *Aristotle* to have borrowed much; the Particulars whereof are instanced by [e] *Patricius*, *Themistius* affirms to have been written, not by the *Pythagorean* (neither hath *Laertius* made mention of any Writings of his, for the *Pythagoreans*, at that Time, wrote but little; the first that wrote any thing being *Philolaus*) but by some *Peripatetick*, who thought his Work might pass with greater Credit, if published in the Name of so ancient a Philosopher.

In *Physick*, the *Fifth Essence*, whereof Celestial Bodies consist, distinct from the Four Elements, is generally ascrib'd to his Invention, only *Simplicius* citeth the Authority of *Xenocrates*, in his Book of the *Life of* Plato, that *Plato* constituted Five simple Bodies, *Heaven and the Four Elements*, asserting, *they differ no less in Nature than in Figure*; for which Reason he assigned the Figure of a *Dodecadron* to *Heaven*, differing from the Figure of the *Four Elements*. But these, as the learned *Nunnesius* observes, seem to be rather Symbolical and Pythagorical, than the true Meaning of *Plato*. For *Plato*, in his *Timæus*, expressly avers, *That the Heavens are*, *of their own Nature*, *dissolute*, *but by the Divine Will*, *are kept together*, *as it were*, *by a Tye from being dissolved*. *Xenarchus*, a Philosopher, wrote against the *Fifth Essence*, introduced by *Aristotle*, whom *Alexander Aphrodisæus* exactly answereth. *Theodorus* calleth *Aristotle* the *Perfecter of*

x Laert. 5. 10. y Suid. z Laert. ibid. a Laert. ibid. b Agel. lib. 21. cap. 5. c Vit. Ar. d Ammon. vit. Ar. e Dissertat. Peripat.

Physick, adding, that only his Writings upon that Subject were approved by following Ages, who rejected whatsoever others had written in the same Kind, as appeareth by their Loss. What *Epicurus* and others have objected against him as a Fault, *That he enquired with such Diligence into the minute, and meanest Things of Nature*, is a sufficient Testimony of his Excellence and Exactness in this Study.

[f] In *Ethick*, whereas *Polyænus* placed Felicity in external Goods, *Plato* in those of the Soul only, *Aristotle* placed it chiefly in the Soul, but affirmed it to be *defiled* and *streightned*, if it want exterior Goods, properly using these Terms: For those Things which are *defiled*, have the same Beauty within, but their Superficies only is hidden; and those which are streightned have the same real Magnitude.

[g] In *Metaphysick*, which he calleth *First Philosophy* and *Wisdom*, and (as the more ancient Philosophers before him) *Theology*, [h] tho' there be not any Invention of his extant, yet he perfectly went thro' all the Parts thereof; for he was not only acquainted, as some falsly imagine, with Terrestrial Things, and those which belong to this World, but even with those Things which are above this World, as may appear from the Eighth Book of his *Physick*, where he saith, *That the first Cause is not subject to Motion, neither in itself, nor by Accident*; in which Words he declareth, *That* God *is not a Body, nor any way passible.* And in his Twelfth Book of *Wisdom*, or *Metaphysicks*, he discourseth accurately of *God* and *Intelligences*, in a rational clear Way, not involved in Fables, or Pythagorical Symbols, but founding his Assertion upon Reason and Demonstration, as much as the Subject and human Reason alloweth. [i] *Patricius* labours much to prove, that whatsoever he had in this kind, excellent, he borrowed from *Hermes Trismegistus*. But, [k] as we have already said, Mr. *Casaubon* hath fully evinced that Book to have been imposed upon the World by some later Writer.

What is added by the ancient *Latin* Interpreter, concerning *Aristotle*'s Sentence of that *Visual Hexagonal Pyramid*, (which [l] a learned Person hath observed to be chosen as a middle Way betwixt the Sentence of those who made the Optick Pencil a Pyramid of a Quadratick Base, and those who made it of a Conick Figure) is very obscure, and hardly admits of an Interpretation worthy so great an Author.

CHAP. VIII.

His Correspondence with Alexander.

WHilst *Aristotle* taught Philosophy at *Athens*, his Disciple *Alexander* was employ'd in an Expedition to *Asia*, against *Darius* King of *Persia*, incited thereunto by the Principles of Honour which were infused into him by *Aristotle*, particularly from the Precedents of *Achilles*, *Ajax*, and other Heroes celebrated by *Homer*, whose Iliads *Aristotle* had so carefully recommended unto him. He began this Expedition in the third Year of the 111th Olympiad, at which Time *Cteficles* was Archon at *Athens*, immediately after the Departure of *Aristotle*, who (it is probable) came only for this Reason from him, as preferring a quiet and studious Life before the Troubles of War.

The first Thing that *Alexander* did, was to visit the Tomb of *Achilles* in the *Sigæum*; at the Sight whereof he broke forth into these Words; *O fortunate young Man, that hadst a* Homer *to celebrate thy Praise! For, had it not been for his Iliads*, adds [m] *Cicero*, in the same Tomb where *Achilles*'s Body lay, *his Name also would have been buried.* He took with him the Iliads of *Homer*, corrected by *Aristotle*, and made it his constant Companion, insomuch that he laid it every Night with his Dagger, under his Pillow. And in a Victory over *Darius*, having taken a Casket of Unguents, of extraordinary Value amongst the Spoils of *Darius*, beset with Pearls and precious Stones, (as [n] *Pliny* describes it) his Friends telling him how many Uses it might be put to, because Unguents did not become a Soldier; *Yes*, saith he, *it shall serve to keep the Books of* Homer, *that the most precious Work may be kept in the richest Case.* Hence was this correct Copy called, as *Plutarch* saith. ἐκ τῆ νάρθηκος.

[o] Whilst he was in *Asia*, engaged in the Wars against *Darius*, in the midst of his continual Victories and Business, hearing that *Aristotle* had publish'd his *Acroamatick* Books of Natural Philosophy, he sent this Letter to him.

[p] *Alexander* to *Aristotle*, Health.

YOU have not done well in publishing your Acroamatick *Discourses; for wherein shall we excell others, if this Learning wherein we have been instituted, be made common to all? As for me, I had rather excell others in Knowledge than in Power. Farewell.*

To which *Aristotle* returned this Answer.

[q] *Aristotle* to *Alexander*, Health.

YOU wrote to me concerning my Acroamatick *Discourses, that they ought not to have been communicated, but kept secret. Know, that they are made publick, and not publick; for none but they who have heard us can understand them. Farewell.*

f Vet. Interp. g Ammon. h Ammon. i Differt. Peripat. k In the Life of Plato. cap. l Nunnæus Vat. Arist. m Pro Arch. n Lib. 29. o Plut. vit. Alex. p Agell. 20. 5. Plut. vit. Alex. q Agell. 20. 5. Epist. Græc.

Thus, notwithstanding *Alexander* was busied in the Wars, yet he forgot not his Master *Aristotle*, but kept a friendly Correspondence with him. So constant was he in his Love to Learning, and particularly so much enflamed, (as [r] *Pliny* saith) with a curious Desire of understanding the Natures of living Creatures, that he sent Thousands of Men, throughout all *Asia* and *Greece*, to procure all kinds of living Creatures, Birds, Beasts, and Fishes, at an excessive Charge; [s] *Athenæus* saith, 800 Talents, which according to [t] *Budæus*'s Account, is 840000 Crowns. These Men he sent with what they took to *Aristotle*, that he might not be ignorant of any Thing that any Nation afforded; by which Information, he composed, as *Pliny* affirmeth, fifty excellent Volumes, *of Living Creatures*, of which ten are only left, unless we put into the same Number, those Books of his which have some near relation to this Subject: As, *Of the going of living Creatures.* 1. *Of the Parts of living Creatures, and their Causes. Of the Generation of living Creatures.* If this were done by *Alexander*, as *Pliny* and *Athenæus* attest, (though [u] *Ælian* ascribe it to *Philip*) it must necessarily have been whilst he was in his *Asiatick* Expedition. For *Aristotle*, as hath been already proved, staid but a very short Time with him after the Death of his Father.

Aristotle made the same Use of his Correspondence with *Alexander*, as he had done of the Interest he before had with *Philip*, the Advantage not only of particular Persons, but of whole Cities.

This the City of *Stagira*, the Place of his Birth, did acknowledge, which, at the Suit of *Aristotle*, *Alexander* caused to be re-edified, and re-peopled, and restored to its former State, having before, by *Philip*, been laid level with the Ground. For, tho' *Plutarch* relate this as done in the Time of *Philip*, *Laertius*, *Ammonius*, *Dion*, *Chrysostome*, *Ælian*, and others hold, that it was done by *Alexander*, to which *Valerius Maximus* adds, that it was not long before *Aristotle*'s Death. In Memory of which Benefit, the People of *Stagira* used to celebrate a yearly Festival, which they called the *Aristotelian Feast*, naming the Month in which it fell, *Stagirites*.

[w] *Eresius* likewise, the Country of *Theophrastus*, which *Alexander* determined to punish very severely; by the Mediation of *Aristotle*, was pardon'd.

That he benefited many particular Persons is evident, saith *Ammonius*, from his Epistles to the King, yet extant, wherein he recommends several Persons to him.

Hence it is manifest, that the Author of his Life is mistaken, when he affirms, that in *Alexander*'s *Asiatick* Expedition, *Aristotle* accompanied him to the *Brachmanes*, where he writ that noble Piece of *the Laws and Institutions of* 255 *Cities*; that likewise he travelled over all *Persia* with *Alexander*, where, during the War, *Alexander* died, and *Aristotle* returned into his own Country. This Relation agrees not with the other Circumstances of *Aristotle*'s Life. *Alexander* died in the fourth Year of the hundred and thirteenth Olympiad, two Years before *Aristotle*'s Departure from *Athens*.

But as it is apparent, that this Mistake proceeded only from Ignorance (yet that so great, that [x] *Patricius* argues from thence neither *Ammonius* nor *Philoponus* to be Authors of his Life) so are there some other Errors, which no less manifestly appear to have proceeded from Malice, raised, it is likely, by the Authors of the other Scandals and Imputations, wherewith they sought to blast his Memory.

[y] Some affirm, that *Alexander*, upon the Treason of *Callisthenes*, took a great Displeasure against *Aristotle*, for having recommended him to him. For tho' at first, writing to *Criterus*, *Attalus*, and *Alcetas*, immediately upon this Accident, he sent them Word, that the Youths had confessed the Plot proceeded only from themselves, not by the Instigation of any other. [z] Yet afterwards, in an Epistle to *Antipater*, he imputes the same Crime to *Callisthenes*, not without this sharp Reflection upon *Aristotle*; *The Youths*, said he, *were stoned to Death by the* Macedonians, *but as for the Sophist, I will punish him myself; and those who sent him, and those who entertain in their Cities such as are Traitors to me.* Hereupon they interpret the Bounty of *Alexander* to *Xenocrates*, and Favour to *Anaximenes*, as not proceeding from the Magnificence of his Disposition, [a] but from the Displeasure he had conceived against *Aristotle*, whom he endeavoured to vex, by obliging his Adversaries and Emulators.

Upon this supposed Displeasure was grounded another Report, that [b] *Aristotle* conspiring with *Cassander* against *Alexander*, sent him, by *Antipater*, some of the Water of *Styx*, wherewith he poisoned *Alexander*. But the Relators hereof differ not a little amongst themselves. *Diodorus Siculus* and *Suidas* affirm, that *Alexander* was poisoned by *Cassander* Son of *Antipater*; *Arianus* by *Jolla* his younger Son. *Porphyrius* saith, That nothing but the Horn of an Ass, such as the Asses of *Scythia* had, would contain the Poison. *Justin* and *Pausanias*, the Hoof of a Horse; *Pliny* and *Arrian*, of a Mule; *Plutarch* and *Zonaras*, of an Ass. They differ no less about the Place whence the Water was fetch'd. Neither indeed can it be expected there should be a better Harmony amongst the Relators of this Fable, when there is so great Dissention and Variety of Relations concerning the Occasion and Manner of his Death. But the most credible is that of *Ephippus*,

r Lib. 8. 17. s Lib. 9. t De asse. lib. 2. 19. u Lib. 4. 19. w Ammon. vit. Arist. x Dissert. Peripat. 1. 1. y Laert. 5. 11. z Plut. vit. Alex. a Laert. ibid. b Plut. Alex.

[c] (cured

[c] (cited by *Athenæus*) [d] *Oroſius*, [e] *Juſtin*, and others, who aver, that *Alexander* died of a Fever, cauſed by Exceſs of Drinking.

CHAP. IX.

Upon what Occaſion he left Athens, *and went to* Chalcis.

[f] TWelve Years *Ariſtotle* profeſſed Philoſophy in the *Lyceum*, not moleſted by any; for tho' his Eminence in Learning procured him many Emulators and Enemies, yet the Favour he had with *Alexander*, while he lived, awed them ſo much, that they durſt not make any Diſcovery of the Ill-will they bore him. No ſooner was *Alexander* dead (according to *Dionyſius Halicarnaſſæus*) but ſome of them conſpired againſt his Life; to which End, *Eurymedon*, a Prieſt, or (according to *Phavorinus*) *Demophilus*, accuſed him of Impiety; *That he introduced ſome Philoſophical Aſſertions, contrary to the Religion of the* Athenians; *that he celebrated* Hermias *as a God, with a Hymn, and had cauſed his Statue to be ſet up in the* Delphian *Temple, with an honourable Inſcription.* Some affirm hereupon, he made an Oration in Defence of himſelf, at the Court of *Areopagus*, wherein he openly pronounced this Verſe, made out of two in *Homer*. [g]

Pears upon Pears, and Figs on Figs grow here.

By σῦκα ἐπὶ σύκοις (*Figs on Figs*) reflecting upon the Multitude of Sycophants which ſprung up every Day in the City. Hence *Phavorinus* ſaith, he was the firſt Philoſopher that pleaded for himſelf, and there was an Oration to that Purpoſe went about many Years after under his Name. But, of the Truth hereof, [h] *Athenæus* maketh Queſtion.

[i] Others affirm, that *Ariſtotle* perceiving the Conſpiracy that was againſt his Life, ſtole privately out of *Athens*, and went to *Chalcis*, where he ſpent the reſt of his Days; returning to his Friends, who demanding the Reaſon of his going, made this Anſwer; [k] *We left* Athens, *that we might not give the* Athenians *an Occaſion to commit again the ſame Wickedneſs they committed againſt* Socrates, *that they might not be guilty of a double Crime againſt Philoſophy.* To *Antipater* he wrote the forementioned Verſe;

Pears upon Pears, and Figs on Figs grow here.

Giving him to underſtand how dangerous it was for him to live in *Athens*, ſince the *Athenians* were wholly addicted to Sycophantiſm and Calumny. This Departure of *Ariſtotle* from *Athens*, *Dionyſius Halicarnaſſæus* placeth in the ſecond Year of the 114th Olympiad; *Apollodorus* a Year later, perhaps leſs rightly.

[m] Being near ſixty two Years of Age, very ſickly, and without Hope of living much longer, the whole Company of his Followers came to him, and beſought him to make Choice of a Succeſſor, whom after his Death they might look upon as the Perfecter of thoſe Studies whereinto he had brought them. There were, at that Time many excellent Scholars in his School, but eſpecially two, *Theophraſtus* and *Menedemus*, or rather, as *Patricius* reads, *Eudemus*. Theſe excelled the reſt in Wit and Learning. The firſt was of *Lesbos*, *Eudemus* of *Rhodes*. *Ariſtotle* anſwer'd them, *He would do as they requeſted, when he ſaw it convenient.* Soon after, the ſame Perſons being preſent who had made this Requeſt to him, he complain'd, *the Wine he then drank did not agree with his Health, but was unwholeſome and harſh, and therefore deſired they would ſend for other Sorts, both* Rhodian *and* Lesbian; *ſaying, He would make uſe of that which he ſhould find beſt for him.* They go, ſeek, find, bring. *Ariſtotle* firſt calls for the *Rhodian*, taſtes it, *A ſtrong Wine*, ſaith he, *and pleaſant*; then calls for the *Lesbian*, which having taſted, *Both*, ſaith he, *are good, but ἡδίων ὁ λέσβιος, the* Lesbian *is the ſweeter*; whereby every one underſtood that his Choice was not of the Wine, but of his Succeſſor, which was *Theophraſtus* of *Leſbos*, a Man of extraordinary Sweetneſs in Diſcourſe and Converſation; whence, not long after, as ſoon as *Ariſtotle* was dead, all his Diſciples applied themſelves to *Theophraſtus*.

CHAP. X.

His Apophthegms.

[n] OF his Apophthegms are remembered theſe.

[o] Being demanded what a Man got by Lying, he anſwered, *Not to be believed when he ſpoke Truth.*

He was often uſed to ſay, *He that hath many Friends, hath none*; which is likewiſe extant in the ſeventh Book of his *Ethicks*.

[p] He ſaid, *When Things happen not as we would, we muſt will as they happen.*

[q] Seeing a Youth very ſelf-conceited, and withal ignorant; *Young Man*, ſaith he, *I wiſh I were what you think yourſelf, and my Enemies, what you are.*

* Seeing a young Man proud of a fine Cloak, *Why boaſt you*, ſaith he, *of a Sheep's Fleece?*

[r] He ſaid, *They who demonſtrate plain Things, light a Candle to ſee the Sun.*

[s] Being reviled by an impudent Perſon; *Thou*, ſaith he, *who art verſed to bear all Things, ſpeakeſt them with Delight; I who am not uſed to ſpeak them, take no Delight in hearing them.*

c Deip. 10. 11. d Lib. 3. c. 21. e Lib. 12. 13. f Laert. 5. 5. g Odyſſ. 11. h L. 15. i Laert. 5. 5. k Ælian. var. hiſt. 3. 36. l Origen. contr. Celſum. lib. 1. m Augell. 13. 6. n Laert. 5. 17. o Stob. Serm. 35. p Stob. ibid. q Ser. ibid. * Ibid. r Ser. 36. s Ser. 29.

[t] Being demanded why he who taught others to ſpeak, himſelf held his Tongue; *A Whetſtone*, ſaith he, *cannot cut, yet it ſets an Edge upon Swords.*

[u] Being asked who can keep a Secret, *He*, ſaith he, *that can hold a glowing Coal in his Mouth.*

[w] Seeing a young Man very neatly dreſs'd; *Are you not aſhamed*, ſaith he, *when Nature hath made you a Man, to make yourſelf a Woman?*

[x] A handſome young Man, much courted, ſaid to him, *If I were hated of the Citizens as you are, I would hang myſelf*; *And I*, replied he, *would hang myſelf, if I were loved by them as you are.*

[y] Being demanded how a Man ſhould come to be rich, he anſwered, *by being poor in Deſire.*

[z] It repented him of three Things; *That he had ever committed a Secret to a Woman; that he had rid when he might have gone on Foot; that he had lived one Day, not having his Will made.*

CHAP. III.

His Will and Death.

FRom that Speech of *Ariſtotle* laſt mentioned, may be gather'd how careful he was to make his Will, but more from the exact Form thereof, which was thus:

BE *all* [a] *well; but if it happen otherwiſe, thus* Ariſtotle *maketh his Will. Be* Antipater *my ſole Executor during the Minority of* Nicanor. *Let* Ariſtomenes, Timarchus, Hipparchus, Dioteles, *(and if he pleaſe, and have Leiſure)* Theophraſtus, *be Guardians of the Children and of* Herpylis, *and all that I leave. I will, that my Daughter, as ſoon as ſhe ſhall be marriageable, be given* Nicanor *to Wife. If any Thing happen otherwiſe (which God forbid) before ſhe be married, or after ſhe be married before ſhe hath any Children, let* Nicanor *have the ordering of my Son, and the Diſpoſal of all other Things, for his Reputation and mine. Let therefore* Nicanor *take Care of the Maid* Pythais, *and my Son* Nicomachus, *and order their Eſtates according to their Conditions, as a Father and a Brother. If in the mean time any Thing ſhall happen to* Nicanor *(which God forbid) either before my Daughter be married, or if married, before ſhe hath any Children; if he make any Will, as he appointeth, ſo let it be. Otherwiſe, if* Theophraſtus *approve of it, let him marry the Maid, and have the ſame Power that* Nicanor *ſhould have had. Otherwiſe, let the Eſtates as well of the Maid as the Boy be diſpoſed with the joint Conſent of the Guardians, and* Antipater, *as they ſhall think fit. Let likewiſe the Executors of* Nicanor *take Care to remember us and* Herpylis, *ſince that ſhe hath been faithful to me, and if ſhe will take a Husband, that ſuch a one be given unto her as may be no Diſparagement unto us. Let them give her out of my Eſtate, beſides what is already mentioned, a Talent of Silver, three Maid-ſervants, if ſhe ſo pleaſe, and the Hand-maid which ſhe hath, and the Boy* Pyrrheus. *And moreover, if ſhe will dwell at* Chalcis, *let her have that Habitation which joineth to the Garden; if at* Stagyra, *our Patrimonial Seat; which howſoever* Herpylis *ſhall chooſe, let the Executors furniſh it, as they ſhall think convenient and proper for* Herpylis. *Let likewiſe* Nicanor *take Charge of the Boy* Mirmax, *that he may be reſtored honourably, as becometh us, unto his own, with all his Goods which we delivered to our Truſt. Let likewiſe* Ambracis *be a free Woman, and have beſtowed upon her at her Marriage, fifty Drachms, and the Girl which ſhe hath. I will likewiſe, that to* Thales *be given, beſides the Handmaid he hath bought, a thouſand Drachms, and another Handmaid. Likewiſe to* Simo, *beſides that Money which he hath already received to buy a Servant, let another Servant be bought, or the like Sum be given again, wherewith he may purchaſe one. As ſoon as my Daughter ſhall be married, let* Tycho, Philo, Olympias *and his Son be free Men. Of thoſe Boys which ſerved me, let none be ſold, but let my Heirs make Uſe of their Service, and when they come to Age let them be manumitted. Let the Executors take Care of thoſe Statues of* Nicanor, *and his Mother, and* Proxenus, *which I give Order for to* Gryllius, *as ſoon as they are perfected, be ſet up. Let likewiſe the Statue of* Arimneſtus *be ſet up, that this Monument may remain of him, ſince he died without Children. I will likewiſe that the Statue of my Mother be conſecrated to* Ceres, *in the* Numæan *Temple, or where elſe ſhall be thought fitting. Whereſoever my Body is buried by the Executors, thither let the Bones of* Pythias, *according as ſhe deſired, be brought and laid with mine. Let likewiſe* Nicanor, *if he continue well in Health, dedicate at* Stagyra, *to* Jupiter Soter, *and* Minerva Sotira, *Statues of Beaſts, of Stone of four Cubits, in Performance of the Vow which we vowed for him.*

[b] He died at *Chalcis*, in the third Year of the 114th Olympiad, *Philocles* being Archon, in the 63d and great Climacterical Year of his Age (not as [c] *Eumelus*, 70 Years old) as appeareth by the Computation of *Apollodorus* and *Dionyſius Halicarnaſſæus*; thus,

	Years.
He came to *Athens* at	18
Heard *Plato*	20
Lived with *Hermias*	3
With *Philip* and *Alexander*	8
Taught in the *Lycæum*	12
Lived at *Chalcis*	2
In all	63

t Stob. Ser. 93. u Ibid. w Ibid. x Ibid. y Serm. 110. z Ibid. a Laert. 5. 11. &c. b Laert. 5. 9. c Apud eund.

The

The Manner of his Death is variously related, *Strabo* [d], *Hesychius Illustris*, and from him *Suidas*, relate that he drank Hemlock, either being condemn'd thereunto by the *Athenians*, as *Socrates* was, or to prevent their Judgment.

[e] *Justin Martyr*, [f] *Gregory Nazianzen*, [g] *Cælius Rhodoginus*, the *Greek* Etymologist *Nonnus*, and others, follow the common Report, that a Question was proposed to him of the wonderful Nature of *Euripus*, an Arm of the Sea, coming into *Chalcis* (as *Lucian* avers) which ebbeth and floweth seven Times in twenty four Hours. Not being able to resolve it, he died of Shame and Anxiety. Some affirm, that as he sat on the Bank, having considered long upon it, he at last threw himself headlong into the River, saying, *Since* Aristotle *could not take* Euripus, Euripus *take thou* Aristotle.

But the Authors of greatest Credit, [h] *Apollodorus*, *Dionysius* [i] *Halicarnassæus*, [k] *Censorinus*, *Laertius* and others affirm, that he died of a Pain in his Stomach, caused by over-watching, and Excess of Study. For *Laertius* affirms he was a most indefatigable Student, and when he went to Bed, he held a brazen Ball in his Hand, that when he fell asleep, the Noise of it falling into a Basin set under it for that Purpose, might awake him, which *Alexander* his Disciple imitated. To this Pain of his Stomach he was very subject, and sometimes assuaged it by applying a Bottle of hot Oil to his Breast. *Notwithstanding this natural Infirmity of his Stomach*, saith *Censorinus*, *and the frequent Indisposition of a sickly Constitution, he preserved himself a long Time through his Virtue and Temperance; for it is much more strange that he attained the Age of* 63 *Years*, than *that he lived no longer.*

The Author of the Book *de Pomo*, affirmeth, that when he was dying, he said to his Disciples, standing about him, *It was not without Reason that* Homer *said* [l], *the Gods came down to Earth to relieve Mankind.* [m] *Cælius Rhodoginus* adds, from the same Author, That when he felt the Pangs of Death to come upon him, weeping between Grief and Hope, he often repeated these Words, *Thou Cause of Causes have Mercy on me.* And his Disciples, when they saw he was departing, said, *He who receiveth the Souls of Philosophers, may he take thine likewise, and lay it up in his own Treasury, as the Soul of a right and perfect Man, as we have known thee to be.* Of this there is no Testimony more ancient than that of the Author of the Book *de Pomo*, who (as *Patricius* clearly observes from his Writings) was a Christian.

[n] The *Stagirites* fetch'd his Body from *Chalcis* to *Stagira*, where they buried it with much Solemnity, building a magnificent Tomb for him, and erecting an Altar to his Memory.

CHAP. XII.

His Person and Virtues.

AS concerning his Person [o], he was slender, having little Eyes, and a small Voice. When he was young, *Laertius* and *Plutarch* affirm, he had a great Hesitation in his Speech. [p] He went in a rich Habit, and wore Rings; his Beard was shaven, his Hair cut short; he had a high Nose, if we credit the Head put up by *Fulvius Ursinus*, found at *Rome*, at the Bottom of the *Quirinal* Hill. He was of a sickly Constitution, troubled with a natural Weakness of Stomach, and frequent Indispositions, which he overmastered by his Temperance.

St. *Hierom* affirmeth, he was the Prince of Philosophers, an absolute Prodigy, and great Miracle in Nature, into whom seemeth to have been infused whatsoever Mankind is capable of.

He was extremely pious towards God and Man, upon which Subject *Fortunus Licetus* hath lately written two Books.

[q] *Eusebius*, *Cassiodorus*, and others affirm, that many Persons, eminent for Sanctity, especially Followers of School-Learning, have, through the Means of *Aristotle*'s Philosophy, been carried on to Inspection into the highest Doctrines of true Faith; as, that there is one God, *&c.*

As concerning his Gratitude to Men, besides those Instances already mentioned, to *Prozenus* and his Son, to *Hermias* and his Sister, to his Master *Plato*, to his own Mother, Brother, and Country, and infinite others; many Philosophers, whose Opinion he takes Occasion to alledge, he mentions with their due Praise; of which were his Master *Plato*, (of whom we have already spoken) whom, as we have said, he sometimes mentioned honourably, and sometimes concealeth his Name, where he preferreth his own Opinion. Amongst others, of whom he maketh honourable Mention, are observed *Democritus* in his first Book, *de Generations*; *Diogenes*, *Apolloniates*, in the same Book; *Anaxagoras*, in the first of his Metaphysicks.

For that he was very moderate, the Interpreter of his Life confirms, instancing in his Book of *Categories*, where he saith, *We ought not to determine any Thing hastily; but to consider often, and to doubt of every Thing, is not unuseful.* And again, in his Book of *Good*, *We must remember, being Men, not only that we are happy, but that we ought to be able to prove it by firm Reason.* And again, in his Ethicks to *Nicomachus*; *Man is our Friend, Truth our Friend; but above all, we ought to honour Truth.* And in his Meteorologicks: *As concerning these we doubt of some of them, others we touch superficially.* And in the same, not once or twice, but infi-

d Lib. 4. e Paræn. ad gent. f Stelieut. 1. g Ant. lect. 19. 8. h Laert. 5. 4. i Epist. ad Amm. k De die natali
l Ant. lect. m 18. 31. n Vet. interp. o Laert. 5. 1. p Ælian. var. hist. 3. 19. q Euseb. Præp. 1. 15.

nite

nite Times, *Men do happen upon the same Opinions, therefore we ought not to be proud of our own Wisdom, in any Thing whereof we conceive ourselves to be the Inventors.*

The common Report therefore (grounded upon no Authority) that he collected the Books of the antient Philosophers, and having taken out of them what he intended to confute, burnt them, is manifestly false; for any one that reads *Cicero*, will find, they were most of them extant in his Time.

CHAP. XIII.

His Wives and Children.

HE had two Wives, the first *Pythais*, Sister to *Hermias*, the Eunuch, Tyrant of *Atarna*, and his adopted Heir. Of the Scandals that were cast upon him by this Marriage, *Aristotle* fully acquits himself in his Epistles to *Antipater*, where he professeth, that he married her only out of the Good-will which he bore unto *Hermias*, and out of a Compassion for the great Misfortunes that had happened to her Brother; adding, that she was a Woman endowed with extraordinary Modesty, and all other Virtues.

His second Wife was named *Herpylis*, a Woman of *Stagira*, whom *Apellico* (cited by *Euseb.*) and (perhaps from him) *Suid.*[r] affirm, he married after the Death of *Pythais*. With her he lived to his End, as *Hermippus*, cited by *Athenæus*, and *Timothæus*, by *Laert.* affirm. *Timæus*, a profess'd Calumniator of *Aristotle* saith, she was his Concubine, and that *Aristotle* lived with her, following the Counsel of *Hesiod* in his *Georgicks*; from which Calumny *Hesiod* is fully vindicated by *Proclus*.

By *Herpylis* he had one Son, as[s] *Apellico* affirmeth, whom he named after his own Father, *Nicomachus*. To him he dedicated his *great Morals*, which[t] *Cicero* thinks to have been written by *Nicomachus* himself: *For I see not*, saith he, *why the Son might not be like the Father.*

This *Nicomachus* was a Disciple of *Theophrastus*, and much beloved by him; under whom he profited exceedingly in Philosophy, and arrived at much Eminence therein. *Suidas* saith, he writ eight Books of Physick, four of Ethicks. *Cicero* compares him both with his Tutor and Father. *Aristocles*, cited by *Eusebius*, affirmeth he was bred up an Orphan, by *Theophrastus*, afterwards died young in the Wars; which Relation agreeth not with *Aristotle*'s Will, nor with *Suidas* or *Cicero*, who aver, that he writ Books out of which *Laertius* brings a Citation in *Eudoxo*.

He had a Daughter also called *Pythais*, who, as *Sextus Empiricus* affirms, was thrice married. First to *Nicanor* the *Stagirite*, Friend to *Aristotle*. Secondly, to *Procles*, who derived his Pedigree from *Demaratus* King of *Lacedæmonia*. By him she had two Sons, *Procles* and *Demaratus*, who studied Philosophy under *Theophrastus*. Her last Husband was *Metrodorus*, Disciple of *Chrysippus* the *Cnidian*, Master of *Erasistratus*. By him she had a Son, named after her Father, *Aristotle*. Of this *Aristotle* there is mention in the Will of *Theophrastus*, where he is called the Son of *Midias*, not *Metrodorus*. *Suidas* affirms he died before his Grandfather.

CHAP. XIV.

His Disciples and Friends.

THE Disciples of *Aristotle* were so many and so eminent, that *Nicanor* of *Alexandria* wrote an express Book upon that Subject, which had it been extant, would doubtless have given us an exact Account of them, whereas now we must rest satisfied with an imperfect Catalogue.

To omit the three Princes that were his Disciples, *Hermias*, *Alexander*, (of whom already) and *Antipater*, Successor to *Alexander* in *Macedonia* (who, amongst other Things, wrote two Books of *Epistles*, in one whereof he related the Death of *Aristotle*) in the first Place is mentioned.

Theophrastus of *Eressus*, a City of *Lesbos*, the most eloquent of his Disciples. Him he appointed to succeed him in the School.

Phanias of *Eressus* also. He wrote many Books often cited by *Athenæus*; among the rest, *Ammonius* cites his *Categorics*, *Analytics*, and *of Interpretation*.

Eudemus of *Rhodes*, esteemed by *Aristotle* in the second Place next to *Theophrastus*. His Life was written by *Damias*, as *Simplicius* affirms, who often mentions him. He wrote *Analyticks*, and a *Geometrical History* (both cited by *Simplicius*) and some other Histories cited by *Laertius*, wherein he said, the *Magi* were of Opinion, that Men should rise again after Death. He survived *Aristotle*.

Eudemus of *Cyprus*, who died in *Sicily*, where he took *Dion*'s Part, as appeareth from *Plutarch*.

Aristotle in Honour of him, called his Dialogue *of the Soul*, after his Name.

Pasicrates, Brother of *Eudemus* the *Rhodian*. To him some ascribe the first lesser Book of *Metaphysicks*, as *Philoponus* affirmeth.

Theodectes; to him *Aristotle* dedicated some Books of Rhetorick, mentioned by *Valerius Maximus*, which he afterwards retracted. *Patricius* conceives he was rather a Companion than a Disciple of *Aristotle*, because he mentions him seven Times in his Rhetorick, which he is never observed to have done of any Disciple.

Clearchus of *Soli*. He wrote many Books often cited by *Athenæus*.

Dicæarchus, Son of *Phidias* of *Messena* in *Sicily*,

r Præp. 15. 2. s Euseb. præpar. Evang. ibid. t De fin. l. 5. u Euseb. ibid.

a Philosopher, Orator, and Geometrician, as *Suidas* affirmeth. He is cited by *Cicero*, mentioned often by *Plutarch* amongst the best Philosophers.

Aristoxenus, Son of *Mnesias*, a Musician of *Tarentum* in *Italy*, who going to *Mantinia*, there studied Philosophy and Musick. He heard his Father, and *Lamprus* an *Erythræan*, and *Xenopholus* a *Pythagorean*, and last of all *Aristotle*, whom after his Death he calumniated and wronged much, because he had left *Theophrastus* his Successor in the School, whereas himself was in great Esteem amongst the Disciples. Thus *Suidas*.

Nicanor, mentioned in his Will.

Philo, who wrote against one *Sophocles*, who caused the Philosophers to be voted out of *Attica*.

[w] *Plato* the younger, mentioned by *Laertius* and *Philoponus*.

[x] *Socrates* a *Pythinian*, mentioned by *Laertius*.

Mnason, a *Phocian*, mentioned by *Ælian* as one of those who assisted *Aristotle* in the Ejection of *Plato* out of the Academy. *Galen* likewise mentions him as Author of some medicinal Writings ascribed to *Aristotle*.

Phrasidemus, a *Phocian*, mentioned by *Laertius*, as a Peripatetick Philosopher. It is likely he was a Disciple of *Aristotle*, for he was contemporary with *Theophrastus*.

Palæphatus, of *Abydas*, an Historian much beloved of *Aristotle*.

Callisthenes, an *Olynthian*, *Aristotle*'s Sister's Son, of whom already.

Hipparchus, a *Stagirite*; of Kin to *Aristotle*. He wrote, as *Suidas* affirmeth, *of the Distinctions of Sexes amongst the Gods*, *of Marriage*, and the like.

Leon, a *Byzantine*, a Peripatetick Philosopher and Sophist. Some affirm he was a Disciple of *Aristotle*'s. He was so excessively fat, that coming to *Athens*, upon an Embassy, the People laugh'd at him; to whom he said, *Do you laugh to see me thus fat? I have a Wife a great deal fatter; yet when we agree, one Bed will hold us both, but when we disagree, not the whole House.* The People suspecting him of Confederacy with *Philip*, upon a Letter of his, came in a Tumult to his House, whereupon fearing to be stoned, he strangled himself.

Æschiron of *Mytilene*, an Heroick Poet, loved much by *Aristotle*, as *Suidas* saith.

Calippus an *Athenian*, who also heard *Plato*.

Satyrus, whose Books *of Lives and Characters* are cited by *Athenæus*.

Hieronymus the *Rhodian*, eminent in Philosophy. That he was *Aristotle*'s Disciple is acknowledged by *Athenæus*.

Heraclides of *Pontus*, a great *Philologist*.

To these add of less Note, *Echecratides* a *Methymnæan*, and *Adrastus* a *Macedonian*, both mentioned by *Stephanus*. *Euxithius*, mentioned by *Plutarch*. *Clitus* a *Milesian*. *Menon* the Historian. *Dioteles* and *Timarchus*.

CHAP. XV.

His Detractors.

AS the Friends and Followers of *Aristotle* were more in Number than those of any other Philosopher, so were also his Detractors, of whom having already had Occasion to make some Mention, we shall not need to give any further Account than this of *Aristotle*'s, alledged by [y] *Eusebius*.

How then is it possible, that what *Epicurus* relates of *Aristotle* can be true, that when he was a young Man, he wasted prodigally all the Means his Father left him, whereby he was necessitated to betake himself to the Wars; but therein being unfortunate, he set up an Apothecary's Shop, and *Plato* keeping open School, amongst the rest admitted him?

And who will credit *Timæus* the *Tauromenite*, who writes, that being come to riper Years, he shut up his poor Shop, and gave over his mercenary Profession?

Who can be persuaded to believe what *Aristoxenus* the Musician saith in the Life of *Plato*, that when he was from home, some Strangers rose up, and set up a School in Opposition to him, which Words some interpret of *Aristotle*, but erroneously; for *Aristoxenus* always commended *Aristotle*; [yet *Suidas*, as we said, avers the contrary.]

Who does not esteem the Commentaries of *Alexinus* ridiculous? For he bringeth in *Alexander* as a Youth talking with his Father *Philip*, slighting the Instructions of *Aristotle*, but approving those of *Nicagoras*, sirnamed *Hermes*.

Eubulides manifestly falsifies in the Book he wrote against *Aristotle*. For first, he bringeth in some dull Poems as written by others, upon his Marriage and Affinity with *Hermias*; then he saith, that he injured *Philip*; that he was not present with *Plato* at his Death; and that he corrupted his Writings.

As for the Accusation of *Demochares* against Philosophers, it is not worth the Mention; for he aspersеth not only *Aristotle*, but all the rest; and whosoever looks upon his Calumnies will say they are trivial; for he affirms, that some Letters of *Aristotle*'s against the City of *Athens* were intercepted and discovered; that he betrayed his own Country, *Stagira* to the *Macedonians*; that when *Olynthus* was taken, he informed *Philip* upon the Sale and Ransom of the Goods and Prisoners, which were the most wealthy of the *Olynthians*.

No less foolishly doth *Cephisodorus*, Disciple of *Isocrates*, calumniate him as an effeminate Person

[w] In Platone. [x] In Socrate. [y] Prepar. Evang. lib. 15.

and

and a Glutton, with many other Aſperſions of the ſame Kind.

But of all, the moſt fooliſh is that of *Lyco*, who profeſſed himſelf a *Pythagorean*, for he ſaith, that *Ariſtotle* ſacrificed to his Wife after ſhe was dead, as the *Athenians* to *Ceres*; and that uſing to bathe himſelf in warm Oil, he afterwards ſold it; and that when he went to *Chalcis*, thoſe who bought his Goods, found in one Bark 75 Braſs Pots. Indeed near ſo many were the Calumniators of *Ariſtotle*, from whom ſprung up others, ſome in the ſame Age, others a little after, all Sophiſts, litigious Perſons and Orators; of whoſe Names and Books no more remains than of their Bodies.

As for thoſe who flouriſhed after theſe, ſome repeat only what theſe had ſaid before, and therefore we need not take any Notice of them, much leſs of thoſe, who not lighting upon thoſe Books, have framed ſome Inventions of their own; ſuch as they, who affirm he had 300 Pots, for there was not any Author of that Time who made Mention thereof but *Lyco*, and he ſaith, there were found only 75 Pots.

And not only from Computation of Time, and from the Perſons who aſſert theſe Calumnies, may any Perſon perceive all they ſay to be but falſe; but alſo from this, that not any two of them lay the ſame Thing to his Charge, but every one hath a particular Calumny different from the reſt. But, if any one of theſe had been true, *Ariſtotle* ſhould have heard of it, not only once from them, but a thouſand Times.

It is manifeſt therefore, the ſame Thing befel *Ariſtotle* which happened to many others, that as well for the Reſpect and Friendſhip he had with Princes, as for the Excellency of his Diſſertations, the Envy of the Sophiſts of that Age perſecuted him. But ſuch as are ingenious ought not to mind Calumniators, but thoſe who have praiſed and imitated him, whom they will find to fall nothing ſhort of the others, either for Number or Worth. Hitherto *Ariſtocles*.

CHAP. XVI.

His Writings.

Laertius hath given a large Catalogue of his Writings, as a Teſtimony of his Excellency in all Kinds of Learning. Their Titles, as reduced to their ſeveral Heads, by *Patricius*, are theſe.

Logick.

THE Sophiſt 1.
Of Sciences 1.
Sophiſtick Diſtinctions 4.
Of Eriſtick 2.
Of Eriſtick Solutions 4.
Of Genus and Species 1.
Of Proprium 1.
Epichirematick Commentaries 1.
Inſtances 1.
Of thoſe which are ſaid many Ways, as according to the Propoſitum 1.
For Science 1.
Diſtinctions 17.
Diæreticks 1.
Of Interrogation and Anſwer 2.
Propoſitions 1.
Eriſtick Propoſitions 4.
Syllogiſms 1.
Firſt Analyticks 9.
Second Analyticks 2.
Of Problems 1.
Methodics 6.
Terms Antetopical 7.
Syllogiſms 2.
Syllogiſtick and Terms 1.
Ante-Topicks 1.
Topicks to Terms 1.
Diæretick 1.
Definitions 13.
Argumentations 2.
Propoſitions 1.
Epichiretick Theſes 25.
Methodic 1.
Of Speech 1.
Categories 1.
Of Interpretation 1.

Physick.

OF the Soul 1.
Of Suffering and being Paſſive 1.
Of Elements 3.
Of Motion 1.
Theſes of the Soul 1.
Of Nature 3.
Phyſick 1.
Of Animals 9.
Anatomy 7.
Anatomick Selections 1.
Of compound Animals 1.
Upon not Generating 1.
Of Plants 2.
Phyſiognomick 1.
Signs of Tempeſt 1.
Phyſicks by Elements 38.
Perſpective Problems 2.
Of Stone 1. In all 75.

Ethick.

OF Juſtice 4.
Of Philoſophy 3.
Politicks 2.
Of Riches 1.
Of Nobility 1.
Of Pleaſure 1.

Alexander; or, *of Colonies* 1.
Of a Kingdom 1.
Of Education 1.
Of Good 3.
Oeconomick 1.
Of Friendſhip 1.
Propoſitions concerning Virtue 3.
Of the Paſſions of Anger 1.
Ethicks 4.
Of the Better 1.
Of Elegible and Accident 1.
Of Pleaſure 1.
Of Voluntary 1.
Of Fair 1.
Amicable Theſes 2.
Politicks 2.
Laws 4.
Conſtitutive Law 1.
Politick Auſcultation 8.
Of Juſt 2.
Of Conſultation 1.
Juriſdictions 1.
Paſſions 1.
Governments of Cities 158.
Proper Democracies.
Oligarchicks.
Ariſtocraticks.
Tyrannicks. In all 217.

METAPHYSICK.

OF Contraries 1.
Of Principle 1.
Of Idea 1. In all 3.

MATHEMATICK.

MAthematicks 1.
Of Magnitude 1.
Of Unity 1.
Aſtronomick 1.
Optick 1.
Of Muſick 1.
Mechanicks 1. In all 7.

PHILOLOGICK.

OF Poets 3.
Gryllus of Rhetorick.
Works of Rhetorical Art 2.
Collection of the Theodectick Art 1.
Rhetorical Enthymemes 1.
Homerical Difficulties 6.
Poeticks 1.
Compariſons 1.
The Olympionicæ 1.
Pythionick Muſick.
Pythick 1.
Pythionick Elenchs 1.
The Dionyſiack Victories 1.
Of Tragedies 1.
Poems 3. *So Hermias to Democritus.*
Elegies. In all 27.

UNCERTAIN or EXTRAORDINARY.

NErinthus 1.
Menexenus 1.
Erotick 1.
Sympoſium 1.
Protreptick 1.
Of Prayer 1.
Collection of Arts 12.
Art 1.
Another Art 1.
Collection 2.
Of fabulous living Creatures 1.
Medicine 2.
Memorials 1.
Encyclicks 2.
Inordinate 12.
Expounded by their Genus 14.
Doctrines 1.
Proverbs 1. In all 46.

EPISTLES.

TO Philip *and* Alexander 4.
To Antipater 3.
To Mentor 1.
To Ariſto 1.
To Olympias 1.
To Hæpheſtion 1.
To Themiſtagoras 1.
To Philoxenus 1. In all 19.

Againſt the ancient Philoſophers.

OUT of Plato's *Laws* 2.
Out of Plato's *Commonwealth* 2.
Out of Timæus *and* Archytas *their Writings* 1.
Problems out of Democritus 2.
Againſt Meliſſus 1.
Againſt Alcmæon 1.
Againſt Gorgias 1.
Againſt Xenophanes 1.
Againſt Zeno 1.
Of the Philoſophy of Archytas 3.
Of the Philoſophy of Speuſippus *and* Xenocrates. 1.
In all 19.

The Sum of all theſe Books, excepting the Epiſtles, is 513. *Laertius*[z] reckons them to be near 400, perhaps accounting the ſeveral Books that are upon the ſame Subject for one. But of theſe the greateſt Part is loſt, and of many that are extant, the Titles altered. Of the extant there are only theſe.

z Laert. 5. 22.

LOGICK.

Categories 1.
Of Interpretation 1.
First Analyticks 2.
Second Analyticks 2.
Topicks 8.
Elenchs 1.

PHYSICK.

Of Natural Auſcultation 8.
Of Heaven 4.
Of Generation and Corruption 2.
Of Meteors 4.
Of the World 1 *ſuſpected.*
Of the Soul 3.
Of Senſe and Senſibles 1.
Of Memory and Reminiſcence 1.
Of Sleep and waking 1.
Of Dream 1.
Divination by Dreams 1.
Of the Motion of living Creatures 1.
Of the Length and Shortneſs of Life 1.
Of Youth and Age, Life and Death. 1.
Of Reſpiration 1.
Of the Going of Animals 1.
Of Breath 1.
Of the Generation of Animals 5.
Of the Parts of Animals 4.
The Hiſtory of Animals 10.
Of Colours 1.
Of Phyſiognomy 1.
Spurious 2.

ETHICK.

Ethick, to Nicomachus 10.
Great Ethick 2.
Ethick to Eudemus 7.
Of Virtues 1.
Oeconomick 2.
Politick 8.

METAPHYSICK.

Metaphyſick 14.
Of the abſtruſe Part of Divine Wiſdom, according to the Ægyptians; tranſlated out of *Arabick*, but reported to be ſpurious, 14.

MATHEMATICKS.

Mathematicks 2.
Mechanick 1.
Of inſecable Lines.

PHILOLOGICKS.

Rhetorick 3.
Rhetorick to Alexander 1.
Poetick 1.

Extraordinary.

Problems 38.
Wonders 1.
Of Zenophanes, Zeno *and* Gorgias 1.

Beſides theſe, there are many other Books cited for his, under theſe Titles.

Magick, Laert. Proem.
Epitome of Orators, Laert. Ariſtip.
Of Beans, Laert, Pythag.
Of Mixtion, Ariſtot. de ſenſu. cap. 3.
Of Sapors, Ariſt. de ſenſu. cap. 4.
Phyſical Hiſtory, Ariſt. de inceſſ. Animal. cap. 2.
Of Nutriment, Ariſt. de Somno, cap. 3.
Selection of Contraries, Ariſt. Metaph. lib. 3. cap. 2.
Diviſion of Contraries, Ariſt. Metaph. lib. 10. c. 3.
Of Oppoſites, Simplic. in cap. de Oppoſit. Comm. 8.
Collection of Pythagorick Opinions, Simplic. in lib. 2. de Cœlo. Com. 4.
Of Ideas, Alexand. in lib. 1. Metaphyſ. Comm. 59. where he cites the Fourth Book, tho' *Laertius*, but one, as if there were no more.
Of Enunciation, Alexand. in lib. 4. Metaphyſ. Com. 25. & 44.
Homerical Difficulties, 6.
Of Platonic Aſſertions. Plut. contra Colot.
Eudemus, Plut. Conſol. ad Apollon.
Of Drunkenneſs, Plut. Sympoſiac. 3. *Athenæus* cites the Tenth Book hereof.
Animal, or of Fiſhes, Athen. Deipn. 7.
Of living Creatures, and of Things pertaining to living Creatures, Athen.
Of the Manners of living Creatures, Athen.
Of Pheaſants, Athen.
Of Conſanguinity, Athen.
Of wonderful Luxury, Athen.
Apology, Athen.
Hiſtories, Athen.
Barbarous Juriſdictions.
Of Audibles, Porphyr. Comm. in Ptol. Muſ. Proclus in Timæum Plat.
The *Cohabitant*, Procluſ. Proæm. in Repub. Platon.
Θεολογεμένα, Macrob. Saturnal. lib. 1.
Of Nature, Clem. Alexandrin. Strom. lib. 6.

We ſhall not add the *Peplus* cited by [a] *Nicephorus*, and the *Chriæ* by *Stobæus*, under his Name, ſince it is manifeſt they belong not to the ſame *Ariſtotle*, as *Patricius* hath evinced.

Theſe Books *Ariſtotle* gave to *Theophraſtus* when he made him his Succeſſor in the School, as *Strabo* affirmeth; adding, *That* Ariſtotle *was the firſt we know of that made a Library, which the* Egyptian *Kings learned of him to do. Theophraſtus* bequeathed all his Books to *Nelius*, a *Scepſian*, who carried them to *Scepſis*, and dying, left them to his Heirs,

[a] Niceph. 10. 36.

Men

Men of no Learning, who only kept them confuſedly lock'd up. And when they underſtood what Care was taken by the *Attaltick* Kings (in whoſe Juriſdiction *Scepſis* was) to make a Library in *Pergamus*, they hid them in a Hole under Ground [where they continued about 130 Years] by which Means they receiv'd ſome Injury by the Wet and Worms. At laſt, ſome that were deſcended from *Ariſtotle* and *Theophraſtus*, ſold them to *Apellico*, a *Teian*, [who, according to *Athenæus*, was made free of the City of *Athens*, a Perſon very rich, who, beſides many other Libraries, bought this of *Ariſtotle*, being himſelf a Lover of *Peripatetick Philoſophy*] for a great Sum of Money. This *Apellico* was more a Lover of Books, than of Learning; ſo, that becauſe they had received ſome Injury, he cauſed them to be tranſcribed, ſupplying the Defects not rightly, and by that Means put them forth full of Faults. The ancient *Peripateticks*, that ſucceeded *Theophraſtus*, wanting Books, as having but very few, and thoſe *Exoterick*, could not treat exactly upon Part of Philoſophy: They that lived later, after that theſe Books were publiſhed, had much greater Helps to Philoſophy, and the Imitation of *Ariſtotle*, although, by reaſon of the infinite Faults, they were forced to ſay many Things by gueſs. Hereunto *Rome* conduced not a little; for (ſoon after the Death of *Apellico*, *Sylla* taking *Athens*, in the fourth Year of the 173d Olympiad, ſeized upon his Library, and cauſing it to be carried to *Rome*, *Tyrannio*, a Grammarian, a Perſon ſtudious of *Ariſtotle*, obtained Leave of the Library-Keeper to be permitted the Uſe of them) the Bookſellers not having good Writers, and not comparing well the Copies, it occaſioned many Faults, as well in thoſe Books that were at *Rome*, as in thoſe tranſcribed and ſold into *Alexandria*. *Plutarch* adds, *that from this* Tyrannio, Andronicus *the* Rhodian *had them, who firſt made them publick, ſetting forth thoſe Volumes, which*, ſaith he, *we have.*

Thus *Strabo* and *Plutarch*. *Athenæus* ſaith, *that* Nelius *ſold them to* Ptolemæus Philadelphius, *by whom they were tranſlated to* Alexandria, where how long they lay hid is uncertain; which Library was afterwards burned by *Julius Cæſar*.

CHAP. XVII.

His Commentators.

NO ſooner were the Writings of *Ariſtotle* communicated to the World, but they were entertained with general Approbation, which ſome expreſſed, by employing themſelves in Commenting upon them; whoſe Example was followed by many in all following Ages. To omit *Paſicrates* the *Rhodian*, Brother of *Eudemus*, who wrote, as *Galen* affirmeth, upon the Book of *Categories*, we ſhall name, in the firſt Place,

Andronicus, the *Rhodian*, who firſt publiſhed *Ariſtotle*'s Writings, put forth a Paraphraſe or Comment upon the greateſt Part of them.

Next, his Diſciple *Boethus*, a *Sidonian*, took much Pains in the Expoſition of *Ariſtotle*, whence he is often mentioned honourably by *Ammonius* and *Simplicius*.

Ariſto, a *Coan*, Diſciple alſo to *Andronicus*, as [b] *Strabo* affirms, living in the Time of *Nicias*, Tyrant of *Coos*, is reckoned, by *Simplicius*, amongſt the old Commentators upon *Ariſtotle*'s *Categories*.

Nicholaus Damaſcenus, who lived in the Time of *Auguſtus*, by whom much loved, is cited by *Simplicius* and *Averroes*, as an Expoſiter of *Ariſtotle*.

Athenodorus of *Tarſis*, a *Stoick*, who lived alſo under *Auguſtus*, as *Plutarch* affirms, is cited by *Simplicius*, as having written upon *Ariſtotle*'s *Categories*, but rather by way of Confutation than Interpretation; as did likewiſe *Alexander Ægeus*, *Nero*'s Tutor, mentioned by *Simplicius*; *Cornutus*, who lived at the ſame time, cited by *Porphyrius* and *Simplicius*; *Lucius* and *Nicoſtratus*, a *Macedonian*, who lived under *Antonius*.

Sotion of *Alexandria*, and *Achacius*, ſeem to have written upon the *Categories*, being often cited by *Simplicius* upon that Subject.

Taurus, the *Beriſian*, a *Platonick* Philoſopher, living under *Antoninus*, wrote firſt concerning the Difference between the Doctrines of *Plato* and *Ariſtotle*.

Adraſtus, the *Aphrodiſæan*, wrote a Comment on *Ariſtotle*'s *Categories*, and of his *Phyſick*, and a Book, concerning the Method of his Philoſophy.

Aſpaſius wrote a Comment on all *Ariſtotle*'s Works, taking particular Care to reſtore the Text; to which End he is often quoted by *Simplicius* and *Boetius*. There is a Comment upon ſome Books of the *Ethicks* extant under his Name.

Herminus, ſomewhat later, ſeems to have written upon all, or the greater Part of *Ariſtotle*'s Works, cited by all the *Greek* Commentators that are extant, and by *Boetius*.

Alexander, the *Aphrodiſæan*, who lived under *Antonius* and *Severus*, wrote upon the *Analyticks*, *Topicks* and *Elenchs*, whence ſtiled by the latter Interpreters Ἐξήγητης *the Expoſitor*.

Galen, who lived at the ſame time, wrote three Books upon *Ariſtotle* of *Interpretation*, four Books upon the Firſt of the firſt *Analitick*, Four upon the Second of the Firſt, ſix upon the Firſt of the ſecond *Analactick*, five upon the ſecond.

[c] *Atticus*, a *Platonick* Philoſopher, beſides ſeven Books, wherein he proved *Plato* and *Ariſtotle* to be of the ſame Sect, contrary to the Aſſertion of *Taurus*; he wrote likewiſe a *Dialogue upon the* Categories *extant*, ſeven Books upon the *Categories*, cited by *Simplicius*, a Comment upon the Book of *Interpretation*,

b Geogr. lib. 14.

c Suid.

Interpretation, cited by *Boetius*; not to mention what he wrote upon *Aristotle de Anima*, since it appears from *Suidas*, that it was rather by way of Opposition than Exposition, which [d] *Theodoret* likewise confirms.

Jamblicus, of *Calsis* in *Cœlosyria*, Master to *Julian* the Emperor, wrote in an abstruse Way upon the Book of *Categories*.

Dexippus, by some thought to be the Son of *Jamblicus*, wrote a *Dialogue on the* Categories *extant*.

Maximus, a *Byzantine*, Disciple of *Jamblicus*, wrote Commentaries on the *Categories*, and other Books of *Aristotle*, as *Simplicius* and *Suidas* affirm.

Plutarch, the younger Son of *Nestorius*, flourishing under *Valentinian* the First, *Gracian* and *Theodosius* the First, according to *Suidas* and *Philoponus*, wrote Commentaries upon some Books of *Aristotle*.

Syrianus, sirnamed the *Great*, of *Alexandria*, a Philosopher, who flourished under *Arcadius*, *Honorius*, *Theodosius* the Second, and *Valentinian* the Second, wrote Commentaries upon *Aristotle*'s Books of *Nature*, of *Motion*, of *Heaven*, and upon the *Categories*, cited by *Simplicius* and *Philoponus*; likewise upon the Second, Fifth and Sixth Book of *Metaphysicks*, which are extant.

Olympiodorus, an *Alexandrian*, who derived himself from *Ammonius Saccus*, and was Contemporary to *Plutarch* and *Syrianus*, wrote upon *Aristotle*'s *Meteors*, extant. He was later than that *Olympiodorus*, who writ upon *Plato*.

Themistius, living, according to *Suidas*, under *Julian* and *Jovian*, wrote a Paraphrase upon *Aristotle*'s *Physick*, Eight Books; a Paraphrase on the *Analyticks*, Two Books; upon his Books, *Of the Soul*, Seven Books. *Of the Scope and Title of the Book of* Categories, One Book.

Proclus, Disciple of *Syrianus*, wrote Two Books concerning *Motions*; wherein he made an Abstract of *Aristotle*'s Second Book of *Motion*: That he wrote also upon his Book of *Heaven*, and the *Elements*, may be conjectured from the frequent Citations of *Simplicius*.

Marinus, who succeeded *Proclus* in the School, seemeth to have written something upon *Aristotle*'s Book *of the Soul*, being often cited upon that Subject by *Philoponus*.

Ammonius Hermonæus wrote upon *Aristotle*'s *Categories*, and upon his Book of *Interpretation*, both which are extant; as likewise upon the Books of *the Soul*, cited by *Philoponus*.

Damascius, a *Platonick* Philosopher, Disciple to *Ammonius*, besides what he wrote in Confutation of *Aristotle*, concerning *Time*, epitomized the Four First, and the Eighth Book of his Physick, and the First Book of Heaven. To these add,

Philoponus and *Simplicius*, and *Asclepius*, Disciple to *Ammonius*.

Johannes Damascenus, whose Compendium of *Aristotle*'s *Logick* and *Physick* are extant; he lived about the Year 770.

Eustrathius wrote upon some of the *Nichomachian Ethicks*, and *Eustratius* upon his Book concerning *Demonstration*.

Michael Psellus, about the Year 800, and *Michael Epesius* upon the *parva naturalia*.

Magentinus upon the *Categories*, and the Book of *Interpretation*.

Nicephorus Blemmydes (under *Johannes Duca.*) upon the *Logick* and *Physick*.

Georgius Plachymerius, and *Theodorus Metochita* lived about the Year 1080, and wrote Epitomes extant.

Of *Arabic* Commentators were *Avicenna* and *Averroes*, about the Year 1216.

The later Writers it will be unnecessary to mention, there being a Catalogue of them annexed to *Aristotle*'s Works, of the *Paris* Edition.

ARISTOTLE's Epistles.

To Philip 1.

THey [e] who undertake a Command for the Good of their Subjects, not preferred thereunto, either by Fortune or Nature, trust not in their own Power, which they know subject unto Chance, but grow great in Virtue, whereby they order the Commonwealth wisely. For there is nothing amongst Men so firm and solid, but the rapid Motion of the Sun changeth it ere the Evening. Nature, if we enquire into the Truth, varieth all Lives, interweaving them, like the Action of a Tragedy, with Misfortunes. Men, like Flowers, have a set Time wherein they flourish and excel others. Wherefore behave not yourself towards *Greece* tyrannically or loosely, for one argues Petulance, the other Temerity. Wise Princes ought not to be admired for their Government but Governance; so that tho' Fortune change, they shall have the same Praise. As for the rest, do all Things well, preferring the Health of your Soul, by Philosophy, that of your Body by Exercise.

To Philip 2.

MOst Philosophers assert Beneficence to be something equal to God. To speak the Truth, the whole Life of Mankind is comprised in conferring and returning Benefits; so as some bestow, others receive, others return. Hence it is just to commiserate all that are in Adversity, for Pity is the Sign of a mild Soul, Sternness of a rude, it being dishonest and impious to neglect Virtue in Mis-

[d] Græ. affec. l. 12.

[e] Ex Collect. Cujacii.

fortunes.

fortunes. For this I commend our Disciple *Theophrastus*, who saith, we never repent of doing good; it brings forth good Fruit, the Prayers and Praises of the Obliged. Wise Men therefore must study to oblige many, thinking, that besides the Praise, there may some Advantage accrue from hence in the Change of Affairs, and if not all, at least some one of those to whom he hath done good, may be in a Capacity to requite him. For this Reason, endeavour to be ready in doing good, but give not Way to your Passions, for that is kingly and civil, this barbarous and odious. As you see Occasion, practise and neglect not this useful Advice.

To Philip 3.

THE most excellent Princes, whose Honour toucheth the Stars, have conferred most Benefits, and not accommodating their Sway only to the present, but considering the Instability of Fortune, have treasured up good Deeds as useful in either Condition. In Prosperity it procures them Honour, for Honour is proper to Virtue; in Adversity Relief, for Friends are much better tried in bad Fortune than in good. The Sight of benevolent Persons are like to that of Land to Men in a Storm. All Fortune apt to desert us, is the true Scope which they propose to themselves, who war, or do unjustly, or comply dishonestly, only the Clearness of virtuous Persons is not unacquainted with the Instability of Fortune, but, by Reason sustaining all Accidents, and being, as *Plato* saith, above them, they are never disordered. Take Heed therefore of the rapid Motion of Things; look upon them as a Circle which reverts into itself; cast up the Accounts of Life, for Chance imposeth many Things upon Life, and maketh our Inclinations follow it. Pardon those that offend ignorantly; be ready to acquit those that do good. This, if you perform not once, but continually, your Court will be secure from all Danger. This, considering the greatness of the Things I have said, is but little, but considering the Person to whom I write, all.

To Alexander 4.

I Am in doubt how to begin, for upon whatsoever I reflect, all seems great and wonderful, not fit to be forgotten, but proper for Remembrance and Exhortation, not to be defaced by Time. Good Precepts and Exhortations of Masters have Eternity for their Spectator. Endeavour to make Use of your Power, not to oppress but to oblige others, than which nothing can be greater in Man's Life. Mortal Nature, which often yieldeth, and is overcome by Fate, obtaineth eternal Memory by the greatness of such Works. Consider this well; you are not unreasonable as some are, who think good Advice ridiculous. Your Descent is honourable, your Kingdom hereditary, your Learning sound, your Glory admirable; and as much as you exceed others in the Goods of Fortune, so ought you to be excellent among the Good in Virtue. In fine, do that which is profitable, and finish what you design.

To Theophrastus 5.

A Sudden Injury is better than a slow Benefit, for the Remembrance and Harm of that lasts but a while, but this groweth old, as if it hated to build a Work to Perpetuity, and many Times deferring what we intend to bestow upon another, he meets with a Calm elsewhere, which allays the Tempest of his Mind. Wherefore I say, mutual Society ought not only to do no Wrong, but if any be received, to be ready to forgive it, for perhaps to do no Wrong is above the Power of Man. As for him who hath erred, to make Use of Reproof, is the Property of a good well-feated Judgment.

THE

THE DOCTRINE OF ARISTOTLE.

The First Part.

CHAP. I.

Of Philosophy in general, and particularly of DIALECTICK.

THE Philosophy of *Aristotle* is well known; many Abstracts thereof have been published, many are read daily in Universities by publick Professors: Yet it will be requisite to our Design to give a short Account thereof, that it may appear wherein the Doctrine and Method of the *Peripateticks* is different from that of the *Academicks* and *Stoicks*.

[f] *Philosophy, according to* Aristotle, *is twofold, Practick and Theoretick. To the Practick belongs Ethick and Politick: This, concerning the well-ordering of a City; that, of a House. To the Theoretick belongs Physick and Logick; but Logick is not properly a Part thereof, but a most expedient Instrument.*

Of Logick he asserted two Ends, probable and true; for each he makes Use of two Faculties, Dialectick and Rhetorick for the probable; Analytick and Philosophy for the true, omitting nothing towards Invention, Judgment and Use. For Invention, his Topicks and Methodicks afford a plentiful Supply, out of which may be taken Problems for probable Arguments. For Judgment, his first and second Analyticks: In the first Propositions are examined; in the second, he treats exactly of their Composition, and the Form of Syllogism. To Use belongs his Agonisticks, and his Books concerning Interrogation, and his Eristicks, and his Sophistick Elenchs, and of Syllogisms, and the like. Hitherto *Laertius*.

Of his Logick we have only these Books remaining, *of Categories, of Interrogation, Analyticks, Topicks, and Sophistick Elenchs.* The first considers *simple Terms*; the second *Propositions*; the rest *Syllogisms, Demonstrative, Dialectick, and Sophistick.* The *Categories* are placed first by the general Consent of all Interpreters; neither is it to be doubted, but that the rest are disposed according to the genuine Method of *Aristotle*. For, in the Beginning of his [g] *Analyticks*, he saith, *We must speak of Syllogism before we come to speak of Demonstration, because Syllogism is the more general.* And in his *Elenchs* [h]; *of Didascalick and Demonstrative Syllogisms, we have spoken already in the Analyticks; of the Dialectick and Pyractick, in the Book immediately preceding these. We come now to speak of the Agonistick and Eristick.*

CHAP. II.

Of Terms.

Terms [i] are of three Kinds, *Homonymous, Synonymous*, and *Paronymous. Homonymous*, whose Name only is common, their Essence divers. *Synonymous*, whose Name and Definition are common to either. *Paronymous* have Denomination from the same Thing, but differ in Case or Termination.

Synonymous (or *Univocal*) Terms, are reduced to ten general Heads, called *Categories*.

1. [k] *Substance*, of two Kinds: *First*, which is most properly Substance, is neither predicated of nor inherent in a Subject. *Second, Substances* are Species and Genus's, which subsist in the first. The Properties of first Substances are, 1. Neither to be in, nor prædicated of a Subject. 2. To be all Substances equally. 3. To signify this particular Thing. 4. To have no Contrary. 5. To admit no Degrees of more or less. 6. To be susceptible of Contraries.

2. [l] *Quantity*, of two Kinds; *Discrete*, as Number; *Continuous*, as a Line. Their Properties

f Laert. 5. 24. g Lib. c. 2. h Cap. 2. i Categ. c. 1. k Cap. 5. l Cap. 6.

1. To have no Contraries. 2. To admit no Degrees of more or less. 3. To denominate Things equal or unequal.

3. [m] *Relatives*, whose whole Being is in some Manner effected towards one another; their Properties. 1. To have Contraries, as Father and Son. 2. To admit Degrees of more and less, as in Kindred. 3. To follow one another mutually. 4. To be naturally together.

[n] 4. *Quality*, from which Things are denominated *Qualited*. It hath four Kinds. 1. *Habit* and *Disposition*. 2. *Natural Power* and *Impotence*. 3. *Passible Qualities* and *Passions*. 4. *Form* and *Figure*. The Properties, 1. To have Contraries, as black and white. 2. To admit Intension or Remission. 3. To denominate Things, like or unlike.

[o] 5. *Action*. 6. *Passion*. Their Properties are, to admit Contraries, to admit Degrees of Intension or Remission.

7. *When*. 8. *Where*. 9. *Position*. 10. *Habit*. These admit not Contraries, nor Degrees of Intension or Remission.

Of those which cannot be reduced to any certain Category, are, 1. *Opposites*, and 2. *Precedents*. 3. *Coæquals*. 4. *Motion*. 5. *Possession*.

[p] Of *Oppositions* there are four Kinds, *Relatives*, *Contraries*, Extreams in the same Kind, as black and white. *Privatives*, as Privation and Habit, Light and Darkness. *Contradictories*, which affirm and deny, as learned, not learned.

CHAP. III.

Of Proposition.

[q] *VOICE* is a Sign of the Notions of the Mind; as in the Mind are two Kinds of Intellection, one simple, expert of Truth and Falsity, the other either true or false. So in Voice, some is simple, some complex.

[r] A *Noun* is a Voice signifying according to Institution, whereof no Part is significant by itself.

[s] A *Verb* is a Voice implying Time, whereof no Part is significant by itself.

[t] A *Speech*, λόγος, is a Voice signifying according to Institution, whose Parts are significant separate.

Of Speech, the enunciative only (called Proposition) belongs to Philosophy, the precatory and imperative, to Rhetorick, Poetry, &c.

[u] Propositions are divided four ways; into *simple* and *complex*, into *affirmative* and *negative*; into *universal*, *particular*, *indefinite*, and *singular*; into *pure* and *modal*; the modal is either *necessary*, *possible*, *contingent*, or *impossible*.

[w] Propositions have three Accidents, *Opposition*, *Consectation*, *Conversion*.

Opposition is either contradictory of a Particular to an Universal; or contrary, of an Universal to an Universal; or sub-contrary, of a Particular Negative to a particular Affirmative.

Consectation, (ἀκολουθησις) or Æquipollens, is the Consideration of those Affections of a Proposition, in respect whereof, two Propositions signify together the same Thing, and are together true or false.

Conversion is a Transposition of the Terms, preserving the Affirmation, Negation, and Verity of the Proposition. It is either Absolute, which reserves the same Quantity, but alters the Quality; or Partial, which reserves not the same Quantity.

CHAP. IV.

Of Syllogism.

[x] *SYllogism* is a Speech, in which some Things being laid down, another necessarily follows. *Perfect Syllogism* is that which requireth no other to shew its Power, Clearness, and Efficacy. *Imperfect* requires another to that Purpose, by Conversion, or Transposition of the Propositions.

[y] The *Matter* of Syllogism is three Terms, the *Form* is the right Disposition of the Matter, according to Figure and Mood.

Figure is an apt Disposition of the Medium with the Extreams, apt for concluding aright. *Mood* is a Disposition of Propositions, according to Quantity and Quality. There are three Figures.

The first, when the *Medium* is first *subject*, then *prædicate*. It hath nine Moods, four Useful, five Useless and Illegitimate. Of the Useful, two are universal, two particular.

The First.
Every A *is* B.
Every C *is* A.
Therefore every C *is* B.

The Second.
No A *is* B.
Every C *is* A.
Therefore no C *is* B.

The Third.
Every A *is* B.
Some C *is* A.
Therefore some C *is* B.

The Fourth.
No A *is* B.
Some C *is* A.
Therefore some C *is* B.

[z] In the second Figure, the Medium is predicated of both the Extreams. It hath 16 Moods, 4 true, 12 false and illegitimate. Of the true, two are universal, two particular.

m Cap. 7. n Cap. 8. o Cap. 9. p Cap. 10. q De Interpret. cap. 1. r Cap. 2. s Cap. 3. t Cap. 4. u Cap. 5. w Cap. 6. x Analyt. prior. lib. 1. cap. 1. y Cap. 4. z Cap. 5.

The

The First.
No M *is* N.
Every O *is* N.
Therefore no O *is* M.

The Second.
Every M *is* N.
No O *is* N.
Therefore no O *is* M.

The Third.
No M *is* N.
Some O *is* N.
Therefore some O *is not* N.

The Fourth.
Every M *is* N.
Some O *is not* N.
Therefore some O *is not* M.

[a] In the third Figure, the Medium is subjected to both Extreams. It hath 16 Moods, false and illegitimate; 6 legitimate, which conclude particularly.

The First.
Every P *is* R.
Every P *is* S.
Therefore some R *is* S.

The Second.
No P *is* R.
Every P *is* S.
Therefore some S *is not* R.

The Third.
Some P *is* R.
Every P *is* S.
Therefore some S *is* R.

The Fourth.
Every P *is* R.
Some P *is* S.
Therefore some S *is* R.

The Fifth.
Some P *is not* R.
Every P *is* S.
Therefore some S *is not* R.

The Fifth.
No P *is* R.
Some P *is* S.
Therefore some S *is not* R.

[b] Every Syllogism ought to be framed in one of these three Figures; but those of the second and third being imperfect, ought to be reduced to the first, which is the most absolute and perfect.

[c] There are six other Forms of Argument, *Conversion of Terms*, *Induction*, *Example*, *Abduction*, *Instance*, *Enthymem.* All these have their Efficacy from the Power of Syllogism, and are reducible to Syllogism.

As concerning the Invention, Power, and Conversion of Syllogism, he is exact and curious to Admiration.

CHAP. V.

Of Apodeictick (or Demonstrative) Syllogism.

[d] ALL *discursive* Knowledge is made by a Prænotion of the Things themselves whereof we discourse; for Ratiocination is not concerning Things unknown. *Demonstration* is a discursive Knowledge, and therefore requireth three Præcognitions. First, that the Subject is, and what it is in a rude confused Manner. Secondly, what the Prædicate is, and what it signifieth. Thirdly, that the Principles are true.

[e] *To know*, is to understand that a Thing is, that this is Cause thereof, and that it cannot be otherwise. *Demonstration* is a scientifick Syllogism. *Demonstrative Science* is from true, first, immediate, more known Causes of the Conclusion *First*, as having none precedent, and being adequate to, and convertible with the Effect. *Immediate* or consectaneous, as having no Term betwixt to join them. *More known*, as being Premises to the Conclusion, not to be demonstrated by any thing.

[f] *Demonstrative Science* is of a Thing necessary, whence the Demonstration itself consists of necessary Propositions; which Necessity requireth Explication of that which is predicated, *of all by itself*, and which is *universal.*

Of all, is that which is attributed to every one, and at all Times, as a living Creature to a Man.

By itself, as being of Essence, proper, competible *per se*, and competible to itself, for itself.

An universal Attribute is that which is in every one by itself, inasmuch as it is itself.

[g] *Demonstration* is of Conclusions of *eternal Truth*, for they are universal Propositions; whence it followeth, that neither Demonstration nor Science are of perishable Things; neither are Definitions of such, which are the Principles of Demonstration.

That there is Demonstration, it is not necessary to have Recourse to *Plato*'s Ideas separate from Singulars; it is enough that there are common Natures which are in Singulars, and are predicated of them.

[h] It is one Thing to know that a Thing is so, another to know why it is so. Hence there are two kinds of Demonstration, διότι, and ὅτι; the first is the true, and most perfect, of which hitherto.

[i] The other kind of Demonstration, *viz.* ὅτι, is more imperfect; it is made two ways in the same Science: First, when the Case is demonstrated by the Effect, thus; *Stars which do not twinkle are neareſt to the Earth; but the Planets do not twinkle, therefore they are neareſt to the Earth.* Secondly, when the Effect is proved by a Cause remote, and not reciprocal, or by an Effect of the remote Cause, as this; *every Thing that breatheth is a living Creature; but no Wall breathes, therefore no Wall is a living Creature.*

a Cap. 6. b Cap. 23. c Annal. Prior. lib. 2, c. 22, &c. d Analyt. poster. lib. cap. 1. e Cap. 2. f Cap. 4. g Cap. 8. h Cap. 11. i Cap. 13.

To know διότι, is proper to ſubalternate principal Sciences, as Geometry and Arithmetick, which contemplate the firſt proper Cauſes. To know ὅτι, is the ſubalternate and inferior, as Optick and Muſick.

[k] Of all Figures, the firſt is moſt accommodated to Knowledge, for that only concludes with an univerſal Affirmative, and therefore in that only is a demonſtrative διότι.

[l] Thus far concerning Science; the oppoſite to Science is *Ignorance*, which is two-fold; One of *pure Negation*, as when a Boy, or ignorant Fellow, knows not that the Sun is greater than the Earth, becauſe he is ignorant of Aſtrology; the other, *of depraved Diſpoſition*, as when an Aſtrologer, or ignorant Optick, believes that Things are as they ſeem; this is Error, which erroneous Ignorance is in falſe Propoſitions, or in a Syllogiſm through a falſe Medium.

Defect of Senſe cauſeth Ignorance of pure Negation; for if any Senſe be wanting, it is neceſſary that ſome Science of Senſibles be likewiſe wanting; for we learn all Things either by Induction or Demonſtration. *Induction* is made of Singulars perceived by Senſe; *Demonſtration* is of Univerſals, which are declared by Induction; wherefore the Beginning of Science is from Singulars, which are Senſibles. Hence it is impoſſible for a Man born blind to have the Science of Colours. Yet no Science is next and immediately from Senſe, for Senſe is of Singulars, which are here, and now; but Science and Demonſtration is of Univerſals, which are every where, and ever, not ſubject to Senſe. Yet, Senſe conduceth to Science and Demonſtration; for as much as an Univerſal is collected from Particulars known by Senſe.

CHAP. VI.

Of Dialectick Syllogiſm.

[m] *Dialectick Syllogiſm* is that which concludes from Probables; Probables are thoſe Things which appear ſuch to all, or to moſt, or only to the Wiſe and moſt Eminent.

[n] *Dialectick* is a Conjectural Art, as *Rhetorick* and *Medicine*; therefore (like thoſe) it attaineth not always its End; it is enough for a *Dialectick* that he omit nothing of his Art for concluding probably.

[o] All Diſputation is of Things controverted, either by Problem or Propoſition; a *Problem* queſtions both Parts, as *a living Creature, is it the Genius of Man or not?* a *Propoſition* queſtions but one Part, as, *Is not living Creature the Genius of Man?* Every Propoſition and Problem is either *Genus*, (under which is contained the Difference) *Definition*, *Proprium*, or *Accident*.

[p] *Definition* is a Speech, ſignifying what a Thing is. *Proprium* is that which declareth not what a Thing is, but is in it only, and reciprocal with it. *Genus* is that which is prædicated, *in quid*, of many that differ ſpecifically. *Accident* is that which is neither *Definition*, nor *Genus*, nor *Proprium*, and may be, or not be, in its Subject.

[q] *Dialectick Propoſition* is a probable Interrogation, received by all, or many, or the moſt excellent; yet ſo as it is not wholly alienate from the common Opinion.

[r] *Dialectick Problem* is threefold, *Practick* or *Moral*, pertaining to Election or Repulſe; *Theoretick*, pertaining to Science; *Neutral*, which conduceth to the reſt, *viz. Logick*.

Theſis is a Paradoxal Sentence of ſome eminent Philoſopher, contrary to the vulgar Opinion.

[s] *Dialectick* Argument is two-fold, *Induction* and *Syllogiſm*.

[t] Arguments are gained by Four Inſtruments, 1. *Choice of Propoſitions*. 2. *Diſtinction of Æquivoques*. 3. *Invention of Differences*. 4. *Conſideration of Similitudes*.

Problems are either univerſal or particular; the ſame Places which confirm or confute one, confirm or confute the other. From *Proprium*, *Genus*, and *Definition*, is immediately and ſimply made *Demonſtration*, but not from *Accident*, becauſe that is external, not neceſſarily and intimately inherent in the Subject. We ſhall not here ſay any thing of the Multitude of Places he hath invented, which are more neceſſary to thoſe that will learn the Art, than ſuitable to this Abridgment.

The Diſputant muſt firſt find out a Place (or Medium) ſecondly, diſpoſe and queſtion it within himſelf; thirdly, propoſe it to his Adverſary.

In Diſputation againſt the Learned, *Syllogiſm* is to be uſed againſt the Vulgar Induction.

[u] The Office of the *Opponent* is to compel his *Reſpondent* to this incredible and abſurd Conſequent from his *Theſis*; of the *Reſpondent*, to take Care that nothing abſurd be collected from his *Theſis*.

CHAP. VII.

Of Sophiſtick Syllogiſm.

AN *Elench* is a *Syllogiſm* which contradicts the Concluſion aſſerted by the *Reſpondent*. Of *Elenchs*, ſome are true, ſome are falſe; that proper to a *Sophos*, whoſe Office is to purſue and defend Truth, and to diſcover and confute Falſhood.

k Cap. 14. l Cap. 15, &c. m Topic. lib. 1. cap. 1. n Cap. 3. o Cap. 3. p Cap. 4. q Cap. 8. r Cap. 9. s Cap. 10. t Cap. 11. u Lib. 8. Cap. 4. w Sophiſt. Elench. cap. 1,

This

This to a *Sophiſt*, who from ſeeming Wiſdom, acquireth Gain, and had rather ſeem, than be.

[x] A *Sophiſt* hath five Ends, whereto he endeavoureth to reduce his Adverſary; the firſt is *Elench* or *Redargution*, [y] of which there are two kinds; one *in the Word*, the other *out of the Word*.

Sophiſms in the Word, are ſix. 1. *Homonymie*, as, *that ill is good*, for τὰ δέοντα *are good*, *but ills are* τὰ δέοντα. The Fallacy conſiſts in the Word τὰ δέοντα, which ſignifies *ſometimes neceſſarily inevitable*, *ſometimes beneficial*.

2. By *Amphibolie*, as, βέλτιον ἐστὶ λαβεῖν με τοὺς πολεμίους, which ſignifies, *either that the Enemies would take me*, *or that I would take the Enemies*.

3. By *Compoſition*, as, τὸ δύνασθαι καθήμενον βαδίζειν, *that he who ſits can walk*, which is true in a divided Senſe, not in a Compounded.

4. By *Diviſion*, as, *Five are Two and Three*, therefore even and odd.

5. By *Aſcent*, which is not ſo eaſily done in *Logick* as in *Poetry*.

6. By *Figure of the Word*, when Things which are not the ſame, are interpreted in the ſame manner, as, *a Male for a Female*.

[z] *Sophiſms out of the Word*, are Seven; 1. From *Accident*, *when that which is demanded is equally competent to the Thing*, *and to the Accident*; for whereas many Things are competent to the ſame, it is not neceſſary that they be all in the Subject and Prædicate, as, *if* Coriſcus *differs from a Man*, *he differs from himſelf*, *for he is a Man*.

2. *From that which is Simple*, or κατὰ πᾶλι, *when that which is ſaid in part is taken of all*, as, *if that which is not*, *is imaginative*, *that which is not*, *is*.

3. *From Ignorance of the Elench*, when *not underſtanding the true Nature of a Contradiction*, *they think that to be an abſolute Contradiction which is none*, *omitting either the ſame Reſpect in the Thing*, *or the ſame Reſpect of the ſame Thing*, *or the Simplicity*, *or the Time*. To this all *Sophiſms* may be reduced.

4. *Of the Conſequent*, when we allow thoſe to be true reciprocal Conſequences which are not ſuch, as, *it is yellow*, *therefore it is Honey*; *and the contrary*, *it is not yellow*, *therefore it is not Honey*.

5. *Of Petition of the Principle*, neither by *requiring that to be granted*, *which was to be proved*, or *proving the ſame by the ſame*, the Terms only changed; as, *the Soul is immortal*, *becauſe it is not ſubject to Death*.

6. *Of a not Cauſe as a Cauſe*, as, *when that is taken to be the Cauſe of the Thing*, *or Concluſion*, which is Cauſe of neither; as, *Arms diſturb Peace*, *therefore they are to be taken away*.

7. *Of Plurality of Interrogations as one*, when many Things are ask'd in one; as, *Juſtice and Impiety*, *are they Virtues or not?*

Hitherto of *Elenchs*; the Four other Ends, whereto a *Sophiſt* endeavours to reduce his Adverſary are, *Falſity*, *Paradox*, *Solœciſm*, and *Tautology*.

Sophiſms are ſolved, either by *Diſtinction* or *Negation*.

Thus much may ſerve for a ſlight View of his *Logick*, whereof we have but few Books left, in reſpect of the many which he wrote upon that Part of Philoſophy.

x Cap. 2. y Cap. 3. z Cap. 4.

The SECOND PART.

CHAP. I.

Of Phyſick.

NOT to queſtion the Method of *Ariſtotle*'s Books of *Phyſick*, much leſs their Titles (as ſome, to make them better agree with *Laertius*'s Catalogue, have done) and leaſt of all their Authority with *Patricius*, we ſhall take them in that Order which is generally received; according to which, next *Logick* is placed *Phyſick*.

[a] *Phyſick* is a Science concerning that Subſtance which hath the Principle of Motion and Reſt within itſelf.

The Phyſical Books of *Ariſtotle*, that are extant, treat of theſe Nine General Heads: *Of the Principles of Natural Things*; *Of the common Affections of Natural Things*; *Of Heaven*; *Of Elements*; *Of the Action and Paſſion of Elements*; *Of Exhalation*; *Of Plants*; *Of Animals*; *Of the Soul*.

CHAP. II.

Of the *Principles* of *Natural Bodies*.

[b] THE *Principles* of *Natural Bodies* are not *one*, as *Parmenides* and *Meliſſus* held; nor *Homoiomerias*, as *Anaxagoras*; nor *Atomes*, as *Leucippus* and *Democritus*; nor *Senſible Elements*, as *Thales*, *Anaximander*, *Anaximenes*, *Empedocles*; nor *Numbers*, or *Figures*, as the *Pythagoreans*; nor *Ideas*, as *Plato*.

[c] *That the* Principles *of Things are* contrary (privately oppoſite) was the joint Opinion of the Ancients, and is manifeſt in Reaſon; for *Principles* are thoſe which neither are mutually of one another, nor of others, but of them are all Things;

a Metaphyſ. 5. 1. b Phyſ. lib. 1. cap. 3. 4. c Cap. 5.

ſuch

such are, first, *Contraries*; as, *being first, they are not of any other*; as contrary, *not of another*.

[d] Hence it follows, that being *contrary*, they must be *more than one*, but *not infinite*; for then Natural Things would not be comprehensible by Reason; yet *more than two*; for, *of Contraries*, only nothing would be produced, but that they would rather destroy one another.

[e] There are therefore *Three* Principles *of* Natural Bodies; *Two* contrary, *Privative* and *Form*; and *One* common Subject of both, *Matter*. The Constitutive Principles are *Matter* and *Form*; of *Privation Bodies* consist not, but *accidentally*, as it is competent to *Matter*.

[f] Things are made of that which is *Ens* potentially, *Materia Prima*, not of that which is *Ens* actually, nor of that which is *Non ens* potentially, which is pure nothing. [g] *Matter* is neither generated nor corrupted; it is the first infinite Subject of every Thing, whereof it is framed primarily in itself, and not by *Accident*, and into which it at last resolveth. To treat of *Form* in general, is proper to *Metaphysicks*.

CHAP. III.

Of Nature, and the Causes of Natural Bodies.

[h] *OF* Being, *some are by* Nature; *as*, Plants; *others from other Causes*; *those have, in themselves, the Principle of their Motion, these have not.* Nature *is a Principle and Cause of the Motion and Rest of that Thing wherein it is, primarily, by itself, and not by Accident. Material Substances have* Nature; *Natural Properties are according to* Nature: Nature *is two-fold*, Matter *and* Form; *but* Form *is most* Nature, *because it is in Act.*

[i] *Of* Causes, *are Four Kinds*; *the* Material, *of which a Thing is made*; *the* Formal, *by which a Thing is made, or Reason of its Essence*; *the* Efficient, *whence is the First Principle of its Mutation or Rest, as a Father*; *the* Final, *for which End it is made, as Health is to walking.* Causes *are* immediate *or* remote, principal *or* accidental, actual *or* potential, particular *or* universal.

[k] Fortune *and* Chance *are Causes of many Effects*; Fortune *is an accidental* Cause *in those Things which are done by Election, for some End*; Chance *is larger*; *an* Accidental Cause *in Things which are done for some End, at least that of* Nature. *They are both* Efficient.

[l] *Nature acts for some End*; *not temeariously, or casually*; *for those Things which are done by Nature, are always, or for the most Part, done in the same Manner, yet sometimes she is frustrated of her End, as in Monsters, which she intends not.*

[m] *Necessity is twofold*; absolute, *which is from Matter*; conditional, *which is from the End or Form. Both Kinds are in natural Things.*

CHAP. IV.

Of the Affections of natural Bodies, Motion, Place, Time.

MOtion [n] is of a Thing which is not such, but may be such, the Way or Act by which it becometh such, as curing of a Body which is not in Health, but may be in Health, is the Way and Act by which it is brought to Health. Neither is it absurd, that the same Thing should be both in Act and Power, as to different Respects; for the Thing moved, as Water in warming is in Act, as to the Heat which it hath, in Power, as to the greater Heat which it is capable of.

[o] *Infinite*, is that which is pertransible without End, such an *infinite in Act* there is not; not amongst simple Bodies, for the Elements are confin'd to certain Number and Place; neither amongst mix'd Bodies, for they consist of the Elements which are finite. But, there are Things *infinite potentially*, as in *Addition*; Number, which may be augmented infinitely, *in Division*; Magnitude, which may be divided infinitely *in Time*, and continued Succession of Generation.

[p] The Properties of Place are, that it contains the Thing placed; that it is equal to, and separable from the Thing placed; that the Place and the Thing placed are together; that it hath upwards or downwards, and the like Difference; that every Physical Body tends naturally to its proper Place, and there resteth.

Place is the immediate immoveable Superficies of a continent Body. Those Things which are contained by another Body are in Place; but those which have not any other Body above or beyond them, are not properly in Place. Bodies rest in their natural Places, because they tend thither as a Part torn off from the whole.

[q] *Vacuum* is Place void of Body; such a *Vacuum* there is not in Nature, for that would destroy all Motion, seeing that in *Vacuum* there is neither *upwards* nor *downwards*, *backwards* nor *forwards*. Nor would there be any Reason, why Motion should be to one Part more than to another. Moreover it would follow, that it were impossible for one Body to make another recede, if the triple Dimension, which Bodies divide, were vacuous. Neither is the Motion of rare Bodies upwards caused by Vacuity, for that Motion is as natural to light Bodies, as to move downwards is to heavy.

[r] *Time* is the Number of Motion by *before* and *after*. Those two Parts of Time are conjoined by (τὸ νῦν) *the present*, as the Parts of a Line are by a

d Cap. 6. e Cap. 7. f Cap. 8. g Cap. 7. h Phys. lib. 2. cap. 1. i Cap. 3. k Cap. 4, &c. l Cap. 8. m Cap. 9. n Physic. lib. 3. cap. 2. o Cap. 7. p Lib. 4. cap. 3. q Cap. 8. r Cap. 10, 11.

Point.

Point. Time is the Measure of Rest as well as of Motion; for the same Measure which serves for the Privation, serves for the Habit. All Motion and Mutation is in Time; for in every Motion there is Swiftness or Slowness, which is defined by Time. The Heavens, Earth, Sea, and other Sensibles, are in Time, for they are moveable.

[s] *Time* being a *numerate* Number, exists not without a *Numerant*, which is *the Soul*. The Measure of Time and other Things, is that which measureth the first and most equal Motion; this is the Motion of the *Primum mobile*, for the first in every Kind is the Measure of the rest.

CHAP. V.

Of the Kinds and Properties of Motion.

MOtion [t] appertains to three Categories, to Quantity, *Accretion* and *Diminution*; to Quality, *Alteration*; to Where, *local Motion*.

Rest is a Privation of Motion in a Body, when, where, and how it is apt for Motion.

[u] As all Magnitude is primarily, and *per se*, continuous and divisible into infinite, so is all Motion, by Reason of Magnitude, and Time itself. For whatsoever is not composed of Indivisibles, is divisible into infinite; but no continuous Thing is composed of indivisible Things, for it is quantitative, whereas Indivisibles having no Extremes or Parts, can neither be conjoined by continuous nor contiguous Motion.

[w] Yet it followeth not, that if there be infinite Magnitude, there can be no Motion; for it is not infinite in Act, but in Power, as are likewise Time and Motion.

[x] Neither is there any Motion in the Instant, τὸ νῦν, for nothing is moved or resteth, but in Time.

[y] Motion therefore is divisible, as well in respect to the Time wherein it is made, as in respect to the Thing wherein it inheres; as both these are always indivisible, so may Motion itself be divided according to these.

[z] Whatsoever is changed, as soon as it is changed, must necessarily be in the (next) Term *to which*, for it leaveth the State or Form in which it was, and assumeth that to which it tendeth; yet tho' in Motion, there is a first Motion of Perfection, wherein we may truly say, the Mutation is made, yet there is no first Motion of Inception.

[a] Whatsoever is moved in any whole Time, is necessarily moved in every Part of that Time.

[b] All Motion is finite, for it is in Time, which is finite.

Whatsoever is thus proper to Motion, is to be applied also to Rest and Quiescence.

CHAP. VI.

Of the first Mover.

WHatsoever [c] is moved must necessarily be moved by another, either external or internal. But lest this Progression be into infinite, we must of Necessity at last come to one first Mover, which is not moved by another. This first Mover, the Cause and Origin of all Motion, is *immoveable*, *one*, *eternal*, and *indivisible*, *void of all Quantity*.

[d] *Immoveable*, for whatsoever Things are moved, are either immediately moved by a first immoveable Mover, or by some other which is likewise moved by another, until at last we come to some first Mover, for nothing can move itself unless there be a first Mover; but of Infinites there is no first.

[e] *One*, for he is most perfect, as being Author of the most perfect and most simple Motion, that of the *primum mobile*. Besides, the best in every Kind is one; for good is simple, ill multiplicious.

[f] *Eternal*, for Motion itself is eternal, as appears thus: The Mover and the Moveable must either be from Eternity, or have had Beginning in some Time; if they began at any Time, it must have been by Motion, and consequently before the first Motion there was another, by which the Mover and Moveable began, which were absurd. Again, if they were eternal, yet without Motion, it must be either by Reason of the Inaptitude of the Moveable, or of its Remoteness from the Mover. But neither could the Moveable be made more apt, or brought nigher to the Mover except by the Motion, whence would follow, that there was a Motion before the first Motion. Again, Time, the Measure of Motion, is eternal, therefore Motion itself is such. That Time is eternal (besides that it is the general Agreement of Philosophers) is thus proved; it cannot be conceived without τὸ νῦν, the Instant, which is intermediate betwixt the past and future, both the End of one and the Beginning of the other; but, if Time had a Beginning, this τὸ νῦν would have been only a Beginning, not End; if Time should have an End, this Instant would be only an End, not a Beginning, both which are repugnant to the Nature of a Moment.

[g] *Indivisible*, *void of Quantity*; the Proof whereof is grounded upon three Theorems. 1. That no finite Mover can move in infinite Time, therefore the first Mover is infinite. 2. That there cannot be infinite Power in finite Quantity; therefore the first Mover is incorporeal. 3. That there cannot be finite Power in that which is infinite, therefore the first Mover is infinite in Power. Hence may be collected, that it is impossible the first Mover should be divisible, corporeal, or affected with

[s] Cap. 14. [t] Phys. lib. 5, cap. 2. [u] Lib. 6. cap. 1. [w] Cap. 2. [x] Cap. 3. [y] Cap. 4. [z] Cap. 5. [a] Cap. 6. [b] Cap. 7. [c] Lib. 7. cap. 1, 2, 5, 6, 7. [d] Lib. 8, cap. 6. [e] Cap. 6. [f] Cap. 7. [g] Lib. 8, cap. 10.

Quantity; for if he had any, it would either be infinite, of which kind actual there is none; or finite, wherein could not consist his infinite Power.

CHAP. VII.

Of Heaven.

HAving treated of the Principles, Causes, and Affections of natural Bodies in general, he proceeds next to Particulars.

[h] The World is perfect, because it consists of Bodies which are perfect, and comprehendeth all Perfection, itself not being comprehended by any other.

[i] Of Bodies, some are *simple*, others *compounded of the simple*. All natural Bodies are moveable locally *per se*. There is a twofold *local Motion*, *simple*, which is competible to simple Bodies; and *mix'd*, which is to the mix'd. Hence it followeth, that there are so many Kinds of simple Bodies, as Variations of simple Motion; for of one simple Body there is one proper Motion. Simple, local Motion is twofold; *circular*, about the Centre, and *right*; the Right is either upwards from the Centre, or downwords to the Centre, and both these either simply, or κατὰ τι. This fourfold Variation of right Motion, evinceth that there are four simple Bodies called *Elements*. Circular Motion must be proper to some other first Essence, different from the Constitutions of the other four simple Bodies, more divine and precedent to all the rest. This is *Heaven*.

[k] Heaven *hath neither Gravity nor Levity*; this is manifest from its Motion, which is circular, not from the Centre, which is proper to light Things, nor to the Centre, as is proper to heavy, but about the Centre.

Heaven is *void of Generation and Corruption*, and consequently of Accretion, Diminution and Alteration, for it hath no contrary; it is therefore the first Body, not to be consumed by Time and Age.

[l] No Body can be infinite, therefore the World itself is not infinite, neither is there any Body beyond it infinite, nor intelligible or mathematical.

[m] There is but one World, for if there were more, the Earth of one would move to the Earth of the other (as being of one Kind) and ascend out of its proper Place.

[n] The World is eternal; whatsoever is eternal is ingenerate and incorruptible. *Plato* therefore erred, in affirming the World to be generated, but incorruptible. If he meant, that as it was generated, it is by Nature corruptible, yet shall never be actually dissolved, because of the eternal Cause of its Conservation, God, he erreth also; for then there would be something that should be always, and yet could not be always.

[o] Heaven is void of Labour (ἀπονος) for it hath no Contrary to retard its Motion.

[p] Heaven hath *the threefold Difference of Position*, upwards and downwards, backwards, right and left, for these are proper to all animate Things which have the Principle of Motion within themselves. The right Side of Heaven is the *East*, for thence begins its Motion; the left Side the *West*; and consequently the Arctick Pole is lowermost, the Antarctick uppermost; forwards our Hemisphere, backwards the other.

[q] Heaven *naturally moveth circularly*, but this circular Motion is not uniform throughout all Heaven, for there are other Orbs which move contrary to the *Primum Mobile*; that there may be a Vicissitude in sublunary Things, and Generation and Corruption.

[r] Heaven is *spherical*, for to the first Body the first Figure is most proper. If it were quadrangular, triangular, or the like, the Angles would sometimes leave a Space without a Body, and occupate another Space without a Body. The Motion of Heaven is circular, as being the Measure of all others, therefore most compendious and swiftest.

[s] The Motion of the *Proprimum Mobile* is equable and uniform, for it hath neither Beginning, Middle, nor End; the *Primum Mobile* and first Mover being eternal in both, and subject to no Variation.

[t] *Stars* are of the same Body with that wherein they are carried, but more thick and compact; they produce Warmth and Light in inferior Things, through Frication of the Air by their Motion; for swift Motion fires Wood, and melts Lead, yet the Spheres themselves are not heated, but the Air only, and that chiefly by the Sphere of the Sun, which by his Accession towards us, increaseth the Heat, his Beams falling more directly, and with double Force upon us.

[u] The Stars being infixed in the Heavens, are moved, not by themselves, with a proper Motion, as Fishes in the Water, and Birds in the Air, but according to the Motion of their Orbs. Otherwise those in the eighth Sphere would not be always equidistant from one another; neither would the Stars have always the same Side turning towards us, as we see the Moon hath.

The *Primum Mobile* is carried about with the swiftest Motion: The seven Orbs of Planets under it, as they are nearer to it, are carried so much the more swiftly about by the Motion thereof; and as they are further distant, more slowly. Whence by how much the nigher they are to the *Primum Mobile*, so much the slower is their proper Motion, because it is contrary to that of the *Primum Mobile*, as being from *East* to *West*.

The Stars are round, for that Figure is most unapt for Self-Motion. We see the Moon is round

h De Coelo. lib. 1. cap. 1. i Cap. 2. k Cap. 3. l Cap. 5. 7. m Cap. 8. n Cap. 12. o Lib. 2. cap. 3. p Cap. 2. q Cap. 3. r Cap. 4. s Cap. 6. t Cap. 7. u Cap. 8. w Cap. 11.

by her Orbicular Sections; therefore the other Stars are so likewise, for the Reason is the same in all.

[x] The Centre of Heaven is the Earth, round, seated immoveable in the midst; which, together with the Sea, makes up one Globe.

CHAP. VII.

Of Elements.

[y] THE Element *of Bodies is a simple Body, into which other Bodies are divided, in which it is either actually or potentially; as in Flesh, Wood, and the like, there is Fire and Earth potentially; for into these they are segregated, but actually they are not; for then should the Flesh and Wood be segregated.*

Whereas every natural Body hath a proper Motion. Motions are partly simple, partly mixed; the mixed proper to mixed Bodies, the simple to simple. It is manifest that there are simple Bodies, for there are simple Motions; the circular proper to Heaven, the right to the Elements.

[z] *The Elements are not eternal; for they are dissolved with reciprocal Mutations, and perish, and are mutually generated of one another.*

[a] *The motive Qualities of the Elements are* Gravity *and* Levity. *Heavy is that which is apt to be carried downwards to the Center or Midst of Heaven;* Light *is that which is apt to be carried upwards towards the Extremities of Heaven. These are either simple or comparative.* Simply heavy *is that which is below all, as the Earth;* Simply light *is that which is above all, as the Fire;* comparatively, heavy and light, *are those in which are both these; above some, below others, as Air and Water. From these have mixed Things, Gravity and Levity, the heavy are carried downwards to a definite Medium, the light upwards to a definite Extream; for nothing tends to infinite. Whence it followeth, that two Elements are extreamly contrary, simply heavy, and simply light, Fire and Earth, which tend to contrary Places. Betwixt these are two Means, participating of the Nature of each Extream, Air and Water. Those Elements which are highest and lightest, are most perfect, and have the Nature of Forms in respect of the inferior, because these are contained by those. To be contained, is the Property of Matter; to contain, of Form.*

[b] *Hence it follows, that there are* four *Kinds of particular second Matter, differing by the accidental Differences of Heat, Cold, Humidity, Siccity, Levity and Gravity, (simple and comparative) though there be but one common Matter of them all; for they are made mutually of one another. The mean Elements are heavy in their proper Places; for Earth being taken away, Water tending downwards, succeeds in its Room; Air descends into the Place of Water, but not contrariwise; for Water ascends not into its Place of Air, unless by Force. In the Extream it is otherwise; for the Air being taken away, the Fire will not descend into its Place, nor the Earth ascend into the Place of Water or Air; for Fire is not heavy, nor Earth light in their natural Place, because they are extream Elements.*

[c] *Figure conduceth to the Swiftness or Slowness of Motion either upwards or downwards, but is not simply, and in itself the Cause of Motion; so an acute Figure cuts the Medium swiftly, a broad obtuse Figure slowly. Hence a thin Plate of Lead or Iron will swim on Water, because it comprehends much of the subjected Body, which it cannot easily divide or penetrate.*

CHAP. VIII.

Of Generation, Corruption, Alteration, Augmentation, and Diminution.

[d] *THERE is a perpetual Succession of Generation, as well simple as accidental, which proceeds from two Causes;* Efficient, *the first Mover, and the Heavens, always moving, and always moved;* and Material, *the first Matter, of which, being* non-ens *actually,* ens *potentially, all Things generable and corruptible consist. This is incorruptible in itself, susceptible of all Forms, whereby the Corruption of one natural Substance becometh the Generation of another, whatsoever Matter remaineth upon the Corruption, being assumed towards the Generation of another.*

Generation *and* Corruption *are two-fold,* simple, *of a Substance,* κατὰ τὶ, *of an Accident, Generation of the less noble Substance is called Generation* κατὰ τὶ, *in respect of the more noble, as that of Earth in respect of Fire.*

Corruption always succeedeth Generation, because the Term, to which *of Corruption* (viz. non-ens) *is the Term* from which *of Generation; and the Term* to which *of Generation* (viz. ens *in Act*) *is the Term* from which *of Corruption. The Matter of that which is generated, and that which is corrupted, is the same; forasmuch as they are, and may be made reciprocally of one another, as Air of Water, Water of Air; but differently disposed.*

[e] Alteration *and* Generation *are different Mutations; in Alteration the Subject remaineth entire, the Affections only are changed, as of sick, sound; in Generation the whole is changed, not any sensible Subject remaining. Alteration is a Mutation according to Quality;* Augmentation *and* Diminution, *according to Quantity;* Local Motion, *according to Place.*

[f] *Augmentation and Diminution differ from other Mutations; first, in the Object, Generation and Corruption concerns Substances; Alteration, Quality, Iation, Place; Augmentation and Diminution, Quantity. Again, in the Manner, that which is generated, or corrupted, or altered, not necessarily changeth Place, but that which augments or diminisheth, in some manner changeth Place, for it is bigger or lesser.*

x Cap. 13. 14. y De Cœlo. lib. 3. cap. 3. z Cap. 5. a Lib. 4. cap. 1. b Cap. 5. c Cap. 6. d De gener. & corrup. lib. 1. cap. 3. e Cap. 4. f Cap. 5.

Augmentation *is an Addition to pre-existent Quantity*; Diminution *a Detraction. Whatsoever is augmented or decreased, is augmented or decreased according to every Part thereof, by Reception of something throughout all Parts; Decretion on the contrary. The animate Body encreaseth, but not the Aliment, for the living Creature remaineth, the Aliment is converted into the Substance of the living Creature. Hereupon, that which is augmented is like unto that which is altered, for both of these remain. All Parts of a living Creature are augmented; the similar first, as Bones and Flesh; then the dissimilar, as consisting of the others.*

Augmentation is made by Accession, or something according to Form, not according to Matter; for by it the whole is augmented and made more such. Accession of Parts, according to Matter, is not Augmentation; for by Materials only (destitute of that Form, which the Parts to be augmented have) the whole living Creature cannot encrease. Aliment therefore, whereby the living Creature is augmented, must be the same potentially which the Thing augmented is in Act. At first, it is contrary, and dissimilar, being in Power the Part of a living Creature, in Act something else: At last, it becometh assimilate to the living Creature, taking the Form of a Part (by aggeneration) through the digestive Power of the animate Body, which changeth the Aliment into its own Substance.

For this Reason Augmentation presupposeth Nutrition. Nutrition *is, when the Aliment as Substance is converted into the same Substance of the living Creature. Augmentation, when the same Aliment, as quantitative, is added to the Quantity of the living Creature. Hence a living Creature, as long as it is sound, is always nourished, but not always augmented. As that which is added is potentially quantitative Flesh, so it can augment Flesh; as it is potentially Flesh only, so it nourisheth; which when it can only do (as when so much Wine is poured into Water that it turns all into Water) then there is a Diminution of the Quantity, but the Form remaineth.*

CHAP. X.

Of Action and Passion.

[g] COntact *is of several Kinds*, Mathematical, *by Contiguity*; Physical, *when the Extreams of several Bodies meet, and mutually act and suffer*; Virtual, *by Power, and metaphorical.*

[h] *The mutual Action and Passion of Physical Contact is betwixt Things, partly unlike as to their Form, partly like as to their Genus (for they are Contraries) Matter; each endeavouring to reduce the Patient to his own Likeness, as Fire, Wood.*

Every Physical Agent *in acting, suffers from the Patient, for both the Agent and Patient are active, endued with Forms Elementary, susceptible of Contraries. But as the first Mover is* immoveable, *so is the first Agent impassible.*

[i] *Every Thing acts, as it is such, actually; suffers, as it is such, potentially. The Conditions of Action and Passion are five;* 1. *What the Agent is in Act, the Patient is in Power.* 2. *The Patient is such according to each Part.* 3. *That which is more disposed, suffers more, and so on the contrary.* 4. *Every Patient is continuous, and not actually divided.* 5. *The Agent must necessarily touch the Patient, either immediately or mediately.*

CHAP. XI.

Of Mixtion and Temperament.

[k] *M*Ixtion is not Generation, for the Matter is not fixed with the Form; nor Alteration, for the Quality is not mixed with the Subject; nor Augmentation, for Aliment, the Matter of Augmentation, is not mixed with, but converted into the animate Body. Conjunction of small Bodies is not true Mixtion, but co-acervation, for those Bodies remain actually in the same, according to their Forms, not composing one third according to every Part. Things which have not the same Matter, are not mix'd, because they cannot be active and passive reciprocally.

Those Things which are properly said to be mixed, must have one common Matter, they must mutually act upon, and suffer one from another; they must be easily divisible; yet so, as that one be not excessive in respect of the other, for then it is not Mixtion, but Mutation into the more predominant, as a Drop of Wine into a great Quantity of Water.

[l] The Principles and Differences of Elements (sensible tactile Bodies) are tactile Qualities, inasmuch as by such Qualities, sensible Bodies, as such, are constituted and differ. Of tactile Qualities there are seven Orders, Hot, Cold, Moist, Dry, Heavy, Light, Hard, Soft, Viscous, Arid, Rugged, Smooth, Thick, Thin. From the two first Orders are derived the Differences of Elements; for by Heat and Cold, Humidity and Siccity, they act and suffer, and are mutually changed by alterative Passions. Of these first Qualities two are active, Heat and Cold; two passive, Humidity and Siccity. Heat is that which congregates homogeneous Things; Cold, that which congregates heterogeneous Things; Humid, that which is not easily contained in its own Bounds; Dry, the contrary.

[m] As there are Four Elements, there must be Four Conjunctions of the primary Qualities, from each of which the Elements are severally collected. The first Conjunction is of *hot* and *dry*, whence proceedeth *Fire*; the Second, *hot* and *moist*, whence *Air*; the Third, of *Moist* and *Cold*, whence *Water*; the Fourth, of *Cold* and *Dry*, whence *Earth*.

g De gener. & corrup. l. 1. h Cap. 7. i Cap. 9. k De gener. & corrup. lib. 1. cap. 10. l De gener. & corrupt. lib. 2. cap. 2. m Cap. 3.

In

In each of these, one Quality is predominant, *Earth* is more *dry* than *cold*, *Water* more *cold* than *moist*, *Air* more *moist* than *hot*, *Fire* more *hot* than *dry*.

All these Elements may be mutually transmutated into one another; the *Symbolical*, which agree in one primary Quality, are more easily transmutated into one another, than the *Assymbolical*, because it is less difficult to change one than many. This Transmutation is not a Generation, but a kind of Alteration, whence it is manifest, one Element cannot be the Principle of another.

[n] *Mixtion*, whereby the Elements concur to the Composition of a Mix'd Body, is made by Coacervation, as *Empedocles* held; but after such a Manner, that their contrary Qualities remain in the Mixt, not potentially only, nor simply actually in their Height, but in a mean kind of Way, their Extremities being reduced to some Temper. From this Contemplation come Mix'd Bodies, differing according to the various Proportion of the Temperament; and, as they are compounded of the Elements, so they resolve into the same.

[o] All these mix'd Bodies consist of all the Elements; of *Earth*, for every Thing participates of the Nature of that Thing whereof it is produced; of *Water*, because every mix'd Thing must be concrete and terminated, which Properties *Water* best affordeth to *Earth*; of *Air* and *Fire*, because every perfect mix'd Body is made by Temperament of Contraries, such is *Air* to *Earth*, *Fire* to *Water*. Again, the Nature of all Mix'd Bodies, as well animate as inanimate, as to Mixture, is the same; but that the Animate consists of all the Elements is manifest, in that they are nourished by them.

[p] The Causes and common Principles of Mix'd Bodies are three, *Material*, *Formal*, *Efficient*. The *Material*, is the Power to be, and not to be; by which, Elementary Things are generated and corrupted. The *Formal*, is the Reason of the Essence of every Thing. [q] The *Universal Efficient*, is the circular Motion of Heaven, not only as being Eternal, Continual, and before Generation, but chiefly because it bringeth nigh to us, and carrieth far from us, that which hath the Generative Power of all Things; that is, the *Sun*, and the other *Stars*; which by their Accession and Recession are the Causes of Generation and Corruption.

[r] All these are so disposed, according to the Order of *Nature*, that, because no Natural Being can be permanent in the same individual State, they may be at least preserved by a continual Succession of many Individuums of the same Species; whence the Natural Cause of Generation is only Conservation of the Species.

CHAP. XII.

Of imperfect Mix'd Bodies.

[s] MIX'D Bodies are two-fold, *imperfect* and *perfect*; *Meteors* are imperfect mix'd Bodies, produced according to Nature, but after a less orderly and constant Manner; [t] the general *Matter* thereof are the Elements; the *Efficient*, the Cœlestial Bodies which act upon Inferiors, by a kind of Coherence; [u] *Heaven* is highest; next *Heaven* the Element of *Fire*; next *Fire*, *Air*; under *Air*, *Water* and *Earth*. Clouds are not generated in the Sphere of *Fire*, nor in the Region of the *Air*, partly by reason of the Heat which is there, partly by reason of the Motion of the Heavens, which carrieth along with it the Element of *Fire*, and the upper Region of the *Air*; by which Motion, Heat is produced in inferior Bodies; for, the *Air* being carried along by the *Heaven*, is heated by that Motion, and by the Proximity of the *Sun* and of the Element of *Fire*.

[x] *Flames* that appear in the upper Part of the Air, are made thus: The Sun by his Warmth extracteth a kind of Breath out of the Earth, which, if hot and dry, is called *Exhalation*, and if hot and moist, *Vapour*. Exhalation ascends higher, as being higher, and being got into the upper Region of the Air, is there enkindled by the Motion of the Air, and Proximity of the Fire. Hence come those they call *Fire-brands*, *Goats*, *Falling Stars*, and the like. [y] Hence are also *Phasmes*, such as are called *Gulfs*, *Chasms*, *bloody Colours*, and the like; the Exhalation being variously coloured by Reflection of the Light, but chiefly seeming Purple, which Colour ariseth from the Mixture of Fire and White.

[z] The efficient Cause of Comets are the Sun and Stars; the material, an Exhalation, hot, dry, condensed, and combustible; so as it burns not much, nor is soon extinguished. It is called a *Comet*, or *airy Star*, when it is alike on every Side; a *Pogoneia*, or *bearded Star*, when it hath a long Train. That it consists of Fire, is manifest, because at the same Time, there is commonly great Wind and Drought. It appears seldom, and then single, and beyond the Tropicks; because Stars, especially the Sun, dissipate the Matter whereof it consists.

[a] The *Galaxy* is not the Light of many Stars together, as *Anaxagoras* held, but an Exhalation hot and dry, kindled by the Motion of many great Stars, which are in that Part where the *Galaxy* appeareth.

[b] We come next to those Meteors which are in the middle and lower Region of the Air; they are there kept so long, until they are condensed by the Cold of that Place, into Drops of Water, which if

n Cap. 7. o Cap. 8. p Cap. 9. q Cap. 10. r Cap. 11. s Meteor. lib. 1. cap. 1. t Cap. 2. u Cap. 3.
x Cap. 4. y Cap. 5. z Cap. 6, 7. a Cap. 8. b Cap. 9.

they come down very ſmall, are called *miſling*; if greater, *Rain*. This thick Vapour, which is ſeen ſuſpended in the Air, and changeth from Air to Water, is a Cloud. *Miſt* is the Superfluity of a Cloud, condenſed into Water.

[c] Vapour attracted by a ſmall Heat not much above the Earth, and deſcending more condenſed by the nocturnal Cold, becometh either *Dew*, or *Froſt*; *Froſt*, when it congealeth before it reſolves into Water; *Dew*, when it turns into Water, ſo as the Warmth cannot dry it up, nor the Cold freeze it.

[d] *Snow* is a congealed Cloud; *Rain*, *Dew*, *Froſt*, and *Snow*, differ almoſt only in Bigneſs and Smallneſs.

[e] *Hail*, tho' it be of the ſame Nature as Ice, yet is ſeldom produced in Winter, as being cauſed by *Antiperiſtaſis*.

[f] As the Air above the Earth condenſed, becometh Vapour, and Vapour by Cold becometh Water, ſo doth it alſo in the Caverns and Receptacles of the Earth, by a continual Mutation: Firſt it turns into little Drops, then thoſe little into greater. Hence come all Springs and Heads of Rivers, abundantly flowing out at one Part of the Earth. Hence great Rivers and Fountains commonly flow from great Hills, which have greateſt Caverns.

[g] The Parts of the Earth are in continual Mutation; ſometimes humid, ſometimes dry, ſometimes fertile, ſometimes deſert, by new Eruptions or Defections of Rivers, or Acceſs or Receſs of the Sea, according to certain Periods of Time. Thus have the Parts of the Earth their Youth and Age, as well as Plants and living Creatures, by the Heat and Converſion of the Sun. *Time* and the *World* are eternal, but *Nilus* and *Tanais* were not always, for thoſe Places whence they firſt iſſued, were once dry Grounds.

[h] The proper Place of Water is the concave Superficies of the Air. This Place the Sea, compaſſing the Earth, poſſeſſeth; for the ſwift and more rare Water is drawn upwards by the Heat of the Sun; the ſalt, more thick and terrene, ſettleth downwards. For this Reaſon all Waters tend to the Sea, as to their proper Place. Yet, hereby the Sea is not enlarged, for the Sun draweth out of it, by reaſon of its Expanſion, as great a Quantity of Water, as it receiveth from Rivers.

[i] The Sea is, as the World, eternal. The Saltneſs thereof proceedeth from Admixtion of ſome terrene, aduſt Exhalation. From the Top of the Sea is drawn up a freſh Vapour; from the Bottom, heated by the Sun, an Exhalation, which paſſeth through the Sea, and cometh up with the Vapour; but falling back into the Sea, bringeth that Saltneſs with it, as Water paſſed often through Aſhes.

[k] *Winds* are produced by the Sun and Stars, of a hot, dry Exhalation, which aſcending, is driven down again by the Coldneſs of the middle Region of the Air, and by reaſon of the Lightneſs of its Nature, cannot go directly to the Bottom, but is carried by the Air up and down. We call it a hot and dry Exhalation, as being more dry than humid. Wind is weakeſt in the Beginning, but gaineth Strength, by taking along with it other light Exhalations, which it meets with by the Way.

[l] Winds are laid by Heat and Cold; exceſſive Heat conſumeth the Exhalations, as ſoon as it cometh out of the Earth; exceſſive Cold binds up the Pores of the Earth, ſo as it cannot paſs.

[m] *Earthquake* is a trembling of the Earth, cauſed by an Exhalation hot and dry, incloſed in the Bowels of the Earth, which ſtriving to get forth, as its Nature requireth, and not able, by reaſon of the Solidity of the Earth, to paſs, maketh the Earth ſhake, forcing a Way through it, and bearing down whatſoever oppoſeth it. The more hot this included Spirit is, the more vehement.

Of the ſame Nature is *Lightning*, *Thunder*, and the like. *Thunder* is, when an Exhalation incloſed in a thick cold Cloud, rolleth it up and down, and at laſt breaketh through it with more or leſs Noiſe, according to the Thickneſs of the Cloud. By this Eruption it acquireth a rare kind of Heat and Light, which is *Lightning*, ſubſequent to the Noiſe of the Eruption; yet ſeen before the other is heard, by reaſon of the Quickneſs of the Sight beyond the Hearing.

[n] As of dry Exhalations, the rare and diſperſed produce Thunder and Lightning; ſo of the great and condenſed is made ἐκπύρωσις, τυφὼν, πρηστὴρ, and Thunder-bolts.

[o] Of *lucid Meteors* appearing in the Clouds, are *Haloes*, *Rain-Bows*, *Parelies*, and *Streaks*: All theſe are cauſed by Refraction, but differ according to the Objects from which they are reflected. A *Halo* appeareth about ſome Star, when there happeneth a Cloud to be, the middle Part whereof, by reaſon of its Rarity, being diſſipated, the reſt of the Parts about, by Reflection, repreſent the Colour of the Star. *Rainbow* is a Refraction of the Sun's Beam upon a humid Cloud, ready to diſſolve into Rain. In like manner are cauſed *Parelies* and *Streaks*.

[p] There are likewiſe imperfect mix'd Bodies, under, or within the Earth, and theſe alſo of two kinds; ſome cauſed by Exhalation, called *Minerals*; others by Vapour, called *Metals*, fuſile or ductile.

CHAP. XIII.

Of perfect mixed Bodies.

[q] THE common Affections of perfect mix'd Bodies, are thoſe which proceed from the primary Qualities of the Elements, whereof two are

c cap. 10. d Cap. 11. e Cap. 12. f Cap. 13. g Cap. 14. h Lib. 2. cap. 2. i Cap. 3. k Cap. 4. l Cap. 5. m Cap. 8. n Cap. 9. o Lib. 3. cap. 2. p Cap. 7. q Meteor. lib. 4. cap. 1.

active,

active, Heat and Cold; two passive, Humidity and Siccity. The natural Effect of these is *Generation*, when Heat and Cold overcome the Matter; otherwise it is *Inquination* and *Inconcoction*. The opposite to simple Generation is *Putrefaction*; every Thing, unless violently dissolved, putrifieth. Hence those Things that putrify, become first humid, then dry; for the external Heat expelleth the internal, and at last consumeth it. All Things therefore putrify, except Fire, for Putrifaction is the Corruption of the natural Heat in every humid Body, by the external. For this Reason, Things are less subject to putrify in Cold or in Motion, and the hotter or greater they are; as a Part of the Sea may putrify, the whole cannot.

Out of putrid Things are bred living Creatures; for the natural Heat, whilst it is separating, endeavoureth as much as possible, that what is taken asunder, and segregated by Corruption, may gather together in some small Parts, which afterwards, by help of the Sun, receive Life. Thus are Worms, Beetles, Gnats, and other Insects bred.

[r] *Concoction* is the Effect of Heat, Inconcoction of Cold. Concoction is a Perfection caused by natural Heat of the opposite passive Qualities, which are mixed with the Matter, as being passive. The End of Concoction in some Things is Mutation of the Essence, as when Food is converted into Flesh and Blood; in others only a Mutation according to Quantity or Quality, as in Fruits that ripen. Inconcoction is an Imperfection in the opposite passive Qualities, proceeding from Defect of Heat.

Concoction is three-fold, πέπανσις, ἕψησις, ὄπτησις. Inconcoction is also three-fold, ὠμότης, μόλυνσις, σῆψις.

[s] Πέπανσις is the Concoction of that Element which is in Fruits; it is perfect, when the Seeds that are within the Fruit are capable of producing their Like, hereto is opposite, ὠμότης, the Incoction of Fruits not able through want of Heat to overcome the Humidity.

[t] Ἕψησις is a Concoction of an humid interminate by external Humidity and Heat; hereto is opposite μόλυνσις, the Inconcoction of a humid interminate, caused by Defect of external Humidity and Heat.

[t] Ὄπτησις is a Concoction by dry and external Heat, yet not excessive, for then it were Aduction; to this is opposed σῆψις, an Inconcoction caused through Defect of Heat and Fire, or Excess of Humidity in the Subject.

[t] As concerning the two passive Qualities, Things are humid and dry, either actually or potentially. Those Things which are mix'd of humid and dry, are terminate, for these Qualities mutually terminate one another, whence Bodies consist not without Earth and Water, this humid, that dry. And for this Reason, Animals can only live in Earth and Water, which are their Matter.

The first Affections of terminate Bodies are Hardness and Softness; hard is that which yields not to the Touch; soft the contrary. Both these are such, either absolutely, or relatively. They are made such by Concretion, which is a Kind of Exiccation.

[u] Exiccation is of Things that are Water, or of the Nature of Water, or have Water in them, either naturally insite, or adventitious. It is done principally by Heat, accidentally by Cold. Humectation (its contrary) is the Concretion of a Vapour into Water, or liquefaction of a solid Body, as Metal. *Concretion* is, when the Humidity being removed, the dry is reduced together, and condensed, either by Cold, as in Generation of Stones; or by Heat, as in Segration of Salt from Water. To Concretion is opposite, Resolution, which is effected by its Contraries. Those Things which are condensed by Heat only, are resolved by Cold only, and so on the contrary.

[w] Besides these principal Affections, there are others secondary, chiefly competent to homogenous Bodies, some passive, some active.

Of passive Qualities in mix'd Bodies, there are eighteen Differences, *Concretile*, *Eliquabile*, *Mollificabile*, *Humectable*, *Flexible*, *Frangible*, *Impressible*, *Formable*, *Compressible*, *Tractile*, *Ductile*, *Fissile*, *Sectile*, *Unctious*, *Friable*, *Condensable*, *Combustible*, *Exhalable*, and their Contraries. From these are thus denominated, *Homiomerious* mix'd Bodies, as Metals, Gold, Brass, Silver, Stone, and the like; and whatsoever is made out of these; as likewise similar Parts in Animals and in Plants, as Flesh and Bone, whereof some are more cold, which consist most of Water, others more hot, which consist most of Earth and Air.

CHAP. XIV.

Of Plants and Animals.

AT the End of his Meteors he proposeth to speak of similar Parts, *as Blood, and the like; what they are, and to what End, their Matter and Reason, but especially whence they have their Motion; next to proceed to* dissimilar Parts; *and lastly, to speak of* those which consist thereof, *as Men, Plants, and the like. Hence* Patricius *conjectures, that his Books* of the Parts of living Creatures, *did immediately succeed those* of the Meteors, *wherein he treateth (as he proposeth)* of similar Parts *unto the tenth Chapter of the second Book, and from thence* of the Dissimilar. *But to reduce his Books* of living Creatures *to this Method, is the less certain, for as much as many of these (besides those which treated particularly of* Anatomy) *have been lost, of which perhaps*

r Cap. 2. s Cap. 3. t Cap. 4. u Cap. 6. w Cap. 8.

were

were ſome which might better have cleared the Series; for in the Books themſelves concerning Animals, *there is nothing to ground it upon.*

For the ſame Reaſon, it is uncertain where his Books of Plants *ought to have been placed, which are loſt; perhaps they might precede thoſe of* Animals; *for he aſſerts that Plants have Souls, (contrary to the* Stoicks) *endued with vegetative Power; that they live, even tho' cut aſunder, as Inſects, whereby two or more are made of one; that the Subſtance they receive by Aliment and the ambient Air, is ſufficient for the Preſervation of their natural Heat.*

As concerning Animals, we have, Of their governing, *one Book.* Of their Hiſtory, *ten Books.* Of their Parts, *four Books.* Of their Generation, *five Books. So exquitely hath he treated upon this Subject, as cannot well be expreſſed by an Abridgment, and therefore we ſhall omit it; the rather becauſe little or nothing was done herein by the* Academicks *or* Stoicks, *a Collation with whom is the principal Deſign of this Summary.*

CHAP. XV.

Of the Soul.

THE [x] Knowledge of the Soul conduceth much to all Truth, and eſpecially to Phyſick, for the Soul is as it were the Principle of animate Things. Animate Things differ from inanimate chiefly by Motion and Senſe.

[y] Whence the ancient Philoſophers defined the Soul by theſe; *Democritus*, the *Pythagoreans*, *Anaxagoras* by *Motion*; *Empedocles* and *Plato* by *Knowledge*; others by *both*; others by *Incorporiety*, or *a rare Body*; *Thales*, *ſomething that moveth*; *Diogenes*, *Air*; *Heraclitus*, *Exhalation*, *an immortal Subſtance*; *Hippo*, *Water*; *Critas*, *Blood.*

[z] The Soul doth not move itſelf, as *Democritus* held; for whatſoever is moved, is moved by another. Again, if the Soul were moved *per ſe*, it would be in Place, and it were capable of being moved violently, and it would be of the ſame Nature with the Body, and might return into the Body after the Separation. Neither is the Soul moved by itſelf, but from its Objects; for if it were moved eſſentially, it might recede from its Eſſence. The Soul therefore is not moved *per ſe*, but by Accident only, according to the Motion of the Body.

[a] The Soul is not *Harmony*, (a proportionate Mixture of Contraries) for then there muſt be more Souls in the ſame Body, according to the different Conſtitution of its Parts. But tho' we commonly ſay, the *Soul grieveth*, *hopeth*, *feareth*, &c. we are not to underſtand that the Soul is moved, but only that theſe are from the Soul in the Body that is moved; ſome by local Motion of the Organs, others by Alteration of them. To ſay, the Soul is angry, is no more proper than to ſay ſhe builds; for it is the Man that is angry by the Soul, otherwiſe the Soul were liable to *Age*, *Decay*, and *Infirmity*, as well as the Organs of the Body.

[b] Neither is the Soul *a rare Body*, conſiſting of Elements, for then it would underſtand nothing more than the Elements themſelves; neither is there a Soul diffuſed through all Things, as *Thales* held, for we ſee there are many Things inanimate.

Some from the different Functions of the Soul argue, that there are more Souls than one in Man, or that the Soul is diviſible, the ſupreme intellectual Part placed in the Head, the iraſcible in the Heart, concupiſcible in the Liver: But this is falſe, for the Intellect is not confined to any Part of the Body, as not being corporeal, nor organical, but immaterial and immortal.

[c] The Soul is the firſt *Entelechy* of a natural organical Body, having Life potentially. *Firſt, Entelechy.*] Entelechy is twofold, the firſt is the Principle of Operation, as Science; the ſecond, the Act itſelf. *Of a Natural*, [not of an artificial Body, as a Tower or Ship. *Organical Body.*] that is, endued with Inſtruments for Operation, as the Eye for Seeing, the Ear for Hearing; even Plants have ſimple Organs. *Having Life potentially*] as it were in itſelf, for potentially is leſs than actually; actually, as in him that wakes; potentially, as in him that is aſleep.

The Soul is otherwiſe defined, that by which we firſt live, feel, and underſtand; whence appeareth, there are three Faculties of the Soul, *nutritive*, *ſenſitive*, *intellective*; the inferior comprehended by the ſuperior potentially, as a Triangle by a Quadrangle.

CHAP. XVI.

Of the nutritive Faculty.

THE [d] firſt and moſt common Faculty of the Soul, is the *Nutritive*; by which Life is in all Things, the Acts and Operation thereof are to be generated, and to take Nouriſhment.

Nutriment is received either towards Nutrition or Augmentation. Nutrition is the Operation of the nutritive Faculty, conducing to the Subſtance itſelf of the animate Being, Augmentation is the Operation of the nutritive Faculty, whereby the animate Body increaſeth to perfect Magnitude. In Nutrition are conſidered, the Soul nouriſhing, the Body nouriſhed, and the Food by which the Nouriſhment is made; hereto is required a natural Heat, which is in all living Creatures. The Aliment is both contrary, or unlike, and like to the Body nouriſhed; as it is undigeſted, we ſay Nouriſhment is by the contrary; as altered by Digeſtion, like is nouriſhed by its like.

x De anima, lib. 1, cap. 1. y Cap. 1. z Cap. 2. a Cap. 4. b Cap. 5. c Lib. 2, cap. 2. d Cap. 4.

CHAP.

CHAP. XVII.

Of the ſenſitive Faculty.

THE [e] *ſenſitive* Faculty of the Soul is that by which Senſe is primarily in Animals. Senſe is a Mutation in the Organ cauſed by ſome ſenſible Object. It is not ſenſible of itſelf, nor of its Organ, nor of any interior Thing. To reduce it to act, is requiſite ſome external ſenſible Object, for Senſe cannot move itſelf, being a paſſive Power, as that which is combuſtible cannot burn itſelf.

[f] Of ſenſible Objects there are three Kinds. *Proper*, which is perceived by one Senſe without Error, as Colour in reſpect of Sight. *Common* which is not proper to any one, but perceived by all. *Accidental*, which, as ſuch, doth not affect the Senſe.

Senſe is either *external* or *internal*, the external are five, *Seeing*, *Hearing*, *Smelling*, *Touching*, *Taſting*.

[g] The Object of *Seeing* is Colour, and ſomething without a Name that gliſtens in the dark, as the Scales of Fiſh, Glow-worms, and the like. Colour is the Motive of that which is actually perſpicuous; nothing therefore is viſible without Light. Perſpicuous is that which is viſible, not by itſelf, but by ſome other Colour or Light, as Air, Water, Glaſs. Light, in the Act of a perſpicuous Thing, as it is perſpicuous. It is not Fire, nor a Body, for then two Bodies would be in the ſame Place.

To Sight and all other Senſes is requiſite a *Medium* and convenient Diſtance. The Object firſt effects the *Medium*, then the Organ.

[h] The Object of Hearing is ſound. Sound is made by Colliſion of two Bodies, hard, ſmooth, and hollow, in a *Medium*, as Air or Water, ſwiftly and vehemently before the *Medium* be diſſipated.

Eccho is a reflex Sound, when the Air, gathered together and forced into a Veſſel, or ſome Place which hindereth its Diffuſion and Progreſs, reverts as a Baſe againſt a Wall. Sound is always reflected, tho' not always perceptibly, as Light alſo, otherwiſe all Places would be dark, which were not directly oppoſite to the Sun, or ſome lucid Body.

Sound is made by that which moveth the Air, and continually ſtirreth it, till it arrive at the Organ, wherein there is an inſite, connatural, animate, immoveable Air, which being moved by the external Air, yieldeth the Senſe of Hearing. Hence it cometh, that we can hear under Water, for the Water cannot get into this Air, becauſe of the winding narrow Paſſages in the Ear; if it do get in, or the Membrane which containeth this Air be otherwiſe broken, it cauſeth Deafneſs.

Voice is the Impulſion of Air attracted by Reſpiration, and forced againſt the vocal Artery by the Soul, which is in the Lungs, with ſome Intent of Signification. Voice therefore is not proper to all Animals, but to ſuch only as have Blood and Breath. Fiſhes therefore have not Voice.

[i] The Object of *Smelling* is Odour. This Senſe is not ſo perfect in Men as in other Creatures, whence Men perceive not Odours, unleſs with Delight or Diſlike, when they are ſo ſtrong as to excite one of theſe. This Defect proceedeth from the Organ of Smelling, which in us is more obtuſe. The *Medium* of Smelling is Air and Water, for Fiſhes ſmell. Hence all living Creatures ſmell not after the ſame Manner; they which breathe, ſmell by drawing in the Air, the reſt not ſo, becauſe of the different Accommodation of the Organ. Thoſe therefore which ſmell by drawing in the Air, cannot ſmell under Water. *Odour* conſiſts generally in dry, as *Sapor* in humid. The Organ of Smelling is dry potentially, as the Object is actually.

[k] The Object of *Taſte* is *Sapor*. Whatſoever is guſtable, is tactable, and humid, either actually, or at leaſt potentially. Dry Things are ſubject to Taſte, as they are potentially humid, and melt as Salt. The Taſte perceiveth that which is guſtable and that which is inguſtable, as the Sight, Darkneſs, the Hearing, Silence; for every Senſe perceiveth the Preſence and Abſence of its Object. That which is potable is perceived by the Touch, as humid by the Taſte, as having *Sapor*. The Tongue taſtes not that which is dry, becauſe the Organ of Taſte muſt be ſuch potentially, as the Object is actually; but without Humidity nothing is guſtable. The Kinds of *Sapors* are ſweet and bitter; to ſweet are referred unctious; to bitter ſalt. The mean are ſharp, piccant, acid, acute; guſtable is that which moveth the Taſte, and reduceth it to act.

[l] The Objects of *Touch* are the primary Qualities, the Organ is that Part which is potentially that which the Object is in act; for that which is like, cannot ſuffer from its like. We feel not Things of equal Heat, Cold, Hardneſs, or Softneſs. The Fleſh is the *Medium*; the firſt Senſory is ſomething more internal. Herein Touch and Taſte differ from the other Senſes, whoſe Objects are at greater Diſtance. Touch perceiveth Things tactile and not tactile.

[m] All theſe Senſes receive ſenſible Species without Matter, as Wax the Impreſſion of a Seal without the Gold. The Organ or Senſory is that in which the ſenſitive Faculty primarily exiſts; a vehement Object deſtroyeth the Organ.

[n] That there are no more external Senſes than theſe five, is manifeſt, in that there are no more in perfect Animals; neither is there any Need of a ſixth Senſe to perceive common Objects, which every Senſe diſcerns by Accident, as Motion, Figure.

The Act of the Object, and the Act of the Senſe

[e] Cap. 5. [f] Cap. 6. [g] Cap. 7. [h] Cap. 8. [i] Cap. 9. [k] Cap. 10. [l] Cap. 11. [m] Cap. 12. [n] Lib. 3. cap. 1.

itself, as Sonation and Audition, are really the same, differ only intentionally. This Act is generally in the Sensitive, not in the Subject.

[o] Sensible Qualities are finite, as being bounded by Extremes and their Contraries, divisible by Accident into infinite, according to the Division of their continuous Subject.

[p] In Sensibles, some are potentially sensible, as a Part joined to the whole; others actually, as the Whole itself, or a Part separated from the whole. But of separate Parts some are so little, that Sense cannot actually perceive them, by Reason of their want of due Magnitude.

[q] Sounds and Odours are successively generated in the *Medium*, and by Degrees deduc'd to the Organ; but Light is produced in an Instant in the Medium, not carried through it by local Motion.

CHAP. XVIII.

Of Common Sense.

EVery [r] external Sense perceiveth the Differences of its own Object, as Sight judgeth of black and white; but the Differences of divers Objects cannot be perceived by the same Sense; there is therefore a *common Sense*, which judgeth the Actions of external Sense, and the Differences of sensible Objects. The Judgment being of a sensible Object, must be done by Sense, and by one Sense only; for, if there were more, one would object one Object apart, the other another, and consequently could not judge between them. For that which judgeth must have Knowledge of all that whereof it judgeth, which no exterior Sense can afford, as being confined to its proper Object.

Common Sense judgeth contrary or different Sensibles in the same Instant, for it discerneth together sweet and black, bitter and sweet. Hence it is like the Centre of a Circle, which in divers Respects is called one, and many. It is one, as all the external Senses are united in it; many, as it is the Fountain and Judge of them.

[s] Sense differs from Intellect; for Sense is in all living Creatures; Intellect in few. Sense erreth not about its proper Object, but is always true; Intellect often erreth by false Opinions and Habits.

CHAP. XIX.

Of Phantasy and Cogitation.

[t] FROM *Sense* is derived *Phantasy* and *Cogitation*. *Phantasy* differs from *Sense* and *Intellect*, tho' it exist not without a previous Knowledge of *Sense*, as neither doth *Cogitation*, which is in Action of the *Intellect*, comprehending *Science*, *Opinion*, and *Prudence*.

The Act of *Phantasy* differs from *Cogitation*, for we fancy Things false, and at our own Pleasure; but we think only what is true, and like unto Truth, and that not as we please our selves, but as the Thing seemeth. Moreover, when we think that Things are ill or good, we are moved with Fear, Joy, Hope; but when we fancy, only without Application of Judgment, we are not mov'd no more than we are frighted at a Picture.

Phantasy is not properly *Sense*; *Phantasy* acteth in him that sleepeth, *Sense* doth not; *Sense* was with us from our Birth, *Phantasy* not; *Sense* is in all Animals, *Phantasy* is not; *Sense* is true, *Phantasy* often false; *Sense* is only of Things present, *Phantasy* of the Absent likewise.

Phantasy is not *Science* or *Intellect*, for that is always of Things true and real, *Phantasy* often is of Things false; *Phantasy* is not *Opinion*, for *Opinion* is followed by Faith, *Phantasy* is not.

Phantasy is a Motion in Animals from *Sense* in act, by which Motion they are variously affected, and conceive Things sometimes true, and sometimes false. The Error of *Phantasy* ariseth from the Error of the *Senses*; *Phantasy*, therefore, is of near Affinity with *Sense*; for, tho' it be not Sense, yet it exists not without *Sense*; or in Things that have no *Sense*. It is derived ἀπὸ τῦ φάος from Light; for Sight, the most excellent of Senses, cannot act without Light.

Many Things are done by Animals, according to *Phantasy*, either because they have not *Intellect*, as Beasts, or that *Intellect* is obscured in them.

CHAP. XX.

Of Memory *and* Reminiscence.

[u] FROM *Phantasy* proceeds *Memory*, which is of Things *past*, as *Sense* is of the *present* Opinion of the *Future*. *Sense* and *Intellection* are necessarily previous to *Memory*. Hence those Animals only, which have Sense of Time, remember as Horses and Dogs, yet *Memory* is not without *Phantasy*, even not that Memory which is of intelligible Things; for he that remembereth, is sensible that he first saw, heard, or learned what he remembereth. *Memory*, therefore, is reducible *per se* to *Phantasy*, as being of *Phantasms*, to *Intellect* only by *Accident*. Hence, in the same Part of the Soul, wherein *Phantasy* exists, resideth likewise *Memory*, for if it were placed only in the *Intellectual Faculty*, it would not be competent to Beasts, which we see it is.

Memory is made by Impression of some Image by the *Sense* upon the Soul. Hence they, who retain not the Image and Figure of Sense, either by continual Motion, or excessive Humidity, as Children, or Drought, as old Men, remember not. To *Memory*, therefore, is required a moderate Temperature of the Brain, yet more inclined to dry.

o De sensu. cap. 6. p Ibid. q Ibid. r Lib. 3. cap. 2. s De Anima, lib. 3. cap. 3. t Cap. 3.
u Lib. de Memor. & Rem. cap. 1.

[w] *Reminiſcence* is not a Reſumption or Aſſumption of *Memory*, but differs ſpecifically from both theſe, for Beaſts have not *Reminiſcence*, tho' they have *Memory*, *Reminiſcence* being made by Diſcourſe and diligent Diſquiſition collecting one Thing from another by a continued Series and Order, until at laſt we call that to Mind which we had forgotten.

CHAP. XXI.

Of Sleep *and* Waking.

[x] TO *Senſe* belongeth *Sleep* and *Waking*; for thoſe animate Things which want *Senſe*, neither ſleep nor wake, as Plants. *Sleep* is an Immobility, and Band, as it were, of *Senſe*; *Waking* is a Solution and Remiſſion of *Senſe*.

[y] The chief Seat of *Sleep* is the *Common Senſe*, which being bound up by *Sleep*, all the exterior Senſes, whereof this is the common Centre, are bound up likewiſe, and reſtrained for the Reſt and Health of the Animal, which is the End of *Waking* alſo.

[z] Every Impotence of *Senſe* is not *Sleep*, but only that which is cauſed by Evaporation of the Aliment. Hence we are moſt ſubject to *Sleep* after Meat, for then much humid Vapour aſcends, which firſt maketh the Head heavy by Conſiſtence there, then deſcends and repels the Heat, whereby is induced *Sleep*. That *Sleep* is made in this manner, is evident from all ſoporiferious Things, as *Poppy*, which cauſeth Heavineſs in the Head, by ſending up Vapours. Labour produceth *Sleep*, by diſperſing the Humours, whence produceth Vapour. Drunken Men and Children are ſubject to ſleep much, melancholy Perſons little, for they are ſo cold within, that the Vapour exhaleth not, eſpecially they being of a dry Conſtitution. *Sleep*, therefore, is a Receſſion of the Heat inward, with a natural kind of Circumobſiſtence.

CHAP. XXII.

Of Dreams.

[a] DReaming is an Affection of the ſenſory Part, in as much as it is Fantaſtick; a *Dream* is an Apparition or Phantaſm ſeen in Sleep.

After the Functions of the external Senſes, there remain their Motions and Similitudes induced by their Objects into their Organs; theſe occurring in Sleep, cauſe *Dreams*, but not at all Times, nor at every Age, for their Species ſhew not themſelves, but upon Ceſſation of the Humours. Hence *Dreams* are not immediately after Sleep, nor in Infants ſoon after their Birth, for then there is too great Commotion, by reaſon of the Alimentary Heat. As therefore in troubled Water no Image appeareth, or if any, much diſtorted; but when it is calm the Image is rendered clearly; ſo when there is a Tumult and Agitation of the Humours, there are no Images preſented, or thoſe dreadful, ſuch as are the Dreams of melancholy and ſick Perſons; but when the Blood paſſeth ſmoothly, and the Humours are ſettled, we have pure and pleaſing Dreams; a a Dream therefore is a Phantaſm, cauſed by Motion of Senſibles already perceived by *Senſe*, occurring to Animals in Sleep.

CHAP. XXIII.

Of the Intellective Faculty.

[b] THE third Faculty of the Soul is the *Intellective*, proper to Man. *Intellect* is that Part of the Soul whereby it knoweth and underſtandeth. It is two-fold, *Patient* and *Agent*. *Patient Intellect* is that by which *Intellect* becometh all Things, for Intellection is like Senſe; Senſe is by Paſſion from a ſenſible Object, Intellect from an Intellectual. The Properties of *Patient Intellect* are theſe; *It is void of Corruptive Paſſion; it is apt for Reception of Species. It is that Species potentially; it is not mix'd with the Body; it hath no Corporeal Organs; it is the Place of Species.*

[c] That there is alſo an *Agent Intellect*, is manifeſt; for in whatſoever kind, there is ſomething that is potentially all of that kind, there is ſomething likewiſe which is the efficient Cauſe of all in that kind; this is the *Agent Intellect*, a Cognoſcitive Power which enlighteneth Phantaſms and the *Patient Intellect*. The Properties thereof are, *that it is ſeparable from the Body, Immortal and Eternal; that it is not mix'd with the Body; that it is void of Paſſion; that it is ever in Act*; but the *Patient Intellect* is mortal, which is the Cauſe of Forgetfulneſs.

[d] The Action of the *Intellect* is two-fold; one, *Intellection of Indiviſibles*, in which is neither Truth nor Falſhood, as all *ſimple* Apprehenſions; the other *Complex*, when we compound and unite Notions by Affirmation or Negation. This is always either true or falſe, the other neither. The *Simple* is Precedent to the *Complex*.

[e] *Intellect* in Act is either *Practick* or *Theoretick*. As a ſenſible Object reduceth the ſenſible Faculty from Power to act, ſo doth an intellectual Faculty, and as the Operation of Senſe is threefold, *Simple Apprehenſion, Judgment if it be good or ill*, and laſtly, *Appetition or Averſion*, according to that Perception: So likewiſe is the Operation of the *Practick Intellect* three-fold; Firſt, *it is moved by Phantaſms, as Senſe is by external Senſibles.* Secondly, *it judgeth the Object to be good or ill, by Affirmation or Negation.* Thirdly, *it moveth the Will to purſue or ſhun it*, whence it is call'd *Practick*. This *Practick Intellect* is moved as well when the ſenſi-

w Cap. 2. x Lib. de Som. & Vigil. cap. 1. y Cap. 2. z Cap. 3. a Lib. de inſom. b De Anim. lib. 3. cap. 4. c Cap. 5. d Cap. 6. e Cap. 8.

sible Object is absent, as when it is present, only excited by the Phantasy. The Object of the *Theoretick Intellect* is true or false; of the *Practick*, good or ill.

[f] The Rational Soul, in some manner, is every Thing; for that which actually knoweth, is in some manner the same with the Thing known.

CHAP. XXIV.

Of the Motive Faculty.

[g] *Besides the* nutritive, sensitive, *and* intellective *Faculties, there is also a* motive *Faculty in animate Creatures. That it is not the same with the* nutritive *is manifest, inasmuch as it proceeds from Imagination and Apprehension, which Plants had not, neither have they Organs fit for Motion, which Nature would have given them if they have this Power. That it is not the same with the* sensitive, *appears, in that some Animals which have Sense, have not the Power, as* Zoophytes, *which have not the Organs fit for this Motion. Neither is it the same with the Theoretick* Intellect, *for that judgeth not as to Action: But progressive Motion is the Action of an Animal flying Ill, or pursuing Good.*

[h] *The Principles of* local Motion *in Animals, are the* practick Intellect *(under which is comprehended Phantasy) and* Appetite. *These two direct and impel the Motive Faculty to Action: Intellect and Phantasy by directing what is to be shunned, what to be embraced; Appetite by shunning or embracing it. Appetite is the chief Principle thereof; for that may move without Intellect, as in Beasts, and many times in Men, who desert their Reason to follow their Pleasure: But Intellect never moveth without Appetite, that is, Will; for Appetite is the Principle of all Motion, Honest and Dishonest; Intellect only of honest Motion.*

In Man, Appetite is two-fold; Will, *which followeth the Judgment of Reason; and* sensual Appetite, *irascible or concupiscible, which followeth Sense and Phantasy.*

In the Motion of Animals, three Things are considered; First, that which moveth, and that is two-fold; the Appetible Object, *which moveth the Appetite as a final Cause, not as an efficient; and the* Appetite *itself, which being moved by the appetible Object, moveth the Animal. Secondly, by what it moves, which is the Heart of the Animal, by which Instrument the appetible Object moveth it. Thirdly, that which is moved, the Animal itself, perfect.*

[i] Insects *are moved locally, as* perfect *Animals are, and consequently by the same Principles, Appetite and Phantasy: But this Phantasy is imperfect, diffused through the whole Body, as appeareth by their uncertain Motion only towards present occurrent Objects. That they have Appetite is manifest, inasmuch as they are sensible of Pain and Pleasure.*

Beasts have sensitive *Phantasy only; Rational Creatures,* deliberative, *which compareth many things conducing to some foreknown End, and chooseth the most expedient. Yet sometimes the Sensitive Appetite in Man overswayeth the Rational; but by the Order of Nature, the Will, which is Rational, ought, as being the Superior to it, to oversway the Sensitive. Thus there are three Motions, one of the Will commanding, another of the Sensitive Appetite resisting, and a third of the Body obeying. But when the sensitive over-ruleth, there are only two Motions, for the Will resists not, but is deceived.*

CHAP. XXV.

Of Life and Death.

[k] GEneration *and* Dissolution *are common to all living Creatures, though all are not produced and dissolved in the same Manner.*

[l] *The Generation of a living Creature is the first Conjunction of the nutritive Soul with the natural Heat.*

Life is the Permanence of that Soul with the said Heat.

Youth *is the Encrease of the first Refrigerative Part,* Age *the Decrease thereof,* ἀκμη, *the constant and perfect Life which is betwixt both.*

As long as an animate Creature liveth, it hath natural Heat within itself; and as soon as that faileth, dieth. The Principle of this Heat is in the Heart. If it be extinguished in any other Part, the Animal may live; but if in the Heart, it cannot.

This Heat is extinguished two Ways; First by Consumption, *when it faileth of itself; Secondly, by* Extinction, *from some contrary, as in violent Death; the Cause is the same in both, Defect of Aliment, which in the living Creature is its Vital Moisture, as Fire wanting Refrigeration, groweth more violent, and soon consumeth the Humidity, which being gone, itself must of Necessity go out.*

Refrigeration therefore is necessary to the Conservation of the natural Heat. Plants are refrigerated by the ambient Air, and by Aliment: Their natural Heat is extinguished by excessive Cold, and dried up by excessive Heat. Animals which live in the Air, or in the Water, are refrigerated by the Air or Water; some by breathing, others without.

[m] Death, *according to the Extinction of natural Heat, is two-fold,* violent *or* natural; *violent, when the Cause is extrinsical; natural, when the Principle thereof is in the animate Creature. For that Part whereon Life dependeth (the Lungs) is so ordered by Nature, that it cannot perform its Office for ever. Death therefore cometh from Defect of Heat, when,*

f Cap. 8. g Cap. 9. h Cap. 10. i Cap. 11. k De vit. & Mort. cap. 23. l Cap. 24. m Cap. 23, 24.

through

through want of Refrigeration, the Radical Humidity is consumed and dried up. Refrigeration faileth naturally, when by Progress of Time, the Lungs in Creatures that have Breath, the Gills in Fishes grow so hard, that they are unapt for Motion.

[n] *Old Men die easily, as having but little natural Heat; and without Pain, because their Dissolution comes not from any violent Affection.*

[o] *The Lives of living Creatures, as well of the same, as of divers Species, differ in Length; the longest Life, most commonly, is that of some Plants, as the Palm and Cypress; that of Creatures which have Blood, rather than the Bloodless; that of Terrestrial Creatures rather than the Aquatile; that of those which have great Bodies, as of Elephants, rather than those of little.*

[p] *The Causes of long Life are, First, the Quantity and Quality of the vital Moisture; if it be much and fat, not easily dried up nor congealed. Secondly, Natural Heat, which suffereth not that Humour to be congealed. Thirdly, a due Proportion betwixt this Heat and that Moisture. Fourthly, fewness of Excrements, for Excrements are contrary to Nature, and sometimes corrupt Nature itself, sometimes a Part.*

Salacious *Creatures, or laborious, grow soon old, by reason of Exsiccation. For the same Reason Men are shorter lived than Women, but more active.*

In hot Countries animate Creatures are larger and live longer than in cold. Those Animals which have little or no Blood, either are not at all produced in the Northern Parts, or soon die.

Both Plants and Animals, if they take not Aliment, die; for the natural Heat, when the Aliment faileth, consumeth the Matter itself wherein it is, the Vital Moisture.

Aquatile Creatures are shorter lived than the Terrestrial, and the Bloodless than those that have Blood, because their Humidity is more watery, and consequently more apt to to be congealed and corrupted.

[q] *Plants live long, as having less of watery Moisture, which therefore is not so apt to be congealed. The Largeness of the upper Parts, as well in Plants as Animals, is a Sign of long Life, because it argues much natural Heat. The upper Part of a Plant is the Root, not the Boughs.*

The THIRD PART.

CHAP I.

ETHICK.

WE come next to the *Moral* Part of Philosophy, including *Ethick*, *Oeconomick*, and *Politick*. Of the first, we have ten Books of *Aristotle*'s, written to his Son *Nichomachus*; two Books, called his *great Ethick*; one *of Virtues*. Of *Oeconomick*, two Books; *of Politick* eight. We shall not have Recourse to these for an Account of his Doctrine in this kind, being furnished by *Stobæus* with a Summary of what he, and the rest of the Peripateticks asserted in Morality.

Ethick [r] (saith he) is so called ἀπὸ τοῦ ἔθους, from *Custom*, for those Things, the Principles and Seeds whereof we receive from Nature, are to be perfected by Custom and right Institution. Hence Ethick pertaineth only to living Creatures, and particularly to Man; for the rest acquire Custom, not by Reason, but Necessity, Man by Reason.

Of the *Soul*, one Part is *Rational*, the other *Irrational*; the rational Part is *Judicative*, the irrational *Appetitive*; of the rational that which is *Theoretick*, conversant in divine Things, is called *Science*; that which is *Practick*, conversant in human Actions, is called *Counsel*. Of the latter, one Part is *concupiscible*, another *irascible*.

In like manner *Virtue* is two-fold, rational and irrational, consisting in Theory and Practice. Ethick Virtue consisteth not in Science, but in Election of Goods.

Virtue is perfected by three Things; *Nature*, *Custom*, and *Reason*. For a Man differing from other Creatures, both in Body and Mind, as being a Species placed between divine Essences and irrational Creatures, hath some Affinity to both; in what is rational, and agrees with the Soul, he is allied to the Divinity; in what is irrational, proper to the Body, he agrees with the irrational. Both these desire Perfection by Reason; and First, he desireth to be, for this is naturally insite in him. Hence he affecteth Things that are according to Nature, and is averse from Things contrary to his Nature. He endeavoureth to preserve *Health*, *Pleasure*, *Life*, these being according to Nature, expetible in themselves, and good. On the contrary, he shunneth *Sickness*, *Pain*, and *Death*, as being repugnant to Nature, and therefore ill, and to be avoided. We love our own Bodies, we love our own Souls, their Parts, their Faculties, their Acts. The Principle of Appetite, Office, and Virtue, is a providential Care of these. If Error did not happen concerning Things expetible and avoidable, but that we lived continually participant of Good, and void of Ill, we should not enquire in these for a true

n Cap. 23. o Lib. de lon. & brevit. cap. 4. p Cap. 5. q Cap. 6. r Eclog. Ethic.

Election. But being Things expetible and avoidable, through Ignorance often deceived, sometimes rejecting the Good, sometimes admitting the Ill for Good, we necessarily have Recourse to *Constancy of Judgment*, which having obtained convenient to Nature, we call it, from the Excellency of its Function, *Virtue*, admiring and honouring it above all Things. For Actions, and those which are call'd Offices, proceed from Election of Things according to Nature, and Rejection of Things repugnant to Nature. Herein consist *right Actions* and *Sins*; even on these dependeth almost the whole Reason of *Election*, as we shall briefly demonstrate.

That Children are *expetible* to Parents, not only *for Use* or Benefit, but also in *themselves*, is most evident. There is no Man so cruel and savage, who doth not rather desire his Children after his Death should live happily and well, than otherwise. By this Affection dying Persons make Wills, providing even for the unborn, choosing Tutors and Guardians to assist them. And as *Children* are loved for themselves, so likewise we love *Parents*, *Brethren*, *Wife*, *Kindred*, *Acquaintance*, *Countrymen*, for themselves, as having some Interest in them by Nature. For, Man is a sociable communicative Creature; and tho' of Friendships some are more remote than others, it is nothing to the Purpose, for all Friendship is for its own Sake, and not for Use only. And if Friendship with Countrymen be expetible in itself, it will likewise be expetible in itself with all Men; for all those who benefit others, are so affected towards them, that they do most Actions for the Office Sake. Who will not free any Man from a wild Beast, if he be in his Power? Who will not direct a Man that is out of his Way? Who will not relieve a Man that is ready to starve, or direct a Man in a Desart to a Spring? Who desires not to be well spoken of after Death? Who abhors not these Speeches as unnatural?

When I am dead, let Earth be mix'd with Fire,
I care not, so I now have my Desire.

It is manifest therefore, that we have a natural Good-will and Friendship towards all Mankind, as a Thing being expetible in itself, and consonant to Reason.

The Race of Gods and Men is one,
From Nature both alike begun.

Love of all Mankind being thus common to us, much more evidently it is expetible in itself towards those whom Conversation hath made our Friends. A Friend, Friendship, and Good-will, are expetible in themselves.

In like manner, *Praise* is expetible *in itself*; for we contract Society with those who praise us; and if Praise, *Glory* likewise, which is nothing but the Praise of many Persons.

Now seeing that *external Goods* are expetible in themselves, much more are the Goods of Soul and Body expetible in themselves. For, if Man be expetible in himself, the Parts of Man must likewise be expetible in themselves. The Parts of Man in general are *Soul* and Body; the Body therefore is expetible in itself. Why should the Body of another Person be dear to us, and not our own? Or why should our Body be dear to us, and not the Parts and Functions thereof? *Health* therefore, *Strength*, *Beauty*, *Swiftness*, *sound Sense*, and the rest, are expetible in themselves; for none of ordinary Capacity would choose to be deformed or maimed, tho' no Inconvenience would happen thereupon; so that Deformity, even without any Inconvenience, seemeth justly avoidable. And if Deformity be avoidable in itself, Beauty is expetible, not for *Use* only, but in *itself*. For, that Beauty pleaseth is manifest, in as much as all have a natural Inclination (besides that of Conversation) to such as are beautiful, and endeavour to confer Benefits on them, so as it seemeth to procure Benevolence. In this respect therefore Beauty is judged expetible in itself, Deformity avoidable in itself. It is the same in *Health* and *Sickness*, *Strength* and *Weakness*, *Activity* and *Heaviness*, *Sense* and *Privation of Sense*.

And if *corporeal* Goods are expetible in themselves, and their contrary Evils avoidable, the Parts and Virtues of the Soul must necessarily be expetible also. For Virtue beginning, as we said, from the Body, and external Goods, and reflecting upon itself, and considering how much more near Relation it hath to the Soul, contracteth a nearer Affinity with it. So that the Virtues of the Soul are much to be preferred before those of the Body, which is easily collected from what hath been said. For, if corporeal Health be expetible in itself, much more is *Temperance*, which freeth us from the Fury of the Passions. And if corporeal *Strength* ought to be numbered amongst Goods, much more ought *Magnanimity*, by which the Soul is strengthened. And if corporeal Beauty be expetible in itself, much more is that of the Soul, *Justice*.

In like manner is it with the Virtues. For, there are three Kinds of *Goods*, which tho' different, have some Kind of Analogy. That which in the Body is called *Health*, in the Soul is called *Temperance*, and in Externals, *Riches*. What in the Body is *Strength*, in the Soul is *Magnanimity*, in Externals *Power*. What in the Body is *Vigour* of *Sense*, in the Soul is *Prudence*, in Externals, *Felicity*. What in the Body is *Beauty*, in the Soul is *Justice*, in Externals *Friendship*.

There are three Kinds of Goods expetible in themselves, those concerning the *Soul*, those concerning the *Body*, and the *External*; but especially those of the Soul, for the Soul is more excellent than the Body.

Yet tho' corporeal and external Virtues be inferior to those of the Soul, they are not to be neglected, partly, as being expetible in themselves, partly, as conducing to civil, sociable and contemplative Life; for

for Life is defined by civil, ſociable and contemplative Actions; *Virtue* (according to this *Sect*) not being a Lover of itſelf, but communicative and civil. For when we ſay, Virtue is neareſt allied to itſelf, the Deſire of the Knowledge of Truth neceſſarily followeth it, ſo as wiſe Men may rightly part with their Life, and Fools rightly preſerve theirs; ſince that to thoſe who are perfect, it is an equal Thing to depart this Life or not.

The Excellency of Virtue is much encreas'd by corporeal and external Goods; yet, the End cannot any Way be compleated by them. The Function therefore of *Virtue* is *Beatitude*, by ſucceſsful Actions. Corporeal and external Goods are ſaid to be efficient of Beatitude, for as much as they confer ſomething thereto, not that they compleat it; for Beatitude is Life. Life conſiſts of Actions, but thoſe can neither be reckoned amongſt Actions nor Functions.

Hereupon comes in *Beneficence*, *Grace*, *Humanity*, *Love of Children* and *Brethren*, of our *Country*, *Parents*, *Benevolence* of *Kinsfolk*, *Friendſhip*, *Equality*, and the whole Company of Virtues; which who neglect, manifeſtly ſin, as to expetible Goods, and avoidable Evils; and alſo in the Acquiſition and Uſe of Goods, they ſin in Election, by Judgment; in Acquiſition, by the Manner; in Uſe, by Ignorance; in Election they ſin, as deſiring that which is not good, or preferring the leſſer Good, as moſt prefer *pleaſant* before *profitable*, *profitable* before *honeſt*. *In Acquiſition*, as not conſidering whence, nor in what Manner, nor how far it ought to be acquired. *In Uſe*, for as much as all Uſe being referred either to itſelf or ſome other, in the former they obſerve no Moderation, in the latter no Decency.

In theſe Things, tho' the Wicked ſin, yet do the Juſt behave themſelves uprightly, following Virtue as their Leader.

In all Virtues there is *Judgment*, *Election* and *Action*; there is no Virtue without theſe; Prudence hath the firſt Place, the reſt follow.

Virtue is called the *beſt Affection*, which may be collected from Induction. The Virtue of a Shoemaker is that by which he knoweth how to make Shoes; and of an Architect, that by which he knoweth how to build a handſome Houſe. Virtue therefore is the beſt of Affections.

Of Virtue there are two Principles, as it were, *Reaſon* and *Paſſion*, which ſometimes agree, ſometimes diſagree; for Pleaſure or Grief, where Reaſon gets the Maſtery, is called *Temperance*, when Paſſion, *Intemperance*; the *Harmony* and Concord of both is *Virtue*, one rightly commanding, the other obeying.

Expetible is that which attracteth the *Appetite* to itſelf; avoidable, that which repelleth it, Reaſon conſenting thereto. Expetible and good were by the Ancients eſteemed the ſame; for they affirmed Good to be that which all deſire.

Of Goods, they ſay ſome are expetible *for themſelves*, ſome for others; the firſt are either *honeſt* or *neceſſary*. Honeſt are the *Virtues* and their Functions; neceſſary, *Life*, and thoſe Things which pertain unto it, as the Body with its Parts and Uſes; and thoſe which are called external Goods; as *Riches*, *Peace*, *Glory*, *Liberty*, *Friendſhip*, for each of theſe conferreth to the Uſe of *Virtue*.

Beatitude conſiſteth of good and ſucceſsful Actions; wherefore it is wholly good, as playing upon Pipes is wholly artificial; for the Uſe of the Matter doth not take away the Goodneſs from Beatitude, as the Uſe of Inſtruments taketh not away from the Art of Medicine. Such Things as are made Uſe of towards this Perfection, are not to be reckoned as Parts; for they, without which the Action cannot be, are not rightly Parts thereof; for Parts conduce to the whole, the reſt conduce to the End.

Good is divided into *Honeſt*, *Profitable*, and *Pleaſant*; theſe are the Scopes of all Actions. Beatitude conſiſts of all theſe. It is *the Uſe of perfect Virtue*, *in perfect Life*, *with proſperous Succeſs*; and *the Function of perfect Life according to Virtue*; and *the Uſe of Virtue according to Nature*, *without any Impediment*.

Tho' ſome aſſert that the *End* is to be happy, and Beatitude the *Scope*, as Riches are good, and to be rich that which is behoveful; yet is it better to follow the Ancients, who aſſert the End to be that for whoſe Sake all Things are, itſelf not being for the Sake of any other, or the ultimate of Things expetible, or Life according to Virtue, in corporeal and external Goods, either in all or the moſt principal.

This being the greateſt Good, uſeth the Miniſtry of the reſt; for as thoſe Things which confer hereunto are to be eſteemed Goods, ſo thoſe Things which reſiſt it are Indifferents; for every good Action doth not effect Beatitude.

They aſſert *Beatitude* to be the *Uſe of perfect Virtue*, as holding ſome Virtues to be *perfect*, others *imperfect*. The Perfect are *Juſtice* and *Integrity*; the Imperfect are *Ingenuity* and *Progreſſion*. The perfect agreeth with the perfect, ſo as the End thereof is the Function of that *Virtue* whereof no Part is wanting.

They added *perfect Life*, to ſhew that Beatitude is in Men of full Age, for a young Man is imperfect, and ſo is his Life. Beatitude th refore is in perfect Time, the longeſt that is appointed for us by the Gods. As one Verſe makes not a Poem, nor one Step a Dance, nor one Swallow a Summer; ſo neither doth a ſhort Time confer Beatitude, for Beatitude is perfect, and requireth a perfect Man and Time.

They added *ſucceſsful Function of Virtue*, becauſe the Goods of Nature are neceſſarily requiſite to Beatitude; for a good Man may exerciſe Virtue in

Misery, but cannot be happy. For as *Virtue* is the only Efficient of *honest* Actions, so is *Beatitude*, of *honest*, *good and excellent*. Neither doth it abide amongst ill or unhappy Things, but enjoyeth the Good, nor is deprived of the Contemplation of Good, or the Conveniencies of Life.

Beatitude being the most pleasant and fairest of Things, increaseth like an Art by the Multitude of its Instruments. It is not the same in God and Man, neither is it equal amongst good Men, for it may sometimes be taken away by Oppression of Miseries. Hence it is to be doubted, whether a Man may be termed happy as long as he is alive, considering the Uncertainty of Fortune; whence *Solon* said, *Consider the End of a long Life, whether it be happy.*

Those who sleep are not participant of Beatitude, but after some Manner, as the Function of the Soul is capable of awaking.

Lastly, they added *Nature*, because every Waking of good Men is not the Use of perfect Virtue, but only that which is according to Nature, that is, free from Madness; for Madness, as well as Sleep, depriveth Men of Use, and of this Reason, and maketh them like Brutes.

As Beatitude is said to be the Use of Virtue, so is Misery of Vice; yet not so, that as this sufficeth to Misery, so that doth to Beatitude.

Life is made sour and unpleasant to the Good by excessive Adversity, to the Ill even in Prosperity, because they sin more, nor can rightly be termed happy.

Having asserted Beatitude to be the chief Good, it followeth that we expound how many Ways it is taken.

Good is understood three Ways. First, for that which is the Cause of Preservation to all Beings; next, for that which is predicated of every good Thing. Lastly, for that which is expetible in itself. The first is *God*; the second the *Genus* of Goods; the third, the *End*, to which all are referred, Beatitude.

That which is expetible in itself, is said three Ways, either that for which something is done; or, for which all Things are done; or, some Part of these.

Again, of these, some are *final*, some *efficient*: Final, are the Actions proceeding according to Virtue; efficient, the Materials of expetible Things.

Of Goods, some are *Honourable*, some *Laudable*, some *Faculties*, some *Profitable*. Honourable, as *God*, our *Prince*, *Parent*. Laudable, as *Riches*, *Empire*, *Liberty*. Profitable, the Efficient, as *Health*.

Again, of Things good and expetible, some are expetible *in themselves*, some *for others*; in themselves, as the *Honourable*, *Laudable*, and *Faculties*; *for others*, as the *Profitable*, which effect and conserve other Things.

Again, of Things good in themselves, some are *Ends*, others *not Ends*; Ends, as *Justice*, *Virtue*, *Health*, and whatsoever consisteth of these; not Ends, as *Ingenuity*, *Memory*, *Learning*.

Again, of Goods, some are *wholly* perfect, others *not*; of the first are *Virtue* and *Prudence*, which benefit all; of the latter, *Riches* and *Power*, which require to be used by a good Man. The same Things whereof a good Man maketh right Use, a wicked Man abuseth, as the same which a good Musician useth well, he who is ignorant of Musick useth amiss. Whosoever maketh ill Use of any Thing, is hurt thereby; as, *a good Horse, which is a Help to him that knoweth how to ride, hurts the unskilful Rider.*

Again, of Goods, some are in the *Soul*, some in the *Body*, some *external*; in the *Soul* are *Ingenuity*, *Art*, *Virtue*, *Wisdom*, *Prudence*, *Pleasure*; in the *Body*, *Health*, *Soundness of Sense*, *Beauty*, *Strength*, *Soundness of Limbs*, and all *Parts*, with their *Faculties* and *Functions*. External are *Riches*, *Glory*, *Nobility*, *Power*, *Friends*, *Kindred*, *Country*. The Goods of the Soul are either conferr'd by Nature, as *Wit* and *Memory*; or acquir'd by *Diligence*, as the *Liberal Sciences*; or fall into Perfection, as *Prudence*, *Justice*, and lastly, *Wisdom*.

Again, of Goods, some may be both *obtained* and *lost*, as *Riches*; some obtain'd, but not lost, as *Felicity* and *Immortality*: Some lost, but not obtained, as *Sense* and *Life*; some neither obtain'd nor lost, as *Nobility*.

Again, of Goods, some are *only* expetible in themselves, as Pleasure and Indolence, some efficient *only*, as Riches; some *both* efficient and expetible in themselves, as Virtue, Friends, Health.

Goods are divided more Ways than these, as not belonging all to one *Genus*, but to all the ten Categories.

These Things laid down, we come next to speak more accurately concerning Virtue, which they place in both Parts of the Soul. In the *Rational* Part, *Integrity*, *Prudence*, *Wisdom*, *Memory*, and the like. In the *Irrational* Part, *Temperance*, *Justice*, *Fortitude*, and other Virtues. These (say they) may be extinguished by Excess, which they prove by Testimony of the Senses, as Things obscure by manifest. For, as by Excess or Defect of Exercise, *Health* is corrupted, but by moderate Exercise is preserved. In like manner is it in *Temperance*, *Fortitude*, and other Virtues. For, as we do call him who feareth the Thunder, mad, not valiant; so, on the contrary, he who feareth Shadows is a Coward. But he is valiant who neither feareth all Things, nor nothing. These Things encrease or extinguish Virtue; being moderate, they increase Courage; being too great, or too little, they extinguish it.

In like manner are all other Virtues extinguished by *Excess* or *Defect*, increased by *Mediocrity*.

Neither

Neither is Virtue only limited by these, but by *Pleasure* and *Grief* likewise; inasmuch as for Pleasure we commit Wickedness, and for Grief shun Good. To explain this more fully, they unfold the Nature of the Soul, wherein are seen three Things; *Passions*, *Faculties*, *Habits*. *Passions*, as *Anger*, *Fear*, *Hate*, *Love*, *Emulation*, *Pity*, and the like. To which is subsequent *Pleasure* or *Grief*. *Faculties*, by which we make use of Passions, and are angry, do emulate, and the like. *Habits* are those from which the Functions of these proceedeth rightly, or otherwise. If any Man be so disposed, that he is any upon any Occasion, he hath the Habit of *Anger*; if so, as to be angry upon no Occasion, he hath the Habit of *Stupidity*, both which are blameable. The laudable Habit is that of *Meekness*, by which we are angry in due Time and Place. Virtues therefore are Habits, by which the Functions of Passions become laudable.

All Virtue consisteth in Action; all Action is continuous. Whatsoever Things are continuous, like Magnitude, have Excess, Defect, and Mediocrity, either in relation to one another, or to us. The mean, relating to us, is in all the best, (this is not quantitative, but qualitative, and therefore is perfect; whereas the Extreams, Excess, and Defect, being contrary, are repugnant to one another, and to the Mean. But the Mean is to both Extreams (as Quality is to Inequality, greater than the least, less than the greatest. Virtue therefore is a deliberative Habit, consisting in Mediocrity, relating to ourselves.

Theophrastus having laid down some Qualities, (following his Master) endeavoureth to conclude from each of them. The Examples he alledgeth are these; Temperance, Intemperance, Stupidity, Meekness, Wrath, Indolence, Fortitude, Boldness, Timidity, Justice, Liberality, Prodigality, Avarice, Magnanimity, Pusilanimity, Arrogance, Magnificence, Ostentation. For of these Habits, some are ill, through Excess or Defect; others good, through Mediocrity. He is not *temperate* who desireth nothing, nor he who desireth all Things; one, like a Stone, desireth not even natural Expetibles; the other, thro' excessive Desire, becometh intemperate. He only is temperate, who desireth honest Things with Reason, in due Time and Measure. He is not *meek* who is angry upon all Occasions, nor he who is angry upon none; but he who is endued with the mean Habit. He is not *valiant* who feareth nothing, not God himself; nor he who feareth all Things, even his own Shadow: Nor *just*, who either assumeth or derogateth too much from himself, but who observeth Equality. He is not *liberal* who giveth away all, nor he who giveth nothing; nor *magnanimous*, who esteemeth himself worthy all great Things, nor he who esteemeth himself worthy none; but he who observeth a Decorum. He is not *magnificent* who is splendid every where, nor he who no where; but who observes due Time and Place.

Thus the Genus of Virtues is placed in *Mediocrity*, and mutually consequent in itself; yet, not alike in all, for Prudence is consequent to the rest in its own proper Nature; the rest are consequent to it by Accession; for he who is just, must necessarily be wise, but not on the contrary.

Of Passions and Appetites, some are *good*, some *bad*, some *mean*; the good are *Friendship*, *Benevolence*, *Indignation*, *Shame*, *Confidence*, *Compassion*; the bad, *Envy*, *Malevolence*, *Contumely*; the mean, *Grief*, *Fear*, *Anger*, *Pleasure*, *Desire*.

Every Passion is conversant in Pleasure and Grief, for which Reason, the Virtues depend upon them; but *Love of Money*, *Love of Pleasure*, *Love-Melancholy*, and the like, are Habits distinct from Vices.

Of *Love*, one kind is of *Friendship*, another of *Conjunction*, the third of *both*. The first is good, the second bad, the third mean.

Of Friendship there are *four* kinds; *Sodality*, *Affinity*, *Hospitality*, *Erotick*. Whether that of *Beneficence*, and that of *Admiration* be to be added to these, is doubtful. The first is derived from *Conversation*, the second from *Nature*, the third from *Cohabitation*, the fourth from *Affection*, the fifth from *Good-Will*, the last from some *Faculty*. Of all these, there are in general three Ends, honest, profitable, and pleasant. All Persons that are studious of Friendship aim at one or more of these Ends. The first Friendship is that which every Man hath to himself; the next to his Parent; the rest to his Friends and Neighbours: Whence Excess in the first, and Defect in the rest, ought to be avoided; that being esteemed *Self-Love*, this *Reservedness*.

Χάεις is taken three ways, for a profitable Benefit, or for the profitable Return of a Benefit, or for the Remembrance of a Benefit. It is placed likewise in the Face and Speech, whence a Man is termed *gracious*, εὐχάεις, ἐπίχαεις.

A good Man must lead a Life conjoin'd with Virtue, whether according to the Necessity of the Times, he execute the Office of a Magistrate, or cohabit with Princes, or impose Laws, or govern some other Part of the Common-wealth. If he be not busied in any of these, he must addict himself to a popular Life, either by Contemplation, or Action, or (which is between both) Instruction: For, tho' he ought to follow the Action and Contemplation of excellent Things, yet if the Time will not allow him to use both, he may make Choice of one, and prefer the contemplative Life, yet not neglecting the Common-wealth. He shall therefore marry, to the End he may have Issue, and addict himself to chaste Love, and as Occasion requireth, drink Wine freely, and finally maintain his Life by due Observance of Virtue, and be ready to resign it, if there be Necessity, taking Care to be buried in his own Country, according to the Rites thereof.

Thus there are three kinds of Life; the *Active*, and *Contemplative*, and that which consists of *both*. As the Voluptuous is esteem'd beneath the Dignity of a Man, so is the Contemplative preferred before the rest. A good Man shall addict himself to the Government of the Common wealth, by Choice not Chance; for the Active Life is conversant in Civil Affairs. *That* Life is best which is led according to Virtue and Nature; the next is *that* which is a mean Condition, as to both; these are both expetible. But the Life which is conjoined with Vice is to be avoided. A *happy* Life differs from a *Good* in this. *The* Happy *is always consonant to Nature, the* Good *sometimes repugnant to Nature.* To the first, *Virtue only is not requisite*, to the other, *it is requisite.* A *mean* Life is that which is placed in Mediocrity, not destitute of Offices. *Rectitudes* in Life are according to Virtue, *Sins* according to Vice; *Offices* in the mean kind of Life.

To these Things thus declared, we must add, that Virtue is a Habit desiring mean Pleasures and Griefs, pursuing that which is honest, as it is honest. Vice is the Opposite hereto.

Wisdom is the Science of the first Causes.

Prudence a Habit examining and acting good Things, as they are good.

Fortitude a Habit betwixt *Boldness* and *Fear*.

Meekness is a mean betwixt *Wrath* and *Stupidity*.

Liberality is a mean betwixt *Prodigality* and *Penuriousness*.

Magnanimity is in the mean betwixt *Arrogance* and *Pusillanimity*.

[s] *Magnificence* is the mean betwixt *Ostentation* and *Sordidness*.

Indignation is the mean betwixt *Envy* and *Malevolence*.

Gravity is the mean betwixt *Assentation* and *Contradiction*.

Modesty is the mean betwixt *Impudence* and *Bashfulness*.

Urbanity is the mean betwixt *Surrility* and *Rusticity*.

[t] *Friendship* is the mean betwixt *Dotage* and *Enmity*.

Truth is the mean betwixt *Detraction* and *Boasting*.

Justice is the mean betwixt *Excess* and *Defect*.

There are other Virtues, part ranked by themselves, part under the former. As under Justice are, εὐσέβεια, ὁσιότης, χρηστότης, εὐκοινωνησία, εὐσυναλλαξία, under Temperance εὐκοσμία, εὐλαξία, αὐτάρκεια, εὐψυχία, φιλιπονία, defined thus.

Εὐσέβεια, is a Habit of worshipping the Gods and Demons, a mean betwixt *Atheism* and δεισιδαιμονία.

Ὁσιότης, a Habit of observing Right towards the Gods and the Dead, a mean betwixt ἀνοσιότης, and something that wants a Name.

Χρηστότης, a Habit of doing well voluntarily for their own Sakes; a mean betwixt πολησία, and something that wants a Name.

Εὐκοινωνησία, a Habit, rendring Men grateful in Society, a mean betwixt ἀκοινωνησία, and something that wants a Name.

Εὐσυναλλαξία, a Habit avoiding Injustice in Contracts; a mean betwixt ἀσυναλλαξία, and something that wants a Name, which pertaineth to *extream Right*.

Εὐκοσμία, a Habit of observing Order, a mean between Ἀλαξία, and something that wants a Name.

Αὐτάρκεια, a Habit literally content with the present, a mean betwixt πλοχεία, and πολυλελεία.

Εὐψυχία, a Habit of sustaining grievous Things unconquered, a mean betwixt ἀψυχία, and ἀεισαμανιότης.

Φιλοπονία, a Habit performing excellent Things indefatigably, a mean betwixt μαλακία, and μαλακοπονία.

Lastly, *Probity* is a Virtue consisting of all the rest; it is perfect, as well because it rendreth good Things honest and profitable, as for that it desireth honest Things for their own Sake.

CHAP. II.

OECONOMICK.

HAving thus explained the Virtues and the chief Heads of *Ethick*, it remaineth that we speak of *Oeconomick* and *Politick*, for as much as Man is by Nature a *Civil Creature*. The first Commonwealth is the lawful Congression of Man and Woman, for Procreation of Children, and Society of Life. This is call'd Οἶκος, a *Family*, it is the Ground and Beginning of a City. A Family seemeth to be a little City, for Marriage being contracted, and Children growing up one under another, and joyn'd one to another, there is deduced another Family, and so a third, and a fourth. Of these is constituted *Neighbourhood* and a *City*, for many Neighbourhoods make us up a City. Thus as a Family hath in it the Seeds of a City, so likewise of a Common-wealth, for in a Family there are prints of *Monarchy*, an *Aristocracy*, and a *Democracy*. The Society between Parents and Children represents a Monarchy; that betwixt Man and Woman an *Aristocracy*, as being contracted for Issue, mutual Comfort and Assistance. To these is added a *Servant*, appointed to be such by Nature, able for Service; but not to live of himself, requiring therefore a Master to govern him. Of all these reduced to a Community is constituted a *Family*.

s For the Text doubtless is defective, and thus to be supplied, μεγαλοπρέπειαν δὲ μεσότητα [ἐλαυσίας δὲ, μικροπρεπείας. Νέμεσιν δὲ μεσότητα] φθονερίας δὲ ἐπιχαιρεκακίας. See Arist. Nicom. 4. 2. and Mag. mor. 1. 28.

t But Arist. otherwise placing Friendship betwixt Arrogation and Derogation.

The

The Government of a Family is, by Nature, given to *Men*, for the Counsel of *Women* is weaker; *Children* are not yet arrived to it, *Servants* never can. The whole Ordering therefore of a Family depends upon the Man; the whole Prudence of *Oeconomy* therefore is in Man. This is partly *Paternal*, partly *Nuptial*, partly *Herile*, partly *Acquisitive*. For, as an Army requireth *Provision*, a City, *Merchandise*; Art, *Instruments*; so a Family Necessaries, as well for common Life as Convenience. Of these the Master of the Family takes the first Care, how honestly to encrease his Revenues, and moderate his Expences. He, as being the Head of the Family, ought to be skilful in many Things, as in *Agriculture*, *Grasing*, *Metals*, whereby he may advantage himself without doing Injury to others. Of *Acquisition*, there are two kinds, one better than the other; that by *Nature*, this by *Art*.

CHAP. V.
POLITICK.

THUS much concerning *Oeconomick*. We come next to speak in short of *Politick*.

First then, *Cities* are constituted as well for the natural Propensity of Man to Society, as for Utility. A City is the most perfect Society. A Citizen is he who is concern'd in the Magistracy. A City is a compleat Number of such Persons, which proceedeth so far, as that it be not a Disagreeing within itself, nor contemptible, but may conveniently provide for Life, and defend itself against Enemies.

Oeconomical Prudence is one kind, *Legislative* another, *Political* a third, *Military* a fourth.

A City is governed either by one Man, or some few, or all; and each of these either rightly, or unjustly; rightly, when the Princes respect the Common Good; unjustly, when they consider their own Private Interest. The Right are, *Monarchy*, *Aristocracy*, *Democracy*; the Unjust, *Tyranny*, *Oligarchy*, *Ochlocracy*. There is also a mix'd Government, consisting of the good Kinds. And whereas a Common-wealth is often changed into better or worse; that is best, which is guided according to Virtue; that worst, which is according to Vice.

They who command, or advise, or judge, in *Democracy*, are taken out of *all*, either by Suffrage or Lot. In *Oligarchy*, out of the *Richer*; in *Aristocracy*, out of the *Best*.

Sedition in Cities, is either according to *Reason* or *Interest*; the First, *when Equals are reduced to unequal Extremities*; the Second, *for Honour*, *Power*, or *Gain*.

Common-wealths are overthrown, either by *Force* or *Fraud*. They last longest which respect the publick Utility.

Courts of *Judicature*, *Processes*, *Pleas*, and *Magistracies*, are ordered according to the Forms of every Common-wealth. The most general Commands are *Priesthood*, *Generalship*, *Admiralty*, ναυαρχία, ἀγορονομία, γυμνασιαρχία, γυναικονομία, παιδονομία, ἀγωνομία, ταμιεία, νομοφυλακία, πεζαλογεία, whereof some relate to Cities, others to Havens and Traffick.

The Office of a Common-wealths-man, is to reform a Common-wealth, which is much harder than to erect one; and to divide the Common People into two Parts, *one* for necessary Offices, *the other* for Convenient. *Mechanicks*, *Husbandmen*, and *Merchants*, are for the necessary sort, continually serving the Common-wealth; but *Soldiers* and *Counsellors*, who are Servants for Virtue, and perform noble Things, are the more excellent.

Old Men are most proper to be Counsellors, and also Priests to perform the sacred Rites; young Men for War. This Order is exceeding ancient, first constituted by the *Ægyptians*, who, amongst other Things excellently disposed, appointed the Temples of the Gods to be built in the highest Places, and the Lands of private Persons to be disposed, partly at the Confines of the Country, partly near the City, whereby both Parts of the Country should meet in Tribute and Tax. They likewise well ordered the Institution of *Sodalities*, and a publick Care for the Education of Children, and that those who are too young or too old, should not marry, to prevent their having weak Children. Likewise, that nothing mix'd be taken away, nothing perfect exposed, Abortion not procured. Thus much of *Politicks*.

The FOURTH PART.

CHAP. I.
Of METAPHYSICKS.

THE *Fourth* and *last Part* of *Philosophy*, which treateth of *Ens* in general, is, by *Aristotle*, termed sometimes, *First*, *Philosophy*, sometimes *Wisdom*, sometimes *Theology*, by his *Followers* and *Interpreters* called *Metaphysick*, from the Order thereof, as *Alexander Aphrodisæus*, and *Philoponus* affirm; being placed after *Physick*, as treating of a less known, and more noble Object.

Upon this Subject there are fourteen Books of *Aristotle* extant, which, saith *Alexander Aphrodisæus*, by the Method of the Discourse and Style, are easily evinced to be his.

[u] *Metaphyſick* conſidereth *Ens* as it is *Ens*, and the primary Cauſe thereof. *Ens* is Analagous, predicated primarily of Subſtance, which is one Eſſence; of Accidents, not ſimply, but in regard of their common Attribution to Subſtance. *Ens* thus being analogically, the Science thereof is one likewiſe; but it treateth chiefly of Subſtance, becauſe it is the firſt Eſſence upon which the reſt depend, and from which they are denominated.

CHAP. II.

Of the Firſt Principle.

THE firſt moſt common Axiom, or Complex Principle is this, [w] *It is impoſſible that the ſame thing ſhould be, and not be, in the ſame, and according to the ſame reſpect.*

[x] To this Principle, all Demonſtrations and Opinions are reduced. It is itſelf indemonſtrable, as being the firſt; otherwiſe there would be an infinite Progreſſion in Demonſtration. There is nothing more known by which it may be proved, no greater Abſurdity than the Denial of it, that an Adverſary can be reduced to.

[y] With the firſt *Negative Principle*, the firſt *Affirmative* hath a near Affinity. *It is neceſſary, that every Thing be predicated affirmatively or negatively of another.* It is not true in Matter of a future Contingent determinately, but ouly indeterminately. This *Affirmative Principle* therefore is not abſolutely the firſt, yet it is true; neither can there be a Medium betwixt contradictory Propoſitions, no more than betwixt even and uneven Number; every Propoſition either affirms or denies, therefore every Propoſition is either true or falſe; between theſe there is no Medium.

CHAP. III.

Of *Subſtance* and *Accident.*

[z] OF *Ens* in general there are three Diviſions; firſt, by *Accident* and *per ſe*; ſecondly, *Potentially* and *Active*; thirdly, *Intentional* and *Real.*

Of *Ens by Accident*, there is no Science, for it is in a manner *Non ens*, it hath no Cauſe *per ſe*, it is not generated or corrupted *per ſe*; it is not always, nor for the moſt part, nor neceſſary, whereas Science is of Things contrary to theſe.

[a] *Ens per ſe*, is divided into ten *Categories.* The firſt is *Subſtance*, and the firſt *Ens*, and conſequently the firſt *Category*, for it is predicated *in quid* of the firſt Subject, whereas Accidents are predicated *in quale* or *quantum.* Again, Subſtance only is *Ens per ſe*, Accidents are *Ens*, as they are Affections of Subſtance. Subſtance is the firſt *Ens*, *by Reaſon* or *Definition*, becauſe Accidents are defined by Subſtance. *By Knowledge*, becauſe the Knowledge of Accidents depends on the Knowledge of Subſtance. *By Time*, for there is ſome Subſtance without Accident, as God and Intelligences, but there is no Accident without a Subſtance. Likewiſe material Subſtances are precedent in Time, at leaſt to ſome Accidents, which arrive unto them after they have ſome Time generated. And laſtly, *by Nature*, for the Subject is, by Nature, before that which inhereth in it. Hence this Part of Phyſick treateth only of Subſtance.

[b] Subject or Subſtance is threefold; *Matter*, *Form*, *Compoſitum.* The two latter are more *Ens* than Matter, tho' Matter be truly Subſtance, as being the firſt and laſt Subject which remaineth, tho' all the Affections of a Body be taken away. This is firſt Matter, which in itſelf is neither compleat Subſtance, nor quantitative, nor in any other *Category.* Neither is it firſt Subſtance, for that is ſeparable, and may exiſt by its own Power without others. That is likewiſe a determinate, perfect, ſingular Subſtance; but Matter cannot be ſeparated from Form, neither is it ſingular or determinable.

[c] Form is that which the Thing itſelf is ſaid to be, *per ſe*, τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, *The Being of a Thing what it was*, the whole common Nature and Eſſence of a Thing, anſwerable to the Definition. Compound ſenſible Subſtances have a proper Definition; but *Ens by Accident*, conſiſting of Subject and Accident, hath not, tho' it may be by Accident deſcribed and explained. Even *Categorical* Accidents being one *per ſe*, and of one Nature, have a *Quiddity* and Definition, not ſimple, as Subſtances, but after their own Manner.

[d] *Matter* and *Form* are not properly generated, but the whole *Compoſitum*, whereto *Ideas* [ſeparate Subſtances] confer nothing, neither as efficient, nor exemplary Cauſes.

[e] The common ſubſtantial, or formal Parts of the Thing defined, are to be put into the Definition of the whole; but the material Parts of the *Individuum* itſelf, muſt not.

CHAP. IV.

Of Power and Act.

NExt [f] *Subſtance*, we come to *Power* and *Act.* Power is either *active* or *paſſive*: Active Power is *the Principle of changing other Things, or acting on another, in as much as it is another.* Paſſive Power is in a Manner the ſame with active, for the Motion of Paſſion and Action is really the ſame, neither can one be without the other, tho' ſimply they are diverſe, being in different Subjects, paſſive in the Patient, active in the Agent.

[g] Of Powers, ſome are void of Reaſon, as the Power of warming; ſome *rational*, as Arts. The rational are of Contraries, as Medicine is of Health

u Metaphyſ. 3. 1. 5. 1. 6. 1. w Cap. 3. c. 4. x Cap. 4. 5. y Cap. 7. z Lib. 6. cap. 2. a Lib. 7. cap. 1.
b Cap. 3. c Cap. 4. d Cap. 8. e Cap. 10. f Lib. 9. cap. 1. g Cap. 2.

and Sick; the Irrational of one only, as Heat produceth Heat.

[h] The Power (contrary to the *Megarick* Philosophers, Followers of *Zeno*) remains, altho' not reduced to Act; for we call a Man *Architect*, tho' he be not actually employed in *Building*. Again, Animals have Sense, even when they are not in Act. Thirdly, it were impossible any Thing could be, which were not actually. *Possible* is that whose Power, if it were reduced to Act, would not imply any Impossibility.

[i] They are mistaken, who think there is any Thing possible, which shall never actually be, or that there are Powers whose Acts are impossible; for hence it would follow, that all Things should be possible, nothing impossible. *Possible* is that which doth or may follow from some Power; if it never followeth, or cometh out of that Power, it is impossible. That which is possible therefore, must at some Time or other be in Act.

[k] Of Powers there are three Kinds, some *natural*, as Senses; some *acquired* by *Custom*, as playing on a Pipe; some by *Discipline*, as Arts. The two last require previous Operations, the natural do not. Natural and irrational Powers are necessarily reduced to Act, when the Agent and Patient are at a due Distance, and there is nothing betwixt to hinder them. The rational Powers are not so, for they are free to act or not to act as they please.

[l] Act is, when the Thing that was in Power is otherwise than when it was in Power.

[m] All Act is before Power, and before all Nature which is contained under Power, by *Reason*, *Essence* and *Time*. *By Reason*, becaus Power is defined by Act. *By Time*, becaus tho' Power be temporal before Act in the same numerical Object; for a Man may first be learned, before he actually be such; yet, in different Things of the same Species, Act is ever before Power in Time; for nothing can be made or reduced from Power, unless by an Agent actually existent.

Lastly, Act is before Power *in Essence*; first, becaus it is later in Generation; for Generation beginneth from the imperfect State of a Thing, and proceedeth to the perfect. Now all Generation proceedeth from Power to Act. Secondly, Act is the End of Power; but the End, as it is later in Generation, so it is more perfect by Nature, and first in Intention.

CHAP. V.

Of true and false.

THE [n] first Division of *Ens* is into *Intentional* and *Real*. [o] The *Intentional* is either *true* or *false*. The Intellect asserteth *truly*, if its Judgment be conformable to the Thing; *falsly*, if not conformable, for there is Composition and Division in the Things themselves, as well as in the Intellect. Whence if the Intellect compound Things by Affirmation, as they are really compounded, or divide them by Negation, as they are really divided, it asserteth truly, otherwise falsly. True and false are in the *simple* Apprehension of Things, but simply, not enunciatively, so as that Truth is nothing but a simple Perception of the Object; Falshood a Non-perception or Ignorance thereof, tho' Ignorance be not properly Falsity. Whence simple Apprehension may be true in itself, false it cannot be, for Falsity requireth Composition.

Complex Truth and Falshood may be of the same separate Substances.

He cannot be deceived in the Knowledge of Things *immoveable*, whosoever hath once conceived them *immutable*; for either he will judge always Truth, or always err, becaus Things immoveable are always in the same Manner. The Vicissitude and Deception, and true and false Judgment, is only in Things contingent and mutable.

CHAP. VI.

Of one, the same, and divers.

ONE [p] is an Affection of *Ens*, not a *Substance* as *Pythagoras* and *Plato* affirmed, but a *Categoreme*, predicated of every Thing as it is *Ens*. To *one* is opposite *many*, by *privative* Opposition, and therefore one is manifested by many, as Indivisible by Divisible, the Privation by the Habit. For Divisible is more known to Sense than Indivisible, and Multitude than Unity. To *one* are referred *the same*, *equal*, *like*; to *many*, *divers*, *unequal*, *unlike*.

[q] Things are *divers*, either by *Genus* or *Species*; by *Genus*, those which have not the same Matter, or a mutual Generation; or whereof one pertains to *corruptible* Substance, the other to *incorruptible*. *By Species*, those which have the same *Genus*. Genus is that wherein those Things that are divers, are said to be the same according to Substance.

CHAP. VII.

Of Immortal, Eternal, and Immoveable Substances.

SUbstance [r] is threefold, two Kinds, *natural*, whereof one is *corruptible*, as *Animal*; the other *sempiternal*, as Heaven. The third is *immoveable*.

That there is a perpetual immoveable Substance, is proved thus. Substances are first *Ens*, therefore if all Substances are corruptible, all Things likewise must be corruptible; which is false, for there is an eternal local Motion, circular, proper to Hea-

h Cap. 3. i Cap. 4. 1. k Cap. 5. l Cap. 6. m Cap. 8. n Lib. 6, cap. 2. o Lib. 9, cap. 10. p Lib. 2. cap. 2. q Cap. 3. r Lib. 12 or 14, cap. 6.

ven, which it is not poſſible ſhould have had a Beginning, or ſhall have a Diſſolution, no more than Time. If therefore *Time* be eternal, as Motion, there muſt neceſſarily be ſome incorruptible and eternal Subſtance, not only that wherein that eternal Motion exiſts, the Heaven itſelf; but one Subſtance, which ſo moveth, that tho' it remain its ſelf moveable, yet it moveth others from Eternity to Eternity, not only having only the Power of Moving, but being continually in the Act of Motion. For *Plato* and the reſt, who conceived God to have done nothing for a great While, err, becauſe that Power were fruſtraneous, which were not reduced to act. Beſides, Motion would not have been eternal, unleſs the Moving Subſtance were not only eternal, and in perpetual actual Motion; but ſuch likewiſe, that it could not but it muſt move always, as being a pure Act void of Power.

Hence the Subſtances which cauſe eternal Motion are void of Matter, for they move from an eternal Act, and are void of all Power.

In Things that ſometimes are, ſometimes are not, Power is precedent to Act, but ſimply and abſolutely Act is precedent to Power. For, neither Things natural or artificial are reduced from Power to Act, but by ſomething that actually exiſts. Now, if the ſame Thing always return by a circular Motion, it neceſſarily followeth, that there is ſomething eternal, which remaineth ever the ſame, and operateth in the ſame Manner. Such an eternal firſt moving Subſtance is the firſt Heaven. The Viciſſitude of *Generation* and *Corruption* is not cauſed by the firſt Heaven, for that moveth always in the ſame Manner, but by the inferior Orbs, eſpecially the Sun, which by his Acceſſion bringeth Life, by his Receſſion Death to all Things mortal.

Thus is the firſt Heaven *eternal*, for it is moved with eternal Motion; beſides which there is ſomething which always moveth, and is never moved itſelf, and is *Eternal*, and *Subſtance* and *Act*.

CHAP. VIII.

Of GODS.

THis [s] *firſt Mover*, moveth in the ſame Manner as Things appetible and intelligible, that is, it ſo moveth others, as itſelf remaineth immoveable. The Motion of the firſt Agent, as it is the firſt efficient Cauſe, conſiſteth in that Influence thereof, whereby it concurreth effectively with the inferior Intelligences in moving its own Orb. Wherefore, the Efficience of the firſt Mover is an Application of the Powers of the inferior Movers to their proper Works, wherein he concurreth with them actively and independently. Thus the Intelligences move the Heavens, not for the Generation of inferior Things (for the End muſt be more noble than the Means) but for that chief and amiable Good, whereunto they endeavour to be like, as their ultimate End.

The firſt Mover is void of *Mutation*, an *Ens*, wholly and ſimply neceſſary, and conſequently the Principle of all. Upon this firſt Principle depend Heaven and Nature, becauſe without him, their ultimate End and firſt Efficient, nothing can be, or be operated.

This firſt Mover, *God*, enjoyeth the moſt perfect Life; perpetual and moſt pleaſant, which abſolute Felicity is proper to him; for as much as he underſtandeth and contemplateth himſelf with infinite Delight. For, as we are happy in Contemplation that laſts but a little while, ſo is God moſt happy, in the infinite and moſt perfect Contemplation of himſelf, who is of all Things moſt admirable.

God *is an eternal living Being, the beſt of Beings, an immoveable Subſtance, ſeparate from ſenſible Things, void of corporeal Quantity, without Parts, and indiviſible*; for ſuch muſt that Principle or Subſtance be which moveth in infinite Time. Nothing finite hath infinite Power. All Magnitude muſt be either *finite* or *infinite*. Finite Magnitude cannot move in infinite Time; infinite Magnitude there is not, as we proved in the *Phyſick*.

God *is impaſſible, not ſubject to Alteration*; the firſt local Motion, which is the circular, not being competible to God, becauſe he is immoveable, it followeth, that other Motions that induce Paſſion or Alteration, and are later than local Motion, cannot likewiſe be competent to him.

CHAP. IX.

Of Intelligence.

[t] BEſides this *firſt Subſtance*, the Mover of the firſt Heaven, there muſt likewiſe be other Subſtances ſeparate from Matter, eternal and immoveable, preſident over the Motions of the inferior Orbs; ſo that after what Number and Order thoſe Orbs are diſpoſed, according to the ſame are theſe external moving, and immovable Subſtances order'd.

From the Number of the *Motions* may be collected the Number of the Spheres, and conſequently of the Subſtances moving, which, according to *Ariſtotle*, are 47.

Heaven is numerically *One*, becauſe the firſt Mover is One. It is an ancient Tradition, that theſe firſt Subſtances that move the Heavens are *Gods*. This Opinion is truly Divine; but what is added, that they had the Shape of Men, or ſome other Animal, was only invented for Perſwaſion of the common People, for the uſe of Laws, and the Convenience of Life. Thus much may ſerve for a ſhort View of his *Metaphyſicks*.

[s] Cap. 7. [t] Cap. 8.

THE-

THEOPHRASTUS.

CHAP. I.

His Country, Parents, Maſters.

Theophraſtus ſucceeded *Ariſtotle*. He was born at *Ereſtus*, (as [u] *Plutarch*, *Laertius*, and others affirm) a Sea-Town of *Lesbos*, ſeated upon a Hill, as [w] *Strabo* deſcribes it, diſtant from *Sigrium* eighteen *Stadia*.

His Father was named *Melantes*, as [x] *Apollodorus* affirmeth, according to [y] others, *Leo*, by Profeſſion a Fuller. *Theophraſtus* was firſt called *Tyrtamus*. He heard *Leucippus* in his own Country, afterwards went to *Plato*, and laſtly, became an Auditor of *Ariſtotle*, who changing the Roughneſs of his Name, called him, as *Suidas* ſaith, *Euphraſtus*, afterwards *Theophraſtus*, from the divine Eloquence of his Speech; wherein (as *Cicero*, [z] *Pliny*, *Laertius*, [a] *Strabo*, and others aver) he excelled all the reſt of his Diſciples.

[b] He was likewiſe ſo quick of Apprehenſion, that what *Plato* had ſaid of *Ariſtotle* and *Xenocrates*, *Ariſtotle* applied to him and *Caliſthenes*. *Theophraſtus* was acute to Admiration, ready to apprehend every Thing that he taught; *Caliſthenes* was dull: So that one needed a Bridle, the other a Spur.

CHAP. II.

His Profeſſion of Philoſophy, and Diſciples.

Ariſtotle retiring to *Chalcis*, in the 2d Year of the 114th Olympiad, [c] being importuned by his Diſciples to appoint a Succeſſor, made Choice of *Theophraſtus* (as hath been already related in the Life of *Ariſtotle*) who thereupon undertook the Government of the School, and *Ariſtotle* dying, lived in his Garden, *Demetrius Phalerius* cohabiting with him. This Time wherein *Theophraſtus* flouriſhed, is reckon'd by [d] *Pliny* to be about the 440th Year from the building of *Rome*; [e] 390 Years, as [f] *Salmaſius* rightly reads, before that Time wherein *Pliny* wrote.

[g] *Hermippus* ſaith, he went at certain Hours to the School, neatly dreſs'd, and there ſitting down, diſcourſed in ſuch manner, that he omitted no Geſture ſuitable to the Argument whereupon he treated; ſo that once, to expreſs a Glutton, he licked his Lips.

[h] In the fourth Year of the 118th Olympiad, *Xenippus* being Archon, *Sophocles*, Son of *Amphiclides*, procured a Law to be made, forbidding all Philoſophers to keep publick Schools, unleſs ſuch only as the Senate and People ſhould think fit to licenſe; if any did otherwiſe, he ſhould be put to Death. By this Decree, ſaith *Athenæus*, he baniſhed all the Philoſophers out of the City; amongſt the reſt *Theophraſtus*, who the Year following return'd, when as *Philo*, a Diſciple of *Ariſtotle*, accuſed *Sophocles* for having done contrary to Law. Whereupon the *Athenians* reverſed the Decree, fined *Sophocles* five Talents, and called home the Philoſophers; by which means *Theophraſtus* returning, was reinſtated in the School.

[i] *Laertius* ſaith, there came to hear him 2000 Diſciples. *Suidas* ſaith, (if there be no Miſtake in the Number) 4470; of whom were *Strabo*, his Succeſſor, *Demetrius Phalereus*, *Nichomachus*, Son of *Ariſtotle*, whom *Ariſtippus* ſaith, he much affected; *Eraſiſtratus* the Phyſician, as ſome affirm, and *Menander* the Comick Poet.

CHAP. III.

His Virtues and Apophthegms.

[k] HE was exceeding Learned and Studious, as *Pamphila* affirmeth.

[l] He was very liberal in conferring Benefits, and a great Cheriſher of Learning.

[m] He made Collections of Money for the Conventions of Philoſophers, not for Luxury, but for Temperance, and Learned Diſcourſes.

[n] He twice freed his Country, being under the Oppreſſion of Tyrants.

[o] *Caſſander* Son of *Antipater*, much eſteemed him; and *Ptolomy* the firſt wrote Letters to him.

[p] He was ſo much honour'd by the *Athenians*, that *Agnonides* accuſing him of Impiety, very hardly eſcaped from being fined himſelf.

[q] Of his Apothegms are remember'd theſe. He ſaid, *It is more ſafe truſting to an unbridled Horſe, than intemperate Speech.*

[r] To a young Man at a Feaſt, ſilent: *If you hold your Peace*, ſaith he, *becauſe you are fooliſh, then you are wiſe; but, if you are wiſe, you do fooliſhly in holding your Peace.*

He uſed to ſay; *Of all Things that are ſpent, Time is the moſt precious.*

u De Exil. w Lib. 13. x Laert. 5. 36. y Suid. z Præf. lib. 1. a Lib. 13. b Laert. 5. 38. c Laert. 5. 38. d Lib. 15. cap. 1. e Plin. 19. 2. f Exerc. c. Plinian, pag. 350. g Athen. lib. 1. h Laert. 5. 38. Athen. 13. deipn. i 5. 37. k Laert. 5. 36. l Laert. 5. 37. m Athen. lib. 5. n Plut. adv. Colet. o Laert. 5. 36. p Laert. q Laert. ibid. r Laert. 5. 40.

[s] Being

[s] Being demanded, as *Ariſto* ſaith, what he thought of *Demoſthenes*, he anſwered; *He is worthy of this City*; of *Demades*, *He is above the City*.

[t] To *Philip*, Son of *Caſſander*, he ſaith; *I wonder your Eyes do not make Muſick, the Pipe of your Noſe coming ſo directly upon them.*

[u] To prove that Riches are not to be loved and admired, he inſtanced *Callias*, a rich *Athenian*, and *Iſmenias* a *Theban*: *Theſe*, ſaith he, *uſe the ſame Things as* Socrates *and* Epaminondas.

[w] He ſaith, *We muſt not love Strangers, to the End we may make Trial of them; but make Trial of them, to the End we may love them.*

[x] He ſaid, *The Soul paid a dear Rent for her Habitation in the Body.*

[y] He ſaid, *Falſhood raiſed from Calumny and Envy, endureth a little while, but ſoon periſheth.*

[z] Seeing a young Man bluſh, *Be of good Comfort*, ſaith he, *that is the Complexion of Virtue.*

[a] He uſed to ſay, *Stand in Awe of thyſelf, and thou ſhalt not be aſhamed before others.*

[b] He ſaid, *The Good need but few Laws, for Things are not accommodated to Laws, but Laws to Things.*

[c] *The Envious are more unhappy than others in this reſpect, that they are troubled not only at their Misfortunes, but alſo at the good Fortunes of others.*

[d] Being demanded what preſerved Human Life, he ſaid, *Beneficence, Reward, and Puniſhment.*

[e] He ſaid, *Honours are to be acquired, not by Converſation and Favour, but by Action.*

[f] Being demanded what Love is, he anſwered, *The Paſſion of an idle Soul.*

[g] He ſaid, *A Woman ought not to be ſeen herſelf, nor behold others richly attired, for both are Enticements to Diſhoneſty.*

[h] He ſaid, *Love is an exceſſive Deſire of ſomething irrational, the Entrance thereof eaſy, the Diſengagement difficult.*

CHAP. IV.

His Will and Death.

[i] *His Will is thus delivered by* Laertius.

BE all well; but if any thing happen otherwiſe, thus we give Order. All thoſe Goods which belong to the Houſe, I bequeath to Melantes *and* Pancreon *Sons of* Leo. *Thoſe which are ſet apart for* Hipparchus, *I Will be thus diſpoſed. Firſt, That the Study and Ornaments belonging thereunto be perfected, and if any Thing may be added more to beautify them, that it be done. Next, that the Statue of* Ariſtotle *be ſet up in the Temple, and the other Donaries which were before in the Temple. Moreover, that the little Walk, which is near the School, be built new, not worſe than it was before; and that the Maps of the World be placed in the lower Walk. That an Altar likewiſe be built, wanting nothing of Perfection and Splendor. I Will, that the Statue of* Nicomachus, *as big as the Life, be finiſhed; it is in* Praxitele's *Hand, let him go on with it. Let it be placed whereſoever they ſhall think good, who have the Diſpoſal of the reſt, and are named in my Will. Thus much for the Temple and Donaries. My Land at* Stagira *I bequeath to* Callinus, *all my Books to* Neleus. *The Garden and Walk, and all the Houſes belonging to the Garden, I bequeath to my Friends hereafter named, that they may exerciſe themſelves, and ſtudy Philoſophy therein; for Men cannot always be abroad. But with Condition, that they do not alienate it, nor pretend any Propriety thereto, but eſteem it a Thing ſacred in common Poſſeſſions, making uſe of all Things therein as becometh juſt and loving Friends. The Perſons to whom I Will that this be in common, are,* Hipparchus, Neleus, Strato, Callinus, Demotimus, Demaratus, Calliſthenes, Melantes, Pancreon, *and* Nicippus. *Let alſo* Ariſtotle, *Son of* Midias *and* Pythias, *if he deſire to ſtudy Philoſophy, partake likewiſe of the ſame Privileges; and let the moſt ancient of the Overſeers take great Care of him, that he be inſtructed as well as is poſſible in Philoſophy. Let us be buried in that Part of the Garden which they ſhall think moſt convenient; not erecting a Monument, or any Thing that is ſumptuous over our Graves. Thus let all Things be ordered according as is ſaid; the Temple, Monument, Garden, and Walk repair'd: Let* Pompylus, *who dwelleth in them, take Charge of them, and of other Things as he did heretofore; for whoſe Pains therein, let the Poſſeſſors thereof conſider him. As for* Pompylus *and* Threpta, *who have been long ſince manumitted, and done us good Service, if there be any Thing which we have beſtowed upon them, or they themſelves have required, as alſo the* 2000 *Drachms which I appointed to be given to them and* Hipparchus, *let them firmly poſſeſs it all, as I have often expreſſed to* Melantes *and* Pancreon, *who aſſented thereunto. Moreover, I beſtow on them* Somatales, *and the Girl. Of my Servants, I manumit* Molon *and* Cimon, *and* Parmenon; *as for* Manes *and* Callias, *when they ſhall have lived four Years in the Gardens, diſcharging their Office unblameably, I Will they be ſet at Liberty. Of the domeſtick Utenſils, let the Overſeers beſtow on* Pompylus *as many as they think fit, and ſell the reſt. To* Demotimus *I give* Cario; *to* Neleus, Donax; *let* Eubius *be ſold. Let* Hipparchus *give to* Callinus 3000 *Drachms. And for* Melantes *and* Pancreon,

s Plut. vit. Demoſt. t Symp. l. 2. u Plut. de Avar. w Plut. de frat. amor. x Plut. de ſanit. tuend. y Stob. 12. z Stob. Ser. 79. a Ser. 37. b Ser. ibid. c Ser. 41. d Ser. 62. e Ser. 402. f Ser. ibid. g Ser. 72. h Ser. ib. i Laert. 5. 61.

if

if we did not look upon Hipparchus, *as having heretofore been very beneficial to us, and now quite Ship-wreck'd in his Fortunes, we should have appointed him a joint Estate with* Melantes *and* Pancreon. *But because I conceive it were not easy for them to be join'd in the ordering of one Family with him, and that it would be more to their Advantage to receive something certain from* Hipparchus, *for these Reasons let* Hipparchus *give to each of them,* Melantes *and* Pancreon, *a Talent. Let him likewise duly furnish the Overseers with all Charges necessary for the Performance of the forementioned Works; which done, let* Hipparchus *be free, and discharged from all Debts and Covenants to me. If any Benefit come to* Hipparchus *from* Chalcis *on my Behalf, let him wholly enjoy it as his own. Be these the Overseers of those Things contained in my Will;* Hipparchus, Neleus, Strabo, Callinus, Demotimus, Calisthenes, Ctesarchus.

Copies of the Will of Theophrastus, *signed with his Ring, are kept; the first by* Hegesias *Son of* Hipparchus. *Witnesses,* Callippus *a* Pelanean, Philomelus *an* Euonymean, Lysander *an* Hybæan, Philion *an* Alopecian. *The second* Olympidorus *hath attested by the same Persons. The third is in the Hands of* Adimantus, *delivered to his Son* Androsthenes. *Witnesses,* Aimnestus *Son of* Cleobulus; Lysistratus *Son of* Phidion, *a* Thasian; Strabo *Son of* Arcesilaus, *a* Lampsacene; Thespippus *Son of* Thespippus, *of* Potters-Street; Dioscorides, *Son of* Dionysius, *an* Epicephisian. Thus (saith *Laertius*) was his Will.

[k] He died old, having lived Eighty-five Years, his Spirits being wasted, as *Suidas* affirms, with continual Writing; and upon the Marriage of one of his Disciples, giving himself some Intermission and Rest, it occasion'd his End.

As he lay upon his Death-bed, [l] *Cicero* saith, *He blamed Nature for giving Harts and Crows so long Life, that could do no Good thereby; and to Man, who could do most Good, so short; whereas if Man had been allowed longer Time, his Life might have been adorned with the Perfection of Arts and Learning.* Thus he complain'd, *that as soon as he came within the View of these, he was taken away.*

His Disciples came to him, and asked him, if he had any thing to say to them; *Nothing,* saith he, *but that the Life of Man loseth many Pleasures only for Glory. When we begin to live, then we die. Nothing is more unprofitable than the Desire of Glory. But be happy, and either give over Study, for it is very laborious, or go perseverantly thro' it, for it is of great Glory. The Vanity of Life is much greater than the Benefit thereof. But I have not Time to advise you what to do; do you consider at Leisure what is best for you.* In saying which Words, he expired. The whole People of *Athens* followed his Body on Foot to the Grave.

CHAP. V.

His Writings.

HE left many Writings; whereof, saith *Laertius*, because they are full of all kind of Learning, I thought good to give this Catalogue.

First Analyticks 3.
Later Analyticks 7.
Of the Analysts of Syllogisms 1.
Epitome of Analyticks 1.
Places of Deduction 2.
Agonisticks, concerning the Theory of *Eristick* Arguments.
Of the Senses 1.
To Anaxagoras 1.
Of Anaxagoras 1.
Of Anaximenes 1.
Of Archelaus 1.
Of Salt, Nitre, Allom 1.
Of Combustibles; or, as the other Edition, of Things that may be petrified, 2.
Of indivisible Lines 1.
Of Auscultation 2.
Of Winds 1.
The Differences of Virtue 1.
Of a Kingdom 1.
Of the Discipline of a King 1.
Of Lives 3.
Of old Age 1.
Of the Astrology of Democritus 1.
Of Sublime Things 1.
Of Apparitions 1.
Of Humour, Colour, Flesh 1.
Of the Description of the World 1.
Of Man 1.
A Collection of the Doctrines of Diog. 1.
Of Definition 3.
Erotick 1.
Another of Love 1.
Of Felicity 1.
Of Species 2.
Of the Epilepsy 1.
Of Divine Inspiration 1.
Of Empedocles 1.
Epichirems 18.
Instances 3.
Of Voluntary 1.
Epitome of Plato's *Commonwealth* 2.
Of the Diversity of Voice in Creatures of the same Kind 1.
Of Subitaneous Apparitions 1.
Of Biting and Blows 1.

[k] Laert. 5. 57.

[l] Tuscul. l. 4.

Of

Of Animals that are said to have Wisdom 7.
Of those which dwell in dry Places 1.
Of those which change Colour 1.
Of those which dwell in Caves 1.
Of Animals 7.
Of Pleasure, according to Aristotle 1.
Of Pleasure, another 1.
Theses 24.
Of hot and cold 1.
Of Dizziness and Dimness 1.
Of Sweat 1.
Of Affirmation and Negation 1.
Calisthenes, *or of Grief* 1.
Of Labours 1.
Of Motion 3.
Of Stones 1.
Of Pestilence 1.
Of Fainting 1.
Megarick 1.
Of Melancholy 1.
Of Metals 1.
Of Honey 1.
Of the Collections of Metrodorus 1.
Sublime Discourse 2.
Of Drunkenness 1.
Of Laws Alphabetically 24.
Epitome of Laws 10.
To Definitions 1.
Of Odours 1.
Of Wine and Oil.
First Propositions 18.
Legislative 3.
Politick 6.
Politick according to several Occasions 4.
Politick Customs 4.
Of the best Commonwealth 1.
Collection of Problems 5.
Of Proverbs 1.
Of Congelation and Liquefaction 1.
Of Fire 2.
Of Winds 1.
Of the Palsy 1.
Of Suffocation 1.
Of Madness 1.
Of Passions 1.
Of Signs 1.
Sophisms 2.
Of the Solution of Syllogisms 1.
Topicks 2.
Of Punishment 2.
Of Hair 1.
Of Tyranny 1.
Of Water 3.
Of Sleep and Dreams 1.
Of Friendship 3.
Of Ambition 2.
Of Nature 3.
Of Physick 17.
Of the Epitome of Physicks 2.
Physicks 8.
To Natural Philosophers 1.
Of Natural Histories 10.
Of Natural Causes 1.
Of Chyles 5.
Of false Pleasure 1.
Of the Soul 1. *Thesis.*
Of undoubted Faith 1.
Of simple Dubitations 1.
Harmonicks 1.
Of Virtue 1.
Occasions or Contradictions 1.
Of Sentence 1.
Of Ridiculous 1.
Meridians 2.
Divisions 2.
Of Differences 1.
Of Injuries 1.
Of Calumny 1.
Of Praise 1.
Of Experience 1.
Epistles 3.
Of Casual Animals 1.
Of Selection 1.
Encomiums of the Gods 1.
Of Festivals 1.
Of Prosperity 1.
Of Enthymemes 1.
Of Invention 2.
Moral Disputes 1.
Moral Descriptions 1.
Of Tumult 1.
Of History 1.
Of the Judgment of Syllogisms 1.
Of Flattery 1.
Of the Sea 1.
To Cassander, *of a Kingdom* 1.
Of Comedy 1.
Of Meteors 1.
Of Speech 1.
Collection of Words 1.
Solutions 1.
Of Musick 3.
Of Meteors 1.
Megacles 1.
Of Laws 1.
Of Things contrary to Law 1.
A Collection of the Doctrines of Xenocrates.
Confabulations 1.
Of an Oath 1.
Rhetorical Precepts 1.
Of Riches 1.
Of Poesy 1.
Problems, Politick, Ethick, Physick, Erotick 1.
Proverbs 1.
Collection of Problems 1.
Of Physical Problems 1.
Of Example 1.
Of Proposition and Narration 1.
Of Poesy, another, 1.

Of the wiſe Men 1.
Of Advice 1.
Of Soleciſms 1.
Of the Art of Rhetorick 1.
Of Rhetorical Arts, 71 *Kinds*.
Of Hypocriſy 1.
Ariſtotelick, *or Theophraſtic Commentaries* 6.
Natural Sentences 16.
Epitome of Phyſics 1.
Of Gratitude 1.
Ethick Characters.
Of Falſhood and Truth 1.
Of the Hiſtory of Divinity 6.
Of the Gods 3.
Geometrical Hiſtories 4.
Epitome of Ariſtotle *concerning Animals* 6.
Epichirems 2.
Theſes 3.
Of a Kingdom 2.
Of Cauſes 1.
Of Democritus 1.
Of Calumny 1.
Of Generation 1.
Of the Prudence and Manners of Animals 1.
Of Motion 2.
Of Sight 4.
To Definitions 2.
Of being given 1.
Of Greater and Leſſer 1.
Of Muſick 1.
Of the Divine Beatitude 1.
To thoſe of the Academy 1.
Protreptick 1.
How a City may be beſt inhabited 1.
Commentaries 1.
Of the Fiery Ebullition in Sicily 1.
Of Things granted 1.
Of the Ways of knowing 1.
Of the Lying Argument 3.
Ante-Topick 1.
To Æſchilus 1.
Aſtrological Hiſtory 6.
Arithmetical Hiſtories of Increaſe 1.
Acicharus 1.
Of Judicial Orations 1.
Epiſtles concerning Aſtycreon *to* Phanias *and* Nicanor.
Of Piety 1.
Euias 1.
Of Opportunities 2.
Of ſeaſonable Diſcourſes 1.
Of the Inſtitution of Children 1.
Another, *different* 1.
Of Inſtitution, *or of Virtues*, *or of Temperance* 1.
Protreptick 1.
Of Numbers 1.
Definitions of Syllogiſtick Speech 1.
Of Heaven 1.
Politick 2.
Of Nature 2.
Of Fruits and Animals. All which, ſaith *Laertius*, amount to 1182 Diviſions: Theſe Books, as *Theophraſtus* had ordered in his Will, were delivered to *Neleus*. What afterwards became of them, hath been related in the Life of *Ariſtotle*.

STRATO.

CHAP. I.

His Life.

STRATO [l] was Succeſſor to *Theophraſtus*. He was of [m] *Lampſacum*, his Father [n] *Arceſilaus*, or, as ſome, [o] *Arceſius*, mentioned in his Will. *He* [p] *was a Perſon of great Worth*, *eminent*, ſaith *Laertius*, *in all Kinds of Philoſophy*, *but eſpecially*, *in that which is called Phyſick*, *the moſt ancient and ſolid Part*, [q] wherein he introduced many Things new, [r] diſſenting not only from *Plato*, but from his Maſter *Ariſtotle*. [s] From his Excellency herein he was called the *Natural Philoſopher*: [t] He preſcribed all divine Power to Nature. [u] Ethick he touched but little. [w] He took upon him the Government of the School, according to *Apollodorus*, in the third Year of the 123 Olympiad, and continued therein eighten Years. He inſtructed *Ptolomy* the Son of *Philadelphus*, who beſtowed eighty Talents upon him.

CHAP. II.

His Will and Death.

His Will, ſaith *Laertius*, was to this Effect.

THUS *I order*, *againſt the Time that I ſhall die*, *All theſe Things which are in my Houſe*, *I bequeath to* Lampyrian *and* Arceſilaus. *Out of the*

l Laert. 5. 58. m Cic. Acad. quæſt. 4. 38. n Laert. ibid. Suid. o Suid. p Laert. ibid. q Cic. de finib. 5. 5. r Plut. adv. Nat. Colot. s Cic. de Nat. deor. t Ibid. Laert. u Cic. de fin. 5. w Laert.

Money which I have at Athens, *let my Executors first defray the Charges of my Funeral, and the solemn Rites after my Interment, doing nothing superfluously nor niggardly. The Executors of these Things I appoint in my Will to be these*; Olympicus, Aristides, Mnesigenes, Hippocrates, Epicrates, Gorgylus, Diocles, Lyco, Athanes. *I leave the School to* Lyco, *for the rest are either too old, or otherwise employed. All the rest shall do well if they confirm this Choice that I have made. I bequeath likewise all my Books unto him, except those which are written by our own Hand, besides all Utensils, Carpets and Cups for Feasting. Let the Executors give* 500 *Drachms to* Epicrates *and one of the Servants, which* Arcesilaus *shall think good. Let* Lampyrion *and* Arcesilaus *discharge all the Debts which* Daippus *undertook for* Hiræus. *Let nothing be owing either to* Lampyrion, *or to the Heirs of* Lampyrion, *but let him be discharged of all, and the Executors bestow on him* 500 *Drachms, and one of the Servants, as* Arcesilaus *shall think good; that having taken much Pains with us, he may have sufficient for Food and Raiment. I manumit* Diophantus *and* Diocles, *and* Abus. *I give* Simmias *to* Arcesilaus. *I manumit* Dromo. *When* Arcesilaus *shall come, let* Hiræus *with* Olympicus *and* Epicrates, *and the rest of the Executors, cast up the Accounts of the Charges of my Funeral and other Things; whatsoever is over and above, let* Arcesilaus *take it of* Olympicus, *not pressing him upon the Day of Payment. Let* Arcesilaus *discharge the Covenants which* Strato *made with* Olympicus, *and* Aminias, *which are in the Hands of* Philocrates *Son of* Tisamenus. *As for my Tomb, let it be ordered as* Arcesilaus, *and* Olympicus, *and* Lyco *shall think good.*

This was his Will, preserved by *Aristo* the *Chian*. He was of so thin and low a Constitution, that he felt not any Pain at his Death.

Of his Name *Laertius* reckons eight.
The *first* a Disciple of *Isocrates*.
The *second*, this Philosopher.
The *third*, a Physician, Disciple of *Erasistratus*.
The *fourth* an Historian, who wrote the Wars of *Philip* and *Perseus* with the *Romans*.
The *fifth* is wanting.
The *sixth*, an Epigrammatick Poet.
The *seventh*, an ancient Physician.
The *eighth*, a Peripatetick, who lived at *Alexandria*.

CHAP. III.

His Writings.

SUidas [x] saith, he wrote many Books; *Laertius* gives this Catalogue of them.

Of a Kingdom 3.
Of Justice 3.
Of God 3.
Of Good 3.
Of Principles 3.
Of Lives.
Of Felicity.
Of Philosophy.
Of Fortitude.
Of Vacuum.
Of Heaven.
Of Breath.
Of Human Nature.
Of the Generation of Animals.
Of Mixtions.
Of Sleep.
Of Dreams.
Of Sight.
Of Sense.
Of Pleasure.
Of Colour.
Of Diseases.
Of Judgments.
Of Faculties.
Of Metallick Machines.
Of Hunger and Offuscation.
Of Light and Heavy.
Of Divine Inspiration.
Of Time.
Of Aliment and Augmentation.
Of uncertain Animals.
Of Fabulous Animals.
Of Causes.
Solutions of Questions.
Proems of Places.
Of Accident.
Of More or Less.
Of Unjust.
Of Priority and Posteriority.
Of Priority of Genus.
Of Proprium.
Of Future.
Confutations of Inventions.
Commentaries, which are suspected.
Epistles, beginning thus; *Strato to Arsinoe, Health.*

x Laert. 5. 58.

LYCO.

CHAP. I.

His Life.

STRATO[y], saith *Laertius*, was succeeded by *Lyco*, Son of *Astyanax* of *Troas*, an eloquent Person, and excellent for Education of Children. He heard also *Panthædus* the *Dialectick*.

He said, that as Horses need both Bridle and Spur, so in Children there must be joined both Modesty and Ambition. Of his florid Expression is alledged this Instance. Of a poor Maid he said, Βαρὺ γὰρ φορτίον παῖδι κόρη διὰ σπάνιν ὡροικὸς ἐκλεχουσα τὸν ἀνθεῶνα τῆς ἡλικίας. *A Maid is a heavy Burden to her Parents when she outruns the flowery Season of her Youth for want of a Dower.* Whence *Antigonus* said of him, That as the Fragrancy an dPleasantness of an excellent Apple will not admit Transplantation, so whatsoever he said was to be heard only from himself. For this Sweetness of Discourse some added the Letter γ to his Name, calling him Γλύκωνα, which implieth *Sweetness*. So [z] *Plutarch*.

In Stile he was very different from himself.

Upon those who were sorry they had not learned when Time was, and wish'd it might be recall'd, he jested thus; he said, *that they who endeavoured to make Amends by a late Penitence for their past Negligence, were conscious of the Impossibility of their Wishes.* And of those that sought to bring it to pass, he said, *they had lost all Reason, in applying the Nature of a strait Line to a crooked Ruler, or beholding their Face in troubled Water, or a confused Mirror.*

He said, *that to the Wreath of publick Games in the* Forum *many aspired, to the* Olympick *few or none.*

He many Times, by his Counsel, much advantaged the *Athenians*.

In his Garments he affected Neatness so much, that, as *Hermippus* saith, *he wore an upper Garment very precious and fine.*

He was very expert in all Exercises, active and well made for a Wrestler, being thin-ear'd and well set, as *Antygonus Carystius* affirmeth; whence in his own Country he practised the *Elean* Games, and played at Ball.

He was intimate with *Eumenes* and *Attalus* beyond all Men, who supply'd him with many Things. *Antiochus* also would have had him lived with him, but could not get him.

He was so great an Enemy to *Hieronymus* the *Peripatetick*, that upon a solemn Day (of which already in the Life of *Arcesilaus*) he only forbore to come to him.

He compared Orators to Frogs, *these*, saith he, *croak in the Water, those by the Water of an Hour-Glass.*

He was Master of the School forty Years, succeeding *Strato* in the 127th Olympiad, as he had given Order by his Will.

CHAP. II.

His Will and Death.

Laertius produceth a Will of his to this Effect.

THUS [a] *I dispose of my Estate, if I shall not recover of this Sickness. All that is in my House I bequeath to the Brethren* Astyanax *and* Lyco, *out of which is to be paid whatsoever I owe at* Athens *to any Man, as also the Charges of my Funeral and Exequies. What is in the City, and* Ægina, *I bestow upon* Lyco, *because he is of our Name, and hath lived long with us, to our great Content, as one that deserved the Place of a Son. The* Peripatum *I leave to those Friends that will make use of it, as* Bulo, Callinus, Aristo, Amphio, Lyco, Pytho, Aristomachus, Heraclius, Lycomedes, Lyco, *my Kinsman. Let them put him in that Place who they conceive will persevere in it, and discharge it best, which let the rest of my Friends confirm for my Sake, and the Places. My Funeral and the Burning of my Body be so ordered by* Bulo *and* Callinus, *it be not prodigal nor niggardly. Out of my Estate at* Ægina, *let* Lyco, *after my Death, give to the young Men as much Oyl as will serve their Turns, that thereby the Memory of me and him that honours me, may be justly preserved. Let them set up my* * *Statue, and chuse a fit Place for the setting up of it, wherein let* Diophantus *and* Heraclides, *Son of* Demetrius *assist them. Out of my Rents in the City, let* Lyco *pay all that I have named after his Departure; in the next Place let* Bulo *and* Callinus, *and the Expences of my Funeral be discharged. Let that Houshold Stuff be taken away which I have left as common betwixt them. Let likewise the Physicians* Pasithemis *and* Midas *be honoured and rewarded for their Care of me, and for their Skill. To the Son of* Callinus *I leave a Couple of* Thericlean *Pots; and to his Wife a Couple of Goblets, and a fine Carpet, and a shaggy Carpet, and a Coverlet, and two Couch-Beds, the best that are left, that we may not seem unmindful of their due Respect towards us. As for those that served me, I order thus:* Demetrius, *who hath been long*

[y] Laert. 5. 65. [z] De Exilio. [a] Laert. 5. 69. * For Wrestling and other Exercises.

long a Free-man, I forgive the Price of his Redemption, and beſtow upon him five Minæ, and a Cloak and a Coat; and as having undergone many Labours with me, let him be decently ſupplied with Neceſſaries. Crito *the* Chelcidonian, *I forgive the Price of his Redemption, and beſtow further on him four Minæ.* Micrus *alſo I manumit, whom let* Lyco *bring up, and ſix Years hence let him inſtruct him. In like manner, I manumit* Chares, *whom let* Lyco *alſo bring up; I give him two Minæ, and my Books that have been publiſhed; the reſt that have not been publiſhed, let them be given to* Callinus, *and let him take diligent Care for the Publiſhing of 'em. To* Syrus *the Free-man, I give four Minæ, and* Menodora, *and if he oweth me any thing, I forgive it him. To* Hilara *I give five Minæ, a ſhaggy Coverlet, two Couch-Beds, a Carpet, and which Bed he ſhall chuſe. I manumit likewiſe the Mother of* Micrus *and* Noemones *and* Dion, *and* Theon, *and* Euphranor, *and* Hermias; *as alſo* Agatho, *after he hath ſerved two Years more; as alſo* Ophelio *and* Poſſidonius, *the Bearers of my Litter, after they have ſerved four Years more, I will that they be ſet at Liberty. I give, moreover, to* Demetrius, Crito, *and* Syrus, *to each a Bed and Coverlet, ſuch as* Lyco *ſhall think fit. This I beſtow on them, for as much as they have expreſſed themſelves faithful in the Performance of ſuch Things as were committed to their Charge. As for my Burial, whether* Lyco *will have it here or at home, let it be as he will; for I perſuade myſelf he will do what is fitting, no leſs than if I had done it myſelf. When he ſhall have faithfully performed theſe Things, let the Bequeſts of my Will remain firm. Witneſſes,* Callinus *an* Hermionean, Ariſto *the* Chian, Euphronius *a* Pœanean.

Thus, ſaith *Laertius* [b], having wiſely managed all Things appertaining to Learning and Humanity, his Prudence and Diligence extended even to the Making his Will; ſo that in that reſpect alſo he deſerveth ſtudiouſly to be imitated.

He died 74 Years old, of the Gout.

There were Four of his Name.

The *firſt*, a *Pythagorean*, mentioned in the Life of *Ariſtotle*.

The *ſecond*, this *Peripatetick*.

The *third*, an *Epic Poet*.

The *fourth*, an *Epigrammatick Poet*.

b Laert. 5. 74.

ARISTO.

ARISTO ſucceeded *Lyco*. He was of the Iſland [c] *Ceos*, famous for a Law, *That whoſoever exceeded* 60 *Years of Age, ſhould be put to Death, that there might be no want of Proviſion for thoſe that were more ſerviceable.* In former time, ſaith *Strabo*, it had four Cities, now there remain but two, *Julis* and *Carthæa*, into which the reſt were transferred. *Paceſſa* into *Carthæa*, *Careſſus* into *Julis*. In *Julis Ariſto* was born; he was an Auditor of *Lyco*, and ſucceeded him in the Government of the *Peripatetick* School, as *Cicero*, *Plutarch*, and *Clemens Alexandrinus* affirm.

He was a great Imitator of *Bion* the *Boriſtenite*. *Cicero* ſaith, he was neat and elegant. He wrote a Treatiſe of *Nilus*, cited by *Strabo*, and *Amatory Similies*, frequently cited by *Athenæus*.

In the ſecond Book of his [d] *Amatory Similies*, he ſaith, that *Polemo* the *Academick* adviſed to provide ſuch Entertainment at Feaſts as ſhould be pleaſant not only at the preſent, but alſo on the Morrow.

[e] In the ſame Book of his *Amatory Similies*, of an *Athenian* well in Years, named *Dorus*, who would be thought handſome, he apply'd the Words of *Ulyſſes* to *Dolo*,

Rich Preſents ſure may lead away,
And thy too eaſy Soul betray.

[f] In the Second of his *Amatory Similies* he ſaith, *the Ancients firſt bound their Heads, conceiving it good againſt the Pain cauſed by the Vapours of the Wine*, afterwards, for more Ornament, they uſed *Garlands*.

Laertius, [g] upon the Teſtimony of *Panætius* and *Soſicrates* affirmeth, *That all the Writings aſcribed to* Ariſto *of* Chios *the* Stoick *(except the Epiſtles) belong to* Ariſto *the* Peripatetick. Their Titles theſe,

Protrepticks 2.
Of Zeno's *Doctrine: Scholaſtick Dialogues* 6.
Of Wiſdom, Diſſertation 7.
Erotick Diſſertations.
Commentaries upon Vain Glory.
Commentaries 15.
Memorials 3.
Chrya's 11.
Againſt Orators.
Againſt Alexinus's *Oppoſitions.*
To the Dialecticks 3.
To Cleanthes, *Epiſtles* 4.

c Strabo l. 10. d Athen. deipn. 10. e Athen. deipn. 12. f Deipn. l. 15. g Laert. 7. 163.

CRITO-

CRITOLAUS.

CRITOLAUS [h] was, according to *Plutarch*, of *Phaselis*, an eminent Sea Town of *Lycia*, described by [i] *Strabo* to have three Havens and a Lake belonging to it. He was an Auditor of *Aristo*, and succeeded him in the School, as *Cicero*, [k] *Plutarch*, and *Clemens Alexandrinus* affirm.

He went to *Rome* on an Embassy from the *Athenians* in the 534th Year from the Building of the City, which falleth upon the 2d Year of the 140th Olympiad.

[i] He condemned *Rhetorick*, as being used rather as an *Artifice* than an *Art*.

h Plut. de Exilio. i Lib. 14. k Clem. Strom. 1. l. Sext. Emper. adver. Mathem. l. 2.

DIODORUS.

DIODORUS [m] was Disciple to *Critolaus*, and succeeded him in the School, as is manifest from *Clemens Alexandrinus*, who adds, that in his Assertion concerning our chief End, he joyned *Indolence* with *Honesty*. He is mentioned by [n] *Cicero*; how long he taught, or who succeeded him, is unknown. Thus far we have an unintermitted Account of the *Peripatetick* School.

m Strabo l. 1. Strom. 2. n Acad. Quæst. 4.

THE

THE

HISTORY

OF

PHILOSOPHY.

THE SEVENTH PART,

Containing the *Cynick* Philoſophers.

ANTISTHENES.

CHAP. I.

His Life.

THE *Cynicks* are derived from *Antiſthenes*, Diſciple of *Socrates*, who, being moſt pleaſed with thoſe Diſcourſes of his Maſter, which treated of Tolerance and Laborioufneſs, inſtituted this Sect. [a] He was born at *Athens*, his Father an *Athenian*, named *Antiſthenes* alſo, his Mother a *Thracian*, or, as *Plutarch*, a *Phrygian*, in whoſe Defence, to thoſe who reproached him that ſhe was a Foreigner, he anſwered, *Cibele, the Mother of the Gods was a* Phrygian. He likewiſe derided the *Athenians* for boaſting of their being Natives, ſaying, they were nothing more noble than Snails and Locuſts. [b] Neither did *Socrates* the leſs eſteem him; but on the contrary, hearing that he had behaved himſelf valiantly at the Fight at *Tanagra*, he ſaid of him, *I knew two Parents, both* Athenians, *could not beget ſo excellent a Perſon.* He firſt heard *Gorgias* the Orator, whence his Dialogues are written in a Rhetorical Stile, conſiſting chiefly in Verity and Exhortation. *Hermippus* ſaith, at the *Iſthmian* Meeting, he uſed to make Orations in Praiſe and Diſpraiſe of the *Athenians*, *Thebans*, and *Lacedemonians*, before all the Aſſembly. But ſeeing many of the Citizens come thither, he refrained.

Next, he applied himſelf to *Socrates*, and profited ſo much under him, that he counſelled his Scholars to become his Fellow-Diſciples under that Maſter. He lived in the *Piræum*, and went every Day 40 *Stadia* to hear *Socrates*.

He affected, even whilſt he was Diſciple to *Socrates*, to go in poor Habit, and [c] once having turned the torn Part of his Garment outermoſt, *Socrates* ſpying it, ſaid, *I ſee Vain-glory through a Hole*; or, as *Ælian*, *Do you uſe this Oſtentation before us alſo?*

[d] Upon the Death of *Socrates* he was the Occaſion of Baniſhment to *Anytus*, and of Death to *Melitus*; for *Melitus* meeting with ſome young Men of *Pontus*, invited to *Athens* by the Fame of *Socrates*, he brought them to *Anytus*, telling them he was wiſer than *Socrates*; whereupon the Standers by in Indignation turned them both out of the City; of which already in the Life of *Socrates*.

CHAP. II.

His Inſtitution of a Sect.

Socrates [e] being Dead, of whom he learned Tolerance and Apathy, he made Choice of *Cynoſarges*, a Gymnaſium at *Athens*, juſt without the Gates, as of the fitteſt Place in which he might diſcourſe of Philoſophy. [f] It was ſo called upon this Occaſion. *Didymus* the *Athenian* ſacrificing in his own Houſe, a white Dog that was by, ſnatch'd the Victim, and running away with it, laid it

a Laert. 6. 1. b Ibid. vit. Socr. c Laert. ibid. Ælian. var. Hiſt. 9. 36. d Laert. 6. 10. e Ibid. 6. 13. f Suid.

down in another Place; *Dydimus* much troubled thereat, consulted the Oracle, which enjoined him to erect a Temple in that Place where the Dog had laid down the Victim, and to dedicate it unto *Hercules*, which was called *Cynosarges*, ὁ κυνὸς ἀργῆ ναός, *The Temple of the white Dog.* [g] Hence *Antisthenes* and his Followers were called *Cynicks*, and by those that disapproved their Institution, *Dogs*; *Antisthenes* himself being termed Απλοκύων, *the sincere Dog.*

He first doubled his old sordid Cloak, and wore it alone [without a Coat] as *Diocles* affirmeth; he carried likewise a Staff and Satchel. *Neanthes* saith he first used a single Cloak. *Soticrates* in the third of his *Successions*, saith, *Diodorus* the *Aspendian* wore a long Beard, and carried a Staff and Wallet.

[h] His Assertions are these, *That Virtue may be acquir'd by Teaching; and those Persons noble who are virtuous. That Virtue was self-sufficient to Felicity, not needing any Thing but a* Socratick *Courage. That Virtue consisteth in Actions, not requiring many Words nor much Learning, and is self-sufficient to Wisdom; for all other Things have a Reference thereto. That Infamy is good and equal to Labour, and that a wise Man ought not to govern the Common-wealth according to the Laws in Force, but according to Virtue. That a wise Man, to have Issue, may make Choice of beautiful Women, and Love, for a wise Man only knoweth what ought to be loved.*

Diocles addeth these; *That nothing is new to a wise Man. That a good Man deserveth Love. That virtuous Persons are Friends. That we ought to get Assistance in War, valiant and just. That Virtue is an Armour that never can be taken from us. That it is better with some few good Men to oppose all the Wicked, than with many wicked Men to contend with few Good. Observe your Enemies, for they first find out your Faults. Esteem a just Man more than a Neighbour. The same Virtue belongeth to Man and to Woman. Those Things are good which are honest, ill which are dishonest. All Things esteem strange. Wisdom is the safest Fortification, for it will neither fall away, nor can be betrayed. In these inexpugnable Things, we ought to build Forts by Meditation.*

[i] *Agellius* saith, *He esteemed Pleasure the greatest Ill*; whence he used to say, *I had rather be mad, than be addicted to Pleasure.*

[k] As to the Opinion of the *Cynicks* in general (not esteeming them, saith *Laertius*, a mere Form and Institution of Life, but a true *Sect* of Philosophy) they were these.

They took away, with *Aristo* the *Chian*, *Dialectick* and *Physick*, and only admitted *Ethick*; whence what some said of *Socrates*, *Diocles* applied to *Diogenes*, affirming he used the same Expressions. That we ought to enquire,

What Good and Ill
Our Houses fill.

They likewise rejected the Liberal Sciences; whence *Antisthenes* said, those who have acquired Temperance, ought not to study any Learning, lest by other Things they be diverted. *Geometry* likewise, *Musick*, and the like, they wholly took away. Whence *Diogenes*, to one that shewed him a Watch, *It is an excellent Invention*, saith he, *against supping too late.* And to one that entertained him with *Musick*,

Wisdom the greatest Cities doth protect,
But Musick cannot one poor House direct.

They likewise, as the *Stoicks*, affirmed to be happy to live according to *Virtue*, as *Antisthenes* in his *Hercules*; for there is a Kind of Affinity betwixt these two Sects, whence the *Stoicks* asserted *Cynism* to be the nearest Way to Virtue, and so lived *Zeno* the *Cittiean.*

Their Diet was slender, their Food only such as might satisfy Nature; their Cloaks sordid; they despised Riches, Glory, and Nobility: Some of them fed only on Herbs and cold Water, living under such Shelters as they could find, or in *Tubs*, as *Diogenes* did, who affirmed, it was proper to the Gods to want nothing, and that those who stand in Need of fewest Things come nearest to the Gods.

They held also, according to *Antisthenes* in his *Hercules*, that Virtue may be acquired by Learning, and that it cannot be lost; that a wise Man deserves to be loved, and never sinneth, and is a Friend to such as are like him, and trusteth nothing to Fortune.

They took away, with *Aristo* the *Chian*, all Things between Virtue and Vice.

CHAP. III.

His Apothegms.

OF his *Apothegms* are remember'd these: [l] He proved Labour to be good, by the Examples of *Hercules* and *Cyrus*, one a *Grecian*, the other a *Barbarian.*

He first defin'd Speech thus, *Speech is that which declareth that which is or was.*

To a young Man of *Pontus*, that came to be his Disciple, and ask'd him what he must bring with him, he answer'd, Βιβλιαρίῳ καινῷ, καὶ γραφείῳ καινῷ, καὶ πινακιδίῳ καινῷ, a new Book, a new Pen, and a new Tablet, where the Word καινῷ is equivocal, and signifieth divided (divided καινῷ) *Wit.*

g Laert. 6. 13. h Ibid. i Lib. 9. c. 5. k Laert. vit. Menedem. l Laert. 6. 2.

To

To one, demanding what kind of Wife he ſhould take, *If a fair one*, ſaith he, *ſhe will be common*; *if foul, a Torment.*

Hearing that *Plato* ſpoke ill of him, *It is King-like*, ſaith he, *to do well, and be ill ſpoken of.*

Being initiated into the *Orphick* Solemnities, the Prieſt telling him, that they who were initiated into thoſe Rites, were made Partakers of many excellent Things in the next World. *Why then*, ſaid he, *do you not die?*

To one that reproacheth him that both his Parents were not *free*; *Neither*, ſaith he, *were they both Wreſtlers, and yet I am a Wreſtler.*

Being demanded why he had few Diſciples, *I beat them away*, ſaid he, *with a Silver Staff.*

Being demanded why he rebuk'd his Diſciples ſo ſharply, *So*, ſaith he, *do Phyſicians the Sick.*

Seeing an Adulterer running away, *Unhappy Man*, ſaid he, *how much Danger might you have eſcaped for one Half-penny.*

He ſaid, according to *Hecaton*, *It is better to fall among Crows than Flatterers, for thoſe only devour the Dead, theſe the Living.*

Being demanded what was moſt happy for Man, he anſwer'd, *To die in Proſperity.*

To a Friend, complaining he had loſt his Notes, *You ſhould have writ them in your Mind*, ſaith he, *and not in your Book.*

As Ruſt conſumeth Iron, ſo Envy, ſaith he, *conſumeth the envious Man.*

Thoſe who would never die, ſaith he, *muſt live piouſly and juſtly.*

He ſaid, *Cities were then periſhing, when they could not diſtinguiſh the Good from the Bad.*

Being commended by ſome wicked Men, [m] *I am troubled*, ſaith he, *to think what Ill I have done.*

He ſaid, *The Cohabitation of Concording Brethren is firmer than any Wall.*

He ſaid, *We ought to carry ſuch Proviſion along with us, as if we ſhould happen to be Ship-wreck'd, we might ſwim away with.*

To thoſe who reproached him for converſing with wicked Men, *So do Phyſicians with the Sick*, ſaith he, *yet are not ſick themſelves.*

He ſaid, *It is abſurd to ſeparate Corn from the Weeds, and in War to reject the unſerviceable Perſon; yet in a Common-wealth, not to extirpate the Wicked.*

Being demanded what he had gained by Philoſophy, he anſwer'd, *That I can converſe with myſelf.*

At a Feaſt, to one that ſaid to him, *Sing*; he reply'd, *Do you then Pipe.*

Diogenes demanding a Coat, he bad him double his Cloak.

Being demanded what Learning was moſt neceſſary, *that*, ſaith he, *which unlearneth Ill.*

He adviſed thoſe who were provoked by Revilings, to bear it with greater Fortitude, than if Stones were caſt at them.

He derided *Plato*, as being proud; and ſeeing at a Show a Horſe going loftily, turning to *Plato*, *Methinks*, ſaid he, *you would have acted the Part of this Horſe very well.* This he ſaid, becauſe *Plato* at the ſame time had commended the Horſe.

Another Time viſiting *Plato* as he lay ſick, and looking into the Baſin whereinto he had vomited, *I ſee here*, ſaith he, *the Choler, but not the Pride.*

He adviſed the *Athenians* to love Aſſes as well as Horſes, which they conceiving abſurd; *and yet*, ſaith he, *you chuſe thoſe for Generals, who know nothing, but how to ſtretch out the Hand.*

To one that ſaid to him, *Many praiſe thee*; why, *ſaith he*, what Ill have I done?

To one that demanded (as *Phanias* ſaith) what he ſhould do to be a good and an honeſt Man; *If you learn*, ſaith he, *of knowing Perſons, that the Vices which you have, are to be avoided.*

To one that praiſed a Life full of Delicacies, *Let the Sons of my Enemies*, ſaith he, *live delicately.*

To a young Man who deſired his Statue might be made handſomer than himſelf, *Tell me*, ſaith he, *if the Braſs itſelf could ſpeak, what you think it would boaſt of?* the other anſwer'd, *of its handſome Figure. Are you not aſham'd then*, reply'd he, *to be proud of the ſame that an inanimate Creature would be?*

A young Man of *Pontus* promiſed to ſupply him as ſoon as his Ship came home laden with Salt Fiſh; hereupon he took him to a Meal-woman, and filling his Satchel, departed; ſhe calling to him for Money, *This young Man*, ſaith he, *will pay you as ſoon as his Ship comes home.*

When at any Time he ſaw a Woman richly dreſſed, he went to her Houſe, and bad her Huſband bring out his Horſe and Arms, that if he were ſo provided, he might allow her thoſe Freedoms, being better able to juſtify the Injuries it occaſion'd; otherwiſe, that he ſhould take off her rich Habit.

He ſaid, [n] *Neither a Feaſt is pleaſant without Company, nor Riches without Virtue.*

He ſaid, [o] *Thoſe Pleaſures which come not in at the Door, muſt not go out by the Door, but by Inciſion or Purging with* Hellebore, *or by* [p] Starving, *ſo to puniſh thoſe Surfeits which we have incurred for a ſhort Pleaſure.*

He ſaid, [q] *Whoſoever feareth others, is a Slave, tho' he know it not himſelf.*

He ſaid, [r] *No covetous Man can be a good Man, or a King, or a Free-man.*

Being demanded what a Feaſt is, he anſwer'd, [s] *The Occaſion of Surfeits.*

He ſaid, [t] *We ought to aim at ſuch Pleaſures as follow Labour, not at thoſe which go before Labour.*

He ſaid, [u] *Common Executioners are better than*

m Laert. ibid. Stob. Serm. 6. n Stob. Serm. 1. o Stob. Ser. 17. p Ser. 8. q Ser. 10. r Ser. 67. s Ser. 47. t Ser. 52. u Serm. 81.

Tyrants; those put only guilty Men to Death, Tyrants the Innocent.

He said, [w] *We ought to wish our Enemies all good Things but Fortitude, for that they possess would fall into the Hands of the Victor, not the Owner.*

[x] *Him that contradicteth,* he said, *we must not again contradict, but instruct; for a mad Man is not cured by another's growing mad also.*

He said, [y] *A Man should always have in Readiness his Wits or a Rope.*

Seeing the *Thebans* much exalted with their Success at the *Luctrian* Fight, he said, [z] *They were like Boys that Triumph when they have beaten their Masters.*

To some that commended a Piper: [a] *But,* saith he, *he is an ill Man; for else he would never have been so good a Piper.*

CHAP. IV.

His Writings.

OF his Books, [b] saith *Laertius,* there are Ten Tomes.

The *First* containing these,

Of Speech, or of Characters.
Ajax, *of the Speech of* Ajax.
Ulysses, *or of* Ulysses.
An Apology for Orestes.
Of Lawyers.
Isographe, *or* Desias, *or* Isocrates.
Against Isocrates's Ἀμάσυεσν.

The *Second* Tome.

Of the Nature of Animals.
Of Procreation of Children, or of Marriage, Erotick.
Of Sophists, Physiognomick.
Of Justice and Fortitude, Protreptick 2, 3.
Of Theognis.

The *Third* Tome.

Of Good.
Of Fortitude.
Of Law, or of Policy.
Of Law, or of Fair and Just.
Of Freedom and Servitude.
Of Faith.
Of a Guardian, or of Trusting.
A Victory, Oeconomicks.

The *Fourth* Tome.

Cyrus.
Hercules *the greater, or of Strength.*

The *Fifth* Tome.

Cyrus, *or of a Kingdom.*
Aspasia.

The *Sixth* Tome.

Truth.
Of Dissertation, Anti-Logick.
Sathon, of Contradiction 3.
Of Dialectick.

The *Seventh* Tome.

Of Discipline, or of Names 5.
Of Dying.
Of Life and Death.
Of Things after Death.
Of the Use of Names, or Eristick.
Of Interrogation and Answer.
Of Opinion and Science 4.
Of Nature 2.
Interrogation concerning Nature 2.
Opinions, or the Eristick.
Problems concerning Learning.

The *Eighth* Tome.

Of Musick.
Of Interpreters.
Of Homer.
Of Injustice or Impiety.
Of Chalcas.
Of the Spie.
Of Pleasure.

The *Ninth* Tome.

Of the Odysseis.
Of Minerva's *Wand, or of* Telemachus, Helena *and* Penelope.
Of Proteus.
The Cyclops, or of Ulysses.
Of the use of Wine, or of Drunkenness, or of the Cyclops.
Of Circe.
Of Amphiaraus.
Of Ulysses *and* Penelope.
Of the Dog.

The *Tenth* Tome.

Hercules, *or* Midas.
Hercules, *or of Prudence, or of Strength.*
The Master, or Lover.
The Master, or Spies.
Menexenus, *or of Ruling.*
Alcibiades.
Archelaus, *or of a Kingdom.*

These, [c] saith *Laertius,* were his Writings, the great Number whereof *Timon* derides, calling him an ingenious Trifler.

There is also, among the *Socratick* Epistles, one under his Name to this Effect:

Antisthenes *to* Aristippus.

IT is not the Part of a Philosopher to live with Tyrants, and to waste Time at Sicilian *Feasts, but rather to be content with a little in his own Country; but you esteem it the greatest Excellence of a virtuous Person, to be able to acquire much Wealth, and to have powerful Friends. Riches are not good; neither if they were in themselves good, are they such, being thus obtained; nor can a Multitude of unlearned Persons, especially Tyrants, be true Friends. Wherefore I would counsel you to leave* Syracuse *and*

w Serm. ibid. x 1 Ser. ibid. y Plut. rep. Stoic. z Plut. vit. Lyc. a Plut. vit. Pericl. b Laert. 6. 15, &c. c Laert. 6. 18.

Sicily; *but if, as ſome report, you are in love with Pleaſure, and aim at ſuch Things, as beſeem not wiſe Perſons, go to* Anticyra *and cure yourſelf by drinking* Hellebore, *for that is much better for you than the Wine of* Dionyſius; *this cauſeth Madneſs, that aſſwageth it: So that as Health and Diſcretion differ from Sickneſs and Folly, ſo much ſhall you be better than you are in theſe Things which you now enjoy.* Farewel.

The Anſwer to this Epiſtle, ſee in the Life of *Ariſtippus*.

CHAP. V.

His Death.

HE died, [d] ſaith *Laertius*, of Sickneſs. As he lay on his Death-bed, *Diogenes* came to him, and asked him if he wanted a Friend. Another Time he came to him with a Dagger, *Antiſthenes* crying out, *Who will free me from this Pain?* He ſhew'd him the Dagger, ſaying, *This ſhall. Antiſthenes* reply'd, *I ſay from my Pain, not from my Life*; for he bore his Sickneſs ſomewhat impatiently thro' Love of Life.

Theopompus commends him above all the Diſciples of *Socrates*, as being of ſuch acute and ſweet Diſcourſe, that he could lead any Man to what he would.

There were three more of this Name, one a *Heraclitean* Philoſopher, the Second of *Epheſus*, the Third of *Rhodes*, an Hiſtorian.

d Laert. 6. 18.

DIOGENES.

CHAP. I.

His Country, Parents, Time, Baniſhment.

Diogenes [a] was of *Sinope*, a City of *Pontus*. His Father's Name was *Iceſius*, or, as others, *Icetes*; by Profeſſion a Money-changer.

He was born (as appears by Computation from his Death, which was in the 90th Year of his Age, in the firſt Year of the 114th Olympiad, *Hegeſias* being *Archon*) about the third Year of the 91ſt Olympiad. *Suidas* ſaith, he was firſt called *Cleon*.

Diocles ſaith, his Father trading publickly in Exchange of Money, was ſurprized coining falſe Money, and thereupon fled: But *Eubulides* ſaith, *Diogenes* himſelf did it, and fled together with his Father; even *Diogenes* in his *Podolus*, acknowledgeth as much. Some affirm, that being made Overſeer, he was perſuaded by the Workmen to go to *Delphi* or *Delus*, the Country of *Apollo*, to enquire of the Oracle if he ſhould do that whereto he was adviſed, παραχαράξι τὸ νόμισμα, which is of ambiguous Signification, implying to alter the Courſe of Life, and to coin falſe Money. The Oracle aſſented. *Diogenes* not underſtanding it in the Civil Senſe, betook himſelf to Coining, and being taken in the Act, was baniſhed, or, as others ſay, fled for Fear. Some affirm, he adulterated the Money he received from his Father, for which the Father was caſt into Priſon, and there died; the Son fled, and coming to *Delphi*, enquired of the Oracle by what Means he ſhould become eminent, whereupon he received that Anſwer.

When he left his Country, one of his Servants followed him, named *Manes* [b], who not enduring his Converſation, ran away from him; ſome perſuaded *Diogenes* to enquire after him, who anſwered, Were it not a Shame, ſince *Manes* doth not need *Diogenes*, that *Diogenes* ſhould need *Manes*? The Fellow wandering up and down, came at laſt to *Delphi*, where he was torn in Pieces by Dogs.

CHAP. II.

How he lived at Athens.

COming to *Athens*, ſaith *Laertius* [c], he applied himſelf to *Antiſthenes*, following the Cynical Philoſophy inſtituted by him. [d] *Antiſthenes* having invited many to hear him, and but few coming, at laſt in Anger would not ſuffer any to come to him, and therefore bad *Diogenes* be gone alſo. *Diogenes* continuing to come frequently, he chid and threatened him, and at laſt ſtruck him with his Staff. *Diogenes* would not go back, but perſiſting ſtill in his Deſire of hearing him, ſaid, *Strike if you will, here is my Head, you cannot find a Staff hard enough to drive me from you, until you have inſtructed me. Antiſthenes*, overcome with his Perſeverance, admitted him, and made him his intimate Friend. From that Time forward he heard him.

Some affirm, ſaith *Laertius* [e], he firſt wore a double Cloak, upon which he uſed to ly [at Night.]

a Laert. 5. 20. b Ælian. var. Hiſt. 13. 28. c Laert. 5. 21. d Ælian. var. Hiſt. 10. 16. e Laert. 6. 23.

He

He likewiſe carried a Wallet, wherein was his Meat. He made Uſe of all Places for all Things, dining, ſleeping, and diſcourſing in any Place, inſomuch, that pointing to *Jupiter*'s Walk, and the *Pompæum*, two publick Places at *Athens*, he ſaid, the *Athenians* built them for his Dwelling. Falling once ſick, he walked with a Staff, which afterwards he continually uſed, as likewiſe a Wallet, not in the City, but when he travelled. He wrote to one to build him a little Houſe, which the other not doing ſo ſoon as he required, he made Uſe of a *Tub* in the *Metroum* to live in, as he declareth in his *Epiſtles*. In Summer he uſed to roll in the burning Sand; in Winter to embrace Statues covered with Snow, accuſtoming himſelf continually to Sufferance. [f] A *Lacedemonian* ſeeing him in this Poſture in the Depth of Winter, asked him if he were not a cold; *Diogenes* ſaid, he was not: What you do then, replied the other, is no great Matter.

At firſt he uſed to beg, of which there are many Inſtances: He one Time begg'd of a Man thus, *If you have given to others, give alſo to me. If to none, begin with me.*

[g] Another Time he begg'd of a Statue, whereof being demanded the Reaſon, *That I may the better*, ſaith he, *bear a Refuſal.*

He requeſted ſomething of a covetous Perſon, who delaying to give; *Man*, ſaith he, *I ask you* εἰς τροφὴν *not* εἰς ταφὴν, *Food, not a Grave.*

He requeſted ſomething of a Perſon very obdurate, who anſwered, Yes, if you can perſwade me to it; *Nay*, replied he, *if I were able to perſuade you to any Thing, it ſhould have been to have hanged yourſelf.*

Of a Prodigal he begged a *Mina*; the other asked why he begged a *Mina* of him, and of others but an *Obolus*: *Becauſe*, ſaith he, *I hope to receive of others again; but whether I ſhall ever have any more of you, the Gods know.*

Being reproached that *Plato* begged not, but he begged; *Yes*, ſaith he, *he beggeth too; but*

Cloſe in your Ear,
Leſt others hear.

[h] Having received ſome little Money from *Dionyſius* the *Cariſian*, he ſaid,

The Gods afford thee thy Deſire,
A Man and Houſe ——

Alluding to his Effeminacy.

[i] For this Reaſon he ſaid, the Imprecations of Tragedians concurred in him, for he was without any City, without a Houſe, deprived of his Country, a Beggar, a Vagabond, having his Livelihood only from Day to Day. And yet, adds *Ælian* [k], he was more pleaſed with this Condition, than *Alexander* with the Command of the whole World, when having conquered the *Indians*, he returned to *Babylon.*

[l] Seeing a Mouſe, as *Theophraſtus* ſaith, running up and down, he thence took Occaſion of Comfort, conſidering it a Creature that looked not for Lodging, and was not diſpleaſed with Darkneſs, nor nice as to Diet.

He walked in the Snow bare-foot, and tried to eat raw Fleſh, but could not.

He ſaid, he imitated Singing-Maſters, who raiſe their Voice too high, thereby to teach others the juſt Tone.

The *Athenians* loved him much; for a Youth having bored Holes in his Tub, they puniſhed him, and gave *Diogenes* a new one.

He uſed to perform the Offices of *Ceres* and *Venus* in publick, arguing thus; *If it be not abſurd to dine, it is not abſurd to dine even in the Market-place; but it is not abſurd to dine, therefore it is not abſurd to dine even in the Market-place.*

[m] Χειρόβιον in the publick Forum; *I would*, ſaith he, *I could as eaſily ſatisfy my Hunger.*

[n] As he dined in the Forum, ſome that were preſent called him Dog; *Nay*, ſaith he, *you are Dogs that ſtand about me when I am at Dinner.*

Being reproached for feeding in the open Forum, *In the Forum*, ſaith he, *I grew hungry.*

Being reproached that he drank in a Victualing-Houſe; *And in a Barber's Shop*, ſaith he, *I am ſhaved.*

He lived without any Servant. Being demanded by one whether he would have a Maid-Servant, or a Man; he ſaid, neither; Who then, anſwered the other, ſhall carry you out to your Grave when you die? *Diogenes* replied, *he that wants a Houſe.*

CHAP. III.

How he lived at Corinth.

IN [o] his old Age he took a Voyage to *Ægina*, but was by the Way taken by ſome Pirates, the Name of whoſe Captain was *Scirpalus.* They carried him to *Crete*, and there expoſed him to Sale; they asked him what he could do; he anſwered, *he could command Men*; and to the Cryer, he ſaid, *If any Man wants a Maſter, let him buy me.* Offering to ſit down, they would not ſuffer him, (it being the Cuſtom of ſuch as were to be ſold for Slaves, to leap up and down) *'Tis no Matter for that*, ſaith he, *Fiſhes are ſold which Way ſoever they ly*; adding, he wondred that Men, being to buy a Pot or Veſſel, examine it curiouſly on the Inſide; but if a Man, they are ſatisfied with his Look, and Outſide. Pointing to a *Corinthian* richly attired that

f Plut. Apoth. Lac. g Laert. 6. 49. h Ælian. var. hiſt. 6. 27. i Laert. 6. 38. k Var. hiſt. 3. 29. l Laert. 6. 22. m Laert. it is explained by Plutarch, de Rep. Stoic. n Laert. ibid. o Ibid. 6. 24.

paſſed by, named *Xeniades*, *Sell me*, ſaith he, *to that Man, for he wants a Maſter.* To *Xeniades*, as ſoon as he had bought him, he ſaid, *Be ſure you do as I command you*, he anſwered in the common Proverbial Verſe,

The Springs of Rivers upwards run.

Diogenes replied, if being ſick you had bought a Phyſician, would you obey his Advice, or would you ſay as before, *The Springs of Rivers upwards run.*

His Friends, according to *Cleomenes*, offered to redeem him; but he told them they were Fools, for Lyons were not Slaves to their Keepers, but the Keepers to the Lyons, for the Property of Servitude is to fear, and Men fear Beaſts.

[p] *Xeniades* having bought him, carried him to *Corinth*, [q] asked him what he would do; he anſwered, he knew how to command free Perſons. *Xeniades* wondering at his Anſwer, ſet him at Liberty, and delivered his Sons to his Charge, ſaying, *take then my Children, and command them.*

[r] He put the Government of his Family alſo into his Hands, which he acquitted himſelf of excellently well in every Thing, inſomuch that *Xeniades* ſaid, *he had brought a good Genius into his Houſe.*

He did not ſuffer the young Men that were under his Charge, to exerciſe themſelves as Wreſtlers, but only till they were warm, and for their Health's Sake. He taught them many Sayings of Poets by Heart, and ſome of his own; and that they might more eaſily remember the full Sum of Learning, he made a brief Collection thereof. He taught them at home to miniſter, uſing thin Diet, and drinking Water, to go negligently in Habit, ſhaven, without Coats, without Shoes, and ſilent, looking upon themſelves as they went. He brought them up likewiſe to hunting. On the other Side, they took great Care of *Diogenes*, and recommended him to their Parents.

[s] When *Alexander* was upon his Expedition againſt the *Perſians*, many Philoſophers came to ſalute him; the ſame Duty he expected from *Diogenes*, who was at that Time at the *Craneum*, a *Gymnaſium* in *Corinth*, where he lived idly, not minding *Alexander*. *Alexander* therefore went and found him out, ſitting in the Sun; he roſe a little to look upon the great Crowd of People that came along with *Alexander*, who ſaluting him, asked *Diogenes* what he would deſire of him; he anſwered, *that you would ſtand aſide a little from betwixt me and the Sun.* Hereat *Alexander* was ſo ſurpriſed, and ſo much admired his high Mind, that his Attendants in returning laughing thereat; but I, ſaid he, were I not *Alexander*, would chooſe to be *Diogenes.*

CHAP. IV.

His Philoſophy.

AND concerning Opinions, he ſaid [t], there is a twofold *Exercitation*, one *ſpiritual*, the other *corporeal*; if in the firſt of theſe we employ ourſelves conſtantly, frequent Phantaſies will occur, which facilitate the Performance of Virtue; the one cannot be without the other, a good Habit and Strength being neceſſary, both in reſpect of the Soul and the Body.

That Virtue is eaſily acquired by Exercitation, he argued, in as much as in the Mechanick Arts and others, that Artiſts by Practice quickly arrive at an extraordinary Readineſs therein, and Wreſtlers and Muſicians excel one another according to the continual Pains they take therein, one more than another; and if they ſhould have taken the ſame Pains about their Souls, it would not have been unprofitably and imperfectly employed.

He ſaid, Nothing in Life can be rightly done without Exercitation; and that Exercitation could maſter any Thing; for whereas Men ſhould chuſe natural Labours, whereby they might live happily; they on the contrary make Choice of the unprofitable, and through their own Folly are in continual Miſery. For even the Contempt of Pleaſure, if we accuſtom ourſelves thereto, will be moſt pleaſant; and as they, who inure themſelves to a voluptuous Life, cannot be taken off it without much Trouble and Grief; ſo they who exerciſe themſelves in a contrary Manner, with as great Eaſe contemn even the Pleaſures themſelves.

He aſcribed not ſo much to Law as to Nature; he affirmed that he followed the ſame Courſe of Life with *Hercules*, preferring nothing before Liberty.

He aſſerted that all Things belong to the Wiſe; arguing thus; *All Things belong to the Gods, the Gods are Friends to wiſe Perſons; all Things are common amongſt Friends; therefore all Things belong to the Wiſe.*

As concerning Law, he held that without it a Commonwealth could not be ordered; for, ſaith he, *Without a City there cannot be any Profit of civil Things; a City is a civil Thing; of Law without a City there is no Profit, therefore Law is civil.*

He derided *Nobility*, *Glory*, and the like, ſaying, they were the Ornaments or Veils of Wickedneſs, and that only a right Commonwealth ought to be honoured.

He held that there ought to be a Community of Women, conceiving Marriage to be nothing, and that every Man and Woman might enjoy one another as they pleaſed themſelves, and conſequently, that all Children ſhould be in common.

He held that it was not unlawful to take any

p Laert. 6. 74. q Gell. 2. 19. r Laert. 6. 74. s Plut. vit. Alex. t Laert. 6. 70.

Thing

Thing out of a Temple, or to feed upon living Creatures; neither was it impious to eat Man's Fleſh, as appeared by the Practice of other Nations; adding that all Things are in all and by all: In Bread there is Fleſh, in Fleſh Bread; the Remainders of Fleſh and Bread being inſinuated by occult Paſſages into other Bodies, and evaporating in like Manner. This *Laertius* cites out of a Tragedy of his, named *Thyeſtes*, if, ſaith he, that Tragedy belong to him, and not rather to *Philiſcus* or *Paſiphon*.

Muſick, *Geometry*, *Aſtronomy*, and the like, he rejected as unprofitable and unneceſſary.

CHAP. V.

His Apophthegms.

HE was very acute, [u] ſaith *Laertius*, in deriding others. He ſaid *Euclid*'s School was not σχολὴ, but χολὴ, not a *School*, but *Anger*, for the Dialecticks affected litigious Diſpute. He ſaid *Plato*'s School was not διάλυσις, but κάλαψις, not Exerciation, but Conſumption.

He ſaid, when he look'd upon *Pilots*, *Phyſicians* and *Philoſophers*, Man was the wiſeſt of all Creatures; but when he looked upon *Interpreters* of Dreams, *Prophets*, or Perſons puffed up with Wealth or Honours, nothing is more fooliſh than Man.

He ſaid, that he often found it convenient in Life to have ready an Anſwer, or a Rope.

At a great Feaſt, ſeeing *Plato* eat Olives; Why ſaith he, you being a wiſe Man, and going to *Sicily* for ſuch Entertainments, did you not enjoy them? He anſwered, By the Gods, *Diogenes*, I fed upon Olives there likewiſe, as well as upon other Things. *Diogenes* replied, why then needed you to have gone to *Syracuſe*, were there no Olives at that Time in *Attica*? This *Phavorinus* aſcribes to *Ariſtippus*, adding, that as he was eating Figs, he met him, and ſaid, Taſte; the other taking and eating; I bad you, ſaith he, taſte, and not devour.

In the Preſence of ſome Friends of *Plato*, ſent to him by *Dionyſius*, *Diogenes* trod under Foot *Plato*'s Robe, ſaying, I tread under Foot *Plato*'s Pride: But *Diogenes*, anſwered *Plato*, how proud are you yourſelf, when you think you contemn Pride? *Sotion* relates this as ſaid to the *Cynick* by *Plato*.

[w] *Diogenes* ſent to *Plato* for Wine and Figs, he ſent him a large Veſſel of Wine and Figs; whereupon *Diogenes*, As you, ſaith he, being demanded how much two and two are, anſwer twenty, ſo you neither grant what I requeſt, nor anſwer what I demand, thus cenſuring his Verboſity.

Being demanded in what Part of *Greece* he had ſeen good Men: *Men*, ſaith he, *no where*, *but good Boys at* Lacedemon.

Making a ſerious Diſcourſe, and perceiving that no Man came to hear him, he began to ſing, whereat a great many gathered together, whom he reproached for coming to Trifles, being ſo backward to ſerious Things.

He ſaid, Men conteſted in undermining or kicking, but none about Goodneſs.

He wondered at Grammarians, who enquiring after the Misfortunes of *Ulyſſes*, forgot their own; and at Muſicians, who whilſt they tune their Inſtruments, have diſcordant Affections in their Souls; and at the Mathematicians, that gazing upon the Sun and Moon, neglecting what was juſt at their Feet; and at Orators, who ſtudied to ſpeak juſt Things, and neglected to act them; and laſtly, at *covetous* Perſons, for diſpraiſing Money, which they loved above all Things.

He reprehended thoſe, who tho' they commended juſt Men for thinking themſelves to be above Money, yet eſteemed the Rich happy.

[x] He was angry at thoſe, who when they ſacrificed to the Gods for their Health, feaſted at the ſame Time contrary to their Health.

He wondered at Servants, who ſeeing their Maſters eat exceſſively, did not take away their Meat.

He praiſed thoſe, who being about to marry, would not marry; who being about to go to Sea, would not go to Sea; who being about to undertake ſome publick Office, would not undertake it; and who being about to bring up Children, forbore to bring them up; and who would compoſe themſelves to live with great Men, yet never went to them.

He ſaid, when we ſtretch out our Hand to our Friend, we ſhould never clutch our Fiſt.

One bringing him into a new Houſe, and forbidding him to ſpit, he ſpit in his Face, ſaying, he could not find a worſe Place. Some aſcribe this to *Ariſtippus*.

Crying out upon a Time, *Men come hither*, a great many flocked about him, whom he fell upon with his Stick, and beat them, ſaying, *I called Men, not Varlets.* This *Hecaton* in his *Chriæ* relates.

Alexander ſaid, If he had not been born *Alexander*, he would have deſired to have been born *Diogenes*.

He ſaid, They were not maimed who were dumb and blind, but they who had not a Wallet.

Going once half ſhaven to a Feaſt of young Men, as *Metrocles* relates, they beat him, whereupon he took their Names, and ſetting them down in a Parchment-Roll, he wore it at his Breaſt, whereby being known, they were reviled and beaten. He ſaid, he was the *Dog of the praiſed, but none of the Praiſers durſt go a hunting with him.*

u Laert. 6. 24. &c. w Stob. Ser. 36. x Ibid. Ser. 6.

To

To one saying, At the *Pythian* Games I overcame Men; *No*, saith he, *I the Men, you the Slaves.*

To those who said to him, You are now old, take your Ease; *What*, saith he, *if I were to run a Race, should I give over when I were almost at the End, or rather contest with greater Courage?*

Finding *Demosthenes* the Orator at Dinner in a common Victualling-house, who ashamed would have stolen away; Nay, saith he, you are now the more *popular*. *Ælian* [y] relates it thus, *Diogenes* being at Dinner at a common Victualling-house, and seeing *Demosthenes* pass by, invited him in, *Demosthenes* refusing; Do you think it, saith *Diogenes*, a Disparagement to dine here, when your Masters dine here every Day? meaning the common People, to whom Orators are but Servants.

To some Strangers, who were desirous to see *Demosthenes*, pointing to him with his middle Finger, *This*, saith he, *is he that leads the* Athenians.

In reproof to one who had thrown away his Bread, and was asham'd to take it up again, he tied a String about the Neck of a Bottle, and dragged it after him thro' the *Ceramick*.

He said most Men were mad *præter digitum*, all but the Finger; if any Man should walk pointing with his middle Finger, he will be thought mad; if his fore Finger, not so.

He said the most precious Things were sold cheapest, and so on the contrary; for a Statue will cost 3000 Pieces of Silver, a Peck of Wheat, two Pieces of Brass.

To one who came to him to study Philosophy, he gave a Fish, and bid him follow him; the other ashamed, threw it away, and departed. Not long after, meeting the same Person, he laughing, said, *The Friendship betwixt you and me was broke off by a Fish*. *Diocles* relates it thus; One saying to him, *Command me*, Diogenes; he gave him a Pennyworth of Cheese to bring after him, the other refusing to carry it, *Our Friendship*, saith he, *a Pennyworth of Cheese hath dissolved*.

Seeing a Boy drink Water in the Hollow of his Hand, he took his little Cup out of his Wallet and threw it away, saying, *The Boy out-went him in Frugality*. He threw away his Dish also, seeing a Boy that had broken his, supping up his Broth in the same manner.

Seeing a Woman prostrate herself unhandsomly in Prayer, and desirous to reprove her Superstition, as *Zoilus* the *Pergæan* reports, came to her, and said, *Are you not ashamed, Woman, that God who stands behind you (for all Things are full of him) should see you in this undecent Posture?*

He said, such as beat others, ought to be consecrated to *Æsculapius*, the God of *Chirurgery*.

He said, *Against Fortune we must oppose Courage; against Nature, Law; against Passion, Reason.*

In the *Craneum*, *Alexander* standing by him, as the Sun shone, said to him, *Ask of me what thou wilt*; he answer'd, *Do not stand between me and the Sun*.

One reading a long tedious Discourse, and coming at last near a blank Leaf at the End of the Book, *Be of good Courage, Friend*, saith he, *I see Land*.

To one proving, by the *horned* Syllogism, that he had Horns, he feeling on his Forehead, *But I*, saith he, *feel none*. In like manner, another maintaining, *there was no such Thing as Motion*, he rose up and walked. To one disputing concerning Meteors, *How long is it*, saith he, *since you came from Heaven?*

A wicked Man having written over the Door of his House, *Let no ill Thing enter here. Which Way then*, saith he, *must the Master come in?*

He anointed his Feet with sweet Unguents, saying, *the Scent went from the Crown of his Head into the Air, but from his Feet to his Nostrils*.

To some *Athenians*, that persuaded him to be initiated into some religious Mysteries, alledging, that such as were initiated had the chiefest Places in the other World. *It is ridiculous*, saith he, *if* Agesilaus *and* Epaminondas *live there among Bogs, and the common People that are initiated, live in the blessed Island*. Or, as *Plutarch*, hearing these Verses of *Socrates*,

> —*Thrice happy they*
> *Who do these Mysteries survey:*
> *They only after Death are bless'd,*
> *All Miseries pursue the rest.*

What, saith he, *shall* Patœcion *the Thief be in better Condition* (because he was initiated) *than* Epaminondas?

Mice coming to him as he was at Dinner, *See*, saith he, Diogenes *also maintaineth Parasites*.

[z] *Diogenes* being present at a Discourse of *Plato*'s, would not mind it; whereat *Plato* angry, said, *Thou Dog, why mindst thou not? Diogenes* unmoved, answered, *Yet I never return to the Place where I was sold, as Dogs do*, alluding to *Plato*'s Voyage to *Sicily*.

Returning from a Bath, one ask'd him, *If there were many Men there?* He said, *No*. The other asking him, *if there were much Company?* He said, *there was*.

Plato defining Man *a two-footed Animal without Wings*, and this Definition being approved, *Diogenes* took a Cock, and plucking off all its Feathers, turned it into *Plato*'s School, saying, *This is* Plato's *Man*; whereupon to the Definition was added, *Having broad Nails*.

To one, demanding at what Time he should

y Ælian var. hist. 9. 29. z Ibid. 14. 33.

dine,

dine, *If thou art rich*, saith he, *when thou wilt*; *if poor, when thou canst.*

At *Megara*, seeing their Sheep with thick Fleeces, and their Children almost naked, *It is better*, saith he, *to be the Sheep of a* Megaræan, *than his Son.*

To one, who hitting him with the End of a long Pole, bade him take heed, *Why*, saith he, *do you mean to hit me again?*

He said, *the Orators were the Servants of the Multitude*; *Crowns, the Boils of Glory.*

[a] He lighted a Candle at Noon, saying, *I look for a Man.*

He stood in the Rain without any Shelter; some that were present pitying him, *Plato*, who was there likewise, said, *If you will shew yourselves pitiful to him, go away*, reflecting upon his Vain-glory.

One giving him a box on the Ear, *O Hercules*, saith he, *I knew not that I should have walked with a Helmet.*

Medias giving him many Blows with his Fist, saying, *There are three thousand Drachms* [alluding to the Fines imposed upon such Outrages] *ready counted for you upon the Table.* The next Day he got a *Cæstus*, and beat him with it, saying, *There are three thousand Drachms ready counted for you.*

Lycias, an Apothecary, ask'd him, *if he thought there were many Gods. How*, saith he, *can I think otherwise, when I take you to be their Enemy?* Others ascribe this to *Theodorus.*

Seeing one that had besprinkled himself with Water, *O unhappy Man*, saith he, *dost thou not know that the Errors of Life are no more to be wash'd away by Water, than Errors in Grammar?*

He rebuked those who complained of Fortune, saying, *They did not request what was good, but that which seemed good to them.*

Of those who are terrified with Dreams, he said, *You never are concerned for the Things you do waking, but what you fancy in your sleep you make your greatest Business.*

[b] At the Olympick Games, the Cryer proclaiming, *Dioxippus hath overcome Men*; *He Slaves*, saith he, *but I Men.*

Alexander sending an Epistle to *Antipater* at *Athens*, by one whose Name was *Athlias*, *Diogenes* being present said, *Athlias* from *Athlias*, by *Athlias* to *Athlias*, alluding to the Name, which implieth *Misery.*

Perdiccas threatning him with Death, unless he would come unto him; *that is no great Matter*, saith he, *for a* Cantharides *or* Spider *may do as much; you should rather have threatned, that you would have lived well without me.*

He often said, *the Gods had given to Men an easy Life, but that it was hidden from those who used choice Diet, Unguents, and the like*; whence to one whose Servant put on his Cloaths, *You will not be truly happy*, saith he, *until he wipe your Nose also*, that is, *when you have lost the Use of your Hands.*

Seeing some that had the Charge of the Things belonging to the Temple, leading a Man to Prison, who had stolen a Cup out of the Treasury, *the great Thieves*, saith he, *lead Prisoners the lesser.*

To a young Man that was throwing Stones at a Gibbet, *Well done*, saith he, *you will be sure to hit the Mark.*

To some young Men that coming about him, said, *Take heed you do not bite us. Fear not Boys*, said he, Diogenes *eats not Beets* [for so he termed effeminate Persons.]

To one Feasting, cloathed in a Lion's Skin, *Do not*, saith he, *defile Virtue's Livery.*

To one extolling the Happiness of *Callisthenes*, in that living with *Alexander* he had plenty of all Things. *Nay*, saith he, *he is not happy, for he dines and sups when* Alexander *pleases.*

When he wanted Money, he said he went to redemand, not borrow of his Friends.

Seeing a young Man going along with some great Persons to a Feast, he took him from them, and carried him to his own Friends, bidding them to look to him better.

To one neatly dressed, who had ask'd him some Question, *I cannot answer you*, said he, *unless I know whether you were a Man or a Woman.*

[c] Of a young Man playing at *Cottabus* in a Bath, *By how much the better*, saith he, *so much the worse.*

At a Feast, one threw a Bone to him as to a Dog, which he, like a Dog, took up, and lifting his Leg, πεσσόυεισεν αὐτοῖς

Orators, and all such as sought Glory by Speaking, he called τρισανθρώπους, thrice Men, instead of τρισαθλίους, thrice wretched.

He called an unlearned rich Man a *Sheep with a Golden Fleece.*

Seeing written upon the Gates of a Prodigal's House, To be Sold, *I knew*, saith he, *being so overcharg'd with Wine, it would vomit up the Owner.*

To a young Man, professing himself much displeased at the many Persons that courted him, *Let him see*, saith he, *that you are displeased, by casting off your Effeminacy.*

Of a foul Bath, *where*, saith he, *shall they be washed that wash here?*

A big Fellow that play'd on the Harp, tho' by all others discommended for playing ill, he praised; being ask'd why, *Because*, saith he, *being an able Fellow, he chooseth rather to play on the Harp than to steal.*

A certain Harper who play'd so ill, that the Company always went away and left him, he saluted thus, *Good-morrow, Cock*; the other asking

[a] Stob. Ser. 4. [b] Et Plut. de curiositate. [c] Vit. Athena.

why,

why, *becauſe*, ſaith he, *your Muſick maketh every one riſe.*

Seeing a young Man doing ſomething, which tho' 'twere ordinary, he conceiv'd to be unſeemly, he filled his Boſom with Beans, and in that Manner walked thro' the People, to whom gazing upon him, *I wonder*, ſaith he, *you look at me, and not at him.*

Hegeſias deſiring to lend him ſome of his Writings, *You are a Fool*, ſaith he, Hegeſias, *who eat Figs not painted, but real; yet neglect true Exercitation, and ſeek after the written.*

Seeing one that had won the Victory at the Olympick Exerciſes, feeding Sheep; *you have made haſte*, ſaith he, *good Man, from the* Olympick *Exerciſes to the Nemæan*, the Word alluding to the Feeding of Sheep.

Being demanded how it cometh to paſs that Wreſtlers are for the moſt Part ſtupid Fellows, he anſwered, *becauſe they are made chiefly of the Skins of Oxen and Swine.*

To a Tyrant, demanding of him what Braſs was beſt, he anſwered, *that whereof the Statues of* Harmodius *and* Ariſtogiton *were made.* This others aſcribe to *Plato.*

Being asked how *Dionyſius* uſeth his Friends, *as Veſſels*, ſaith he, *emptying the full, and throwing away the empty.*

A young Man newly married, having written upon his Houſe, *The Son of* Jupiter, Hercules, Callinicus *dwelleth here, let nothing ill enter*; he added, *Aſſiſtance after a Defeat*, implying it was too late, he being already married.

He ſaid Covetouſneſs is the Metropolis of all Evil.

Seeing one that had waſted all his Means, eating Olives, *If you had uſed to dine ſo*, ſaid he, *you would not have ſupp'd ſo.*

He ſaid, *Good Men are the Images of the Gods, Love is the Buſineſs of idle Perſons.*

Being asked what is the moſt miſerable Thing in Life, he ſaid, *an old Man in want.*

[d] Being demanded, the Bitings of what Beaſts were moſt dangerous; *of wild Beaſts*, ſaith he, *a Detractor*; *of Tame, a Flatterer.*

Beholding a Picture of two Centaurs very ill painted, he ſaid, *Which of theſe is* Chiron? The Jeſt conſiſteth in the *Greek* Word, which ſignifieth *worſe*, and was alſo the Name of a Centaur, Tutor to *Achilles.*

He ſaid, *the Diſcourſe of Flatterers is a Rope of Honey. He called the Belly the Charybdis of Life.*

Hearing that *Didymo*, an Adulterer was taken; *he deſerves*, ſaith he, *to be put out of his Name* (meaning emaſculated.)

[e] Being asked why Gold looks pale; *becauſe*, ſaith he, *many lie wait for it.*

Seeing a Woman carried in a Litter; *that is not*, ſaith he, *a fit Cage for ſuch a Beaſt.*

Seeing a Servant that had run away from his Maſter, ſitting upon the Brink of a Well: *Young Man*, ſaith he, *take Heed you do not fall in:* Alluding to the Puniſhment of fugitive Servants.

Seeing one that uſed to ſteal Garments in the Bath; he ſaid, ἐπ' ἀλομμάτιον ἢ ἐπ' ἄλλο ἱμάτιον, *Do you come for Unguents, or for another Garment?*

Seeing ſome Women hanged upon an Olive-tree; I would, ſaith he, *all Trees bore the ſame Fruit.*

Seeing a Thief that uſed to rob Tombs, he ſpoke to him in that Verſe of *Homer*,

——— *What now of Men the beſt,*
Com'ſt thou to plunder the Deceas't?

Seeing a handſome Youth all alone aſleep, he awaked him, ſaying in the Words of *Homer*, *Awake.*

Μή τίς σοι εὐδοντι μεταφρενῶ ἐν δόρυ πήξη,

To one that feaſted ſumptuouſly, he ſaid that Verſe of *Homer.*

Son thou haſt but a little Time to live.

Plato diſcourſing concerning *Ideas*, and naming τραπεζότητα, and κυαθότητα, as if he ſhould ſay, *Tableity* and *Cuppeity*, he ſaid, *I ſee* Plato, *the Table and the Cup, but not the Tableity and Cuppeity. Plato* anſwered, It is true indeed, you have Eyes by which the *Table* and *Cup* are ſeen; but not an Intellect, by which *Tableity* and *Cuppeity* are ſeen.

Being demanded what he thought *Socrates*; he anſwered, *mad.* Being demanded at what Time a Man ſhould marry; *a young Man*, ſaith, *not yet*; *an old Man not at all.*

To one that asked, what he ſhould give him to let him ſtrike him, he anſwered, *a Helmet.*

To a young Man dreſſing himſelf neatly; [f] *if this*, ſaith he, *be for the Sake of Men, you are unhappy, if for Women, you are unjuſt.*

Seeing a young Man bluſh; *Take Courage*, ſaith he, *that is the Colour of Virtue.*

Hearing two Men plead againſt one another, he condemned both, ſaying, *One had ſtolen, the other had not loſt.*

Being demanded what Wine he thought moſt pleaſant, he anſwered, *That which is drunk at another's Coſt.*

To one that ſaid, many deride thee; he anſwered, *but I am not derided:* As conceiving,

d Et Stob. Ser. 65. e Stob. Ser. 55. f Stob. Ser. 161.

ſaith *Plutarch*, [g] thoſe only to be derided, who are troubled at ſuch Things.

To one who ſaid, Life is an ill Thing: *Life*, ſaith he, *is not an ill Thing, but an ill Life is an ill Thing.*

[h] As he was dining upon Olives, they cauſed a Tart to be ſet before him, which he threw away, ſaying,

Stranger, when Kings approach, withdraw.

The Words of *Laius*'s Officers to *Oedipus*.

Being asked what Kind of Dog he was, he anſwered, *When he was hungry, a Spaniel; when his Belly was full, a Maſtiff; one of thoſe which many commend, but dare not take Abroad with them a hunting.*

Being demanded whether wiſe Men might eat Dainties; *all Things*, ſaith he, *as well as others.*

[i] Being demanded why Men gave to Beggars, and not to Philoſophers; *becauſe*, ſaith he, *they are afraid they may be lame or blind, but are not afraid they may be Philoſophers.*

To one that reproached him as having counterfeited Money; *indeed*, ſaith he, *there was a Time when I was ſuch a one as you are; but the Time will never come that you will be as I am.*

Coming to *Mindus*, and ſeeing the Gates very large, the City ſmall, *Mindinians*, ſaith he, *ſhut your Gates, leſt your City run out at them.*

Seeing a Thief that was taken ſtealing Purple, he applied that Verſe of *Homer* to him,

The Purple Death, and potent Fate have ſeiz'd.

To *Craterus*, who invited him to come to him, he returned Anſwer, *I had rather lick Salt at* Athens, *than enjoy the greateſt Delicacies with* Craterus.

Meeting *Anaximenes* the Orator, who was very fat; *give us*, ſaith he, *ſome of your Fleſh, it will eaſe you, and help us.*

The ſame *Anaximenes* being in the Midſt of a Diſcourſe, *Diogenes* ſhewing a Piece of Salt-fiſh, diverted the Attention of his Auditors; whereat *Anaximenes* growing angry, *ſee*, ſaith he, *a hard Pennyworth of Salt-fiſh hath broke off* Anaximenes's *Diſcourſe.*

Some aſcribe this to him. *Plato* ſeeing him waſh Herbs, came and whiſpered thus to him; if you had followed *Dionyſius*, you would not have needed to waſh Herbs; to whom he returned this Anſwer in his Ear, *If you had waſhed Herbs, you needed not to have followed* Dionyſius.

To one that ſaid to him, many laugh at you; *And Aſſes perhaps at them*, ſaith he, *but they care not for Aſſes, nor I for them.*

Seeing a young Man ſtudying Philoſophy: Well done, ſaith he, you will teach thoſe who love your outward Beauty, to admire your Soul.

To one that admired the Multitude of votive Offerings in *Samothracia*, given by ſuch as had eſcaped Shipwreck: *There would have been far more*, ſaith he, *if thoſe who periſhed had preſented theirs.* Others aſcribe this to *Diagoras* the *Melian.*

To a young Man going to a Feaſt, he ſaid, You will come back *Chiron* (alluding to the Word which implieth *worſe*) the young Man came to him the next Day, ſaying, I went and returned not *Chiron*: No, ſaith he, *not* Chiron *but* Eurition.

Returning from *Lacedæmon* to *Athens*, to one that asked him from whence he came, and whither he went: *From Men*, ſaith he, *to Women.*

Returning from the Olympick Games, to one that asked if there were much People there; *Much People*, ſaith he, *but few Men.*

He compared Prodigals to Fig-trees growing on a Precipice, whoſe Fruit Men taſte not, but Crows and Vultures devour.

Phryne the *Curtezan* having ſet up a golden Statue of *Venus* at *Delphi*, he wrote on it, *From the Intemperance of the* Grecians.

Alexander coming to him, and ſaying, I am *Alexander* the great King: *And I*, ſaith he, *am* Diogenes *the Dog.*

Being asked why he was called *Dog*: *I fawn on thoſe that give*, ſaith he, *I bark at thoſe that will not give, and I bite the Wicked.*

As he was gathering Figs, the Keeper of the Orchard ſpying him, told him, it is not long ſince a Man was hang'd upon that Tree: *And for that Reaſon*, ſaith he, *I will cleanſe it.*

[k] Obſerving *Dioxippus* the Olympick Victor, to caſt many Glances upon the Curtezan: *See*, ſaith he, *a common Woman leads the martial Ram by the Neck.*

To two infamous Perſons ſtealing away from him; *Fear not*, ſaith he, *Dogs eat not Thiſtles.*

To one that asked him concerning a Youth taken in Adultery, whence he was; he anſwered, *Of* Tegea; Tegea (*a City of* Arcadia) whereto he alluded, is a publick Brothel.

Seeing one that in former Times had been an ill Wreſtler, profeſs Medicine; *What is the Matter*, ſaith he, *have you a Deſign to caſt thoſe down that have thrown you?*

Seeing the Son of a common Woman throw Stones amongſt a Crowd; *Take Heed*, ſaith he, *you do not hit your Father.*

g Vit. Fab. Max. h Stob. Ser. 17. i Stob. Ser. 77. k Æl. 12. 58.

To a Youth, ſhewing him a Sword, given him by one that loved him, he ſaid, ἡ μὲν μαχαιρα καλὴ ἡ δὲ λαβὴ αἰσχρά.

To ſome that extolled one who had beſtowed ſomething on him; *But you do not praiſe me*, ſaith he, *who deſerved to receive it.*

To one that redemanded an old Cloak of him, *If you give it me*, ſaith he, *I muſt keep it; if you lent it me, I muſt make Uſe of it.*

To a ſuppoſititious Perſon that ſaid to him, You have Gold in your Cloak, *Yes*, ſaith he, *and for that Reaſon I lay it* [1] *under me when I go to ſleep.*

Being demanded what he had gained by Philoſophy, *If nothing elſe*, ſaith he, *at leaſt this, to be prepared for all Fortunes.*

Being demanded of what Country he was, he anſwered, *A Citizen of the World.*

To one that ſacrificed, praying he might have a Child, *You pray for a Child*, ſaith he, *but never trouble yourſelf what Kind of Child it may prove.*

At an Ordinary, being demanded Money, he anſwered the Maſter in that Verſe of *Homer*,

Ask others, but from Hector *hold thy Hand.*

He ſaid, *The Miſtreſſes of Kings were Queens, for the Kings did whatſoever they would have them.*

The *Athenians* having decreed to ſtile *Alexander*, *Bacchus*; *And make me*, ſaith he, *Serapis.*

To one reproaching him for living in filthy Places, *The Sun*, ſaith he, *viſits Kennels, yet is not defiled.*

Being at Supper in the Temple, they brought him coarſe Bread, he threw it away, ſaying, *Nothing but what is pure muſt come within a Temple.*

To one that ſaid, Why do you, who know nothing, profeſs Philoſophy? He anſwered, *Tho' I ſhould but pretend to ſtudy Philoſophy, yet that were a Profeſſion thereof.*

To one that recommended his Son to him, ſaying, he was very ingenious, and exceeding well educated; He anſwered, *Why then doth he need me?*

Thoſe who ſpeak good Things, but do them not, differ nothing from a Lute, for that neither hears, nor hath Senſe.

He went to the Theatre, as all the People were going out; being asked why he did ſo, *This*, ſaith he, *is that I ſtudy all my Lifetime.*

Seeing an effeminate young Man, *Are you not aſhamed*, ſaith he, *to uſe yourſelf worſe than Nature hath done? She hath made you a Man, but you will force yourſelf to be a Woman.*

Seeing an ignorant Man tuning a Lute, *Are you not aſhamed*, ſaith he, *to try to make a Lute ſound harmoniouſly, and yet ſuffer your Life to be ſo full of Diſcord?*

To one that ſaid he was unfit for Philoſophy, *Why do you live*, ſaith he, *if you care not for living honeſtly?*

To one who deſpiſed his own Father, *Are you not aſhamed*, ſaith he, *to deſpiſe him who is the Cauſe you are ſo proud?*

Hearing a handſome Youth ſpeak fooliſhly, *Are you not aſhamed*, ſaith he, *to draw a Leaden Dagger out of an Ivory Sheath?*

Being reproached for accepting a Cloak from *Antipater*, he anſwered in thoſe Words of *Homer*,

The Gifts of Gods muſt not be thrown away.

One that hit him with a Pole, and then bid him take Heed, he ſtruck with his Staff, and ſaid, *and take you Heed.*

To one that ſued to a Curteſan, *What mean you, Wretch*, ſaith he, *to ſue for that which is much better to miſs?*

To one that ſmelled ſweet of Unguents, *Take Heed*, ſaith he, *this Perfume make not your Life ſtink.*

He ſaid, *Slaves ſerve their Maſters, and wicked Men their Paſſions.*

Being demanded why Slaves are called Ἀνδράποδα, *Footmen*, becauſe, ſaith he, *they have Feet like Men, but ſuch Minds as you that ask the Queſtion.*

Seeing an unskilful Archer going to ſhoot, he ſat down at the Mark, *Leſt*, ſaith he, *he ſhould hit me.*

He ſaid, *Lovers are unhappy in Pleaſure.*

Being demanded whether Death be ill, *How*, ſaith he, *can that be ill, whereof when it cometh we have no Senſe?*

Alexander coming to him, and ſaying, Do you not fear me? What, ſaith he, are you Good or Ill? He anſwered, Good; *Who*, replies *Diogenes*, *fears that which is Good.*

He ſaid, *Learning is a Regulation to young Men, a Comfort to old Men, Wealth to poor Men, and an Ornament to rich Men.*

To *Didymo* an Adulterer curing a Maid's Eye, *Take Heed*, ſaith he, *leſt in curing the Eye you hurt not the Ball*, [the Word κόρη ſignifying both Eye ball and Virginity.]

To one that ſaid, his Friends lay in wait for him, *What then is to be done, if Friends and Enemies muſt be uſed alike?*

Being demanded what is beſt amongſt Men, he anſwered, *Freedom of Speech.*

Coming into a School, and ſeeing there many Statues of the Muſes, but few Auditors, *By the Help of the Gods, Maſter*, ſaith he, *you have many Auditors.*

[m] To one that asked him how he might order himſelf beſt, *By reprehending*, ſaith he, *thoſe Things in yourſelf which you blame in others.*

[n] He gave good Counſel to a Perſon very diſſo-

1 The Jeſt conſiſteth in the Alluſion betwixt two Greek Words ὑποκολιμαῖος and ὑποκεκλιμένος. m Stob. Eth. Ser. 1. n Ser. 4.

lute;

lute; being demanded what he was doing, he answered, *Washing an* Ethiopian.

He went backwards into the School of the *Stoicks*, whereat some laughing, *Are you ashamed*, saith he, *to do that in the whole Course of your Life, for which you deride me in Walking?*

[p] He said, *Men provide for their Living, but not for their well Living.*

[q] He said, *It was a Shame to see Wrestlers and Singing-Masters observe temperate Diet, and moderate their Pleasures, one for Exercise, the other for his Voice, and yet no Man would do so much for Virtue's Sake.*

[r] He said, *Pride, like a Shepherd, driveth Men whither it pleaseth.*

[s] Seeing the high Walls of *Megara*, he said, *Unhappy People, mind not the Height of your Walls, but the Height of their Courages, who are to stand on the Walls.*

[t] *He compared covetous Men to such as have the Dropsy, those are full of Money, yet desire more; these have Water, yet thirst after more: Passions grow more intense by Enjoyment of what they desire.*

[u] Seeing a Man make Love to an old rich Widow; *This Love*, saith he, *is not blind but toothless.*

[w] Being demanded what Beasts were the worst? *In the Field*, saith he, *Bears and Lions; in the City, Usurers and Sycophants.*

[x] *He compared Flattery to an empty Tomb, on which* Friendship *was inscribed.*

[y] *Blaming* Antisthenes *for being too remiss in Discourse, in regard that when he spoke loudest, he could hardly be heard, and calling himself the Trumpet of Reproof*; Antisthenes *replied, He was like a Bee, that makes no great Noise, yet stings sharply.*

[z] He said, *Reproof is the good of others.*

[a] A certain *Athenian* asking him why he lived not with the *Lacedemonians*, whom he praised so much; *Physicians*, saith he, *tho' they study Health, converse with the Sick.*

[b] He said, *Other Dogs bark at their Enemies, I my Friends, that I may preserve them.*

[c] He asked *Plato, if he were writing Laws*; *Plato* affirmed he was. *Did you not write a Common-wealth before*, saith *Diogenes? I did*, answers *Plato. And had not that Common-wealth Laws*, said he? The other answering it had; *To what End*, replied *Diogenes, do you write new Laws?*

[d] He said, *To give Physick to a dead Body, or advise an old Man, is the same Thing.*

[e] To a bald Man that reviled him, *I will not return your Reproaches*, saith he, *yet cannot but commend your Hair, for leaving so bad a Head.*

[f] To an Informer that fell out with him; *I am glad*, saith he, *of the Enmity betwixt us, for you hurt not your Foes, but your Friends.*

[g] To one that reviled him; *No Man*, saith he, *will believe you when you speak ill of me, no more than they would me, if I should speak well of you.*

[h] *Alexander* sent him a Dish full of Bones with this Message, it was meet for Dogs; he answered, *Yea, but not for a King to send.*

[i] He said, *It was the same Fault to give to them that deserved nothing, as not to give to them that do.*

[k] He said, *As Houses where there is Plenty of Meat are full of Mice, so the Bodies of such as eat much, are full of Diseases.*

[l] At a Feast, one giving him a great Cup full of Wine, he threw it away, for which being blamed, *If I had drunk it*, saith he, *not only the Wine would have been lost, but I also.*

[m] Being demanded what was hardest, he answered, *To know ourselves, for we construe most Things according to our own Partiality.*

[n] He said, *Medea was a wise Woman, and not a Witch, who by Labour and Exercise corroborated the Bodies of effeminate Persons, whence arose the Fable, that she could renew Age.*

To [o] one that professed himself a *Philosopher*, but argued litigiously, he said, *Why do you spoil the best Part of Philosophy, yet would be thought a Philosopher?*

[p] Questioning one of those young Men that followed him, he was silent; whereupon *Diogenes, Do you not think*, saith he, *it belongs to the same Man to know when to speak, and when to hold his Peace?*

[q] *Being demanded how a Man should live under the Authority of Superiors; as we do by Fire*, saith he, *not too near, lest it burn; not too far off, lest we freeze.*

[r] Seeing some Women talk privately together, he said, *the Asp borrows Poison from the Viper.*

[s] Being demanded what was the heaviest Burden the Earth bears, he answered, *An ignorant Man.*

[t] An Astrologer in the *Forum*, discoursing to the People, and shewing them in a Tablet the *Erratick Stars*; *No*, saith *Diogenes, it is not the Stars that err, but these*, pointing to the People.

[u] Being demanded what Men are the most noble; *They*, saith he, *who contemn Wealth, Glory, and Pleasure, and over-master the Contraries to these, Poverty, Ignominy, Pain, Death.*

[w] Seeing the Servants of *Anaximenes*, carrying many Goods, he demanded to whom they belonged; they answered, to *Anaximenes. Is he not ashamed*, replied *Diogenes, to have so much Houshold Stuff, and yet not be Master of himself?*

[x] He said, *Virtue dwelleth neither in a rich City, nor a private House.*

[y] He said, *Poverty is a self-taught Help to Philosophy; for what Philosophy endeavours to perswade by Words, Poverty enforceth in Practice.*

o Ser. 4. p Ibid. q Ser. 64. r Ser. 7. s Ibid. t Ser. 14. u Ser. 13. w Ibid. x Ibid. y Ibid. z Ibid. a Ibid. b Ibid. c Ibid. d Ser. 8. e Ser. 53. f Ser. 54. g Ibid. h Ser. 67. i Ibid. k Ibid. l Ser. 69. m Ser. 81. n Ser. 29. o Ser. 33. p Ser. 34. q Ser. 104, & 105. r Ser. 124. s Ser. 134. t Ser. 88. u Ser. 139. w Ser. 140. x Ser. 91. y Ser. 93.

[z] To a wicked Man reproaching him for his Poverty; *I never knew*, ſaith he, *any Man puniſhed for Poverty, but many for Wickedneſs.*

[a] *He called Poverty a ſelf-inſtructing Virtue.*

[b] To one that reproached him with Poverty; *What mean you*, ſaith he? *Poverty never made a Tyrant, Riches many.*

[c] *Alexander* ſeeing him aſleep in his Tub, ſaid, *O Tub full of Wiſdom.* The Philoſopher riſing up, anſwered, *Great King,*

One Drop of Fortune's better far,
Than Tubs replete with Wiſdom are.

To whom a Stander-by replied,

One Drop of Wiſdom, Fortune's Seas excells.
In unwiſe Souls Misfortune ever dwells.

[d] Seeing an old Woman painted, *If this be for the Living you are deceived*, ſaith he, *if for the Dead, make Haſte to them.*

[e] To one bewailing his own Misfortune, as that he ſhould not die in his own Country, *Be of Comfort*, ſaith he, *the Way to the next World is alike in every Place.*

[f] Having a great Pain in his Shoulder which troubled him much, one ſaid to him in Deriſion, Why doſt thou not die, *Diogenes*, and free thyſelf from this Miſery? He anſwered, *It is fit they ſhould live, who know how to order their Life; for you who know not what to do or ſay, it is a convenient Time to die.*

[g] He uſed to ſay, Ariſtotle *dineth when* Philip *pleaſeth, but* Diogenes *when it pleaſeth* Diogenes.

[h] At *Corinth*, ſeeing *Dionyſius* the younger, who was depoſed from the Kingdom of *Sicily*, *This is a Life*, ſaith he, *you deſerve not, you merit rather not to live here freely and without Fear, but at home in perpetual Impriſonment.*

[i] To ſome who commended *Plato*, he ſaid, *What hath he done worthy Commendation, having profeſſed Philoſophy ſo long, yet never moved any to Grief.*

[k] To one demanding how he might take the greateſt Revenge upon his Enemy, he anſwered, *By being good and virtuous yourſelf.*

[l] In commending his Maſter *Antiſthenes*, he would ſay of him, *Of Rich, he made me Poor; and inſtead of a fair Houſe, made me live in a Tub.*

CHAP. VI.

His Writings.

OF the Writings aſcribed to him are theſe.

Dialogues.
Ichthyas.
The Geay.
The Leopard.
The Athenian People.
Policy.
Ethick Art.
Of Riches.
Erotick.
Theodorus.
Hypſias.
Ariſtarchus.
Of Death.
Epiſtles.
Tragedies, 7. viz.
Helena.
Thyeſtes.
Hercules.
Achilles.
Medea.
Chryſippus.
OEdipus.

Soſicrates and *Satyrus* affirm, that none of theſe were written by *Diogenes*; the Tragedies *Statyrus* aſcribes to *Philiſcus* of *Ægina*, *Socion* affirmeth theſe only to have been written by *Diogenes.*

Of Virtue.
Of Good.
Erotick.
The Poor.
The Tolerant.
The Leopard.
Caſſander.
Cephalio.
Philiſcus.
Ariſtarchus.
Siſiphus.
Ganymede.
Chrias, and *Epiſtles.*

CHAP. VII.

His Death.

HE [m] died, as *Demetrius* ſaith, at *Corinth*, about 90 Years old, the ſame Day that *Alexander* died at *Babylon*; which, according to *Ælian*, was the ſeventh of *Thargelion*, in the firſt Year of the 114th Olympiad.

The Manner of his Death is variouſly related. *Eubulus* ſaith, he lived to his End with *Xeniades*, and was buried by his Sons. As he lay ſick, *Xeniades* asked him how he would be buried; he anſwered, with his Face downward; *Xeniades* demanding the Reaſon, *Becauſe*, ſaith he, *all Things will be turned upſide down*; alluding, ſaith *Laertius*, to the Greatneſs of the *Macedonians*, who not long before were a poor inconſiderable People. Some

z Ser. 93. a Ibid. b Ser. 95. c Ibid. d Ser. 270. e Ser. 96. f Æl. var. hiſt. 10, 11. g Plut. de Exul.
h Plut. quorum. ger. Reſp. i Plut. de vert. Moral. k Plut. aud. de Poet. l Macrob. Sat. 7. 3. m Laert. 6. 79. var. hiſt. 1. 25.

report

report, that being near Death, he gave Order that his Body ſhould be left unburied, that the wild Beaſts might partake of him, or be thrown into a Ditch, and a little Duſt be caſt over it; or thrown upon a Dunghill, that he might benefit his Brethren.

[n] *Ælian* ſaith, that being ſick to Death, he threw himſelf down from a Bridge which was near the Gymnaſium, and ordered the Keeper of the *Paleſtra* to take his Body and throw it into the River *Iliſſus*.

Others affirm, he died of a Surfeit of raw Fleſh; others, that he ſtop'd his own Breath; others, that cutting a Cuttle-fiſh in Pieces to throw it to Dogs, it bit aſunder a Nerve in his Foot, whereof he died.

Others affirm, he died as he was going to the Olympick Games: Being taken with a Fever, he lay down by the Way, and would not ſuffer his Friends to carry him; but ſitting under the Shade of the next Tree, ſpoke thus to them; *This Night I ſhall be a Victor, or vanquiſhed; if I overcome the Fever, I will come to the Games; if not, I muſt go to the other World, and drive it away by Death.*

Antiſthenes ſaith [o], his Friends were of Opinion he ſtopp'd his own Breath; for coming, as they conſtantly uſed, to viſit him in the *Cranæum* where he lived, they found him covered. They did not imagine it was Sleep, by Reaſon of his great Wakefulneſs; but immediately putting back his Cloak, perceived he was dead. Hereupon there aroſe a Contention amongſt them who ſhould bury him; they fell from Words to Blows; but the Magiſtrates and great ones of the City, came themſelves and buried him by the Gate which leads to *Iſthmus*. Over the Sepulchre they placed a Column, and upon it a Dog cut out of *Parian* Stone. Afterwards his own Countrymen honoured him with many brazen Statues, bearing this Inſcription;

Time doth the ſtrongeſt Braſs decay;
Diogenes, *thou ne'er canſt die,*
Who to content the ready Way
To following Ages didſt deſcry.

Laertius reckons *five* of this Name; the *firſt* of *Apollonia*, a Natural Philoſopher.
The *ſecond*, a *Sicionian*.
The *third* this.
The *fourth* a *Stoick* of *Seleucia*.
The *fifth* of *Tarſis*.

n Var. hiſt. 8. 14.

o Laert. 2. 77.

MONIMUS.

MOnimus was a *Siracuſian* [p], Diſciple to *Diogenes*; he was firſt Servant to a Money-changer, to whom *Xeniades*, who bought *Diogenes*, often coming, he was ſo taken with the Worth and Virtue of the Perſon, that he counterfeited himſelf mad, and threw all the Money from off the Table, whereupon his Maſter turning him away, he betook himſelf to *Diogenes*. He followed likewiſe *Crates* the Cynick, and others of that Sect, which confirmed his Maſter in the Opinion that he was mad. He was a Perſon eloquent and learned, mentioned by *Meander* in his *Hippocramus*; of ſo great Conſtancy, that he contemned all Glory for Virtue's Sake. He wrote ſome Things, which at firſt Appearance ſeemed ludicrous, but contained deep ſerious Senſe; as of *Appetites*, two Books, and a *Protreptick*.

p Laert. 6. 82.

ONESICRITUS.

ONeſicritus [q] was of *Ægina*; or, according to *Demetrius*, an *Aſtypalæan*; he had two Sons; he ſent the Younger, named *Androſthenes*, to *Athens*, who hearing *Diogenes*, would not depart thence. Hereupon he ſent the Elder, named *Phiſcus*, who ſtaid there likewiſe for the ſame Reaſon. Laſtly, the Father himſelf went, and was ſo much taken with *Diogenes*, that he became a ſedulous Auditor of him, as his two Sons were.

He was eſteemed amongſt the moſt eminent Diſ-

q Laert. 6. 84.

ciples

ciples of *Diogenes*. *Laertius* compares him with *Xenophon*; one fought under *Cyrus*, the other under *Alexander*. One wrote the *Inſtitution of* Cyrus; the other the *Praiſe of* Alexander. Their Stiles alſo were very like.

CRATES.

Crates[r] was a *Theban*, Son of *Aſcondas*; he was likewiſe reckoned amongſt the moſt eminent of *Diogenes*'s Diſciples; yet *Hippobotus* ſaith, he was not a Diſciple of *Diogenes*, but of *Bryſo* the *Achæan*.

He flouriſhed about the 113th Olympiad. *Antiſthenes*, in his *Succeſſions*, ſaith, that being at a Tragedy where *Telephus* was repreſented carrying a Basket in a ſordid Condition, he betook himſelf to the *Cynical* Philoſophy, and ſelling all his Eſtate (for he was very rich, having gotten together above two hundred Talents) he diſtributed it amongſt the Citizens, and was ſo conſtant a Profeſſor of this Philoſophy, that *Philemon*, the Comick Poet, takes Notice thereof in theſe Words,

By him in Summer a thick Coat was worn.
In Winter-time (ſo temperate) *a torn.*

Diocles ſaith, *Diogenes* perſuaded him to part with his Eſtate, and to throw all the Money he had left into the Sea; and that the Houſe of *Crates* was from *Alexander*, that of *Hipparchia* his Wife, from *Philip*. Some of his near Friends that came to him to diſſuade him from this Courſe of Life, he beat away, for he was of a reſolute Spirit.

Demetrius the *Magneſian*, ſaith, he depoſited ſome Money in the Hands of a Banker, with this Condition, *that if his Sons betook themſelves to any Civil Employments, it ſhould be repaid again, but if to Philoſophy, it ſhould be diſtributed amongſt the People*, for as much as a Philoſopher ſtands in need of nothing.

Eratoſthenes relates, that having a Son named *Paſicles*, by his Wife *Hipparchia*, as ſoon as he arrived at Man's Eſtate, he brought him to the Houſe of a young Maid that was his Slave, ſaying, *This is a hereditary Matrimony to you; but thoſe who commit Adultery are, according to the Tragedians, puniſhed with Baniſhment or Death; thoſe who keep Concubines were, according to the Comedians, by Luxury and Drunkenneſs, tranſported to Madneſs.*

Paſicles, the Diſciple to *Euclid*, was his Brother.

He ſaid, 'tis not poſſible to find a Man without a Fault, for in every Pomegranat there is at leaſt one Grain corrupt.

Having diſpleaſed *Nicodromus* a *Lutiniſt*, he beat him black and blue; whereupon he paſted a Piece of Paper on his Forehead, wherein was written, Nicodromus *did this*.

He was exceedingly invective againſt common Women.

He reproved *Demetrius Phalereus* for ſending Bread and Wine to him, ſaying, *I wiſh the Fountains alſo produced Bread*, intimating, that he lived with Water.

The *Athenian* Magiſtrates blamed him for wearing a long Robe; *I will ſhew you*, Theophraſtus, ſays he, *in the ſame Attire*; which they not believing, he brought them to a Barber's Shop, where he was ſitting to be trimm'd.

At *Thebes*, being beaten by the Maſter of the *Gymnaſium*, or as others, at *Corinth* by *Euthycrates*, he laughed, ſaying,

He by the Foot him drew,
And o'er the Threſhold threw.

Zeno in his *Chiras* ſaith, *he ſowed a Sheep-skin upon his Cloak, to appear the more deformed.* He was of a very unhandſome Look, and whilſt he diſcourſed, laughed.

He uſed to lift up his Hands and ſay, *Be of good Courage*, Grecians, *both for the Eyes and all other Parts, for you ſhall ſoon ſee theſe Deriders ſurpriſed by Sickneſs, and proclaiming you happy, blame their own Slothfulneſs.*

He ſaid, we ought ſo long to ſtudy Philoſophy, until the Leaders of the Army ſeem to be Horſe-drivers.

He ſaid, they who lived with Flatterers were forſaken Perſons, living like Sheep amidſt Wolves, nor with thoſe who wiſh'd them well.

Perceiving he drew nigh to Death, he looked upon himſelf, ſaying,

——*And doſt thou go, old Friend,*
To the next World, thou whom old Age doth bend?

for he was crooked thro' Age.

To *Alexander*, asking, whether he would that his Country ſhould be reſtored, or not; *To what End*, ſaith he, *ſeeing there will come perhaps another* Alexander *and depopulate it.* He ſaid, *Contempt of Glory and Want were his Country, which were not ſubject to Fortune*, and that he was Countryman to *Diogenes*, not fearing any Body.

Coming into the *Forum*, where he beheld ſome buying, others ſelling, [s] *Theſe*, ſaith he, *think them-*

r Laert. 6. §5. 10.

s Stob. Ser. 5.

ſelves happy in Employments contrary to one another, but I think myſelf happy in having nothing to do either Way.

To a young Man followed by a great many Paraſites, *Young Man*, ſaith he, *I am ſorry to ſee you ſo much alone.*

He ſaid, *we ought not to accept Gifts from all Men, for Virtue ought not to be maintained by Vice.*

[t] Seeing at *Delphi* a golden Image of *Phryne* the Curtezan, he cried out, *This is a Trophy of the* Grecian *Intemperance.*

Seeing a young Man highly fed and fat, *Unhappy Youth*, ſaith he, *do not fortify your Priſon.*

He ſaid, *He gained Glory, not by his Riches, but his Poverty.*

To one, demanding what he ſhould get by Philoſophy: *You will learn*, ſaith he, *to open your Purſe eaſily, and give readily, not as you do now, turning away, delaying and trembling, as if you had the Palſey.*

He ſaid, *Men know not how much a Wallet, a Meaſure of Lupines, and Security of Mind is worth.*

The Epiſtles of *Crates* are extant, wherein, ſaith *Laertius*, he writes excellent Philoſophy, in Stile reſembling *Plato*. He wrote *Tragedies* likewiſe, full of deep Philoſophy.

He died old, and was buried in *Bœotia.*

t Serm. 16.

METROCLES.

Metrocles was Diſciple of *Crates*, Brother to *Hipparchia*. He firſt heard *Theophraſtus* the *Peripatetick*, &c. afterwards apply'd himſelf to *Crates*, and became an eminent Philoſopher.

He burnt, as *Hecaton* ſaith, his Writings, ſaying,

Theſe are the Dreams of wild fantaſtick Youth.

He burnt likewiſe the Dictates of his Maſter *Theophraſtus.*

Vulcan *come hither*, Venus *needs thy Aid.*

He ſaid, *Of Things, ſome are purchaſed by Money, as Houſes; ſome by Time and Diligence, as Learning: Riches are hurtful, if not rightly apply'd.*

He died old, he ſtrangled himſelf.

Of his Diſciples are remembered *Theombrotus* and *Cleomenes*. *Demetrius* of *Alexandria* was Auditor of *Theombrotus*; *Timarchus* of *Alexandria*, and *Echicles* of *Epheſus* were Diſciples of *Cleomenes*. *Echicles* heard alſo *Theombrotus*, from whom came *Menedemus*, of whom hereafter. Amongſt theſe was alſo *Menippus* of *Sinoppe.*

HIPPARCHIA.

Hipparchia was likewiſe taken with the Diſcourſes of thoſe *Cynicks*; ſhe was Siſter to *Metrocles*; they were both *Maronites.* She fell in Love with *Crates*, as well for his Diſcourſe as manner of Life, from which none of her Suitors, by their Wealth, Nobility or Beauty, could divert her, but that ſhe would beſtow herſelf upon *Crates*, threatning her Parents, if they would not ſuffer her to marry him, ſhe would kill herſelf. Hereupon her Parents went to *Crates*, deſiring him to diſſuade her from this Reſolution; which he endeavoured, but not prevailing, went away, and brought all the little Furniture of his Houſe and ſhewed her, *This*, ſaith he, *is your Husband, That the Furniture of your Houſe; conſider upon it, for you cannot be mine unleſs you follow the ſame Courſe of Life.* She immediately took him, and went up and down with him, and in publick, συνεγένετο, and went along with him to Feaſts.

At a Feaſt of *Lyſimachus* ſhe met *Theodorus* the Atheiſt, with whom ſhe argued thus, *If that, which if* Theodorus *do, be not unjuſtly done, neither is it unjuſtly done if* Hipparchia *do the ſame; but* Theodorus, *if he ſtrike himſelf, doth not unjuſtly, therefore* Hipparchia *doth not unjuſtly if ſhe ſtrike* Theodorus; *Theodorus* anſwered nothing, only plucked her by the Coat, which ſhe wore not like a Woman, but after the manner of the *Cynicks*; whereat *Hipparchia* was nothing moved; whereupon he ſaid,

Her Webb and Loom
She left at Home.

I did, ſaith ſhe, Theodorus, *and I think have not erred in chuſing to beſtow that Time which I ſhould have ſpent in Weaving, on Philoſophy.*

Much more, ſaith Laërtius [u] *is aſcribed to her.*

u Laert. 6. 96.

MENIP-

MENIPPUS.

Menippus was a *Cynick*, [w] a *Phœnician* by birth, Servant by Condition, as *Achaichus* affirms. *Diocles* ſaith, his Father was of *Pontus*, called *Bato*. *Menippus* for Acquiſition of Riches went to *Thebes*, and was made free of that City. He wrote nothing ſerious, all his Books being full of Mirth, not unlike the Writings of *Meleager*. *Hermippus* ſaith, he was named *Hemerodaniſta*, the Daily Uſurer, for he put out Money to Merchants upon Intereſt, and took Pawns; at laſt being cheated of all his Goods, he hanged himſelf.

Some ſay the Books that are aſcribed to him were writ by *Dionyſius* and *Zopyrus*, *Colophonians*, which being ludicrous, they gave to him as a Perſon diſpoſed that Way; they are reckoned thirteen.

Nœnia's.
Teſtaments.
Epiſtles, in the Perſons of the Gods.
Two Natural Philoſophers, Mathematicians and Grammarians.
Of Epicurus.

Laertius reckons Six of this Name. The *firſt* wrote the *Lydian* Story, and epitomiz'd *Xanthus*.
The *ſecond* this.
The *third*, a Sophiſt, of *Caria*.
The *fourth*, a Graver.
The *fifth* and *ſixth* Painters, both mentioned by *Apollodorus*.

w Laert. 6. 39.

MENEDEMUS.

Menedemus [x] was Diſciple of *Colotes*, of *Lampſacum*. He proceeded, as *Hippobotus* relates, to ſo great Extravagance, that he went up and down in the Habit of the Furies, declaring he was come from the World below to take Notice of ſuch as offended, and that he was to return thither to give an Account of them.

He went thus attired, *A dark Gown to his Heels, girt with a Purple Girdle; upon his Head an* Arcadian *Hat, on which were woven the Twelve Signs, tragick Buskins, a long Beard, in his Hand an Aſhen Staff.* Hitherto of the *Cynicks*.

x Laert. 6. 102.

THE

THE

HISTORY

OF

PHILOSOPHY.

THE EIGHTH PART,

Containing the *Stoick* Philoſophers.

ZENO.

CHAP. I.

His Country, Parents, firſt Studies.

THE Sect of *Stoicks* had its Original from the *Cynicks*, *Zeno* was the Author thereof, who having firſt been a Scholar of *Crates*, and afterwards a Hearer of other Philoſophers, at laſt inſtituted this new Sect. [a] He was born at *Cittium*, a *Greek* Sea-town, in the Iſle of *Cyprus*, with [b] a lock'd Haven, inhabited by *Phœnicians*, whence [c] he ſometimes was termed the *Phœnician*. His Father was called *Mnaſeas*, by ſome *Demeas*, a Merchant, whence was objected to *Zeno* the Obſcurity of his Birth and Country, as being [d] a Stranger, and of mean Parentage, whereof he was ſo far from being aſhamed, that [e] he refuſed to be made a Citizen of *Athens*, as conceiving it to be an undervaluing of his own Country; inſomuch as when [f] he contributed to a Bath in *Athens*, and his Name was inſcribed upon a Pillar with the Title of Philoſopher, he deſired they would add a *Cittiean*.

[g] *Zeno* (as *Hecaton* and *Apollonius Tyrius* relate) enquiring of the Oracle what Courſe he ſhould take to lead the beſt Courſe of Life, was anſwered, that he ſhould converſe with the Dead; whereupon he addicted himſelf to the Reading of ancient Authors.

[h] Herein he was not a little furthered by his Father, who, as *Demetrius* ſaith, trading frequently to *Athens*, brought him as yet but very young, many *Socratical* Books, which excited in him a great Affection to Learning.

[i] Being now ſeventeen (or as *Perſeus* twenty two) Years old, he took a Voyage to *Athens*, carried thither as well by his particular Inclination to Philoſophy, as by his Buſineſs, which was to ſell ſome Purple that he had brought out of *Phœnicia*. He took along with him a hundred Talents, and having ſold his Merchandiſe, applied himſelf to Philoſophy, yet continued to lend his Money out to Merchants upon Intereſt, ſo to improve his Stock.

Some affirm his Ship was caſt away in the *Piræum*, which News being brought him to *Athens*, he ſeemed nothing at all moved, but only ſaid, [k] *Thou doſt well, Fortune, to drive me into a Gown*; or as Seneca, *Fortune commands me to ſtudy Philoſophy more earneſtly.*

[l] Others ſay, That being troubled at the Loſs of his Ship, he went up to the City of *Athens*, and ſitting in a Bookſeller's Shop, read a Piece of *Xenophon*'s Commentaries, wherewith being much pleaſed, he asked the Bookſeller where ſuch Men lived;

[a] Laert. 7. 1. [b] Strab. lib. 14. [c] Suid. [d] Cic. Tuſc. quæſt. 5. c. 12. [e] Plut. de rep. Stoic. [f] Laert. [g] Laert. 7. 2. [h] Laert. 7. 31. [i] Laert. 7. 2. [k] Plut. de util. cap. ex inimic. [l] Laert. ibid.

Crates by Chance passed by, the Bookseller pointed to him, saying, *Follow that Man*, which he did, and from that Time forward, became a Disciple of *Crates*.

CHAP. II.

Of his Masters.

Zeno thus changing the Course of his Life, applied himself to *Crates*, [m] being apt to Philosophy, but more modest than suited with the Cynical Sect. Which *Crates* to remedy, gave him a Pot full of Pottage to carry through the Cetamick; and perceiving him to hide it, as ashamed, with his Coat, he struck the Pot with his Stick and broke it. *Zeno* running away, all wet, *What*, said he, *are you running away, little* Phœnician? *No body hurt you.* He made a little hollow Cover of a Pot, in which he carried the Money of his Master *Crates*, that it might be in Readiness when he went to buy Meat. Thus he lived a while with *Crates*, during which Time he writ his Book of the *Commonwealth*, whence some jesting, said, it was written under the Dog's Tail.

At last deserting *Crates*, he applied himself to *Stilpo* [n] the *Megarick* Philosopher. *Apollonius Tyrius* saith, That taking hold of his Cloak to pluck him away from *Stilpo*, he said, *O* Crates, *the Handles by which the Philosophers are to be taken hold of, are their Ears; lead me by those your Way, or else, tho' you constrain my Body to be with you, my Mind will be with* Stilpo. With *Stilpo* he remained ten Years.

From *Stilpo* he went to *Xenocrates*, being so well satisfied with the Instruction of these two Masters, that he said, *He made a very good Voyage when he was shipwreck'd*; tho' others apply it to his living with *Crates*.

[o] He afterwards applied himself to *Diodorus Cronus*, as *Hippobotus* avers, under whom he studied Dialectick, to which Science he was so much addicted, that [p] when a certain Philosopher of that Sect had informed him of seven Species of Dialectick, in that Fallacy which is called *the Mower*, he asked him what he was to give him for his Reward, the Philosopher demanded an hundred Pieces of Silver; *Zeno* (so much was he affected to Learning) gave him two hundred.

[q] Lastly, notwithstanding that he had made a great Progress in Philosophy, he heard *Polemon*, whose Doctrine was *against Pride*; whereupon *Polemon* told him, Zeno, *I am not ignorant that you ly in Ambush, and come slyly into my Garden* (as the *Phœnicians* use) *to steal away Learning.*

CHAP. III.

His School, and Institution of a Sect.

Having been long a Hearer of others, he at last thought fit to communicate the Learning which he had received and improved. To this End he made Choice of the ποικίλη στοὰ, *the painted Walk*, [r] so named from the Pictures of *Polygnotus*, otherwise called *Pisianactia*. Here he constantly walked and discoursed, resolving to settle there, and make the Place as full of Tranquillity as it had been before of Trouble: For, in the Time of the thirty Tyrants, near 1400 Citizens were there put to Death.

Hither resorted a great many Disciples to him, who were at first called *Zenonians*, as *Epicure* affirmeth, from their Master, afterwards from the Place where he taught, *Stoicks*, as *Eratosthenes* in his eighth Book of ancient Comedy; adding, that not long before, some Poets that lived there were called *Stoicks* also, upon which Occasion the Name was very well known.

He was subtile in Disquisition and Dispute.

He disputed earnestly with *Philo* the Dialectick, and exercised himself together with him; so that *Zeno the younger* admired him no less than his Master *Diodorus*.

He first seemeth (saith [s] *Laertius*) to have set a Bound to the Looseness and Extravagance of Propositions: But of this more, when we come to speak of his Philosophy, which by Reason of its largeness, we remit to the End of his Life.

CHAP. IV.

What Honours were conferred upon him.

Zeno, by the Philosophy which he taught, and the Practice of his Life conformable to that Doctrine, gain'd so high an Estimation amongst the *Athenians*, that [t] they deposited the Keys of the City in his Hands, as the only Person fit to be entrusted with their Liberties. His Name was likewise much honoured by his own Country-men, as well those at *Cyprus*, as those who lived at *Sidon*.

Amongst those who honoured and favoured *Zeno*, was *Antigonus Gonotus* King of *Macedonia*, a Prince no less eminent for his Virtue than his Greatness, much esteem'd him, and as often as he went to *Athens*, heard him. He sent many times to invite him to come to him, amongst the rest, one Letter to this Effect, alledged by *Apollonius Tyrius*.

m Laert. 7. 3. n Laert. 7. 2. o Laert. 7. 25. p Laert. 7. 35. q Laert. ibid. Suid. r Laert. 7. 6. s Laert. 7. 15. t Laert. 7. 6. &c.

King

King *Antigonus* to Zeno the Philoſopher, Health.

I Think that I exceed you in Fortune and Glory; but in Learning and Diſcipline, and that perfect Felicity which you have attained, I am exceeded by you. Wherefore I thought it expedient to write to you, that you will come tome, aſſuring myſelf you will not deny it. Uſe all Means therefore to come to us, and know that you are not to inſtruct me only, but all the Macedonians. *For, he who teacheth the King of* Macedonia, *and guideth him to Virtue, it is evident that he doth likewiſe inſtruct all his Subjects in Virtue; for ſuch as is the Prince, ſuch, for the moſt Part, are thoſe who live under his Government.*

Zeno anſwered thus,

To King Antigonus, Zeno, *Health.*

I Much eſteem your earneſt Deſire of Learning, in that you aim at Philoſophy; not popular, which perverteth Manners, but that true Diſcipline which conferreth Profit, avoiding that generally commended Pleaſure which effeminates the Souls of ſome young Men. It is manifeſt, that you are inclined to Generoſity, not only by Nature, but by Choice. A generous Nature, with indifferent Exerciſe, aſſiſted by a Maſter, may eaſily attain to perfect Virtue. But I am very infirm of Body, by reaſon of my Age, for I am fourſcore Years old, and therefore not able to come to you; yet I will ſend you ſome of my Con-Diſciples, who, in thoſe Things that concern the Soul, are nothing inferior to me; in thoſe of the Body, are much ſuperior to me; of whom, if you make uſe, you will want nothing conducing to perfect Beatitude.

Thus Zeno abſolutely refuſed to go to *Antigonus*, but ſent him his Diſciple *Perſæus*, Son of *Demetrius*, a *Cittiean*, (who flouriſhed in the 130th Olympiad, Zeno being then very old) and *Philonides* a *Theban*, both mentioned by *Epicurus* in his Epiſtle to *Ariſtobulus*, as having been with *Antigonus*.

CHAP. V.

His Apophthegms.

OF his *Apophthegms* are remembred theſe: Of a Man very finely dreſs'd, ſtepping lightly over a Kennel, *He doth not care for the Dirt*, ſaith he, *becauſe he cannot ſee his Face in it.*

A certain [u] *Cynick* came to him to borrow Oyl, ſaying he had none left; Zeno deny'd him, and as he was going away, *Now*, ſaith he, *conſider which of us two are the more impudent.*

[w] *Cremonides*, whom he much affected, and *Cleanthes* ſitting down beſide him, he aroſe; whereat *Cleanthes* wondering, *I have heard good Phyſicians ſay*, ſaith he, *that the beſt Remedy for Tumours is Reſt.*

Two ſitting by him at a Feaſt, he that was next him hit the other with his Foot; *Zeno* hit him that was next him with his Knee, and turning him to him, *What then think you*, ſaith he, *that you have done to him that ſits below you.*

To one that loved the Company of Boys, *Neither have thoſe Maſters*, ſaith he, *any Wit, who converſe always with Boys, nor the Boys themſelves.*

He ſaid, that elegant Speeches were like *Alexandrian* Silver, fair to the Eye, and figur'd like Money, but not a Whit of the more Value. Speeches which are otherwiſe, he likened to Attick Tetradrachmes, which had a rough Stamp, but were of greater Value.

Ariſto, his Diſciple, diſcourſing many Things fooliſhly, ſome petulantly, others confidently, *It cannot be*, ſaith he, *but your Father was drunk when you were begot*; whereupon himſelf being very conciſe of Speech, he called him the *Talker.*

[x] To a great Eater, who left nothing for thoſe that eat with him, he cauſed a great Fiſh to be ſet before him, and immediately to be taken away; the other looking upon him, *What*, ſaith he, *do you think your Companions ſuffer every Day, ſeeing that you cannot ſuffer my Greedineſs once?*

A young [y] Man, who queſtioned ſomething more curiouſly than ſuited with his Age, he brought him to a Glaſs, and bad him look in it, and then ask'd him, *whether he thought that Queſtion agreed with that Face?*

To one that ſaid he diſliked many Things of *Antiſthenes*'s Writing, he brought his *Chria* of *Sophocles*, and asked him, *if there were any Thing therein excellent?* The other anſwer'd, *he knew not. Are you not aſhamed then* (replied Zeno) *if* Antiſthenes *have ſaid any thing ill, you ſelect and remember that; but if any excellent, you are ſo far from remembring, as not to mind it?*

To one that ſaid the Speeches of Philoſophers were ſhort, *You ſay very true*, ſaith he, *ſo ſhould their very Syllables be, as much as is poſſible.*

One ſaying of *Polemon*, that he propoſed ſome Things, and ſaid others. He frowning ſaid, *What Rate do you ſet upon Things that are given?*

He ſaid, that a Diſputant ſhould have the Voice and Lungs of a Comedian, but not the Loudneſs.

To thoſe that ſpeak well, he ſaid, we ſhould allow a Place to hear, as to skilful Artificers to ſee; on the other ſide, the Hearer muſt ſo attend to what is ſpoken, that he take no Time to cenſure.

To a young Man that ſpoke much, *Your Ears*, ſaith he, *are fallen into your Tongue.*

To a handſome Youth, who ſaid that he thought that in his Opinion, a wiſe Man ought not to love, *Nothing*, ſaith he, *will be more unhappy to you that are handſome.*

He ſaid, that moſt Philoſophers are in many things Fools, in trivial and vulgar Ignorant.

u Laert. 7. 17. w Laert. 7. 18. x Laert. 7. 19. Athen. Deipn. y Laert. ibid.

He prononnced that of *Capecia*, who when one of his Disciples began to grow high, beating him, he said, *Right is not placed in great, but great in right.*

To a young Man discoursing with much Confidence, *Young Man*, saith he, *I should be loath to tell you my Thoughts.*

A Youth of *Rhodes*, handsome and rich, but refractory to him; not enduring, he bad him first sit in a dirty Seat, that he might dirty his Gown; next placed him among the Beggars, that he might converse with them and their Rags, until at last the young Man went away.

He said, that nothing is more unseemly than Pride, especially in young Men.

He said, that we must not only commit to Memory, Speeches and Words, as those who make ready some Dish of Meat, but apply it, and make Use of it in our Minds.

He said, that young Men must use all Modesty in their Walking, in their Behaviour, and in their Garments, often repeating those Verses of *Euripides* concerning *Capanæus.*

He was not puft up with his Store,
Nor thought himself above the Poor.

He said, nothing was more alienate from the Comprehension of Sciences, than Poetry; and that we need nothing more than Time.

Being ask'd, *Who is a Friend?* he answer'd, *My other self.*

Having taken his Servant in a Theft, he beat him; the Fellow said, *It was his Destiny to steal*; and *to be beaten*, said he.

He said, that *Beauty is the Sweetness of the Voice*, or, according to some, he call'd it, *The Flour of Beauty.*

Seeing the Servant of one of his Companions black and blue with Stripes, *I see*, saith he, *the Fruits of your Anger.*

To one that smelled sweet of Ointments, *Who is it*, saith he, *that smells so effeminately?*

To *Dionysius* sirnamed μεταθέμενος *the Retractor*, who ask'd him, *why he corrected all but himself? because*, saith he, *I do not believe you.*

To a young Man who spoke too freely, *For this Reason*, saith he, *we have two Ears, and but one Tongue, that we should hear much and speak little.*

[z] He was invited to a Feast with other Philosophers, by the Ambassador of *Antigonus* (according to *Laertius* of *Ptolomy*) and whilst of the rest every one amidst their Cups made Ostentation of their Learning, he alone sat silent; whereupon the Ambassadors asking him what they should say of him to *Antigonus*, *That which you see*, saith he, *for of all Things, 'tis hardest to contain Speech.*

Being demanded how he behav'd himself when reviled, he said, *As an Ambassador dismiss'd without Answer.*

He changed the Verses of *Hesiod* thus,

Who good Advice obeys, of Men is best.
Next, he who ponders all in his own Breast.

For that Man (saith he) *is better who can obey good Advice, and make good Use thereof, than he who finds out all Things of himself; for the latter hath only Understanding, but the other Practice also.*

[a] Being demanded how it came to pass, that being very austere, he notwithstanding was very chearful and merry at a Feast, he answered, *Lupines, tho' in themselves bitter, being steeped, grow sweet.*

He said, *it was better to slip with the Foot than with the Tongue.*

He said, *that to do well is no small Matter; to begin well, depended on a small Moment.*

This some ascribe to *Socrates.*

[b] One of the young Men in the Academy speaking of foolish Studies, *If you don't dip your Tongue in your Mind*, saith *Zeno*, *you will speak many other foolish Things.*

[c] He accused many, saying, *When they might take Pleasure in Labour, they would rather go to the Cook's Shop for it.*

[d] He said, *that we should not affect Delicacy of Diet, not even in Sickness.*

[e] Being demanded by one of his Friends, what Course he should take to do wrong, *Imagine*, reply'd he, *that I am always with you.*

[f] Being demanded whether a Man that doth wrong, may conceal it from God. *No*, saith he, *nor he who thinketh it.*

[g] To some that excused their Prodigality, saying, that they had Plenty, out of which they did it; *Will you excuse a Cook*, saith he, *that should oversalt Meat because he hath store of Salt?*

[h] He said that of his Disciples, *some were* φιλόλογοι *Lovers of Knowledge*; *others* λογοφιλοι, *Lovers of Speaking.*

[i] He compared the Arts of *Dialectick* to just Measures filled, not with Wheat or any thing of Value, but with Chaff and Straw.

[k] He said we ought not to enquire *whether Men belonged to great Cities, but whether they deserved a great City.*

[l] Seeing a Friend of his too much taken up with the Business of his Land, *Unless you lose your Land*, saith he, *it will lose you.*

[m] He said, *A Man must live not only to eat and drink, but to use his Life for the obtaining a happy Life.*

[n] *Antigonus* being full of Wine, went to visit him, and kissing and embracing him as a drunken Man,

z Laert. 7. 24. Stob. Serm. 33. a Laert. 7. 26. Athen. Deipn. 12. b Stob. Ser. 29. c Stob. Ser. 6. d Stob. Ser. 17. citing Musonius. e Stob. Ser. 49. f Stob. Ser. 37. g Stob. Ser. 55. h Stob. Ser. 37. i Stob. Ser. 8. k Stob. Ser. 111. l Stob. Ser. 56. m Stob. Ser. 772. n Ælian. var. hist. 9. 26.

bad

bad him demand whatsoever he would, swearing that he would give it him; *Zenon* answered, πεμψάς ἐμεσον, at once reproving his Vice, and taking care of his Health.

[o] Stretching out the Fingers of his Right Hand, he said, *such is Phantasie*; then contracting them a little, *such is Assent*; then closing them quite, and shutting his Fist, *such is Comprehension*; then putting to it his left Hand, and shutting it close and hard, *such* (saith he) is *Science, of which none is capable but a wise Man.*

CHAP. VI.

His Death.

[p] ZENO having continued, according to *Apollonius*, Master of his School fifty-eight Years, and attained to the 98th of his Age, by the Computation of *Laertius* and [q] *Lucian*, (for that he lived but 72 Years, as some affirm upon the Testimony of *Persæus*, seems to be a Mistake, seeing that his Letter to *Antigonus* was written in his 80th Year) [r] in all which Time he was never molested by any Sickness; died upon this Occasion; going out of the School, he fell and broke his Finger, whereupon striking the Ground with his Hand, he said, as *Niobe* in the Tragedy, *I come, why do you call me?* Or as others, *Why do you drive me?* And going out, [s] some say, he immediately strangled himself; [t] others, that by little and little he famish'd himself.

[u] When the News of his Death came to *Antigonus*, he broke forth into these Words, *What a Spectacle have I lost!* and being demanded why he so much admired him, *Because*, said he, *tho' I bestowed many great Things upon him, he was never therewith exalted or dejected.* He sent immediately *Thraso* on Embassy to the *Athenians*, requesting that they would build him a Tomb in the Ceramick, which the *Athenians* performed, honouring him with this Decree.

A DECREE.

ARrhenides *being Archon, the Tribe of* Acamantis *having the first Place in the Phrytanæum, the tenth Day of Maemacterion, the three and twentieth of the sitting of the Phrytanæum, the Congregation of Presidents decreed thus:* Hippo, *Son of* Cratistoteles *a Xympetean, and the rest of the Presidents,* Thraso, *Son of* Thraso, *an Anacæan, declared*;

Whereas Zeno, *Son of* Mnaseas, *a Cittiean, hath professed Philosophy many Years in this City, and in all other Things performed the Office of a good Man, encouraging those young Men, who applied themselves to him, to Virtue and Temperance, leading himself a Life suitable to the Doctrine which he professed, a Pattern to the best to imitate; The People have thought fit (good Fortune go along with it) to do Honour to* Zeno, *Son of* Mnaseas *the Cittiean, and to crown him with a Crown of Gold according to the Law, in Reward of his Virtue and Temperance, and to build a Tomb for him publickly in the Ceramick. For the making of which Crown, and building of the Tomb, the People shall make choice of five Men of the* Athenians *to take charge thereof. This Decree the Scribe of the People shall write upon two Pillars, one whereof shall be placed in the Academy, the other in the Lycæum. The Charge of the Pillars, he who is Overseer of the Publick Works shall undertake to defray, by way of Rate, that all may know the* Athenian *People honour good Men both alive and dead. To take care of the building are appointed,* Thraso *an Anacæan,* Philocles *a Pyræan,* Phædrus *an Anaphistian,* Medon *an Acarnean,* Micythus *a Sympalletean.*

[w] The *Athenians* caused likewise his Statue in Brass to be set up, as did also the *Cittieans* his Countrymen. *Antipater* the *Sidonean* bestowed this Epitaph upon him:

Here Zeno *lies, who tall* Olympus *scal'd,*
Not heaping Pelion *on* Ossa's *Head,*
Nor by Herculean *Labours so prevail'd,*
But found out Virtue's Path which thither led.

Another Epigram was written upon him by *Xenodotus the* Stoick, Disciple of *Diogenes:*

Zeno, *thy Years to hoary Age were spent,*
Not with vain Riches, but with Self-content:
A stout and constant Sect deriv'd from thee,
The Mother of nought-dreading Liberty:
Phœnicia, *whence thou issuedst, who can slight?*
Thence Cadmus *too, who first taught* Greece *to write.*

CHAP. VII.

His Person and Virtues.

AS concerning his Person, [x] *Timotheus* saith he was wry-neck'd: *Apollonius Tyrius*, that he was lean, tall, and of a swarthy Complexion, whence stiled by some (as *Chrysippus*) the *Egyptian Sprig.* [y] His Look was sad, grave, severe and frowning; his Constitution not strong, for which Reason *Persæus* saith, he forbore to feast much. His ordinary Diet consisted in raw Food, especially Figs both raw and dried, Bread and Honey, which he eat moderately, and a little sweet Wine.

[z] His Continence was such, that when *Persæus*, who cohabited with him, brought a She-Minstrel to him, he immediately sent her back.

[a] Not-

o Cic. Acad. quæst. 4. 47. p Laert. 7. 18. q Lucian de Longæv. r Laert. 7. 28. s Laert. ibid. t Suid. u Laert. 7. 15. w Laert. 7. 6. x Laert. 7. 1. y Laert. 7. 17. z Laert. ibid.

[a] Notwithstanding his Severity, he was very complaisant, and often feasted with King *Antigonus*, and meeting him sometimes drunk, went along with him to *Aristocles* the Musician, to nightly Banquets and Plays.

[b] Popular Ostentation he avoided, by sitting in the lowest Place; whereby he freed himself from the troublesome Importunity of the other Part.

[c] He never walked with more than two or three at once: *Cleanthes* saith, he many times gave Money to People that they would not trouble him, and throng about him. Being on a certain Time encompassed by a great Crowd, he shewed them a wooden Ball on the top of the Cloyster, which formerly belonged to an Altar; This, saith he, was once placed in the middle; but, because it is troublesome, it is now laid aside: I desire you would in like manner withdraw yourselves, that you may be less troublesome.

[d] He was so free from being corrupted by Gifts, that *Democharis* Son of *Laches*, desiring him to let him know what Business he would have to *Antigonus*, promising to write about it, and assuring him, that *Antigonus* would furnish him with whatsoever he desired; he turned away from him, and would never after converse with him.

[e] He was so humble, that he conversed with mean and ragged Persons; whence *Timon*:

And for Companions gets of Servants Store,
Of all Men the most empty, and most poor.

He was most patient and frugal in his Houshold Expence, something inclining to the Sordidness of the Barbarians. *Laeritus* mentions one Servant that he had, *Seneca* avers he had none.

[f] Whensoever he reprehended any, it was covertly and afar off, as may appear by many of his Apophthegms.

[g] His Habit was mean, whence it was said of him,

Him nor the Winter's rigid Frost or Rain,
The scorching Sun, or sharp Disease can pain:
Not like the common Sort of People he;
But Day and Night bent on Philosophy.

The Comick Poets, unwittingly, intending to discommend him, praise him; as *Philemon*, in his Comedy of Philosophers,

He Water drinks, then Broth and Herbs doth eat,
To live, his Scholars teaching, without Meat.

This some ascribe to *Possidippus*.

His Virtues were so eminent, that they grew at last into a Proverb, *More Continent than* Zeno *the Philosopher*; whence *Possidippus*,

——— *He e'er ten Days were spent,*
Zeno *in Continence outwent.*

Indeed he excelled all Men in this kind of Virtue, and in Gravity, and, by *Jove* (addeth *Laertius*) in Felicity likewise.

CHAP. VIII.
His Writings.

HE wrote several Books, wherein (saith [h] *Laertius*) he so discoursed, as no *Stoick* after him: Their Titles are these;

Of Commonwealth, written whilst he was an Auditor of *Crates*, and (as [i] *Plutarch* saith) much applauded; the Scope whereof was this, *That we should not live in several Cities and Towns by distinct Laws, but that we should own all Men as our Countrymen and Fellow-Citizens; that their should be one Manner of Life, and one Order, as one Flock which grazeth by equal Right in one Pasture.*

Of Appetite; or, *of Human Nature.*
Of Passions.
Of Office.
Of Law.
Of the Discipline of the Grecians.
Of Sight.
Of the Universe.
Of Signs.
Pythagoricks.
Universals.
Of Words.
Homerical Problems 5.
Of hearing Poetry.
The Art.
Solutions.
Confutations.
Memorials.
The Morals of Crates.

[k] Some, amongst whom is *Cassius* a *Sceptian*, reprehended many Things in the Writings of *Zeno*: First, that in the beginning of his Commonwealth, he affirmeth, *The Liberal Sciences to be of no Use.*

Again, That *all wicked Men are Enemies among themselves, and Slaves and Strangers, as well Fathers to their Children, as Brethren to Brethren.* Again, That *only good Men are Citizens, and Friends, and Kindred, and Children*, as he affirmeth in his Book of the *Commonwealth*. So that according to the *Stoicks*, Parents should be Enemies to their Children, because they are not wise.

That

a Laert. 1. ibid. b Laert. 7. 14. c Laert. ibid. d Laert. ibid. e Laert. ibid. f Laert. 7. 16. g Laert. 7. 27.
h Laert. 7. 4. i Plut. de fortit. Alex. Mag. k Laert. 7. 32.

That in his Commonwealth he would have *Women to be in common.*

That *no Temples, Courts of Judicature, nor publick Schools, ſhould be built in a Commonwealth.*

That *Money is not neceſſary, neither for Exchange nor Traffick.*

That *Women ſhould go in the ſame Habit as Men.*

CHAP. IX.

His Diſciples.

ZENO (ſaith *Laertius*) had many Diſciples; the moſt eminent theſe;

PERSEUS, Son of *Demetrius*, a *Cittiean*; ſome affirm [l] he was *Zeno*'s Scholar, others that he was one of the Servants which were ſent by *Antigonus* to *Zeno* to tranſcribe his Writings; whence *Bion* ſeeing this Inſcription on his Statue, *PERSÆUS OF ZENO A CITTIEAN* ſaid [m], *The Graver miſtook, for inſtead of ὁ κιτ]ιεὺς, he ſhould have put ὀικιτ]ιεὺς, a Servant.*

Afterwards he returned to *Antigonus* King of *Macedonia*; *Antigonus*, to make a Trial of him, cauſed a falſe Report to be brought him, that his Lands were ſpoiled by the Enemy; whereat appearing troubled, *Do you not ſee*, ſaith *Antigonus*, *that Riches are not to be reckoned amongſt indifferent Things?*

Antigonus ſo much favour'd him, that he preferred him to the Government of *Acrocorinthus*; on which Fort depended not only *Corinth*, but all *Peloponneſus*; in this Charge he was unfortunate; for the Caſtle was taken by the Cunning of *Aratus* a *Sicyonian* ([n] *Athenæus* ſaith, whilſt *Perſæus* was feaſting) who turned out *Perſæus*, whereupon afterwards, to one that maintained *only a wiſe Man is a Governor*; *and I*, ſaith he, *was one of the ſame Mind, being ſo taught by* Zeno, *but now am of another Opinion*; *the* Sicyonian *young Man*, (meaning *Aratus*) *hath taught me otherwiſe*; thus *Plutarch*; but *Pauſanias* ſaith, that *Aratus*, upon taking of the Fort, amongſt others, put *Perſæus* the Governor to Death.

He ſaid, [o] *That thoſe were eſteemed Gods who had invented ſome Things very uſeful to human Life.*

He wrote theſe Books; *Of a Kingdom*; *the* Lacedemonian *Commonwealth*; *of Marriage*; *of Impiety*; Thyeſtes; *of Love*, *Protrepticks*, *Exercitations*; Chrias 4. *Commentaries againſt* Plato's *Laws* 7. [p] *Sympoſiack Dialogues.*

Ariſto, Son of *Miliades*, a *Chian*, ſirnamed the *Syren*; when *Zeno* fell into a long Sickneſs, he left him, and went (as *Diocles* ſaith) to *Polemo*; he was alſo a Follower of *Perſæus*, whom he flattered much, becauſe of his Favour with *Antigonus*; for he was much given to Pleaſure, even unto his End. Thus revolting from his Maſter *Zeno*, he aſſerted,

That the End conſiſts in thoſe mean Things which are betwixt Virtue and Vice; that is, in Indifference; not to be moved on either Side, nor to imagine the leaſt Difference to be in theſe Things, but that they are all alike: For a wiſe Man is like a good Player, who, whether he perſonate *Agamemnon* or *Therſides*, will act either Part very well. Thus he took away the Dignity which *Zeno* held to be in theſe mean Things betwixt Virtue and Vice; holding that there is no Difference in them.

He took away Phyſick and Logick, affirming that one is above us, the other appertains nothing to us: *Ethick* only appertains to us; he compared Dialectick Reaſon to Cobwebs, which, tho' they ſeem artificial, yet are of no Uſe.

He introduced not on any Virtues, as *Zeno*; nor one called by ſeveral Names, as the *Megarick* Philoſophers, but affirmed they have a Quodammodotative Relation to one another.

Profeſſing theſe Tenets, and diſputing in *Cunoſarges*, he came to be called Author of a Sect; whence *Miltiades* and *Diphilus* were called *Ariſtonians.*

He was very perſuaſive, and wrought much upon the common People, whence *Timon in Sillis.*

One of Ariſto's *ſmooth perſuaſive Race.*

He defended eagerly this Paradox of the *Stoicks*, *That a wiſe Man doth not opinionate, but know*; which *Perſæus* oppoſing, cauſed of two like Twins, firſt, one to give a Depoſitum to him, then the other to come and re-demand it; and by his doubting if it were the ſame Perſon, convinced him.

He inveighed againſt *Arceſilaus* [q calling him a Corrupter of Youth.] On a time, ſeeing a Monſter like a Bull, but of both Sexes, he ſaid, *Alas! Here is an Argument for* Arceſilaus *againſt Energy.* To an Academick, who ſaid, he comprehended nothing, *do you not ſee*, (ſaith he) *him who ſitteth next you?* which he denying, *Who ſtruck you blind*, ſaith he, *or took your Light away.*

He wrote theſe Treatiſes, *Protrepticks* 2. *Of* Zeno's *Doctrine.* *Scholaſtick Dialogues* 6. *Of Wiſdom*, *Diſſertations* 7. *Erotick Diſſertations.* *Commentaries upon Vain-glory.* *Commentaries* 15. *Memorials* 3. *Chrias* 11. *Againſt Orators.* *Againſt* Alexinus *his Oppoſitions.* *To the Dialecticks* 3. *To* Cleanthes *Epiſt.* 4. But *Panætius* and *Soſicrates* affirm the *Epiſtles* only to be his, the reſt to be *Ariſto*'s the *Peripatetick.*

The Sun ſtriking hot upon his Head (which was bald) occaſioned his Death. There was another of the ſame Name, a *Juliite*, a Peripatetick; another an *Athenian*, a Muſician, a Tragick Poet; a fifth, an *Alæan*, who writ the *Rhetorical Art*; a ſixth of *Alexandria*, a *Peripatetick.*

l Laert. 7. 36. m Athen. l. 4. n Deipn. 4. o Cic. de nat. Deor. 1. p Athen. deip. 6. Laert. 7. 37. q Laert. vit. Arceſ.

[r] *Erillus*, (or as *Cicero*, *Herillus*) was a *Carthaginian*; when he was a Boy, he was loved and courted by many; which *Zeno*, by causing him to be shaved, diverted.

He held, that the End is Science, which is to live so, as to refer all Things to Science, joined with Life. That Science is a Habit susceptive of Phantasies, falling under Reason.

Yet, sometimes he said, there is no End; but, that the End itself is changed by the Things, and those which are joined to the Things, as Brass, of which the Statues of *Alexander* and *Socrates* is made.

That τέλος the End, and ὑποδέλτις differ, one is objected to unwise Persons as well as wise, the other to wise only.

Those Things which are betwixt Virtue and Vice, are Indifferents.

His Books are written in a short Stile, consisting of few Words, but very efficacious, wherein is contained what he held contrary to *Zeno*.

His Writings these, *Of Exercitation*, *Of Passion*, *Of Suspicion*, *the Law-giver*, *Majeutick*, *Antipheron*, *The Master*, *The Preparative*, *The Directive*, Hermes, Medea, *Dialogues*, *Moral* Theses.

His Disciples were called *Herilians*, named by *Cicero*, as a particular Sect among the *Socraticks*.

Dionysius [s], Son of *Theophantus*, an *Heracleot*, from the Change of his Opinion sirnamed ὁ μεταθέμενος, *the Retractor*. He was from the Beginning studiously addicted to Learning, and writ Poems of all Kinds; then betook himself to *Aratus*, being much pleased with him. Of Philosophers he first heard, as *Diocles* affirms, *Heraclides* his Country-man; then *Alexines* and *Menedemus*, after these *Zeno*.

Revolting from *Zeno*, he addicted himself to the *Cyrenæans*; he went to common Houses, and addicted himself to other Pleasures.

He asserted the End to be Pleasure, and that by Reason of his own pur-blindness; for being much grieved thereat, he durst not affirm Grief to be one of the Indifferents.

He died eighty Years old, starved.

His Writings are thus intitled, *Of Apathy* 2. *Of Riches and Favour*, *and Punishment*; *Of the Use of Men*; *Of good Fortune*; *Of the Kings of the Ancients*; *Of Things that are praised*; *Of the Customs of the Barbarians*.

Sphærus was of *Bosphorus*; he first heard *Zeno*, then *Cleanthes*, and having made a sufficient Progress in Learning, went to *Alexandria* to *Ptolomy Philopater*, where there arising a Dispute, whether a wise Man doth opinionate, and *Sphærus* maintaining that he doth not, the King commanded some Quinces, *Athenæus* saith, Birds of Wax to be set before him, wherewith *Sphærus* being cozened, the King cried out, that he assented to a false Phantasy; *Sphærus* presently answered, *That he assented not that they were Quinces, but that it was probable they were Quinces; but comprehensive Phantasy differs from probable,* [t] *for that is never false, but in probable Matters sometimes a Thing falls out otherwise than we imagined.* [u] *Menesistratus* accusing him that he denied *Ptolomy* to be King, he answered, that *he thought* Ptolomy, *or such a one was King.*

His Writings are these; *Of the World*, *of the Seed of Elements*, *of Fortune*, *of Beasts*, *against Atoms and Apparitions*, *of the Organs of Sense*, *upon* Heraclitus's *five Dissertations*, *of moral Description*, *of Office*, *of Appetite*, *of Passions* 2. *Dissertations of a Kingdim*, *of the* Lacedemonian *Commonwealth*, *of* Lycurgus *and* Socrates 3. *of Law*, *of Divination*, *Erotick Dialogues*, *of the Eretriack Philosophers*, *of Things like*, *of Definitions*, *of Habit*, *of Contraries* 3. *of Reason*, *of Riches*, *of Glory*, *of Death*, *of the Art of Dialectick* 2. *of Categorems*, *of Ambiguities*, *of Epistles*.

Cleanthes, whom *Zeno* compared to Writing Tables, that are so hard, they will not easily admit an Impression, but having once received it, keep it long. He succeeded *Zeno*, of him therefore apart.

Philon, a *Theban*.

Callippus, a *Corinthian*.

Possidonius, an *Alexandrian*.

Athenodorus of *Soli*; there were two more of the same Name, Stoicks.

Zeno, a *Sidonian*.

Last, in the Catalogue of his Disciples must be remembered an *Eretrian* Youth (mentioned by *Stobæus* [w]) who heard *Zeno* till he came to be a Man; then returning to *Eretria*, his Father asked him what he had learned all that Time; he answered, he would shortly let him see, and did so; for, not long after, his Father in Anger did beat him, which he took quietly, saying, *This I have learned, to bear with the Anger of a Father, and not to oppose it.*

In the Life of *Zeno*, (for as much as he is Author of that Sect) it will be requisite to give Account of the Doctrine of the Stoicks in general; wherein, if the Terms seem harshly rendered, it will easily be forgiven by those, who consider the Stoicks were no less particular in their Words than in their Doctrines.

r Laert. 7. 165. s Ibid. 7. 166. t Athen. 7. u Laert. 7. 177. w Ethic. Serm. 77.

THE

THE DOCTRINE OF THE STOICKS.

The First Part.

CHAP. I.

Of Philoſophy in general, and particularly of Dialectick.

Wiſdom [x] is the Science of Things divine and human; *Philoſophy* is the Exercitation of convenient Art. *Convenient* is the only and ſupreme Virtue. Of *Virtues* in the moſt general Senſe there are three Kinds, *natural*, *moral*, *rational*; for which Cauſe Philoſophy likewiſe hath three Parts, *Phyſick*, *Ethick*, *Logick*; *Phyſick*, when we enquire concerning the World, and the Things in the World; *Ethick* is employed about human Life; *Logick* is that Part which concerns Reaſon, which is alſo called *Dialectick*. [y] Thus *Zeno* the *Cittiean* firſt divided it in his Book of *Speech*; and *Chryſippus* in his firſt Book of *Speech*, and in his firſt of *Phyſicks*; and *Apollodorus Ephillus* in his firſt Book of *Introductions into Doctrines*; and *Eudromus* in his *moral Inſtitutions*, and *Diogenes* the *Babylonian*, and *Poſſidonius*. Theſe Parts *Apollodorus* calleth *Places*; *Chryſippus* and *Euromus*, *Species*, others *Genus's*.

That Logick is a Part of Philoſophy diſtinct from the reſt, (wherein all the Stoicks agree) is proved by two Arguments, the firſt this: [z] Every Thing which uſeth another, if that which the Thing uſing, uſeth, be neither Part nor Particle, nor Part of Part of any other, it muſt be Part or Particle of the Thing uſing; as Medicine uſeth the Art of preſcribing Diet; which Art being neither Part nor Particle of any other, is conſequently a Part or Particle of Medicine; of Part, as to the Cure; of Particle, as to the Practice.

[a] Philoſophy is converſant about Logick; Logick therefore is either a Part or Particle of Philoſophy; but a Particle it is not, for it is not a Part either of the Contemplative or the Active. That which is a Particle of any Thing, ought to have the ſame Matter and Scope with that whereof it is a Part. Logick hath neither of theſe common with active Philoſophy, the Matter whereof is human Things, and Moderation of Appetite, the common Scope, what in them is to be embraced or ſhunned; but the Matter of Logick is Propoſitions; the Scope, to demonſtrate by a Compoſure of Propoſitions, that which neceſſarily falls out upon the Collection. Neither is Logick a Part of the Contemplative, the Matter whereof is Things divine; the End, Contemplation of them: Now, if it be not a Part, either of the Contemplative or the Active, it is not a Particle of Philoſophy, but equally ſeparate from both theſe, and conſequently it muſt be a Part of it.

[b] The ſecond Argument is thus. No Art frameth its own Inſtruments; if therefore Philoſophy make Logick, it is not its Inſtrument, but Part thereof.

[c] Philoſophy, is by ſome compared to a Field which produceth all Manner of Fruit; Phyſick to the Soil and tall Trees; Ethick to the mature pleaſant Fruit, Logick to the ſtrong Fence. Others liken it to an Egg; Ethick to the Yolk, which ſome affirm to be the Chicken; Phyſick to the White, which is the Nouriſhment of the Chicken; Logick to the Outſide or Shell. *Poſſidonius*, (becauſe the Parts of Philoſophy are inſeparable from one another, but Plants are diſtinct from the Fruits, as Walls from Hedges) chuſeth rather to compare Philoſophy to a living Creature, Phyſick to Blood and Fleſh, Logick to Bones and Nerves, Ethick to the Soul. (Thus *Sextus Empiricus*, by whom, perhaps, *Laertius* is to be corrected, who ſaith, *They likened Ethick to the Fleſh, Phyſick to the Soul.*) Laſtly, they compare Philoſophy to a City well fortified and governed according to Reaſon.

x Plut. de plac. Phil. 1. y Laert. 7. 39. z Ammonius in Categ. a Philop. in lib. 1. Anal. prior. b Ammonius in Categor. c Sext. Emp. adv. Log. 1.

[d] Some affirm, that none of these Parts are distinct from the rest, but all intermingled with one another, for which Reason they deliver them confusedly. The greater Part place *Logick* first, *Ethick* next, *Physick* last; because the Mind ought first to be fortified for the keeping those Things which are committed to it, so as it be not easily expugnable. The *Dialectick* Place is a Fortification for the Mind. Secondly, to describe the Contemplation of Manners, that they may be reformed, which is safely undertaken, when the logical Power is first laid down. Lastly, to induce the Contemplation of Nature, for that is more Divine, and requireth a more profound Attention. This Method [e] *Plutarch* affirms to have been observed by *Chrysippus*, adding that *of Physick, the last Part, is that which treateth of God; for which Reason they call the Precepts of Religion* τελετὰς. It seems, therefore, that there is some Mistake in *Laertius*, who of those who place *Logick* first, *Physick* next, and *Ethick* last, citeth *Zeno* in his Book *of Speech*, and *Chrysippus*, and *Archedemus*, and *Eudromus*. But *Diogenes* the *Ptolemæan* (continueth he) begins with *Ethick*. *Apollodorus* puts *Ethick* in the second Place, *Panætius* and *Possidonius* begin with *Physick*, as *Phanias*, Companion of *Possidonius* affirms in his First of *Possidonius's Dissertations*.

[f] Of Logick, *Cleanthes* assigneth Six Parts, *Dialectick*, *Rhetorick*, *Ethick*, *Politick*, *Physick*, *Theologick*. Some affirm these are not Parts of *Logick*, but of *Philosophy* itself; so *Zeno* of *Tarsis*. The logical Part is by some divided into two Sciences, *Rhetorick* and *Dialectick*; some add the *definitive Part*, some divide the Definitive into that which concerns *Invention* of Truth (by which the Differences of Phantasies are directed) and that which concerns *Knowledge* of Truth; for Things are comprehended by Notions.

[g] *Rhetorick* is the Science of well Speaking, by dilating upon the Thing comprehended. *Dialectick* is the Science of well Speaking, (that is true and consentaneous) or well disputing by Question and Answer. It is defined by *Possidonius*, the *Science of True, False*, and *Neuter*.

[h] *Rhetorick* is of three Kinds, *Deliberative*, *Judicial*, *Demonstrative*. The Parts of *Rhetorick* are *Invention*, *Stile*, *Disputation*, *Pronunciation*; *Rhetorical Speech* is divided into *Proem*, *Narration*, *Confutation*, *Epilogue*.

[i] *Dialectick* is necessary, and a *Virtue* within its Species, containing other Virtues; ἀπερισπωσία, a a Science whereby we are taught when to assent, and when not; ἀνεκκλισία, a firm Reason, whereby we resist Appearances, and are not led away by them; ἀνελεγξία, a Fortitude of Reason, which keeps us from being transported with the adverse Opinion; ἀμαλαθότης, a Habit, directing Phantasies to right Reason.

[k] *Dialectick* is a Science or certain Comprehension, or a Habit, not erring by Reason in Reception of Phantasies; but without *Dialectick*, a wise Man cannot be infallible in Reason; for by this we discern the true, false, and probable, and distinguish the ambiguous.

CHAP. II.

Of the Instruments and Rules of Judgment.

IN [l] the first Place they put the Discourse concerning Phantasies and Sense, as a Judicatory, whereby the Truth of Things is discerned.

[m] The Senses (according to *Zeno*, who made many Alterations in *Dialectick*, and asserted many Things of the Senses that were wholly new) are joined by a certain kind of extrinsical Impulsion, termed Phantasy. To these Phantasies received by the Senses, is added an Assertion of the Mind, which is placed in us voluntary. The Phantasy, when seen, is comprehensible, when received and approved, Comprehension; and if so comprehended as that it cannot be plucked away by Reason, Science.

[n] Judgment is a Perfection which discerneth a Thing.

[o] That which judgeth is taken two Ways, 1. By which we say, some Things are, others are not; these are true, those are false. 2. Of Essence only, and this is understood three Ways, *Commonly*, *Properly*, and *most Properly*. *Commonly*, for every Measure of Comprehension, in which Sense, even those Things which judge naturally, have this Appellation, as Sight, Hearing, Taste. *Properly*, for every artificial Measure of Comprehension; thus a Cubit, a Ballance, a Ruler, a Pair of Compasses, are call'd Things that judge; but Sight and Hearing, and the other common Instruments of Sense, are not. *Most Properly*, for every Measure of Comprehension of a Thing, uncertain, and not evident. In which Sense, those Things which belong to the Actions of Life, are not said to be Things judging, but the Logical only, and those which dogmatical Philosophers alledge for the Invention of Truth.

The Logical is subdivided into that *from which*, that *by which*, and *Application* or Habitude. *From which*, the Man; *by which*, the Sense; the Third is the *Application* of Phantasy or Sight; for, as in the Staticks there are three Things which judge, the Weigher, the Ballance, and Position of the Ballance. The Weigher is the Judge from which, the Ballance the Judge by which, the Position of the Ballance, as it were a Habitude. And again, as to discern right or oblique Things, is required an Artificer, a Ruler, and the Application thereof. In

d Laert. 7. 40. e De Plac. Phil. 1. f Laert. 7. 41. g Laert. 7. 42. h Laert. ibid. i Laert. 7. 46. k Laert. ibid.
l Laert. 7. 41. m Cic. Acad. 1. 11. n Galen. Hist. Phil. T. 4. o Sext. Emp. adv. Mathem.

like

like manner in Philoſophy are required thoſe three Things mentioned in the Diſcernment of true and falſe; the Man from whom the Judgment is made, is like the Weigher or Artificer; to the Ballance and Ruler anſwer Senſe and Cogitation, by which the Judgment is made; to the Habitude of the forenamed Inſtruments, the Application of Phantaſy, by which a Man cometh to judge.

[p] The *Judge* of Truth they affirm to be *Comprehenſive Phantaſy*, that is, proceeding from that which is; ſo *Chryſippus* in the 12th of his Phyſicks, and *Antipater* and *Apollodorus*. But *Boethus* holds many Judicatories, the *Mind*, and *Senſe*, and *Appetite*, and *Science*; from whom *Chryſippus* diſſenting in his firſt Book of *Reaſon*, affirmeth the Judicatories to be *Senſe* and *Anticipation*. *Anticipation* is a natural Notion of Univerſals. Others of the more ancient Stoicks (as *Poſſidonius* ſaith in his Book of *Judgments*) aſſert *right Reaſon* to be the Judicatory.

CHAP. III.

Of Senſe.

Dialectick [q] is derived from Corporeal Senſes; for from thence, the Soul conceiveth *notorious* (ἐνοίας) of thoſe Things which are explained by Definition, and from thence is propagated and connexed the whole Reaſon of Learning and Teaching.

[r] *Senſe* is a Spirit, proceeding from the ſupreme Part of the Soul, and permeating to the Organs.

[s] Whatſoever Things are comprehended, are manifeſtly comprehended by Senſe; all Conceptions of the Mind depend upon Senſe.

[t] Comprehenſion made by the Senſes is true and faithful (according to *Zeno*) for as much as Nature hath given it as a Rule for Science, and Principle of herſelf.

[u] Nothing is more clear than this ἐναργεία *Evidence*, there cannot be any Speech more perſpicuous.

[w] Of Senſibles and Intelligibles, ſome are true, but not directly ſenſible; but, by relation to thoſe Things which are next, as falling under Intelligence.

CHAP. IV.

Of Phantaſy.

IN the firſt Place (ſaith [x] *Diocles* the *Magneſian*) they put the Reaſon concerning Phantaſy and Senſe, as a Judgment, whereby the Truth of Things is diſcerned. It is Phantaſy as to its Genus, and likewiſe in as much as the Reaſon of Aſſent, Comprehenſion, and Intelligence (which is more excellent than the reſt) conſiſts not without Phantaſy; for Phantaſy goeth firſt, then the Mind endued with Elocution, declareth by Words what it ſuffers from the Phantaſy.

[y] *Phantaſy* is ſo called from φῶς Light; for as Light ſheweth itſelf, and with itſelf all thoſe Things which are contained within it; ſo *Phantaſy* ſheweth itſelf, and that which maketh it.

[z] *Phantaſy* is an Impreſſion in the Soul. *Cleanthes* adds, *an Impreſſion by Depreſſion and Eminence*, as that Impreſſion which is made in Wax by a Seal.

Chryſippus conceives this to be abſurd; *For*, ſaith he, *when the Soul firſt apprehends a Triangle and a Square, it will follow that the ſame Body, at the ſame time, muſt have in itſelf ſeveral Figures*, which is abſurd. Again, whereas many Phantaſies are together conſiſtent in us, the Soul muſt have divers Figures, which is worſe than the former. He therefore conceived that *Zeno* uſed the Word *Impreſſion* for *Alteration*, meaning thus: *Phantaſy is an Alteration of the Soul, whereby it is no longer abſurd; that the ſame Body (many ſeveral Phantaſies being at the ſame time conſiſtent in us) ſhould receive ſeveral Alterations. For, as the Air receiving at once innumerable different Percuſſions, hath preſently many Alterations; ſo the ſupreme Part of the Soul, receiving various Phantaſies, doth ſomething which hath Proportion and Conformity thereto.*

Some object that this Expoſition is not right; becauſe, tho' every Phantaſy is an Expreſſion and Alteration in the Soul; yet every Impreſſion or Alteration of the Soul is not Phantaſy; as, *when the Finger ſmarts or itches, and the Hand is rubb'd, there is then an Impreſſion or Alteration in the Soul*; but it is not Phantaſy, becauſe it is not in the ſupreme Part of the Soul.

They anſwer, *That in ſaying an Impreſſion in the Soul, is implied as in the Soul as fully, as if we ſhould ſay, Phantaſy is an Impreſſion in the Soul as in the Soul*; as when we ſay, *the White in the Eye*, we imply, *as in the Eye*, that is, *the White is in a certain Part of the Eye, which all Men have ſo by Nature*. So when we ſay, *Phantaſy is an Impreſſion in the Soul*, we imply the *Impreſſion to be made in the ſupreme Part thereof*.

Others more elegantly anſwer, that the Word *Soul* is taken two Ways, either the Whole, or for the principal Part; when the ſay, *Man conſiſts of Soul and Body*, or, *that Death is a Separation of the Soul from the Body*, we mean properly the ſupreme Part, wherein properly conſiſts the Motions and Goods of the Soul. When *Zeno* therefore calleth *Phantaſy an Impreſſion of the Soul*, he is not to be underſtood of the whole Soul, but of Part thereof, as if he ſhould ſay, *Phantaſy is an Alteration of the ſupreme Part of the Soul*.

To this Interpretation, ſome object thus: *Appetition*, *Aſſention*, and *Comprehenſion*, are Alterations

[p] Laert. 7. 47. [q] St. Aug. Civ. dei, 8. 7. [r] Laert. 7. 52. [s] Orig. contra Celſ. lib. 7. [t] Cic. Acad. quæſt. 1. 11. [u] Cic. Acad. quæſt. 2. 6. [w] Sext. Empir. adv. Mathem. [x] Laert. 7. 49. [y] Plut. Plac. Phil. 4. 12. [z] Sext. Emp. adv. Mathem.

in the ſupream Part of the Soul; but theſe differ from Phantaſy, that being a certain Kind of Perſuaſion and Affection, whereas this is more Operation than Appetition, therefore the Definition is not good, being competible to many other Things.

They anſwer by Recourſe to συμπλοκαις (*implicancies*) that a Definition is underſtood to be in all. As he who ſaith, *Love is an Application of the Soul towards Procurement of Friendſhip, implieth amongſt young People*; ſo when we ſay, *that Phantaſy is an Alteration in the ſupream Part of the Soul, we imply by Perſuaſion*; *for*, *Alteration is not made by Operation.*

[a] Of Phantaſies there are two Kinds, ſome are *ſenſible*, others not *ſenſible*. *Senſible* are thoſe which are received through one or more of the Senſes: *Not ſenſible* are thoſe which are received through the Mind, as of Incorporeals, and other Things, comprehended by Reaſon. The ſenſible formed from Things that are, are made with Conceſſion and Aſſent. There are alſo Apparitions of Phantaſies, proceeding from Things which are.

Again, ſome are *Rational*, others *Irrational*; *Rational*, thoſe of reaſonable Creatures; *Irrational*, thoſe of Unreaſonable. The Rational are Intelligence, the Irrational have no Name.

Again, ſome are *Artificial*, others *Inartificial*; for, an Image is conſidered by an Artiſt one Way; by him that is not an Artiſt, another way.

[b] Again, ſome are *Probable*, others *Improbable*; the *Probable* are thoſe which make an eaſy Motion in the Soul; as, it is now Day, I diſcourſe, and the like. The *Improbable* are of a contrary Nature, averting us from Aſſent; as, it is Day, the Sun is not above the Earth; if it is dark, it is Day. *Both Probable and Improbable* are thoſe, which, by Relation to other Things, are ſometimes ſuch as in doubtful Speeches, neither probable are improbable, nor, ſuch as theſe, The Stairs are even, the Stairs are odd.

Of probable and improbable Phantaſies, ſome are *true*, ſome are *falſe*, ſome are neither true nor falſe. *True*, are thoſe, whoſe Predication is true, as, it is Day, 'tis Light: *Falſe*, whoſe Predication is falſe; *both true and falſe*, as happened to *Oreſtes* in his Madneſs, meeting *Electra*; that he met ſomething, it was true, for it was *Electra*; but, that it was Fury, was falſe. *Neither true nor falſe*, are thoſe which are taken from the Genus; for the Genus is not ſuch as the Species in all Reſpects: As, of Men, ſome are *Grecians*, ſome are barbarous; but Man in general is not *Grecian*, for then all Men muſt be *Grecians*; neither barbarous, for the ſame Reaſon,

Of true Phantaſies, ſome are *comprehenſive*, others are *not comprehenſive*. *Not comprehenſive* are thoſe which happen through Sickneſs, or Perturbation of Mind; many being troubled with Frenſy or Melancholy, attract a true Phantaſy which is not comprehenſive, even from that which extrinſically occurs caſually, for which Reaſon, they neither aſſert it often, nor aſſent unto it. *Comprehenſive* Phantaſy is that which is impreſſed and ſigned by that which is, and conformable to that which is, ſo as it cannot be of that which is not.

To comprehenſive Phantaſy three *Conditions* are requiſite: 1. That it ariſe from that which is; for many Phantaſies ariſe from that which is not, as in Madmen. 2. That it be conformable to that which is; for ſome Phantaſies are from that which is, but repreſents the Similitude of that which is not: As *Oreſtes* derived a Phantaſy from that which was, *viz.* from *Electra*, but not according to that which was; for he thought her to be one of the Furies. Comprehenſive Phantaſy muſt be conformable to that which is, and ſo impreſſed and ſigned, as that it may imprint artificially all the Properties of the Thing fancied, as Gravers touch all the Parts of thoſe Things which they imitate, and the Impreſſion made by a Seal on Wax exactly and perfectly, beareth all its Characters. Laſtly, That it be without Impediment; for ſometimes comprehenſive Phantaſy is not creditable, by Reaſon of outward Circumſtances; as when *Hercules* brought *Alceſtis* taken out of the Earth, to *Admetus*, *Admetus* drew from *Alceſtis* a comprehenſive Phantaſy, but did not credit it; for, he conſidered, that ſhe was dead, and therefore could not riſe again, but that ſometimes Spirits appear in the Shape of the deceaſed.

[c] *Phantaſie*, *Phantaſton*, *Phantaſticon*, and *Phantaſm*, according to *Chryſippus*, differ thus: *Phantaſie* is a Paſſion made in the Soul, which ſheweth itſelf, and that which made it; as, when with our Eyes we ſee white, it is a Paſſion engendred by Sight in the Soul, and we may call this a Paſſion, becauſe the Object thereof is a white Thing which moveth us: The like of Smelling and Touching.

Phantaſton is that which maketh Phantaſie; as the White and the Cold, and whatſoever is able to move the Soul, that is Phantaſton.

Phantaſticon is a fruſtraneous Attraction, a Paſſion in the Soul proceeding from nothing; as in thoſe who fight with Shadows, or extend their Hands in vain: For, to Phantaſy is objected Phantaſton, but Phantaſticon hath no Object.

Phantaſm is that, to which we are attracted by that fruſtraneous Attraction, which happens in melancholy, or mad Perſons; as *Oreſtes*, in the Tragedy, when he ſaith,

Bring

a Laert. 7. 51. b Sext. Emp. adv. Mathem. c Plut. plac. Phil. 4. 12.

Bring hither, Mother, I implore,
The ſnaky bloody Maids no more,
Whoſe very Looks wound me all o'er.

This he ſaith in his Madneſs, for he ſaw nothing: Wherefore *Electra* anſwers him,

Ah! quiet in thy Bed (unhappy) lie,
Thou ſeeſt not what thou think'ſt before thy Eye.

CHAP. V.

Of True and Truth.

TRUE [d] (according to *Zeno*) is that which is impreſſed in the Mind from that whence it is, in ſuch Manner, as it cannot be from that which is not: Or, as others; [e] *True* is that which is, and is oppoſed to ſomething. *Falſe* is that which is not; yet, is oppoſed to ſomething alſo.

Truth and *True* differ three Ways, by *Eſſence*, by *Conſtitution*, by *Power*. By *Eſſence*, for *Truth* is a Body; but, *True* is incorporeal, for it is a dicible λεκτὸν, and therefore incorporeal. On the contrary, *Truth* is a Body, as being the enunciative Science of all true Things. All Science is in ſome Meaſure the ſupream Part of the Soul, which ſupream Part is a Body: Therefore *Truth* in general is corporeal.

By *Conſtitution*; *True* is conceived to be ſomething uniform and ſimple by Nature; as, *It is Day*, *I diſcourſe*. *Truth*, as being a Science, conſiſteth of many Things, by a Kind of Conſervation. Wherefore as a People is one Thing, a Citizen another; a People is a Multitude conſiſting of many Citizens; but, a Citizen is no more than one. In the ſame Manner differeth *Truth* from *True*. *Truth* reſembleth a People, *True*, a Citizen; for, *Truth* conſiſteth of many Things collected, *True* is ſimple.

By *Power*; for *True* doth not abſolutely adhere to *Truth*: A Fool, a Child, a Madman, may ſpeak ſomething *True*, but, cannot have the Science of that which is *True*. *Truth* conſiders Things with Science, inſomuch that he who hath it, is wiſe; for, he hath the Science of true Things, and is never deceived, nor lieth, altho' he ſpeak falſe, becauſe it proceedeth not from an ill, but good Affection.

CHAP. VI.

Of Comprehenſion.

COmprehenſion [f] (καταλήψις) was firſt uſed in this Senſe by *Zeno*, by a Metaphor taken from Things apprehended by the Hand; [g] which Alluſion he expreſt by Action. For, ſhewing his Hand with the Fingers ſtretched forth, he ſaid, ſuch was Phantaſy; then bending them a little, ſaid, ſuch was Aſſent; then compreſſing them and clutching his Fiſt, ſuch was Comprehenſion.

[h] Comprehenſion is a firm and true Knowledge, Non-comprehenſion the contrary; for ſome Things we only think that we ſee, hear, or feel, as in Dreams and Frenzies; other Things we not only think, but truly do ſee, or hear, or feel. Theſe latter, (all but the Academicks and Scepticks) conceive to fall under firm Knowledge; the other, which we imagine in Dreams or Frenzie, are falſe.

[i] Whatſoever is underſtood, is comprehended by the Mind, one of theſe two Ways, either by *evident Incurſion* (which *Laertius* calls by Senſe) or by *Tranſition from Evidence* (*Laertius*, Collection by Demonſtration) of which latter there are three Kinds, by *Aſſimulation*, by *Compoſition*, by *Analogy*.

By *incurrent Evidence* is underſtood White and Black, Sweet and Sowr.

By *Tranſition* from Evidents: By *Aſſimilation*, is underſtood *Socrates* by his Picture: By *Compoſition*, as of a Horſe and Man is made a Centaur; for putting together the Limbs proper to both Species, we comprehend by Phantaſy that which was neither Horſe nor Man, but a Centaur compounded of both.

By *Analogy*, Things are underſtood two Ways; either by *Augmentation*; or, when from common ordinary Men, we by Augmentation fancy a Cyclops, who not like

Men that with Ceres's *Gifts are fed,*
But, ſome tall Hill erects his Head.

Or by *Diminution*, as a Pigmy. [k] Likewiſe the Center of the Earth is underſtood by Analogy from leſſer Globes.

To theſe Kinds add, [l] Comprehenſion by *Tranſference*, as Eyes in the Breaſt; by *Contiariety*, as Death; by *Transference*, as Dicibles, and Place; by *Privation*, as a Man without Hands; juſt and good are underſtood *Naturally*.

CHAP. VII.

Of Aſſent.

THESE [m] Things being enough known, which we have already explained, let us now ſpeak a little of *Aſſent*, and *Approbation*, termed συγκατάθεσις, not that, that is not a large Place, but the Grounds thereof have been already laid, for when we explained the Power that was in

d St. Aug. contra Acad. Lib. 2. e Sext. Emp. Adv. Mathem. f Cic. Acad. quæſt. 4. 47. g Cic. Acad. quæſt. 4. ibid.
h Galen. hiſt. phil. i Sext. Empir. adv. Mathem. k Laert. 7. 53. l Laert. ibid. m Cic. Acad. quæſt. 4. 12.

the Senſes, we likewiſe declared, that many Things were comprehended and perceived by the Senſes, which cannot be done without *Aſſent*. Moreover, ſeeing that betwixt an inanimate and an animate Being, the greateſt Difference is, that the Inanimate doth nothing, the Animate doth ſomething; we muſt either take away Senſe from it, or allow it aſſent, which is within our Power. When we will not have a Thing either to perceive or Aſſent, we in a Manner take away the Soul from it; for as it is neceſſary, that the Scale of Ballance which is laden, ſhould tend downwards; ſo is it that the Soul ſhould yield to Things that are perſpicuous.

[n] Altho' Aſſent cannot be made unleſs it be moved by Phantaſy, yet when that Phantaſy hath an immediate Cauſe, it hath not (according to *Chryſippus*) this principal Reaſon; not that it can be made without any extrinſecal Excitation (for it is neceſſary that Aſſent be moved by Phantaſy) but it returns to its Cylinder and Cone, which move not by Impulſion; then of their own Nature the Cylinder ſeems to rowl, and the Cone to turn round. As therefore he who thruſt the Cylinder, gave it the Beginning of Motion, but did not give it Volubility; ſo the objected Phantaſy imprinteth, and as it were ſealeth in the Soul its Species, yet the Aſſent is in our Power, and that (as he ſaid in a Cylinder) extrinſecally impelled, the Motion is continued by its own Power and Nature.

[o] Phantaſies, wherewith the Mind of Man is preſently affected, are not voluntary or in our own Power, but infer themſelves by a Kind of Violence. Approbations (συγκαταθέσεις) by which theſe Phantaſies are known and judged, are voluntary, and made according to our Arbitrement. So as upon any dreadful Noiſe from Heaven, or by the Fall of any Thing, or ſudden News of ſome Danger, or the like; it is neceſſary that the Mind of a wiſe Man be a little moved, and contracted, and appalled, not through Opinion perceived of any ill, but certain rapid and inconſiderate Motions, which prævert the Office of the Mind and Reaſon. But preſently the ſame wiſe Man approveth not τὰς τοιαύτας φαντασίας, thoſe dreadful Phantaſies, that is, ἃ συγκατατίθεται ἀλλὰ προσεπιδοκάσει, but rejects and refuſes them; nor is there any Thing in theſe, which ſeemeth to him dreadful. Thus differ the Souls of wiſe and unwiſe Men: The unwiſe, when Phantaſies appear cruel and difficult at the firſt Impulſion of the Mind, think them to be truly ſuch as they appear, and receiving them as if they were juſtly to be feared, approve them by their Aſſent, ᾗ προσεπιδοκάζει, (this Word the Stoicks uſe upon this Occaſion:) But a wiſe Man ſuddenly changing Colour and Countenance, ἃ συγκατατίθεται, aſſents not, but retaineth the State and Vigour of his Judgment, which he always had of theſe Phantaſies, as nothing dreadful, but terrifying only with a falſe Shew, and vain Fear.

CHAP. VIII.

Of Notions.

FROM Senſe [p], *the Rule of Science, Notions, are imprinted in the Soul, by which, not only Principles, but larger Ways to Reaſon are found out.*

[q] *A Man when he is born, hath the ſupream Part of his Soul, like unto clean Paper, upon which every Notion is inſcribed. The firſt Manner of Inſcription is by the Senſes; as for Example: They who perceive a Thing that is white, after it is taken away, retain the Memory thereof; but, when they have conceived many Remembrances of one Species, then they ſay, they have Experience, for Experience is a Multitude of Similitudes.*

Of Notions, *ſome are* Natural, *which are in ſuch Manner as we have ſaid, and without Art: Others* gained *by Learning and Induſtry; theſe are properly called* Notions, *the other* Anticipations. *The Reaſon for which we are called Rational, is ſaid to be perfected by Anticipations in the firſt ſeven Years.*

Intelligence is the Phantaſm of the Intellect of a rational Creature; for Phantaſm, when it lighteth upon a rational Soul, is then called ἔννοημα, *Intelligence, a Word taken from the Intellect. For to other Creatures there happen not Phantaſms; to the Gods only, and to us theſe are incident. Thoſe which belong to us, are Phantaſms, as to their Genus; Notions as to their Species; as Denaries and Staters, when paid for Tranſportation, are called* Naula.

[r] *Common Notions are planted in all Men, (in which they all agree together) one is not repugnant to another; for who holds not, that Good is profitable, and ought to be choſen with utmoſt Endeavours? Who holds not, that what is juſt, is fair and well beſeeming? Whence then proceed Contentions and Differences? To wit, from the Application of firſt Notions to ſingular Things.*

[s] *Theſe Notions, and whatſoever is of this Kind, which right Reaſon conformeth in us, being long examined, are true, and ſuitable to the Natures of Things.*

n Cic. lib. de fato. o Agell. 19. 1. and from him St. Auguſt. civit. Dei, 9. 4. p Cic. Acad. 1, 11. q Plut. de plac. phil. 4. 11. r Arrian. Diſt. Epict. 1. 22. s Simp. in Epict.

CHAP. IX.

Of Science and Opinion.

That [t] which is comprehended by Senſe, *Zeno* called *Senſe*; and if ſo comprehended, as not to be plucked away by Reaſon, *Science*, otherwiſe *Ignorance*; from which proceedeth Opinion, which is weak and common, to the falſe and unknown.

[u] Theſe three are joined together, Science, Opinion, and Comprehenſion, which borders upon the other two. Science is a firm, ſtable immutable Comprehenſion with Reaſon. Opinion, an infirm weak Aſſent; Comprehenſion, which cometh between both, is an Aſſent to comprehenſive Phantaſy. Comprehenſive Phantaſy is true, in ſuch a Manner, that it cannot be falſe. Therefore Science is in wiſe Men only, Opinion in Fools; Comprehenſion is common to both, as being that by which Truth is judged; [w] and is for this Reaſon reckoned by *Zeno*, neither amongſt the right (κατορθώματα) nor amongſt the bad (ἁμαρτήματα) but betwixt Science and Ignorance, affirming, that this only is to be credited.

CHAP. X.

Of Voice, Speech, and Words.

Theſe [x] three are joined to one another; that which is ſignified, that which ſignifieth, and the Contingent. *That which ſignifieth*, is the Voice, as *Dion*; *That which is ſignified*, is the Thing declared by the Voice; it is that which we apprehend, and is preſent in our Cogitation. *The Contingent* is the outward Subject, as *Dion* himſelf.

[y] Dialectick being converſant about that which ſignifieth, and that which is ſignified, [z] is divided into two Places; one, *of Significats*, the other, *of Voice*. The Place of *Significats* is divided into *Phantaſies, and Subſiſtents on Phantaſy, Dicibles, Axioms*, &c.

In the other Place, concerning *Voice*, is declared literal *Voice*, the *Parts of Speech*, the Nature of *Soleciſms* and *Barbariſms*, *Poems*, *Ambiguities*, *Song*, *Muſick*, and (according to ſome) *Definitions* and *Diviſions*.

[a] The Phantaſies of the Mind precede Speech, *(Of theſe therefore we have already treated)* then the Mind endued with the Faculty of Speaking, declareth by Speech what it receiveth from the Phantaſy: For this Reaſon, [b] the Conſideration of Dialectick, by the joint Conſent of all, ſeems as if it ought to be firſt taken from the Place of Voice.

[c] *Voice* is Air percuſſed, the proper ſenſible Object of Hearing, (as *Diogenes* the *Babylonian*, in his *Art of Voice*.) The Voice of a living ſenſitive Creature is Air percuſſed with Appetite; the Voice of Man is articulate, proceeding from the Mind. At his fourteenth Year it is perfected.

Speech (as [d] *Diogenes* ſaith) is a literate Voice; as, it is Day. *Word* is a ſignificative Voice proceeding from the Mind. *Language* is a Speech according to the Variety of Nations, whereof each uſeth its peculiar Dialect; as the *Attick* Ἀττικὴ, the *Ionick* Ἰωνικὴ. Voice and Speech differ, in that Voice is Sound, but Speech articulate only. Speech and Word differ; for Word is always ſignificative; but Speech ſometimes ſignifieth nothing, as *Blitiri*, which is no Word. To ſpeak and to pronouuce differ; Voices are pronounced, but Things only are ſpoken; [e] for, to ſpeak, is to pronounce a ſignificant Voice of a Thing that is ſaid.

[f] Hence *Chryſippus* ſaith, That he who beginneth to ſpeak and pronounce Words, before he can put them in their right Place, doth not ſpeak, but think that he ſpeaks; as the Image of a Man is not a Man; ſo in Crows, Daws and Children, when they firſt begin to ſpeak, the Words which they ſay are not Words. He only ſpeaketh who knoweth to put a Word in the right Place.

They (particularly [g] *Zeno*) [h] took much Pains in the Invention and Explication of Words, [i] wherein they diſtinguiſhed very ſubtilly. Hence *Cicero* calleth the *Stoicks* Architects of Words. *Ammonius*, the *Grammarians*, Followers of the *Stoicks*.

[k] The *Elements* of Speech are the twenty four Letters. *Letter* is taken three Ways; Firſt, for the Character or Figure which is formed. Secondly, for the Element or Power. Thirdly for the Name, as *A*. Of the Elements, ſeven are *Vowels*, α ε ι ο υ ι ω, ſix *Mutes*, β γ δ κ π τ.

[l] Of Speech there are five Parts, as *Diogenes* ſaith in his Book of *Voice*, and *Chryſippus* [m]. At firſt they reckoned but four, ſeparating the *Articles* from the *Conjunctions*, afterwards the latter *Stoicks* dividing the *Appellatives* from the *Nouns*, made them five, *Noun*, *Appellation*, *Verb*, *Conjunction*, *Article*. (*Antipater* in his Book of *Speech*, added the *Medium*. *Appellation* (as *Diogenes* ſaith) is a Part of Speech ſignifying a common Quality; as, Man, Horſe. *Noun* a Part of Speech denoting a proper Quality; as *Diogenes*, *Socrates*. *Verb*, (as *Diogenes* ſaith) a Part of Speech ſignifying a Thing, which is predicated of one or more Things, incompoſed; or as ſome ſay, an Element of Speech without Caſes, whereby the Parts of Speech are connected; as, I write, I ſpeak. *Conjunction* is a Part of Speech without Caſes, conjoining the Parts of Speech. *Article* is an Element of Speech, having Caſes, diſtinguiſhing the Kinds and Numbers of Nouns; as, ὁ, ἡ, τὸ, οἱ, αἱ, τά.

t Cicer. Acad. quæſt. 1. 11. u Sext. Emp. adv. Mathem. w Cic. Acad. quæſt. 1. 11. x Sext. Emp. adv. mathem. y Laert. 7. 43. z Laert. ibid. a Ibid. 7. 49. b Ibid. 7. 55. c Ibid. d Ibid. e Sext. Emp. adv. mathem. f Varro de Ling. Lat. lib. 5. g Cicero offic. 1. 17. h Dionyſ. Halic. de compoſ. verb. i Ammon. k Laert. 7. 57. l Ibid. m Dionyſ. Halic. Sect. 11.

Every

[n] Every Word, by Reaſon of that which it ſignifieth, called four neceſſary Things into Queſtion, its *Origin*, *Power*, *Declination*, *Ordination*.

As concerning the firſt, which the *Greeks* call Ετυμολογία, they conceived that Names are given by Nature; the firſt pronounced Voices, imitating the Things themſelves, from which the Names were afterwards impoſed, by which Reaſon they derive Etymologies, conceiving that there is not any Word, for which there cannot be given a certain Reaſon. They therefore ſtudiouſly enquired whence Words are deduced; much Pains was taken, firſt by *Zeno*, then by *Cleanthes*, afterward by *Chryſippus*, to give a Reaſon of Commentitious Fables, and to explain the Cauſes of Words, why they are called ſo and ſo.

This Beginning is to be ſought, until we arrive ſo far, as that the Thing agree in ſome Similitude with the Sound of the Word, as when we ſay, *Tinkling* of Braſs, the *Neighing* of Horſes, the *Bleating* of Sheep, the *Gingling* of Chains. Theſe Words, by their Sound, expreſs the Things which are ſignified by them.

But for as much as there are Things which ſound not, in theſe the Similitude of Touching hath the ſame Power. As they touch the Senſe ſmoothly or harſhly, the Smoothneſs or Harſhneſs of Letters in like Manner touches the Hearing, and thereby occaſioneth their Names. As when we ſay *ſmooth*, it ſounds ſmoothly; ſo who will not judge *Harſhneſs* to be harſh by the very Word? It is ſmooth to the Ear, when we ſay *Pleaſure*; harſh, when we ſay *Crux*, *a Croſs*; the Things themſelves make good the Sound of the Words. *Honey*, as ſweetly as the Thing itſelf affects our Taſte, ſo ſweetly doth the Name touch our Hearing: *Sour*, as harſh in both. *Wool* and *Briars*, as the Words are to the Hearing, the Things are to the Touch. Theſe are conceived to be the Infancy, as it were, of Words, when the Senſe of the Thing concords with the Senſe of the Sound.

From hence proceeded the Licence of Naming, according to the Similitude of the Things among themſelves; as when, for Example, *Crux*, a *Croſs*, is therefore ſo called, becauſe the Harſhneſs of the Word concords with the Harſhneſs of the Pain which the Croſs effecteth. But *Crura*, *Thighs*, are ſo called, not from Harſhneſs of Pain, but, becauſe in Length and Hardneſs, they are, in reſpect of other Limbs, like unto the Wood of a Croſs. Hence it comes to Abuſe, that the Name is uſurped, not of a like Thing, but as it were near; for what Likeneſs is there betweeu the Signification of *little* and *minute*, when as that may be *little*, which not only is nothing *minute*, but is ſomewhat grown; yet, by Reaſon of a certain Nearneſs, we ſay *minute* for *little*. But this Abuſe of the Word is in the Power of the Speaker; for he may uſe the Word *little*, and not *minute*. This Example belongs to that which we will ſhew, when we call that a *Fiſhpond* which hath no Fiſh in it, nor any Thing like a Fiſh: It is denominated from Fiſhes, by Reaſon of the Water wherein Fiſhes live. So the Word is uſed by Tranſlation, not from Similitude, but a certain Kind of Vicinity. And if any one ſhould ſay, that Men in ſwimming reſemble Fiſhes, and that from thence a Fiſh-pond is ſo named, it were fooliſh to refuſe it, ſince that neither is repugnant to the Nature of the Thing, and both are occult. But, this is to the Purpoſe, which we cannot dilucidate by one Example, how much the Origin of the Word, which is taken from Vicinity, differs from that which is derived from Similitude.

From hence there is a Progreſſion to the contrary. *Lucus* is thought to be ſo named, *Quod minime luceat*; and *bellum*, *quod res bella non ſit*; and *fœdus*, *quod res fœda non ſit*. But if we derive *porcus*, as ſome do a *fœditate*, it returns to that Vicinity, when that which is made, is named that by which it is made.

For this Vicinity is very large, and divided into many Parts, either by Efficiency, as this Word *porcus à fœditate*; from which likewiſe *fœdus*; or by Effect, as *puteus*, ſo named, becauſe the Effect thereof is *potatio*; or by that it containeth, as *urbs ab orbe*, becauſe in a Place which they liked, they firſt made a Tract about it with a Plough, as *Virgil* ſaith of *Æneas*.

——*Urbem deſignat Aratro.*

Or by that which is contained, as if *horreum* were derived from *hordeum*; or by Abuſe, as *hordeum* for Wheat; or the Whole from a Part, as *mucro*, which is the Point, for the whole Sword; or a Part from the Whole, as *capillus quaſi capitis pilus*, What need we go any further? Whatſoever elſe can be reckoned, we may ſee the Origin of the Word contained, either in the Similitude betwixt Things and Sounds, or in the Similitude betwixt Things themſelves, or in Vicinity or Contrariety, which Origin we cannot purſue beyond Similitude.

But this we cannot do always; for there are innumerable Words, the Reaſon of which lie hid. To the Infancy, or rather Stock and Seed of ſuch Words, beyond which no Origin is to be ſought, neither if a Man do enquire can he find any, they proceed in this Manner. The Syllables in which *v* hath the Place of Conſonant, as in theſe Words, *venter*, *vafer*, *velum*, *vinum*, *vomis*, *vulnus*, have a thick, and as it were, a ſtrong Sound, which the very Cuſtom of ſpeaking confirmeth, which from ſome Words we take them away, leſt they ſhould

[n] S. Auguſt. de Dialect. cap. 6.

further

burthen the Ear; for which Reaſon we ſay *amaſti*, rather than *amaviſti*; and *abiit*, not *abivit*, and innumerable of the ſame kind; therefore when we ſay *Vis*, the Sound of the Word having, as we ſaid, a kind of Force, ſuiteth. Now from this Vicinity, by that which they affect, that is, becauſe they are violent, *vincula* ſeem to be named, and *vimen quod aliquid vinciatur*. Thence *vites*, becauſe they claſp about thoſe Things by which they grow. Hence alſo by Similitude, *Terence* calls a crooked old Man *Vietum*. Hence the Earth, worn into winding Paths by the Feet of Paſſengers, is called *Via*; but if *Via* be ſo named, *quaſi vi pedum trita*, the Origin returns to the Vicinity. But let us ſuppoſe it derived from the Similitude it hath with *vitis* or *vimen*, that is, from its winding; one asketh me, *why it is called* Via? I anſwer, *from the Winding and Crookedneſs thereof*, which the Ancients call'd *Vietum*; thence the Rounds of a Wheel *Vietos*. He demands how *Vietum* comes to ſignify Winding? I anſwer, *from the Similitude of* Vitis, *a Vine*. He requires whence *Vitis* is ſo named? I ſay, becauſe it doth *vincire* thoſe Things which it comprehends. He queſtions whence *vincire* is derived? We ſay, *a vi*. He asks, *whence* vis? We give this Reaſon, *becauſe the Word in its robuſt and forcible Sound agreeth to the Thing which it ſignifieth*. He hath nothing more to demand.

[o] In like manner in this Word *Ego*; as *Chryſippus* obſerves, in pronouncing the firſt Syllable, we depreſs the under Lip, as if it were to point to our ſelves; then by Motion of the Beard we point to our own Breaſts; of which [p] *Nigidius* hath given more Inſtances in his Grammatical Commentaries.

The ſecond Queſtion concerning Words, is of their Power, περὶ σημαινόντων, *of Significants*; whence [q] *Chryſippus* divided Dialectick into two Parts, περὶ τῶν σημαινόντων καὶ σημαινομένων, *of Significants, and Significats*. Here they enquire, *how many Ways every Thing may be ſaid, and how many Ways a Thing ſaid may ſignify?*

Here is examined the Ambiguity of Words. [r] *Ambiguity* (or Amphiboly) is a Word ſignifying two or more Things, naturally and properly, according to the Language of the Nation, in ſuch manner, that many Senſes may be collected from the ſame Words, as αὐλητρὶς πέπτωκε, which one way ſignifies, *the Pot fell* thrice; another way, *the She-Minſtrel fell*.

[s] Every Word (according to *Chryſippus*) is by Nature ambiguous, for the ſame may be taken two or more Ways. [t] Neither is that any thing to the Purpoſe which *Hortenſius* calumniates in *Cicero*, Thus they affirm that they hear Ambiguities acutely, explain them clearly. The ſame Perſons hold, that every Word is ambiguous; how then can they explain the Ambiguous by the Ambiguous, that were to bring a Candle not lighted into the Dark? This is ingeniouſly and ſubtiley ſaid, but like that of *Scævola* to *Antonius*, *You ſeem to the Wiſe to ſpeak acutely, to Fools truly*. For what elſe doth *Hortenſius* in that Place, but by his Ingenuity and Facetiouſneſs, as an intoxicating Cup, bring Darkneſs upon the Unlearned? For when they ſay, *Every Word is ambigious*, it is underſtood of ſingle Words. Ambiguities are explained by Diſputation. No Man diſputeth by ſingle Words, none therefore explaineth ambiguous Words by ambiguous Words; and yet ſeeing that every Word is ambiguous, no Man can explain the Ambiguity of Words, except by Words, but thoſe conjoined and not ambiguous. As when we ſay, *Every Soldier hath two Feet*, it doth not follow that a whole Regiment of Soldiers that have two Feet, ſhould have in all but two Feet. So when I ſay, *Every Word is ambiguous*, I do not ſay, a Sentence, nor a Diſputation, altho' they are woven of Words. Every ambiguous Word therefore may be explained by an inambiguous Diſputation.

The third Queſtion is concerning *Declination*, ἀνωμαλία and ἀναλογία. [u] Some follow *Analogy*, others *Anomaly*. *Analogy* is a like *Declination* of like, in Latin *Proportio*. *Anomaly* is an Inequality, following the Cuſtoms of Declinations. [w] *Chryſippus* wrote ſix Books, περὶ τῆς ἀνωμαλίας, ſhewing, that like Things are noted with unlike Words, and unlike Things with like Words.

The laſt Queſtion is concerning *Ordination*, σύνταξις. [x] Upon this Subject *Chryſippus* wrote two Books (*Laertius* reckons more) whoſe Scope is not Rhetorical but Dialectick, as will eaſily appear to the Reader; *Of the Syntax of Axioms*; *Of true and falſe Axioms*; *Of poſſible and impoſſible*; *Of contingent, and tranſient, and ambiguous*, and the like, which confer nothing to ſingle Speech or Pleaſure, or Grace to Elocution.

[y] There are five *Excellencies* of Speech, *Propriety*, *Perſpicuity*, *Succinctneſs*, *Decorum*, *Elegance*.

Propriety is a proper Phraſe, according to Art, not ter the common Expreſſion.

Perſpicuity is, when that which is intended is deliver'd clearly.

Succinctneſs is, when that only is compriſed, which is neceſſary to the Thing.

Decorum is a Conformity to the Thing.

Elegance is an avoiding of vulgar Phraſe.

[z] Amongſt the Faults of Speech is *Barbariſm*, a Phraſe not in uſe with the beſt Perſons; and *Solœciſm*, a Speech incoherently framed.

o Galen. de decret. Hipp. & Plat. lib. 2. p Agel. 10. 5. q Laert. 7. 63. r Laert. ibid. s Agel. 11, 12. t D. Auguſt. de Dialect. u Agel. 2. 20. w Varro de ling. lat. x Dionyſ. Halicarn. de compoſ. verb. y Laert. 7. 59. z Laert. ibid.

CHAP. XI.

Of Definition and Diviſion.

Definition [a] (according to *Antipater*, in his Book of *Definitions*) is Speech by *Analyſis* pronounced adæquately, or (as *Chryſippus* in his Book of *Definitions*) an Anſwer to this Queſtion, *What a Thing is?*

[b] Thoſe Definitions are vicious which include any of thoſe Things which are not in the Things defined, or not in all, or not in ſome; ſo as if we ſhould ſay, *A Man is a Rational Creature*, or *a mortal Grammatical Creature*, ſeeing that no Man is immortal, and ſome Men are Grammarians, the Definition is faulty.

[c] We muſt therefore, when we take thoſe Things which are common to the Things we wou'd define, and others, proſecute them ſo far until it become proper, ſo as not to be transferable to any other Thing, as this, *An Inheritance is Riches*, add, *which by the Death of ſome Perſon falleth to another*, it is not yet a Definition, for Riches may be held many other ways, as well as by Inheritance; add one Word, *by right of Law*; now the Thing will ſeem disjoyned from Community: So that the Definition is thus explained. *Inheritance is Riches, which by the Death of one Perſon falleth to another by Right of Law*; it is not yet enough, therefore add, *neither bequeathed by Will, nor detained by Poſſeſſion*, and it is perfect.

[d] Of Definition there are two kinds; one of Things *which are*; the other of Things *which are underſtood*. Thoſe *Things which are*, we call ſuch as may be ſeen or touched, as a *Field*, *Houſe*, *a Wall*, and the like. On the other ſide, we ſay thoſe Things *are not*, which cannot be touched or ſhewn, as Poſſeſſion, Guardianſhip, Nation, Kindred, which have not any Body, yet there is ſome Conformity in the Underſtanding, which we call Notional, whereby in Argumentation they may be explained by Definition. This latter kind is rather called Deſcription, a Speech, which by the exterior Figure of the Things, bringeth us to the Things themſelves, or a Definition ſimply expreſſing the Power of a Definition.

[e] Again, of Definitions, ſome are of *Partitions*, others of *Diviſions*. *Of Partitions*, when the thing propoſed is torn (as it were) in Pieces, as if we ſhould ſay, *the Civil Law is that which conſiſteth in Laws, Senators, Things judged, the Authority of Lawyers, Edicts of Magiſtrates, Manners and Equity*.

The Definition *of Diviſions* comprehendeth all Species which are under the Genus defined, thus; *Abalienation is of that Thing which is in our Power, or a Deliverance of it into the Power of another; or a Conceſſion by Law, amongſt whom thoſe Things may be done by Civil Right.*

[f] *Diviſion* is a Section of the Genus into its immediate Species, as, *of living Creatures, ſome are rational, ſome irrational.* [g] This therefore is an ill Diviſion; *of Men ſome are* Grecians, *ſome* Ægyptians, *ſome* Perſians, *ſome* Indians; for the next Species are not deſperate, but oppoſite. We muſt therefore ſay thus; *Of Men ſome are* Grecians, *ſome* Barbarians; and again, by Sub-diviſion *of* Barbarians, *ſome are* Ægyptians, *ſome* Perſians, *ſome* Indians, which likewiſe is in the Diviſion of Things that are. For thoſe which are good and bad, are different to us; thoſe who are intermediate betwixt good and bad, are indifferent to us. The Diviſion therefore ought not to be ſo, but rather thus: *Of Things that are, ſome are indifferent, others different; of the different, ſome are good, ſome are ill*; for this Diviſion is like unto that which ſaith, *of Men, ſome are* Grecians, *others* Barbarians; *of* Barbarians, *ſome are* Egyptians, *ſome* Perſians, *ſome* Indians; the other is likewiſe, *of Men, ſome* Grecians, *ſome* Egyptians, *ſome* Perſians, *ſome* Indians.

Hence it followeth, that [h] perfect Diviſion hath an univerſal Power; for he who divideth thus, *of Men, ſome are* Grecians, *others Barbarians*, ſaith as much as this, if there are any Men, they are either *Grecians* or *Barbarians*; for if there be any Man, who is neither *Greek* nor *Barbarian*, the Diviſion muſt neceſſarily be ill, the Univerſal falſe. Wherefore when we ſay, *Of Things that are, ſome are good, ſome ill, ſome intermediate*, it is as much (according to *Chryſippus*) as this Univerſal; if there be any Things that are, they are either good or ill, or indifferent. But this Univerſal is falſe, if any thing falſe be ſubjected to it. For, if two Things be ſubjected, one good, the other ill; or, one good, the other indifferent, in this Expreſſion of thoſe Things which are, one kind is good, that is true; but this, theſe are good, is falſe, for they are not good; for one is good, the other ill. And again, theſe are ill, is falſe, for they are not ill, but only one of them. The like in Indifferents; for it is falſe that theſe are Indifferents, as that theſe are good or ill.

[i] There are three Forms of Diviſion, *Anti-diviſion, Sub-diviſion, Partition*. *Anti-diviſion* is a Diviſion of the Genus into Species by the contrary: As for Example, by Negation, as of things that are, ſome are good, others not good.

Sub-diviſion is Diviſion upon a Diviſion; as of Things that are, ſome are good, others not good; of the not good, ſome are ill, others indifferent.

Partition is a Diſtribution of the Genus into

a Laert. 7. 60. b Sext. Emp. adv. Log. c Cic. Topic. c. 6. d Cic. Topic. c. 5. e Cic. Topic. ibid. f Laert. 7. 61.
g Sext. Empir. adv. Math. 10. 2. h Sext. Empir. adv. Math. 10. i Laert. ibid.

Places

Places (according to *Crinis*) as of Goods, ſome belong to the Soul, others to the Body.

CHAP. XII.

Of Genus, Species, *&c.*

GENUS[k] *is a Comprehenſion of many Notions referred to one, as a* living Creature, *for this includes all living Creatures. Notion is a Phantaſy of the Mind, not any Thing exiſtent or qualitative, but as it were, ſomething exiſtent and qualitative; as the Notion of an Horſe, no Horſe being preſent.*

Species *is that which is contained under the* Genus, *as under* living Creature *is contain'd Man.*

Moſt general *is that which is a* Genus, *but hath no* Genus; Moſt ſpecial, *that which is a* Species, *but hath no* Species.

To this Place of Voice belong likewiſe, as we ſaid, the Conſideration of Poem *and* Poeſy. Poem *(according to* Poſſidonius, *in his* Introduction to Speech) *is a Speech in Metre or Rhime, not Proſe, as γαῖα μεγίστη, and διὸς ἀιδή.* Poeſy *is a ſignificant Poem with Deſign, containing the Imitation of Things divine and human.*

CHAP. XIII.

Of Things.

NOtions, *Words, and Things, as we have ſaid, are conjoined together. From Notions we come to Words, from Words we come now to Things themſelves. By Notions Things are perceived.* [l] *Thoſe are ſaid to be* Things *which are dicible.* [m] *The* Stoicks, *by a new Name, call Things τυγχάνοντα,* Contingents, *becauſe we deſire that Things might befall us, and that we might obtain them.* [n] Contingents *therefore is ſubject itſelf, beyond the Notion or Word, as* Dion.

[o] *They comprehend all Things under one common* Genus. [q] *Somewhat;* [p] *placing this* Genus *above all; the Reaſon this:* In Nature ſome Things are, ſome Things are not. *For, thoſe Things which are not, but only incur in the Mind, as* Centaurs, Giants, *and whatſoever elſe is formed by falſe Cogitation, hath ſome Image, altho' it hath no Subſtance. Even Negatives are in being.* Somewhat *is therefore more general than* Ens, *which is underſtood only of Corporeals.*

[q] *Things are ſub-divided into four Genus's,* Subjects, *and* Qualitatives, *and* Quodammodotatives in themſelves, *and* Quodammodotatives as to others.

[r] *Thus the* Stoicks *treating more ſtrictly and ſubtilly of theſe Things, contract the Predicaments into a leſſer Number, taking ſome of thoſe Things which they diminiſhed, but with ſome Alteration.*

CHAP. XIV.

Of Subjects.

THere[s] is not any thing beſides τὸ ὑποκείμενον, *Subject.* The Differences concerning this are non-ſubſiſtent.

[t] *Subject* is two-fold; one which is called the *firſt* Subject; ſuch is Matter expert of all Qualities, which *Ariſtotle* calleth a *Body potentially.* The other, that which is *effected with Quality*, as *Braſs*, and *Socrates*, with thoſe Things which are in them, or prædicated by them.

CHAP. XV.

Of Qualitatives.

QUalitatives[u] *have a Subſiſtence, and are ſeparate from their Subjects: For Qualities (as all other Accidents) are Bodies, ſeeing that, according to* Zeno, *nothing can be effected by that which is incorporeal, nor can that which is incorporeal effect any thing; whatſoever effecteth is a Body. Effective Quality therefore is a Body. Matter is expert of Quality, but Qualities are not expert of Matter.*

[w] Quality *is the Habit of that which is qualitative.* Qualitative *is taken three Ways;* Firſt, *for whatſoever hath Difference, whether it be Motion or Habit, and whether hardly or eaſily ſeparable. In this Senſe, not only he who is wiſe, but he who ſtretcheth out his Hand, are qualitative. The* ſecond *Signification includes not Motions, but Habits only, which they define* Qualitative, *that is, which hath a Difference endued with Habit, as a wiſe Man, or an armed Man. Of theſe, ſome are adequate to the Meaſure of their Pronunciation and Conſideration, others not adequate. Theſe they omit; thoſe which are adequate, equal, and permanent, they call* Qualitative; *as, a* Grammarian, *and a* wiſe Man; *neither of theſe exceeds, or falls ſhort of his Quality. Likewiſe a Lover of Meat, and a Lover of Wine, being in act ſuch as a Glutton, and a Drunkard, becauſe they make uſe of thoſe Parts which ſerve to this End, are ſo called: So that if any Man be a Glutton, he is conſequently a Lover of Meat; but if he be a Lover of Meat, he is not therefore immediately a Glutton; for, being deſtitute of thoſe Parts which he uſeth in eating, he wanteth the Act, but not the Habit. Quality is adequated to Qualitative in this laſt Senſe.*

[x] *All Qualities are either* Cauſes, *and then they are called* Forms, *or* Effects, *and then they are generally called* ἕξεις, Habituals, *which Word* Antipater *extends as large as the common Accident, both of*

k Laert. 7. 60. l Laert. ibid. m Philop. in Analyt. prior. u Sext. Empir. adv. Math. o Alex. Aphrod. in Top. 4. p Senec. Ep. 58. q Simplic. in Categor. r Simplic. ibid. s Simplic. in Categ. t Simplic. ibid. Categ. u Dexip. in Categ. 2. 22. w Simplic. in Categ. x Burſius in Dialect. Cic. 4. 3.

Things corporeal and incorporeal, τὶ somewhat. Of Habituals *there are four Kinds, μεθεκτὰ, that is, ἐννοήματα, when they reside in the Mind; τευκτὰ, that is, πλάσεις, when they fall from the Mind into the Voice; καταγορήματα, when by the Motion of the Mind, they are prædicated of any Thing; συμβεβηκότα, or, συμβάμματα, when then happen to Subjects.*

[y] *Habits are only Things united; but those which are conjoined by Contiguity, as a Ship, or by Distance, as an Army; in these there can be no Habit; nor one Thing Spiritual above all, nor one Reason, whereby they may come to subsist within one Habit.*

[z] *It is common to Quality of corporeal Things to be the Difference of their Substance, not taken severally, but contracted into one Notion and Property of the Mind, nor by Time or Strength reduced to Form, but by its own Tality, according to which, the Generation of the Qualitative subsists.*

[a] Power (*a Species of Quality*) *is that which hath and giveth the Faculty of exercising many Accidents; as Prudence giveth the Faculty of walking prudently, and discoursing prudently; or according to some, Power is that which the Faculty of exercising many Accidents, and which ruleth and governeth the Acts subjected unto it. What* Aristotle *called natural* Power, *they name* Aptitude.

Habits are intended and remitted. Dispositions cannot be intended or remitted. Thus the Straitness of a Wand, altho' it may easily be discomposed and bent, is a Disposition; for Straitness cannot be intended or remitted. Likewise the Virtues are Dispositions, not in respect of their Firmness and Constancy, but because they cannot admit of Degrees of more and less; but Arts must either have Firmness, or not be Dispositions. Thus Habitude *is taken in the Latitude of the Species,* Disposition *is the chief Perfection of the Species, and in that which is the most it can be, whether it be easily alter'd (as the Straitness of a Wand) or not.*

CHAP. XVI.

Of Quodammodotatives.

THE third Kind of Things are τὰ πῶς ἔχοντα, Quodammodotatives. [d] *They differ from Qualitatives, because Matter is otherwise effected by Habits, otherwise by* Quodammodotatives, *in this or that Manner. Moreover, Qualitatives are* Quodammodotatives *as to Matter, and conversant therein; but properly,* Quodammodotatives *are conversant in Qualitatives.* [e] *Again, as Habituals may be said to extend farther than Habits, so* Quodammodotatives *are larger than Qualitatives; for* Quodammodotatives *extend even to those Things which are* Quodammodotatives *as to others, and include them; but Qualitatives consist only in those which make a Difference.*

[f] *This Place* Boethius *conceives to have the Power of Habit. Habit chiefly and universally is taken three Ways: First, to be to itself, and according to itself. Secondly, in respect to another. Thirdly, of another to it. That which is considered* as to itself, *pertains to* Quodammodotatives; *as* armed, *for it is a Habit of ones Self, to ones Self. That which is* to another, *pertains to Relation; for a Father, or a right Hand, are said, according to a Habit, not of themselves to themselves, but of them to another. But that which is of another to us, as of an armed Man, being the Habit of another to us, pertains to Habit.*

To this Head they reduce *Quantitatives* and *Quantity*, and their Species, *Place*, *Time*, and some Species (according to *Aristotle*) of Quality, *Figure* and *Form*; as also *Action*, *Passion*, *Sight*, *Habit*.

CHAP. XVII.

Of Quodammodotatives as to others.

THE last Genus of Things is τὰ πρός τι ἔχοντα, *Quodammodotatives as to others.* [g] Of these there are two Kinds, *Relatives* and *Quodammodotative-Relatives.* The *Relatives* are opposed and distinguished from those which are by themselves, and absolute. The *Quodammodotative-Relatives* are opposed to those which have a Difference; as for Example, Sweet and Sowr, and whatsoever is of the like Kind, are Relatives; but *Quodammodotative-Relatives*, are as the right Side, *Father*, and the like; for they have a Difference, in that they are characteriz'd by Differences, according to some Species. As therefore there is one Notion of those which are by themselves, and absolute, and another of those which are considered with Difference: So some things are *Relatives*, others *Quodammodotative-Relatives.* The Consequence of Conjunctions in these is contrary; for, with those which are by themselves, co-exist those which have a Difference; for, those which are by themselves, have some Differences, as White and Black. But those, which are by themselves, co-exist not with those which have a Difference. Sweet and Bitter have Differences, whereby they are characterized; yet they are not absolute, but *Relatives.* But, those who are *Quodammodotative-Relatives*, being contrary to those which have Differences, are likewise *Relatives.* For, the right Side, and a *Father*, besides that they are *Quodammodotative*, are likewise *Relatives*; but Sweet and Bitter being *Relatives*, have a Difference, whereby they are contrary, being *Quodammodotative-Relatives.* Those which are *Quodammodotative-Relatives*, it is impossible should be by themselves, and absolute, or by Difference; for they depend solely upon

y Simplic. in Categ. z Ibid. a Ibid. b Ibid. c Ibid. d Plotin. 1. 10. e Simplic. in Categ. f Simplic. ibid. g Simplic. in Categ.

Relative

Relative Habit. *Relatives* therefore are not by themſelves, for they are not abſolute; yet are they according to Difference; becauſe they are diſtinguiſhed by ſome Character. To expreſs this more clearly, *Relatives* are thoſe, which by their proper Character reſpect another: *Quodammodotative-Relatives* are thoſe which uſe to happen to another, but not without Mutation and Alteration of thoſe Things which are about them; yet, with reſpect of ſomething external. If therefore any Thing with Difference reſpect another, it is only *Relative*, as Habit, Science, and Senſe: But if it reſpect another, not out of inherent Difference, but in pure Habit, it is *Quodammodotative-Relative*. For, a *Father*, and right Side, to their Conſiſtence, require ſome external Things, for as much as there being no Mutation made in them, he is no longer a *Father*, his Son being dead, and the right Side is no longer, ſo, after he is riſen, in reſpect of whom it was ſaid to be ſuch; but Sweet and Bitter will not alter, unleſs their Power be likewiſe changed. If therefore *Quodammodotatives* are changed in Habit to another, although they receive no Paſſion in themſelves, it is manifeſt they have their Being in the Habit alone, not in Difference.

[h] This Genus was firſt introduced by *Ariſto*, [i] who firſt defined *Quodammodotative-Relatives* to be thoſe, *whoſe being is the ſame with their* Quodammodotative *being to one another:* And ſo alſo *Andronicus* defines them.

CHAP. XVIII.

Of Dicibles.

TO the Place concerning Things and Significats, belongeth that concerning *Dicibles*, περὶ λεκτοῦ, to which true and falſe is common. [k] *Dicible* is that which conſiſteth according to rational Phantaſy. [l] *Rational Phantaſy* is that, by which what is comprehended by Phantaſy, may be expreſſed by Speech. Every Thing that may be ſaid, ought to be ſaid, for from thence is derived the Denomination.

[m] *Dicible* is a mean betwixt Notion and Thing. *Dicibles* are Notions, that is, νοήματα, but not meerly and ſimply Notions, [n] which in as much as they are the Principles of Science, and are Intelligencies, are called περιλήψεις and ἔννοιαι, but in as much as they reſide in the Mind, are called ἐννοήματα, and are Genus's and Species, in which Manner, being ready for Expreſſion, they are called *Dicibles*, and pertain to the enunciative Faculty of the Soul. For whatſoever is ſaid, if it be conſidered as it is ſaid of Something, they are *Categorems*; if ſo, as it breaketh forth into Voice, and with Voice, they are Words; if retained in the Mind, ready to break forth, they are *Dicibles*. *Dicible* therefore is a Word, and yet ſignifies not a Word, but that which is underſtood in the Word, and is contained in the Mind.

[o] Of *Dicibles* there are two Kinds, the *Defective* and the *Perfect*. The *Defective* are thoſe which have an imperfect Enunciation, not compleating the Sentence, but requiring ſomething to follow; as *writeth*, for we ask, who? To this Kind belong *Categorems*, which are prædicated of other Things.

The *Perfect* are ſuch as have a perfect Enunciation: Of theſe are two Kinds: The firſt peculiarly called *Perfect*, which tho' they compleat the Sentence, yet ſignify neither true nor falſe. Of theſe there are many Kinds, as *Interrogation*, *Percontation*, *Imperative*, *Adjurative*, *Optative*, *Imprecative*, or *Execrative*, *Subſtitutive*, *Hypothetical*, *Compellative*, *like* to, or *Tranſcending an Axiom*, and *Dubitative*.

Interrogation is that which is a perfect Sentence, but requireth an Anſwer; as, *Is it Day?* for this is neither true nor falſe; ſo that *it is Day*, is an Axiom, *Is it Day?* an Interrogation.

Percontation is a Thing for which we cannot anſwer ſignificantly, as Interrogation, *yes*; but as thus, *He dwelleth in ſuch a Place.*

Imperative is a Thing, in ſpeaking whereof, we command; as,

Go thou to the Inachian *Flood.*

[p] *Adjurative*, as, *witneſs thou Earth.*

Optative, which we ſpeak wiſhing, as,

Great Jove who doſt in Ida *reign,*
The Victory let Ajax *gain.*

Imprecative, or Execrative, as,

As on the Ground this Wine I pour,
So may the Earth his Blood devour.

Subſtitutive, or Expoſitive, as, *Let this be a right Line.*

Hypothetical, as, *ſuppoſing the Earth to be the Centre of the Globe of the Sun.*

Compellative, is a Thing in Speaking, which we call another, as,

Atrides, Agamemnon, *King of Men.*

Like to, or *tranſcending an Axiom*, is that which hath an axiomatical Manner of Speaking; but becauſe it ſuperabounds in ſome Particle or Affection, it is not ranked amongſt Axions, as,

How beauteous is thy Virgin Train!
How like to Priam's *Son, that Swain!*

h Laert. vit. Ariſtonis. i Simplic. in Categ. k Laert. 7. 63. l Sext. Epir. Adv. Math. m Ammon. in proem. Ariſt. περὶ ἑρμ. n Burſ. in Dial. Cic. 5. 1. o Laert. 7. 63. p Ammon. in lib. περὶ ἑρμ.

Dubita-

Dubitative is a Thing different from an Axiom, which whoſoever ſpeaks, maketh a Doubt. as,

Then are not Life and Grief of Kin? All theſe are neither true nor falſe.

The other Kind of perfect Dicibles which compleat the Sentence, affirmeth or denieth, and is either true or falſe. It is called *Axiom.*

CHAP. XIX.

Of Categorems.

Categorem [o] is that which is prædicated of another, or a Thing conſtrued with one or more, or as (*Apollodorus*) a defective *Dicible*, conſtrued with the right Caſe, to make an Axiom.

[p] Whatſoever is prædicated of another, is prædicated of the Name of the Caſe; and both theſe are either *perfect*, as that which is prædicated, and together with the Subject ſufficient to make an Axiom. Or they are *defective*, and require ſome Addition to make thereof a perfect Prædicate.

If that which is prædicated of a Name, make an Axiom, it is a *Categorem*, or σύμβαμα, a Congruity, as *walketh*, for Example, *Socrates walketh.*

But if it be prædicated of the Caſe (whereby Tranſitions are made from one Perſon to another, wherein it is neceſſary that ſome oblique Caſe be likewiſe pronounced with the right) they are called παρασυμβάματα, as an Addition to the σύμβαμα, (or as [q] *Priſcian* renders it, *leſs than Congruities*) as *Cicero ſaved his Country.*

Again, if that which is prædicated of ſome Noun, require a Caſe of ſome other Noun to be added to make up the Axiom, ſo as the Conſtruction be made of two oblique Caſes, they are ἀσυμβάματα, Incongruities, or according to *Ammonius*, *leſs than*, σύμβαματα, as, *it pleaſes me to come to the*; Whether the Nouns only, or the Words require it.

[r] Again, of *Categorems* there are four Kinds, *Right*, *Supine*, *Neuter*, *and reciprocally active*, *and paſſive*. *Right* are thoſe which have a Motion tending to another, and are conſtrued with one of the oblique Caſes, for the making of a *Categorem*, as *Heareth*, *Seeth*, *Diſcourſeth.*

Supine are thoſe which are conſidered from Habit to an Agent, and is conſtrued with a paſſive Particle, as, I am heard, I am ſeen.

Neuter, as thoſe which are neither Way, as, to be wiſe, to walk.

Reciprocally, *Active* and *Paſſive* are thoſe, which ſeem Supines, but are not, for they are acts, as κείρεται, for therein is included ὁ κειρόμενος.

The *Right* (or Nominative) *Caſe*, is ſo called by the Stoicks, whom the Grammarians follow, becauſe it falleth directly from the Notion which is in the Mind. *Oblique Caſes* are the Genitive, Dative, and Accuſative.

CHAP. XX.

Of ſimple Axioms.

AXiom [s] is that which is either true or falſe, or a Thing perfect by itſelf, negative, or affirmative, as far as it extends; or, (according to *Chryſippus*, in his Dialectick Definitions) *Axiom* is that which affirmeth or denieth, as far as it extends; as *Dion* walketh. It is called *Axiom*, ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀξιοῦσθαι καθ' ἑαυτὸν, becauſe Aſſent is either given to it or not; for he who ſaith, it is Day, aſſenteth thereunto. If it be Day, the Axiom is true; if it be not, falſe.

[t] Of *Axioms*, the firſt and moſt proper Difference is of the *Simple*, and not *Simple* (thus divided by *Chryſippus*, and *Archidemus*, and *Athenodorus*, and *Antipater*, and *Crinis.*)

[u] *Simple Axioms* are thoſe which conſiſt neither of one Axiom twice taken, nor of different Axioms, neither by one or more Conjunctions; as, *It is Day*, *'tis at Night* Socrates *diſputes.* [w] Of *Simple Axioms* there are many Kinds, *Apophatick*, or Negative, *Arnetick*, or univerſally negative; *Steretick*, or Privative; *Categorick*, or Predicative; *Categoreutick*, or Indicative; *indefinite* and *mediate.*

[x] *Negative* Axioms are thoſe, in which a negative Particle is propoſed; as, *If this is*, *that is not.* But if the Negation be of the latter Part of the Axiom, the other Part not being negative, then the Axiom is not negative, but predicative; as, *It happeneth to ſome Pleaſure not to be good.* This therefore declareth what happeneth to the Thing, and therefore is predicative. [y] A Species of negative Axiom, is the ſupernegative, when, between the Parts connected and copulated by two Affirmations, a Prepoſition with a Negation is interpoſed, and that very Negation denied; as, *If it is Day*, *it is not Light.* Of the ſame Kind are all thoſe, wherein Negation is propoſed to Negation; as, *It is not both Day and not Day.*

[z] *Univerſally negative Axioms* are thoſe, which conſiſt of an univerſal negative Particle, and a Categorem; as, *no Man walketh.*

[a] *Privative* are thoſe which conſiſt of a privative Particle, and an Axiom in Power, as, *he is inhuman.*

[b] *Predicative* are thoſe, which conſiſt of a right Caſe and Categorem; as, *Dion walketh.*

[c] *Indicative*, or [d] *Definitive*, is that which con-

o Laert. 7. 64. p Ammon. in Ariſt. περὶ ἑρμ. q Lib. 18. r Laert. 7. 64. s Ibid. 7. 65. t Ibid. 7. 68. u Laert. ibid. Sext. Empir. adv. Math. w Laert. 7. 69. x Laert. ibid. Ammo. περὶ ἑρμ. y Boet. in Cic. Top. l. 5. z Laert. 7. 70. a Ibid. b Ibid. c Ibid. d Sext. Emp. adv. Math.

ſiſts of a demonſtrative right Caſe, and a Categorem; as, this *Man walketh.*

[e] *Indefinite*, is that which conſiſts of one or more indefinite Particles; as, *a certain Man walketh, he is moved.*

[f] *Intermediate* are of this Kind, *a Man ſitteth, or a Man walketh*; *a certain Man walketh*, is indefinite, for it determines no ſingle Perſon; *that Man ſitteth*, is definite. *Socrates ſitteth*, is intermediate; for it is not indefinite, becauſe it determines the Species; nor definite, becauſe it is not pronounced with Demonſtration, but it is intermediate betwixt both.

[g] An *indefinite Axiom*, as *ſome one ſitteth*, is true, when the Thing definite is true; as, *he ſitteth*; but if none of the Singulars do ſit, the indefinite Axiom is not true, that *ſome one ſitteth.*

CHAP. XXI.

Of not-ſimple Axioms.

NOt-*ſimple* [h] Axioms are thoſe, which are in a Manner double, conſiſting of one Axiom diverſified, or of Axioms; of one Axiom diverſified; as, *if it be Day, it is Day*; of Axioms, as, *if it be Day 'tis Light* [i].

[k] In *not-ſimple* Axioms, that which immediately followeth the Conjunction, *if*, or *whereas*, is called the *Antecedent*, *the firſt*, or *the Beginning*; the reſt is called *the Ending*, or *Conſequence*, or *ſecond.* Notwithſtanding that the Axiom be pronounced by Inverſion; as, *It is Light, if it be Day*; for in this, the Ending or Conſequence is, *it is Light*, altho' it be ſpoken firſt; the Antecedent, *it is Day*, altho' it be put in the ſecond Place; for it immediately followeth the Conjunction *if.*

The Laws and Rules of Conſequents are theſe: 1. [l] From True followeth True; as, *if it be Day*, it followeth, *that it is Light.* 2. From Falſe followeth Falſe; as, if this be falſe *that it is Night*, this is likewiſe, *it is dark.* 3. From Falſe followeth True, as from this, *the Earth flieth*, followeth, *the Earth is.* 4. From True doth not follow Falſe; for from this, *the Earth is*, it followeth not, *that the Earth flies.*

[m] Of *not ſimple* Propoſitions there are many Kinds, *Connex*, *Adnex*, *Conjunct*, *Caſual*, *Declarative of the more*, and *Declarative of the leſs.*

[n] *Connex* (according to *Chryſippus* in his *Dialectick*, and *Diogenes* in his *Dialectick Art*) is that which conſiſts of the connective Conjunction, *if*; which Conjunction declareth, that the Conſequent is ſecond to the firſt; as, *if it be Day it is Light.* Of a diverſified Axiom, and the Conjunction *if*, conſiſteth this Connex, *if it be Day, it is Day*, theſe are properly right Axioms. Of different Axioms, and the Conjunction *whereas*, this, *if it is Day, 'tis Light.* [o] Connex Axioms are called alſo *Tropical*, becauſe they turn from the Antecedent to the Conſequent.

The Rules of Connex Axioms are theſe; [p] That is a *true* Connex wherein the contrary of the Conſequent is repugnant to the Antecedent, as, *if it is Day, 'tis Light*; for, *that it is not Light*, the contrary to the Conſequent is repugnant to, *it is Day*, the Antecedent. A *falſe* Connex is that wherein the contrary to the Conſequent, is not repugnant to the Antecedent; as this, *if it is Day, Dion walks*; for, that *Dion walketh not*, is not repugnant to, *it is Day.*

[q] *Adnex*, (which ſome reckon as a Species of the Connex) according to *Crinis*, in his Dialectick, is an Axiom connected by the Conjunction *whereas*, beginning with an Axiom, and ending with an Axiom; as, *whereas it is Day, it is Light*, the Conjunction ſheweth, that the ſecond is a Conſequent of the firſt, and that the firſt is ſubſiſtent.

The Rules of Adnex Axioms are theſe; [r] That is a true Adnex, which beginneth from true, endeth in that which is conſequent; as, *whereas it is Day, the Sun is over the Earth.* Falſe is that which beginneth from Falſe, or endeth not conſequently; as, *whereas it is Day, Dion walketh*, if this be ſaid when it is not Day.

[s] A *conjunct* Axiom is that which is knit together by Conjunctions copulative; as, *it is both Day and it is Light.* The Rules therefore are theſe; That is a right Conjunction wherein all Things are true; as, *it is Day, and it is Light.* That is *falſe*, which hath ſomething falſe. An Axiom which hath neither Conjunction nor Disjunction, is to be taken in the Senſe of the Speaker; for Conjunction is ſometimes taken for Disjunction; as, *to me, and my Heir.*

[t] A *disjunct* Axiom is that which is disjoined by a Disjunctive Conjunction; as, *either it is Day, or it is Night.* This Conjunction ſheweth, that one of the Axioms is falſe.

[u] All Things that are disjoined, are repugnant to one another, and their Oppoſites likewiſe are repugnant. Of all Things that are disjoined, one muſt be true, the reſt falſe, otherwiſe nothing at all is true, or all, or more than one are true, either thoſe which are disjunct, will not be repugnant, or thoſe which are oppoſite to them will not be contrary to one another, then the Disjunct will be falſe, and is called παραδιζευγμένον, as this is, in which the Oppoſites are not contrary; either thou runneſt, or walkeſt, or ſtandeſt, for they are repugnant to one another, but their Oppoſites are

e Laert. 7. 70. Sext. Empir. adv. Math. f Sext. Emp. ibid. g Sext. Emp. ibid. h Laert. 7. 73. i Sext. Emp. adv. Math. k Sext. Empir. ibid. l Laert. 7. 71. m Ibid. n Ibid. 7. 73. o Philopon. in Anal. prior. p Laert. ibid. q Laert. 7. 71. r Ibid. 7. 74. s Ibid. t Ibid. u Agell. 16. 8.

not

not repugnant, becauſe not to walk, and not to ſtand, and not to run, are not contrary in themſelves; for thoſe Things are ſaid to be contrary, which cannot be true together. But you may at the ſame Time neither walk, nor run, nor ſtand. Every Disjunction therefore is not only true, but neceſſary; for if of Contraries there could be a falſe Conjunction, no Disjunction could be true.

A *Caſual Axiom* is that which is connected by this Conjunction, *becauſe*, as, *becauſe it is Day, 'tis Light*; for the firſt is, as it were Cauſe of the ſecond. The Rules thereof are theſe: A caſual Conjunction is true, when beginning from true, it endeth in the Conſequent, and cannot have the Antecedent for its Conſequent; as, *becauſe it is Day, 'tis Light*; but this Axiom, *it is Light*, doth not follow from the other, *it is Day*.

A *Falſe caſual*, is that which either beginneth from falſe, or endeth in that which is not conſequent, or whoſe Antecedent may be the Conſequent, as, *becauſe it is Night, Dion walks*.

An Axiom, *declarative of the more*, is that which is conſtrued with this Conjunction, *more*, as, *it is more Day than Night*. *Declarative of the leſs*, is contrary to the former, as, *it is leſs Day than Night*.

CHAP. XXII.

Of contrary Axioms.

Contrary Axioms [w] are thoſe which are repugnant to one another, according to Truth and Falſhood, whereof one affirmeth, the other denieth, as, *it is Day, it is not Day*. Only Negatives are contrary, ἀντικείμενα, and oppoſite, and repugnant, for only in Contraries one Propoſition is true, the other falſe. The other three Kinds of Contraries alledged by *Ariſtotle* are pronounced without a Conjunction. Whatſoever is pronounced without a Conjunction, is neither true nor falſe, for true and falſe belongeth to Axiom. Axiom is a Speech which conſiſteth in the Conjunction of ſome Thing, whereas, of *Ariſtotle*'s other three Kinds of Contraries, none are conjunct but ſimple, as Black and White, Double and Single, Sight and Blindneſs.

Adverſe are (as likewiſe defined by *Ariſtotle*) thoſe which in the ſame Kind are moſt diſtant. Nothing that is pronounced by Negation is adverſe (ἐναντίον) to another, for then the Adverſe to Virtue will be not Virtue, and to Vice not Vice, and under not Virtue will be included many other Things beſides Vice, even a Stone, a Horſe, and whatſoever is beſides Virtue; under not Vice will be found Virtue, and all other Things. Thus all Things would be adverſe to one, and the ſame the Adverſe to Virtue and Vice. Moreover, if Virtue were not adverſe to Vice, but to Not-vice, the Intermediate will be adverſe both to Good and Bad, which is abſurd.

The Rules of Contraries are theſe. 1. Contrariety is principally in Acts, Habits, and the like. 2. Categorems and Qualitatives are called as it were contrary. Prudently and imprudently, in ſome Manner lead to Things contrary, but Contraries abſolutely are in Things; and Prudence is ſo immediately contrary to Imprudence, not this to that.

Contraries are either *Disjunctive* or *Subdisjunctive*; *Disjunctive*, as when we ſay, *It is either Day or Night*. *Subdisjunctives*, are of two Kinds, either *in Whole*, betwixt Univerſals, as, *Every living Creature either doth or ſuffereth, no living Creature either doth or ſuffereth*; or *in Part*, betwixt Particulars; as, *he either ſitteth or walketh; he neither ſitteth nor walketh*.

[x] The Rules of Contraries are theſe: Of Disjunctives one being aſſerted, the other is neceſſarily taken away; one being taken away, the other is neceſſarily aſſerted.

Of Subdisjunctives in whole, both cannot be true, both may be falſe; both cannot be affirmative, both cannot be negative.

Of Subdisjunctives in Part, both may be true, becauſe they are taken in Part.

CHAP. XXIII.

Of Poſſible and Impoſſible, Neceſſary and Unneceſſary, probable, paradoxal and reaſonable Axioms.

MOreover [y], of Axioms, ſome are *poſſible*, others *impoſſible*; ſome *neceſſary*, others not *neceſſary*. A *poſſible* Axiom is that which is ſuſceptible of a true Predication, without Obſtruction from thoſe Things, which tho' external, are yet contingent with the Thing itſelf; as *Diocles lives*. *Impoſſible* is that which can never be ſuſceptible of Truth, Externals oppugning it, as, *the Earth flies*. Neceſſary is that which is ſo true as that it cannot any Way receive a falſe Prædication, or, may receive it; but thoſe Things which are extrinſical, will not permit that it be true, as *Virtue profiteth*. *Not-neceſſary*, is that which may be either true or falſe, exterior Things not obſtructing it, as *Dion walks*.

[z] Theſe future Repugnants, and their Parts, are according to the ſame Manner, as the preſent and the paſt. For if it be true that the Thing either ſhall be or ſhall not be, it muſt be either true or falſe, becauſe Futures are determined according to theſe; as, if a Navy is built to-morrow, it is true to ſay that it ſhall be built; but if it be not, it is falſe to ſay that it ſhall be built, becauſe it will not be; therefore it will either be, or not be, and conſequently one of the two is falſe.

[w] Laert. 7. 73. [x] Simplic. ad Categor. [y] Laert. 7. 75. [z] Simplic. in lib. Ariſt. de oppoſit.

Concerning

Concerning Poſſibles and Neceſſaries, there is great Difference betwixt *Diodorus* and *Chryſippus*. [a] *Diodorus* holds that only to be poſſible which either is, or will hereafter be. That which neither is, nor ever ſhall be, is impoſſible. As *for me to be at* Corinth is poſſible, if I ever were there, or ever ſhall be there; but if I never was there, nor ever ſhall be there, it is impoſſible. That a *Boy ſhall be a Grammarian* is not poſſible, unleſs hereafter he come to be one.

[b] On the contrary, *Chryſippus* held, that thoſe Things which neither are, nor ever ſhall be, are yet poſſible to be, as, *to break a Gem*, tho' it never come to be broken. [c] Moveover that from Poſſibles an Impoſſible may follow, as in this Axiom, which is a true Connex. *If* Dion *be dead, he* (pointing to *Dion*) *is dead.* The Antecedent, *if* Dion *be dead*, is poſſible, becauſe it may at ſome time be true that he ſhall be dead; but this Axiom, *he is dead*, is impoſſible: for *Dion* being dead, the Axiom likewiſe is aboliſh'd, that *he is dead*, ſeeing he is no longer that Man, capable of being demonſtrated by the Pronoun *He*, for *he* is a Demonſtration of a living Creature. If therefore *Dion* being not yet dead, this Word, *He* may be ſaid of him, being dead, it cannot be ſaid *he is dead.* So that in this Place, *he is dead*, is impoſſible. For it were not impoſſible, if, ſome time after the Death of *Dion*, of whom it was before predicated in the Connex whilſt he lived, it might be again predicated, *he is dead*; but becauſe that cannot be, it is impoſſible, that, *he is dead*, ſhould be predicated of him.

To conclude, [d] ſome held with *Diodorus*, that whatſoever is paſt, is true of Neceſſity: That to impoſſible there followeth not a poſſible, and that what cannot be done, neither is nor ſhall be true. Others (as *Cleanthes* and *Antipater*) that ſomething is impoſſible that neither is nor ſhall be; that to poſſible followeth not impoſſible; and that which is paſt, is not true of Neceſſity. Others, that ſomething is poſſible which is not true; that whatſoever is paſt, is true of Neceſſity, and that to poſſible followeth alſo impoſſible.

Furthermore of Axioms, ſome are [e] *probable*, ſome *paradoxal*, ſome *reaſonable*. A *probable* Axiom is that which perſuadeth us by a ſpecious Show to aſſent to it, as *whatſoever bringeth forth another, is a Mother*; which is falſe, for the Hen is not the Mother of the Egg.

[f] *Paradoxal* Axioms are thoſe which ſeem true only to the Wiſe, [g] contrary to the Opinion of all others. [h] Theſe are likewiſe in other Arts, beſides Philoſophy; for what is ſtranger than to prick the Eyes for the Recovery of Sight? If we ſay this to one ignorant of Chirurgery, will he not laugh at it? Is it not therefore ſtrange, that ſuch Things as are true in Philoſophy ſhould ſeem Paradoxes to the Unlearned.

[i] A *reaſonable* Axiom, is that which hath many Conditions requiſite to the Truth thereof, as, *I ſhall live To-morrow.*

CHAP. XXIV.

Of Reciprocal Axioms.

HItherto of the [k] Contrariety and Repugnance of Axioms. Now of their Conſent and Agreement, whereby one followeth and is correſpondent to another, either according to Truth or Falſhood, by μετάπτωσις, *Reciprocation.*

Of *Reciprocation* there are three Kinds; the Firſt ἀναστροφὴ, *Perverſion*, a Migration into falſe; the Second ἀντιστροφὴ, *Converſion*, a Migration into true; the Third ἰσοδυναμία, *Equipollence*, into the ſame.

CHAP. XXV.

Of Signs.

TO the Place of Axioms appertain likewiſe Signs. [l] Sign *is an Axiom antecedent, in a true Connex, and having Power to detect the Conſequent.*

[m] Sign *is taken two Ways; commonly, for whatſoever falleth under any Senſe, and ſignifieth ſomething that proceedeth from it; and properly for that which declareth a Thing which is not manifeſt.*

[n] *Things which are certain require no Sign, for they are comprehended of themſelves; neither thoſe which are wholly uncertain, for they can no way be comprehended;* [o] *but thoſe only which are uncertain in Time, or by Nature, may be comprehended by Signs, but not by the ſame. Things that are uncertain in Time, are comprehended by commemorative Signs; Things uncertain by Nature, are comprehended by demonſtrative.*

Of Signs *therefore, ſome are* demonſtrative, *others* communicative. *A* communicative Sign *is that which is ſo near to the Thing, that together with the* Sign *the Thing itſelf appeareth, into the Knowledge whereof the* Sign *bringeth us, as* Smoak, *which when we ſee, we know it proceeds from Fire. A* demonſtrative Sign *is, that which not being obſerved before with an evident* Sign, *leads us by that to the Knowledge of the Thing; as when a Female hath Milk, we preſently know that ſhe hath brought forth.*

CHAP. XXVI.

Of Reaſons or Arguments.

DIalectick is the Diſcipline of Speech, concluded by Reaſon. *Reaſon*, λογος, ſometimees call'd alſo *Argument*, and *Interrogation*, is according to [p] *Crinis*, and that which conſiſts of one or more *Sumptions*, and an *Aſſumption*, and an *Inference*, as,

a Johan. Grammat. in Ariſt. de oppoſit. b Cic. de fat. c Alex. Aphrod. in Anal. prior. d Epictet. 11. 19. e Laert. 2. 75. f Laert. ibid. g Cic. Parad. h Epictet. 1. i Laert. 7. 76. k Laert. 7. 76. l Sext. Emp. hypot. 2. 1. m Sext. adv. Mathem. n Sext. Emp. ibid. & Pyrr. hyp. 2. 10. o Galen. Philoſ. hiſt. p Laert. 7. 77.

If it be Day it is Light. } *Sumption.*
But it is Day: } *Assumption.*
Therefore it is Light. } *Inference.*

The *Reason* of the *Stoicks* differs from the *Syllogisms* of *Aristotle* in three respects. [q] First, a *Syllogism*, according to *Aristotle*, cannot have less than two Propositions, a *Reason* may have but one; as, *Thou livest, therefore thou breathest*; which kind *Antipater* calls μονολήμματα. Secondly, in *Syllogisms*, something besides that which is granted in the Premises; but in *Reasons*, the Conclusion may be the same with both, or either of the Sumptions. The first are called διαφερόμενοι, as,

If it is Day, it is Day.
But it is Day,
Therefore it is Day.

[r] The Second are called ἀδιαφόρως περαίνοντες, as,

It is either Day or not Day.
But it is not Day.
Therefore it is not Day.

[s] Lastly, in *Syllogisms*, the Conclusion must necessarily follow by reason of the Premises, whereas there are three kinds of Reasons which have not this Property; the First, μονολήμματα, already mentioned; the Second ἀμεθόδως περαίνοντες, *not methodically conclusive Reasons*; as,

The First is greater than the Second.
The Second greater than the Third;
Therefore the First is greater than the Third.

This concludes necessarily, but not syllogistically, unless this Proposition be put in the first Place; *What is greater than another, is greater also than that which is less than that other.* Of the same kind is that Theorem in the First of *Euclid*'s Elements, *This Line is equal to that, therefore this Line is likewise equal to that*, which is true indeed; but to conclude syllogistically, requires this universal Proposition, *Those which are equal to a Third, are equal to one another.*

The third kind of Reasons, from which *Syllogism* differeth by this Property, are [t] παρέλκοντες λόγοι redundant Reasons, and those of two kinds. The first are such as have a superfluous Sumption; as,

Every just Thing is honest,
Every honest Thing is good,
Every good Thing is expetible in itself;
Therefore every just Thing is good.

The Second are those in which the proper Conclusion is not inferr'd, but something Consequent, or Accident, as that Argument of *Epicure:*

Whatsoever is dissolved hath not Sense,
Whatsoever hath not Sense pertaineth not to us.
Therefore Death pertaineth not to us.

Whereas to conclude syllogistically, we should say, *Therefore whatsoever is dissolved pertaineth not to us.*

In a Reason or Argument the *Sumption* λῆμμα and the *Assumption* [u] πρόσληψις (term'd by *Aristotle* μετάληψις) are Axioms receiv'd by consent of the Adversary, for Construction of that which is called *Inference* ἐπιφορὰ (by *Aristotle* συμπέρασμα *Conclusion*) because it is inferr'd from the rest.

[w] Of *Sumption* and *Assumption*, according to *Chrysippus*, there are four Differences; the first *Scientifick*; the second *Exercitative*, or (as *Aristotle* calls it) *Dialectick*; the third, *Probable* and *Rhetorical*; the fourth, *Sophistic.*

CHAP. XXVII.

Of *Conclusive Reasons.*

OF [x] *Reasons* there are two kinds, *Conclusive* and *not Conclusive. Conclusive Reasons* are those, in which the *Sumptions* being granted, from the Concession thereof, the *Inference* seemeth to follow.

Conclusive Reasons, in respect of their Matter, are of two kinds, *true* and *false. True* are those which, from true Sumptions, collect a true Inference. *Not true*, the contrary.

The Laws and Rules of true and false Reasons are these: Truth is consequent to Truth; as, if it is Day, it is Light. 2. False is consequent to False, as if it be false that it is Night, it is likewise false that it is dark. 3. False is consequent to true; as Earth, if it flies is Earth. 4. False is not consequent to true; for, because it is Earth, it is not therefore consequent that it flies.

Again, of true Reasons, some are *demonstrative*, others *not demonstrative.* A *demonstrative* Reason is that which by Things that are certain, or perspicuous, collecteth that which is uncertain and less perspicuous; *as if Sweat issue thro' the Skin, we may understand Pores; but Sweat issues thro' the Skin, therefore we may understand Pores.*

Not demonstrative are contrary; as, *if it is Day, it is Light; but it is Day, therefore it is Light.* Herein the Inference, *it is Light*, is certain.

CHAP. XXVIII.

Of *Syllogistick Conclusive Reasons*, or *Syllogism.*

CConclusive Reasons, as to their Form, likewise are of two kinds; *Syllogistically conclusive*, and *not Syllogistically conclusive.*

[q] Alexand. Aphrod. in anal. prior. [r] Alex. Aphrod. in anal. prior. [s] Ibid. [t] Alex. Aphrod. in anal. prior. & in Topic. 1.
[u] Not περάλημψις as the learned Burfius hath observed, dial. Cic. 6. 2. [w] Galen. de Doctrina Hippocr. & Plat. lib. 2. [x] Laert. 7. 78. Sext. Empir. adv. Mathem.

[y] *Syllogiſtically concluſive* Reaſons (or Syllogiſms) are thoſe which either cannot be more concluded, or whereof one or more of the Sumptions are reduced to thoſe which cannot be concluded again; as, if *Dion* walks, he is moved.

Syllogiſms (by which the *Stoicks* underſtand only the Tropical, or Hypothetical) are of three Kinds, *Connex*, *Disjunct*, *Conjunct*.

[z] A *connex* Syllogiſm is, when two are ſo connected in themſelves, that one is the Antecedent, the other the Conſequent, in ſuch Manner, as, if the Antecedent be aſſerted, the Conſequent followeth, and the Conſequent being taken away, the Antecedent is likewiſe taken away, as, If it be Day, it is not Night, this Antecedent is true, therefore it followeth, it is Night. This King of Syllogiſm pertains to the firſt and ſecond Moods. In the firſt it is called from Poſition of the Antecedent, to Poſition of the Conſequent; in the Second, from Negation of the Antecedent, to Negation of the Conſequent. The Laws concerning the Truth or Falſhood of theſe Syllogiſms, are the ſame with thoſe of connex Axioms.

Of connex Syllogiſms there are two Kinds; *Connex in themſelves*, as *if it is Light, it is Light*; *but it is Light, therefore it is Light*; and *connex by others*; as, *if it is Day, it is Light*; *but it is Day, therefore it is Light.*

A *conjunct* Syllogiſm, is [a] when we deny ſomething conjunct, and to theſe add another Negation, and of theſe take the firſt, that what remains be taken away, as [b] it cannot be that a Legacy is Money, and Money not a Legacy; but a Legacy is Money, therefore Money is a Legacy.

[c] A *disjunct* Syllogiſm is that in which there cannot be more than one Thing true; or, that in which if one be, the other is not; or if one be not, the other is; as, *It is either Day or Night, but it is not Night, therefore it is Day*; for one being aſſerted, the other is taken away, and ſo on the contrary. [d] The Evidence of this Syllogiſm *Chryſippus* conceives to be ſo great, that even Dogs have Knowledge thereof. For coming to a Place where are three Ways, if by the Scent they find that the Beaſt hath not gone in two of them, they run directly to the Third without ſcenting, as if they argued thus, the Beaſt went either this Way, or that Way, but neither this Way nor that Way, therefore that Way: The Laws of disjunct Syllogiſms are the ſame as thoſe of disjunct Axioms.

CHAP. XXIX.

Of Moods.

SYllogiſtick [e], concluſive Reaſons are diſpoſed into *Moods*. Of *Moods* there are two Kinds, the firſt *ſimple*, properly called a Mood, τρόπος, defin'd a Kind of Figure of the Reaſon, as thus,

If the Firſt is, the Second is,
But the Firſt is,
Therefore the Second is.

(It is obſervable by the Way, that the *Stoicks* for Letters uſed Numbers:) The other *compounded*, called λογοτρόπος, as being conſiſtent of both Reaſon and Mood, as,

If Plato *liveth*, Plato *breatheth*,
But the Firſt,
Therefore the Second.

This is uſed in a long Syntax, that it be not neceſſary to ſpeak a long Aſſumption, or a long Inference, but they abbreviate them thus, but the Firſt, therefore the Second.

Of *Moods* or Tropes there are two Kinds, one of *Indemonſtrables*, ſo term'd, not that they cannot be demonſtrated, but becauſe they conclude ſo evidently, that they need not be reproved; the other of *Demonſtrables*.

Of indemonſtrable *Moods*, there are (according to *Chryſippus*) five, according to [f] others more or leſs.

The Firſt wherein every Reaſon conſiſts of a Connex, and an Antecedent from which beginneth the Connex, and the Conſequent is inferr'd, as,

If the Firſt, then the Second,
But the Firſt,
Therefore the Second.

The *ſecond* Indemonſtrable is, which, by the Conſequent of the Connex, and the contrary of the Conſequent, hath a Concluſion contrary to the Antecedent, as,

If it is Day, 'tis Light,
But it is Night,
Therefore it is not Day.

The *third* is that which by a negative Complication, and one of thoſe which are in the Complication, infers the contrary to that which remains, as,

Plato *is not both dead and alive,*
But Plato *is dead,*
Therefore Plato *is not alive.*

The *fourth* is that which by a Disjunctive, and one of thoſe which is in the Disjunctive, concludeth the contrary to that which remains, as,

y Laert 7. 78, &c. z Simplic. in Epictet. a Cic. Topic. 1. b Cic. ibid. c Simplic. ad Epict. d Sect. hyp. 2. Pyrrh. cap. 14. e Laert. 7. 76. f Cic. Topic. c. 14. Martian. capel. Nupt. Phil. 4.

Either 'tis the First or Second,
But it is the First,
Therefore it is not the Second.

The *fifth* is that wherein the whole Reason is connected by a Disjunctive, and one of those which are in the Disjunctive of the contrary, inferreth the rest, as,

Either it is Night, or it is Day,
But it is not Night,
Therefore it is Day.

CHAP. XXX.

Of not-Syllogistick-conclusive Reasons.

REASONS [g] *Not-Syllogistically-conclusive* (which are likewise especially called (as their Genus) conclusive in Opposition to Syllogisms) are those which conclude not by Way of Syllogism, as,

It is false, that it is both Night and Day,
But it is Day,
Therefore it is not Night.

And this of *Chrysippus.*

Whatsoever is good is laudable,
Whatsoever is laudable is honest,
Therefore whatsoever is good is honest.

These *Not-Syllogystick*, or *Categorick*-Conclusives, are frequently used by the *Stoicks* (as by *Zeno* in *Cicero*) but immethodically, not reduc'd to Mood and Figure. Those they applied only to Tropical Reasons, as in which consisteth the sole Way and Order of Inference. The Categorical are not Syllogisms, because in them something is ever omitted, and therefore they are ἀμεθόδως περαίνοντες, immethodically conclusive; as in that Argument of *Chrysippus* last mentioned, two Assumptions, and an Inference are omitted, for it ought to be thus,

If it be good, it is laudable,
But it is good,
Therefore it is laudable.

And again,

If it be laudable, it is honest,
But it is laudable,
Therefore it is honest.

Hence are derived those Reasons which are called ἐπιβαλλοντες, and ἐπιβαλλομένοι, *Adjicient* and *Adject*, consisting of Propositions continually assuming without Conclusions. *Adject* are those whose Conclusion is omitted; *Adjicient*, those whose demonstrative Proposition is omitted, as,

The First of every Second,
The Second of every Third,
The Third of every Fourth;
Therefore the First of every Fourth.

In this Adject, the Conclusion is omitted, which is, therefore the First of every Third.

CHAP. XXXI.

Of Not-conclusive Reasons.

Not-conclusive [h] Reasons are those, whose opposite to the Inference is repugnant to the Connection of the Sumptions; [i] they are four Kinds. 1. By Incoherence. 2. By Redundance. 3. By being in an ill Figure. 4. By Defect.

By Incoherence, when the Propositions have no Conjunction or Communion with one another, nor with the Inference, as,

If it is Day, it is Light,
But Corn is sold,
Therefore it is Light.

For neither, *it is Day*, hath any Communion with *Corn is sold*, nor both of them together, with, *it is Light*, but each dependeth upon something else.

By Redundance, when something is assumed to the Proposition extrinsical and superfluous, as,

If it is Day, it is Light,
But it is Day, and Virtue profiteth,
Therefore it is Light.

For *Virtue profiteth*, is superfluously assumed with the other Proposition, the Inference depending upon the other two.

By *being in an ill Figure*, as this is a right Figure,

If the First, the Sscond,
But the First is,
Therefore the Second.

But this,

If the First, the Second,
But not the Second.

Is not conclusive; not that in this Figure, there cannot be Reason which may collect Truth from Truth, for that it may do, as thus,

g Laert. 7. 68. h Laert. 7. 77. i Sext. Emp. adv. Mathem.

If Three are Four, Six are Eight,
But three are not Four,
Therefore Six are not Eight.

But becauſe there may be ſome ill Reaſons in it, as this,

If it be Day, 'tis Light,
But it is not Day,
Therefore it is not Light.

By *Defect*, when there wants one of the collective Propoſitions, as,

Riches are either ill or good,
But Riches are not good;
Therefore they are ill.

For in the Disjunct there wanteth this, or *indifferent*; ſo that to be perfect the Sumption ſhould be thus, Riches are ill, or good, or indifferent.

CHAP. XXXII.

Of fallacious Reaſons or Sophiſms.

BY Dialectick [k] are diſcerned true and falſe Reaſons: The latter are *Sophiſms*, proper to *Sophiſts*, who diſpute for vain Glory, or Gain; as true Reaſons are to *Logicians*, whoſe End is only to find out Truth.

Of fallacious Reaſons there are many Kinds; the *Quieſcent* Reaſon, or *Sorites*, the *Lying*, the *Inexplicable*, the *Sluggiſh*, the *Dominative*, the *Vailed*, *Electra*, the *Horned*, the *Crocodilite*, the *Reciprocal*, the *Nullity*, the *Defective*, the *Mower*, the *Bald*, the *Occult*, the *Negative*.

[l] *Sorites*, named from σωρὸς, *a Heap*, is [m] when ſome Things evidently true, by ſhort Mutations, the Diſpute is brought to Things evidently falſe: [n] *As, are not two few? Are not three ſo likewiſe; and four, and ſo on to ten? But, two are a few, therefore ten.* [o] It is called alſo ἡσυχάζων λόγος, *the quieſcente Reaſon*, becauſe the Way to underſtand it, is by ſtopping, and withholding the Aſſent.

The *lying* Reaſon, ψευδόμενος λόγος, is a captious Argument, not to be diſſolved. Of this, ſee the Life of *Eubulides*.

[p] The *inexplicable* Reaſon, ἄπορος λόγος, ſo called, from the intricate Nature thereof, not to be diſſolved; wherefore it ſeems to be the ſame with the lying, and perhaps the Genus to moſt of thoſe which follow.

The *ſluggiſh* Reaſon, ἀργὸς λόγος, is manifeſted by this Example: [q] *If it be decreed that you ſhall recover of this Sickneſs, you ſhall recover whether you take Phyſick or not. Again, if it be decreed you ſhall not recover, you ſhall not recover, whether you take Phyſick or not, therefore it is to no Purpoſe to take Phyſick.* This Argument is juſtly termed ſluggiſh, ſaith *Cicero*, becauſe by the ſame Reaſon, all Actions may be taken away from Life.

The *Dominative* Reaſon, κυριεύων λόγος: Of this already in the Life of *Diodorus*.

The *vailed* Reaſon, ἐγκεκαλυμμένος λόγος: Of this, and *Electra*, and the *horned* Reaſon, κερατίνος λόγος, in the Life of *Eubulides*.

The *Crocodilite*, ſo named from this *Egyptian* Fable: [r] A Woman ſitting by the Side of *Nilus*, a Crocodile ſnatched away her Child, promiſing to reſtore him, if ſhe would anſwer truly to what he asked; which was, *Whether he meant to reſtore him or not?* She anſwer'd, *Not to reſtore him*, and challenged his promiſe, as having ſaid the Truth. He reply'd, that *if he ſhould let her have him, ſhe had not told true.*

The *reciprocal* Reaſons, μεταπίπτουσες, ſuch was that of [s] *Protagoras* the Sophiſt, againſt *Evathlus*, a rich young Man, his Diſciple, who promiſed him a great Sum of Money for teaching him, whereof Half he paid in Hand, the other Half was to be paid the firſt Time that he ſhould plead before the Judges, and carry the Cauſe. Having learned long, and attained a great Perfection in Rhetorick, he forbore to plead in Publick, that he might defraud *Protagoras*. *Protagoras* ſues him, and the Cauſe coming to a Hearing, begins thus: *Know fooliſh young Man, that which Way ſoever the Cauſe goes, whether for thee or againſt thee, thou muſt pay what I demand. If againſt thee, it will be given me by Judgment; if for thee, thou muſt pay it according to our Agreement.* *Evathlus* anſwers: *I might have been entrapped by your Subtilty, if I did not plead myſelf, but had employed ſome other to plead for me. Now I rejoice doubly in the Victory, that I ſhall be too hard for you, not only in Cauſe, but in Argument. Know therefore, my moſt wiſe Maſter, that which Way ſoever the Cauſe goeth, either with me, or againſt me, I will not pay what you demand. If it go with me, the Judgment will acquit me; if againſt me, you are to have nothing by our Agreement.* The Judges not able to determine it, diſmiſſed them both.

[t] The *Nullity*, οὖτις, uſed by *Ulyſſes*, who called himſelf οὖτις, no Body, when he hurt *Polypheme*, whence it came to be ſo named.

k Laert. 7. 82. l Suid. m Ulpian. 48. ad Sabin. n Laert. tho' the Example be falſly applied, as Burſus and Caſaubon have obſerved. o Cic. Acad. quæſt. 4. p Augel. 9. 15. q Cicer. de Fato. r Doxopat. Apotheg. s Agel. 5. 10. t Odyſſ. 9.

The

The *defective* Reaſon ἐλλιτὴς λόγ⊙, mentioned by *Laertius in Zenone:* The *Mower* θερίζων λόγ⊙, by *Lucian.* The *Bald*, φαλακρὸς λογ⊙, by *Laertius in Eubulide.* The *Occult*, διαλανθάνων λόγ⊙, by *Laertius in Eubulide.* The *Negative*, ἀποφάσκων λόγ⊙, by [w] *Laertius in Chryſippo*, and by *Epictetus.* But of theſe enough.

CHAP. XXXIII.

Of Method.

THere are two Kinds of Diſputation: [x] One, when the Truth itſelf is ſubtilly poliſhed in the Diſpute: The other, when every Expreſſion is accommodated to the vulgar Opinion; for, we muſt uſe popular and uſual Words, when we ſpeak of popular Opinions, which *Panætius* in the like Manner hath done.

[y] The firſt Way was peculiar to the Stoicks, ſhort, acute, and ſpinous, called likewiſe Logick, moſt worthy of Philoſophy; for this uſeth Definition, Diviſions, and the Lights which they afford, as likewiſe Similitudes, Diſſimilitudes, and the nice acute Diſtinction of them.

The vulgar Way of Diſpute is likewiſe twofold, one by continued Oration, the other by Queſtion and Anſwer; the firſt called [z] *Analytick*, or *Rhetorical*; the other [b] *Topick*, or [c] *Dialectical.* [d] Tho' the firſt be delightful, yet the latter is more commodious, when we inſiſt on Particulars, and underſtand what every Man granteth, what every Man denieth, what we would have concluded from Conceſſions, and brought to an End. For, when a Speech is carried on like a Torrent, altho' it bears many Things along with it; yet we can hold nothing, we cannot ſtop the rapid Courſe of an Oration. [e] The other, concluding as *Zeno* uſed, more ſhortly and narrowly, lieth more open to Reprehenſion. As a River in its Courſe, cannot at all, or very hardly be corrupted, but Water ſhut up, eaſily: So by a fluent Oration, the Faults of the Oppoſer are carried quite away; in a narrow Speech they are not eaſily defended.

But each of theſe Methods hath a ſeveral Uſe; the firſt is proper for Expoſition of Arts and Sciences, the other for Diſputation.

w Laert. 7. 83. x Cic. Offic. 2. y Cic. de fin. 3. z Senec. Epiſt. 14. 90. a Cic. de fin. 2. b Senec. Epiſt. 14. 90. c Cic. de fin. 2. d Cic. ibid. e Cic. de Nat. Deor. 2. 7.

THE

THE DOCTRINE OF THE STOICKS.

The SECOND PART.

CHAP. I.

Ethick, and the Parts thereof.

THE [a] moral Part of Philoſophy is divided into theſe Places; *Of Appetite, of Good and Ill, of Paſſions, of Virtue, of the End, of the firſt Eſtimation, of Actions, Offices, Exhortations and Dehortations.*

Thus diſtinguiſheth *Chryſippus*, *Archidemus*, *Zeno* of *Tarſis*, *Apollodorus*, *Diogenes* (the *Babylonians*) *Antipater* and *Poſſidonius*. But *Zeno* the *Cittiean*, and *Cleanthes*, as being more ancient, were leſs accurate in their Manner of treating upon theſe Things.

CHAP. II.

Of Appetite.

THE Conſideration of Ethick, beginneth properly from Appetite. [b] *Appetite* is moved by Phantaſy of an Office, for it is the Impulſion of the Soul to ſomething.

Appetite in rational and irrational Creatures is different; Ὄρεξις, is not rational Appetite, but a Species of rational Appetite. Rational Appetite is defined an Impulſion of the Intellect to the doing of ſomething. Βούλησις is a Species of Practick Appetite, being an Impulſion of the Intellect to ſomething future. Hence Appetite is taken four Ways, for rational and irrational Inclination, and for rational and irrational Averſion. To theſe may be added the Habit of Appetition, which is likewiſe called Appetite, the Origin of all appetitive Acts.

Of practick Appetite there are many Species, of which are,

1. Πρόθεσις, A Deſignation.
2. Ἐπιβολή, An Appetite before Appetite.
3. Παρασκευή, An Action before Action.
4. Ἔγχρησις, An Appetite to ſomething now exiſtent.
5. Αἵρεσις, A Will by Ratiocination.
6. Προαίρεσις, A Will before a Will.
7. Βούλησις, An Appetite joined with Reaſon.
8. Θέλησις, A ſpontaneous Will.

CHAP. III.

Of firſt natural Appetite.

THE [c] firſt Appetite of a living Creature is to preſerve itſelf, this being from the Beginning proper to it by Nature, as *Chryſippus* in his firſt Book of Ends, who affirms that the Care of ourſelves, and the Conciouſneſs thereof, is the firſt Property of all living Creatures. For, Nature producing a living Creature, intended either to alienate it from itſelf, or to commend it unto its own Care; but the firſt is not likely; it followeth therefore, that Nature commendeth to every Thing the Preſervation of itſelf, whereby it repulſeth whatſoever is hurtful, and purſueth what is convenient.

[d] As ſoon therefore as a living Creature cometh into the World, it is conciliated to itſelf; commended to the Conſervation of itſelf and its own State, and to the Election of ſuch Things as may preſerve its State; but alienated from Deſtruction, and from all ſuch Things as may deſtroy it. This is manifeſt, in as much as before the Acceſſion of Pleaſure or Grief, young Creatures deſire thoſe Things which conduce to their Welfare, and refuſe the contrary; which would not be, if they did not love their own State, and fear Deſtruction.

a Laert. 7. 84. b Stob. Eclog. Ethic. c Laert. 7. 85. d Cic. de fin.

Neither

Neither could they desire any Thing without having some Sense of themselves, whereby they love themselves, and what belong to them. Hence it is manifest, that the Principle of this Love is derived from themselves.

[e] Whereas some do hold the first Appetite of a living Creature to be that of Pleasure, that is false. The [f] greater Part of Stoicks conceive that Pleasure is not to be placed amongst the natural Principles of Love to ourselves; for if Nature had so ordered it, many dishonest Things would have followed. Pleasure [g] is an after Accession, when as Nature enquiring by itself into itself, receiveth those Things which are agreeable to its Constitution, after which Manner living Creatures are exhilerated, and Plants sprout forth. Nature hath thus far made no Difference betwixt Plants and living Creatures, that whereas Plants are ordered without Appetite or Sense, there is in living Creatures something according to the Nature of Plants: But, there being over and above in living Creatures an innate Appetite, whereby they go to those Things that are proper for them, the natural Part in them is governed by the Appetetive.

[h] That we naturally love those Things which are first proposed unto us by Nature, may be argued from hence, in that there is no Man, if both were put to his Choice, but had rather have all his Limbs able and sound, than useless and imperfect. These Comprehensions we conceive fit to be acquired for their own Sake, because they have in themselves something, as it were, complex, including Truth. This is decernible in young ones, whom we see delighted, tho' it nothing concerns them, if they themselves find out any Thing by Reason. Even the Arts we conceive to be assumed for themselves, as well because in these there is something worthy Assumption, as because they consist of Knowledge, and contain some things constituted by Reason and Power.

CHAP. IV.

Of Appetites consequent to the first.

THus according [i] to the first innate Principles of Nature, those Things which are according to Nature being expetible in themselves, their Contraries avoidable in themselves, the first Office is to conserve itself in the State of Nature; the next, to obtain those Things which are according to Nature.

Here beginneth good to be first understood; for it is the first Conciliation of Man to Things according to Nature. This Good, as soon as Man receiveth Intelligence or Notion thereof, and seeth the Order and Concord of Offices, he esteemeth far above those Things which he formerly loved; and by rational Knowledge collecteth, that herein is placed the chief good of Man, laudable and expetible in itself. To this chief Good, which consisteth in Homology or Convenience, all honest Actions having Reference, Honesty itself, which is reckoned amongst the Good, tho' it rise afterward, is notwithstanding alone expetible in its own Power and Dignity. But, of those which are the first Objects of Nature, none is expetible in itself.

Now, whereas Offices proceed from the first natural Objects, they must necessarily be referred to the same; so as all Offices tend to the fulfilling of the first natural Appetites; yet, not so, as if therein consisted the ultimate Good. Honest Action is in the first Conciliation of Nature, for it is consequent, and ariseth, as we said afterward; yet it is according to Nature, and much more allective than all that go before it.

And seeing that all Offices proceed from the first natural Appetites, even Wisdom itself must be derived from thence likewise. But as it often happens, that he who is recommended to another, more esteemeth him to whom he is recommended, than the Person which recommended him; so it is not strange, that we being recommended to Wisdom by the first natural Appetite, afterwards more esteem that Wisdom, than those Things whereby we arrived at it. And as our Limbs are given to us for a certain Reason of living, so the Appetition of the Soul is given, not for every Kind of Life, but for one certain Form of Living; so likewise Reason and perfect Reason. For, as Action is proper to a Player, Motion to a Dancer, yet, not any, but one certain Kind; so the Life that is to be acted, is in one certain Kind, not in any, which Kind we call convenient and consentaneous. Wisdom is not like the Art of a Pilot, or a Physician; but rather to that Action we mentioned, and to Dancing, that the Extream, that is, the Effection of the Art be in the Art itself, and not extrinsecal. There is another Similitude betwixt Wisdom and these Arts, for in them are those Things which are done rightly; yet, are not all the Parts whereof they consist, contained therein. Things done rightly, or Rectitudes, contain all Numbers of Virtue; for, only Wisdom is wholly converted into itself, which is not in other Arts. But improperly is the Art of a Pilot and a Physician compared with the ultimate of Wisdom; for, Wisdom includeth Fortitude and Justice, and judgeth all Things that happen to Man to be below it, which happeneth not in other Arts; but none can hold these Virtues which we last mentioned, unless he affirm there is nothing that's different, but honest and dishonest.

e Laert. 7. 85. f Cic. de fin. 3. g Laert. 7. 85. h Cic. de fin. 3. i Ibid.

CHAP.

CHAP. V.

Of Good and Ill.

HItherto of Appetites; we come next to their Objects. [k] Things (according to *Zeno*) are whatsoever participate of Essence. Of Things, some are *good*, some *ill*, some *indifferent*.

[l] *Good* is several Ways defined by the Stoicks; but their Definitions tend all to one End. [m] *Good* is Profit, or that which differeth not from Profit. Profit is Virtue, and a virtuous Action; not different from Profit, is a virtuous Man, and a Friend. For Virtue being a *quodammodotative* Hegemoniack, and virtuous Action being an Operation according to Virtue, is plainly Profit. A virtuous Man and a Friend is not different from Profit; for Profit is a Part of Virtuous, as being the Hegemoniack thereof. Now the Wholes are neither the same with their Parts, for a Man is not a Hand; nor different from their Parts, for they subsist not without Parts; wherefore the whole is not different from its Parts, and consequently, a virtuous Man being the whole, in respect of his Hegemoniack, which is Profit, is not different from Profit.

Good is by some defined, that which is expetible in itself; by others, that which assisteth to Felicity, or compleateth it; by [n] *Diogenes*, that which is absolute by Nature [or, [o] that which is perfect, according to the Nature of a rational Creature.] The Consequent thereof is a beneficent Motion, or State absolute in Nature.

Whereas Things are known, either by Use, or Conjunction, or Similitude, or Collation, by this fourth Kind, is the Knowledge of Good; for when from those Things which are according to Nature, the Mind ascendeth by Collation of Reason, then it attaineth the Notion of Good.

[*] Good is known and armed, not by Accession, Increase, or Comparison with other Things, but by its proper Power; for as Honey, tho' it be most sweet, yet in its proper kind of Taste, not comparative to any other, we perceive it to be sweet; so this Good of which we speak, is that which is most to be esteemed; but that Estimation consisteth in the Kind, not the Magnitude: For Estimation being neither amongst the Good nor Ill, whatsoever you apply it to, it will remain in its kind. Different therefore is the proper Estimation of Virtue, which consisteth in the Kind, not in Increase.

[p] To *Good* belongeth all Virtue, as Prudence, Justice, Temperance, Fortitude, and whatsoever participates of those, as virtuous Actions, and Persons. [q] Accessions here are Joy, Cheerfulness, and the like.

[r] *Ills* are the contrary Vices, as Imprudence, Injustice, Intemperance, Pusillanimity, and whatsoever participates of Vice, as vicious Actions and Persons. [s] The Accessions hereunto are Discontent, Affliction, and the like.

[t] Of *Goods*, some, as we have said, are *Virtues*, others *not Virtues*, as Joy, Hope, and the like. In like manner of *Ills*, some are *Vices*, as those already mention'd; others *not Vices*, as Grief and Fear.

Again, [u] of *Goods*, some are *continual* in all the Virtues, and at all times; such as all Virtue, sound Sense, wise Appetition, and the like. Others are *intermissive*, as Joy, Hope, and prudent Counsel, which are not in all the Wise, nor at all times.

In like manner of *Ills*, some are continual in all, and always in the Imprudent, as all Vice, and imprudent Sense, and imprudent Appetite; others intermissive, as Grief, Fear, and imprudent Answer, which are not always in the Wicked, nor at all times.

[w] Again, of *Good*, there are three kinds; the first *from which* Profit cometh, as from its first Cause, such is Virtue. The Second, *by which* Profit cometh, as Virtue, and virtuous Action. The Third, *that which may* profit, as Virtue, and virtuous Actions, and a virtuous Man, and a Friend, and the Gods and good Demons. [x] Thus the second Signification includeth the first; and the Third, both the first and second.

[y] In like manner of *Ills*, there are three kinds: First, that from which Hurt originally proceedeth, as Vice. Secondly, that by which Hurt cometh, as vicious Actions. Lastly, and most largely, whatsoever is able to hurt.

[z] Again, of *Goods*, some are *in the Soul*, as Virtue, and virtuous Actions; some *without the Soul*, as, a true Friend, a good Country, and the like: Some *neither* within nor without the Soul; as good and virtuous Men.

In like manner of *Ills*, some are *within* the Soul, as Vices, and vicious Actions; some *without* the Soul, as imprudent Friends, Enemies, and the like; some *neither* within nor without the Soul, as wicked Men, and all that participate of Vice.

Of *Goods within the Soul*, some are *Habits*, some *Affections*, some neither Habits nor Affections. The *Virtues* themselves are Affections; their *Studies* Habits, not Affections; their *Acts* neither Habits nor Affections.

In like manner of *Ills*, some are *Affections*, as Vices; some Habits only, as Infirmities of Mind, and the like; some *neither* Habits nor Affections, as vicious Actions.

k Stob. Ecl. Eth. l Cic. de fin. 3. m Sext. Empir. Pyrr. 3. 20. n Cic. de fin. 3. o Laert. 7. 90. [*] Cic. de fin. 3. p Laert. ibid. Stob. ibid. q Laert. ibid. r Laert. ibid. Stob. ibid. s Laert. ibid. t Stob. ibid. u Stob. ibid. w Laert. 7. 96. Stob. ibid. Sext. Emp. Pyrr. hypot. 3. 21. x Sext. Empir. ibid. y Laert. ibid. Stob. ibid. z Laert. ibid. Stob. ibid. Sext. Empir. Pyrr. hyp. 3. 23.

Again,

[a] Again, of *Goods*, some are *final*, some *efficient*, some *both* final and efficient. A Friend, and the Benefits arising from him, are *efficient* Goods. Fortitude, Magnanimity, Liberty, Delectation, Joy, Tranquillity, and all virtuous Actions, are final Goods. Both efficient and final, are all Virtues, as they perfect Felicity they are efficient, as they constitute it as Parts thereof, final.

In like manner of *Ills*, some are final, some efficient, some both. Fear, Baseness, Servitude, Stupidity, Frowardness, Grief, and all vicious Actions, are final. Participant of, are Vices, as they procure Misfortune they are efficient, as they constitute it as Parts thereof, final.

Again, of *Goods*, some are *expetible in themselves*, not desired for the Sake of any other; others are *Preparatory* to some other, call'd effectively expetible. The *Expetible* in themselves are (according to *Diogenes*) of two kinds; 1. *Ultimately expetible*, as *Beatitude*. 2. *Those which have in them the Cause of being expetible, as every Good hath.*

Again, of *Goods*, some are *necessary Beatitude*, as all Virtues and their Acts; others *not necessary*, as Joy, Delectation, and Study. In like manner of *Ills*, some are necessary to Infelicity, as all the Vices and their Acts; others not necessary thereunto, as all Passions and Infirmities of the Soul, and the like.

Again, of *Goods*, some consist in Motion, as Joy, Delectation, and the like; some in Affection, as Quiet, Imperturbation; of those which consist in Affection, some are likewise in Habit, as the Virtues; others in Affection only, as the former. Neither consist the Virtues only in Habits, but other Acts likewise, changed by a virtuous Man, in a manner into Virtue. Of these Goods which are in Habit, are those we call Studies, as Love of Learning, and the like; for these Arts, by their Affinity with Virtue, lead directly to our chief End.

Again, of *Goods*, some are *absolute*, as *Science*; others *relative*, as Honour, Benevolence, Friendship, and the like.

Science is a certain infallible Comprehension by Reason. It is taken three ways. *First*, for a System of Sciences conjoyned together in a good Man. *Secondly*, for a System of artificial Sciences, having a Certainty. *Lastly*, for a demonstrative infallible Habit of Phantasies by Reason.

Friendship is a Community of Life, and consent of Studies. The kinds thereof are Six,

1. γνωριμώτατη, a Friendship amongst known Persons.
2. συνήθεια, amongst Familiars.
3. ἑταιρία, amongst those of the same Age.
4. ξενία, towards Strangers.
5. συγγενική, amongst Kindred.
6. ἐρωτική, from Love.

Again, of *Goods*, some are *simple*, as, Knowledge; others *mix'd*, as, εὐγενία, a good Use of Children conformable to Nature, as εὐγηρία, good Use of old Age, conformable to Nature, εὐζωία, a good Use of Life conformable to Nature.

Exemption from Grief, ἀλυπία, and *Conservation of Order*, εὐταξία, are the same with, as the Mind is with Prudence, and communion with Goodness, yet are otherwise referred, which is observable likewise in the other Virtues. Hence are the same Distinctions applicable to ill.

Every Good is *beneficial, opportune, conducible, useful, commendable, fair, helpful, eligible, just.*

Beneficial, συμφέρον, as conferring that whereby we receive Benefit.

Opportune, ἕκον, as comprising that whereof we stand in need.

Conducible, λυσιτελές, as resolving in itself the Means, as the Gain acquired by Traffick exceeds the Charge.

Useful, χρήσιμον, as conducing to our Profit.

Commendable, εὐχρηστον, from the Use.

Fair, καλον, as proportioned to the Necessities of Receivers.

Helpful, ὠφέλιμον, as it relieves us.

Eligible, αἱρετόν, as being in Reason to be preferred.

Just, δίκαιον, as being conformable to Law.

On the contrary every Ill is unbeneficial, importune, inconducible, unuseful, uncommendable, foul, unhelpful, avoidable, and unjust.

[b] Perfect Good is called καλὸν, *Fair*, because it is absolute in all Numbers required of Nature, and perfectly proportionate.

Of *Fair* (or *Honest*) there are four Species, *Just*, *Valiant*, *Temperate*, *Knowing*; in these are honest Actions consummated.

Likewise of αἰσχρον, *Foul*, (or *Dishonest*) are four Species, *Unjust*, *Cowardly*, *Dissolute*, *Foolish*.

Honest, is called καλὸν, *Fair*, first, because it renders those who are endued therewith, worthy of Praise. Secondly, because it is most suitable to its proper Work. Thirdly, because 'tis an Ornament; we say, a wise Man is only good and fair.

Only that which is good, is fair or honest. So *Hecato* in his Third Book of Good, and *Chrysippus* of *Fair*. This is Virtue, and what participates thereof, which is all one as to say, *that whatsoever is good, is honest likewise*; and reciprocally, *whatsoever is honest is good.*

[c] That what is honest, only is good, is proved thus; Whatsoever is good, is laudable; whatsoever is laudable, is honest; therefore whatsoever is good is honest. Again, there is no Good which is not expetible, nothing expetible which is not pleasant and amiable, therefore approvable, therefore laudable, therefore honest. Again, no Man can glory

a Cic. de fin. 3. b Laert. 7. 100. c Cic. de fin. 3.

in

in a Life that is miſerable or not happy, therefore to glory is proper to the Happy, but to glory relateth only to that which is honeſt, therefore honeſt is happy. And as he who is laudable, hath ſome eminent Mark of Renown and Glory, for which he is juſtly ſtiled happy, the ſame may be ſaid of the Life of ſuch a Man, whence, if a happy Life conſiſt in Honeſty, only that which is honeſt is to be eſteemed good. Moreover, what Man can be termed conſtant, firm, magnanimous, unleſs we grant that Pain is not an Ill? For he who reckoneth Death amongſt the Ills, cannot but fear it; ſo no Man in any thing can neglect and contemn that which he accounteth ill. This being granted, the next Aſſumption is this; he who is magnanimous and valiant, deſpiſeth, as if they were nothing, all Things that can arrive to Man; whence it followeth, that nothing is ill which is not diſhoneſt; and this ſublime, excellent, magnanimous Perſon, accounting all human Things below him, confideth in himſelf and his own Life paſt and future, knowing that no Ill can happen to a wiſe Man; whereby we ſee that what is honeſt only is good, which is to live happily and honeſtly.

[d] On the other ſide, nothing is good but what is honeſt; for, who is, or ever was, ſo fervently covetous, and of ſuch diſordinate Affections, that the ſame things, for the Attainment whereof he would perpetrate any Wickedneſs, he had not much attain'd unto (ſetting aſide all Puniſhment) without all that wicked Means? What Advantage or Fruit do we aim at, in deſiring to know thoſe Things which are hidden from us, how they are moved, and by what Cauſes agitated in Heaven? Who is ſo ſavage, ſo obdurate to natural Studies, that he abhors Things worthy Knowledge, receives them without Pleaſure, or ſome Benefit, and values them at nothing? Who is there, that when he heareth of the Actions, Speeches, Counſels of magnanimous Perſons, eminent in all Virtue, is not affected with any Pleaſure? Who is there, that being inſtituted in an honeſt Family, and ingeniouſly educated, is not offended at Diſhoneſty, tho' it bring no Hurt to him? Who is there that looks without Trouble upon ſuch as live impurely and flagitiouſly? Who doth not hate ſordid, vain, light, frivolous Perſons? If Diſhoneſty were not in itſelf avoidable, why ſhould Men, when they are in the Dark, or in a Wilderneſs, abſtain from any thing that is evil, but that the very Deformity and Diſhoneſty thereof deters them? Nothing therefore is more clear, than that honeſt Things are expetible in themſelves, and diſhoneſt Things avoidable in themſelves.

Hence it followeth, that what is honeſt is more eſteemable, than thoſe mean Things which accrue by it. And when we ſay, that Folly, Temerity, Injuſtice, and Intemperance, are avoidable, in reſpect of thoſe Things which are conſequent to them, it contradicts not the former Aſſertion, that what is diſhoneſt only is ill, becauſe they relate not to the Hurt of the Body, but to diſhoneſt Actions which proceed from Vice.

[e] All Good is equal, and every Good is highly expetible, and admits neither increaſe nor decreaſe. * Here cometh in a great Controverſy betwixt the *Stoicks* and the *Peripateticks*, which tho' *Carneades* affirms to be only verbal, *Cicero* holdeth to be mere Things than Words.

† The *Peripateticks* hold, That all Goods are requiſite to happy Life. The *Stoicks*, that whatſoever is worthy Eſtimation, comprehendeth happy Life. Thoſe holding Pain to be an Ill, it follows, that a wiſe Man cannot be happy upon the Rack. Theſe who account not Pain among the Ills hold, that a wiſe Man continueth happy in the midſt of Torments; for, if ſome bear thoſe Pains with greater Courage for their Country, or ſome lighter Cauſe, Opinion, not Nature increaſeth or diminiſheth the Power of the Pain. Again, the *Peripateticks* aſſerting three Kinds of Good, affirm a Man to be ſo much the more happy, the fuller he is of external corporeal Goods, or, in the *Stoicks* Expreſſion, he who hath moſt corporeal Eſtimables, is moſt happy, for as much as by them Beautitude is compleated. On the contrary, the *Stoicks* hold, that thoſe Goods which they call of Nature, make not, by their Frequency, a Life more happy, or are more expetible, or more eſtimable; for then Wiſdom being expetible, and Health expetible, both together would be more expetible than Wiſdom alone; whereas either being worthy Eſtimation than Wiſdom alone. For the *Stoicks*, who held Health to be eſtimable, but place it not amongſt the Goods, hold likewiſe, that no Eſtimation is to be preferr'd before Virtue. From this the *Peripateticks* diſſent, aſſerting, that an honeſt Action without Pain, is more expetible than the ſame Action with Pain; the *Stoicks* otherwiſe: For, as a Taper is darkned by the Light of the Sun, and as a Drop of Water is loſt in the Vaſtneſs of the *Ægean* Sea, and as in the Riches of *Crœſus* the Acceſſion of one Farthing, and one Step in the Way between this and *India*, ſo in that End of all Good which the *Stoicks* aſſert, all the Eſtimation of corporeal Things muſt neceſſarily be obſcur'd, overwhelm'd, and periſh, by the Splendor and Magnitude of Virtue. And as Opportunity εὐκαιρία, is not made any thing greater by Production of Time; for whatſoever is opportune hath its Meaſure; ſo right Affection, κατόρθωσις, and the Good itſelf placed in it, that it be conformable to Nature, admitteth no Acceſſion of increaſe. For, as that Opportunity, to thoſe of which we ſpeak, are not made greater by Production of Time, for which Reaſon the *Stoicks*

d Cic. ibid. e Laert. 7. 101. * Cic. de fin. 3. † Cic. ibid.

conceive, that a happy Life is not more to be desired, if it be long, than if it be short; and they use this Simily, *As it is the Praise of a Shoe to fit the Foot, neither are many Shoes preferr'd before two, nor the Greater before the Less*; so in those Things, whose Good is confin'd to Opportunity and Convenience, neither are the more to be preferred before the fewer, nor the longer before the shorter: Nor do they argue acutely, who say, if long Health be more to be esteemed than short, then likewise a long Use of Wisdom, more than a short; they understand not, that the Estimation of Health is judged by Space, that of Virtue by Opportunity; as if they should say likewise *a good Death*, or *a good Labour to a Woman in Travail, is better long than short*; so that they see not that some Things are more esteemed for their Shortness, others for their Length.

CHAP. VI.

Of Eupathies.

AS [f] soon as any Object is presented to us, which seemeth good, Nature [*as we said*] drives on to the Acquisition thereof, which being done constantly and prudently, is call'd Will; imprudently and excessively, Desire.

[g] Moreover, while we are so moved, that we are in some Good, that happeneth also two Ways, when the Soul is moved quietly and constantly according to Reason, this is called Joy; when vainly and excessively, Pleasure.

[h] In like Manner, as we desire good Things by Nature, so by Nature we decline the Ill: This Declination, if done according to Reason, is called *Caution*, if without Reason, *Fear*. [i] Caution is only in a wise Man, of Fear he is not capable.

Hence it appeareth, that there are three Kinds of good Affections of the Mind, called [k] *Eupathies*, or [l] *Constancies*; *Joy*, *Caution*, *Will*.

1 [m] *Joy* is contrary to Pleasure, as being a rational Elevation of the Mind.

2. *Caution* is contrary to Fear, as being a rational Declination of ill.

3. *Will* is contrary to Desire, as being a rational Appetite.

These are the primary Eupathies; and as under the primary Passions are comprehended many subordinate Passions; so are there secondary Eupathies subordinate to those.

Under *Joy* are 1. *Delectation*. 2. *Cheerfulness*. 3. *Æquanimity*.

Under *Caution*, 1. *Respect*. 2. *Clearness*.

Under *Will* are, 1. *Benevolence*. 2. *Salutation*. 3. *Charity*.

Notwithstanding that Eupathies [n] and Passions are contrary; yet are there but three Eupathies, tho' there are four Passions; for there is no Eupathy contrary to *Grief*.

CHAP. VII.

Of Passions.

FRom [o] Falsities perceiveth a Perversity of Intellect, hence spring up several Passions, and Causes of Disorder.

[p] *Zeno* defineth Passion, a præternatural Motion of the Soul, (or as [q] *Cicero* renders it, *a Commotion of the Soul, averse from right Reason, against Nature.*) *Others more briefly, a more vehement Appetite. More vehement they call that, which recedeth from the Constancy of Nature*, and [r] is contrary to Nature, wherefore all Passion is an excessive stupid Desire.

[s] The Kinds of Passion arise from two opinionated Goods, and two opinionated Evils, so they are four. From the Good, *Desire* and *Pleasure*; Pleasure from present Good, Desire from future; from the Ill, *Fear* and *Grief*; Fear from the future, Grief from the present; from these Things, whose coming we fear, when they do come, grieve us. Pleasure and Desire arise from an Opinion of good Things, Desire is fervently transported to that which seemeth good, Pleasure rejoiceth when we have obtained what we desire. Thus [t] *Desire* and *Fear* go foremost, that to apparent Good, this to apparent Ill; *Pleasure* and *Grief* follows; Pleasure, when we attain what we desire, [u] Grief, when we incur what we fear.

[w] All Passions arise from *Judgment* and *Opinion*, whence they are more strictly defined, (that it may appear not only how vicious they are, but also that they are in our Power) thus;

[x] *Grief* is a fresh Opinion of present Ill, wherein it seemeth fit that a Mind be contracted and dejected, or [y] a Contraction of the Soul caused by Opinion of present Ill.

[z] *Pleasure* is a fresh Opinion of present Good, wherein it seemeth good that the Mind be exalted, ed, or [a] an irrational Elevation of Mind to something that seemeth eligible.

[b] *Fear* is an Opinion of eminent Ill, which seemeth to be intolerable, or a Contraction of the Soul disobedient to Reason, caused by Expectation of Ill.

[c] *Desire* is an Opinion of Good to come, that if it were present, it were fit for our Use, or [d] an Appetite disobedient to Reason, caused by the Opinion of consequent Good.

These four are, as *Hecato* saith, primary Passions, under each of which there are subordinate

f Cic. Tus. quæst. lib. 4. 6. g Cic. ibid. h Cic. ibid. i Cic. ibid. Laert. 7. 15. k Laert. ibid. l Cic. ibid. m Laert. ib. n Cic. Tus. quæst. 4. 7. o Laert. 7. 110. p Laert. ibid. q Tusc. quæst. 4. r Laert. ibid. s Cic. ibid. t Stob. Ecl. Eth. u λυπὴν ὅταν περιπέσωμεν, &c. so supply the Text. w Cic, ibid. x Cic, ibid. y Stob, ibid. z Cic, ibid. a Laert. ibid. b Cic. ibid. c Cic. ibid. d Stob. ibid.

Passions,

Paſſions, ſeveral Species belonging to their proper Genus.

Under *Grief* are theſe Kinds,

[e] Envy, φθόνος, *invidentia*; a Grief at the Proſperity of others, [f] which doth no Hurt to him that envieth, [g] for ſome Men deſire to ſee their Neighbours ſuppreſſed, that themſelves might be advanced above them. For if a Man grieve at the Proſperity of another, whereby he is damaged, he is not properly ſaid to envy; as that of *Hector* to *Agamemnon*; but he who is nothing damaged by the Proſperity of another, yet grieveth thereat, truly envieth.

[h] *Æmulation*, ζῆλος, (not here taken for the Imitation of Virtue, for that is laudable) a Grief that another Man enjoyeth that which we deſire and want, or as *Laertius*, a Grief for another's Felicity, which we wiſh to ourſelves, and an Emulation thereof, as greater than our own.

[i] *Jealouſy*, ζηλοτυπία, *Obtrectation*, a Grief leſt another enjoy what we [k] love and poſſeſs.

[l] *Compaſſion*, ἔλεος, *Miſericordia*, a Grief for the Miſery another ſuffers undeſervedly, for no Man compaſſionates the Puniſhment of a Parricide or Traytor.

Anguiſh, ἄχθος, *Anger*, an oppreſſive Grief.

Mourning, πένθος, *Luctus*, Grief for the Death of a Friend that was dear to us.

Wailing, *Mœror*, a Grief accompanied with Tears.

Trouble, ὀδύνη, *ærumna*, a laborious piercing Grief.

Sorrow, *Dolor*, a vexatious Grief, perhaps the ſame which in *Stobæus* is termed ἄση, a Grief, with conflict of Spirit.

[m] *Lamentation*, ἀνία, a Grief with Thoughtfulneſs, proceeding from, and encreaſing by Conſideration and Diſcourſe.

Moleſtia, a permanent Grief.

Affliction, a Grief with corporeal Torment.

Deſperation, a Grief without any Hope of Amendment.

Ενόχλησις, an urgent Grief attended by Difficulty.

Ἄχος, a Grief taking away the Voice.

Σύγχυσις, an irrational Grief corroding, and hindering us from enjoying the preſent.

Under *Pleaſure*, are,

[n] *Malevolence*, ἐπιχαιρεκακία, a Pleaſure at another's Ill, without any Good to ourſelves. This hath no real Subſiſtence, for no good Man was ever known to rejoice at the Harm of another.

Delectation, κήλησις, a Pleaſure affecting and ſoothing the Mind by the Ear, and in like manner by the Eye, touch, ſmell, or taſte, which are all of one kind.

Jactation, a boaſting Pleaſure, with inſolent Behaviour.

Τέρψις, *quaſi* τερπνὴ ἕξις, an Inclination of the Mind to Diſſoluteneſs.

Διάχυμα, the Diſſolution of Virtue.

Ἀσμένισμος, a Pleaſure from Things not expected.

Τοήτεια, a Pleaſure cauſed by Sight, without Deceit.

Under *Fear*, are

Dread, δεῖμα, a Fear cauſing πάθος.

Sloth, ὄκνος, *Pigritia*, a Fear of future Action, or Suſception of Labour.

Shame, αἰσχύνη, a Fear of Ignominy.

Ἔκπληξις, a Fear of ſome unuſual Phantaſy.

Φόβος, a Fear with Loſs, or Trepidation of Voice.

Ἀγωνία, a Fear of ſomething uncertain, or a Fear of offending or falling.

Δεισιδαιμονία, a Fear of Gods or Demons.

Δέος, a Fear of ſome grievous Thing.

Terror, a Fear, which by ſtriking the Mind, cauſeth Redneſs, Paleneſs, Trembling, or Gnaſhing of the Teeth.

Timor, a Fear of approaching Ill.

Pavor, a Fear thruſting the Mind out of its Place.

Exanimatio, a Fear conſequent, and, as it were, Companion to *Pavor*.

Conturbatio, a Fear which diſperſeth all our Thoughts.

Formido, a permanent Fear.

The Paſſions ſubordinate to Deſire are generally two, *Anger* and *Love*.

Anger is a Deſire of taking Revenge upon thoſe by whom we conceive our ſelves wrong'd.

The Species thereof are,

Θυμὸς, or as *Cicero*, θύμωσις, *excandeſcentia*, Anger beginning.

Χόλος, Anger increaſing.

[o] Μῆνις, *odium*, Anger inveterate.

Κότος, *Inimicitia*, Anger watching the Occaſion of Revenge.

Περφία, Anger breaking forth into Action.

Μῖσος, a Deſire whereby we wiſh Ill to another, with continual Progreſſion.

Malice, *Diſcordia*, a bitter Anger, with utmoſt Hatred, conceived in the Heart.

Φιλονεικία, a Deſire converſant in Difference of Opinions.

Love is an Impulſion of Good-will for apparent Beauty, whereby it is diſtinguiſh'd from the Love of the Virtuous, which is a voluntary Suſception of Labour for true Beauty. The Species of Love are,

Σπάνις, *Indigentia*, an (inexpleble) Deſire of that which we want, and being ſeparated from it, in vain incline to it.

e Laert. ibid. f Cic. ibid. g Plut. Cont. Stoic. h Cic. ibid. i Laert. 7. 111. k Cic. ibid. l Laert. ibid. m Laert. 7. 112. n Cic. Laert. whence ſupply Stobeus, where (Pleaſure being omitted) theſe are applied to a wrong Head. o Μῆνις & κότος are confounded by Laertius.

Πόθος, *Desiderium*, a Desire to see that which is not present. They distinguish these two thus: Desire is of those Things which are said, or predicated of any Thing which they call *Categorems*, as to have Riches, to take Honours; Indigence is of the Things themselves; as of Honours, of Money.

Ἵμερος, Desire of Conversation of that which is absent.

Φιληδονία, Desire of Pleasure.

Φιλοπλουτία, Desire of Riches.

Φιλοδοξία, Desire of Glory.

In all these Passions, there is Opinion. Opinion is a weak Assent. Hence Passions, (as *Chrysippus* in his Book of *Passions* affirms) are Judgments; for Avarice is an Opinion, or false Judgment that Money is good; Drunkenness and Intemperance are the like. Opinion is likewise sudden from the contractive Motion of an unreasonable Elation of the Mind, unreasonable and preternatural, in as much as it is not obedient to Reason. For every Passion is violent: Wherefore oftentimes, tho' we see in those that are transported by Passion, the Inconvenience thereof; yet notwithstanding, the same Persons that condemn it, are carried away by it, as by a Headstrong Horse, and therefore properly may use that Saying:

Against my Judgment Nature forceth me.

Meaning by Judgment, the Knowledge of right Things; for Man is carried beyond Nature by Passion, to transgress natural Reason and Right.

All those who are led by Passion, are diverted from Reason, but in another Manner than those who are deceived. For the Deceived, as for Example, they who think Atoms to be the Principles of all Things, when they come to know that they are not, change their Judgment: But those that are in Passion, altho' that they are taught not to grieve, or fear, or give Way to any Passion in the Soul, yet they do not put them off, but are led on by their Passions, until they come to be subject to their tyrannical Sway.

CHAP. VIII.

Of Sickness and Infirmities.

THE [r] Fountain of all Passions is Intemperance, which is a total Defection from the Mind, and from right Reason, so averse from the Prescription of Reason, that the Appetites of the Soul can by no Means be ruled or contained. As therefore Temperance allayeth Appetites, and causeth them to obey right Reason, and preserveth the considerate Judgments of the Mind; so Intemperance, the Enemy thereto, enflameth, troubleth, and inciteth the State of the Soul. Thus Griefs and Fears, and the rest of the Passions, all arise from this. For, as when the Blood is corrupt, or Flegm, or Choler aboundeth, Sicknesses or Infirmities arise in the Body; so the Disorder of ill Opinions, and their Repugnance to one another, divesteth the Soul of Health, and troubleth it with Diseases.

[s] By Passions the Mind becometh indisposed, and as it were sick. *Sickness* of Mind, νόσημα, is an Opinion and Desire of that which seemeth greatly expetible, but is not such, as Love of Women, of Wine, of Money. These νοσήματα have likewise their Contraries in the other Extream, as Hatred of Women, of Wine, of Money.

This Sickness of Mind happening with Imbecility, is called ἀρρώστημα, *Infirmity*. For, as in the Body there are Infirmities, as Gouts, Convulsions, and the like; so are there Infirmities in the Mind, as Love of Glory, Love of Pleasure. And as in Bodies there is a Propensity to some particular Diseases; so in the Mind there is a Proclivity ἐνεμπλοσία, or ἐνκλαφυεία, to some particular Passions, as φθονερία, *Propensity to Envy*, ἀνελεημοσύνη, *Propensity to Unmercifulness*, and the like.

[t] In this Place, much Pains hath been taken by the Stoicks, chiefly by *Chrysippus*, to compare the Sicknesses of the Mind with those of the Body.

Passion (for as much as Opinions are inconstantly and turbulently tossed up and down) is always in Motion; and when this Fervour and Concitation of the Mind is inveterate, and, as it were, settled in the Veins and Marrow, then ariseth Sickness and Infirmities, and those Aversions which are contrary to those Infirmities and Diseases. These differ only intentionally, but really are the same, arising from Desire and Pleasure; for when Money is desired, and Reason not immediately applied, as a *Socratick* Medicine to cure that Desire, the Evil spreadeth through the Veins, and cleaveth to the Bowels, and becometh Sickness and Infirmity, which when they grow inveterate, cannot be plucked away. The Name of this Sickness is Avarice. In like Manner arise other Sicknesses, as Desire of Glory, Desire of Women, φιλογυνεία, and the rest of Sicknesses and Infirmities. Their Contraries arise from Fear, as Hatred of Women, μισογυνεία, Hatred of Mankind, Inhospitality, all which are Infirmities of the Mind, arising from Fear of those Things which they fly and shun.

Infirmity of Mind is defined, *A vehement Opinion, inherent, and wholly implanted in us, of a Thing not to be desired, as if it were exceedingly to be desired.* That which ariseth from Aversion, is defined, *A vehement Opinion, inherent, and throughly implanted in us, of a Thing that ought not to be*

[r] Cic. Tusc. quæst. 4. 9. 10. [s] Lacrt. Stob. 7. 115. Cic. ibid. [t] Cic. Tusc. quæst. 4.

shunned,

ſhunned, as if it ought to be ſhunned. This Opinion is a judging ourſelves to know what we have not.

Under *Infirmity* are theſe Species, *Love of Money, of Honour, of Women, of curious Meats,* and the like. Love of Money, Avarice, is a vehement Opinion, inherent, and throughly implanted in us, as if it were exceedingly to be deſired. In the like Manner are all the reſt defined.

Averſions are defined thus, *Inhoſpitality is a vehement Opinion, inherent, and throughly implanted in us, that Gueſts ought to be ſhunned.* In like manner is defined Hatred of Womankind, ſuch as was that of *Hippolitus*, and of Mankind as that of *Timon*.

As ſome are more prone to one Sickneſs than to another; ſo are ſome more inclinable to Fear, others to other Paſſions; in ſome is Anxiety, whereby they are anxious; in others Choler, which differeth from Anger; for it is one Thing to be cholerick, another Thing to be angry, as Anxiety differs from Grief; for all are not anxious, who are ſometimes grieved, nor are all that are anxious grieved always: As there is a Difference betwixt Ebriety and Ebrioſity, and it is one Thing to be a Lover, another to be amorous.

This Propenſity of ſeveral Perſons to ſeveral Sickneſſes, is called from an Analogy to the Body, Infirmity, whereby is underſtood a Propenſity to be ſick: But in good Things, becauſe ſome are more apt to ſome Goods than to others, it is ſtiled Facility, in ill Things Proclivity, implying a Lapſion; in Neuters it hath the former Name.

As there is Sickneſs, Infirmity, and Defect in the Body, ſo in the Mind. Sickneſs is the Corruption of the whole Body. Infirmity is Sickneſs, with ſome Weakneſs. Defect is, when the Parts of the Body diſagree with one another, whence ariſeth Pravity, Diſtortion, Deformity of the Limbs; ſo that thoſe two, Sickneſs and Infirmity, ariſe from the Confuſion and Trouble of the Health of the whole Body; Defect is ſeen in perfect Health. But, in the Mind, Sickneſs is not diſtinguiſhed from Infirmity, but by Cogitation only.

Vitioſity is a Habit or Affection, inconſtant in itſelf, and oft differing in the whole Courſe of Life; ſo that in one, by the Corruption of Opinions, is bred Sickneſs and Infirmity; in the other, Inconſtancy and Repugnance. For every Vice hath not diſagreeing Parts, as of them who are not far from Wiſdom, that Affection is different from ſelf, as being unwiſe, but not diſtorted nor depraved.

Sickneſs and Infirmities are Parts of Vitioſity; but, whether Paſſions are Parts thereof alſo, it is a Queſtion. For Vices are permanent Affections, Paſſions are moving Affections, ſo that they cannot be Parts of permanent Affections.

And as in all Things the Soul reſembleth the Body, ſo in good likewiſe. In the Body, the chiefeſt are Beauty, Strength, Health, Soundneſs, Agility; ſo likewiſe in the Mind. And as the good Temper of the Body is, when thoſe Things whereof we conſiſt, agree well among themſelves; ſo the Health of the Soul is, when the Judgments and Opinions thereof agree. This is the Virtue of the Soul, which ſome affirm to be Temperance; others, a Soul obedient to the Precepts of Temperance, and obſequious thereunto, not having any Speciouſneſs of her own. But, whether one or other, it is only in a wiſe Man; yet there is one Kind of Health of the Soul, which is common alſo to the Unwiſe, when by the Care of Phyſicians, the Diſtemper of the Mind is removed.

And as there is in the Body an apt Figure of the Limbs, together with a Sweetneſs of Colour, which is called Beauty; ſo in the Soul, Equality, and Conſtancy of Opinions, and Judgments following Virtue, with a certain Firmneſs and Stability, or including the very Power of Virtue, is called Beauty.

Likewiſe correſpondent to the Powers, Nerves, and Efficacy of the Body, in the ſame Terms are named the Powers of the Soul. Agility of Body is called Quickneſs; the ſame Commendation is aſcribed to Wit, in reſpect that the Soul over-runneth many Things in a ſhort Time. Only there is this Difference betwixt Souls and Bodies; ſtrong Souls cannot be aſſaulted by Diſeaſes, ſtrong Bodies may. But the Offenſions of Bodies may happen without any Fault; thoſe of the Soul cannot, all whoſe Sickneſſes and Paſſions proceed from Contempt of Reaſon, and therefore are in Men only; for, tho' Beaſts do ſome Things like this, yet they fall not into Paſſions.

Betwixt acute and obtuſe Perſons, there is this Difference, the Ingenious, as *Corinthian* Braſs, ruſteth, ſlowly falling into Sickneſs, and more quickly get out of it: The Dull do not ſo; neither doth the Soul of an Ingenious Perſon fall into every Sickneſs and Paſſion; for, there are not many Things extremely ſavage and cruel, and ſome alſo have a Shew of Humanity, as Compaſſion, Grief, Fear.

But the Infirmities and Sickneſſes of the Mind are leſs eaſily rooted out, than thoſe great Vices which are contrary to the Virtues; for the Sickneſſes remaining, the Vices may be taken away, becauſe the Sickneſſes are no ſooner healed, than the Vices are removed.

CHAP.

CHAP. IX.

Of *Virtue and Vice.*

VIrtue[u] is a convenient Affection of the Soul throughout all Life.

Of Virtues there are three Kinds: The firſt *general*, taken for any Perfection of a Thing, as of a Statue: The ſecond are[w] *Sciences*, or *Contemplative*, which, according to *Hecaton*, conſiſt in Speculation, as *Prudence* and *Juſtice*. The third *not Sciences*, or *not contemplative*, which are conſidered as conſequent to the ſpeculative; as, *Health*, *Strength*, *Hope*, *Joy*, and the like. Health is conſequent to Temperance, a theoretick Virtue, as Strength to the Building of an Arch. They are called *not-contemplative*, becauſe they require no Aſſent, but are by after Acceſſion, and common even to the Wicked, as Health and Strength.

Vice is the contrary to Virtue, for the rational Creature is perverted ſometimes by the Perſuaſion of exterior Things, ſometimes by the Counſel of thoſe with whom he converſeth, contrary to Nature, who gives us Inclinations unperverted.

Of Vices therefore there are two Kinds; the firſt, *Ignorance* of thoſe Things whereof Virtues are the Knowledge; as Imprudence, Intemperance, Injuſtice; the ſecond *not-ignorances*; as Puſillanimity, Imbecility.

Panætius aſſerteth two Virtues, *Theoretick* and *Practick*: Others three, *Rational*, *Natural* and *Moral*; *Poſſidonius* four; *Cleanthes*, *Chryſippus*, and *Antipater* more; *Apollodorus* one only, *Prudence*.

Of Virtues, ſome are *primary*, others *ſubordinate*. The *primary* are four, *Prudence*, *Temperance*, *Fortitude*, *Juſtice*; the firſt converſant in Offices, the ſecond in Appetite, the third in Tolerance, the fourth in Diſtribution.

Prudence is the Science of Things that are to be done, and not to be done, and neuter; or the Knowledge of good, bad, and neuter in civil Life.

The Virtues ſubordinate to Prudence are five.

Εὐβουλία, the Science of Things that are to be done, how they may be done beneficially.

Εὐλογιστία, The Science of comprehending Things to be effected.

Ἀγχίνοια, The Science of finding out our Office.

Νουεχεία, The Science of attaining the Scope in every Thing.

Εὐμηχανία, The Science of finding out the Iſſues of Things.

[x] *Temperance*, is the Science of Things, expetible, avoidable, and neuter. Under Temperance are theſe Species.

Εὐταξία, the Science of Time and Order for the well-doing of Things.

Κοσμιότης, The Science of honeſt and diſhoneſt Motions.

Αἰδημοσύνη, The Science of avoiding juſt Blame.

Fortitude, is the Science of Things grievous, not grievous and neuter; the Species under it theſe:

Ἐγκράτεια, A Science tenacious of right Reaſon.

Καρτερία, a Science perſiſting in right Judgment.

Θαρραλεότης, A Science whereby we truſt.

Μεγαλοψυχία, The Science of overcoming thoſe Things which happen to the Good and Bad.

Εὐψυχία, A Science of the Soul, which renders her invincible.

Φιλοπονία, The Science of going through to the Attainment of that which we propoſe to ourſelves.

Juſtice is the Science of diſtributing to every one according to his Deſert; under Juſtice are four ſubordinate Virtues.

Εὐσέβεια, The Science of worſhipping the Gods.

Χρηστότης, The Science of well-doing.

Ἐυκοινωνησία, The Science of Equality in Community.

Εὐσυναλλαξία, The Science of contracting honeſtly with others.

In like manner of Vices, ſome are primary, others ſubordinate to the Primary. The primary Vices are, *Imprudence*, *Intemperance*, *Puſillanimity*, *Injuſtice*.

[y] *Imprudence* is the Ignorance of Things good, ill, and neuter; and the Ignorance of Things to be done, not to be done, and neuter.

Intemperance is the Ignorance of Things expetible, avoidable, and neuter.

Puſillanimity is the Ignorance of Things grievous, not grievous and neuter.

Injuſtice is the Ignorance of diſtributing to every one according to his Deſerts.

The ſubordinate Vices to theſe are correſpondent to the ſecondary Virtues, as, ἀκρασία, δεξυνδία κακοβουλία, which are defined anſwerably to their oppoſite Virtues.

Theſe Virtues are perfect, and conſiſt in Contemplation; but there are other Virtues which are not Arts, but Faculties, conſiſting in Exerciſe, as, Health of the Soul, Integrity and Strength thereof, and pulchritude. For, as the Health of the Body is a good Temperature of hot, cold, dry, and moiſt; ſo the Health of the Soul is a good Temperature of the Doctrines in the Soul. And as the Strength of the Body conſiſteth in a Tenſion of the Nerves, ſo the Strength of the Soul in a proper Extenſion thereof to Judgment and Action: And as the Beauty of the Body is a Symmetry of all the Parts to one another, and to the Whole, ſo the Beauty of the

u Laert. 7. 8. &c. w Stob. 2. &c. x Stob. by whom correct Laertius, who applies this Definition to Temperance. y Stob. Ἄφροσύνην δὲ ἄγνοιαν ἀγαθῶν, καὶ κακῶν, καὶ ἀδετέρων. ἢ ἄγνοιαν ὧν ποιητέον, καὶ μὴ ποιητέων; ſo ſupply the Text.

Soul is the Symmetry of the Reaſon and Parts thereof, to the Whole, and to one another.

All thoſe Virtues which are Sciences and Arts, have common Theorems, and the ſame End, wherefore they are (as [a] *Zeno* ſaith) inſeparable, connexed to one another, as *Chryſippus*, *Apollodorus* and *Hecaton* affirm. He who hath one hath all, (ſaith [b] *Chryſippus*) and he who doth according to one, doth according to all. He who hath Virtue, is not only contemplative, but alſo practick of thoſe things which are to be done. Things which are to be done, are either expetible, tolerable, diſtributible, or retainable; ſo that whoſoever doth one Thing wiſely, doth another juſtly, another conſtantly, another temperately; and ſo is both wiſe, magnanimous, juſt and temperate.

Notwithſtanding theſe Virtues differ from one another by their Heads: For, the Heads of Prudence are, to contemplate and do well; that which is to be done in the firſt Place, and in the Second, to contemplate what Things are to be avoided, as obſtructive to that which is to be done. The proper Head of Temperance is to compoſe our own Appetites in the firſt Place, and to conſider them; in the ſecond, thoſe under the ſubordinate Virtues, as being obſtructive and divertive of Appetites. The Heads of Fortitude are, in the firſt Place, to conſider all that we are to undergo; in the ſecond, other ſubordinate Virtues. The Heads of Juſtice are, in the firſt Place, to conſider what every one deſerves; in the ſecond, the reſt: for all Virtues conſider the Things that belong to all, and the Subordinate to one another. Whence *Panætius* ſaith, *It is in Virtue as in many Archers, who ſhoot at one Mark, diſtinguiſhed by divers Colours; every one aims at the Mark, but one propoſes to himſelf the white Line, another the Black, and ſo of the reſt; for all theſe place their ultimate End in hitting the Mark, but every one propoſes to himſelf a ſeveral manner of hitting: ſo all Virtues have Beatitude, which is placed conformably to Nature for their End, but ſeveral Perſons purſue it ſeveral Ways.*

As Virtues are inſeparable, ſo are they the ſame ſubſtantially with the ſupreme Part of the Soul, in which reſpect all Virtue is ſaid to be a Body, for the Intellect and Soul are a Body; for the Soul is a warm Spirit innate in us: therefore our Soul is a living Creature, for it hath Life and Senſe, eſpecially the ſupreme Part thereof, called the *Intellect*. Wherefore all Virtue is a living Creature, becauſe it is eſſentially the Intellect; and therefore φρονήσις ζῴον, for that Expreſſion is conſequent to this Aſſertion.

Between Virtue and Vice there is no Medium (contrary to the *Peripateticks*, who aſſert a mean Progreſſion betwixt Virtue and Vice) for all Men have a natural Appetite to Good; and as a Stick is either ſtreight or crooked, ſo Man muſt be either juſt or unjuſt; but cannot be either more or leſs juſt or unjuſt.

[c] That Virtue may be learned, is aſſerted by *Chryſippus*, in his Firſt Book *of the End*, and by *Cleanthes* and *Poſſidonius* in his *Exhortations*, and *Hecaton*, becauſe Men of bad are made good.

That it may be loſt, is likewiſe affirmed by *Chryſippus*, deny'd by *Cleanthes*. The firſt ſaith, *it may be loſt by Drunkenneſs or Madneſs*; the other, *that it cannot be loſt, by reaſon of the firm Comprehenſions of the Soul.*

[d] Virtue is in itſelf Virtue, and not for Hope or Fear of any external Thing. It is expetible in itſelf; for which Reaſon, when we do any thing amiſs, we are aſhamed, as knowing that only to be good, which is honeſt.

[e] In Virtue conſiſteth Felicity, for the End of Virtue is to live convenient to Nature. Every Virtue is able to make a Man live convenient to Nature; for Man hath natural Inclinations for the finding out of Offices for the Compoſure of Appetites, for Tolerance and Diſtribution. Virtue therefore is ſelf-ſufficient to Beatitude, as *Zeno*, *Chryſippus*, and *Hecaton* aſſert. *For if*, ſaith he, *Magnanimity*, as conceiving all Things to be below itſelf, *is ſelf-ſufficient, and that be a Part of Virtue, Virtue itſelf, which deſpiſeth all Things that obſtruct her, muſt alſo be ſelf-ſufficient to Beatitude.* But *Panætius* and *Poſſidonius* deny that Virtue is ſelf-ſufficient, affirming, *that it requires the Aſſiſtance of Health, Strength, and Neceſſaries*; yet they hold, *that Virtue is always uſed*, as *Cleanthes* affirms, for it cannot be loſt, and is always practis'd by a perfect Mind, which is good.

[f] Juſtice is not by Nature, but by Preſcription, as Law and right Reaſon. Thus *Chryſippus* in his Book of Honeſty.

[g] Virtue hath many Attributes, it is call'd,

1. Ἀγαθὸν, a Good, becauſe it leadeth us to right Life.
2. Ἀρεσὸν, becauſe it is approv'd without any Controverſy, as being moſt excellent.
3. σπουδαῖον, becauſe 'tis worthy of much Study.
4. Ἐπαινετὸν, becauſe it may juſtly be praiſed.
5. Καλὸν, becauſe it inviteth thoſe that deſire it.
6. Συμφέρον, becauſe it conduceth to Goodneſs of Life.
7. χρήσιμον, becauſe it is uſeful.
8. ἀιρετὸν, becauſe it is rightly expetible.
9. ἀναγκαῖον, becauſe being preſent it profiteth; being abſent, it doth not.
10. λυσιτελὲς, becauſe it hath an Uſe that exceeds the Labour.

a Plut. repugn. Stoick. b Ibid. c Laert. 7. 91. d Laert. 7. 89. e Laert. 7. 88. f Laert. 7. 127. g Stob.

11. αὐτάρκεις, becauſe it is alone ſufficient to him that hath it.

12. ἀνενδεεῖς, becauſe it takes away all Want.

13. ἁπλῶν, becauſe it is common in Uſe, and extendeth to all the Uſes of Life.

CHAP. X.

Of the End.

THE [h] *End* is that, for whoſe Sake all Offices are done, but itſelf is not done for the Sake of any; or that to which all Things done conveniently in Life are referred, itſelf is referred to nothing.

The *End* is taken three Ways; Firſt, *for the final Good*, which conſiſteth in rational Converſation. Secondly, *for the Scope*, which is convenient Life, in relation thereto. Laſtly, *for the Ultimate of Expetibles*, unto which all the reſt are referred.

Scope and *End* differ; for *Scope* is the propoſed Body, which they who purſue Beatitude aim at. Felicity is propoſed as the *Scope*, but the *End* is the Attainment of that Felicity. If a Man throw a Spear, or an Arrow at any Thing, he muſt do all Things that he may take his Aim aright, and yet ſo, as to do all Things whereby he may hit; ſo when we ſay, *it is the ultimate End of Man to obtain the Principles of Nature*, we imply, in like manner, he muſt do all Things neceſſary to taking Aim, and all Things likewiſe to the hitting of the Mark; but this is the laſt, the chief Good in Life, that is to be ſelected, not deſired.

Reaſon being given to rational Creatures, for the moſt perfect Direction, to live according to Reaſon, is in them to live according to Nature, that being the Artificer of Appetite. Hence *Zeno* firſt (in his Diſcourſe of Human Nature) affirms, that the End is to live conformably, that is, to live according to one's own Reaſon concordantly; as on the contrary, ſavage Beaſts that are always at Difference, live miſerably.

The Followers of *Zeno*, conceiving his Expreſſion not full enough, enlarged it. Firſt, *Cleanthes*, his Succeſſor, added *to Nature*, making it up thus, *The End is to live conformably to Nature, which is to live according to Virtue*; for Nature leads us to Virtue. Thus *Cleanthes* in his Book of *Pleaſure*, and *Poſſidonius*, and *Hecaton* in his Book of *Ends*.

Chryſippus, to make the Expreſſion of *Cleanthes* more clear, expounds it thus, *To live according to expert Knowledge of Things which happen naturally*; for our Natures are Parts of the Univerſe, our End therefore is to live conformably to Nature, which *Chryſippus*, in his Firſt Book of *Ends*, expounds, both our own proper human Nature, and likewiſe the common Nature of the Univerſe. But *Cleanthes* allows only common Nature to be followed, and not the Particular. To live according to this Knowledge, is all one as to live according to Virtue, not doing any thing forbidden by our Common Law. Right Reaſon, which is current amongſt all, being the very ſame that is in God, the Governor of all. The Virtue thereof, and the Beatitude of a happy Man, is, when all Things are ordered according to the Correſpondence of a Man's Genius, with the Will of him who governs the Univerſe.

Diogenes defineth the End, *a good Uſe of Reaſon, in the Election and Refuſal of natural Things, chuſing thoſe that are according to Nature, and refuſing thoſe that are repugnant to Nature.* So likewiſe *Antipater*.

Archidemus defineth it, *To live, performing compleatly all Offices, chuſing of thoſe Things which are according to Nature, the greateſt and moſt principal, and not to be able to tranſgreſs them.*

Panætius, to *live according to the Appetites given us by Nature.*

Poſſidonius, to *live contemplating the Truth and Order of the Univerſe.*

[i] Thus by living according to Nature, the *Stoicks* underſtand three Things: Firſt, to live according to the Knowledge of thoſe Things which happen by Nature. This is *Zeno*'s End, to live convenient to Nature. Secondly, to live, preſerving all, or the greater Part of mean Offices. This Expoſition differeth from the former; for that is a Rectitude, proper only to a wiſe Man; this is the Office of a progreſſive, not perfect Perſon, which may likewiſe be to the Fooliſh. The Third is, to live in Enjoyment of all, or the greater Part of thoſe Things which are according to Nature. This is not conſtituted in our Action, for it conſiſteth of that kind of Life which enjoyeth Virtue, and of thoſe Things which are according to Nature, and are not in our Power.

[k] The chief Good, therefore, is to live ſuitably to the Knowledge of thoſe Things which arrive by Nature, elective of thoſe which are according to Nature, and rejective of thoſe which are contrary to Nature. [l] This is to live conveniently and conformably to Nature, when the Soul entring into the Path of Virtue, walketh by the Steps and Guidance of right Reaſon, and followeth God. That which is in other Arts is artificial, is here epigematick and conſequent.

This End is Beatitude. *Beatitude* by *Zeno*, is defined *a good Courſe of Life*, which Definition is uſed likewiſe by *Cleanthes* and *Chryſippus*, and all their Followers, who affirm Beatitude to be nothing but a happy Life.

Fair, and *Good*, and *Virtue*, and that which *participates of Virtue*, are equivalent Terms, whence it follows, that Beatitude is all one with living according to Virtue. [m] And as Good and Virtue ad-

h Stob. Ecl. Eth. 3. &c. i Cic. de fin. 4. k Cic. de fin. 2. l Philo. Jud. περὶ ἀπαθ. m Cic. de fin. 5.

mit no Degrees of Increaſe or Diminution, neither doth the ultimate End of all Good and Virtue increaſe or diminiſh: For, as they who are drowned are no more able to breathe, tho' they are nearer to the Top of the Water, than they who are in the Bottom; nor a little Whelp, the Time of whoſe Sight approacheth, ſee any more than one that is newly littered; ſo he, who hath made ſome little Progreſs in Virtue, is no leſs in Miſery, than he who hath made none.

CHAP. XI.

Of Indifferents.

OF Things, as we have ſaid, ſome are good, ſome ill, ſome indifferent. [n] To deny this Difference of Things, would be to confound all Life, as *Ariſto* doth; neither could there be any Function or Act of Wiſdom, ſince that, if amongſt thoſe Things which appertain to Life there were no Difference, no Election were requiſite.

Good and Ill, as we ſaid, are thoſe Things which are honeſt or diſhoneſt. Of theſe hitherto. Betwixt both theſe, there are ſome Things which conſer nothing to happy or unhappy Life, called Indifferents. [o] To Profit is a Motion or State proceeding from Virtue; to Hurt is a Motion or State proceeding from Vice; but Indifferents neither Profit nor Hurt; ſuch are Life, Health, Pleaſure, Beauty, Strength, Riches, Honour, Nobility, and their Contraries; Death, Sickneſs, Grief, Deformity, Imbecility, Poverty, Diſhonour, Meanneſs, and the like. Thus *Hecaton* in his ſeventh Book of *Ends*, and *Apollodorus* in his *Ethicks*, and *Chryſippus*. Theſe therefore are not Goods, but Indifferents. For, as the Property of Heat is to warm, not to cool; ſo is it of Good to profit, not to hurt. But Health and Wealth do not hurt more than they profit, therefore Health and Wealth are not Goods. Again, that which we may uſe ill as well as well, is not good; but Health and Wealth may be uſed ill as well as well, therefore Health and Wealth are not Goods. Yet *Poſſidonius* reckons theſe amongſt Goods. But *Hecaton* in his 19th of *Good*, and *Chryſippus* of *Pleaſure*, will not allow Pleaſure a Good; for Pleaſures are diſhoneſt, but nothing diſhoneſt is good.

[p] Moreover, Riches, as *Diogenes* conceiveth, have not only this Power that they guide to Pleaſure and good Health, but that they compriſe them. They do not the ſame in Virtue nor in other Arts, whereto Money may be a Guide, but it cannot contain them. Thus, if Pleaſure or Health were good, Riches likewiſe ſhould be numbered amongſt the good; but if Wiſdom be good, it followeth not that Riches likewiſe be good, nor that any Thing which is not reckoned amongſt the good; that which is good cannot be contained by any Thing which is not amongſt the Good. And alſo for this Reaſon, becauſe Sciences and Comprehenſions of Things, by which Arts are produced, move Appetition; but if Riches are not reckoned among the Good, it followeth that no Art can be contained in Riches, and much leſs any Virtue, for Virtue requireth far more Study and Exerciſe than Art, and compriſeth the Firmneſs, Stability, and Conſtancy of all Life, which Art doth not.

[q] Things are ſaid to be indifferent in three Reſpects: Firſt, if they move neither Appetite nor Averſion, as, if the Stars be of even Number, or to have even or uneven Hairs on our Head, to ſtretch out the Finger this Way or that Way, to take up a Straw, and the like. Secondly, Things are ſaid to be indifferent which move Appetite and Averſion equally, not one more than the other; as in two Pieces of Silver of equal Value, no Way different, which to him who comes to make Choice of either, are indifferent. There is an Appetition to the Election of one, but not more of this than of that. The third Kind of Indifferents are thoſe which are neither good nor Ill, expetible nor avoidable, conducing neither to Happineſs nor Unhappineſs. In this Senſe all Things are called indifferent, which are betwixt Virtue and Vice, as Health, Wealth, Strength, Glory, and the like; for we may be happy without theſe, tho' their Uſe hath ſome Relation to Happineſs, their Abuſe to Unhappineſs. In this Senſe whatſoever we may ſometimes uſe well, other Times ill, is indifferent, which Kind appertaineth chiefly to Ethick.

[r] Again, of Indifferents ſome are *Natural*, and move Appetite, as Health, Strength, Soundneſs of Senſe, and the like; ſome *Preternatural*, which move Averſion, as Sickneſs, Infirmity, and the like; ſome *Neuter*, which move neither Appetite nor Averſion, as the Conſtitution of the Soul and Body, one capable of receiving Phantaſies, the other Wounds.

Of natural and preternatural Indifferents, ſome are *primary*, others by *Participation*. *Primary* natural Indifferents are Motions or Affections convenient with Reaſon, as Health and Strength. *Participant* are thoſe by which that Motion or Affection is communicated, as a healthful Body, ſound Senſe. *Preternatural* Indifferents are the contrary to theſe.

CHAP. XII.

Of Eſtimation.

Eſtimation, ἀξία, is a certain Concurrence with convenient Life, [s] which concerns all good. Eſtimation [t] is twofold; one, a mediate Power or

n Cic. de fin. 3. 15. o Laert. 7. 104. p Cic. de fin. 3. q Sext. Emp. Pyrrh. hyp. 3. 22. whence ſupply Laertius and Stobæus. r Stob. Ecl. Phyſ. 4. &c. s Laert. 7. 105. t Stob. ibid.

Uſe concurring with Life according to Nature; ſuch we call Health or Wealth, as far as they conduce to Life, according to Nature. The other is the Valuation of the Eſtimator, impoſed by him who is skilful in ſuch Things.

Again, *Eſtimation* is taken three Ways: Firſt, for abſolute *Donation*: Secondly, for *Return of Approbation*: Thirdly, as *Antipater* calls it, *Elective*, by which, when ſome Things are propoſed, we rather chooſe theſe than thoſe; as Health before Sickneſs, Life before Death, and Riches before Poverty. In like Manner, Diſeſtimation is taken three Ways, the Terms only changed to the contrary. *Donation*, according to *Diogenes*, is a Judgment that a Thing is according to Nature, or conferreth Uſe thereto. *Approbation* is in Man, not in Things. *Election* only in the good, not the Indifferent.

[u] Hence followeth another Diſtinction of Indifferents, whereof ſome are *preferred*, ſome *rejected*, ſome *neither preferred nor rejected*. *Preferred* are thoſe, which tho' they are Indifferents, have nevertheleſs a ſufficient Reaſon why they are to be had in Eſtimation, as Health, Soundneſs of Senſe, Exemption from Grief, Glory, and the like. *Rejected* are thoſe, which are not worthy any Eſtimation, as Poverty, Sickneſs, and the like. *Neuter* are thoſe which are neither preferred nor rejected, as to extend or contract the Finger.

Theſe Terms preferred, προηγμένον, and rejected, ἀπο προηγμένον, were invented by *Zeno*, upon this Ground; [w] as when we ſpeak of the Court, no Man ſaith, the King himſelf is preferred to Dignity, but thoſe who are in ſome Honour, next and ſecond to him in Rank; ſo when we ſpeak of Life, we call not thoſe Things which are in the firſt Place, the preferred or promoted, but thoſe which are in the ſecond; and ſo likewiſe in the rejected. Now foraſmuch as Good hath the firſt Place, it follows, that what is preferred, is neither Good nor Ill. No Good is reckoned amongſt the Preferred, becauſe that hath the greateſt Eſtimation; but the Preferred having the ſecond Eſtimation, approacheth ſomewhat to the Nature of Good. It is called *Preferred*, not that it conduceth to Beatitude, but in reſpect of the Rejected. We define it thus: *An Indifferent with mean Eſtimation*; for it could not be, that nothing ſhould be left in mean Things, that is according to, or contrary to Nature, neither being left, that nothing ſhould be placed in them, which is ſufficiently eſtimable, this being granted, that there is not ſomething preferred. Rightly therefore this Diſtinction is made, and may more fully be explained by this Simily. As if we ſhould ſuppoſe our ultimate End to be ſo to caſt the Die that it may chance right, the Die that ſhall be ſo caſt as to fall right, muſt have ſomething prepoſed and preferred towards its End; and on the other Side the contrary; yet the Prepoſition of the Die nothing conduceth to that End; ſo thoſe which are preferred, relate indeed to the End, but nothing pertain to the Power and Nature thereof.

Of the *Preferred*, ſome are in the *Soul*, as Ingenuity, Art, Progreſſion, and the like; ſome *in the Body*, as Life, Health, Strength, Ability, Soundneſs, Beauty; ſome *external*, as Riches, Honour, Nobility, and the like.

In like Manner, of the *Rejected*, ſome are *in the Soul*, as Habitude, Ignorance; ſome *in the Body*, as Death, Sickneſs, Infirmity, Maim, Deformity. Some *external*, as Poverty, Diſhonour and Meanneſs.

Likewiſe of the *Neuter*, ſome are *in the Soul*, as Imagination, Aſſent; ſome *in the Body*, as Whiteneſs, Blackneſs; ſome *external*, which having no Eſtimation or Uſe, are of little Value.

Thoſe which are preferred in the Soul, conduce more to living according to Nature, and are of more Worth than thoſe of the Body, or the External, as to have a good Diſpoſition of Mind is better than to have a good Diſpoſition of Body.

Again, of the *Preferred*, ſome are preferred for *themſelves*, as Ingenuity, Countenance, State, Notion, and the like; ſome *for others*, becauſe they effect ſomething, as Riches and Nobility; ſome *both for themſelves and others*, as Health, Strength, Soundneſs, Ability; for themſelves, as being according to Nature; for others, as affording no ſmall Benefit.

[x] As concerning *Reputation*, εὐδοξία, *Chryſippus* and *Diogenes* affirm, that being ſeparated from Utility, we ſhould not ſo much as ſtretch out our Finger for it. But thoſe who followed them, not able to withſtand *Carneades*, affirmed Reputation to be preferred for itſelf, and that it was proper for an ingenious Man, freely educated, to deſire to be well ſpoken of by his Parents, Kindred, and good Men, and that for the Thing itſelf, not for the Uſe thereof; adding, that as we provide for Children, tho' to be born after our Death; ſo we muſt provide for future Reputation after Death, even for its own Sake, ſeparated from all Uſe.

In like manner of the *Rejected*, ſome are rejected *for themſelves*, ſome *for others*, ſome *both for themſelves and others*, which appears by the Rule of Contraries.

CHAP. XIII.

Of Actions and Offices.

OF thoſe *Actions* which proceed from Appetite, ſome are *Offices*, ſome *preter Offices*, ſome *Neuter*.

[y] *Office* is that which is preferred, and hath a

u Laert. ibid. Stob. ibid. Sext. Empir. Pyrrh. hyp. 3. w Cic. de fin. 3. x Cic. de fin. 3. y Laert. 7. 108. Cic. de fin. 3.

good

good Reaſon for the doing thereof, as being convenient to Life; or, as others, Office is whatſoever Reaſon requireth to be done, as to honour our Brethren, Parents, Country, to relieve our Friends. *Zeno* firſt gave it this Name, τὸ Καθῆκον, *Office*, ἀπὸ τῆς κατὰ τινὰς ἥκειν. It is an Action conformable to the Dictates of Nature, and extends even to Plants, and irrational living Creatures, for Offices may even be obſerved in thoſe.

Preter Office is an Action which Reaſon acquireth that we do not, as, to neglect our Parents, to contemn our Brethren, to diſagree with our Friends, to deſpiſe our Country, and the like.

Neuter are thoſe Actions which Reaſon neither requireth nor forbiddeth, as the taking up of a Straw.

[z] Of *Offices*, ſome are *perfect*, called κατορθώματα, *Rectitudes*, Actions done according to Virtue; as, to do wiſely, to do juſtly; others *Not-rectitudes*, Actions which have not a perfect Office, but a mediate; as to marry, to go an Embaſſy, to diſcourſe, and the like.

Of *Rectitudes*, ſome are *in Things requiſite*, others not: Of the firſt Kind are to be wiſe, temperate, and the like: Of the ſecond thoſe which are not requiſite to the being ſuch. In like manner are *Preter-offices*.

Again, of *Offices*, ſome are *ordinary*, as, to have a Care of ourſelves, of our Limbs, and the like: Some *extraordinary*, as, to maim ourſelves, throw away our Goods. Accordingly is it of *Preter-offices*.

Again, of *Offices*, ſome are *continual*, as, to live virtuouſly; ſome *intermiſſive*, as, to queſtion, anſwer, walk, and the like. Accordingly it is of *Preter-offices*.

[a] Office is a mean Thing, placed neither amongſt the good, nor their Contraries; for, there is ſomething in this approveable, ſo as a right Reaſon may be given for it, as done approveably. That which is ſo done is Office. And foraſmuch as in thoſe Things which are neither Virtues nor Vices, there is ſomething which may be of Uſe, it is not to be taken away. Again, it is manifeſt, that a wiſe Man doth ſomething in theſe mean Things, he therefore, when he doth it, judgeth that it is his Office ſo to do; but a wiſe Man is never deceived in Judgment, therefore there is an Office in mean Things. Again, we ſee there is ſomething which we call a Thing rightly done, or Rectitude, but that is a perfect Office; therefore there is an inchoat Office; as, if it be a Rectitude *juſtly* to reſtore a *Depoſitum*, to reſtore a *Depoſitum* muſt be a ſimple Office. The Addition of *juſtly* makes it Rectitude, the ſimple Reſtitution without the additional Term, is an Office.

[b] And ſince it is not to be doubted, but that in mean Things, ſome are to be performed, others rejected, whatſoever is done in that Manner, is comprehended in common Office; whence it is manifeſt, that all Men by Nature loving themſelves, as well the Fooliſh as the Wiſe, will take thoſe Things which are according to Nature, and reject the contrary. This is therefore one common Office of the Wiſe and Unwiſe, converſant in mean Things.

All Offices proceeding from theſe, it is juſtly ſaid, that to thoſe are referred all our Thoughts, even the forſaking of Life, or continuing in it. In whom moſt Things are according to Nature, the Office of that Perſon is to remain in Life; in whom there are, or are foreſeen to be more Things contrary to Nature, his Offices is to forſake Life, altho' he be happy, and of a Fool to continue in Life, altho' he be miſerable; for that Good, and that Ill, as we have often ſaid, are Things that follow afterwards. The firſt Principles of natural Appetite fall under the Judgment and Election of a wiſe Man, and is, as it were, the Matter ſubjected to Wiſdom. Thus the Reaſon of continuing Life, or forſaking it, is to be meaſured by all thoſe Things we mentioned. For, neither are they who enjoy Virtue, obliged to continue in Life, nor they who live without Virtue to die; and it is often the Office of a wiſe Man to part with his Life, even when he is moſt happy, if it may be done opportunely, which is to live conveniently to Nature. This they hold, That to live happily, depends on Opportunity; for Wiſdom commandeth, that a wiſe Man, if it be required, ſhould part with his Life. Wherefore, Vice having not Power to bring a Cauſe of voluntary Death, it is manifeſt that the Office even of Fools, who are likewiſe wretched, is to continue in Life, if they are in the greater Part of thoſe Things, which we hold to be according to Nature. And foraſmuch as going out of Life, and continuing in it, be alike miſerable, neither doth Continuance make his Life more to be avoided; we ſay not therefore without Cauſe, that they who enjoy moſt Naturals ſhould continue in Life.

Hitherto it appertains to know, that the Love of Parents towards their Children is the Effect of Nature, from which Beginning we may tract all Mankind, as proceeding from thence. Firſt, by the Figure and Parts of the Body, which declare, that Nature carefully provided for Procreation. Neither can theſe two agree, that Nature orders Procreation, and takes no Care that thoſe which are procreated ſhould be loved; for even in Beaſts the Power of Nature may be ſeen, whoſe Care, when we behold in bringing up of their young, methinks

z Stob. ibid. a Cic. de fin. 3. b Cic. de fin. 3.

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we hear the very Voice of Nature herſelf. Wherefore as it is manifeſt that we abhor Pain by Nature, ſo it is likewiſe apparent, that we are driven by Nature to love thoſe we have begotten.

Hence ariſeth a common natural Commendation of Men amongſt Men, that it behoveth a Man not to ſeem alienate from Man, for this very Reaſon, becauſe he is Man. For, as among the Parts of the Body, ſome are made only for themſelves, as the Eyes and Ears; others aſſiſt towards the Uſe of other Parts, as the Thighs and Hands; ſo, tho' ſome huge Beaſts are born only for themſelves; yet, that Shell-Fiſh, which is called *Patula prima*, and the *Pinnoteres*, ſo named from keeping its Shell, which ſhutteth itſelf up ſo cloſe, as if it taught others to look to themſelves; as alſo Ants, Bees, Storks, do ſomething for the Sake of others. Much nearer is the Conjunction of Mankind; ſo that we are inclined by Nature to Conventions, Counſels, Cities.

[c] Whatſoever is produced upon the Earth, is created for the Uſe of Man; but Men are generated for Men that they may profit one another. In this we ought to follow Nature our Leader, and to bring forth common Benefit to the publick by mutual Offices, by Giving, by Receiving, by Arts, by Endeavours, and by Faculties, to unite the Society of Man with Man.

[d] The World is governed by the Power of God; it is, as it were, a common City of Men and Gods, and each of us is a Part of the World; whence it followeth by Nature, that we ſhould prefer the common Benefit before our own. For as Laws prefer the Safety of the general before that of any particular; ſo a good and wiſe Man, conformable to Law, not ignorant of Civil Office, taketh more Care for the Benefit of the general, than of any particular, or of his own. Nor is he who betrays his Country more to be condemned, than he who deſerts the common Benefit or Safety. Whence it followeth, that he is to be commended who undergoeth Death for the Commonwealth, and teacheth us, that our Country is dearer to us than ourſelves. And becauſe that Speech is eſteemed inhumane and wicked, of thoſe who affirm, They care not when they are dead, if all the Earth were ſet on Fire; it is certainly true, that we are likewiſe to provide for thoſe who ſhall hereafter be, even for their own Sake. From this Affection of the Soul, whence proceed Wills and Commendations of dying Perſons, as alſo, foraſmuch as no Man will live ſolitary in a Deſart, even with the greateſt Abundance or Plenty; it is eaſily underſtood that we are born for Conjunction, Congregation, or natural Community; we are impelled by Nature to benefit others the moſt that we can. All theſe are Offices, chiefly by teaching and communicating the Reaſons of Prudence, ſo that it is not eaſy to find one, who will not communicate to ſome other what he knoweth himſelf. Thus we are not only inclined to learn, but alſo to teach. And as it is given to Bulls by Nature, to fight even with Lions, for their Heifers, with great Force and Impetuoſity; ſo they who abound in Wealth, and are able to do it (as is related of *Hercules* and *Bacchus*) are incited by Nature to preſerve Mankind. Likewiſe, when *Jupiter* is ſtiled *Optimus* and *Maximus*, *Salutaris*, *Hoſpitalis*, *Stator*, we hereby expreſs that the Safety of Mankind is under his Tuition. But we cannot expect, if we ourſelves are vile, abject, and neglected amongſt ourſelves, that we ſhould be dear to the immortal Gods, and loved of them. As therefore we make Uſe of our Limbs, before that we have learned for what Cauſe of Utility we have them, ſo are we conjoined and conſociated amongſt ourſelves by Nature to civil Community, which, if it were otherwiſe, neither would there be any Room for Juſtice or Goodneſs.

Yet tho' there are mutual Chains betwixt Man and Man, Man hath no common Right with Beaſts, [e *by Reaſon of our Diſſimilitude, as both* Chryſippus *and* Poſſidonius *affirm*] for all other Things, ſaith *Chryſippus*, were made for Men and the Gods, but they for Community and Society one with another; ſo that Men may make Uſe of Beaſts for their Benefit, without doing any Wrong.

Moreover, ſince the Nature of Man is ſuch, that there is a certain civil Right betwixt him and all Mankind, he who preſerveth that Right is juſt; who tranſgreſſeth it, unjuſt. But as in a Theatre, tho' it be common, that Room which a Man poſſeſſeth is juſtly ſaid to be his Place; ſo this civil Right in a City and the World, doth not repugn to the Propriety of particular Perſons.

In order to the Conſervation of all Society, Conjunction, and Dearneſs betwixt Man and Man, Emoluments and Detriments, ὠφελήματα and βλάμματα, which benefit or hurt, muſt be common amongſt them, and not only common but equal. Convenients and Inconvenients, ἐνχρησήματα, and δυχρησήματα muſt be common, but not equal. Thoſe which benefit or hurt, are either good or ill, and therefore muſt neceſſarily be equal; Convenient and Inconvenient are ranked amongſt the Preferred and Rejected, and therefore cannot be equal. Emoluments and Detriments are common, but Rectitudes and Sins not common.

Herein Friendſhip is requiſite, as being one of thoſe Things which benefit. Some affirm, that a good Man ought to be as much concerned for his Friend as for himſelf; others, that every Man ought to be moſt concerned for himſelf. Yet theſe

c Cic. offic. 1. 3. d Cic. de finib. 3. e Laert. 7. 129.

latter

latter confeſs, that it is contrary to Juſtice, whereunto we are born, to take away any Thing from another, and aſſume it to ourſelves.

Neither can Friendſhip be contracted, nor Juſtice performed for private Reſpects and Advantages, for then theſe Advantages might overthrow and pervert them. But neither could Juſtice or Friendſhip be at all, unleſs they were expetible in themſelves. Juſtice is by Nature; it is contrary to a wiſe Man, not only to do an Injury, but even to hurt. Neither can it be right to injure thoſe who are our Friends, or have deſerved well of us; Equity cannot be ſeparated from Utility; whatſoever is equal and juſt, is likewiſe honeſt; and reciprocally, whatſoever is honeſt, is equal and juſt.

[f] *Panætius*, who diſcourſed moſt accurately of Offices, propoſeth three Kinds wherein Men uſe to deliberate or conſult of Offices. Firſt, when they doubt whether that of which the Queſtion is, be honeſt or diſhoneſt. Secondly, whether it be Profitable or Unprofitable. Thirdly, if that which hath the Shew of Honeſty be repugnant to that which ſeems profitable.

[g] Next the *Gods*, we are to reverence our *Parents* and *Brethren*. [h] As concerning the Burial of Parents, *Chryſippus* ſaith, it ought to be done in the moſt ſimple manner; for the Body, as the Nails, Teeth, or Hair thereof, nothing pertaineth to us, and therefore ought not to be uſed with any Curioſity or Reſpect. Fleſh, if it be uſeful, ought to be converted into Aliment (tho' it were a part of our own Body, as the Foot) as is proper to it; if uſeleſs, put under Ground, or thrown into ſome remote Place, without more Reſpect than we have of our Nails or Hair when cut off.

[i] Concerning the Office of the *Buyer* and the *Seller*, *Diogenes* the *Babylonian*, and *Antipater* his Diſciple differ. *Antipater* holds, that all muſt be laid open, that the Buyer be not ignorant of any thing that the Seller knoweth. *Diogenes*, that the Seller, as far as is appointed by Civil Law, ought only to tell the Faults, and conceal the reſt, for as much as he in ſelling deſireth to ſell to his beſt Advantage.

Hecaton, in his ſixth Book *of Offices*, is full of theſe Queſtions, as, *Whether a good Man in a Dearth may give over Houſe-keeping.* He diſputes it on both ſides, but concludes, that the Office is directed rather by Profit than Humanity.

He queſtions, *Whether if at Sea a Ship be to be disburthen'd by the Caſting out of ſomething, we ſhould rather caſt over Board a Horſe of great Price, or a Slave worth little.* In this Caſe, private Intereſt leads one Way, Humanity another.

If a Fool in a Shipwreck catch hold of a Plank, may a wiſe Man wreſt it from him, if he can? He ſaith, he may not, for it is injurious. What may the Maſter of the Ship? May not he take his own? No; no more than he may throw a Paſſenger out of the Ship, becauſe it is his own, into the Sea; for until they come to the Place to which they are bound, the Ship is not the Maſter's, but the Paſſengers.

What if two Shipwreck'd Perſons light upon one Plank, and both pluck at it, ſhould one give it over to the other? Yes; but to him, who, it is more expedient, ſhould live, either for his own Sake, or the Commonwealth. But, what if theſe be alike in both? There will be no Contention, but either as it were by Lot, or Mication with the Fingers (*giuoco della mora*) one will give place to the other.

What if a Father rob Temples, undermine the Publick Treaſury, ſhould the Son reveal it to the Magiſtrates? It were a great Wickedneſs. On the contrary, he ought to defend his Father, if he be call'd in queſtion. But, is not our Country before all Offices? Yes; but it is for the Good of our Country to have Citizens pious to their Parents.

What if a Father ſhould aim at Poſſeſſion of the Tyranny, or endeavour to betray his Country, ſhall the Son keep his Counſel? He ſhall beſeech him not to do it. If that prevail not, he ſhall accuſe him, yea, threaten; and laſtly, if the Matter ſhall tend to the Deſtruction of the Country, he ſhall prefer the Safety of the Country before that of his Father.

If a wiſe Man receive counterfeit Money for good, if afterwards he know it to be counterfeit Money, may he pay it where he owes any thing, for good? *Diogenes* ſaith, he may; *Antipater*, that he may not.

If a Man ſell Wine that will not laſt, and know it to be ſuch, ought he to declare it or no? *Diogenes* thinks he is not obliged, *Antipater* conceives a good Man muſt. Theſe are, as it were, Caſes of Controverſy amongſt the *Stoicks*.

CHAP. XIV.

Of Præter-Offices.

As [k] every perfect Office in a rational Creature is a Rectitude, and always compleat in all Numbers; ſo every *Præter-Office* in a rational Creature is a Sin. A Sin is that which is done contrary to right Reaſon, or in which ſomething of Office is omitted by a rational Creature. [l] A good Deed is the Command of the Law; Sin the Prohibition of the Law. Hence it is, that the Law forbiddeth Fools and Madmen many Things, but preſcribeth them nothing, becauſe they are not capable of doing any thing well.

[m] All Sins are Impiety, as being a Reſiſting of the Will of the Gods. The Gods love Virtue and

f Cit. Offic. lib. 1. and again, lib. 3. Ecl. Eth. g Laert. h Sext. Empir. Pyrr. hypot. 3. 25. i Cit. de Offic. lib. 3. k Stob. l Plut. de repugn. Stoic. m Stob. ibid.

its Works; they hate Vice and its Works. Every Sin therefore displeaseth them, and consequently is Impiety.

[n] All Sins are equal (so *Chrysippus* in the First of his *Moral Questions*, and *Persæus*, and *Zeno*) tho' not alike, for they flow from one Fountain, as it were, of Vice, and the Judgment is the same in all, but by the external Object by which the Judgment is made, they are render'd unlike: That they are equal, is evident from this: If there be not one Truth more Truth than another, nor one Falshood more Falshood than another, neither is one Deceit more Deceit than another, nor one Sin more Sin than another. He who is distant from *Canobus* a hundred Furlongs, and he who is distant but one Furlong, are both alike not at *Canobus*; so he who sins more, and he who less, are both alike not in the right Way.

Yet, tho' Sins are equal, there are some Differences in them, forasmuch as some proceed from an obdurate incurable Affection, others from an Affection not obdurate nor incurable. And tho' every Lye is equally a Lie, yet all Men do not lye equally; but every Sin is equally Sin; for every Sin consisteth in Lying. Thus *Chrysippus*, *Persæus*, and *Zeno*. But *Heraclides* of *Tarsis*, friend to *Antipater*, and *Athenodorus*, hold, that Sins are unequal.

CHAP. XV.

Of wise or virtuous Persons Paradoxes.

THERE are (according to *Zeno*) two kinds of Men, the Wise or Virtuous, and the Vicious. The Wise make use of Virtue thro' the whole Course of their Life, the Vicious of Vice.

[o] Of the Wise there are two sorts, one in Perfection, consummate; the other in Progression, procedent. Of the First are these following Paradoxes to be understood; [p] not that the *Stoicks* positively affirm there ever was such a one in Nature, (for [q] *Zeno*, *Cleanthes*, and *Chrysippus*, were great and venerable Persons, yet did not attain the Heighth of human Nature) but that such a one might possibly be.

[r] *A wise Man is void of Passion*; for he cannot fall. There is another kind of Person void of Passion likewise, a wicked Man that is obdurate and inflexible.

[s] *A wise Man is void of Pride*; Honour and Dishonour are alike to him. There is another kind of Person void of Pride, a wicked Man, equally inclinable to Dishonour as to Honour.

A wise Man is austere; for he neither speaketh for Complaisance, nor admitteth any thing spoken in that kind. There is another sort of austere Persons, which resemble sour Wine, not fit for Drinking, but for Medicines only.

A wise Man is sincere; for he taketh Care that he be not thought better than he is, by reason of some specious Show, and withal to express whatsoever Good he hath, without any rhetorical Gloss.

[t] *A wise Man is not pragmatical*; for he declines the doing of any Thing that is beyond his Office.

[u] *A wise Man is never drunk*, altho' he drink Wine; for he never sinneth, but doth all Things according to Virtue.

A wise Man is never mad; yet sometimes strange Phantasies may occur to him thro' Melancholy or Deliration, not according to the Reason of Eligibles, but præternatural.

A wise Man is never grieved; for Grief, according to *Apollodorus*, is an irrational Contraction of the Soul.

A wise Man is divine; for he hath God with himself; but a wicked Man is an Atheist. An Atheist is taken two Ways; for him who is an Enemy to the Gods, and for him who believeth there are no Gods; which all wicked Men do not.

A wicked Man is impious, because he doth all Things according to Vice, as the Good according to Virtue; and he who hath one Vice, hath all. He is an Enemy to the Gods, for Enmity is the Discord of Life, as Amity is the Concord. The Wicked differs from the Gods in his Course of Life, and therefore is an Enemy to them, for they account all their Enemies who are contrary to them. The Wicked are contrary to the Good. God is good, therefore the Wicked are Enemies to God.

A wise Man is religious; for he is skilful in all Divine Rites. Religion is the Science of Divine Worship. He sacrificeth to the Gods, and is pure, detesting all Sin, holy and just in Divine Things.

A wise Man only is a Priest, skilful in Sacrifices, Business of the Temple, Expiations, and other Things proper to the Gods.

A wise Man is a Prophet, endued with the Science of those Signs which are communicated by Gods or Demons which belong to human Life. In him therefore are all Kinds of Vaticination, as well by Dreams, Birds, and other Things.

A wise Man reverenceth and loveth his Parents and Brethren, next the Gods. He hath likewise an innate Love of his Children, which the Vicious hath not.

A wise Man ought to apply himself to some Office in the Commonwealth (according to *Chrysippus*) unless otherwise diverted; for he will encourage Virtue and suppress Vice, especially in those Commonwealths which are far from Perfection. He ought to make Laws, instruct Men, prescribe Rules. To which is opposite, Study of Popularity, specious Deceit, Prescription of Things unprofitable, which are not competible to a wise Man.

n Plut. de repugn. Stoic. o Senec. Ep. 72. Acad. Quæst. p Cic. 4. Laert. 7. 117. q Quintil. lib. 12. r Laert. ibid.
s Laert. ibid. &c. t Plut. de repugn. Stoic. citing Chrysippus.

[u] *A wise Man ought to marry* (as *Zeno* in his *Commonwealth*) that he may have Children.

A wise Man doth not opinionate or think, but believe or know, for he never assents to any Falsity. Ignorance is an infirm Assent; he thinks all firmly. There are two Kinds of Opinion, one an Assent to Things not comprehended, the other a weak Belief; neither of these are in a wise Man, for he never assented without Comprehension, and then always firmly; for nothing is hidden from him, otherwise he might have a false Opinion. Therefore he is never diffident. Faith is proper to a wise Man, for it is a firm Existimation. A Science is a firm Habit, therefore a wicked Man doth neither know nor believe.

[u] *A wise Man must imitate the Cynicks*; for Cynicism is the nearest Way for Virtue, as *Apollodorus* in his Ethick. Others say, a wise Man ought to continue in that Sect, if he have been thereof; but if he have not, not to enter into it.

A wise Man may, upon Occasion, eat Man's Flesh. Of this already among the Offices.

A wise Man is only free, the Wicked are Slaves; for Liberty is the Power of doing according to our own Judgment. There is another kind of Servitude which consisteth in Subjection, a Third in being possess'd and subjected, to which is opposed vicious Domination.

A wise Man is only a King; for Monarchy is a Principality subordinate to none, which only consists in the Wise, as *Chrysippus* in his Treatise. *That Zeno used Words properly.* For (saith he) a Prince must know both good and bad, which none of the Wicked knoweth. Dominion and the kinds thereof, Monarchy, Magistracy, Generalship, Admiralty, and the like, are only proper to a wise Man; therefore the Wise only command, tho' not actually, yet potentially.

A wise Man is only proper to be a Magistrate, Judge, and Orator; but not any of the Wicked.

A wise Man is void of Sin; for he cannot fall into Error.

A wise Man is innocent, and uninjurious; for he cannot hurt either himself or others, nor receive, nor do any Injury; for Injury is a hurtful Injustice, which is not competible to a wise Man, altho' he may be unjustly assaulted; for he having within himself all Good and Virtue, is not capable of Vice or Harm.

A wise Man is not merciful, nor pardons any, remitting nothing of the Punishments inflicted by Law, as knowing them to be proportioned to, not exceeding the Offence; and that whosoever sinneth, sinneth out of his own Wickedness. A wise Man therefore is not benign; for he who is benign, mitigates the Rigour of Justice, and conceives the Punishments inflicted by Law to be greater than they ought; but a wise Man knoweth the Law to be good, or a right Reason, commanding what is to be done, and what not.

A wise Man nothing wonders at those Things which seem paradoxal, as *Charon's* Cave, the Ebbing and Flowing of the Sea, and hot Springs, and Ebullitions of Fire.

A wise Man will not live in a Desart; for he is communicative by Nature, and practick, and will undertake Exercise to strengthen his Body.

A wise Man will pray, requesting good Things of the Gods, as *Possidonius* affirms, in his First *of Offices*, and *Hecaton* in his Thirteenth *of Paradoxes.*

A wise Man only is a Friend: Friendship is only amongst the Wise, for in them only is an Unanimity as to Things that concern Life and Community, so as our Friends may make Use of them as freely as we ourselves. Unanimity is the Science of common Good. A Friend is expetible in himself. Plenty of Friends is a Good; but amongst the Wicked there is no Friendship; for Friendship being real and not feigned, it is impossible it should consist without Faith and Constancy: But in the Wicked there is Infidelity, and Inconstancy, and Hostility, and therefore not Friendship, but some external Connexions, whereby Necessity or Opinion ties them together.

A wise Man doth all Things well; as we say, *all Pipes play the* Ismenian *Tune well.* He doth all Things wisely, temperately, prudently, modestly, and according to the other Virtues, throughout the whole Course of his Life. A wicked Man doth all amiss, sinning in the whole Course of his Life, inconstant by Nature, often grieved by his own ill Actions, wretched and troubled, forasmuch as he is vexed at the Thing done, so much is he angry at himself for being the Author of it.

[w] *A wise Man loveth* [x] *(virtuously) those whose Beauty express their inward Virtue.* Thus *Zeno*, *Chrysippus*, and *Apollodorus* affirm: For Love is an Impulsion of Benevolence, raised from Beauty, which Love is not of Conjunction, but of Friendship. For this Reason, *Zeno*, tho' he were in Love with *Thrasonides*, a young Woman that was in his Power, yet suppress'd his Affection because she was averse from him. This *Chrysippus* calls the Love of Friendship; it is no way discommendable, for Beauty is the Flower of Virtue.

A wise Man upon Occasion will die voluntarily for his Country and Friends; or, in case he be seized by some excessive Pain, Loss of his Senses, or incurable Diseases.

A wise Man is μέγας, for he compasseth that which is proposed; ἄδρος, for he is every way augmented; ὑψηλὸς, for he hath attained the just Height of Wisdom; ἰσχυρὸς, for he is invincible, and insuperable. The Wicked are the contrary.

u Cic. de finib. lib. 3. w Laert. Cic. Tusc. quæst. 4. x Cic. de finib. 3.

A wise Man profiteth the Wise, and is mutually profited by all the Wise, tho' not Friends or Acquaintance; for betwixt them there is a Concord and Community of Goods; and he who benefiteth another, benefiteth likewise himself. A wicked Man neither conferreth nor receiveth Benefits; for one is to move towards Virtue, the other is to be moved towards Virtue.

A wise Man is a good Oeconomist, skilful to acquire Wealth. Oeconomist is a Habit active, and contemplative in the Business of a Family; Oeconomy is the ordering of Expences, Works and Possessions; the Science of Acquisition is a Reason whereby Wealth is attained, which some account in Indifferents, others in Good. But no wicked Man is a good Oeconomist, since only a wise Man knoweth from whence, how, and how far Gain may be acquired.

A wise Man only is perfect, for he wanteth no Virtue; a wicked Man is imperfect, for he hath no Virtue. Therefore the Wise are always happy, the Wicked miserable; which Happiness, according to *Chrysippus*, differs nothing from that of God, nor is less expetible. The Wicked partake of no Good, because Virtue, and that which partakes thereof, is good, and those Things which are convenient and requisite, are proper only to the Wise, as the Contraries to the Wicked.

A wise Man is only rich; for Good is true Riches, and Ill true Poverty; a wicked Man is poor, not having the Means to become rich.

A wise Man is only obedient; the Wicked can neither obey nor command.

A wise Man only is honourable; for Honour is the Reward of Virtue; the Wicked wanting this, are justly dishonourable.

A wise Man is only ingenuous and noble, according to some of the Stoicks; but others deny it, referring these not to Nature, but Institution only, according to the Proverb, *Custom is a second Nature*. So that Ingenuity is an Habit of Nature or Institution, apt to Virtue; Nobility is a Habit of Descent or Institution, apt to Virtue.

A wise Man is pleasing, persuasive, opportune and sincere; for he is expert in every Thing, affable in Conversation, and helpful to the Publick. The Wicked are the contrary.

A wise Man is the best Physician; for he hath considered his Constitution, and those Things which are requisite for his Health.

A wise Man may lawfully part with his Life, the Wicked cannot, because in their Life they never acquire Virtue, nor eschew Vice. But Life and Death are limited by Offices, and their Contraries.

A wise Man will accept of Empire, and cohabit with Princes; but not unless he perceive it may be done without Danger, and to much Advantage.

A wise Man never lieth; for he who speaketh a Falshood is not properly said to lie, unless it be with Intent to deceive. A Lie may be used many Ways without Assent, as in War against Enemies, or in the like Necessity.

A wise Man neither deceiveth nor is deceived; for he never sinneth, he useth not his Sight, Hearing, or any other Sense ill. He is not suspicious, nor repenteth, for both these are proper to fallacious Assent. He can no Way be changed, or err, or opinionate.

A wise Man only (tho' not all wise Men) *is happy in Children, in old Age, and in Death.*

A wise Man doth nothing contrary to his Appetite; for all such Things are done with a Privation, and nothing adverse unforeseen happeneth to him. But in the primitive Time, there was some wise Man that did not desire or will any Thing, because that those Things which were then present, were not sufficient to be required by him.

A wise Man is meek; for Meekness is a Habit whereby Things are done meekly, not breaking forth into Anger.

A wise Man is peaceful and modest; Modesty is the Science of decent Motion; Tranquillity the Order of natural Motions. The contrary to these are seen in the Wicked.

A wise Man is free from all Calumny; he calumniates none, and is not calumniated by any; for Calumny is a lying Imputation of feigned Friends, to which the Wise are not liable, for they are true Friends; the Wicked are, for they are feigned.

A wise Man delayeth nothing; for Delay is an Omission of Office through Slothfulness, of which *Hesiod*,

Nothing defer a Year, a Month, a Day,
He fights against himself that doth delay.

A wise Man can only incite and be incited to Virtue, a Fool cannot; for he neglecteth Precepts, and goeth no further than the Words, not proceeding to Action. A wicked Man is not desirous to hear or learn, as not being capable, by Reason of his Imprudence, of what is rightly said; whence it followeth, that he can neither be incited nor incite to Virtue. He that is capable to be incited, or to incite, must be prepared by Philosophy, which is not competible to a wicked Man; for he who diligently heareth Philosophers, is not prepared to Philosophy, but he who expresseth their Doctrine in their Life and Actions. This no wicked Man can do, for he is prepossessed by Vice. If he should be incited, Vice would pull him back; but none that is vicious is incited to Virtue, as none sick to Health.

Every

Every wicked Man is an Exile, wanting Law and Country, for both these are good. That a City or Country is good, *Cleanthes* proveth thus. If there be a Habitation, where those who fly for Succour, find Justice, it is good; but a City is such a Habitation, therefore a City is good. A City is taken three Ways; for a Habitation, for a Convention of Men, and for both. In the two latter Significations it is called Good.

Every wicked Man is rustick; for Rusticity is Ignorance of Laws and civil Manners. A wicked Man refuseth to live according to Law, and is hurtful as a savage Beast.

A wicked Man is tyrannical, cruel, violent, and injurious, whensoever he gets an Occasion.

A wicked Man is ungrateful, not obliging nor requiring; for he doth nothing by Friendship.

A wicked Man is not perseverant; for Perseverance is the Science of obtaining our Purpose, not being deterred by Labour.

A wicked Man is not capable of the Right of Donation. Donation is the good bestowing of Estimation, but nothing that is good is competible to the Wicked.

Every wicked Man is delighted with his Wickedness, which we may perceive not so much by his Discourse as Actions, which shews that he is carried on to Wickedness.

THE DOCTRINE OF THE STOICKS.

The THIRD PART.

CHAP. I.

Physick and the Parts thereof.

PHysick [a] is divided into these Places; *of Bodies, of Principles, of Elements, of Gods, of Place, of Vacuum:* Thus especially; but generally into three Places; *of the World, of Elements, Aitiologick of Causes.*

That concerning the *World*, is divided into two Parts; whereof one Contemplation is common also to the Mathematicks, concerning fixed Stars and Planets; as whether the Sun be of the same Magnitude as he appears to be, and whether the Moon be so likewise; of their Periods, and the like: The other, Contemplation, proper only to Physick, to enquire into the Essence of these; whether the Sun and Stars consist of Matter and Form; whether generate or ingenerate, whether animate or inanimate, whether corruptible or incorruptible, whether governed by Providence, or the like.

The Place concerning *Causes*, is likewise twofold; whereof one, Contemplation, is common also to the Medicinal Disquisitions, whereby they enquire concerning the principal Part of the Soul, and those Things which are produced in the Soul and Seed, and the like. The other is likewise usurped by the Mathematicks, as, in what Manner we see, what is the Cause of the visual Phantasy? How are made Clouds, Thunder, Rainbows, Halo's, Comets, and the like?

CHAP. II.

Of Bodies.

NAtural [b] Philosophy brancheth into two Parts, of Corporeals and Incorporeals.

A Body is that which doth or sufficeth; [c] it is the Sense with Essence or Substance, and finite: Whatsoever [d] is, is a Body, for whatsoever is, either doth or suffereth.

[e] Principles are Bodies void of Form.

Elements are Bodies endued with Form.

[f] Causes are corporeal, because they are Spirits.

[g] Qualities are corporeal, for they are Spirits, and aerical Intentions, which affect the Parts of all Things, generated with Form and Figure.

[h] Virtues, Vices, Arts, Memory, Phantasies, Affections, Appetitions, Assents, are Bodies existing in the supreme Part of the Soul.

[i] The Soul is a Body, because it maketh us to be living Creatures.

[k] Night and Day are Bodies.

[l] Voice is a Body, for it maketh that which is heard; in a Word, whatsoever is, is a Body and a Subject [m], for the Stoicks take away intellectual Substances, affirming all Things that are, to be comprehended by Sense) only Differences are not subsistent.

[n] A solid Body (according to *Apollodorus*) is divisible three Ways, into Length, Breadth and Depth.

A Superficies is the Term of a Body, or that which hath only Length and Breadth, but no Depth; thus *Possidonius.*

A Line is the Term of a Superficies, or a Length without Breadth, that which hath Length only.

A Point is the Term of a Line, or the least Mark.

a Laert. 7. 132. b Senec. Epist. 89. c Laert. ibid. d Plut. cont. Stoic. e Laert. ibid. f Plut. plac. phil. 1. 11. g Plut. cont. Stoic. h Plut. cont. Stoic. Tertul. de anima. cap. 6. i Sen. Ep. 113. k Plut. de plac. l. 4. l Laert. ibid. m Orig. philos. n Laert. 7. 135.

[o] A Body is divisible into infinite, yet it consisteth not of infinite Bodies.

CHAP. III.
Of Principles.

THE [p] Place concerning Bodies, is divided into two Degrees, into those which produce, and those which are produced; the first Principles, the second Elements.

[q] Principles and Elements differ: Principles are ingenerate, incorruptible: Elements shall perish by Conflagration. Moreover, Principles are Bodies, and void of Form; Elements have Form.

[r] There are two Principles of all Things, the Agent, and the Patient: The Patient is a Substance void of Quality, called Matter; the Agent is the Reason which is in the Matter, God.

[s] Matter is sluggish, a Thing ready for all Things, but will cease if none move it. The Cause, that is, the Reason formeth Matter, and moldeth it which Way he pleaseth, out of which he produceth various Works. There must therefore be something out of which a Thing is made, and also by which it is made. This is the Cause, that Matter. [t] The Cause or active Reason is God.

[u] In the Agent there is Power, in the Patient a certain Matter [or Capacity] and in both, both; for Matter itself could not cohere, if it were not kept together by Power, nor that Power without some Matter; for there is nothing, which is not compelled to be somewhere.

[w] Both these, God and the World, the Artist and his Work, they comprehend within this Term *Nature*, as if Nature were God mixed through the World. [x] Sometimes they call that Nature which containeth the World, sometimes that which generateth and produceth Things upon the Earth.

The Agent is, as we said, called the Cause. A Cause [y], according to *Zeno*, is that by which there is an Effect, which is not a Cause; or, as *Chrysippus*, the Reason of the Effect; or, as *Possidonius*, the first Author of a Thing. A Cause is a Body, a Not-Cause a Categorem. It is impossible that the Cause being assigned, the Effect should not be present, which is to be understood thus: The Soul is the Cause through which we live, Prudence the Cause by which we are wise. It is impossible that he who hath a Soul should not live, or he who hath Prudence should not be wise.

CHAP. IV.
Of Matter.

THE [z] Substance of all [a] qualitative] Beings, is first Matter, according to *Zeno* and *Chrysippus*, in his first *of Physicks*.

[b] Matter is that of which every Thing is made; it hath two Names, οὐσία, Substance, and ὕλη, Matter. Substance is of all Things in general, Matters of Particulars.

[c] Universal Matter is (according to [d] *Zeno*) wholly eternal, not admitting, as *Chrysippus* saith, Increase or Decrease.

[e] Particular Matter admitteth Augmentation and Diminution [f], (for it remaineth not always the same, but is separated and mixed, so that, according to *Chrysippus*, its Parts perish by Separation, and exist by mutual Mistion. But those who call Fire, Air, Water and Earth, Matter, assert not a Thing void of Form, but of a Body.

[g] Matter is a Body, [h] and finite.] *Possidonius* saith, That the Substance and Matter of the Universe is void of Quality and Form, in as much as it hath not a certain Figure and Quality in itself; but it is always seen in some Figure and Quality. But the substantial Nature of the Universe differs from Matter intentionally only.

[i] Matter is passible; for if it were immutable, Things could not be generated of it. Hence it followeth, that it is divisible into infinite; yet itself, as *Chrysippus* saith, is not infinite; for nothing that is divisible is infinite, but Matter is continuous.

[k] Through this Matter, *Zeno* affirmeth, that the Reason of the World, which some call Fate, is diffused as Seed.

CHAP. V.
Of the World.

OF [l] this Matter was made *the World*. The World hath several Appellations, κόσμος, *the World*; τὸ πᾶν, *the All*; τὸ ὅλον, *the Whole*; κόσμος [m], *World*, is taken three Ways: First, for God himself, who is properly qualified with all Essence. Incorruptible and Ingenerate, who framed the Universe after a certain Period of Time, who resolved all Nature into himself, and again generated it out of himself. Secondly, for the starry Ornament: And thirdly, that which consists of both.

o Stob. Phys. 17. p Senec. Ep. 89. q Laert. 7. 134. r Ibid. s Sen. Ep. 65. t Ibid. u Cic. Acad. quæst. 16. w Lactant. 7. 3. x Laert. 7. 148. y Stob. Phys. 1. 16. z Laert. 7. 150. a Stob. Phys. 14. b Laert. ibid. c Ibid. d Stob. Phys. 13. e Laert. ibid. f Stob. Phys. 14. g Ibid. h Laert. ibid. i Ibid. k Stob. Phys. 14. l Laert. 7. 137. m Ibid.

The

[n] *The All*, τὸ πᾶν, is one Way taken, as *Apollodorus* ſaith, for the World, and another Way for the Syſtem of the World, and the Vacuity beyond it. The World is finite, the Vacuity infinite.

[o] Thus likewiſe they diſtinguiſh betwixt τὸ πᾶν, and τὸ ὅλον: τὸ πᾶν, includeth alſo an infinite Vacuity, in which the World is: τὸ ὅλον ſignifies the World without that Vacuity, which neither is increaſed nor diminiſhed; but its Parts are ſometimes extended, ſometimes contracted. It began from the Earth as its Centre, for the Centre is the Beginning of a Circle.

[p] The World is that which is properly qualited with the Eſſence of all Things; or, as [q] *Chryſippus* and [r] *Poſſidonius* define it, a Syſtem of Heaven and Earth, and of the Natures therein contained; or a Syſtem of God and Men, and of all Things that were made for them.

[s] The World was made by God; for if (ſaith *Chryſippus*) there be any Thing which produceth ſuch Things as Man, tho' endued with Reaſon, cannot produce, that (doubtleſs) is greater and ſtronger, and wiſer than Man. But a Man cannot make the Celeſtial Things; therefore that which made them, tranſcendeth Man, in Art, Counſel, Prudence and Power, and what can that be but God?

[t] The World was made for thoſe animate Eſſences which have the Uſe of Reaſon, theſe are the Gods and Men, than whom nothing is better.

All [u] Things of which it conſiſteth, and which it produceth within itſelf, are accommodated to the Uſe of Man.

The World was made in this Manner; [w] God in the Beginning being alone by himſelf, converted all Subſtance (which according to *Zeno*, was Fire) firſt into Air, then into Water. And as in the Plant the Seed is contained; ſo God, who is the prolifick Reaſon of the World, left ſuch a Seed in the Humidity, as might afford eaſy and apt Matter for the Generation of thoſe Things that were to be produced.

[x] *Zeno* addeth, that one Part tending downward, was condenſed into Earth, another Part remained pure Water, and partly, being exhal'd, Air, of a Particle of which Air flaſhed out Fire.

[y] *Cleanthes* deſcribeth it in this Manner. The Univerſe being ſet on Fire, the middle Part thereof firſt ſettled downwards, then the next Parts by little and little were quenched. Thus the Univerſe being wet, the extreme Fire, (the middle Part oppoſing it) ſprang upward, and began the Conſtitution of the World, and the Revolution of this Conſtitution ſhall never end. For as the Parts of every Thing are at certain Times produced of Seed; ſo the Parts of the Univerſe (amongſt which are living Creatures and Plants) are produced in their Seaſons; and as ſome Reaſons of the Parts are mixed together in the Seed, which being compoſed, are again diſſolved; ſo of one are all Things made; and again, of one is all compounded by an equal and perpetual Revolution.

[z] The World is one, of the ſame corporeal Subſtance, and of a ſpherical Figure, for this is of all Figures moſt apt for Motion. Thus *Zeno*, *Chryſippus*, *Poſſidonius*, and others.

[a] The World is ſeated in an infinite incorporeal Vacuity, which is beyond it, circumfuſed about it, [b] into which the World ſhall be diſſolved by Conflagration. The World is finite, the Vacuity infinite; yet [c] *Poſſidonius* ſaith, it is no more than will ſuffice for the Revolution of the World, when it ſhall periſh. [d] By this Argument they confute the Motion of Atoms downward, introduced by *Epicurus*; for in that which is infinite, there are no local Differences of high or low.

The World is not heavy, becauſe the whole Fabrick thereof conſiſteth of heavy and light Elements, and being placed in the Midſt, whither ſuch Bodies tend, it keepeth its Place.

[e] In the World there is no Vacuity, but it is compleatly one, for that neceſſitates a Conſpiration and Harmony betwixt Celeſtials and Terreſtrials.

The World is [f] ſelf-ſufficient, becauſe it alone hath all in itſelf, whereof it ſtandeth in no Need. Of itſelf it is nouriſhed and augmented, whereas the Parts are tranſmuted and converted into one another.

The World is a [g] perfect Body; the Parts of the World are not perfect, becauſe they are reſpective to the whole, and not of themſelves. The Univerſe is by Nature apt to move itſelf in all Parts, to contain, preſerve, and not break, diſſolve and burn itſelf, the Univerſe ſending and moving the ſame Point, and the Parts thereof having the ſame Motion from the Nature of the Body. Like it is that this firſt Motion is naturally proper to all Bodies, namely, to incline towards the Midſt of the World, conſidering the World moveth ſo in regard of itſelf; and the Parts likewiſe, in that they are Parts of the whole.

[h] The World is a living Creature, rational, animate and intellectual, (ſo *Chryſippus*, *Apollodorus*, and *Poſſidonius*) and hath an animate ſenſible Eſſence. For a living Creature is more excellent than that which is not a living Creature; but nothing is more excellent than the World, therefore the World is a living Creature. That it is animate is manifeſt from our Soul, which is a Piece thereof taken out of it. (But *Boethius* denies that

n Laert. 7. 137. o Stob. Phyſ. cap. 24. p Laert. ibid. q Stob. 25. r Laert. ibid. s Lactant. de ira dei cap. 10. t Cic. de nat. 2. u Lactant. de ira dei, cap. 13. w Laert. 7. 141. x Laert. ibid. Stob. Phyſ. cap. 20. y Ibid. z Laert. 7. 140. a Ibid. b Plut. plac. phil. 2. 9. c Ibid. d Plut. contra Stoic. e Laert. ibid. f Plut. contra Stoic. g Ibid. h Laert. 7. 142.

the World is a living Creature.) [i] The Mind or Providence passeth through every Part thereof, as the Soul doth in us, but in some Parts more, in others less; through some permeating, as a Habit, as in the Bones and Nerves; through some as a Mind, as through the principal (Hegemonick) Part. In like manner the whole World is an animate rational Creature, the Hegemonical Part thereof is the Æther, as *Antipater* the *Tyrian*, in his eighth Book of the World. But *Chrysippus* in his first of *Providence*, and *Possidonius* of the *Gods*, affirm, that Heaven is the Hegemonick of the World; *Cleanthes*, the Sun. But *Chrysippus* in the same Book (differing from what he said before) affirmeth it to be the purest Part of the Æther, which they call the first God, sensibly, because it passeth through all in the Air, and through all living Creatures and Plants, but through the Earth as a Habit.

[k] The World, according to the greater Part of Stoicks, is corruptible, for it is generated in the same Manner, as Things comprehensible by Sense. Again, if the Parts thereof be corruptible, the Whole is also corruptible; but the Parts of the World are corruptible, for they are daily changed into one another, therefore the Whole itself is corruptible. And again, if any thing admit any change into the Worse, it is corruptible; but the World doth, for it admitteth Exsiccation and Inundation; therefore, *&c.*

[l] The World shall perish by Fire, caused by the Power of Fire, which is in all Things, which after a long time, consuming all the Moisture, shall resolve all Things into itself. The Moon, Stars and Sun, saith [m] *Cleanthes*, shall perish, but God shall assimilate all Things to himself, and resolve all into himself. [n] This Opinion of the general Conflagration of the World, was held by the first and most ancient of this Sect, *Zeno*, *Cleanthes* and *Chrysippus*.

[o] This First is the Seed of the World; after the Conflagration it diffuseth itself even into the Vacuity that was beyond the World. Afterwards, by Order of the same Reason which made the World, it shall withdraw and contract itself towards the Generation of a new World, yet not be quite extinguished, but so as that some Portion thereof remain, forasmuch as it is the Cause of Motion.

But [p] *Boethius*, *Possidonius*, and [q] *Panætius* deny this Conflagration of the World, conceiving rather that the World is eternal, to whom likewise *Diogenes* the *Babylonian* assents.

CHAP. VI.

Of Elements.

GOD [r] having converted, as we said, all Matter into Moisture, and prepared it for the Generation of future Things, in the next Place produced the four Elements, Fire, Water, Air, and Earth. Of these discourseth *Zeno* in his Book *of the Universe*, and *Chrysippus* in his First *of Physicks*, and *Archedemus* of *Elements*.

[s] *Element* is that of which generated Things are first made, and into which they are resolved. The four Elements are Matter or Substance endued with Quality. Fire is hot, Water moist, Air cold, Earth dry; yet not so, but in Air there is part of the same Quality; for in the highest it is Fire, which is called *Æther*, in which is generated the first Sphere of Planets; next Air, then Water, the Basis of all, Earth being placed in the Midst of all.

[t] Of the Four Elements, two are light, Fire and Air; the other two, Earth and Water, heavy, which properly tend to the Center; but the Center itself is no way heavy.

CHAP. VII.

Of Fire.

THE [u] first Element is that of *Fire*, which as all Bodies tend to the Middle, inclineth, as much as the Lightness of its Nature permits, to the Centre of the World, by a circular Motion round about it.

[w] There are (according to *Zeno*) two kinds of *Fire*; one artificial, requisite to the Use of Life, which converteth Nutriment into itself; the other, inartificial (so [x] *Cicero* renders ἀτεχνὲν) by which all Things grow, and are preserved; [y] for whatsoever is nourished and groweth, comprises within itself the Power of Heat. This *Fire* is diffused thro' all the Parts of the World, and they are all sustained by it: That it is in the Earth, appeareth by Seeds and Roots, which spring up and grow by the Temperament of this Heat. That it is in Water appeareth, forasmuch as Water is susceptible of greater Cold, as by Freezing. It is consequently in Air also; that being a Vapour extracted from Water, and supply'd by Motion of the Heat which is in the Water. But primarily, and originally, it is in the Element of Fire, a Nature absolutely hot, which dispenseth salutary vital Heat to all other Things. [z] This is Nature, saith *Zeno*,

i Laert. 7. 138. k Laert. 7. 141. l Phil. Jud. de Immortal. mundi. m Laert. 7. 137. n Numen. apud. Euseb. o Plut. cont. Stoic. p Phil. ibid. q Cic. de Nat. Deor. 2. 46. Stob. c. 24. r Laert. 7. 136. s Laert. ibid. t Laert. ibid. u Stob. Phys. 23. w Stob. ibid. x De Nat. Deor. 2. y Cic. de Nat. Deor. 2. z Stob. Phys. p. 47.

and

and the Soul. Of *Fire* consist the Sun, Moon, and Stars.

CHAP. VIII.

Of the Stars.

[a] IN the *Æther* are generated the Stars of the noblest and purest Part thereof, without Admixtion of any other Nature, wholly hot and pellucid, animate Creatures indued with Sense and Intellect.

[b] *Possidonius* defineth a Star a Divine Body, consisting of ætherical Fire, splendid and fiery, never resting, but always moving circularly.

That the Stars are wholly fiery, *Cleanthes* proveth by the Testimony of two Senses, Touch and Sight; for the Lustre of the Sun is brighter than of any Fire, seeing that it shines so far and wide to so vast a World; and such is its Touch, that it not only warmeth, but oftentimes burneth, neither of which it would do if it were not fiery.

Now (saith he) the Sun being fiery, is either like that Fire which is requisite to the Use of Life, or unto that which is contained in the Bodies of living Creatures; but this our Fire, which the Use of Life requireth, is a Consumer of all Things, disturbeth and dispatcheth all Things. On the contrary, the other is corporeal, vital, and salutary, it conserveth all Things, it nourisheth, encreaseth, sustaineth, and affecteth with Sense; therefore, saith he, there's no Question to which of these Fires the Sun is like, for he causeth all Things to flourish and sprout up, according to their several kinds; wherefore the Fire of the Sun being like those Fires which are in the Bodies of living Creatures, the Sun must be a living Creature also, and so must be likewise the rest of the Stars of the cœlestial Fire, which is called *Æther* or *Heaven*.

[d] For seeing that of living Creatures, one kind is generated in the Earth, other kinds in the Water, others in the Air, it were absurd to think, that in that Part which is most apt for Generation of living Creatures, no living Creature is generated. The Stars possess the *Æther*, which being most rare, and in perpetual Agitation and Vigour, it is necessary the living Creature that is generated in it, be endued with most acute Sense, quickest Mobility. The Stars therefore have Sense and Intelligence; whence it followeth, that they are to be reputed Gods. For we say, *that they who live in the purest Air, are much more acute and understanding, than those who live in a thick Climate.* The Diet likewise is thought to conduce not a little to the sharpning of the Understanding. Whence it is probable, the Stars are endued with most excellent Understanding, forasmuch as they dwell in the ætherial Part of the World, and are nourished with Exhalations from the Sea and Earth, extenuated by a long Distance.

The Sense and Intellect of the Stars is chiefly manifest from their Order and Constancy, for nothing can be moved by Proportion and Number without Providence, in which nothing is temerarious, nothing various, nothing casual. But the Order of Stars, and Constancy throughout all Eternity, cometh neither from Nature, for that is void of Reason, nor from Fortune, which affecteth Variety, and disalloweth Constancy.

Again, all Things are moved either naturally, or violently, or voluntarily. Those which move naturally, are carried either by their Weight downward, or by their Lightness upwards, neither of which is proper to the Stars, for their Motion is circular. Neither can it be said, that they are moved violently against their own Nature; for what Power can be greater? It remaineth, therefore, that their Motion be voluntary.

[e] No Fire can subsist without some Aliment, [f] the Stars therefore are nourished by the Vapours of the Earth.

[g] Of Stars (according to *Chrysippus*) there are two Sorts, both which are by Nature divine, animate, and providential, the Fixed and the Erratick. The Multitude of the Fixed is incomprehensible; the Erratick are lower than the Fixed; the Fixed are all ranked in one Superficies, as is manifest to the Sight, the Erratick in several. The Sphere of fixed Stars includeth that of the Erratick. The highest of the Erratick, and next to the fixed Stars is the Sphere of *Saturn*, next, that of *Jupiter*, after which, that of *Mars*, then that of *Mercury*, then that of *Venus*, then that of the *Sun*, and lastly, that of the *Moon*, which being neareſt the Air, seemeth therefore aerial, and hath greatest Influence upon terrestrial Bodies.

[h] *Saturn*, φαινων, finisheth his Course in almost thirty Years; *Jupiter*, φαέθων, in twelve; *Mars*, πυρόεις, in twenty-four Months wanting six Days; *Mercury*, στίλβων, in a Year; *Venus*, φωσφόρος, (lowest of the five Planets) in a Year.

[i] The *Sun* and the *Moon* are properly called ἄστρα, Stars; but ἄστηρ and ἄστρον differ; for every ἄστηρ is ἄστρον, but not the contrary.

[k] The *Rising* of a Star, *Chrysippus* defineth, its Advancement above the Earth; and the *Setting* thereof its Occultation under the Earth. The same Stars at the same time rise to some, and set to others. The Apparition of a Star, ἑπτολή, is its rising together with the Sun; and the Setting thereof, is its setting with the Sun: for Setting is taken two Ways, in Opposition to Rising, and in Opposition to Apparition. As the Apparition of the Dog-star is its rising together with the Sun, and its setting is its Occulation under the Earth together with the Sun, the same is said of the *Pleiades*.

a Cic. Nat. Deor. 2. b Stob. Phys. 54. &c. c Cic. Nat. Deor. 2. d Cic. Nat. Deor. 2. e Cic. ibid. f Laert. 7. 145. g Stob. Phys. 25. h Cic. de Nat. Deor. 2. i Stob. Phys. 55. k Stob. ibid.

CHAP.

CHAP. IX.

Of the Sun.

NExt [l] *Venus* (the loweſt Planet) is the *Sun*, the [m] Chief of all that conſiſt of this ætherial Fire. The *Sun* is defined by *Cleanthes* and *Chryſippus*, an intellectual Taper, gathered and kindled from the Vapours of the Sea. [n] *Poſſidonius* defineth the *Sun* a moſt pure Fire, greater than the Earth, of a ſpherical Figure (as [o] *Cleanthes* alſo affirms) anſwerable to that of the World.

[p] That the *Sun* is fiery, is manifeſt in that it hath all the Operations of [q] Fire; and foraſmuch as he is Fire, it followeth that he muſt be nouriſhed. [r] The *Sun* is nouriſhed by Exhalations from the Great Ocean.

[s] According to the Expanſion of this ſubjected Aliment, ſaith *Cleanthes*, in his Motion from Tropick to Tropick, removeth in a ſpiral Line, from the Æquinoctial towards the North, and towards the South. [t] *Zeno* ſaith, he hath two Motions, one with the World from *Eaſt* to *Weſt*, the other contrary, thro' the Signs.

[u] That the *Sun* is greater than the Earth, appeareth in that it enlighteneth, not only all the Earth, but Heaven alſo. Again, the Shadow of the Earth being conical, argues the Sun to be greater than the Earth. Again, it is viſible every where by reaſon of its Magnitude.

[w] The *Sun* is eclipſed by Interpoſition of the *Moon* betwixt us and that Part of the *Sun* which is toward us, (as *Zeno*, in his Book of the Univerſe.) For meeting the *Sun*, and coming under him, ſhe ſeemeth to darken his Light, and afterwards to diſcloſe it again, as will appear in a Baſon of Water.

CHAP. X.

Of the Moon.

IN [x] the loweſt Part of the *Æther* is the *Moon*. The *Moon* (according to *Zeno*) is an intellectual, wiſe, igneous Star, conſiſting of artificial Fire. *Cleanthes* ſaith, ſhe is of a fiery Subſtance, and of a dirty Figure. [y] *Lipſius* for πιλοειδῆ, dirty, ſubſtitutes πιλοειδῆ, as if of the ſame Figure, as a Hat or Cap. But perhaps there needs no Alteration, for they [z] affirm'd, as ſhe is nearer to the Earth than the *Sun*, ſo is ſhe of a more terrene Nature. *Poſſidonius*, [a] and moſt of the *Stoicks* affirm, ſhe is mix'd of Fire and Air, [b] by reaſon of which Diverſity of Subſtance ſhe is not ſubject to Corruption. [c] To this Mixtion of Air in her Compoſition, they impute likewiſe thoſe Spots which are ſeen in her Face. [d] She is greater than the Earth, as well as the *Sun* is, and ſpherical as the *Sun*, yet appeareth in various Figures, the Full Moon, Firſt Quarter, New Moon, Laſt Quarter.

[e] *Chryſippus* ſaith, ſhe is a Fire collected after the *Sun*, from the Exhalation of freſh Waters, for which Cauſe ſhe is likewiſe nouriſhed by them, as [f] *Poſſidonius* alſo aſſerteth.

[g] Her Motion is ſpiral. [h] *Zeno* ſaith, ſhe hath two Motions, as the one with the World from Eaſt to Weſt, the other contrary thro' the Signs. [i] The Period of her Courſe is called a Month; μὴς, is likewiſe that Part of the Moon which appeareth to us, for one half of her is always turned towards us.

[k] The Moon is eclipſed when ſhe falleth into the Shadow of the Earth. For altho' every Month ſhe is oppoſite to the Sun, yet ſhe is then only eclipſed when ſhe is fulleſt, by reaſon of the Obliquity of her Courſe, whereby her Latitude is varied towards the North and South. When therefore ſhe happens to be near the Ecliptick, and oppoſite to the Sun, ſhe is eclipſed; which happens (as *Poſſidonius* ſaith) in *Libra* and *Scorpio*, and in *Aries* and *Taurus*. Thus *Laertius*; but *Poſſidonius* ſeems to have been ignorant of, or not to have conſidered the Motion of the Nodes of the Moon (commonly called *Caput & Cauda Draconis*) whereby the Reſtitution or Period of Eclipſes is made in nineteen Years, (κατὰ τὸ ὁλοσχερέστερον) which was the Ground of *Meton's Period*, and of the *Cycle of the Moon*, in the *Julian* Calendar.

CHAP. XI.

Of Air.

NExt [l] the Sphere of the Moon (ſaith *Chryſippus*) is the Element of *Air*, interpoſed betwixt the Sea and Heaven, ([m] ſpherical in Figure) [n] conſecrated by the Name of [o] *Juno*, Siſter and Wife of *Jupiter*, who is the *Æther*; betwixt theſe there is a near Conjunction.

[p] The *Air* is divided into three Regions, the Higheſt, the Middle, and the Loweſt. The higheſt Region is the hotteſt, and drieſt, and rareſt, by reaſon of the Vicinity of the eternal Fires. The loweſt and neareſt to the Earth is thick and caliginous; becauſe it receiveth terrene Exhalations. The middle Region is more temperate than the higher and lower, as to Siccity and Rarity, but colder than both. This, wherein the Clouds and Winds are generated, is, according to *Poſſidonius*, forty Furlongs above the Earth. Next to it is the pure and liquid Air of untroubled Light. From the turbulent Part of the Moon is twenty hundred thouſand Furlongs.

l Cic. Nat. Deor. 2. m Stob. p. 56, 57. n Laert. 7. 144. o Stob. p. 57. p Laert. ibid. q Cic. ibid. r Stob. p. 56. s Stob. ibid. t Stob. p. 57. u Laert. 7. 145. w Laert. ibid. x Stob. Phyſ. p. 59. y Phyſ. Stoic. 2. 13. z Laert. 7. 145. a Plut. pl. 2. 25. Stob. p. 59. 2. 30. b Pl. plac. Phil. c Stob. p. 60. d Pl. Phil. 2. 26. e Stob. p. 59. f Laert. ibid. g Laert. ibid. h Stob. p. 57. i Stob. p. 59. k Laert. 7. 146. l Stob. p. 49. m Cic. de Nat. Deor. 2. n Laert. 7. 147. o Cic. ibid. p Senec. Nat. Queſt. 2. 10.

[q] To the Air is attributed the primitive Cold.

[r] As concerning Things in the Air, *Winter* is the Rigour of the Air, next above the Earth, occaſioned by the Remoteneſs of the Sun, and is the coldeſt of the Seaſons of the Year. *Spring* is the Seaſon ſucceeding *Winter*, preceding *Summer*, and is a good Temperature of the Air, occaſioned by Approach of the Sun. *Summer* is that Seaſon of the Year, when the Air above the Earth is warmed, by the Sun's Acceſs towards the North. *Autumn* that Seaſon of the Year which followeth *Summer* and precedeth Winter, is made by the Return of the Sun from us.

[s] Winter cometh, when the Air is predominant in Thickneſs, and is forced upward: Summer, when the Fire is predominant, and driven downward.

[t] Wind is a Fluxion of the Air, having ſeveral Names, from the Variety of Places; as for Example; that which bloweth from the Darkneſs of the Night, and Sun-ſetting, is called *Zephyrus*; from the Eaſt and Sun-riſing, *Apeliotes*; from the North, *Boreas*; from the South, *Lybs*. [u] It is occaſioned by the Sun's Extenuation of the Vapours.

[w] The *Rain-bow* is a Reflection of the Sun's Beams from a humid Clond; or, as *Poſſidonius*, an Apparition of Part of the Sun or Moon in a Cloud, dewy, concave, and continuous to the Phantaſy, as in a Looking-glaſs, the Repreſentation of a Circle.

[x] *Comets* are Fires ſubſiſting of thick Air, carried up to the ætherial Place.

[y] Σέλας is an Accenſion of ſudden Fire, ſwiftly carried through the Air, appearing length-ways.

[z] *Rain* is a Converſion of Clouds into Water, when either from the Earth, or from the Sea, by the Power of the Sun, the Humour is drawn upwards ineffectually.

[a] *Froſt* is congealed Rain.

[b] *Hail* is a concrete Cloud, diſperſed by the Wind.

[c] *Snow* is Humidity from a concrete Cloud, according to *Poſſidonius*.

[d] *Lightning* is an Accenſion of Clouds, which are driven by the Winds upon one another, and broken, according to *Zeno*.

[e] *Thunder* is a Noiſe occaſioned by the Colliſion of Clouds.

[f] *Thunderbolt* is a ſtrong Inflammation ruſhing upon the Earth with great Violence, when the Clouds, by Impulſion of the Winds are broken againſt one another. Some define it a Converſion of fiery inflamed Air, violently ruſhing down.

[g] *Typho* is a violent Thunder, thruſt down with a great Force of Wind, or a ſmoaking Wind, which ruſheth down upon the breaking of the Cloud.

Preſter, is a Cloud incloſed with Fire by Wind in the Concavity of the Earth: There are many Kinds, *Earthquakes*, *Chaſma*'s, and the like.

CHAP. XII.

Of Water and Earth.

THat Part of the World (ſaith [h] *Chryſippus*) which is the moſt ſolid Support of Nature, as Bones are in a living Creature, is called the Earth: About this the Water is evenly diffuſed. The Earth hath ſome uneven Parts ariſing out of the Water, called Iſlands, or, if of large Extent, Continents, from the Ignorance of Man, who knows not, that even thoſe are Iſlands, in reſpect of the great Ocean.

The Earth is in the Midſt, being in the Nature of a Centre [i] one and finite, [k] ſpherical in Figure. The Water is likewiſe ſpherical, having the ſame Centre with the Earth.

The Earth hath five *Zones*, one Northern, beyond the Artick Circle, uninhabitable through Extremity of Cold; another temperate; a third not habitable by Reaſon of extreme Heat, whence it is called Torrid; a fourth Temperate; a fifth Southern, not habitable by Reaſon of Cold. [l] But *Poſſidonius* conceiveth the Climate under the Equinoctial to be temperate; for, ſaith he, under the Tropicks where the Sun dwells longeſt, the Places are habitable, and why not then under the Æquator? Again, the Night being equal to the Day, affordeth Leiſure enough for Refrigeration, which is aſſiſted likewiſe by Showers and Winds.

[m] The Generation of the World began from the Earth, as from the Centre; for the Centre is the Beginning of a Sphere.

[n] Plants have not any Soul at all, but ſpring up of themſelves, as it were by Chance.

CHAP. XIII.

Of Miſtion and Temperament.

Chryſippus aſſerteth a [o] Spirit moving itſelf to itſelf, and from itſelf, or a Spirit moving itſelf backwards and forwards. He calleth it Spirit, as being moved Air, anſwering in ſome Proportion to the Æther, ſo that it both meets in one; and this Motion is only according to thoſe who think, that all Nature receiveth Mutation, Solution, Compoſition, and the like.

Compoſition, *Mixtion*, *Temperament* and *Confuſion* are different. Compoſition is a Contract of

q Laert. 7. 151. r Laert. ibid. s Ibid. t Plut. plac. Phil. 3. 7. u Laert. ibid. w Ibid. x Ibid. y Ibid. z Ibid. a Ibid. b Ibid. c Ibid. d Ibid. e Ibid. Plut. plac. Phil. 3. 3. Stob. p. 65. f Laert. ibid. g Ibid. h Stob. p. 48. i Plut. plac. Phil. 3. 9. Laert. 7. 155. k Plut. plac. phil. 3. 10. l Cleomed. in Meteoris. m Stob. Ecl. Phyſ. c. 25. n Plut. plac. Phil. 5. 56. o Stob. Phyſ. 20.

Bodies,

Bodies, whoſe Superficies are contiguous to one another, as in Heaps of Grain or Sand. Mixtion if of two or more Bodies, whoſe Qualities are diffuſed through the whole, as we ſee in Fire, and red hot Iron, and in our own Souls; for everywhere there is a Diffuſion through intire Bodies, ſo as one Body doth paſs through another. Temperament is of two or more humid Bodies, whoſe Qualities are diffuſed through the whole. Mixtion is alſo common to dry Bodies, as to Fire and Iron, to the Soul and the Body, Temperament only to the Humid. For Qualities appear from the Temperament of ſeveral humid Things, as of Wine, Honey, Water, Vinegar, and the like; that in ſuch Temperament, the Qualities of the Things tempered remain, is evident from this, that oftentimes they are by ſome Art ſeparated from one another. For if we put a Spunge dipped in Oil into Wine mix'd with Water, the Water ſeparating itſelf from the Wine, will gather to the Spunge. Laſtly, Confuſion is the Tranſmutation of two or more Qualities into another of a different Nature, as in Compoſition of Unguents and Medicines.

CHAP. XIV.

Of Generation and Corruption.

Poſſidonius [p] aſſerteth four Species of Generation and Corruption, of Things that are, into Things that are; (for that of Things that are not, and of Things that are not to be rejected, conceiving there is none ſuch.) Of Tranſmutations into Things that are, one is by Diviſion, another by Alteration, a third by Confuſion, a fourth of the whole by Reſolution. Of theſe, Alteration concerneth the Subſtance, the other three are of the Qualities which inhere in the Subſtance. According to theſe are Generations made. But the Subſtance itſelf is neither augmented nor diminiſhed by Appoſition or Detraction, but is only altered, as happeneth to Numbers and Meaſures. But in Things properly qualited, as *Dion* and *Theon*, there is Augmentation and Diminution, whereof the Quality of each remaineth from the Generation until the Corruption thereof, in Plants and living Creatures which are capable of Corruption. In Things properly qualited, he aſſerted two ſuſceptible Parts; one according to the Subſtance, another according to the Quality. This, as we have often ſaid, admitteth Augmentation and Diminution. Neither is the Thing properly qualited, and the Subſtance out of which it is, all one, nor divers, but only, not all one, becauſe the Subſtance is a Part, and occupateth the ſame Place; but Things that are divers have diſtinct Places, and are not conſidered in Part. That as to the Thing properly qualited, and as to the Subſtance, it is not the ſame, *Mneſarchus* affirmeth to be evident, becauſe it is neceſſary, that to the ſame happen the ſame Things. For if, for Example, a Man having formed a Horſe, ſhould break it, and make a Dog, we would preſently, beholding it, ſay, this was not before, but it is now: So are the Qualited and the Subſtance divers. Neither is it likely that we ſhould all be the ſame as to Subſtance; for it often happens that the Subſtance is pre-exiſtent to the Generation, as the Subſtance of *Socrates* was, before *Socrates* was; and after the Corruption and Death of *Socrates*, the Subſtance remaineth, tho' *Socrates* himſelf be not.

CHAP. XV.

Of Motion.

MOtion [q] (according to *Chryſippus*) is a Mutation of Parts, either in whole or in Part, or an Exceſſion out of Place, either in Whole or in Part, or a Change according to Place or Figure. *Jaculation* is a vehement Motion from on high. *Reſt* is partly a Privation of Motion in a Body, partly the ſame Habit of a Body before and after. There are two firſt Motions, *right* and *oblique*; from the Mixtion of theſe ariſeth great Variety of Motions.

[r] *Zeno* affirms the Parts of all Things conſiſting by themſelves, are moved towards the Middle of the Whole, and likewiſe of the World itſelf; wherefore it is rightly ſaid, that all Parts of the World tend to the Middle thereof, and principally the heavy, and that there is the ſame Cauſe of the *Reſt* of the World, in the infinite Vacuity, and of the *Reſt* of the Earth, in the World, in the Midſt of which it is conſtituted as a Point. All Bodies have not Gravity, as Air and Fire; yet theſe in ſome Manner tend to the Midſt of the World.

CHAP. XVI.

Of living Creatures.

OF [s] animate Creatures there are two Kinds, (for Plants, as we ſaid, have no Souls) ſome are appetitive and concupiſcible, others rational. The *Soul*, according to *Zeno*, *Antipater*, and *Poſſidonius*, is a hot Spirit, for hereby we breathe and move. *Cleanthes* ſaith, we live ſo long as that Heat holdeth.

Every Soul hath Senſe, and is a Spirit innate in us, wherefore it is a Body, and ſhall continue after Death; yet is it by Nature corruptible, notwithſtanding that it is a Part of the Soul of the Univerſe which is incorruptible: Yet ſome hold, that the leſs firm Souls, ſuch are thoſe of the Unlearned,

o Stob. Phyſ. 20. p Ibid. 21. q Ibid. 23. r Ibid. s Plut. plac. Phil. 4. 3.

periſh at the Diſſolution of the Body; the ſtronger, as thoſe of the Wiſe and Virtuous, ſhall laſt even until the general Conflagration.

[t] The Soul hath eight Parts, whereof Five are the Senſes, the ſixth Generative, the ſeventh Vocal, the eighth Hegemonick.

[u] The ſupreme or hegemonick Part of the Soul, is that which maketh Phantaſies, Aſſent, Senſe, Appetite. This ſupreme Part is called *Rotiocination*; [w] it is ſeated in the Heart, ſome ſay in the Head, as in its Sphere.

[x] From the hegemonick Iſſue, are extended to the Body of the Seven other Parts, which it guideth by their proper Organs, as a Fiſh its Claws.

Senſe is an Apprehenſion by the ſenſitive Organ, or a Comprehenſion. *Senſe* is taken many Ways; for the Faculty, Habit, Act, Phantaſy, whereby the ſenſible Object is comprehended, and the hegemonick Parts of the Soul are call'd *Senſe*. Again, the Senſories are intelligent Spirits diffuſed from the Hegemonick to the Organs. [y] The *Senſes* are *Sight*, *Hearing*, *Smell*, *Taſte*, *Touch*.

[z] *Sight* is a Spirit extended from the hegemonick Part to the Eyes. *Sight* is made by Contraction of that Light which is between the Eye and the Object, into a Cone, according to *Chryſippus*. *Apollodorus* ſaith, that Part of the Air, which is conical, is next the Sight, the Baſe next the Object; ſo as that which is ſeen is pointed out to by the Air as by a Stick.

Colour is the firſt Figuration or Habit of Matter.

Darkneſs is viſible; for from the Sight there iſſueth a Splendor which paſſeth round about that Darkneſs. Neither is the Sight deceived, for it truly ſees that it is dark. *Chryſippus* ſaith, that we ſee according to the Intention of the mediate Air, which is ſtruck by the viſual Spirit, which paſſeth from the Hegemonick to the Apple of the Eye, and after that Blow, falleth upon the Ear next, extending itſelf in a conical Figure. Again, from the Eye are emitted fiery Rays, not black or dusky, and therefore Darkneſs is viſible.

[a] *Hearing* is a Spirit extended from the hegemonick Part to the Ears. *Hearing* is made when the Air betwixt the Speaker and the Hearer is verberated in a Circulation, and at laſt by Agitation, paſſeth in at the Ears, as the Circles that are made in a Pond, by caſting in a Stone.

[b] *Smelling* is a Spirit extended from the Hegemonick to the Noſtrils.

[c] *Taſting* is a Spirit extended from the Hegemonick to the Tongue.

[d] *Touching* is a Spirit extended from the Hegemonick Part to the Superficies, ſo that it perceiveth that which is obliged to it.

[e] The ſixth Part of the Soul is the Generative, which is a Spirit from the Hegemonick to the *Paraſtatæ*; of this Part, ſee *Laertius* from φέρμα δὲ λέγουσιν εἶναι, &c. to ὡς ὁ σφαῖρος, and *Plutarch de Philoſoph. Plac. lib.* 5. *cap.* 4, 5, 9, 11, 12, 13, 15, 16, 17, 23.

[f] The ſeventh and laſt Part of the Soul, is that which *Zeno* calls Vocal, commonly called the Voice. It is a Spirit proceeding from the Hegemonick Part to the Throat, Tongue, and other proper Inſtruments of Speech. [g] Voice is Air, not compoſed of little Pieces, but whole and continuous, having no Vacuity in it. This Air being ſtruck by the Wind, ſpreadeth into Circles infinitely, until the Air round about it be filled like the Water in a Pond by throwing in of a Stone, only the Water moves ſperically, the Air circularly. Voice is a Body, for it acteth, it ſtriketh upon, and leaveth an Impreſſion in our Ear, as a Seal in Wax. Again, whatſoever moveth and diſturbeth ſome Affection, is a Body; Harmony moveth with Delight, Diſcord diſturbeth. Again, whatſoever is moved is a Body, but Voice is moved and reverberated from ſmooth Places, as a Ball againſt a Wall. So in the *Egyptian* Pyramids, one Voice is redoubled four or five Times.

CHAP. XVII.

Of GOD.

HItherto of the material Principle, and that which is produced of it; we come now to the other Principle, the Agent, GOD.

[h] This Queſtion they divide into Four Parts: Firſt, that there are Gods. Secondly, what they are. Thirdly, that they order the World. Fourthly, that they take Care of human Affairs.

[i] *Cleanthes* ſaith, That the Notions of God are imprinted in the Minds of Men from four Cauſes. Firſt, from Divination, for the Gods afford us Signs of future Things, wherein if there be any Miſtake it is not from their Part, but from the Error of human Conjecture. The Second, is from the Multitude of good Things we receive by the Temperature of Heaven, the Fertility of the Earth, and abundance of other Benefits. The Third, from the Terror of Thunder, Tempeſt, Rain, Snow, Hail, Devaſtation, Peſtilence, Earthquakes, and ſometimes Groanings, Showers of Stones and Blood, Portents, Prodigies, Comets, and the like; with which Men are affrighted into a Belief, that there is a heavenly Divine Power. The Fourth and greateſt Cauſe is the Equability of the Motion and Revolution of Heaven, the Sun, Moon, and Stars, their Diſtinctions, Variety, Beauty, Order, the very Sight whereof declares that they were not made by Chance.

t Laert. 7. 157. Plut. plac. Phil. 4. 4. u Plut. plac. Phil. 4. 4. w Plut. plac. Phil. 4. 4. x Plut. plac. Phil. 4. 21. y Plut. plac. Phil. 4. 21. z Plut. plac. Phil. 4. 21. a Plut. plac. Phil. 4. 21. b Plac. Phil. 4. 21. c Plut. ibid. d Plut. ibid. e Plut. ibid. f Plut. ibid. g Plut. Pl. Ph. 4. 19. h Cic. Nat. Deor. lib. 2. i Cic. ibid.

That there are Gods, *Chryſippus* proveth thus: [k] If there is ſomething in Nature, which the Mind, Reaſon, Power, and Faculties of Man could not make, that which did make it is better than Man; but celeſtial Things, and all thoſe whoſe Order is ſempiternal, could not be made by Man; there is therefore ſomething which made them, which is better than Man, and what is that but God? For if there are no Gods, what can there be in Nature better than Man? For in him only is Reaſon, than which nothing is more excellent. But for a Man to think that there is nothing in the World better than himſelf, is a fooliſh Arrogance; therefore there is ſomething better, and conſequently there is a God.

[l] *Zeno* more concisely thus: That which is rational, is better than that which is irrational; but nothing is better than the World, therefore the World is rational. In like manner may be proved, that the World is wiſe, that it is happy, that it is eternal; for all theſe are better than the Want of theſe. But there is nothing better than the World; whence it followeth, that the World is God.

Again, he argues thus: No Part of an inſenſible Thing hath Senſe; but the Parts of the World have Senſe, therefore the World hath Senſe.

He proceedeth to urge this more ſtrictly. *Nothing*, ſaith he, *that is void of Mind and Reaſon, can, of itſelf, generate that which is animate and rational; but the World generates animate and rational Creatures, therefore the World is animate and rational.*

Likewiſe, according to his Cuſtom, he concludeth his Argument with a Similitude: *If out of an* Olive *Tree ſhould come harmonious Pipes, that made Muſick, you would not doubt but that the Science of Muſick were in the* Olive *Tree. What if a Plain Tree ſhould bear Muſical Inſtruments? you would think there were Muſick in thoſe Plain Trees.* Why then ſhould we not judge the World to be animate and wiſe, that produceth out of itſelf animate and wiſe Creatures?

There is nothing beſides the World which wanteth nothing, and which is perfect and compleat in all its Numbers and Parts. *For as the Cover*, ſaith *Chryſippus*, *was made for the Shield's Sake, and the Scabbard for the Sword's, ſo beſides the World, all other Things were made for the Sake of ſomething elſe.* Fruits of the Earth were made for living Creatures, living irrational Creatures for the Uſe of Man, Horſes for Carriage, Oxen for Tillage, Dogs for Hunting and Defence; but Man himſelf was made to contemplate and imitate the World. Not that he is at all perfect, but only a Part of that which is perfect. But the World itſelf, for as much as it comprehendeth all Things, neither is there any thing which is not in it, is every way perfect. What therefore can be wanting to that which is beſt? But there is nothing better than the Mind and Reaſon, therefore theſe cannot be wanting to the World.

Chryſippus addeth this Compariſon; *As all Things are beſt in the moſt perfect and mature Creatures, as in a Horſe better than in a Colt, in a Dog better than in a Whelp, in a Man better than in a Child*; ſo that which is beſt in all the World, muſt be in that which is perfect and abſolute; but, than the World, nothing is more perfect, nothing better than Virtue, therefore the World hath proper Virtue. The Nature of Man is not perfect; yet in Man there is Virtue, how much more then in the World? The World therefore hath Virtue, therefore it is wiſe, and conſequently God

[m] Thus the Notion and Apprehenſion Men have of God, is, firſt, by conceiving the Beauty of thoſe Things which are objected to their Eyes; for no beautiful Thing hath been made by Chance and Adventure, but compoſed and framed by ſome ingenious and operative Art. Now, that the Heaven is beautiful, appeareth by the Form, Colour, and Bigneſs thereof, by the Variety alſo of Stars diſpos'd therein. Moreover, the World is round in manner of a Ball, which Figure, of all others, is principal and moſt perfect, for it alone reſembleth all the Parts; for being round itſelf, it hath the Parts alſo round.

As to the ſecond Part of the Queſtion, [n] God is an immortal Being, rational, perfect, or intellectual in Beatitude, void of all Evil, provident over the World, and Things in the World, not of human Form, Maker of all, and, as it were, Father of all.

[o] They define God a Spirit full of Intelligence, of a fiery Nature, having no proper Form, but transforming himſelf into whatſoever he pleaſeth, and reſembling all Things.

We underſtand by God, ſaith *Antipater*, a living Nature or Subſtance, happy, incorruptible, doing good to Mankind. All Men acknowledge the Gods immortal. They who deprive the Gods of Beneficence, have an imperfect Notion of them, as they likewiſe, who think they are ſubject to Generation and Corruption.

[p] Yet there are ſome Gods, ſaith *Chryſippus*, generative and mortal, as well as there are others ingenerate. [The [q] World, Stars, and Earth, are God's, but the ſupreme God is the ætherial Mind, *Jupiter*.] The Sun, Moon, and other ſuch like Gods were begotten; but *Jupiter* is eternal. Other Gods uſe a certain Nouriſhment, whereby they are maintained equally; but *Jupiter* and the World after another ſort than the generated, which ſhall be conſumed by Fire. *Jupiter* groweth continually, until ſuch time as all Things be conſumed in him,

k Cic. ibid. l Cic. ibid. m Plut. pl. Ph. 1. 5. n Laert. 7. 147. o Plut. pl. Ph. 1. 6. p Pl. contrad. Stoic. q Stob. Ec. Phyſ. 3.

Death

Death being the Separation of the Soul and Body; for seeing that the Soul of the World never departeth at all, but augmenteth continually, until it have consumed all the Matter within itself, we cannot say that the World dieth.

[q] The Substance of God, *Zeno* affirms to be the whole World and Heaven; so also *Chrysippus* in his 11th of the Gods, and *Possidonius* in his first of the Gods. But *Antipater*, in his seventh of the World, affirms his Substance to be aerial. *Boethius* in his Book of Nature saith, the Substance of God is the Sphere of fixed Stars. Sometimes they call him a Nature containing the World, sometimes a Nature producing all upon Earth.

As concerning the third Part of the Question, they affirm, that [r] God is an operative artificial Fire, methodically ordering and effecting the Generation of the World, comprehending in himself all prolifick Reason, by which every Thing is produced according to Fate. God is a Spirit diffused through the whole World, having several Denominations, according to the several Parts of the Matter thro' which he spreadeth, and the [s] several Effects of his Power shewn therein. They call him Δία, as Δι' ὃν πάντα, by whom all Things are: ζῆνα, as the Author τῆς ζῆν of Life. *Minerva*, as diffused thro' the Æther; *Juno*, as thro' the Air; *Vulcan*, as through the [t] artificial Fire; *Neptune*, as through the Water; *Ceres*, as through the Earth. In like manner the rest of his Names were imposed with respect to some Property. [u] This Place was first discoursed upon by *Zeno*, after whom *Cleanthes* and *Chrysippus* dilated more largely upon it.

[w] By this Providence, the World, and all Parts of the World, were in the Beginning constituted, and are in all Time ordered. This Disputation they divided into three Parts: The first, from the same Reason that teacheth us there are Gods, inferreth, that the World is ordered by them, seeing that there is nothing higher or more excellent than this Administration. The second, from that Reason which teacheth us, that all Things are subjected to an understanding Nature, and exquisitely ordered by it, inferreth, that it is generated of animate Principles. The third Place is derived from Admiration of cœlestial and terrestrial Things. Upon these *Cicero* discourseth at large, according to the Opinion of the Stoicks.

As to the fourth Part of the Question in general concerning the Gods, that they have a particular providential Care of Mankind, it is manifest, in that whatsoever is in this World was made for the Use of Man, and is conducible thereunto; and if for the whole Species, they must consequently have the same Care of Particulars, which they express by many Portents, and all those Signs whereupon the Art of *Divination* depends, there was never any great Person without some divine Inspiration. But we must not argue from hence, that if the Corn or Vineyard of any Man be hurt by a Tempest, or Fortune deprive him of any of the Conveniencies of Life, that he to whom this hath happened, may be judged to be hated or neglected of God. The Gods take Care of great Things, the little they neglect; but to great Persons all Things have always a happy Issue.

[x] *Chrysippus* in his fourth Book of *Providence*, saith, there is nothing more ignorant, nothing more sordid than those Persons, who think, Good might have been without Ill. For Good and Ill being Contraries, it is necessary that both consist together mutually, sustaining one another, as it were by Opposition. For how could we understand *Justice*, unless there were *Injuries*? What is *Justice*, but a Privation of *Injustice*? How can *Fortitude* be understood, but by Opposition to *Fear*? How *Continence*, but from *Intemperance*? How *Prudence*, if there were not *Imprudence*? Why doth not these Fools desire that *Truth* might be without *Falsehood*? Such are *Good* and *Ill*, *Happiness* and *Misery*, *Grief* and *Pleasure*; one is tied to the other, as *Plato* says, by their contrary Ends.

[y] Here followeth the Question, Whether that Providence which framed the World and Mankind, did make likewise those corporeal Infirmities and Sicknesses which Men suffer. *Chrysippus* affirmeth, it was not the Intent of Nature to make Men obnoxious to Sickness: For this agreeth not with the Author of Nature, and Parent of all good Things; but he having generated many great Things, most apt and useful, other Things also, incommodious to those which he made, were aggenerated together with them, coherent to them, made, not by Nature, but certain necessary Consequence κατὰ παρακολούθησιν. As, saith he, when Nature framed the Bodies of Men, more subtle Reason, and the Benefit of the World, would have required that the Head should have been made of the smallest and thin Bones; but this Utility would have been followed by another extrinsical Inconvenience of greater Consequence, that the Head would be too weakly defended, and broken with the least Blow. Sicknesses therefore and Diseases are engendered whilst Health is engendered. In like manner, saith he, whilst Virtue is begotten in Man, by the Counsel of Nature, Vices likewise are begotten by contrary Affinity.

CHAP. XVIII.

Of Nature.

NExt [z] *Jupiter*, *Possidonius* placeth Nature. By Nature they sometimes understand that which

q Laert. 7. 148. r Plut. plac. Phil. 1. 6. s Laert. ibid. can, παντέχνον πῦρ. 7. 148. u Cic. w Cic. de nat. Deor. 2. 24. t Perhaps it should be ἀτεχνικὸν, tho' Æschylus ascribes this to Vulx Agel. lib. 6. cap. 1. y Ibid. z Plut. plac. 1. 28. Laert.

con-

containeth the World, sometimes that which produceth Things upon Earth; both which, as we said, is to be understood of God. For that Nature which containeth and preserveth the World, hath perfect Sense and Reason, which Power is the Soul of the World, the Mind and divine Wisdom. Thus [a] under the Term of Nature, they comprehend both God and the World, affirming that the one cannot without the other, as if Nature were God permeating through the World, God the Mind of the World, the World the Body of God. This [b] *Chrysippus* calleth *Common-Nature* in Distinction from particular Nature.

[c] Nature is defined by *Zeno* an artificial Fire, proceeding in the Way of Generation, which is the fiery Spirit, the Artist of Forms; by others, a Habit receiving Motion from itself, according to prolifick Reason, and effecting and containing those Things which subsist by it, in certain definite Times, producing all Things, from which itself is distinct by Nature, proposing to itself these two Ends, Utility and Pleasure, as is manifest from the Production of Man.

CHAP. XIX.

Of Fate.

THE [d] third from *Jupiter* according to *Possidonius)* is *Fate*, for *Jupiter* is first, next Nature, then Fate.

[e] They call Fate a Concatenation of Causes, that is, an Order and Connexion which cannot be transgressed.

Fate is a Cause depending on Laws, and ordering by Laws, or a Reason by which the World is ordered.

[f] Fate is, according to *Zeno*, the motive Power of Matter, disposing so and so, not much differing from Nature and Providence.

[g] *Panætius* affirmeth Fate to be God.

[h] *Chrysippus* defineth Fate a spiritual Power, governing the World orderly; or, [i] a sempiternal and indeclinable Series and Chain of Things, itself rolling and implicating itself by eternal Orders of Consequence, of which it is adapted and connected; or, as *Chrysippus* again, in his Book of *Definitions* hath it, [k] the Reason of the World, or Law of all Things in the World, governed by Providence; or the Reason why Things past have been, the present are, the future shall be. For Reason, he useth Truth, Cause, Nature, Necessity, and other Terms, as attributed to the same Thing in different Respects. Fate, from the several Distributions thereof, is called *Clotho*, *Lachesis* and *Atropos*. *Lachesis*, as it dispenseth to every one, as it were by Lot; *Atropos*, as it is an immutable Dispensation, from all Eternity; *Clotho*, in Allusion to the Resemblance it hath with spinning and twisting of Threads.

[l] Necessity is a Cause invincible, most violent, and inforcing all Things. [m] Fortune is a Cause unknown and hidden to human Reason. For some Things come by Necessity, others by Fate, some by deliberate Counsel, others by Fortune, some by Casualty.

[n] But Fate being a Connexion of Causes interlaced and linked orderly, comprises also that Cause proceedeth from us.

[o] That all Things are done by Fate, is asserted by *Zeno* in his Book of *Fate*, and *Possidonius* in his second Book of *Fate*, and *Boethius* in his 11th of *Fate*. Which [p] *Chrysippus* proves thus: If there is any Motion without a Cause, then every Axiom is not either true or false; for that which hath not efficient Causes, will be neither true nor false; but every Axiom is either true or false, therefore there is no Motion without a Cause. And if so, then all Things that are done, are done by precedent Causes, and if so, all Things are done by Fate. That all Axioms are either true or false, *Cicero* saith, he labour'd much to prove, whereby he takes away *Possibles*, *Indeterminates*, and other Distinctions of the *Academicks*, of which see *Alcinous*, Chap. 26.

[q] In answer to *the sluggish Reason*, if it be your Fate to die of this Sickness, you shall die whether you have a Physician or no; and if it be your Fate to recover, you shall recover whether you have a Physician or not. *Chrysippus* saith, that in Things some are *simple*, some *conjunct*. Simple is thus, *Socrates* shall die on such a Day; for whether he do any Thing or not, it is appointed he should die on such a Day. But if it be destin'd thus, *Laius* shall have a Son *Oedipus*, it cannot be said, whether he accompany with a Woman or not, for it is a *conjunct* Thing, and *confatal*, as he terms it, because it is destin'd that *Laius* shall lie with his Wife, and that he shall get *Oedipus* of her. As if we should say, *Milo* shall wrestle at the Olympick Games, and another should infer, then he shall wrestle whether he have an Adversary or no, he were mistaken; for that he shall wrestle is a conjunct Thing, because there is no wrestling without an Adversary. Thus are refelled all Sophisms of this Kind, (you shall recover whether you have a Physician or not) for it is no less determined by Fate that you shall have a Physician, than that you shall recover. They are *confatal*.

Thus there being two Opinions of the old Philosophers; one, that all Things are so done by Fate,

a Lactant. lib. 7. cap. 3. b Plut. de cont. Stoic. c Laert. ibid. d Stob. 1. 9. Plut. e Plut. plac. Phil. 1. 28.
f Laert. 7. 149. g Stob. ibid. h Ibid. i Agel. 6. 2. k Stob. ibid. l Plut. plac. phil. 1. 27. m Ibid. 1. 29.
n Ibid. 1. 27. o Laert. ibid. p Cic. de Fato. q Ibid.

that

that Fate inferreth a Power of Neceſſity, as *Democritus*, *Heraclitus*, *Empedocles*, and *Ariſtotle* held; the other, That the Motions of our Souls were voluntary, without any Fate: *Chryſippus*, as an honourable Arbitrator, took the middle Way betwixt theſe, but inclining moſt to thoſe who conceive the Motions of our Souls free from Neceſſity. The Ancients, who held all Things to be done by Fate, ſaid, it was by a Violence and Neceſſity; thoſe who were of the contrary Opinion, denied that Fate had any Thing to do with our Aſſent, and that there was no Neceſſity impoſed upon Aſſents. They argued thus: If all Things are done by Fate, all Things are done by an antecedent Cauſe; and if Appetite, then likewiſe thoſe Things which follow Appetite, therefore Aſſents alſo. But, if the Cauſe of Appetite is not in us, neither is the Appetite itſelf in our Power; and if ſo, neither thoſe Things which are effected by Appetite are in our Power, and conſequently neither Aſſents nor Actions are in our Power; whence it followeth, that neither Praiſe can be juſt, nor Diſpraiſe, nor Honour, nor Puniſhment; but this is falſe, therefore all Things are not done by Fate.

But *Chryſippus* not allowing this Neceſſity, yet maintaining, that nothing happened without precedent Cauſes, diſtinguiſheth thus: *Of Cauſes*, ſaith he, *ſome are perfect and principal, others aſſiſtant and immediate.* When we ſay, *All Things are done by Fate, from antecedent Cauſes*, we underſtand not the perfect and principal Cauſes, but the Aſſiſtant and Immediate. He therefore anſwers the former Objection thus; *If all Things are done by Fate, it followeth, that all Things be done by antecedent Cauſes, but not by the Principal and Perfect, but by the Aſſiſtant and Immediate, which tho' they be not in our Power, it followeth not, that the Appetite likewiſe is in our Power.* This Argument, therefore, concludes well againſt thoſe who join Neceſſity with Fate, but nothing againſt thoſe who aſſert antecedent Cauſes not perfect nor principal. What Aſſent is, and how it cometh to be in our Power, we have already ſhewn in the *Logick*.

Hence it followeth, that [r] notwithſtanding all Things are neceſſarily co-acted and connected by Fate, with a certain principal Reaſon; yet (ſaith *Chryſippus*) our Minds are ſo obnoxious to Fate, as their Property and Quality is. For, if at the firſt by Nature they were formed ſoundly and profitably, all that Power which cometh upon them extrinſically from Fate, they tranſmit eaſily and inoffenſively; but if they are harſh, ignorant and rude, not ſupported by any Helps of good Art, altho' they are preſſed by little or no Conflict of fatal Incommodity, yet by their own Unluckineſs, and voluntary Impulſion, they ruſh into continual Sins and Errors, which Thing maketh, that this natural and neceſſary Conſequence of Things, which is called Fate, be by this Reaſon. For it is, as it were, fatal, and conſequent in its kind, that wicked Minds ſhould not be without Sins and Errors, an Inſtance whereof he bringeth not unappoſite. *As*, ſaith he, *a rolling Stone, if you turn it down a ſteep Place, you firſt give it the Cauſe and Beginning of its Precipitation, but afterwards it rolleth headlong of itſelf; not that you make it do ſo any longer, but becauſe its Figure, and the Volubility of its Form is ſuch.* In like manner, Order, and Reaſon, and Neceſſity, moveth the Beginnings of Cauſes; but the Impetuouſneſs of our Thoughts and Minds, and our own Actions, are guided by every Man's private Will and Mind. Thence, continueth he, the *Pythagoreans* ſay,

Men of their own Accord their Ills procure.

As conceiving that all Ills proceed from themſelves, and according to their own Appetites, when they ſin and offend, and according to their own Mind and Deſign.

For this Reaſon he denieth, That we ought to ſuffer and hear ſuch wicked, or idle, or noxious, or impudent Perſons, who being taken in ſome Fault or Wickedneſs, have recourſe to the Neceſſity of Fate, as to a Sanctuary, affirming, that they have done wickedly, is not to be attributed to their Timerity, but to Fate.

CHAP. XX.

Of Not Bodies, or Incorporeals; and firſt of Dicibles.

HItherto of Bodies; we come next to the ſecond Place of Phyſick, concerning Not-Bodies, or Incorporeals. Incorporeal is that which may be, but is not contained in Bodies. [s] Of thoſe there are four Kinds, *Dicibles*, *Vacuum*, *Place* and *Time*.

Dicible is that which conſiſteth according to rational Phantaſy, a Mean betwixt Notion and Thing. Of this already in the Logick.

CHAP. XXI.

Of Vacuum and Place.

THE ſecond Incorporeal is *Vacuum*, which is the Solitude or Vacuity of a Body. In the World there is no Vacuum, neither in the Whole nor in any Part: Beyond it, there is an infinite Vacuity, into which the World ſhall be reſolved. Of this already in the Chapter concerning the World.

Next is *Place*. *Place* is that which is fully occupated by the Body; or, as *Chryſippus* defines it, that which is or may be occupated by one or more

r Agell. 6. 2. s Sext. Emp. adv. Mathem.

Things.

Things. Thus it differs from Vacuity, which hath no Body, and from Space, which is occupated but in part, as a Veſſel half full of Wine.

CHAP. XXII.

Of Time.

LAST of the Incorporeals is *Time*. *Time* is, according to many of the *Stoicks*, the Motion of itſelf, not of Heaven, and had no Beginning of Generation. *Chryſippus* ſaith, That *Time* is the Meaſure of Slowneſs or Swiftneſs. *Zeno* defined it the Interval of Motion, and Meaſure of Slowneſs and Swiftneſs, according to which, all Things were and are.

Poſſidonius ſaith, That ſome are wholly infinite, as all *Time*; ſome only in part, as the paſt and future; for they are joyned together by the preſent. He defined *Time* the Interval of Motion, or the Meaſure of Swiftneſs and Slowneſs, one Part of it being preſent, the other future, the preſent connected to the future by ſomething like a Point. It is called τὸ νῦν, attributed to the leaſt Part of *Time* that falleth under Senſe, ſubſiſting according to the Difference of paſt and future.

Chryſippus ſaith, That *Time* is the Interval of Motion, the Meaſure of Swiftneſs and Slowneſs, a conſequent Interval to the World's Motion, according to which all Things are, and are moved, unleſs rather there be a two-fold Time, as the Earth, and Sea, and Vacuity, and Univerſe, have the ſame Names with their Parts. And as Vacuity is every way infinite, ſo Time is both ways infinite, for the preſent and future have no End. He likewiſe aſſerts, That no entire Preſent is Time, for continuous Things being divided into infinite, Time likewiſe admitteth of the ſame Diviſion; ſo that no Time is properly preſent, but ſo called, after a leſs acurate manner. The preſent only is ſubſiſtent, unleſs it be underſtood as of *Categorems*; as Walking is attributed to him that walketh, but not to him that ſitteth or lieth. Thus much for the *STOICAL PHILOSOPHY.*

CLEANTHES.

CHAP. I.

His Life.

CLeanthes [a] was of *Aſſus*, a *Lycian* City fortified, as *Strabo* deſcribes it, both by Nature and Art, Son of *Phanias*. He was firſt, according to *Antiſthenes*, a Wreſtler, and coming to *Athens*, having no more than four Drachms, he applied himſelf firſt to *Crates*, then to *Zeno*, whom he heard conſtantly, and perſevered in his Philoſophy and Opinions.

He was much commended for his Laborioufneſs, in as much as being poor, he went by Night to the Gardens to draw Water, and in the Day time ſtudied Philoſophy. Hence he was called φρεάντλης. *The Drawer of Water.*

Being cited to the Court to give an Account how he lived, being ſo healthful and luſty, he produced the Gardner, under whom he drew Water, and a Woman, for whom he ground Meal, to witneſs how he ſubſiſted. The *Areopagites* wondering hereat, allotted him 10 *Minæ*, which *Zeno* would not ſuffer him to accept. *Antigonus* gave him 3000 *Minæ*. On a time leading ſome young Men to a Spectacle, the Wind blew back his Cloak, and diſcovered that he had no Coat; whereupon the *Athenians* much applauded him, and, as *Demetrius* the *Magneſian* ſaith, beſtowed a Coat upon him.

Antigonus, who was his Auditor, asked him why he drew Water [b], he anſwered, *Do I only draw Water? Do I not alſo dig and water the Ground, and all for the Sake of Philoſophy?* For *Zeno* brought him up to this, and bad him bring him an *Obolus* gained by his Labour. Upon a time he brought in his Gains before all his Diſciples, ſaying, Cleanthes, *if he would, could maintain another* Cleanthes; *but they who have wherewithal to maintain themſelves, would be ſupplied by others, yet ſtudy Philoſophy nothing the more diligently.* Hence *Cleanthes* was called *a ſecond Hercules*. He was very laborious, but dull and ſlow.

[c] He uſed to write the Dictates of *Zeno* in Shells, and the Shoulder-blades of Oxen, for want of Money to buy Paper. He was his Auditor nineteen Years.

For theſe Reaſons, tho' *Zeno* had many other eminent Diſciples, yet he ſucceeded him in the School.

CHAP. II.

His Apophthegms.

HIS [d] Fellow-Diſciples derided him, he took it patiently, and being called *Aſs*, anſwered, he only could bear *Zeno*'s Burthen.

Another Time being reproached as timerous, *Therefore*, ſaith he, *I ſin little.*

Preferring his own Poverty before the Plenty of the Rich; *Whilſt they*, ſaith he, *play at Ball, I manure a hard barren Soil.*

He often chid himſelf, being all alone, which *Ariſto* over-hearing; whom, ſaith he, do you chide? he ſmiling, anſwered, *A grey-headed old Fellow without Wit.*

To one that ſaid, *Arceſilaus* abrogated the Offices of Life; Peace, ſaith he, diſpraiſe him not, for tho' he takes away Offices in Diſcourſe, he commends them in his Actions; To whom *Arceſilaus* ſaying, I cannot endure Flattery; *I do indeed flatter*, replies *Cleanthes, when I ſay you ſpeak one Thing and do another.*

[e] To one that asked what he ſhould teach his Son, he anſwered in the Words of *Electra*,

Peace, Peace, a little Step.

A *Lacedemonian* ſaying, that Labour was good, he laughed, anſwering,

My Son, thou of a gen'rous Race art come.

Diſputing with a young Man, he asked him whether he did feel; the other anſwers he did; he replied, *Why then do I not feel that you feel?*

Soſythius the Poet, ſaying in the publick Theatre when *Cleanthes* was preſent;

Thoſe whom Cleanthes' *Madneſs leads away*;

He ſat ſtill, not changing his Countenance; whereupon the Auditors applauding him, turned out *Soſythius*, who afterwards coming to *Cleanthes*, told him he was ſorry that he had reproached him;

a Laert. 7. 168. b Laert. ibid. Plut. de vitand. Aer. c Laert. 7. 174. d Ibid. 7. 171. e Oreſt. apud Euripid.

Cleanthes

Cleanthes answered, *It were unfit I should behold unconcerned* Bacchus *and* Hercules *derided by the Poets, and be angry at a little Word against myself.*

He compared the Peripateticks to Lutes, that make good Musick, but hear it not themselves.

Holding, according to *Zeno*, that the Mind may be discerned in the Countenance, some merry young Men brought an effeminate Youth to him rustically cloathed, desiring his Opinion of that Man's Disposition. He bad him depart, which the other going to do, sneezed; *Cleanthes* presently cried out, *I have found out the Man, he is effeminate.*

To one that was all alone talking to himself, *You discourse*, saith he, *with a Man that is not ill.*

To one that reproached him with his Age, *I would be gone*, saith he, *but when I consider that I am in Health, fit to write and study, I rather chuse to stay.*

[f] *Cleanthes* bad those who came to hear him, to fancy Pleasure painted in a Tablet, richly habited and adorned, sitting on a Throne, the Virtues standing about her, as her Handmaids, doing nothing else but wait on her Commands, whispering in her Ear (if it can be fancied of a Picture) to bid her take Heed of doing any Thing imprudently, that may offend the Minds of Men, or any Thing that may occasion Grief.

[g] He said, Whosoever sweareth, at the same time sweareth truly, or forsweareth himself: If he intend to do that which he sweareth, tho' he do it not, he sweareth truly; if he intended it not, he is forsworn.

[h] One observing him silent, said to him, why do you hold your Peace? It is pleasant to talk to Friends; *It is indeed*, answered *Cleanthes*, *but the more pleasant it is, the more we ought to allow them the Freedom of it.*

[i] He said, That unlearned Men differed from Beasts in their Figure.

[k] Being demanded, why amongst the Ancients, when there were fewest Philosophers, there were more eminent than at this Time; he answered, *Because then they minded the Thing itself, now only in Words.*

[l] To one that asked him, how a Man might be rich, he answered, *By being poor in Desire.*

CHAP. III.

His Writings.

HE left behind him (saith *Laertius*) these excellent Books.

Of Time.
Of Zeno's *Philosophy.*
Explications of Heraclitus 3.
Of Sense 4.
Of Art.
To Democritus.
To Aristarchus.
To Erillus.
Of Appetite 2.
Archæology.
Of God.
Of Giants.
Of Hymeneals.
Of a Poet.
Of Office 3.
Of right Consultation.
Of Gratitude.
Protreptick.
Of Virtues.
Of Ingenuity.
Of Gorgippus.
Of Envy.
Of Love.
Of Liberty.
The Art of Love.
Of Honour.
Of Glory.
The Politick.
Of Counsel.
Of Laws.
Of Judging.
Of the Reason of Living.
Of Speech 3.
Of the End.
Of honest Things.
Of Actions.
Of Science.
Of a Kingdom.
Of Friendship.
Of a Symposium.
That the Virtue of Man and Woman is the same.
That a wise Man may use Sophisms.
Of Chrias.
Dissertations 2.
Of Pleasure.
Of Properties.
Of Inexplicables.
Of Dialectick.
Of Tropes.
Of Categorems.
Besides these are mentioned,
[m] *Of Atoms.*
Of Brass.
[n] *Of Sumptions.*
Fabulous Traditions.
[o] *The Art of Rhetorick.*

f Cic. de finib. lib. 2. g Stob. Ser. 28. h Ser. 33. i Ser. 80. k Ser. 92. l Ser. ibid. m Laert. vit. Zeni n Athen. deipn. 13. o Cic. de fin. l. 4.

CHAP. IV.

His Death.

HE lived according to *Laertius* eighty Years, according to *Lucian*, 99. The Occaſion of his Death this; being troubled with a Soreneſs of his Gums (*Stobæus* ſaith, an Ulcer under his Tongue) he was enjoined by the Phyſicians to faſt two Days; which he did, and was well; then they told him he might eat again, but he would not, ſaying, he was now gone a great Way on his Journey; *Would* [p] *you have me*, ſaith he, *having paſt over the greateſt Part of my Life, return back again, and begin it anew?* [q] Having faſted two Days more, he died.

[r] *Simplicius* ſaith, he ſaw an exquiſite Statue of *Cleanthes* in *Aſſus*, an Example of the Magnificence of the *Roman* Senate, dedicated to his Honour.

p Stob. Serm. 7. q Laert. 7. 176. r In Epictet. cap. ult.

CHRYSIPPUS.

CHAP. I.

His Life.

Chryſippus [s] was of *Soli*, a City of *Cilicia*, afterwards called *Pompeiopolis*, his Father was of *Tarſis*, named *Apollonius*, or, as *Suidas*, *Apollonides*, who came and lived at *Soli*, which perhaps gave *Laertius*, and from him *Suidas*, occaſion to doubt whether *Chryſippus* himſelf were not of *Tarſis*.

He firſt exerciſed in the *Hippodrome*. *Hecaton* ſaith, that having waſted his Patrimony in the King's Service, he applied himſelf to Philoſophy. Coming to *Athens*, he heard, as ſome affirm, *Zeno*, or rather (as *Diocles* and others) *Cleanthes*, from whom, whilſt he was yet alive, he diſſented. He was an eminent Philoſopher, ingenious and acute in every Thing; ſo that in moſt Opinions he differed from *Zeno* and *Cleanthes*, to whom he would only ſay, *Tell me the Doctrines, and let me alone for Proofs*. If at any Time he croſſed *Cleanthes* in Diſpute, he was afterwards ſorry for it, often ſaying,

Of Happineſs in all I am poſſeſs'd,
But in Cleanthes; *there alone unbleſs'd.*

He was ſo famous for *Dialectick*, that it was a common Speech, *If the Gods themſelves would uſe Dialectick, they would make Uſe only of the Chryſippean*. But he was more plentiful in Matter, than free in Expreſſion.

He was infinitely ſtudious and induſtrious, as appeareth from the Multitude of his Books. An old Woman that waited on him ſaid, that he wrote every Day 500 Paragraphs.

When any queſtion'd him in private, he anſwered meekly and freely; but as ſoon as any Company came, he grew eager and litigious, ſaying,

Brother, there hangs a Cloud before your Eyes;
Caſt quite away this Madneſs, and be wiſe.

When he drunk at Feaſts, he lay very ſtill, only ſhaked his Legs; whereupon his Woman ſaid, *Chryſippus's Legs only are drunk*.

He had ſo good an Opinion of himſelf, that to one who asked him to whom he ſhould commend his Son, he anſwered, *To me; for if I knew any better, I would hear Philoſophy of him myſelf*: Whence it was ſaid of him,

He is inſpir'd by Jove,
The reſt like Shadows move.

As alſo that,

Had not Chryſippus *been,*
No Stoa *we had ſeen.*

Arceſilaus and *Lacydes* (as [t] *Sotion* ſaith) coming into the Academy, he ſtudied Philoſophy with them, whence he diſputed againſt Cuſtom and for Cuſtom, and of Magnitude and Multitude, uſing the Arguments of the Academicks.

[u] He was a great Deſpiſer of Honours, for of all his Writings, he dedicates none to any King. [w] He was content with little, for [x] he lived without any other Attendants than one old Woman; and when

s Laert. 7. 179. t Ibid. u Ibid. w Serm. 17. x Laert. 7. 185.

Ptolomy

Ptolomy wrote to *Cleanthes*, desiring he would come to him, or send some one of his Disciples, *Sphærus* went, but *Chrysippus* refused.

Having sent for *Aristocreon* and *Philocrates*, his Sister's Sons, he first taught in the *Lyceum* in the open Air, as *Demetrius* writes.

CHAP. II.

His Apophthegms.

To [y] one that blamed him for not hearing *Aristo*, as many did; If I should follow many, saith he, I should not study Philosophy.

To a Dialectick assaulting *Cleanthes* with *Sophisms: Leave*, saith he, *diverting an aged Person from serious Things; propound those to us that are young.*

[z] He said, Meditation is the Fountain of Discourse.

[a] He said, Drunkenness is a lesser Madness.

[b] He said, a wise Man grieveth, but is not troubled, for his Mind yields not to it.

[c] To one that said to him, Your Friend revileth you behind your Back: *Blame him not*, saith he, *for he might do it before my Face.*

[d] To a wicked Man that cast many Aspersions upon him: *You have done well*, saith he, *not to omit any Thing that is in yourself.*

[e] Being told that some spoke ill of him; *It is no Matter*, saith he, *I will live so that they shall not be believed.*

[f] He said, there is a Difference between swearing true, and swearing truly; and betwixt swearing false, and forswearing. That which is sworn, at the Time that it is sworn, must necessarily be either true or false, seeing that the Form of swearing is an Axiom: But he that sweareth, at the same Time that he sweareth, is not necessarily perjured, or sweareth true, because the Time is not yet arrived that must determine his Oath. For as a Man is said to have covenanted truly or falsly, not when the Covenant is made, but when the Time whereby it is limited is come: So a Man is said to swear truly or falsly, when the Time comes wherein he promised to make good his Oath.

[g] Being demanded why he did not undertake the Government of the Commonwealth; *Because*, saith he, *if I govern ill, I shall displease the Gods; if well, the People.*

[h] He said, he who hath arrived at Perfection, dischargeth all Offices, omitting none, yet his Life is not happy, for Beatitude is a Post-accession thereto, when as the mean Actions acquire a Constancy, Habit, and peculiar Confirmation.

CHAP. III.

His Writings.

Because, saith *Laertius* [i], his Writings were very celebrious, we shall give an Account of them, digested according to their Subjects. They were these.

Of the Logical Place, Theses.
Logick.
Philosophical Commentaries.
Dialectick Definitions, to Metrodorus, 6.
Of Dialectick Names, to Zeno 1.
Dialectick Art, to Aristagoras 1.
Of connex Probables, to Dioscorides 4.

The first Order of the *Logical* Place of Things.

Of Axioms 1.
Of not simple Axioms 1.
Of Connex, to Athenades 2.
Of Negatives, to Aristagoras 3.
Of Catagoreuticks, to Athenodorus 1.
Of Things spoken by Privation, to Thearus 1.
Of best Axioms, to Dion 3.
Of Indefinites 4.
Of Things spoken according to Time 2.
Of perfect Axioms 2.

The second Order.

Of true Disjunct, to Gorgippides 1.
Of true Connex, to Gorgippides 1.
Division, to Gorgippides 1.
Of Consequents 1.
Of that which is for three, to Gorgippides 1.
Of Possibles, to Clitus 4.
Of Significations, against Philo 1.
What are false 1.

The third Order.

Of Precepts 2.
Of Interrogations 2.
Of Percontation 4.
Epitome of Interrogation and Percontation 1.
Epitome of Answers 1.
Of Question 2.
Answer 4.

The fourth Order.

Of Categorems, to Metrodorus 10.
Of Right and Supine, to Philarchus 1.

y Laert. 7. 182. z Stob. Ser. 3. a Ibid. 17. b Ibid. 7. c Ibid. 55. d Ibid. e Ibid. f Ibid. 28. g Ibid. 43. h Ibid. 101. i Laert. 7. 189.

Of

Of Conjunctions, to Apollonides 1.
To Pasylus, *of Categorems* 4.

The Fifth Order.

Of the Five Cases 1.
Of Expressions defined according to the Subject 1.
Of Assimilation, to Stesagoras 2.
Of Appellatives 2.

Of the Logical Place concerning Words, and their Reasons. The First Order.

Of singular and plural Expressions 6.
Of Words, to Sosigenes *and* Alexander 5.
Of the anomaly of Words, to Dion 4.
Of Sorites pertaining to Voice 3.
Of Solœcisms, to Dionysius 1.
Of unusual Speech 1.
Words, to Dionysius 1.

The Second Order.

Of the Elements of Speech 5.
Of the Syntax of Things said 4.
Of the Syntax, and Elements of Speech, to Philip 3.
Of the Elements of Speech, to Nicias 1.
Of Relative Speech.

The Third Order.

Of Not-Dividents 2.
Of Amphibolies to Apollas 4.
Of Tropical Amphibolies 1.
Of Connex Tropical Amphibolies 2.
Upon Panthœdus, *of Amphibolies* 2.
Introduction to Amphiboly 5.
Epitome of Amphibolies to Epicrates 1.
Connex to the Introduction of Amphibolies 2.

Of Logical Place concerning Reasons and Moods.

The First Order.

The Art of Reasons and Moods, to Dioscorides 5.
Of Reasons 3.
Of the Composition of Moods, to Stesagoras 2.
Comparison of Tropical Axioms 1.
Of reciprocal Reasons and Connex 1.
To Agatho, *or of sequent Problems* 1.
Of Inferences, to Aristagoras 1.
Of placing the same Reason in divers Moods 1.
Against those who oppose that the same Reason may be placed in Syllogistick and not Syllogistick Moods 2.
Against those who oppose the Reduction of Syllogisms 3.
Against Philo's *Book of Moods, to* Timostratus 1.
Logical Conjuncts, to Timocrates, *and* Philomathes.
Upon Reason and Moods 1.

The Second Order.

Of conclusive Reasons, to Zeno 1.
Of first indemonstrable Syllogisms, to Zeno 1.
Of Reduction of Syllogisms 1.
Of Redundant Syllogisms, to Pasylus 2.
Theorems of Solœcisms 1.
Syllogistick Introductions, to Zeno 1.
Introductions to Moods, to Zeno 3.
Of Syllogisms false in Figure 5.
Syllogistick Reasons by Reduction in Indemonstrables 1.
Tropical Questions to Zeno *and* Philomathes *(suspected to be spurious)* 1.

The Third Order.

Of Coincident Reasons, to Athenades 1. *spurious.*
Coincident Reasons as to the Medium 3. *spurious.*
Of Aminius's *Disjunctions* 1.

The Fourth Order.

Of Hypotheses, to Meleager 3.
Hypothetick Reasons in Law, to Meleager 1.
Hypothetick Reasons for Introduction 2.
Hypothetick Reasons of Theorems 2.
Solution of Hedyllus's *Hypotheticks* 2.
Solution of Alexander's *Hypotheticks* 3. *spurious.*
Of Expositions, to Leodamas 1.

The Fifth Order.

Of Introduction to the Lying Reason, to Aristocreon 1.
Lying Reasons to the Introduction 1.
Of the Lying Reason, to Aristocreon 6.

The Sixth Order.

Against those who think true and false are one, 1.
Against those who dissolve the Lying Reason by Distinction 2.
Demonstration, that Infinites are not to be divided 1.
Upon that which hath been said against the Divisions of Infinites, to Pasyllus 3.
Solutions according to the Ancients, to Dioscorides 1.
Of the Solution of the Lying Reason, to Aristocreon 3.
Solution of Hedyllus's *Hypotheticks, to* Aristocreon *and* Apollas.

The Seventh Order.

Against those who say the Lying Reason hath false Sumptions 1.
Of the Negative, to Aristocreon 2.

Negative Reasons, to Gymnasias 1.
Of the diminutive Reason, to Stesagoras 2.
Of opinionative and quiescent Reasons, to Onetor 2.
Of the veiled Reason, to Aristobulus 2.
Of the occult Reason, to Athenades 1.

The Eighth Order.

Of the Nullity, *to* Menecrates 8.
Of Reasons consisting of Indefinite and Definite, to Pasyllus 2.
Of the Nullity, *to* Epicrates 1.

The Ninth Order.

Of Sophisms, to Heraclides *and* Pollis 2.
Of insoluble Dialectick Reasons, to Dioscorides 5.
Against Arcesilaus's *Method, to* Sphærus 1.

The Tenth Order.

Against Custom, to Metrodorus 6.

Of the Logical place besides these four Differences, there are dispersed, not containing in the Body of logical Questions, 39.

Of the *Ethick* place, for Direction of Moral Notions. The First Order.

Description of Speech, to Theoporus 1.
Moral Theses 1.
Probable Sumptions for Doctrines, to Philomathes 3.
Definitions of civil Persons, to Metrodorus 2.
Definitions of wicked Persons, to Metrodorus 2.
Definitions of mean Persons, to Metrodorus 2.
General Definitions, to Metrodorus 7.
Definitions of other Arts, to Metrodorus 2.

The Second Order.

Of Things like, to Aristocles 3.
Of Definitions, to Metrodorus 7.

The Third Order.

Of Things not rightly objected against Definitions, to Laodomas 7.
Probalties for Definitions, to Dioscorides.
Of Species and Genus, to Gorgippides 2.
Of Divisions 1.
Of Contraries, to Dionysius 2.
Probables for Divisions, Genus's and Species.
Of Contraries 1.

The Fourth Order.

Of Etymologicks, to Diocles 6.
Etymologicks, to Diocles 4.

The Fifth Order.

Of Proverbs, to Zenotodus 2.
Of Poems, to Philomathes 1.
How Poems must be heard 2.
Against Criticks, to Diodorus 1.

Of the Moral Place of common Speeches, according to Arts and Virtue. The First Order.

Against Rescriptions, to Timonax 1.
How we think and speak Singulars 1.
Of Notions, to Laodamus 2.
Of Suspition, to Pythonax 2.
Demonstration that a wise Man doth not opinionate 1.
Of Comprehension, and Science, and Ignorance 4.
Of Speech 2.
Of the Use of Speech, to Leptines.

The Second Order.

That the Ancients approved Dialectick with Demonstration, to Zeno 2.
Of Dialectick, to Aristocreon 4.
Upon the Objections against Dialectick 3.
Of Rhetorick, to Dioscorides 4.

The Third Order.

Of Habitude, to Cleon 3.
Of Art and Sloth, to Aristocreon 4.
Of the Differences in Virtues, to Diodorus.
What Virtues are 1.
Of Virtues, to Pollis.

Of the Moral Place concerning Good and Ill. The First Order.

Of Honesty and Pleasure, to Aristocreon 10.
Demonstration, that Pleasure is not the chief End 4.
Demonstration, that Pleasure is not Good 4.
Of those which are said ******.

Thus concludes the Seventh Book of *Laertius*; and who seeth not that the last of these Titles is defective, and moreover that the rest of the *Orders*, concerning this Place *of Good and Ill*, (whereof this is but the first) are wanting. Doubtless the End of this Book is imperfect, and wanteth, if not the Lives of any Stoical Philosophers, who succeeded *Chrysippus* (whereof he mentions *Zeno*, and others elsewhere) yet at least a considerable Part of his Catalogue, containing the rest of his *Ethick* Writings, and all his Physick, many of which are elsewhere cited even by *Laertius* himself, which, as the learned *Casaubon* had observed, he would not have ascribed to *Laertius*'s Neglect that *Chrysippus*'s Book of *Laws* is not mentioned. Of his *Ethick* Writings, besides those here named, were these,

Of

k *Of Laws.*
l *Introduction to the Consideration of Things, good or ill.*
m *Of Honest.*
n *Of Consent.*
o *Of Things expetible in themselves.*
p *Of Things not expetible in themselves.*
q *Of Politick.*
r *Of Ends.*
s *Of Passions.*
t *Of* Ethick *Questions.*
u *Of Lives, whereof* Plutarch *cites the 4th Book.*
w *That* Zeno *used Names properly.*
x *Of Justice, the first Book cited by* Laertius.
y *Of Life and Transaction.*
z *Of Offices.*
a *Demonstration of Justice.*
b *Protrepticks.*
c *Of the End.*
d *Of a Common-wealth.*
e *Of the Office of a Judge.*
f *Of Good.*
g *Of Habits.*

To Physick belong these,

h *Physicks.*
i *Of the Soul, the 12th Book cited by* Laertius.
k *Of Providence, the first Book cited.*
l *Of the Gods.*
m *Of Fate.*
n *Of Divination.*
o *Of the Philosophy of the Ancients.*
p *In Calumniation of the Senses.*
q *Of* Jupiter.
r *Of Nature.*
s *Physical Theses.*
t *Of Substance.*
u *Of Motion.*
w *Physical Questions, the Third Book cited.*
x *Of Vacuity.*
y *Epistles.*

z The Number of all his Writings, according to *Laertius*, was 705. He wrote so much, that he had often occasion to treat upon the same Subject, and setting down whatsoever came into his Mind, he often corrected and enlarged it by the Testimonies of others; whence having in one Book inserted all *Euripides*'s *Medea*, one having the Book in his Hand, answer'd another, that asked him what Book it was, It is *Chrysippus*'s *Medea*. And *Apollodorus* the *Athenian*, in his Collection *of Doctrines*, asserting, that *Epicurus* had written many Books upon his own Strength, without using the Testimonies of others, and that he therein far exceeded *Chrysippus*, adds these Words, *For if a Man should take out of* Chrysippus's *Writings, all that belongs to other Men, he would leave the Paper blank.*

Seneca gives this Censure of him: [a] He is most subtle and acute, penetrating into the Depth of Truth. He speaks to the Thing that is to be done, and useth no more Words than are necessary to the Understanding thereof; but adds, that his [b] Acuteness being too fine, is many times blunted, and retorted upon itself; even when he seems to have done something, he only pricks, not pierceth.

[c] Some there are who inveigh against him, as one that wrote many obscene Things, not fit to be spoken, as in his *Commentary of the ancient Physiologists*; what he writes concerning *Jupiter* and *Juno* is obscenely feigned, delivering that in six hundred Paragraphs, which the most impudent Person would not have committed to Writing; for, say they, he hath related the Story most unhandsomely; and tho' he prais'd it as natural, yet it becometh Curtezans rather than Gods.

Moreover, what he saith of those that write *of Tables*, is false, not to be found in *Ptolemo*, nor *Hipsicrates*, nor *Antigonus*, but forged by himself.

In his Book of *Common-wealth*, he allows Marriage with the Mother and a Daughter, and repeats the same in the Beginning of his Book, *Concerning Things expetible in themselves.*

In his third Book *of Justice*, extending to a thousand Paragraphs, he advised to feed upon the very Dead.

In his second Book of *Life and Transaction*, he affirmeth, a wise Man ought to take Care to provide himself Food; but to what End must he provide himself Food? For Livelihood? Life is an *Indifferent*. For Pleasure? Pleasure also is *indifferent*. For Virtue? That is *Self-sufficient* for *Beatitude*. Such kinds of Acquisition of Wealth are very ridiculous. If they proceed from a King, there is a Necessity of complying with him; if from a Friend, that Friendship is venial; if from Wisdom, that Wisdom is mercenary. For these Things, saith *Laertius*, some have inveighed against him.

CHAP. IV.

His Death.

HE [d] died, according to *Apollodorus*, in the 143d Olympiad, (to supply *Laertius*, in whom the centenary Number is wanting by *Suidas*) having lived 73 Years.

k Acl. 14. 4. l Athen. Deipn. 4 & 11. m Deip. 4. & 8. n Deipn. 6. o Athen. Deipn. 7. p Ath. Deipn. 4. q Laert. vit. Zen. Pl. rep. Stoic. r Laert. Zen. pl. Rep. s Laert. vit. Zen. t Laert. ibid. u Plut. rep. Laert. ibid. w Laert. x Plut. repug. Laert. ibid. y Laert. ibid. z Plut. repug. a Plut. repug. b Plut. repug. c Plut. repug. & de com. not. d Plut. repug. e Plut. repug. f Plut. repug. g Plut. repug. h Laert. ibid. i Laert. ibid. k Laert. ibid. l Plut. repug. Laert. ibid. m Plut. rep. Laert. ibid. n Laert. ibid. o Laert. ibid. p Plut. rep. q Plut. rep. & com. not. r Plut. repug. s Plut. rep. t Plut. rep. u Plut. rep. w Plut. com. not. x Plut. com. not. & Laert. y Laert. ibid. z Laert. 7. 181. a De Benef. 1. 3. b Sen. de Benef. 1. 4. c Laert. 7. 187. d Laert. 7. 184.

The Manner of his Death is differently related; *Hermippus* affirms, That being in the *Odæum*, (a Kind of publick Theatre at *Athens*) his Diſciples called him away to Sacrifice, and thereupon taking a Draught of Wine, he was immediately ſeized by a *Vertigo*, of which at the End of five Days he died. Others report, he died of exceſſive Laughter. Seeing an Aſs eat Figs, he bid his Woman offer it ſome Wine, and thereat fell into ſuch Extremity of Laughter, that it killed him.

As to his Perſon, he was very little, ſaith *Laertius*, as appeareth by his Statue in the *Ceramick*, which is almoſt hid by the Horſe that ſtands next it, whence *Carneades* called him κρύπτιππος, *hid by a Horſe* [e]. The Poſture of this Statue, *Cicero* ſaith, was ſitting, and ſtretching forth his Hand. *Pauſanias* ſaith [f], it was ſet up in the *Gymnaſium*, called *Ptolomæan* from the Founder, not far from the *Forum*.

[g] *Laertius* reckons four more of this Name.

The *firſt*, a Phyſician, to whom *Eraſiſtratus* acknowledgeth himſelf beholding for many Things.

The *ſecond*, his Son, Phyſician to *Ptolomy*, who, upon the Calumnies of ſome that maligned him, was publickly puniſhed and beaten with Rods.

The *third*, Diſciple to *Eraſiſtratus*.

The *fourth*, a Writer of *Georgicks*.

e Cic. de fin. 1. f Pauſan. Attic. c. 17. g Laert. 7. 185.

ZENO.

Zeno [a] was of *Tarſis*, or according to others, of *Sidon*, his Father named *Dioſcorides*. He was Diſciple to *Chryſippus*, and his Succeſſor in the School. [b] He wrote few Books, but left behind him many Diſciples.

a Suidas. b Laert. vit. Zen.

DIOGENES.

Diogenes was born at *Seleucia* [c], he was ſirnamed the *Babylonian*, from the Vicinity of that Place. He was Diſciple of *Chryſippus*, and is ſtiled by *Cicero* [d] an eminent and ſerious Stoick. [e] *Seneca* relates, That diſcourſing earneſtly concerning Anger, a fooliſh young Man ſtanding by, ſpat in his Face, which he took meekly and diſcreetly, ſaying, *I am not angry, but am in doubt whether I ought to be ſo or not.* He was one of the three that was ſent from *Athens* on *Embaſſy* to *Rome*; of which already in the Life of *Carneades*, who learned Dialectick of him. *Cicero* ſaith, he lived to a great Age. Amongſt other Things, he wrote a Treatiſe of *Divination*.

c Laert. vit. Diog. d Cic. Tuſc. quæſt. 3. 12. e De ira 3. 38.

ANTIPATER.

Antipater [f] was of *Sidon*, Diſciple to [g] *Diogenes* the *Babylonian*, *Cicero* calls him a moſt acute Perſon; *Seneca*, one of the great Authors of the Stoical Sect. [h] He declined to diſpute with *Carneades*, but filled his Books with Confutations of him, whence he was called καλαμοδίας, *The clamorous Penman*. [i] He diſputed much againſt thoſe who aſſerted *nothing*. Beſides other Things, he writ two Books of *Divination*. [k] *Cicero*, at the latter End of his ſecond Book of *Offices*, ſaith, he then was lately dead at *Athens*.

f Laert. 7. 28. g De Offic. 3. 12. h Plut. de Garrul. i Cic. Ac. quæſt. 4. 6. k Cic. de Divin. l. 1. 3.

PANÆTIUS.

Panætius [l] was of *Rhodes*, his Anceſtors eminent for martial Affairs and Exerciſes. He was Diſciple to *Antipater* [m], intimate Friend to [n] *P. Scipio Africanus*, whom he accompanied in his Journey to *Alexandria*. *Cicero* calls him, [o] *Almoſt Prince of the Stoicks, a Perſon extremely ingenious and grave, worthy the Familiarity of* Scipio *and* Lælius.

[p] He was a great Admirer of *Plato*, whom every where he calleth, *Divine, moſt wiſe, moſt holy, the* Homer *of Philoſophers*. But his Opinion of the Immortality of the Soul, he approved not, arguing thus; Whatſoever is generated, dieth; but Souls are generated, as is manifeſt from the Likeneſs of thoſe that are begotten, to their Parents, not only in Body but in Diſpoſition. His other Argument was, There is nothing that is grieved or pained, but is ſubject to be ſick; whatſoever is ſubject to Sickneſs, is likewiſe ſubject to Death; Souls are ſubject to Grief, therefore they are ſubject to Death.

[q] He alone rejected Aſtrological Predictions, and receded from the Stoicks, as to *Divination*; yet would not poſitively affirm there was no ſuch Art, but only that he doubted it.

He wrote three Books of *Offices*, much commended by *Cicero*.

Lipſius conjectures he died old, becauſe *Cicero* affirmeth, out of *Poſſidonius*, that he lived thirty Years after he had written his Books of Offices.

l Strabo. l. 4. m Cic. de Divin. l. 1. n Plut. Apoph. o Acad. quæſt. 4. 33. p Cic. Tuſc. quæſt. lib. 1. 32. q Cic de divin. l. 1. & 2.

POSSIDONIUS.

Poſſidonius [r] was born at *Apamea* in *Syria*. He lived at *Rhodes*, and there managed civil Affairs, and taught Philoſophy. *Pompey*, in his Return from *Syria* [s], went to *Rhodes* purpoſely to hear him, and coming to his Door, forbad the Lictor to knock, as was the Cuſtom; but he (ſaith [t] *Pliny*) to whom the Eaſt and Weſt had ſubmitted, himſelf ſubmitted his *Faſces* at this Gate. But underſtanding that he was very ſick of a great Pain in his Joints, he reſolved only to give him a Viſit. At his firſt coming and Salutation, he told him with much Reſpect, that he was extremely ſorry he could not hear him. *Poſſidonius* anſwered, *You may, for no corporeal Pain ſhall make me fruſtrate the Coming of ſo great a Perſon*. And thereupon he diſcourſed ſeriouſly and copiouſly upon this Subject, as he lay in his Bed, *That nothing is good, but what is honeſt*. And as often as his Pain took him, he would ſay, *Pain, it is to no Purpoſe; tho' thou art troubleſome, I will never acknowledge thou art ill*.

[u] He made a Spear, wherein were all the Converſions of the Sun, Moon and Planets, exactly as they moved in the Heavens every Day and Night.

[w] Of his Writings are cited by *Cicero* five Books *of Divination*; as alſo five Books *of the Nature of the Gods*.

Thus far we have a continued Succeſſion of the *Stoick* Philoſophers, the laſt *School*, according to *Laertius*'s Diſpoſition, of thoſe that were deſcended from *Thales*.

r Strab. lib. 7. s Cic. Tuſc. qu. l. 2. 25. t Plin. Ep. l. 1. 7. u Cic. de nat. Deor. lib. 2. w De divinat. l. 3.

FRANCIS

FRANCIS Lord *Verulam*,

Advancement of Learning, LIB. III. SECT. V.

AS for the Placits of Ancient Philoſophers, as were thoſe of *Pythagoras*, *Philolaus*, *Xenophon*, *Anaxagoras*, *Parmenides*, *Leucippus*, *Democritus*, and others, (which Men uſe diſdainfully to run over) it will not be amiſs to caſt our Eyes with more Reverence upon them. *For altho'* Ariſtotle *(after the Manner of the Race of the* Ottomans*) thought he could not ſafely reign, unleſs he made away all his Brethren*; yet to thoſe who ſeriouſly propound to themſelves the Inquiſition and Illuſtration of *Truth*, and not *Dominion* or *Magiſtrality*, it cannot but ſeem a Matter of great Profit, to ſee at once before them, the ſeveral Opinions of ſeveral Authors touching the Nature of Things. Neither is this, for any great Hope conceived, that a more exact Truth can any way be expected from theſe or from the like Theories: For, as the ſame *Phœnomena*, the ſame *Calculations*, are ſatisfied upon the Aſtronomical Principles, both of *Ptolomy* and *Copernicus*; ſo the popular Experience we embrace, and the ordinary View and Face of Things, may apply itſelf to many ſeveral Theories; whereas a right Inveſtigation of Truth requires another manner of Severity and Speculation. For as *Ariſtotle* ſaith elegantly, *That Children at firſt, indeed, call all Men Fathers, and Women Mothers; but afterwards they diſtinguiſh them both:* So certainly Experience in Childhood will call every *Philoſophy*, *Mother*; but when it comes to Ripeneſs, it will diſcern the true Mother. In the mean time it is good to read over divers Philoſophies, as divers Gloſſes upon Nature; whereof, it may be, one in one Place, another in another, is more corrected: Therefore, I could wiſh a Collection made, but with Diligence and Judgment, *De Antiquis Philoſophiis*, out of the Lives of Ancient Philoſophers; out of the Parcels of *Plutarch*, of their *Placits*;

cits; out of the Citations of *Plato*; out of the Confutations of *Ariſtotle*; out of a ſparſed Mention found in other Books, as well of Chriſtians as of Heathens (as out of *Lactantius*, *Philo*, *Philoſtratus*, and the reſt:) *For I do not yet ſee extant a Work of this Nature.* But here I muſt give Warning, that this be done diſtinctly, ſo as the Philoſophies, every one ſever'dly, be compoſed and continued, and not collected by Titles and Handfuls, as hath been done by *Plutarch*. *For every* Philoſophy, *while it is entire in the whole Piece, ſupports itſelf; and the Opinions maintained therein, give Light, Strength, and Credence mutually one to the other; whereas, if they be ſimple and broken, it will ſound more ſtrange and diſſonant.* In truth, when I read in *Tacitus* the Actions of *Nero*, or of *Claudius*, inveſted with Circumſtances of Times, Perſons, and Inducements, I find them not ſo ſtrange, but that they may be true: But when I read the ſame Actions in *Suetonius Tranquillus*, repreſented by Titles and common Places, and not in Order of Time, they ſeem monſtrous, and altogether incredible. *So is* Philoſophy *when it is propounded entire, and when it is ſliced and articled into Fragments.*

MONTAIGNE, ESSAYS, Chap. XII.

How much do I deſire, that, in my Life-time, either ſome other, or Juſtus Lipſius, *the moſt knowing Perſon that is left us, of a moſt poliſhed and judicious Wit, truly allied to my* Turnebus, *had both the Will and the Health, and Leiſure enough to collect in one Regiſter, according to their Diviſions and their Claſſes, ſincerely and curiouſly, as much as we can ſee thereof, the Opinions of the Ancient Philoſophy, upon the Subject of our Being, and of our Manners, its Controverſies, the Credit and Succeſſion of its Sects, the Application of the Life of the Authors and Followers, to their Precepts in memorable and exemplary Accidents! What an excellent and profitable Work would this be?*

THE

THE

HISTORY

OF

PHILOSOPHY.

THE NINTH PART,

Containing the *ITALICK* Sect.

PYTHAGORAS.

CHAP. I.

The Country, Parents, and Time of PYTHAGORAS.

THE *Italick* Sect was distinct from the *Ionick* in respect of the Author, Place, Discipline, and Doctrine; denominated from that Part of *Italy*, which from the frequency of Greek Colonies was called *Magna Græcia*. Yet was not the Author, *Pythagoras*, an Italian; for, tho' [a] some think, his Father was of *Metapontum*; [b] some, a Tyrrhene, of *Etruria* in *Italy*, yet [c] *Diogenes* and others report him a Tyrrhene, of the Race of those who inhabited *Lemnos*, *Imbrus*, and *Scyrus*; and that coming upon Traffick to *Samos*, he settled there, and was made free. With these concurs [d] *Aristoxenus*, (to whom *Clemens Alexandrinus* joineth *Aristarchus* and *Theopompus*) who [e] in the Life of *Pythagoras*) saith, [f] that he was born in one of those Islands which the *Athenians* won, and expelled thence the Tyrrhenians. Whence *Suidas* saith, that *Pythagoras was a Samian, but by Birth a Tyrrhenian, brought over young by his Father from* Tyrrhenia *to* Samos. And indeed his Country seems inscrutable to [g] *Lycus*; to [h] *Josephus no less difficult to find out, than that of* Homer.

Nor is it strange, that the Country of his Father should be question'd, since it is not agreed concerning his Name and Quality: [i] *Justin* calls him *Demaratus*, (and *Johannes Sarisburiensis*, from *Justin*, *Maratus*) [k] others, *Mamercus*: But the greater Part of Writers agree, that he was called [l] *Mnesarchus*; his Profession, according to *Hermippus* and others, a Graver of Rings; according to others, a Merchant.

[m] Some there are who affirm, he was a *Phliasian*; *Pausanias* reports, that he was Son of *Euphron*, Grandson of *Hippasus*, who upon the taking of *Phlius* by the *Dorians*, fled to *Samos*. Others, that he was Son of *Hippasus*; *Hippasus* was Son of *Euthyphron* of *Cleonymus*, who was banished out of *Phlius*; and that *Mamercus* (or rather *Mnesarchus*) lived in *Samos*, whence *Pythagoras* was said to be a *Samian*. [n] *Cleanthes* relates he was a *Syrian*, of the City of *Tyrus* in *Syria*, (or rather in *Phœnicia*) whence making a Voyage to *Samos* for Traffick, at such Time as the *Samians* were much oppress't with Famine, he furnished them with Corn; in requital whereof, they made him free of their Country. [o] *Hippobotus* saith, that *Pythagoras* was a *Samian*.

Indeed, the most general and approv'd Opinion is, that *Mnesarchus* was a *Samian*, descended from *Ancæus*, who first brought a Colony into *Samos*; and

[a] Porphyr. de vit. Pythag. [b] Plut. Sympos. [c] Porph. ibid. [d] Porph. ibid. [e] Strom. l. 1. [f] Porph. [g] Porph. ibid. [h] Contra Appion. [i] Lib. 20. in Pyth. [k] Laert. ibid. [l] Laert. Suid. Apul. [m] Porph. [n] Porph. [o] Clem. Alex. Strom.

that *Pythagoras*, his Son, was born at *Sidon* in *Phœnicia*; but by Education, as well as Extraction, a *Samian* alſo. This is ratified by the Authority of *Jamblichus*, who begins his Life with this fabulous Narration.

[p] *It is reported, that* Ancæus, *who liv'd at* [q] Same *in* Cephalenia, *was deſcended from* Jupiter, [others ſay from *Neptune* and *Aſtypalæa*] *an Opinion occaſioned by his Virtues, or ſome particular Greatneſs of Soul. In Prudence and Magnanimity he excelled all other* Cephalenians. *This* Ancæus *was commanded by the* Pythian *Oracle, to gather together a Colony out of* Cephalenia, Arcadia, *and* Theſſaly, *augmenting it from* Athens, Epidaurus, *and* Chalcis; *and that having got them together under his Command, he ſhould people an Iſland, named from the Richneſs of the Soil* Melamphyllos, [r] (black-leaf) *and call the City which they built* Samos, *from* Same *in* Cephalenia. *The Oracle was thus:*

Inſtead of *Same*, *Samos* thou (an Iſle)
Shalt plant *Ancæus*, which Men *Phyllas* ſtile.

That this Colony was drawn from thoſe ſeveral Places, appears not only from their religious Rites and Sacrifices, (which are derived from the Countries out of which thoſe People came) but alſo from the Affinities and mutual Conventions made by the Samians. Mneſarchus *and* Pythais, *the Parents of* Pythagoras, *are ſaid to be deſcended from the Family of the ſame* Ancæus, *that planted this Colony there.* [s] Of *Pythais*, it is confirmed by *Apollonius*.] *Which Nobleneſs of their Extraction, being much celebrated amongſt their Country-men, a* Samian *Poet declar'd him to be the Son of* Apollo, *in* [t] *theſe Words.*

Pythais of all *Samians* the moſt fair,
Jove-lov'd *Pythagoras* to *Phœbus* bare.

Which Report was raiſed thus. This Mneſarchus *the* Samian *being upon Occaſion of Traffick at* Delphi, *with his Wife, who was at that Time newly with Child, and not known to be ſo; he enquired of the Oracle concerning his Voyage to* Syria. *The Propheteſs told him, that his Journey ſhould be according to his Mind, very advantageous. That his Wife was already with Child, and ſhould bring forth a Son that ſhould exceed all Men that ever were, in Beauty and Wiſdom, and through the whole Courſe of his Life conduce much to the Benefit of Mankind.* Mneſarchus *conſidering, that the Oracle would not have ſpoken of his Son, ſeeing that he demanded nothing concerning him, if there were not ſomething extraordinary to be expected from him, immediately hereupon changed the Name of his Wife, which before was* Parthenis, *to* Pythais, *from the Propheteſs; and as ſoon as ſhe was delivered at* Sidon *in* Phœnicia, *they called the Child* Pythagoras. *For* Epimenides, Eudoxus, Xenocrates, [and others mentioned by [u] *Apollonius*] *are to be rejected, who affirm* Apollo *at that time lay with* Pythais, [x] *and got her with Child, (ſhe not being ſo before) and thereupon foretold it by the Propheteſs; this is not to be admitted. But that the Soul of* Pythagoras, *being of the Regimine of* Apollo, *(whether as a Follower, or ſome other Way more near to him) was ſent to Men none can doubt, ſince it may be evinced by theſe Circumſtances of his Birth, and the univerſal Wiſdom of his Mind. Thus much* (ſaith *Jamblichus*) *concerning his Generation.* Whence we ſee the Greeks did ſo much admire his Wit, that they thought it could be nothing leſs than Divine, and thereupon fabled *Apollo* to be his Father.

Pythagoras was the youngeſt of three Sons, the eldeſt [y] *Cleanthes*, calls *Eunuſtus*; *Laertius*, and *Suidas Eunomus*; the ſecond, *Tyrrhenus*. He had likewiſe an Uncle, *Zoilus*, mentioned by *Laertius*.

The Reaſons for eſtabliſhing the Times concerning *Pythagoras*'s Life will hereafter be ſet forth, upon Occaſion of his going into *Italy*. In the mean time I ſhall deſire it may be admitted, that he was born about the third Year of the fifty-third Olympiad: That being eighteen Years old, he heard *Thales* and others. Then he went to *Phœnicia*, thence into *Egypt*, where he ſtaid twenty-two Years; afterwards at *Babylon* twelve Years, then returned to *Samos*, being fifty-ſix Years old; and from thence went into *Italy*. The Particulars whereof ſhall in their ſeveral Places be more fully diſcourſed.

CHAP. II.

His firſt Education and Maſters.

MNeſarchus (ſaith [z] *Jamblichus*) *returning from* Syria *to* Samos *with much Wealth, and Abundance of Merchandize, built a Temple, which he dedicated to* Apollo *the* Pythian, *and brought up his Son in ſeveral excellent Diſciplines, committing him ſometimes to* Creophylus, *ſometimes to* Pherecydes *of* Syrus, *and to almoſt all the Præfects of the Temple; as being bleſt with the faireſt and moſt divine Son that ever Man had.*

Some there are who affirm, that [a] *he was firſt a Wreſtler*; and *that* [b] *when* Pherecydes *firſt diſcourſed among the Greeks, concerning the Immortality of the Soul,* Pythagoras *the* Samian, *moved at the Novelty of the Diſcourſe, became of a Wreſtler, a Philoſopher.* But theſe Relations ſeem to have been occaſion'd by confounding *Pythagoras* the Philoſopher with a Wreſtler of that Name, his Contemporary, of whom hereafter.

Cleanthes

[p] Jambl. vit. Pyth. c. 2. [q] So read both here and afterwards, as appeareth by the Oracle, ἀντὶ Σάμης. [r] Strab. l. 14. [s] Porph. p. 181. [t] Cited alſo by *Porphyrius*. [u] Porph. p. 181. [x] Adding ἡ κρύβδην αὐτὴν ὀκ μὴ ἔτως ἴχέσης κατασῆσαι. [y] Porph. ibid. [z] Vit. Pythag. c. 2. [a] Laert. 7. 2. [b] St. Auguſt. Ep. 9. ad Voluſ.

[c] *Cleanthes* and [d] *Suidas* relate, that *he first heard* Pherecydes *the Syrian, at* Samos; *and in the second Place* Hermodamas, τῷ Κρεοφυλίῳ, *the* Creophylian, *at the same* Samos, *then very old.* [e] Hermodamas *was his Name, but he was firnamed* Creophylus. Wherefore perhaps instead of τῷ Κρεοφυλίῳ, should be [f] *read*, τῷ Κρεοφύλῳ; or else he was termed a *Creophylian*, as well as firnamed *Creophylus*; [g] *for that reported to be descended from* Creophylus *a* [h] Samian, *who, in Times past, entertained* Homer *as his Guest, and was, as some say, his Master and his Rival in Poetry.* But [i] *Apuleius*, who saith, *Hermodamas*, or *Leodamas*, as he calls him, was Disciple to that *Creophylus*; an Error no less in Chronology, than when he saith, *Pythagoras* was Disciple to *Plato*, unless the whole Text be corrupted.

[k] Pythagoras *his Father dying, he grew up in Prudence and Temperance, being, whilst he was yet very young, generally much respected and honoured, even by the most aged. His Presence and Discourse attracted all Persons; to every one on whom he looked, he appeared worthy Admiration, insomuch that many averred, he was the Son of a Deity. He being thus confirm'd by the great Opinions that were had of him, by the Education of his Infancy, and by his natural Excellency, made himself daily more worthy of these Advantages, adorning himself with Devotions, with Sciences, with excellent Conversation, with Constancy of Mind, with grave Deportment, and with a sweet inimitable Serenity; never transported with Anger, Laughter, Emulation, Contention, or any other Disorder; living like some good Genius, come to converse in* Samos. *Hereupon, tho' young, a great Report was spread of him, to* Thales *at* Miletus, *to* Bias *at* Priene, *two of the Sages, and to all the Cities thereabout; many in all those Parts commending the young Man, made him famous, calling him by a Proverb,* [The Samian Comer] *or,* [The fair-hair'd Samian.]

About this Time began the Tyranny of Polycrates, *when* Pythagoras *about eighteen Years old, foreseeing the Event, and how obstructive it would prove to his Designs, and to the Pursuit of Learning, which he intended above all Things,* [[l] being young, and desirous of Knowledge, left his Country to go to travel] *stole away privately by Night, taking with him* Hermodamas, (*firnamed* Creophylus, *and descended, as was reported, from that* Creophylus *who was Host to* Homer) *and made a Voyage to* Pherecydes, [at *Lesbos*, to whom, *Laertius* saith, he was recommended by his Uncle *Zoilus*] *and to* Anaximander, *the natural Philosopher, and to* Thales *at* Miletus. *With each of these he conversed severally in such Manner, that they all lov'd him, admired his Parts, and communicated their Learning to him.* [[m] Under *Anaximander* the *Milesian*, he is said to have studied the Knowledge of natural Things.] Thales *entertained him kindly, and, wondring at his Excellency above other Youths, which much surpassed the Report he had received, assisted him as far as he was able in Sciences; withal, accusing his own Age and Infirmity, he advised him to make a Voyage to* Egypt, *there to get Acquaintance with the Priests of* Memphis *and* [n] Diospolis, *since of them he had learned those Things for which he was by many esteem'd wise, tho' he were not of such Forwardness, neither by Nature or Education, as he saw* Pythagoras *to be. Whence he presaged, that, if he conversed with those Priests, he should become the most Divine and Wisest of Men.*

This *Pherecydes* fell sick at *Delos:* that he outlived not the fifty-seventh Olympiad, is manifest from a [o] Letter which he writ the Day before his Death to *Thales*, who died the first Year of the Olympiad following. And tho' the greater Part of Authors write, that at the same Time, when the *Cylonians* in *Crotona*, conspir'd against the *Pythagoreans*, which was not long before *Pythagoras* died, *Pythagoras* was gone from *Italy* to *Delos*, to visit and bury *Pherecydes*, yet *Dicæarchus and other more accurate Authors* (saith [p] *Porphyrius*) *aver, that* Pythagoras *was present when that Conspiracy broke forth; and that* Pherecydes *died before* Pythagoras *departed from* Samos. The former Relation hath imposed, among others, [q] upon the learned *Salmasius*, who, to reconcile this with other Circumstances concerning *Pherecydes*, is constrain'd to imagine another Person of the same Name. It was therefore before *Pythagoras* left *Samos*, that [r] *Pherecydes, being desperately seized by a Phthiriasis, he went to visit him, and attended him in his Sickness until he died, and then performed the Rites of Funeral, as to his Master.* For *Laertius* and *Porphyrius* add, that *after the Death and Burial of* Pherecydes, *he returned to* Samos, *out of a Desire to enjoy the Society of* Hermodamas.

[s] *Phavorinus*, in the seventh Book of his various History, and [t] *Porphyrius*, relate, that after he had lived a while with *Hermodamas*, he first taught Wrestlers, and of them *Eurimenes*, to diet with Flesh, (whereas other Wrestlers used to eat dry'd Figs, Cheese-curds, and Whey) whereby he became Victor at the Olympick Games. But *Laertius* and [v] *Jamblichus* observe, that this is falsly ascribed to *Pythagoras* the *Samian*, (for he allowed not the eating of Flesh) but was indeed the Invention of *Pythagoras*, Son of *Eratocles*, of whom hereafter.

[c] Porph. p. 2. [d] In Pythag. [e] Jambl. c. 2. [f] As once in *Ritterhusius*'s Edition, or perhaps τῷ Κρεοφύλᾳ. [g] Jamb. [h] Strabo, l. 14. [i] Florid. l. 2. [k] Jam. continues. [l] Laert. 8. 2. [m] Apul. Florid. l. 2. [n] Thebes. [o] Laert. vit. Thaletis. [p] Pag. 38. [q] Plin. exercit. [r] Porph. p. 10, 11. Jam. c. 30. p. 162. Laert. 8. 2. [s] Laert. 8. 47. [t] Vit. Pyth. [v] Cap. 5.

CHAP. III.

How he travelled to Phœnicia.

HAving [x] learn'd of *Thales* above all things to husband his Time, and for that Reaſon forbearing Wine and Fleſh, and having before refrained from eating much, and accuſtomed himſelf to ſuch Meats as were light and eaſy of Digeſtion, by which means he procur'd a Habit of Watchfulneſs, Clearneſs of Mind, and an exact conſtant Health of Body; he made a Voyage to *Sidon*, as well out of a natural Deſire to the Place itſelf, eſteeming it his Country, as conceiving that he might more eaſily paſs from thence into *Egypt*.

Here he conferr'd with the Prophets, Succeſſors of *Mocus* the Phyſiologiſt, and with others, and with the *Phœnician* Prieſts, and was initiated into all the Myſteries of *Byblus*, and *Tyre*, and ſundry of the [y] principal ſacred Inſtitutions in divers other Parts of *Syria*; not undergoing theſe Things out of Superſtition, as may be imagined, but out of Love to Knowledge, and a Fear, leſt any thing worthy to be known, which was preſerved amongſt them, in the Miracles or Myſteries of the Gods, might eſcape him: Withal, not being ignorant that the Rites of thoſe Places were deduced from the *Ægyptian* Ceremonies, by means whereof he hoped to participate of the more ſublime and divine Myſteries in *Ægypt*, which he purſued with Admiration, as his Maſter *Thales* had adviſed him.

CHAP. IV.

How he travelled to Egypt.

SOme [z] *Ægyptian* Mariners paſſing accidentally along that Coaſt, which lies under *Carmel*, (a *Phœnician* Mountain, where he ſpent much of his Time in private Retirement at the Temple) willingly received him into their Ship; but obſerving, during the Voyage, how temperately he liv'd, keeping his uſual Diet, they began to have a greater Eſteem for him: And perceiving ſome Things in the Excellency of his Demeanour, more than human, they reflected within themſelves, how that he appeared to them as ſoon as they landed, coming down from the Top of the Mountain *Carmel*, (which they knew to be more ſacred than other Hills, and not trod upon by the Vulgar) eaſily and directly, neither Stones nor Precipices obſtructing his Paſſage; and how that coming to the Side of the Ship, [a] he asked, Whether they were bound for *Ægypt*; and they anſwering, That they were, he went into the Veſſel, and ſilently ſitting down in a Place where he might leaſt diſturb the Mariners, in caſe they ſhould be in any Streſs, continued in the ſame Poſture two Nights and three Days, without Meat, Drink, or Sleep; (except when none perceived he ſlumbered a little, ſitting in the ſame unmovable Poſture, and this conſtantly to the End) and how that the Voyage proceeded direct, beyond their Expectation, as if aſſiſted by the Preſence of ſome God. Laying all theſe Things together, they concluded and perſuaded themſelves, that ſome Divine Genius did indeed come along with them from *Syria* to *Egypt*. The reſt of the Voyage they performed proſperouſly, obſerving a greater Reſpect than formerly in their Words and Actions, as well to one another as towards him, until they at laſt arrived upon the Coaſt of *Egypt*, by a moſt fortunate Paſſage, without any Storm.

As ſoon as he landed, they reverently took him up, and ſeating him on the cleaneſt Part of the Sand, rear'd an extemporary Altar before him, on which they laid Part of all the Sorts of Proviſions which they had, as the firſt Fruits of their Lading, and drew up their Veſſel in the ſame Place where they firſt put to Sea. *Pythagoras*, tho' weakned with long Faſting, was not ſick, either at his landing, or by their handing of him; nor did he, when they were gone, abſtain long from the Fruits which they had laid before him, but took them, and preſerved his Conſtitution therewith undiſturbed, till he came to the next Houſes. [b] From thence he went to ſearch after all the Temples with diligent and exact Inquiſition.

[c] *Antiphon*, in his Book concerning ſuch as were eminent for Virtue, extolleth his Perſeverance when he was in *Egypt*, ſaying, *Pythagoras deſigning to become acquainted with the Inſtitution of the* Egyptian *Prieſts, and diligently endeavouring to participate thereof, deſired* Polycrates *the Tyrant to write to* Amaſis *King of* Egypt, *with whom he had Friendſhip*, (as appears alſo by [d] *Herodotus*) *and Hoſpitality*, (formerly) *that he might be admitted to the aforeſaid Doctrine. Coming to* Amaſis, Amaſis *gave him Letters to the Prieſts, and going firſt to thoſe of* Heliopolis, *they ſent him to the Prieſt of* Memphis, *as the more antient, which was indeed but a Pretence of the* Heliopolitans; [[e] For the *Egyptians* imparted not their Myſteries to every one, nor committed the Knowledge of Divine Things to profane Perſons, but to thoſe only who were to inherit the Kingdom; and, of Prieſts, to thoſe who were adjudged to excel the reſt in Education, Learning, and Deſcent.] *From* Memphis, *upon the ſame Pretence, he was ſent to* Thebes. *They not daring, for fear of the King, to pretend Excuſes, but thinking, that by reaſon of the Greatneſs and Difficulty thereof, he would deſiſt from the Deſign, enjoin'd him very hard Precepts, wholly different from the Inſtitution of the* Grecians, *which he readily*

[x] Jamb. Cap. 13. [y] Reading ἐξαι, ἵτως. [z] Jamb. continueth. [a] For μόνοντε ὑποστεγάμενον, reading ἐπιστεγάμενος τε μὼν ἐς Αἰγύπτιον ὁ ἀποπλεῖς, &c. [b] Cap. 4. [c] Porphyr. vit. Pythag. pag. 5. cited alſo by *Lactius*. [d] Lib. 3. [e] Clem. Alex. Strom. 5.

readily performed, to their so great Admiration, that they gave him Power to sacrifice to the Gods, and to acquaint himself with all their Studies, which was never known to have been granted to any Foreigner besides. [f] *Clemens Alexandrinus* relates particularly that *he was Disciple to* Sonchedes, *an* Egyptian *Arch-prophet.*

[g] *Diogenes* saith, that *whilst he lived with these Priests, he was instructed in the Learning and Language* (as *Antiphon* also affirms) *of the* Egyptians, *and in their three Kinds of Writing*, Epistolick, Hieroglyphic, and Symbolic; *whereof one imitates the common way of speaking; the rest allegorical, by Enigms:* [h] They who are taught by the *Egyptians*, learn first the Method of all the *Egyptian* Letters, which is called *Epistolographic*; the second, *Hieratick*, used by those who write of sacred Things; the last and most perfect *Hieroglyphic*, whereof one is *Curiologick*, the other, *Symbolick*. Of the *Symbolick*, one is properly spoken by *Imitation*, another is written as it were *Tropically*; another on the contrary doth allegorize by *Enigms*. For instance, in the *Kyriologick* way, to express the Sun, they make a Circle; the Moon, a Crescent. *Tropically*, they do properly traduce, and transfer, and express by exchanging some Things, and variously transfiguring others. Thus when they deliver the Praises of Kings, in Theological Fables, they write by *Anaglyphicks*. Of the third kind, by *Ænigms*, let this be an Example: All other Stars, by reason of their oblique Course, they likened to the Bodies of Serpents, but the Sun to that of a *Beetle*, because having formed a Ball of Cow-dung, and lying upon its back, it rolls it about (from Claw to Claw.) They say moreover, that this Creature liveth six Months under Ground, and the other half of the Year upon the Earth; and that it immits Seed into the Globe (of the Earth) and so generates, there being no Female of that Species. Hitherto *Clemens*.

Thus [i] *being acquainted with the Learning of that Nation, and enquiring into the Commentaries of the Priests of former Times, he knew the Observations of innumerable Ages*, as *Valerius Maximus* saith. And [k] *living admir'd and belov'd of all the Priests and Prophets with whom he conversed, he informed himself by their means accurately, concerning every thing; not omitting any Person, eminent at that Time for Learning, or any kind of religious Rites; nor leaving any Place unseen, by going into which he conceived that he might find something extraordinary.* [For [l] he went into the *Adyta* of the *Egyptians*, and, as [m] *Clemens* saith, permitted himself to that End to be circumcised) and learned Things not to be communicated concerning the Gods, mystick Philosophy.] *He travelled to all the Priests, and was instructed by every one, in that wherein they were particularly learned. In* Egypt *he lived twenty-two Years, in their Private Sacred Places, studying* Astronomy *and* Geometry, *and was initiated (not cursorily or casually) into all the religious Mysteries of the Gods.*

Laertius [n] saith, *He made three Cups of Silver, and presented them to each* [Society] *of the* Egyptian *Priests*; which, as we said, were three, of *Heliopolis*, *Memphis*, and *Thebes*.

CHAP. V.

How he went to Babylon.

Amasis [o] dying in the third Year of the sixty-third Olympiad, (which was the 223d of *Nabonassar*) his Son *Psamminitus* succeeded him, who is by *Cresias* named *Amistæus*, and seems to be the same whom [p] *Pliny* calls *Semniserteus*, (tho [q] others interpret it of *Amasis*) *in whose Reign*, saith he, *Pythagoras was in Egypt.* At this Time *Cambyses* invaded and conquered *Egypt*, [r] *by whom* Pythagoras *was taken Prisoner, and sent to* Babylon. *There he lived* [[s] with the most excellent among the *Chaldeans*, and] *with the Magi*, the *Persian* Magi, (for so [t] *Cicero*, [u] *Apuleius*, and [w] *Eusebius* term them) in respect that *Babylon* was then under that Monarchy; which is the meaning also of [x] *Valerius Maximus*, and [y] *Lactantius*, who affirm, that *he went from* Egypt *to the* Persians, (not to *Persia*, as [z] some conceive) *and resigned himself to the most exact Prudence of the Magi to be formed.*

[a] *The Magi received him kindly, and instructed him in the most profound and sublime Mysteries of the Worship of the Gods. By their means also he arrived at the Heighth of* Arithmetick, Musick, *and other Mathematical Sciences. From them*, saith [b] *Valerius Maximus, he, with a docile Mind, received the Motions of the Stars, their Power, Property, and Effects*, [c] *their States and Periods; the various Effects of both in the Nativities of Men, as likewise the Remedies of Diseases, which are purchased at vast Rates by Sea and Land.*

Of the *Chaldeans*, with whom he lived in *Babylon*, [d] *Diogenes* particularly instanceth *Zabratus, by whom he was cleansed from the Pollutions of his Life past, and instructed from what Things virtuous Persons ought to be free; and learnt the Discourse concerning Nature*, (Physick) *and what are the Principles of the Universe.* This *Zabratus* was probably the same with that *Zoroastres*, one of the *Persian* Magi, whom, [e] *Apuleius* saith, *he chiefly had for Teacher*, terming him, *Omnis divini arcanum antistatem*: And the same

[f] Strom. 1. [g] Porph. p. 8. [h] Clem. Alex. Strom. Lib. 5, [i] Val. Max. 8. 7. [k] Jam. Cap. 4. continuing. [l] Laert. 8. [m] Strom. 1. pag. 302. [n] Laert. 8. 2. [o] Herod. l. 3. cap. 14. [p] Lib. 36. cap. 9. [q] Usher Annal. 4167. [r] Jam. cap. 4. [s] Clem. Stro. 1. [t] *De Finib.* 5. [u] Florid. 2. [w] Præp. 10. [x] Lib. 8. cap. 7. [y] Lib. 4. c. 2. [z] Vorgius de Philosoph. Sectis cap. 6. sect. 4. [a] Jamb. continueth. [b] Lib. 3. [c] Apul. Florid. lib. 2. [d] Porph. p. 2. [e] Florid. 2.

same with *Mazaratus* the *Assyrian*, whom [f] *Alexander*, in his Book of Pythagorick Symbols, affirms to have been Master to *Pythagoras*; the same whom [g] *Suidas* calls *Zares*; *Cyril*, *Zaran*; *Plutarch*, *Zaratas*: Whence [h] some conceive, that they all mean *Zoroastres* the Magus, who was also called *Zarades*, as evidently appears from *Theodoret* and *Agathias*. Indeed he could not hear *Zoroastres* himself, as being some Ages later; yet it appears from the Relation of *Apulcius*, that many conceived *Pythagoras* to have been a Follower of *Zoroastres*. Perhaps him whose Doctrine *Pythagoras* embraced, (for [i] *Clemens* saith, *he explained* Zoroastres *the Persian Magus)* Posterity believed to have been his Master. This *Nazaratus* the *Assyrian* was by some supposed to be the Prophet *Ezekiel*; which Opinion *Clemens* oppugns; nevertheless (as Mr. *Selden* observes) the most accurate Chronology teacheth, that *Ezekiel* and *Pythagoras* flourished together, betwixt the 50th and 52d Olympiad; and therefore the Account of Time hinders not, but that this *Nazaratus* might be *Ezekiel*.

[k] *Diogenes* (in his Treatise of incredible things, beyond *Thule)* adds, that he went also to the *Hebrews*, which [l] *Lactantius* expressly denies. [m] *Eusebius* saith, *He is reported to have heard the* Persian Magi, *and the Diviners of the* Egyptians, *at what time some of the* Jews *were gone to* Babylon, *others to* Egypt. That he conversed with the *Jews* at *Babylon*, (saith the [n] Bishop of *Armagh)* may be argued, for that he transferred many of their Doctrines into his Philosophy, as *Hermippus* declares in his first Book of things concerning *Pythagoras*, cited by [o] *Josephus*; and in his first Book of Lawgivers, cited by [p] *Origen*, which likewise is confirmed by [q] *Aristobulus* the *Jew*, a Peripatetical Philosopher, in his first Book to *Philometor*; who moreover was induced by the same reason to believe, that the Books of *Moses* were translated into *Greek* before the *Persian* Empire; whereas it is much more probable, that *Pythagoras* receiv'd that Part of his Learning from the Conversation which he had with the *Hebrews*.

[s] *Alexander* adds, that he heard the *Galatæ* and the *Brachmanes*. *From* Chaldea (saith *Apuleius) he went to the* Brachmanes: *These are wise Persons, a Nation of* India, *for which reason he went to their Gymnosophists. The* Brachmanes *conferred many things to his Philosophy; what are the Documents of Minds, what the Exercises of Bodies, how many are the Parts of the Soul, how many the Vicissitudes of Life; what Torments or Rewards, according to their Merits, are allotted to Men after Death.*

[t] *Diogenes* adds, that *he went also to* Arabia, *and lived with the King there*; but it is not easy to find the Name of the Court of the King of that wandring Nation.

As concerning his Learning, it is generally said, that [v] *he learned many, and those the most excellent Parts of his Philosophy, of the* Barbarians. [w] *Diogenes* affirms, *he gained the greatest Part of his Wisdom from these Nations.* [x] *The Sciences which are called Mathematical, he learnt of the* Egyptians, *and the* Chaldeans, *and the* Phœnicians: *for the* Egyptians *were of old studious of Geometry; the* Phœnicians, *of Numbers and Proportions; the* Chaldeans, *of astronomical Theorems, divine Rites, and Worship of the Gods; and other Institutions concerning the Course of Life, he learned and received of the Magi. These are more generally known, as being committed to writing; but the rest of his Institutions are less known.*

[y] *Hermippus* saith, *He embraced the Opinions of the Thracians*; which [z] some interpret of *Pittacus*, whose Father *Hyrrhadius* was of that Country: But with more reason may it be understood of *Orpheus*, from whom *Jamblichus* acknowledgeth that he derived much of the theological Part of his Science.

CHAP. VI.

How he returned to Samos.

[a] HAving lived at *Babylon* twelve Years, he returned to *Samos* [for that he was redeemed by one *Gyllus* Prince of *Crotona*, *Apuleius* cites but for a less creditable Relation] about the fifty-sixth Year of his Age; *where being known by some of the most ancient Persons, he was looked upon with greater Admiration than before; for he seemed to them more wise, more beautiful, and more divinely majestic. His Country summoned him to some publick Employment, that he might benefit the Generality, and communicate his Knowledge: Which he not refusing, endeavoured to instruct them in the symbolical way of learning, altogether resembling that of the* Egyptians, *in which he himself had been instituted. But the* Samians *not affecting this way, did not apply themselves to him.*

Pythagoras, *tho' he saw that no Man came to him, or sincerely affected his Learning, endeavoured nevertheless all possible ways to continue amongst them, not despising or undervaluing* Samos, *because it was his Country. And whilst he was very desirous that his Countrymen should taste, though against their Wills, the Sweetness of his Mathematicks, he observed in a* Gymnasium, *a young Man that play'd at Tennis dextrously and nimbly, but otherwise poor and indigent: And imagining that this Youth would be wholly guided by him, if without Labour he should supply him with Necessaries; when they had done washing, he called him to him, and told him, That he would continually furnish him with all things sufficient for his Maintenance, if he would learn briefly, and without Labour, and constantly*

[f] Porph. p. 185. [g] In voce Pythagoras. [h] Selden de Diis Syris. Syntag. 2. [i] Strom. 1. [k] Porph. p. 8. [l] Lib. 4. c. 2. [m] Præpar. l. 13. [n] Annal. p. 151. [o] Contra Appion, l. 1. [p] Contra Celsum, l. 1. [q] Clem. Strom. 1. Euseb. Præpar. l. 13. [r] Clem. Alex. Strom. 1. [t] Porph. p. 185. [v] Clem. Strom. 1. [w] Porph. p. 8. [x] Ibid. p. 4. [y] Joseph. contra Appion, lib. 1. [z] Vossius de Philos. sect. c. 6. sect. 2. [a] Jamb. c. 4.

ly (that he might not be over-burthen'd) some Mathematicks, which he himself, when he was young, had learned of the Barbarians; *which had now left him, by reason of old Age and Forgetfulness. The Youth promising, and being allured by the Hopes of Maintenance, he endeavour'd to initiate him in Arithmetick and Geometry, drawing the Demonstration of each in a Table; and teaching him, he gave the young Man for every Scheme (or Diagram) three* Oboli, *as a Reward and Compensation. And this he continued to do a long time, out of a Love of Glory, and industriously bringing him into the Theory by an exact Method. But when the young Man, having made a good Progress, was sensible of the Excellency both of the Pleasure and the Consequences in Mathematicks, the wise Man perceiving it, and that he would not now quit his Learning, what Inconvenience soever he might suffer, pretended that he had no more* Trioboli *to give him.* "'Tis no matter, "saith the Youth; I am able to learn and receive "your Arithmeticks without it." *He replied,* "But "I have not sufficient to find Food for myself, "wherefore I must now give over, to acquire Ne- "cessaries for every Day, and daily Food; nor is it "fit now to be taken up with Tables and fruitless "Studies." *Whereupon the young Man, loth to be hindred from continuing his Learning, replied,* "I "will supply you, and in some manner requite you; "for I will give you for every Scheme three *Oboli.*" *And from thenceforward became so much in love with Mathematicks, that he alone of all the* Samians *was commended with* Pythagoras, *being likewise of the same Name, Son of* Eratocles. *His* Aleiptick Commentaries *are extant, and his Directions* to the Wrestlers of that Time, to eat Flesh instead of dried Figs; *which by some are falsly ascribed to* Pythagoras *the Son of* Mnesarchus, [as is formerly intimated] but by [b] *Pliny*, to one of that Name who professed Exercises of the Body, which agreeth with the Relation of *Jamblichus.*

CHAP. VII.

How he went to Delus, Delphi, Crete, *and* Sparta.

NOT long after, according to the Relation of [c] *Jamblichus*, Pythagoras *went to* Delus, *where he was much admir'd by the Inhabitants, for that he prayed only at the Altar of* Apollo Genitor, called [d] Unbloody, [which stands behind the horn Altar] [e] because it were offered only Wheat, and Barley, and Cakes; but no Victim, as *Aristotle* saith in his Treatise concerning the *Delian* Commonwealth, *and applied himself to none but the Attendants thereof.*

From Delus, [f] *Jamblichus* saith, *he went to all Places of* Oracle. [g] At *Delphi* he wrote an Elegy upon the Tomb of *Apollo*, whereby he declared that *Apollo* was Son of *Silenus*, but slain by *Pytho*, and buried in the Place called [h] *Triops*, which was so named, for that the three Daughters of *Triopas* mourned there for *Apollo*. *At* Delphi *also* ([i] *Aristoxenus* saith) *he learned many moral Documents of* Themistoclea.

He went also to *Crete* and *Sparta*, to acquaint himself with the Laws of *Minos* and *Lycurgus*, which at that time were much renowned, as [k] *Justin* and [l] *Jamblichus* affirm.

Neither was *Crete* less famous for religious Ceremonies, being esteemed the Place where *Jupiter* was born, and brought up by the *Corybantes* or *Dactyli*, Priests of *Cybele*, in a Cave of the Mountain *Ida*, which they so named after that *Phrygia*, whence they came. They had also a Tradition, that *Jupiter* was buried there, and shew'd his Tomb. Here [m] *Pythagoras* addressed himself to the Priests of *Morgus*, one of the *Idæan Dactyli*, who purify'd him with the *Ceraunian* Stone, [so called, in that it is conceived to be a Piece of *Jupiter*'s Thunderbolt, and therefore perhaps used by his Priests.] In the Morning he lay stretch'd forth upon his Face by the Sea-side; at Night by a River, crown'd with a Wreath, made of the Wooll of a black Lamb.

He also apply'd himself to the *Cretan Epimenides*, that eminent Southsayer, as *Apuleius* calls him. [n] He went [° down] with him into the *Idæan* Cave, wrapt in black Wooll, and stayed there three times nine Days, according to the Custom; and to *Jupiter*, and saw the Throne which is made yearly there for him, and writ an Epigram upon his Tomb, beginning thus:

Here Zan *deceased lies, whom* Jove *they call.*

Thus was he [p] initiated into all religious Rites, as well *Grecian* as *Barbarian.*

CHAP. VIII.

How he went to Olympia *and* Phlius.

[q] AFter he had made enquiry into the Laws and Customs of *Crete* and *Lacedæmon*, he went down to the Olympick Games; and having given a Proof of his multiplicious Knowledge, to the Admiration of all *Greece*, being demanded what his Appellation was, he answer'd, that he was not *Sophos*, Wise; (for excellent Men had already possess'd that Name) but *Philosophos*, a Lover of Wisdom.

But [r] some relate this as done at *Sicyon*, in discourse with *Leon*, Tyrant of that Place; others at *Phlius*, distant from *Sicyon* a hundred Furlongs. Of the latter are [s] *Heraclides*, in his Book of the breathless Woman; and [t] *Soficrates* in his Successions. The

[a] Lib. 23. c. 7. [b] Cap. 5, & 7. [c] Clem. Strom. 7. [d] Laert. 8. 13. [e] Cap. 5. p. 40. [f] Porph. p. 10, 11. [g] Reading ἐν τῷ καλαμίνῃ τρίποδι. Hesych. Τρίοψ, ὁ ὑπὸ τῶν Πυθαγορικῶν ἐν Δελφοῖς τρίπους. [h] Laert. ibid. [i] Lib. 20. [k] Cap. 5. [l] Porph. p. 11. [m] Ibid. p. 11. [n] Laert. 8. 3. [o] Ibid. 8. 2. [p] Val. Max. 8. 7. [q] Laert. in Proem. [r] Ibid. [s] Laert. vit. Pyth.

The Teſtimony of *Heraclides* is thus delivered by [v] *Cicero*. He went (as is reported) to *Phlius*, and diſcourſed upon ſome things learnedly and copiouſly with *Leo* Prince of the *Phliaſians*. *Leo* admiring his Wit and Eloquence, demanded in what Art he did moſt confide? He anſwered, "That he knew "no Art, but was a Philoſopher. *Leo* wondring at "the Novelty of the Name, asked, Who were "Philoſophers, and what Difference there is be-"tween them and others? *Pythagoras* anſwered, "That human Life ſeem'd to reſemble that publick "Convention, which is celebrated with the Pomp "and Games of all *Greece*. For, as there, ſome "by bodily Exerciſes aim at the Glory and Nobility "of a Crown; others are led away by Gain in "Buying or Selling: But there is a certain Kind of "Perſons, and that thoſe of the better Quality, who "ſeek neither Applauſe nor Gain, but come to be-"hold, and curiouſly obſerve what is done, and "how. So we coming out of another Life and "Nature into this Life, as out of ſome City into "the full Throng of a publick Meeting, ſome ſerve "Glory, others Riches: Only ſome few there are, "who deſpiſing all things elſe, ſtudiouſly enquire "into the Nature of things. Theſe he called En-"quirers after Wiſdom, that is, Philoſophers."

Thus, whereas Learning before was called *Sophia*, *Wiſdom*; and the Profeſſors thereof, *Sophoi*, *Wiſe Men*, (as *Thales* and the reſt, of whom we treated in the firſt Book) * *Pythagoras*, by a more modeſt Appellation, named it *Philoſophy*, *Love of Wiſdom*; and its Profeſſors, *Philoſophers*; conceiving the Attribute of Wiſe not to belong to Men, but to God only; that which is properly termed Wiſdom, being far above human Capacity. [w] "For though "the Frame of the whole Heaven, and the Stars "which are carried about in it, if we conſider their "Order, is fair; yet is it ſuch but by Participation "of the primary Intelligible, who is a Nature of "Numbers and Proportions, diffuſing itſelf through "the Univerſe; according to which, all theſe things "are ordered together, and adorn'd decently. Wiſ-"dom therefore is a true Knowledge, converſant "about thoſe fair things which are firſt, and divine, "and incommixt, and always the ſame; by Parti-"cipation whereof, we may call other things Fair. "But Philoſophy is an Imitation of that Science, "which likewiſe is an excellent Knowledge, and "did aſſiſt towards the Reformation of Mankind."

CHAP. IX.

How he lived at Samos.

[x] HAving been a diligent Auditor and Diſciple of all theſe, he returned home, and earneſtly addicted himſelf to Enquiry after ſuch things as he had omitted; and firſt, [as ſoon as he returned to *Ionia*] (ſaith *Antiphon*, cited by [y] *Porphyrius*, repeated and enlarged by *Jamblichus*) *he built* [in his Country] *within the City*, a School, which even yet is called the Semicircle of *Pythagoras*, in which the *Samians*, when they would conſult about publick Affairs, aſſemble; chuſing to enquire after things Honeſt, Juſt, and Advantageous in that Place, which he, who took care of them all, had erected. Without the City he made a Cave, proper for his Study of Philoſophy, in which he lived for the moſt part Day and Night, [and diſcourſed with his Friends] and made enquiry into the moſt uſeful Part of Mathematicks, taking the ſame Courſe as *Minos* Son of *Jupiter*. And ſo far did he ſurpaſs all whom he taught, that they for the ſmalleſt Theorems were reputed great Perſons.

Pythagoras now perfected the Science of the celeſtial Bodies, and over-run it, with all Demonſtrations arithmetical and geometrical. Nor this only, but he became much more admir'd for the things he performed afterwards; for Philoſophy had now received a great Increaſe, and all *Greece* began to admire him; and the beſt and moſt ſtudious Perſons, for his ſake, reſorted to *Samos*, deſiring to participate of his Inſtitutions.

CHAP. X.

His Voyage to Italy.

BUT [z] *Pythagoras* being engaged by his Countrymen in all Embaſſies, and conſtrained to be intereſted in their publick Negotiations, and perceiving that if he ſhould comply with the Laws of his Country, and continue there, it would be hard for him to ſtudy Philoſophy; for which reaſon, all former Philoſophers ended their Lives in foreign Countries: Weighing all theſe Conſiderations, and to avoid civil Employments; or, as others ſay, declining the Negligence of Learning, which at that time poſſeſs'd the *Samians*, departed into *Italy*, preferring that Place before his Country, which contained moſt Perſons fervently deſirous of Learning.

But before we ſpeak of his Actions in *Italy*, it will be requiſite, as well to ſettle the Time of his coming, as the State of that Country as it was at that Time. It was a received Opinion amongſt the more ancient, but leſs learned *Romans*, that *Pythagoras* was contemporary with King *Numa*. The Occaſion of that Tradition might perhaps ariſe from thoſe Books, which were found in the Sepulchre of *Numa* 803 Years after his Death, as *Antius Valerius*, cited by [a] *Livy*, and *Caſſius Hemina*, by [b] *Pliny*, relate; and ſuppoſed to contain Pythagorical Philoſophy. But that Opinion is long ſince refuted, by the more learn-

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[v] Tuſcul. quæſt. 5. * Laert. Proœm. [w] Jamb. in vit. Pyth. [x] Jamb. c. 5. p. 20. [y] Page 6. [z] Jamb. c. 5. p. 6.
* Decad. 40. lib. ult. [b] Lib. 13. c. 13. ſect. 27.

ed *Romans* and *Grecians*, *Cicero*, *Titus Livius*, *Dionysius Halicarnassæus*, *Plutarch*, and others.

They who have looked more strictly into the Time of *Pythagoras*, seem to follow two different Accounts. *Jamblichus* saith, that he lived in *Egypt* 22 Years; that he was carried from thence by *Cambyses*; that he lived in *Babylon* 12 Years; that from thence he returned to *Samos*, being 56 Years old; that from *Samos* he went into *Italy* in the 62d Olympiad, *Erixidas*, a *Chalcidean*, being Victor at the Olympick Games: From whence it follows, that he went into *Egypt* about the third Year of the 53d Olympiad, and that he was born the second Year of the 48th Olympiad; and that it was the 52d Olympiad, when he, in the 18th Year of his Age, heard *Thales*, *Pherecydes*, and *Anaximander*. This Account seems to be followed by *Laertius*, *Porphyrius*, *Themistius*, *Suidas*, (from *Laertius*) and others, who affirm, he went from *Samos* into *Italy*, at what Time *Polycrates* was Tyrant of *Samos*, conceiving it unfit for a Philosopher to live under such a Government: For by [c] *Diodorus*, *Pythagoras* is acknowledged in the 61st Olympiad, *Thericles* being Archon; by [d] *Clemens Alexandrinus*, about the 62d Olympiad, under *Polycrates*; and in the second Year of the 64th Olympiad, *Polycrates* was betrayed and put to death by *Oroetas*. This Account [e] *Antiochus* also seems to follow, who reckons from the Time of *Pythagoras* to the Death of *Epicurus* 312 Years. *Epicurus* died in the second Year of the 127th Olympiad; the 312th Year upwards, is the first of the 49th Olympiad. Neither is *Livy* much different from this Computation, who makes him to come into *Italy*, *Servio Tullio regnante*, who died about a Year or two before. And this Account might be the Occasion of making him live to 90 Years, as *Laertius* saith many do; and to 104 Years, as the nameless Author of his Life in *Photius*, the Year of his Death being, according to *Eusebius*, the fourth of the 70th Olympiad.

But this Account may, with good Reason, be question'd; for if it be granted, (as by *Jamblichus* himself, and other good Authorities it is affirmed) that *Pythagoras* was in *Egypt* when *Cambyses* subdu'd it, and that he was carried away Captive by him into *Babylon*, the Time of his going into *Italy* must of necessity be much later; for *Cambyses* invaded *Egypt* in the fifth Year of his Reign, which is the third Year of the 63d Olympiad, and the 223d Year of *Nabonassar*, of which there is no question in Chronology. For that the seventh Year of *Cambyses* is known to be the 225th Year of *Nabonassar*; because *Ptolemy* in his [f] *Almegist* relates an astronomical Observation of a lunar Eclipse at *Babylon*, on the 17th Day of the Month *Pharenoth*, according to the *Egyptians*, which is with us the 16th of *July*, one Hour before Midnight. From whence now it follows, that if he lived 22 Years in *Egypt*, that then he went thither in the third Year of the 58th Olympiad; and that if he had staid in *Babylon* twelve Years, he went into *Italy* about the End of the 66th Olympiad; and that if he were then 56 Years old, he was not born before the first Year of the 53d Olympiad. And according to this Account, they who make him to live but 70 or 80 Years, do not much differ in the Time of his Death from them, who, according to the other Account, make him live so much longer; for they who give him most Years, do not make him to die later, but to be born sooner.

This Account they seem to follow, who affirm, [g] he went from *Samos* to *Italy*, for that he could not brook *Syloson* the Brother of *Polycrates*, on whom (being a private Person, after his Brother's Death) *Darius Hystaspis* afterward bestow'd the Tyranny of *Samos*, in requital of a Garment which *Syloson* had given him, before he came to the Empire. And thus perhaps is [h] *Strabo* to be understood, who saith, Pythagoras, *as they reported, in the Time of* Polycrates, *seeing the Tyranny begun, forsook the City, and went from thence to* Egypt *and* Babylon, *out of Love to Learning; and returning Home, and seeing that the Tyranny continued still, he went into* Italy, *where he ended his Days.* By this Continuation of the Tyranny, seems to be meant the Reign of *Syloson*, who [i] ruled so cruelly, that many Persons forsook the City, insomuch that it became a Proverb,

A Region vast
By Syloson *laid waste.*

With both these Accounts agree what [k] *Cicero* and [l] *Agellius* affirm, concerning his coming into *Italy*, that it was in the Reign of *Tarquinius Superbus*; but to neither can that of [m] *Pliny* be accommodated, who saith, that *Pythagoras observed the Nature of the Star* Venus *about the* 42d *Olympiad, which was of the City of* Rome *the* 142d *Year.* There must therefore be either an Error in both the Numbers; or, which I rather believe, in *Pliny* himself, occasion'd, perhaps, by mistaking *Tarquinius Priscus* (under whom they both fall) for *Tarquinius Superbus*, under whom *Pythagoras* flourished.

If therefore he came into *Italy* in the Reign of *Tarquinius Superbus*, the Opinion of [n] *Cicero* is to be received, that he was there when *Lucius Brutus* freed his Country; and upon the Expulsion of *Tarquinius Superbus*, he and *Lucius Collatinus* were made the first Consuls, at which Time the Dominion of the *Romans* extended not any way above six Miles from their City; and the southern Parts of *Italy* were chiefly inhabited by the *Grecians*, who at several Times had there planted divers Colonies, whereof we shall only mention those which were more particularly concerned in the Actions of *Pythagoras*.

[a] Excerpt. Vales. p. 241. [b] Lib. 14. [c] Strabo, ibid. [d] Strom. [e] Tusc. Quæst. 1. 16. [f] Clem. Strom. 1. [g] Lib. 17. cap. ult. [h] Lib. 5. c. 4. [i] Lib. 2. c. 8. [k] Diod. in Excerpt. Vales. p. 243. [l] Tusc. Quæst. l. 6. 1

The moſt ancient of theſe is *Metapontum*, ſeated in the *Bay* of *Tarentum*, betwixt *Heraclea* and *Tarentum*, built by *Neſtor* and the [o] *Pylians*, a People of *Peloponneſus*. Long after were founded,

Catana, a City on the Eaſt-ſide of *Sicily*, betwixt *Meſſena* and *Syracuſe*, built by a Colony of *Chalcideans* in the [p] 11th Olympiad.

Tarentum in *Italy*, in the [q] 18th Olympiad, built [r] by the *Parthenians*, who were Children of the *Lacedæmonian* Women, born in the Abſence of their Husbands at the *Meſſanian* Wars, and therefore called *Parthenians* in reproach; which not brooking, they conſpired againſt the *Lacedæmonian* People; but being betrayed and baniſhed, came hither.

Crotona, a City in the *Bay* of *Tarentum*, built in the [s] 19th Olympiad [t] by a Colony of *Achæans*, under the Conduct of *Miſcellus*; by whom named *Crotona*, at the Command of *Hercules*, in memory of *Croto* his Hoſt, whom having unwittingly ſlain, he buried there. This City, for being built by the Command of *Hercules*, engraved his Figure in their Coins.

Sybaris, a City diſtant from *Crotona* 200 Furlongs, according to *Strabo*'s Account; but, as others conceive, more than twice ſo much; built at the ſame time [u] by a Colony of *Troezenians*, under the Conduct of *Iſeliceus*, betwixt the two Rivers *Crathis* and *Sybaris*.

[w] *Locri* in *Italy*, built the 24th Olympiad by the *Locrians*, a People of *Achaia*.

[x] *Agrigentum*, an *Ionian* Colony, built by the *Geloans* [y] 108 Years after their own Foundation. [z] *Gela* was built in the 45th Year after *Syracuſa*: [a] *Syracuſa* in the 11th Olympiad: *Agrigentum* therefore in the 49th.

To theſe add, of leſs certain Time, *Rhegium* in *Calabria*, built by the *Chalcedeans*. *Nimera* and *Tauromenium* in *Sicily*, Colonies of the *Zanclæans*. Indeed ſo generally was the Pythagorical Doctrine received in theſe Parts, that [b] *Jamblichus* affirms, *All* Italy *was filled with Philoſophical Perſons; and whereas before it was obſcure, afterwards, by reaſon of* Pythagoras, *it was named* Μεγάλη Ἑλλάς, Magna Græcia.

CHAP. XI.

His Arrival at Crotona, *and upon what Occaſion he firſt became eminent there.*

HE came at firſt to *Crotona*, the State of which City in particular was this: [c] At the Beginning, the *Crotonians* joining with the *Sybarites* and the *Metapontines*, determined to expel the reſt of the *Grecians* out of *Italy*. They firſt took the City of *Syris*; and taking it ill that at their beſieging *Syris* the *Locrians* aſſiſted the adverſe Party, raiſed a War againſt them; related thus by [d] *Juſtin*: "The *Locrians* being terrify'd, recur to the *Spartans* for Refuge, "and beg their Aid. They, oppreſs'd with a long "War, bad them ſeek Help of *Caſtor* and *Pollux*. "Neither did the Ambaſſadors ſlight the Advice of "the Aſſociate City; but going into the next Temple, they ſacrific'd, and implor'd the Help of the "Gods: Having offered Victims, and obtained, as "they thought, what they requeſted, no leſs joyful, "than as if they were to carry the Gods themſelves "along with them, they made Couches for them in "the Ship, and by a fortunate Voyage bring Comfort, inſtead of Relief, to their Countrymen. "This known, the *Crotonians* alſo ſend Ambaſſadors to the Oracle at *Delphi*, praying for Victory, "and a happy Succeſs of the War. Anſwer is "made, that Enemies muſt be overcome in Vows "firſt, before in Arms. They vow'd to *Apollo* the "Tents of the Spoil. The *Locrians* underſtanding "the Vow of their Enemies, and the Anſwer of the "God, vow'd the Ninths, and kept it ſecret, leſt "they might be out-done in vowing. Being drawn "forth into the Field, the *Crotonian* Army conſiſting of 120000 Soldiers; the *Locrians* beholding "how ſmall a Number they were, (for they had "but 15000) gave over all Hope of Victory, and "unanimouſly reſolved to die; and ſo great Courage did every Man take from Deſperation, that "they conceived they ſhould be Conquerors, if "they did not die unwillingly. But whilſt they "fought to die honourably, they overcame more "fortunately; neither was there any other Cauſe of "that Victory, than that they deſpaired of it. Whilſt "they were in Sight, an Eagle never left the *Locrian* "Army, but flew about it all the while, until they "had gain'd the Victory. In the Wings of the Army alſo, two young Men, armed after a faſhion "different from all the reſt, of extraordinary Bigneſs, on white Horſes, in crimſon Mantles, were "ſeen to fight; and, after the Fight, were ſeen no "more. This Wonder was increaſed by the incredible Swiftneſs of Fame; for the very ſame Day "that this Fight happen'd in *Italy*, the Victory was "reported at *Corinth*, *Athens*, and *Lacedæmon*. After this, the *Crotonians* uſed no military Exerciſe, "nor minded Arms; for they hated what they had "taken up unſucceſsfully, and would have changed "their Life into Luxury, had it not been for *Pythagoras* the Philoſopher." Hitherto *Juſtin*.

"As ſoon as he arriv'd in *Italy*, and came to *Crotona*, *Dicæarchus* [e] ſaith, that upon the coming "of a Perſon, who was a great Traveller, and excellent,

[o] Solin. c. 2. [p] Euſeb. Chron. [q] Euſeb. ibid. [r] Strab. ibid. [s] Euſeb. ibid. [t] Strab. l. 6. [u] Solin. c. 2. [w] Euſeb. Chron. [x] Strab. l. 6. [y] Thucyd. l. 6. [z] Thucyd. ibid. [a] Euſeb. Chron. [b] Cap. 29. [c] Juſtin. l. 20. 2. [d] Lib. 20. [e] Porph. vit. Pythag. p. 187.

" cellent, and through a peculiar Advantage of Na-
" ture, prosperously guided by Fortune, (for he was
" of a free Presence, tall, graceful in his Speech and
" Gesture, and in all things else) the Citizens of
" *Crotona* were so taken with him, that having won
" the Affections of the old Men, who were the Ma-
" gistrates of the City, and made an excellent and
" large Discourse to the young Men; he did the se-
" cond Time, by command from the Magistrates,
" make an Exhortation to the young Men, and af-
" terwards to the Boys, who came flocking out of
" the School to hear him; and lastly, to the Wo-
" men, assembled to that Purpose. The Occasion
" and Manner mentioned by *Plutarch* and [e] *Porphy-*
" *rius*, related thus by [f] *Jamblichus*.

" At this Time, walking from *Sybaris* to *Croto-*
" *na*, upon the Sea side, he lighted upon some Fi-
" sher-men; and whilst their Net was yet at the
" Bottom loaden, he told them exactly the Num-
" ber of the Fishes that they should draw up. And
" the Men undertaking to do whatsoever he should
" command them, if it fell out accordingly; he re-
" quired them to turn back again the Fishes alive,
" after they had exactly numbred them; and which
" is more wonderful, not one of all the Number, at
" that Time, of the Fishes, whilst they were out of
" the Water, died; he being present, and giving the
" Fishermen the Price of the Fish, he departed to
" *Crotona*. But they divulged what was done, and,
" learning his Name of the Boys, declared it to eve-
" ry one; which they hearing, desired to see the
" Stranger, which was opportune to him; for he
" was of such an Aspect, that whosoever saw him
" could not but admire him, and conceive him to
" be the Person that he really was."

CHAP. XII.

His Oration to the young Men.

[g] SOME few Days after, he went into the pub-
lick School, and the young Men flocking to
him, it is said, that he made Discourses to them,
wherein [h] he exhorted them to respect their Elders,
declaring, " That in the World, and in Life, and
" in Cities, and in Nature, that which is precedent
" in Time is more honourable than that which is
" subsequent; as, the East than the West, the Morn-
" ing than the Evening, the Beginning than the
" End, Generation than Corruption; moreover,
" Natives than Strangers. In like manner, in Co-
" lonies, the Leader and Planter of Cities, and ge-
" nerally the Gods than Dæmons, Dæmons than
" Semi-gods, Heroes than Men: And of these
" (Men) the Causes of Generation, than the young-
" er. This he said by way of Induction, to make
" them have a greater Esteem of their Parents, to
" whom, he said, they had as much Obligation, as
" a dead Man might owe to him that should raise
" him again to Life. Moreover, that it was just to
" love above all, and never to afflict the first, and
" those who have done us greatest Benefits: But Pa-
" rents only, by the Benefit of Generation, are the
" first, and Predecessors are the Causes of all Things
" that succeed rightly to their Successors; shewing,
" that they are nothing less beneficial to us than the
" Gods, against whom it is not possible to offend in
" so doing; and the Gods themselves cannot but in
" Justice pardon those, who reverence their Parents
" equal to them; for it is from them that we learn
" to worship the Deity; whence *Homer* gives the
" King of the Gods the same Stile, calling him, *Fa-*
" *ther of Gods and Mortals*. And many other fabu-
" lous Writers have delivered, that the chiefest of
" the Gods were ambitious to make up the divided
" Love of Children, by a new Conjunction of Pa-
" rents; and for this End, making a new Suppositi-
" tion of Father and Mother, *Jupiter* brought forth
" *Minerva*; *Juno*, *Vulcan*; of a contrary Sex to
" their own, that they might participate of that
" Love which was more remote.

" Now all Persons granting the Judgment of the
" Gods to be strongest, he demonstrated this particu-
" larly to the People of *Croto*, because that *Hercules*
" was of Affinity with them, therefore they ought
" willingly to obey the Injunctions of their Parents,
" since they understood, that this God, in Obedi-
" ence to another elder than himself, underwent his
" Labours, and presented to his Father, as the Epi-
" nicium of his Actions, the Olympick Games.

" He declared likewise [i], that in their Conversati-
" on to one another they should so behave themselves,
" that they might hereafter never become Enemies to
" their Friends, but might soon become Friends to
" their Enemies; as to their Friends they should ne-
" ver become Enemies, but to their Enemies quickly
" become their Friends. And that they should study
" in their Behaviour towards their Elders, their Re-
" verence towards their Parents, and in their Love
" to one another, their Community towards their
" Brethren.

" Furthermore he discoursed concerning Tempe-
" rance, saying, that young Men should make Try-
" al of their Nature at that Time, in which they
" have their Desires vigorous. Then he advised
" them, that it was worth their Observation, that
" this only Virtue was convenient both for Children,
" and Maids, and Women, and old Men, but espe-
" cially for young Men. Further, this Virtue only
" declares, that they understand the Goods of the
" Body and the Soul, seeing it preserves Health, and

[e] Vit. Pyth. [f] Cap. 8. [g] Jambl. continueth. [h] The Beginning of this Oration is in *Laertius* also, L. 8. Num. 22, 23.
[i] This also is in *Laertius*.

" a Desire of the best Studies. This is manifest " from the contrary; for the *Barbarians* and the " *Grecians* contending about *Troy*, both Parties, for " the Intemperance of one Man, fell into extraordi- " nary Calamities; those in the War; these in their " Voyage home. And God appointed ten Years, " and a thousand Years, only for the Punishment of " this Injustice, foretelling by Oracle the taking of " *Troy*, and the sending of the Virgins by the *Locri-* " *ans*, to the Temple of *Minerva* the *Ilian*.

" He likewise exhorted the young Men to love " Learning, telling them, how absurd it were to " judge Learning to be the most advantageous of all " Things, and to wish for it above all Things, yet " to bestow no Time or Pains in that Exercise: es- " pecially, seeing the Care of our Bodies is like evil " Friends, which soon forsake us; but that of Insti- " tution, like the good, which stay with a Man till " Death; procuring to some immortal Glory after " Death.

" He framed many other Things, partly out of " History, partly out of Doctrines, shewing, that " Learning was a common Nobility of those, who " were first in every Kind; for their Inventions " were the Institutions of the rest. Thus is this na- " turally advantageous; that of other commendable " Things, some it is not possible to communicate to " another, as Strength, Beauty, Health, Courage; " some, whosoever imparts them to another, can- " not have them himself, as Riches, Government, " and the like: But for this, you may receive it of " another, and yet the Giver have nothing the less " of it. Moreover some, a Man cannot gain if he " would, he may receive Institution if he will: " Then he may apply himself to the Affairs of his " Country, not upon self-confidence, but Institu- " on; for by Education, Men differ from Beasts, " *Greeks* from *Barbarians*, Freemen from Slaves, " Philosophers from the Vulgar. Who have in ge- " neral this Advantage, that as of those who run " swifter than others, there had been seven out of " this their own City, at one Celebration of the " Olympick Games; but of such as did excel in " Wisdom, there had been found but seven in the " whole World; and in the following Times in " which he lived, there was but one who did excel " all others in Philosophy: For he called himself by " that Name, *(Philosopher)* instead of *Sophos*, a " wise Man.

CHAP. XIII.

His Oration to the Senators.

[k] THUS he discoursed to the young Men in the School; but they relating to their Fathers what he had said, the Thousand-men summoned *Pythagoras* to the Court, and commending him for the Advice he had given to their Sons, they com- manded him, that if he had any thing which might benefit the People of *Crotona*, he should declare it to the Magistrates of the Commonwealth.

The *Crotonians* (saith [l] *Valerius Maximus*) did earnestly intreat him, that he would permit their Se- nate, which consisted of a thousand Persons, to use his Advice.

" Hereupon he first advised them to build a Tem- " ple to the Muses, that they might preserve their " present Concord; for these Goddesses [m] have all " the same Appellation, and [n] have a reciprocal " Communication and Delight, chiefly in Ho- " nours common to them all; and the *Chorus* of " the Muses is always one and the same. More- " ver, Concord, Harmony, Rythm, all those " Things which procure Unanimity, are compre- " hended.

" He likewise shewed them, that their Power did " not only extend to the excellent, but to the Con- " cord and Harmony of Beings.

" Further he said, they ought to conceive, they " received their Country as a *depositum* from their " People: Wherefore they ought so to manage it, " as being hereafter to resign up their Trust with a " just Account to their own Children. That this " will certainly be, if they be equal to all their Ci- " tizens, and excel other Men in nothing more than " in Justice; knowing, that every Place requireth " Justice. He show'd it out of the Mythology, " that *Themis* hath the same Place with *Jupiter*, as " *Dice* with *Pluto*, and Law among Cities; so that " he who did any thing unjustly in Things under " his Charge, seemed to abuse the whole World, " [*both above, below, and on Earth.*]

" That it is convenient in Courts of Judicature, " that [o] none attest the Gods by Oath, but use to " speak such Things, as that he may be believed " without Oath.

" Moreover, that every one should so govern his " Family, as that they should refer themselves to " their own House, as to a Court of Judicature, " and that they should be naturally affectionate to " such as are descended of them, as having only of " all Creatures received the Sense of this Affection; " and that they should converse with the Woman " that is Partner of their Life: For, as some Men " making Contracts with others, write them in " Tables and Pillars; those with Wives, are in the " Children. And that they should endeavour to be " belov'd of those which come from them, not by " Nature, of which they are not the Cause, but by " Election; for that Kindness is voluntary.

" That they should likewise take Care, that they " know no Women but their Wives, and that the

" Wives

[k] Jambl. c. 9. [l] Lib. 8. c. 18. [m] Μοῦσαι q. ἱμνοῦσαι. Synes. in Dione, & Cassidor. l. 3. var. [n] Ar. 1. Apost. ἀπικοινω- πάσαι αἱ ἐπώνυμαι ἀλλήλαις. Cicer. quasi cognatione quadam, &c. [o] To the same Effect *Laertius*.

" Wives do not adulterate the Race, through the " Careleſneſs and Wickedneſs of their Husbands.

" Further, they muſt conſider, they take the " Wife from the Altar with Librations, as a Vota- " reſs, in the Sight of the Gods, and ſo to go in un- " to her, and that ſhe become, in Order and Tem- " perance, a Pattern to thoſe that live in the Houſe " with her, and to the Women of the City.

" And that they ſhould ſee carefully that none " tranſgreſs, leſt, not fearing the Puniſhments of " Law, ſuch as do unjuſtly lie hid; but having a " Reſpect to Honeſty in their Carriage, they may " be incited to Juſtice.

" Further, he commanded, that in all their Acti- " ons they ſhould avoid Idleneſs; for there is no " other good, than the Opportunity in every Acti- " on.

" He aſſerted, that it is the greateſt of Injuſtice, " to ſeparate Children and Parents from each other.

" That he is to be thought the greateſt Perſon, " who can of himſelf foreſee what is advantageous: " the next to whom is he, who by thoſe Things " which happen to other Men, obſerves what is " good for himſelf. The worſt is he, who ſtays to " learn what is beſt, by the Experience of ſuffering " Ill.

" He ſaid, that they who are deſirous of Glory, " ſhall not do amiſs, if they imitate thoſe who are " crowned for running; for they do no Harm to " their Adverſaries, but deſire that they themſelves " may obtain the Victory. And it beſeemeth Ma- " giſtrates not to be rigid to thoſe who contradict " them, but to benefit thoſe who obey them.

" He likewiſe exhorted every one that aimed at " true Glory, to be indeed ſuch, as he deſired to ap- " pear to others; for it is not ſo ſacred a Thing to " be adviſed by another, as to be praiſed for what is " done; for one is only requiſite to Men, the other " much more uſed by the Gods.

" In concluſion he ſaid, that their City chanced " to be built by *Hercules*. When he drove [*Gerion's*] " Oxen through *Italy*, being injured by *Lacinius*, " *Croto* coming to help him; not knowing him by " reaſon of the Night, and thinking him to be one " of his Enemies, he ſlew him; and then promi- " ſing at his Grave, that he would build a City " which ſhould bear his Name, if ever he came to " be a God; in Gratitude for his Kindneſs, he ſaid, " it behoved them to govern their Commonwealth " juſtly.

" They hearing this, built a Temple to the Mu- " ſes, and put away the Concubines which they " uſed to keep; and intreated him to diſcourſe ſeve- " rally in the Temple of *Pythian Apollo* to the Boys, " and in the Temple of [p] *Juno* to the Women."

CHAP. XIV.

His Oration to the Boys.

[q] HE being perſuaded by them, diſcourſed to the Boys in this Manner; " That they ſhould " neither begin Contumelies, nor return them to " the Reproachers,

" And concerning παιδεία, (Inſtitution) which " is of the ſame Name as the Time of their Youth, " he commanded them diligently to purſue it; ad- " ding, that to a well diſpoſed Youth, it is eaſy to " preſerve Honeſty throughout all his Life; but to " him that is not well diſpoſed, it is hard at that " Time to continue it, but more difficult from an ill " beginning to run to the End.

" Moreover he declared, that they are moſt belo- " ved of the Gods, and for that Reaſon in Times of " Dearth, they are ſent forth to pray to the Gods " for Rain, as if the Deity would ſooneſt hear them. " And they only being always ſanctified, had leave " to live in the Temple.

" For the ſame Reaſon, the Gods that are moſt " Kind to Men, *Apollo* and *Cupid*, are by all Pain- " ters repreſented, as having that Age (of Boys.) " It is likewiſe acknowledged, that the crowned " Games were inſtituted for the ſake of Boys; the " *Pythian*, upon the Conqueſt of *Pytho* by a Boy; " that in *Nemea*, for a Boy likewiſe; and that in " *Iſthmus*, upon the Death of *Archemorus* and *Me- " licertus*.

" Beſides all this, at the building of the City *Cro- " to*, *Apollo* told the Leader of the Colony, that he " would give him a Progeny, if he conducted his " Colony to *Italy*; whence they ought to reflect, " that *Apollo* hath a particular Providence for that " Generation; and over Youth, even all the Gods. " Wherefore they ought to ſtudy to be worthy of " their Love, and employ themſelves in hearing, " that they may be able to ſpeak. Moreover, if " they would live to be old themſelves, they ſhould " obey their Elders, and not contradict them; for " by that Means they will become eſteemed worthy, " not to be injured by thoſe that are younger than " themſelves."

CHAP. XV.

His Oration to the Women.

IT is ſaid, [r] that he diſcourſed to the Women con- cerning Sacrifices; firſt, that " As when another " Man were to pray for them, they would have him " to be honeſt and good, becauſe the Gods hearken " to ſuch Men; in like Manner ought they above " all

[p] Mentioned by *Cicero*, and others. [q] Jambl. c. 21. [r] Jambl. c. 11.

" all things so to behave themselves, as that they may " indeed have the Gods attentive to their Prayers.

" Next, that they must present the Gods with " such Things, as they themselves make with their " own Hands; and without the Help of Servants, " offer them at the Altar; as Cakes, Wax and In- " cense: but that they present not the Deity with " Slaughter and Death; nor that they offer so much " at one Time, as if they were never to come thi- " ther again.

" As concerning their Conversation towards their " Husbands, he commanded them to consider, that " Fathers did yield to their Daughters, that their " Husbands should be more beloved by them than " their Parents. Wherefore it is fit, that either they " contradict their Husbands in nothing, or then " think they have the Victory, when they are over- " ruled by them.

" Moreover he spared that celebrious Apophthegm " concerning Coition, that for her who riseth from " her own Husband, it is lawful to go to the Tem- " ples the same Day; but for her who riseth from " him that is not her Husband, never.

" He exhorted them likewise, throughout their " whole Life to speak well of others, and to take " care that others speak well of them, and that they " destroy not that good Report which is given; nor " confute those Mythographers, who (seeing the " Justice of Women, in respect that they lend their " Garments without Witness, when any hath need " of them, and that they made no Bargains and " Engagements) feigned three Women who made " use of one Eye amongst them, because of their " readiness to communicate. Which if apply'd to " Men, as if when one had received any thing, he " should restore presently, or communicate to his " Neighbour, every one would say, there is no such " Thing, it being contrary to their Nature.

" Further, he who is said to be the wisest of all " Persons, who disposed the Language of Men, and " invented all Names, whether he were a God, or " a Dæmon, or some divine Man, upon considera- " tion, because the female Sex is most addicted to " Piety, made every Degree of Age synonymous " with some God, and called the unmarried Wo- " man, *Core*; her who is given to Man, [t] *Nympha*; " her who hath Children, *Mother*; her who hath " Childrens Children, in the Dorick Dialect, *Ma- " ja*; to which respect of their Devotion, it agrees, " that the Oracles at *Dodona* and *Delphi*, are deli- " vered by Women.

" Having thus commended their Devotion, he " converted his Discourse to speak of Decency of " Habit, that none should presume to wear any " sumptuous Cloaths, but offer them all at *Juno's* " Temple (which amounted to) many Millions of " Garments.

" He is reported also to have said thus, that " throughout the Country of the *Crotoniates*, the Vir- " tue of a Man towards his Wife was much celebra- " ted. *Ulysses* refusing Immortality at *Calypso's* " Hands, rather than to forsake *Penelope*. Let it " be the Part of the Wives to express their virtuous " Loyalty towards their Husbands, that this Praise " may be reciprocal.

CHAP. XVI.

His Institution of a Sect in Private and Publick.

BY this Discourse, [u] *Pythagoras* gained no small Honour and Esteem in *Crotona*, and by means of that City, throughout all *Italy*.

At the first [x] Oration which he made in *Crotona*, he attracted many Followers, insomuch that it is said, he gained six hundred Persons, who were by him not only won to the Philosophy which he pro- fest, but following his Rules, became, as we call it, *Cœnobii*; and these were they who studied Philoso- phy. [w They did put their Estates into one common Stock, and kept Silence five Years, only hearing his Discourses, but not seeing him, until they were fully proved, and then they became of his Family, and were admitted to him.] There were the same *six hundred Persons*, who, *Laertius* saith, *came to his nocturnal Acroasis*, (per- haps meaning the Lectures through a Skreen du- ring their Probation, for he adds) if any of them were thought worthy to see him, they wrote of it to their Friends, as having obtain'd a great Matter. This Society *Laertius* calls, *his System*, (which *Cassio- dorus* interprets, College) *Agellius*, his Family.

Besides these, there were many Auditors, called *Acousmaticks*, whereof he gained [as [x] *Nicomachus* relates] two thousand by one Oration, which he made at his first coming into *Italy*, who [that they might not live from home] erected a large *Homacoceï- on*, [which [y] *Clemens Alexandrinus* interprets to be the same as *Ecclesia*, Church with us] whereinto were admitted Boys and Women; and built Cities, and inhabited all that Part of *Italy* which is called *Mag- na Græcia*, and received Laws and Statutes from him as divine Precepts, without which they did not any thing; they lived together unanimously, prai- sed by all, and applauded as happy by such as lived round about them.

Thus *Pythagoras* distinguished those whom he ad- mitted, according to their several Merits; for it was not fit that all should partake alike, being not of a like

[t] So supply the Text from *Laertius*, who cites something to the same purpose out of *Timæus*. Κορη is a Name of *Proserpina*; Νύμφη, *Bride*, relates to the Nymphs; Μήτηρ, to *Cybele* Mother of the Gods; Μαῖα, to *Maja*, Mother of *Mercury*. [u] Jambl. c. 12. Porph. p. 12. [w] Jambl. c. 6. [x] Laert. 8. 15. [x] Jambl. c. 6. Porph. p. 13. [y] Strom. 1.

like Nature; nor fit that ſome ſhould receive all the Learning, others none, for that would have been contrary to his Community of all, and to his Equality. He therefore, of the Diſcourſes which he made, communicated to every one that Part which was proper for him; and diſtributed his Learning ſo, as that it might benefit every one according to his Capacity; and obſerving the Rules of Juſtice, in giving to every one that ſhare of the Diſcourſe which they deſerved; calling, upon this Account, ſome *Pythagoreans* (thoſe of the *Syſtem*) ſome *Pythagorites*, (thoſe of the *Homacoceion*) as we call ſome *Atticks*, ſome *Atticiſts*. Dividing them thus aptly into two Names, he appointed one Part to be γνησιος, Genuine, the other he ordered to be Imitators of them. As to the *Pythagoreans* he decreed, that all their Eſtates ſhould be in common, and that they ſhould lead their whole Lives together in Community; but the others he ordered to keep their Eſtates to themſelves, yet to meet together. Thus was this Succeſſion of both Parties conſtituted by *Pythagoras*, the Diſcipline which was obſerved by the more genuine, the *Pythagoreans*, we ſhall remit, together with his Doctrine, to the End of his Life.

CHAP. XVII.

His Authority in Civil Affairs.

[a] WHatſoever Cities in his Travels through *Italy* and *Sicily*, he found ſubjected to one another, (whereof ſome had been ſo of a long time, others of late) he infuſed into them a Reſentment of Liberty by his Diſciples, of whom he had ſome out of every City, he reſtored them to Liberty. Thus he freed *Crotona*, *Sybaris*, *Catana*, *Rhegium*, *Himera*, *Agrigentum*, *Tauromenium*, and ſome others, to whom he ſent Laws by *Charondas* the *Catanæan*, and *Zaleucus* the *Locrian*, by means whereof they laſted a long time well governed, and were deſervedly envied by their Neighbours. He wholly took away Diſſention, not only from among his Diſciples, and their Succeſſors for many Ages after, but alſo from all the Cities of *Italy* and *Sicily*, both inteſtine and external Diſſention. For he did frequently pronounce to all manner of Perſons every where, whether many or few, an Apothegm, which reſembles a monitory Oracle of God, which was a kind of Epitome or Recapitulation of all that he taught. The Apothegm was thus, *That we ought to avoid with our utmoſt Endeavour, and to amputate with Fire and Sword, and all other Means, from the Body, Sickneſs; from the Soul, Ignorance; from the Belly, Luxury; from a City, Sedition; from a Family, Diſcord; from all Things, Exceſs.* By which he did indulgently put every one in Mind of his beſt Doctrines.

Yet is he reported to have been the Occaſion of the War between the *Sybarites* and the *Crotonians*, which ended in the total Subverſion of the *Sybarites*; the Manner is thus related by *Diodorus Siculus* and *Jamblichus*.

[b] When the *Grecians* built *Sybaris* in *Italy*, it ſoon came to paſs, that through the Goodneſs of the Soil, [tho' [c] *Athæneus* deny it to be Fertile] "the City "became in a ſhort Time very rich; for being ſeated "betwixt two Rivers, *Crathis* and *Sybaris*, (from "which it took its Name) and the Citizens poſſeſſing a large Country, they ſoon gathered together "great Riches; and admitting many to be free of "their Country, they arrived to ſuch Height, that "they ſeemed far to excel all the reſt of the Inhabitants of *Italy*. [d] But ſo luxurious that they became infamous even to a Proverb; and no leſs addicted to all other Vices, inſomuch that they, out of Inſolence, put to death thirty Ambaſſadors of the *Crotonians*, and threw their Bodies from the Walls to be devoured by Beaſts.] "The City was ſo po"pulous, that it contained no leſs than 300000 Per"ſons. At that time *Telys* was chief Magiſtrate, "who, accuſing the greateſt Men, procured of the "*Sybarites* to baniſh 500 of the richeſt Citizens, and "to confiſcate their Goods. Theſe baniſhed Men "went to *Crotona*, and there (after the manner of "Suppliants) fled to the Altars erected in the *Forum*; "hereupon *Telys* ſent Ambaſſadors to the *Crotonians*, "to declare, that they ſhould either deliver up the "baniſhed Men, or expect War." [Theſe *Sybarite* Ambaſſadors had been inſtrumental in the Murther of ſome Friends of *Pythagoras*, perhaps ſome of the thirty *Crotonians* whom they ſlew.] [e] "Amongſt "them, one there was, who had killed ſome of "them with his own Hands; another was Son to "one of the ſame Murtherers, who was dead. "Moreover, he was of thoſe Kinds of Perſons, who, "being oppreſt with Want, ſtir up Sedition, that "they may take occaſion thereby to fall on the "Goods of others. Theſe *Sybarites* came to *Py*"*thagoras*, and blamed him; and one of them "(which was he that had a Hand himſelf in the "Death of his Friends) demanding a Reaſon of his "Reproof, he ſaid, That he did not give Laws. "Whereupon they accuſed him, as if he had made "himſelf *Apollo*, and eſpecially for that before, up"on a Queſtion being asked, Why theſe Things "were ſo? he asked him that propounded the Que"ſtion, Whether, when *Apollo* delivered his Ora"cles, he would require him to render a Reaſon? "The other deriding, as he thought, thoſe Diſ"courſes, in which *Pythagoras* declared the Return "of

[a] *Porphyr.* p. 14. and from him *Jamb.* cap. 7. [b] Diod. l. 12. [c] Deip. l. 12. [d] Athen. Deip. l. 12. [e] Jamb. c. 30.

" of the Soul, and telling him, That when he went " into the other World, he would give him a Let- " ter to carry to his Father, and desired him to " bring an Answer to it when he came back; I shall " not, replied *Pythagoras*, go to the Place of the " wicked, where Murtherers are punished. The " Ambassadors having thus reviled him, and he go- " ing to the Sea-side, and washing himself, many " following him, one of those who advised the *Croto-* " *nians*, said, When he had sufficiently spoken a- " gainst all the other Things that they did, at last he " accused them especially, for offering to oppose and " abuse *Pythagoras*, of whom when heretofore, as " Fables report, Beasts could speak, no one of them " durst ever speak an ill Word [f].

" *Diodorus* saith, that a Council being called, " and it being put to the question, Whether they " should deliver up the [g] *Italiotes* to the *Sybarites*, " or undergo a War with an Enemy more powerful " than themselves? The Senate and People made " some doubt, and the People first inclined to the De- " livery of the Suppliants, rather than endure the " War. But afterwards, *Pythagoras*, the Philosopher, " advising them to protect the Suppliants, they " changed their Opinion, and determined to fight " in their Defence. The *Sybarites* came into the " Field with an Army of three hundred thousand; " the *Crotonians* had but one hundred thousand. " They were led by *Milo* the Wrestler, who, at the " first Onset, himself put to flight that Wing of the " Army which was opposite to him, for he was of " invincible Strength. This Man having Courage " answerable to his Strength, had been six Times " Victor at the Olympic Games, and when he be- " gan this Fight, was crowned with Olympic " Wreaths, wearing, like *Hercules*, a Lion's Skin " and a Club, and obtaining the Victory for his " Countrymen was much admired by them. [The *Crotonians* likewise made use of a Stratagem, where- by they got the Day: [h] The *Sybarites* were so much addicted to Luxury, that they taught their Horses to dance at Feasts. This the *Crotonians* knowing, (as *Aristotle* relates) in the midst of the Fight, they commanded some Pipers, whom, to that Purpose, they had brought along with them, to play dancing Tunes; the Horses, as soon as they heard the Mu- sick, not only fell a dancing, but carried their Ri- ders violently over to their Enemies.] " Thus the " *Sybarites* being put to Flight, the *Crotonians* spared " none that they took, but put all to the Sword, " whereby the greater Part of the Army was slain, " and the City, after a dishonourable Surrender, " laid waste." This, according to *Diodorus*, hap- pened sixty three Years before the second of the eighty third Olympiad, which falls upon the first Year of the sixty eighth Olympiad.

Agrigentum was by his means freed from the Ty- ranny of *Phalaris*, in this manner: " [i] When *Py-* " *thagoras* was detained by *Phalaris*, a most cruel " Tyrant, [k *with whom he stayed six Months*] and " *Abaris* the *Hyperborean*, a wise Person, came to " converse with him, and asked him Questions, par- " ticularly concerning sacred Rites, Images, Di- " vine Worship, Providence of the Gods, as well of " those in Heaven, as conversant about the Earth, " and such like Demands; *Pythagoras*, as being " highly inspired, answered him with much Truth " and Persuasion, insomuch that he drew the Stan- " ders-by to his Opinion: Whereupon *Phalaris* see- " ing the People taken with him, was angry with " *Abaris* for praising *Pythagoras*. He grew fierce " against *Pythagoras* himself, and at last came to that " Heighth, as to speak all Blasphemies against the " Gods, as were possible for such a kind of Person. " But *Abaris* acknowledged himself thankful to *Py-* " *thagoras* for these Things. He learned next of " him, that all Things depend upon Heaven, and " are disposed of from thence; which he collected, " as from many other Things, so especially from the " Efficacy of Sacrifices. Far therefore was he from " thinking, that *Pythagoras*, who taught him these " Things, was a Deceiver, but he rather admir'd " him as a Person supernaturally inspir'd. *Phalaris*, " in answer hereunto, deny'd plainly and openly all " Things that were done in sacred Rites. Where- " upon *Abaris* transferred his Discourse from these " Things to such as appear manifestly to all Men, " and by the Divine Operations which are in all Ex- " tremities; as in extraordinary Wars, and incura- " ble Diseases, Destruction of Fruit, Transmission " of Pestilence from Country to Country. By these " difficult irremediable Causes, he endeavoured to " prove, that there is a Divine Providence which " over-ruleth all human Hope and Power. But " *Phalaris* impudently opposed it. Hereupon *Py-* " *thagoras* knowing that that Day would be fatal to " *Phalaris*, spoke very freely; and looking upon " *Abaris*, said, That there is a Passage from Heaven " to the Aerial and Terrestrial Parts; and did likewise " discourse scientifically, concerning the Dependance " of all Things upon Heaven, and did irrefragably " demonstrate the free Power of the Soul, and pro- " ceeded to shew the perfect Operation of the Rea- " son, and of the Mind. Then he spoke boldly con- " cerning Tyranny, and all Excess of Fortune, all " Injustice, all Covetousness, strongly maintaining " that they are all nothing worth. After this, he " made a Divine Exhortation concerning the best " Life,

[f] Lib. 12. Olymp. 83. 2. [g] So were the *Greeks* that inhabited *Italy* called, not the Natives. The same Difference betwixt *Sicilio- tes* and *Sicilians*. [h] Athen. Deip. l. 12. [i] Jambl. c. 32. [k] Tzetzes Chiliad. 6. 31.

" Life, and made a resolute Opposition against the " worst, and did most plainly deliver the Doctrine " concerning the Power and Passions of the Soul; " and which was more than all these, he demonstra- " ted, that the Gods are not the Causes of Ills; " and that Diseases and Passions are Seeds of the In- " temperance of the Body; and reprehended *Mytho-* " *graphers* and *Poets* for such Things as they had " falsly deliver'd; and sharply reprov'd *Phalaris*, and " shewed what the Power of Heaven is, and how " great by its Operations. As concerning Infliction " of Punishment by Law, he gave many Instances " thereof, and clearly shewed the Difference betwixt " Man and other living Creatures. He likewise " scientifically discoursed concerning intrinsical and " enunciative Reason, and concerning the Mind, " and the Knowledge proceeding from it, with many " other moral Documents dependent thereon. He " treated of what Things are useful in Life, making " an Exhortation to the Pursuit of the useful, and " dehorting from the hurtful; and that which is " most of all, he made a Distinction between " the Things done according to Fate, and according " to the Mind, and of those which are done accord- " ing to Necessity, and according to Decree. More- " over, he discoursed concerning *Dæmons*, and the " Immortality of the Soul, much and wisely; where- " of we shall have occasion to speak elsewhere, and " shew, that these Things do confer most to Forti- " tude, seeing that he himself in the midst of all " Dangers, did with a constant Mind discourse Phi- " losophy, and arm himself against Fortune; as also " for that he slighted and contemned the Person that " attempted to hurt him, and despised the Fear of " Death, and all human Contingencies, nor was he " at that Instant any thing concerned for them. In- " deed (continues *Jamblichus*) it is manifest, that he " was nothing troubled with the Fear of Death, but " had a far more noble Design, the freeing of *Sicily* " from the Oppression of Tyranny. That it was " he who did it, is manifest from the Oracle of *A-* " *pollo*, which declared, That *Phalaris*, when his " Subjects grew better and more unanimous, should " lose his Authority; which they did at the coming " of *Pythagoras*, through his Exhortations and In- " structions. But a clearer Evidence hereof is from " the Time: For that very Day that *Phalaris* went " about to bring *Pythagoras* and *Albaris* into Danger " of Death, he was himself slain. The manner " thus related by [l] *Tzetzes*: It chanced that a Hawk " pursued a great Flight of Pigeons; which *Phalaris* " seeing, said to those that stood by him, Behold, " Friends, how much an ignoble Fear can do, for " if but one of all these Pigeons would turn again, it " would presently give a Stop to the Pursuer. This " Speech an old Man that was present no sooner " heard, when taking up a Stone he threw it at *Pha-* " *laris*; and the rest following his Example, did " the like. Some say they stoned him to Death; " others, that they put him into Chains, and wrapt " him in a Sheet of Lead, wherein he died misе- " rably."

To the *Locrians*, besides *Charondas* and *Zeleucus* already mentioned, he sent [m] *Timarus* also, to make Laws for them.

To the *Rheginenses* he sent upon the same Employment [n] *Theatetus*, *Helicaon*, *Aristocrates*, and *Phytius*.

Thus, as [o] *Porphyrius* saith, *Pythagoras* and his Friends were a long time so much admired in *Italy*, that many Cities committed themselves to be governed by them.

CHAP. XVIII.

Wonders related of him.

IF we may credit (saith [p] *Porphyrius*, and from him [q] *Jamblichus*) what is related of him by ancient and creditable Authors, his Commands had an Influence even upon irrational Creatures; for he laid hold of the *Daunian* Bear, which did much hurt to the People thereabout, and having stroaked her awhile, and given her Maza and Fruits, and sworn her, that she never more touch any living Creature, he let her go. She straightway hid herself in the Hills and Woods, and from thenceforward never assaulted any living Creature.

[r] Seeing an Ox at *Tarentum* in a Pasture, wherein grew several Things, cropping green Beans, he came to the Neat-herd and counselled him to speak to the Ox, that he should abstain from the Beans; but the Neat-herd mocking him, and saying, He could not speak the Language of Oxen, he himself went to him, and whispering in the Ear of the Ox, he not only refrained immediately from Beans at that time, but from thenceforward would never touch any, and lived many Years after about *Juno*'s Temple at *Tarentum*, till he was very old; and was called the sacred Ox, eating such Meats as every one gave him.

[s] An Eagle flying over his Head at the Olympick Games, as he was by chance discoursing to his Friends concerning *Auguries* and *Omens*, and divine Signs, and that there are some Messages from the Gods to such Men as have true Piety towards them; he is said [[t] *by certain Words to have stopt here and*] to have caused her to come down; and after he had stroaked her awhile, he let her go again. This perhaps was that white Eagle, which *Jamblichus* re-

[l] Chil. 6. 130. [m] Jambl. p. 130. and 154. [n] Jambl. p. 130. [o] Pag. 190. [p] Ibid. [q] Cap. 13. [r] Porphyr. ibid. Jambl. c. 13. [s] Porphyr. ibid. Jambl. c. 13. [t] Plut. in Numa.

ports he ſtroaked at *Croto*, and ſhe endured it quietly. For the *Crotonians* inſtituted Games, which they called *Olympick*, in Emulation of the *Grecians*.

A River (which [u] *Porphyrius* calls *Caucaſus*, *Apollonius* Πόταμον κατὰ Σάμον; *Laertius* and *Jamblichus*, *Neſſus*; *Ælian*, *Coſa*; St. *Cyril*, *Cauſus*) as he paſſed over it, with many of his Friends, ſpoke to him, and ſaid with a plain clear Voice, χαῖρε Πυθαγόρα, Hail *Pythagoras*.

[w] In one and the ſame Day, almoſt all affirm, that he was preſent at *Metapontum* in *Italy*, and at *Tauromenium* in *Sicily*, with the Friends which he had in both Places, and diſcourſed to them in a publick Convention, when as the Places are diſtant many *Stadia* by Sea and Land, and many Days Journey aſunder. *Apollonius* relates this, as done at *Croto* and *Metapontum*.

[x] At the publick Solemnity of the Olympick Games, he ſtood up and ſhewed his golden Thigh; as he did in private to *Abaris*, to confirm him in the Opinion, that he was *Hyperborean Apollo*, whoſe Prieſt *Abaris* was.

[y] A Ship coming into the Harbour, and his Friends wiſhing they had the Goods that were in it: Then (ſaith *Pythagoras*) you will have a dead Body: And when the Ship came at them, they found in it the Body of a dead Man.

[z] To one who much deſired to hear him, he ſaid, That he would not diſcourſe until ſome Sign appeared. Not long after, one coming to bring News of the Death of a white Bear in *Daunia*, he prevented him, and related it firſt.

[a] They affirm he foretold many Things, and that they came to paſs; inſomuch that [b] *Ariſtippus* the *Cyrenæan*, in his Book of Phyſiologick, ſaith, He was named *Pythagoras*, from ſpeaking Things as true as *Pythian Apollo*. He foretold an Earthquake by the Water which he taſted out of a Well; and foretold, That a Ship, which was then under ſail with a pleaſant Gale, ſhould be caſt away.

At *Sybaris* he took in his Hand a Serpent of deadly biting, and let it go again. And at *Tyrrhenia* he took a little Serpent, and biting it, kill'd it with his Teeth.

[c] A thouſand other more wonderful and divine Things are related conſtantly, and with full Agreement of him; ſo that, to ſpeak freely, more was never attributed to any, nor was any more eminent. For his Predictions of Earthquakes moſt certain are remembred, and his immediate chaſing away of the Peſtilence, and his Suppreſſion of violent Winds and Hail, and his calming of Storms, as well in Rivers as upon the Sea, for the Eaſe and ſafe Paſſage of his Friends; from whom *Empedocles*, and *Epimenides*, and *Abaris* learning it, often performed the like, which their Poems plainly atteſt. Beſides, *Empedocles* was ſirnamed *Alexanemos*, the Chaſer away of Winds; *Epimenides*, *Cathartes*, the Luſtrator; *Abaris*, *Æthrobates*, the Walker in the Air; for, riding upon an Arrow of *Hyperborean Apollo*, which was given him, he was carried in the Air over Rivers and Seas, and inacceſſible Places, which ſome believed to have been done by *Pythagoras*, when he diſcourſed with his Friends at *Metapontum* and *Tauromenium* upon the ſame Day.

[d] To theſe add his Trick with a Looking-glaſs, as the Scholiaſt of *Ariſtophanes* calls it, who deſcribes it thus: The Moon being in the Full, he wrote whatſoever he pleaſed in Blood upon a Looking-glaſs, and telling it firſt to the other Party, ſtood behind him, holding the Letters towards the Moon; whereby he who ſtood betwixt him and the Moon, looking ſtedfaſtly upon her, read all the Letters which were written in the Looking-glaſs in the Moon, as if they were written in her.

But theſe Things, ſome, even of the Antients, have imputed to Goetick Magick, as *Timon*, who terms him, Γοητα, a Magician; others, to Impoſture, as appears by this Relation of *Heraclides*, and the Scholiaſt of *Apollonius*: [e] When he came into *Italy*, he made a Vault under Ground, and charged his Mother [[f] to give out that he was dead, and] to ſet down in a Table-book all things that happened, expreſſing the Times punctually: Then he went down [and ſhut himſelf up in the Vault] and his Mother did as he ordered her, until ſuch time as he came up again. After a while *Pythagoras* came up, lean and withered; and coming into the Congregation, declared, that he was returned from the *Inferi*, and related to them what was done there [and told them many prodigious Stories concerning the *Palingeneſie*, and the Things of the *Inferi*; telling the living News of their dead Friends, with whom he ſaid he met in the *Inferi*.] [g] *Hieronymus* relates, That he ſaw there the Soul of *Heſiod* bound with Braſs to a Pillar, ſhrieking; and that of *Homer* hung up on a Tree, encompaſſed by Serpents, for the Fables which he had raiſed concerning the Gods: Thoſe likewiſe tormented who uſed not the Company of their own Wives. For this he was much honoured by the *Crotonians*. They being much moved at what he ſaid, wept and lamented, and hereupon conceived ſuch an Eſteem of *Pythagoras*, as being a Divine Perſon, that they ſent their Wives to him to be inſtructed in his Doctrine, which Women were called *Pythagoreans*. Thus *Hermippus*. The Scholiaſt adds, [Hereby he raiſed an Opinion concerning himſelf, That, before the

[u] Pag. 192. [w] Porph. ibid. Jambl. c. 28. [x] Plut. in Numa. Laert. Porph. p. 18. [y] Porph. p. 193. [z] Jambl. c. 28. [a] Anon. de vita Pyth. apud Phot. [b] Laert. 8, 2. [c] Porph. p. 18, 19. [d] In Nubes, p. 759. [e] Heraclides apud Laertium. [f] Schol. Apol. [g] Laert. 8, 21.

the *Trojan* War, he was *Æthalides*, the Son of *Mercury*; then *Euphorbus*, then *Hermotimus*, then [h] *Pyrrhus*, a *Delian*; laſtly, *Pythagoras*.] And, as *Laertius* ſaith, in his Writings he reported of himſelf, That he had come from the *Inferi* to Men, 207 Years ſince. Of this more in his Doctrine, *Part 2. Chap. 5. Sect. 10.*

CHAP. XIX.

His Death.

THE Time of *Pythagoras* his Death hath been formerly touched: It was, according to *Euſebius*, in the fourth Year of the 70th *Olympiad*, after he had lived, as [i] *Juſtin* ſaith, at *Crotona* 20 Years. The Occaſion is differently related. [k] *Laertius* thus.

Pythagoras died in this manner: As he ſate in Counſel together with his Friends, in the Houſe of *Milo*, it happened that the Houſe was ſet on fire by one who did it out of Envy, becauſe he was not admitted. Some affirm, the *Crotonians* did it out of fear of being reduced to a Tyranny. *Pythagoras* running away, was overtaken; coming to a Place full of Beans, he made a Stop, ſaying, It is better to be taken, than to tread; and better to be killed, than to ſpeak. So the Purſuers ſlew him. In the ſame manner died moſt of his Diſciples, about forty in Number; ſome few only eſcaped, of whom were *Architas* the *Tarentine*, and *Lyſis*, of whom we ſpake before. *Dicæarchus* ſaith, that *Pythagoras* fled to the Temple of the Muſes at *Metapontum*, and died [l] for want of Food, having lived there forty Days without eating. *Heraclides*, in his Epitome of the Lives of *Satyrus*, relates, That having buried *Pherecydes*, he returned to *Italy*, where finding the Faction of *Cyclo* (prevalent), he departed to *Metapontum*, and there ſtarved himſelf, not willing to live any longer. *Hermippus* ſaith, that the *Agrigentines* and *Syracuſians* warring againſt one another, *Pythagoras*, with his Friends, went to the *Agrigentines*, and was Head of them: But they being vanquiſhed, and he flying to a Field of Beans, was there ſlain; the reſt (being thirty-five) were burn'd at *Tarentum*, for intermeddling with the Governors and Rule of the Commonwealth.

Jamblichus, from *Ariſtoxenus* and others, gives a more particular Account: There were (ſaith he) ſome, who oppugned theſe Men, and roſe up againſt them. That this Conſpiracy happened in the Abſence of *Pythagoras*, is acknowledged by all; but they diſagree concerning his Journey: Some ſay, he was gone to *Pherecydes* the *Syrian*; others, to *Metapontum*. The Cauſes of this Conſpiracy are diverſly related alſo; one is ſaid to have proceeded from the Men who were called *Cylonians*, thus: *Cylo*, a *Crotonian*, who, in Race, and Honour, and Wealth, excelled all the reſt of the Citizens, but otherwiſe of a harſh, violent, turbulent and tyrannical Humour, was exceedingly deſirous to participate of the *Pythagorick* Inſtitution; and coming to *Pythagoras*, who was now very old, he was repulſed for the Reaſons aforeſaid. Hereupon there aroſe a great Conteſt, *Cylo* and his Friends oppoſing *Pythagoras* and his Friends: and ſo eager and violent was the Malice of *Cylo* and his Party, that it extended even to the laſt of the *Pythagoreans*. *Pythagoras* therefore for this reaſon departed to *Metapontum*, where it is ſaid that he died. The *Cylonians* (ſo called) continue to exerciſe their Hatred and Enmity towards the *Pythagoreans*: For a while, the Integrity of the *Pythagoreans*, and the Kindneſs of the Cities (which was ſo great as to be governed by them) was prevalent; but at laſt they ſo plotted againſt the Men, as that ſurpriſing them, aſſembled in the Houſe of *Milo* at *Crotona*, conſulting about military Affairs, they burned them all except two, *Archippus* and *Lyſis*, who being youthful and ſtrong, eſcaped out of doors. This falling out, and the Cities not taking any notice of the Misfortune, the *Pythagoreans* gave over their Buſineſs. This happened from two Cauſes, as well by reaſon of the Unconcernment of the Cities, (for they had no regard of the Murther to puniſh the Authors thereof) as by reaſon of the Death of the moſt excellent Perſons, two only of them were ſaved, both *Tarentines*; of whom, *Archippus* retired to *Tarentum*; but *Lyſis*, out of Hatred of the Neglect they had received from the Cities, departed into *Greece*, and lived at *Achaia* in *Peloponneſus*: Thence, upon a particular Deſign, he removed to *Thebes*, where *Epimanondas* heard him, and called him Father. There he died. The reſt of the *Pythagoreans*, all but *Architas* the *Tarentine*, forſook *Italy*; and aſſembling at *Rhegium*, they lived there together: But in progreſs of time the Management of publick Affairs decayed. The moſt eminent of theſe were *Phanto*, and *Echecrates*, and *Polymnaſtus*, and *Diocles* (both *Phliaſians*) and *Xenophilus*, a *Chalcidean* of *Chalcis* in *Thrace*: Theſe preſerved the Cuſtoms and Doctrines from the Beginning; but, with the Sect itſelf, at laſt they were wholly extinguiſhed. This is related by *Ariſtoxenus*.

Nicomachus agreeth in all things with this Relation, except in that he ſaith, This Inſurrection happened at what time *Pythagoras* was gone to *Delos* to viſit *Pherecydes*, who was ſick of a *Phthiriaſis*; then were they ſtoned and burned by the *Italiotes*, and caſt forth without Burial. Hitherto *Jamblichus*.

With theſe alſo agreeth the Relation of *Neanthes*, thus deliver'd by [m] *Porphyrius*.

[h] So read, not *Pythius*. ill render'd, *amicorum inopia*.
[i] Lib. 20. c. 4.
[k] Laert. 8. 39.
[l] Ἀσιτήσαντα. So in *Porphyrius*, p. 39. σπάνει τῶν ἀναγκαίων,
[m] Vita Pyth. p. 205.

Pythagoras and his Friends having been a long time ſo much admir'd in *Italy*, that many Cities committed themſelves to them, at laſt they became envied, and a Conſpiracy was made againſt them in this manner: *Cylo*, a *Crotonian* (who, in Extract, Nobility, and Wealth, exceeded all the reſt of the Citizens; but otherwiſe was of a violent, rigid, and tyrannical Diſpoſition, and one that made uſe of the multitude of his Friends to compaſs his unjuſt Ends) as he eſteemed himſelf worthy of all excellent things, ſo moſt particularly to partake of the Pythagorick Philoſophy; he came to *Pythagoras*, and much extolled himſelf, and deſired his Converſation. But *Pythagoras* preſently obſerving the Nature and Manners of the Perſon, and perceiving by the Signs which he obſerved in the Bodies of ſuch as came to him, what kind of Diſpoſition he was of, bad him depart, and go about his buſineſs. Hereat *Cylo* was not a little troubled, taking it for a great Affront, being of himſelf a Perſon of a rough violent Spirit. Therefore calling his Friends together, he began to accuſe *Pythagoras*, and to conſpire againſt him and his Diſciples. Whereupon, as ſome relate, the Friends of *Pythagoras* being gathered together in the Houſe of *Milo* the Wreſtler, *Pythagoras* himſelf being abſent (for he was gone to *Delos*, to viſit *Pherecydes* the *Syrian*, formerly his Maſter, who was deſperately fallen ſick of a *Phthiriaſis*, and to attend on him) they ſet the Houſe on fire, and burned and ſtoned them all, except two who eſcaped the Fire, *Archippus* and *Lyſis*, as *Neanthes* relates; of whom, *Lyſis* went into *Greece* to *Epimanondas*, whoſe Maſter he had formerly been.

But [n] *Dicæarchus*, and other more accurate Authors affirm, that *Pythagoras* himſelf was there preſent when this Conſpiracy was perpetrated; for *Pherecydes* died before he left *Samos*. Of his Friends, forty being gathered together, were beſet in a Houſe; moſt of them going diſperſedly to the City, were ſlain. *Pythagoras*, his Friends being taken, firſt eſcaped to the *Caulonian* Haven, thence went to the *Locrians*. The *Locrians* ſent ſome old Men to the Borders of their Country, who gave him this Anſwer: We have heard, *Pythagoras*, that thou art a Perſon wiſe, and of great Worth; but we have nothing in our Laws that is reprehenſible, and therefore we will endeavour to preſerve them. Go to ſome other Place, taking of us whatſoever you have need of. Hereupon leaving the City of the *Locrians*, he ſailed to *Tarentum*; where receiving the ſame Entertainment he had at *Croto*, he went to *Metapontum*: for great Seditions were raiſed againſt him in every Part, which are remember'd by the Inhabitants at this Day, who recount the Seditions againſt the *Pythagoreans*, as they call them; for all that Faction which ſided with *Pythagoras* were called *Pythagoreans*. In the *Metapontine* Faction, *Pythagoras* is ſaid to have died, flying to the Temple of the Muſes, and ſtaying there forty Days, through want of Neceſſaries.

Others relate, that when the Houſe wherein his Friends uſed to meet, was fired, his Friends threw themſelves into the Fire to make a way for their Maſter, ſpreading their Bodies like a Bridge upon the firſt; and that *Pythagoras*, eſcaping out of the Burning, deſtitute of all his Friends, for Grief ended his Days.

With theſe Men, oppreſſed with this Calamity, failed their Knowledge alſo, which till then they had preſerved ſecret and concealed, except ſome things difficult to be underſtood, which the Auditors that lived without *(the Skreen)* repeated by heart. *Lyſis* and *Archippus* eſcaping, and as many as were at that time in other Parts, preſerved ſome little Sparks of Philoſophy, obſcure and difficult to be found out; for being now left alone, and much grieved at the Perpetration of that Wickedneſs, fearing leſt the Name of Philoſophy ſhould be quite extinguiſh'd amongſt Men, and that for this reaſon the Gods would be angry with them, they made ſome ſummary Commentaries; and having reduc'd the Writings of the Ancients, and thoſe which they remember'd, into one Body, every one left them in the Place where they died, charging their Sons, Daughters, and Wives, that they ſhould not communicate them to any out of their own Family. Thus privately continuing it ſucceſſively to their Succeſſors, they obſerved it a long time. And for this reaſon, ſaith *Nicomachus*, we conjecture, that they did purpoſely avoid Friendſhip with Strangers; and for many Ages they preſerved a faithful conſtant Friendſhip amongſt themſelves.

[o] *Moderatus* ſaith, that this (Pythagorick Philoſophy) came at laſt to be extinguiſh'd, firſt, becauſe it was ænigmatical; next, becauſe their Writings were in the *Doric* Dialect, which is obſcure; by which means the Doctrines deliver'd in it were not underſtood, being ſpurious and miſapprehended, becauſe (moreover) they who publiſh'd them were not *Pythagoreans*. Beſides, *Plato*, *Ariſtotle*, *Speuſippus*, *Ariſtoxenus*, and *Xenocrates*, as the *Pythagoreans* affirm, vented the beſt of them, as their own, changing only ſome few things in them; but the more vulgar and trivial, and whatſoever was afterwards invented by envious and calumnious Perſons, to caſt a Contempt upon the *Pythagorean* School, they collected and delivered as proper to that Sect.

But foraſmuch as [p] *Apollonius* gives a different Account of theſe things, and adds many things which have not yet been ſpoken, let us give his Narration alſo concerning the Inſurrection againſt the *Pythagoreans*. He (therefore) ſaith, That the *Pythagoreans* were envied from their very Childhood; for the People,

[n] Porph. p. 206, &c. [o] Ibid. p. 202. [p] Jamb. c. 35. p. 254.

ple, as long as *Pythagoras* diſcourſed with all that came to him, loved him exceedingly; but when he apply'd himſelf only to his Diſciples, they undervalued him. That he ſhould admit Strangers, they well enough ſuffered; but that the Natives of the Country ſhould attribute ſo much to him, they took very ill, and ſuſpected their Meetings to be Contrivements againſt them. Beſides, the young Men being of the beſt Rank and Eſtate, it came to paſs, that after a while they were not only the chief Perſons in their own Families, but governed even the whole City, they becoming many, as to a Society, (for they were above three hundred Perſons) but being a ſmall Part as to the City, which was not order'd according to their Manners and Inſtitutions. Notwithſtanding, as long as they poſſeſſed the Place they were in only, and *Pythagoras* lived there, the City followed the original Government thereof, tho' much perplexed, and watching an Opportunity for Change. But after they had reduced *Sybaris*, and that he departed, and they diſtributed the conquer'd Country into Colonies, as they pleaſed; at length the concealed Hatred broke forth, and the Multitude began to quarrel with them. The Leaders of this Diſſention were thoſe who were neareſt ally'd to the *Pythagoreans*. Many things that had paſs'd grieved them, according as they were particularly affected; but one of the greateſt was, that he only ſhould be thought capable of Diſreſpect. For the *Pythagoreans* uſed never to name *Pythagoras*; but whilſt he lived, they called him *Divine*; after Death, *the Man*: As *Homer* introduceth *Eumæus* mentioning *Ulyſſes*;

I to pronounce his Name, though abſent, fear;
So great is my Reſpect, and he ſo dear.

In like manner, not to riſe out of Bed after the Sun's up, nor to wear a Ring whereon the Image of God is engraved; but to obſerve the Sun, that they may adore his Riſing; and not to wear a Ring, leſt they might chance to have it on at a Funeral, or carry it into any unclean Place. Likewiſe, not to do any thing without Premeditation, nor any thing whereof they could not give a good Account; but that in the Morning they ſhould conſider what they were to do, and at Night they ſhould make a Recollection thereof, as well to ponder the things themſelves, as to exerciſe the Memory. Likewiſe, if any one of that Community had appointed to meet another in any Place, he ſhould ſtay there Day and Night until the other came. The *Pythagoreans* likewiſe accuſtomed themſelves to be mindful of what is ſaid, and to ſpeak nothing raſhly. But above all things, as an inviolable Precept, to be kept even until Death, he adviſed them not to reproach, but always to uſe good Words, as at Sacrifices. Theſe things much diſpleaſed all in general, as I ſaid, foraſmuch as they admitted Men to be educated in this Singularity amongſt them. But, in that they reached forth the Hands to *Pythagoreans* only, and not to any of their own Family, except their Parents: likewiſe, in that they had their Eſtates in common, wholly alienated from their own Domeſticks: hereat their Allies were much diſpleaſed; and they beginning the Diſſention, the reſt readily joined themſelves, and engaged in it. And at the ſame time *Hippaſus*, *Diodorus* and *Theages* ſaying, That it was fit every one ſhould partake of the publick Government and Convention; and that the Magiſtrates being choſen by Lot, ought to give an Account: But on the other ſide, the *Pythagoreans*, *Alcimachus*, and *Dimachus*, and *Meto*, and *Democedes* oppoſing it, and forbidding that the Government of the Country ſhould be abrogated: theſe taking the Part of the Commons, got the better. But afterwards, many of the common People underſtanding that there was a Diviſion in the publick Convention, *Cylo* and *Nino*, Orators, framed an Accuſation againſt them; the firſt was one of the beſt Quality, the other of the vulgar Sort. To this effect, a long Diſcourſe being made by *Cylo*, the other continued it, pretending that he had found out the greateſt Secrets of the *Pythagoreans*. But indeed having forged and writ ſuch things, as thereby he might chiefly traduce them; and having deliver'd the Book to a Notary, bad him read it. The Title was, *The ſacred Diſcourſe*: the Sum whereof this: *That Friends ought to be reverenced as the Gods themſelves, but all other Men tyranniz'd over like Beaſts. That the ſame Sentence of* Pythagoras *himſelf reduced to Verſe, was thus rehearſed by his Diſciples:*

Friends equal with the Gods he did reſpect,
All others (as of no account) neglect.

And that he chiefly praiſed Homer *for ſaying,* Ποιμένα λαῶν, *the Shepherd of the People; for that he tacitly imply'd, that the reſt of Mankind were but Beaſts. That he affected Oligarchy, and was an Enemy to unmarried Perſons, as thoſe who had been Chief in Election of Magiſtrates by Lot. That he affected Tyranny, in as much as he ſaith, It is better to be a Bull, though but one Day, than an Ox all our Life-time. That he praiſed the Laws and Cuſtoms of other People, and commanded, That whatſoever was decreed by them ſhould be uſed. In fine, he declared, That their Philoſophy was a Conſpiracy againſt the People; and adviſ'd them, that they ſhould not hearken to the Voice of their Conſultations, but rather think of forbidding them to meet in Council at all, if they alledged, that they had a ſettled Aſſembly, conſiſting of a thouſand Voices. Wherefore it was not fit that they ſhould, as far as in them lay, give ear to prohibited Perſons, and permit them to ſpeak; but to eſteem their right Hand which they held from them hoſtile, when they ſhould offer to put in a Stone for voting, conceiving*

conceiving it an unworthy thing, that three hundred thousand Men, who all lived about the River Tetrais, *should be oppressed by Seditions, and overcome by the thousandth Part of them in that City.* This Calumny so much exasperated the Hearers, that some few Days after, as they were sacrificing in the Temple of *Pythian Apollo*, they ran in tumultuously to do Violence to them. But the *Pythagoreans* being informed beforehand thereof, fled to the publick Hall. *Democedes*, with the young Men, went to *Platea*; but they dissolving the Laws, used Decrees, whereby accusing *Democedes* of stirring up the young Men to Tyranny, they proclaimed, That whosoever did kill him should have in Recompence three Talents: And there being a Fight, wherein he, by the means of *Theages*, was overcome, they gave him three Talents out of the publick Treasury. But there arising many Misfortunes in the City and Country, the banished Persons being called to Judgment, and the Examination thereof being committed to three Cities, *Tarentum*, *Metapontum*, and *Caulon*, they that were put in Commission, thought good (as appears by the *Crotonian* Records) to banish them. So they banished the whole Generation, saying, That the Children ought not to be separated from their Parents, and seiz'd their Estates. But after many Years, *Dimachus* and his Friends being slain in another Fight, and *Litago* also, who was Head of this Faction, they took Compassion on them, and resolved to call home those who were left: Wherefore sending for their Ambassadors from *Achaia*, they made an Agreement with the banish'd Men by them, and hung up the Copies of their Oaths in the Temple of *Delphi*. The *Pythagoreans* who returned, were about Threescore, besides those who were very aged, of whom some addicted themselves to Medicine, and cured the sick, and so became Masters of that which is called Method. Those who were restored, grew into great Favour with the People, at that time in which it was proverbially said, in Opposition to those who violate the Laws, *These are not under the Government of* Nino.

CHAP. XX.

His Person and Virtues.

HIS Person [a] *Jamblichus* describes to have been in his Youth extraordinary beautiful, called, The fair-hair'd *Samian*; [b] and at 56 Years of Age, of a more comely and divine Presence. [c] *Laertius* saith, *He is reported to have been of a most awful Aspect, insomuch as his Disciples thought him* Hyperborean Apollo: Adding, That [d] *Timon* takes notice of the Awfulness of his Presence in his *Silli*, tho' he alledg'd it in Disparagement of him.

> Pythagoras *skill'd in the Goetick Laws,*
> *Who courts by grave Discourse human Applause.*

So great an Impression it made upon those with whom he conversed, that a young Man being sharply reprehended by him, immediately went and hanged himself. Whereupon *Pythagoras* ever after forbore to reprove any Person.

[e] *Lycon*, in the Life of *Pythagoras*, saith, That he used a spare Diet: *Athenæus*, That he drank very little, and lived so moderately, that he was often content only with Honey. [f] *By his moderate Diet he preserved his Body in the same constant State, not sometimes sick, sometimes well, sometimes fat, sometimes lean. It appeared by his Countenance, that the same Constancy was in his Soul also. He was not subject to Joy* (as *Cicero* likewise observes) *or Grief, no Man ever saw him rejoice or mourn.* [g] Neither did any ever see him *alvum exonerantem, cœuntem*, or drunk. He refrained wholly from Derision, and Assentation, and Scoffs, and detracting Speeches. He never punished any in Anger, neither Servant, nor free Person.

[h] *He wore a white and clean Stole*, (or Gown) *and used white woollen Blankets, for as yet Linnen was not known in those Parts, and* [i] *a gold Crown and Breeches.*

[k] *Diogenes* discoursing of his daily Conversation, saith, He had Morning Exercitations at his own House, composing his own Soul to the Lyre, and singing some old Pæans of *Thales*. He likewise sung some Verses of *Homer* and *Hesiod*, whereby he rendred his Mind more sedate. Moreover, he used some Dances, which he conceived to conduce to Agility and bodily Health. His Walks he used not with many, promiscuously, but with two or three, in the Temples or Groves, making choice of such Places as were most pleasant, and remote from Noise.

[l] Having purchased the Estate of *Alcæus*, who, after his Embassy to *Lacedæmon*, died; he was no less admired for his Œconomy than Philosophy.

Besides this *Pythagoras* the Philosopher, there were many others of the same Name; the most ancient a [m] *Laconian*, Contemporary with King *Numa*.

Laertius reckons four, all about the same Time, or at least not long distant from one another; for, (besides the Philosopher) there was one a *Crotonian*, a tyrannical Person; another a *Philasian*, σωμασμητὴς ἀλειπτὴς, (*Exercitator*, as [n] *Pliny* renders it) one that profess'd

[a] Cap. 2. p. 31. [b] Cap. 5. p. 37. [c] Laert. 8. 11. [d] Ibid. [e] Athen. Deipn. 10. [f] Porph. p. 195. [g] Laert. 8. 19. [h] Laert. see also Jamb. c. 21. [i] Ælian. var. Hist. 12, 22. [k] Porph. p. 194. [l] Jamb. c. 30. p. 170. [m] Plut. in Numa. [n] Lib. 7. c. 23.

profeſſed to teach corporeal Exerciſes, and to diet and order the Body for them. This ſeems to be the ſame *Pythagoras*, [o] Son of *Eratocles*, who writ *Aleiptick Commentaries*, and adviſed the Wreſtlers, inſtead of Figs, to eat Fleſh; both which are aſcribed by ſome to *Pythagoras* the Philoſopher. The third, a *Lacynthian*, to whom are aſcribed the Doctrines of Philoſophy, which it was lawful to divulge, and the proverbial αὐτὸς ἔφα; both which were proper to *Pythagoras* the Philoſopher. Some reckon another *Pythagoras* of *Rhegium*, a Statuary, who invented Rhythm and Symetry; and another of *Samos*, a Statuary alſo, (perhaps the ſame whom [p] *Pliny* placeth in the 67th *Olympiad*) and another an Orator of no Reputation; another a Phyſician, who writ of σκύλλη, the Sea-Onion, (aſcribed by [q] *Pliny* to the Philoſopher) and concerning *Homer*; and another, the Hiſtory of the *Doreans*, as *Dionyſius* relates. Hitherto *Laertius*.

To theſe add [r] *Pythagoras* the *Epheſian*, who lived before *Cyrus*; another of the ſame Name, [s] Præfect under *Ptolemy*; a third, a [t] Painter.

CHAP. XXI.

His Wife, Children, Servants.

HE took to Wife *Theano*. Some affirm, ſhe was a [u] *Crotonian*; but [w] *Porphyrius*, a *Cretan*, Daughter of *Pythanax*, or [x] *Pythonax*. After the Death of *Pythagoras*, ſhe took upon her the Tuition of their Children, and the [y] Government of the School, [z] marrying *Ariſtæus*, who ſucceeded him in that Dignity. *Laertius* ſaith, *There were ſome Writings extant under her Name*; whereof *Suidas* inſtanceth, *Philoſophical Commentaries, Apophthegms, and a Poem in* Hexameter *Verſe*. Of her Apophthegms are remembred theſe: [a] Being demanded how ſoon, after Coition, a Woman is pure, ſhe anſwered, *If with her own Husband, at the ſame inſtant; if with a ſtrange Perſon, never*. She adviſed every Woman, when ſhe goeth to-bed to her Husband, to put off her Modeſty with her Cloaths, and when ſhe riſeth, to put it on again with them. Being asked (upon occaſion perhaps of ſome ambiguous Word) ποια; which of the two ſhe meant? She anſwered, *That for which I am called a Woman*. To one admiring her Beauty, and ſaying, *How white an Arm!* She anſwered, *But not common*. *Laertius*, who affirms ſhe was Daughter to *Brontinus*, a *Crotonian*, adds, That according to ſome, *Theano* was Wife to *Brontinus*, and Diſciple to *Pythagoras*. And with this ſecond, it ſeems, the former was frequently confounded, as particularly in the firſt of the precedent Apophthegms, which *Jamblichus* affirms to be ſpoken by *Theano*, the Wife of *Brontinus*, tho' attributed by ſome (of whom is *Laertius*) to *Theano*, the Wife of *Pythagoras*.

[b] Of his Sons by *Theano* are remembred *Telauges* and *Mneſarchus*: *Mneſarchus* ſeems to be the ſame whom [c] *Plutarch* calls *Mamercus*; for both theſe Names are given to the Father of *Pythagoras*, from whom that of his Son, doubtleſs, was derived. [d] By ſome he ſeems to be called *Damo*, if there be no Miſtake occaſion'd by *Pythagoras* his Daughter, of the ſame Name. Theſe two, *Telauges* and *Mneſarchus*, were, upon their Father's Death, bred up under their Mother *Theano*, and afterwards governed the School, as *Jamblichus* atteſts of *Mneſarchus*, *Laertius* of *Telauges*; who adds, That he taught *Empedocles*, as ſome conceive; and *Hippobotus* cites, out of *Empedocles* himſelf, this:

[e] *Noble* Telauges *from* Theano *ſprung*,
And great Pythagoras——————

But of *Telauges* there is no Writing extant. Thus *Laertius*, who yet elſewhere cites an Epiſtle of *Telauges* to *Philolaus*. And *Jamblichus* affirms, That ſome aſcribed to him the ſacred Diſcourſe which went under the Name of *Pythagoras*.

To theſe two Sons, add, (upon the Authority of [f] *Duris* the *Samian*, in his ſecond Book of Hours) *Arimneſtus*, Maſter to *Democritus*, who returning from Baniſhment, ſuſpended a brazen Tablet in the Temple of *Juno*, the Diameter whereof was nigh two Cubits, bearing this Inſcription:

Me Arimneſtus, *who much Learning trac'd*,
Pythagoras *beloved Son here plac'd*.

His Daughters were *Sara*, *Muya*, *Arignota*, (whoſe Pythagorical Writings *Porphyrius* mentioneth, as extant in his time) and [g] *Damo*: With her *Pythagoras* left his Writings at his Death, charging her not to communicate them to any that were not within the Family. Whereupon ſhe, though ſhe might have had much Money for the Books, would not accept it, preferring Poverty, with Obedience to her Father's Command, before Riches. One of his Daughters *Pythagoras* gave in Marriage to *Meno* of *Crotona*, whom he had educated ſo well, that when a Virgin, ſhe went foremoſt in the Company of the Virgins; and when a Wife, foremoſt among the married Women. The *Crotonians* made of her Houſe a Temple to *Ceres*: The Street they called *Muſæum*.

Of

[o] Jam. c. 5. p. 40. [p] Lib. 34. c. 8. [q] Lib. 19. c. 5. [r] Suid. [s] Plin. 37. 2. [t] Plin. 34. 8. [u] Suid. in Theano. [w] Pag. 182. [x] Suid. [y] Theodoret. de princip. adv. gent. Serm. 2. [z] Jambl. cap. ult. [a] Laert. 8. 43. [b] Suid. in Pyth. [c] In Numa. [d] Suid. in Pythag. [e] Perhaps Τηλαυγὴς, κλυτὸς κἠξοχ, &c. Laert. 8. 43. [f] Porph. Vit. Pyth. [g] Suid. Jambl. Vit. Pyth.

Of his Servants are particularly remembred two, *Aſtræus* and *Zamolxis*: Of the firſt, thus [g] *Diogenes*, in his Treatiſe of incredible Things beyond *Thule*; *Mneſarchus* being a *Tyrrhenian*, by extract of thoſe *Tyrrhenians* who inhabited *Lemnos*, *Imber* and *Scyrus*, went from thence, and travelled to many Countries and Cities, found an Infant lying under a large tall Poplar, and coming to it, he perceived that it lay with the Face towards the Sky, looking ſtedfaſtly upon the Sun without winking. In its Mouth was put a little ſlender Reed like a Pipe. And ſeeing, to his great wonder, that the Child was nouriſhed with the Drops that diſtill'd from the Tree, he took the Child away, believing it to be of a divine Race. This Child when he grew up, was entertain'd by *Androcles*, a Native of that Country, who adopted him into his own Family, and committed the Management of his Affairs to his Truſt. *Mneſarchus* afterwards growing very rich, brought up the Child, naming him *Aſtræus*, together with his own three Sons, *Eunoſtus*, *Tyrrhenus*, and *Pythagoras*: Which Boy, as I ſaid, *Androcles* being yet very young, adopted his Son. He put the Boy to a Luteniſt, a Wreſtler, and a Painter; but as ſoon as he was grown up, he ſent him to *Miletus* to *Anaximander*, to learn Geometry and Aſtronomy. *Mneſarchus* gave *Aſtræus* to *Pythagoras*, who receiving him, and conſidering his Phyſiognomy, and examining the Motions and Reſtings of his Body, inſtructed him. For he firſt found out the way of diſcerning the Nature of every Man; neither did he entertain any as his Friend or Diſciple, before he had examined by Phyſiognomy his Diſpoſition.

He had likewiſe another Servant whom he entertained in *Thrace*, named *Zamolxis*, for that as ſoon as he was born, they wrapped him in a Bear's Skin, which Skin the *Thracians* call *Zalmus*; whom *Pythagoras* affecting, inſtructed in ſublime Speculations, and concerning ſacred Rites, and the Worſhip of the Gods. Some affirm, he was called *Thales*. The Barbarians worſhipped him inſtead of *Hercules*. *Dionyſiphanes* ſaith, he was Servant to *Pythagoras*, and falling into the Hands of Thieves, and being branded by them, when *Pythagoras* was diſturbed by ſeditious Factions, and baniſhed, he bound his Forehead about becauſe of the Scars. Some ſay, that the Name *Zamolxis* ſignifies a ſtrange Perſon. Hitherto *Diogenes*. To this *Zamolxis* (ſaith *Laertius*) the *Getes* ſacrifice, as *Herodotus* relates, conceiving him to be *Saturn*. But [h] *Herodotus* having delivered the Tradition of the *Grecians*, (that he ſerved *Pythagoras* at *Samos*, bought out his Freedom at a great rate, and returning to his Country, reformed their Manners) concludes with his own Opinion, that *Zamolxis* lived many years before *Pythagoras*.

CHAP. XXII.

His Writings.

SOme there are who hold, that *Pythagoras* left no any thing in Writing; of this Opinion are [a] *Plutarch*, [b] *Joſephus*, [c] *Lucian*, [d] *Porphyrius*, [e] *Ruffinus*, and others: But [f] *Laertius* ſaith, that all ſuch as affirm he wrote nothing, do but jeſt; for *Heraclitus* the natural Philoſopher ſaid expreſly of him, *Pythagoras* Son of *Mneſarchus* was skilful in Hiſtory above all Men; and ſelecting thoſe Writings, made up his own Wiſdom, and variety of Learning and Art. To which Citation perhaps, [g] *Clemens Alexandrinus* refers, who ſaith, *Heraclitus* being later than *Pythagoras*, mentioneth him in his Writings. The Books attributed to him are theſe.

[h] Three Treatiſes, *Pædeutick*, *Politick*, *Phyſick*; to which *Laertius* refers the foreſaid Teſtimony of *Heraclitus*; foraſmuch as *Pythagoras*, in the beginning of his phyſical Treatiſe, ſaith, *No, by the Air which I breathe; no, by the Water which I drink, I ſhall not* [i] *bear the blame of this Diſcourſe.*

[k] Six Treatiſes, reckoned by *Heraclides*, Son of *Serapion*, in his Epitome of *Solion*, thus; *One concerning the Univerſe in Verſe.* The ſecond intituled, *The ſacred Diſcourſe, beginning thus:*

Young Men in Silence entertain all theſe.

[To the ſame perhaps belongs this;

Wretched, thrice wretched, Beans forbear to eat,
Your Parents Heads as well may be your Meat.

[l] And this cited by *Euſtachius*;

Which way to *Orcus* Souls deſcend; which way
Return, and the Sun's chearful Light ſurvey.]

The third, of the Soul. The fourth, of Piety. The fifth, *Helothales*, Father of *Epicharmus*. The ſixth, *Crotona*, and others.

Two Treatiſes, a Diſcourſe concerning Nature, and another concerning the Gods; [m] both which he in a ſhort time taught *Abaris* the *Hyperborean*. The firſt may poſſibly be the ſame with the phyſical Treatiſe, mentioned by *Laertius*; the other, as *Jamblichus* ſaith, is intituled alſo, *The ſacred Diſcourſe*, [but it is not the ſame with that ſacred Diſcourſe,

[g] Porph. p. 7. [h] Lib. 4. [a] De virt. Alexand. l. 1. [b] Orig. Judaic. l. 1. [c] De Lapſ. in Salut. [d] Porph. Vit. Pyth. p. 208. [e] D. Hieron. Epiſt. adv. Rufin. [f] Κακοτεχνίαν artes callidas & vafras. So is κακοτέχνας ſometimes taken in a good Senſe; *Greg. Naz.* adv. *Jul.* Orat. 3. ἐπεὶ ἤ γέτοι μιμεῖσθαι μὲν λέγονται τῶν ἀθρόπινων τινὰ διαλογισμάτων μὴ τοι κακοτέχνως προσδεεμένων τέτοις ἢ ἀλλοτρίοις, the Text being ſo to be reſtored. [g] Strom. [h] Laert. 8. 6. [i] The Interpreters both otherwiſe. [k] Laert. 7. 7. [l] In Iliad. 2. [m] Jambl. c. 19.

course, which *Heraclides* ascribes to him; for that was in Verse, this in Prose,] as being collected out of the most mystical places of *Orpheus*, written either by *Pythagoras*, as most hold, or, as some eminent and creditable persons of that School assert, by *Telauges*, out of the Commentaries left by *Pythagoras* with *Damo* his Daughter, Sister of *Telauges*, which after her death, they report to have been given to *Bitale*, Daughter of *Damo*, and to *Telauges* Son of *Pythagoras*, Husband to *Bitale*. What *Jamblichus* cites out of this Work, see hereafter in the Doctrine of *Pythagoras*; it is cited also by [n] *Hierocles*, *Syrianus*, and others.

An Oration to *Abaris*, mentioned by *Proclus*.

Orpheus, a Poem, as *Ion* the Chian *(in triagmis)* (affirms. *Laert.*

The *Scopiads*, beginning thus, Μὴ ἀναίδως μηδένι. *(Laert.*

Hymns, out of which *Proclus* brings these Verses.

——— *Sacred Number springs*
From th' uncorrupted Monad, and proceeds
To the divine Tetracties, she who breeds
All; and assigns the proper bounds to all,
Whom we the pure immortal Decad call.

Arithmetick, mention'd by [o] *Isidore*, who affirms, *He was the first that writ upon this Subject amongst the Grecians, which was afterward more copiously composed by* Nicomachus.

Prognosticks, of which thus [p] *Tzetzes*.

Pythagoras *Samian*, Mnesarchus *Son*,
Not only knew what would by fate be done,
But ev'n for those who futures would perceive,
He of Prognosticks several Books did leave.

Of the magical Virtues of Herbs, frequently cited by [q] *Pliny*, who saith, That though some ascribe it to *Cleemporus* a Physician, yet pertinacious Fame and Antiquity vindicate it to *Pythagoras*; and this very thing gives authority to the Volumes, that if any other thought his pains worthy the name of that Person, which that *Cleemporus* did, who can believe? Seeing that he hath put forth other Things in his own name. To this work seems to belong that Volume, which *Pythagoras* wrote concerning the Sea-Onion, cited also by *Pliny*; but by *Laertius* ascribed to another *Pythagoras* a Physician.

The golden Verses of *Pythagoras*, or, as others, of the *Pythagoreans*. But indeed their Author, as *Suidas* saith, is not certainly known, though some ascribe them to him. Of these is [r] *Proclus*, who styles him, *Father of the golden Verses*. Even the Verses themselves seem to confirm it, there being amongst them some, which *Pythagoras* is known to have repeated to his Disciples, by the Testimonies of *Laertius*, *Porphyrus*, and others.

Nor suffer sleep at night to close thy eyes,
Till thrice thy acts that day thou hast o're-run;
How slipt? what deeds? what Duty left undone?

Others, (as [s] *Chrysippus*) attribute them to his Disciples; some particularly to *Lysis* the *Tarentine*; some to *Philolaus*. St. *Hierom* conceives that the Sentences and Doctrines were of *Pythagaras*, but reduced to verse succinctly by *Archippus* and *Lysides* his Disciples, who had their Schools in *Greek*, and at *Thebes*, and having the Precepts of their Master by heart, made use of their own Ingenuity instead of Books. Or they might be compiled by *Epicarmus*, of whom *Jamblichus* saith, [t] coming to *Syracusa* in the reign of *Hiero*, he forbore to profess Philosophy openly, but did reduce the Opinions of the *Pythagoreans* into Verse, thereby in sportive manner venting the Doctrine of *Pythagoras*.

Epistles; [u] of which are extant two only, one to *Anaximenes*, the other to *Hiero*.

Pythagoras to *Anaximenes*.

AND thou, O best of Men, if thou didst not excel Pythagoras *in extract and honour, wouldst have left* Miletus; *but now the honour of this Country detains thee, and would also detain me, were I like* Anaximenes. *But if you who are the most considerable Persons should forsake the Cities, their Glory would be lost, and they become more infested by the* Medes. *Neither is it fit to be always busied in Astrology, but better to take care of our Country. Even I my self bestow not all my time in Study, but sometimes in the Wars, wherein the* Italians *are engaged one against another.*

This Epistle seems to have been written in answer to that of *Anaximenes* to *Pythagoras*, already produc'd in the life of *Anaximenes*.

Pythagoras to *Hiero*.

MY Life is secure and quiet, but yours will no way suit with me: A moderate and self-denying Person, needs not a Sicilian *Table.* Pythagoras, *whersoever he comes, hath all things sufficient for the day; but to serve a Lord is heavy and intolerable, for one unaccustomed to it.* Αὐτάρκεια, *self-sufficiency, is a great and safe thing, for it hath none that envies or conspires against it; whence that Life seemeth to come neareſt God. A good Habit is not acquired by vene-*

[n] In Aur. Carm. c. 2. [o] De Origin. 3. 2. [p] Chil. 1. 58. [q] Lib. 24. c. 17. [r] In Timæum. l. 3. [s] Agel. l. 9. [t] Cap. ult. [u] Laert. 8. 49.

real Pleasures, nor high Feeding; but by Indigence, which leadeth to Virtue; various and intemperate Pleasures enslave the Souls of weak Persons, but especially those which you enjoy, inasmuch as you have given your self over to them; for you are carried in suspence, and cannot be safe, because your Reason opposeth not it self to those Things which are pernicious. Therefore write not to Pythagoras *to live with you; for Physicians will not fall sick to bear their Patients company.*

These are mentioned as the genuine Writings of *Pythagoras*; others there were accounted spurious, as,

The Mystick Discourse, which (saith *Laertius*) they affirm to have been written by *Hippasus*, in detraction from *Pythagoras*.

[w] Many Writings of *Aesto*, a *Crotonian*, were likewise ascribed to *Pythagoras*; as were also,

[x] *Aliptick Commentaries*, written indeed by another of that name, Son of *Eratocles*.

The Dialect used by *Pythagoras* and his Disciples, was the Dorick, which some conceive chosen by them as the most excellent, as *Metrodorus*, cited by [y] *Jamblichus*; *Epicharmus* (saith he) and before him *Pythagoras*, took the Dorick, the best of Dialects, as it is also the best musical Harmony; for the Ionick and Æolick partake of the Chromatick; the Attick is much more participant of the Chromatick; but the Dorick Dialect is Enarmonick, consisting of full sounding Letters. The Antiquity of the Dorick Dialect is testified by the Fable: For *Nereus* married *Doris*, Daughter of the Ocean, whom they feign to have had Fifty; of whom, one was the Mother of *Achilles*. Some (saith he) affirm, that *Deucalion*, Son of *Prometheus*, and of *Pyrrha*, Daughter of *Epimetheus*, begot *Dorus*; he, *Hellen*; he, *Æolus*. But in the *Babylonian* sacred Records, *Hellen* is said to be the Son of *Jupiter*, and that *Hellen* begot *Dorus*, and *Xanthus*, and *Æolus*, by whose direction he went to *Rhodes*. Now it is not easy to speak exactly concerning the Ancients to those of later Times, yet is it acknowledged by both these Stories, that the *Dorick* is the most ancient of these Dialects. Next which the *Æolick*, so named from *Æolus*. The Third the *Ionick*, derived from *Io*, Son of *Xanthus*. The Fourth the *Attick*, founded by *Creusa*, Daughter of *Erechtheus*, so named three Ages after the rest, according to the *Thracians*, and the Rape of *Orithuia*, which many Histories declare. *Orpheus* also, the most ancient of Poets, used the *Dorick* Dialect.

But perhaps the true Reason is, because it was the Dialect of the Country. For the *Pythagoreans* [z] admonished all Persons to use the Language of their own Country, what *Grecians* soever came into their Community; for to speak a strange Language, they approved not. The *Dorick* Dialect was common throughout *Magna Grecia*. *Crotona* and *Sybaris* were Colonies of the *Achaans*, *Syracuse* of the *Corinthians*; both which were originally *Dorick*, as being of *Peloponnesus*; [a] *Thucidides* alledgeth this as a motive which induced the *Athenians* to war with the *Sicilians*, lest being *Doreans*, they should at some time or other assist the *Doreans*, by reason of their Affinity; and, being a Colony of the *Peloponnesians*, should join with the *Peloponnesians*. Hence, to the Stranger, in *Theocritus* his *Adoniazuze*, reproving the *Syracusian* Women thus,

[b] *Peace foolish babbling Women, leave your prate;*
Your wide-mouth'd Dorick *here is out of date.*

One of them answers,

G'up, whence are you? what is our Talk to thee?
Correct your Minds, not us of Sicily.
I would you knew't, we are from Corinth *sprung,*
As was Bellerophon; *our Mother-tongue*
Peloponnesian *is, nor is it scorn*
That they speak Dorick *who are* Dorick-*born.*

For, (saith the Scholiast) the *Syracusians* were originally *Corinthians*: *Peloponnesus* was inhabited by the *Doreans*, together with the *Heraclidæ*.

CHAP. XXIII.

His Disciples.

MAny were the Persons, who from several parts reforted to *Pythagoras*, to be his Disciples, and lived with him in that Condition. Of these there were (as [c] *Aristoxenus* relates) *Leucanians*, *Messapians*, (or, as *Laertius*, *Peucetians*) and *Romans*.

[d] *Simichus*, Tyrant of the *Centoropians*, [a People of *Sicily*, the Town it self being called *Centorpa*] having heard him, laid down his Command, and distributed his Riches, part to his Sister, part to his Citizens.

[e] *Abaris* also of *Scythia*, a *Hyperborean*, came hither, who being unacquainted with the *Greek* Language, and not initiated, and withal advanced into Years, *Pythagoras* would not introduce him by various Theorems; but instead of the Silence, and the long Attention, and other Trials, he made him presently fit to receive his Doctrines, and taught him in a short time to understand those two Books concerning Nature, and concerning the Gods. For *Abaris* now in Years, came from the *Hyperboreans*, a Priest of

[w] Laert. 8. 7. [x] Jamb. c. 5. [y] Cap. 34. [z] Jamb. ib. [a] Lib. 6. [b] Mr. *Sherburn* [c] Porph. p. 190
[d] Porph. ib. [e] Jam. cap. 19.

of *Apollo* there, and converting the wiſeſt Things concerning Religion, from *Greece* to his own Country, that he might lay up the collected Gold to his God's Uſe, in his Temple among the *Hyperboreans*; but coming by the Way into *Italy*, and ſeeing *Pythagoras*, and likening him to the God whoſe Prieſt he was, and believing he was no other, not a Man like him, but very *Apollo* himſelf, both by his Gravity, and by ſome Marks and Tokens which he knew; he gave *Pythagoras* an Arrow which he brought from the Temple, as neceſſary for his Journey through ſo many different Contingencies, and ſuch a long Travel: For riding upon that, and ſo paſſing over Places that were otherwiſe impaſſable, as Rivers, Lakes, Marſhes, Mountains, and the like; and coming to any Place, as they ſay, he made Purifications, and expelled Peſtilences and Storms from thoſe Cities that deſired his Aſſiſtance. We are informed, that *Lacedæmon* being purged by him, never had the Peſtilence afterwards, whereas it was formerly very ſubject to that Sickneſs, by reaſon of want of free Paſſage of the Air (the *Taygetan* Mountains, amongſt which it is built, penning it up; for thoſe Hills lye above it, as *Gnoſſus to Crete*) and other ſuch Signs of the Power of *Abaris* are reported. But *Pythagoras* [e] accepting the Arrow, and not looking ſtrangely upon it, or asking the Cauſe why he gave it him; but, as if he were himſelf the true God, taking *Abaris* aſide, he ſhewed him his golden Thigh, as an aſſured Mark that he was not miſtaken; and then reckoning every Particular of all thoſe that were in the Temple, that he did not gueſs amiſs; and adding, That he came for the Benefit of Men, and for this Reaſon was in Man's Shape, that they might not be aſtoniſhed at one ſo far above them, and ſo fly his Doctrine. And he commanded him to ſtay there, and to join with him in inſtructing them who came to him: And as for the Gold which he had gathered for his God, he commanded him to give it to thoſe whom he had aſſembled; inſomuch that he actually confirmed the Sentence, *All Things are common amongſt Friends*. *Abaris* thus ſtaying with him (as we ſaid) he gave him the Epitome of Phyſiology and Theology, and inſtead of the Art of gueſſing by Sacrifices, he taught him that Kind of Prognoſtick which is by Numbers, as thinking that more ſacred and divine, and more agreeable to the celeſtial Numbers of the Gods. And other Doctrines he taught *Abaris*, ſuch as were proper for him.

[f] *Milo* of *Crotona*, the moſt eminent Wreſtler of thoſe Times, was Diſciple to *Pythagoras*: He, when in the Hall of the College a Pillar begun to yield, went under it, and by that means ſaved all the Scholars, and at laſt got away himſelf; and it is probable that this Confidence in his great Strength was the Occaſion of his Death. For they report that as he was going through a thick Wood far from any Way, finding a great Tree with Wedges in it, he ſet his Hands and Feet to it, trying to reive it aſunder; whereupon the Wedges fell out, and he being caught, became a Prey to the wild Beaſts. In his Houſe it was, that the *Pythagoreans* were ſurprized and burned by the *Cylonians*.

[g] *Calliphon* of *Crotona*, is mentioned by *Hermippus*, as an intimate Friend of *Pythagoras*, who reported, when *Calliphon* was dead, That his Soul was continually preſent with him, and that the Soul commanded him that he ſhould not paſs the Place where his Aſs fell; and that he ſhould abſtain from impure Water, and avoid ill-ſpeaking.

We only mention theſe here, as being moſt particularly intereſted in the Relation of *Pythagoras* his Life: A more perfect Account of the reſt, receive in the following Catalogue.

CHAP. XXIV.

The Succeſſion of his School.

[h] THE Succeſſor of *Pythagoras* is by all acknowledged to have been *ARISTÆUS*, Son of *Damophon*, a *Crotonian*, who lived in the time of *Pythagoras*, ſeven Generations above *Plato*: Neither did he ſucceed in the School only, but in breeding the Children of *Pythagoras*, and in the Marriage of *Theano*, for his eminent Underſtanding of his Opinions; for he is ſaid to have taught the Doctrine of *Pythagoras* forty Years together lacking one, living, in all, near an hundred; he aſſigned the School to *Ariſtæus*, as being the oldeſt.

Next him, *MNESARCHUS*, Son of *Pythagoras*.

He deliver'd it to *BULAGORAS*, in whoſe time the City of *Crotona* was ſacked.

Him ſucceeded *TIDAS*, a *Crotonian*, returning from Travel which he began before the War, but he died with Grief for the Calamity of his Country; whereas it was a common Thing to others, when they were very old, to free themſelves from the Fetters of the Body.

Afterwards they took one of the *Lucanians*, ſaved by ſome Strangers, to be Preſident of the School; to whom came *DIODORUS* the *Aſpendian*, who was taken by reaſon of the Scarcity of Men in their College.

At *Heraclea*, *CLINIAS* and *PHILOLAUS*.

At *Metapontum*, *THEORIDES* and *EURYTUS*.

[e] For τυχν perhaps read ἰχνν. [f] Strab. l. 6. p. 263. [g] Joſeph. contra Appion. l. 11. [h] Jambl. c. ult.

At *Tarentum*, *ARCHYTAS*.

Of the external *Acroaticks* was *Epicharmus*, but not of the College. Coming to *Syracuſa* in the Time of the Tyranny of *Hieron*, he forbore publickly to profeſs Philoſophy; but he reduced the Opinions of thoſe Men, (the *Pythagoreans*) into Verſe, ſportively divulging the abſtruſe Doctrines of *Pythagoras*.

Of the *Pythagoreans* it is likely that many were obſcure; the Names of ſuch as were eminent are theſe;

Crotonians.

Hyppoſtatus, Dymas, Ægon, Æmon, Silius, Cleoſthenes, Agelas, Epiſylus, Phyciadas, Ecphanius, Timæus, Buthius, Eratus, Itanaus, Phodippus, Bryas, Evander, Millias, Antimedon, Ægeas, Leophron, Agylas, Onatus, Hyppoſthenes, Cleophron, Alcmæon, Damocles, Milon, Meton.

Metapontines.

Brontinus, Parmiſcus, Areſtadas, Leo, Damarmenos, Æneas, Chilas, Meliſias, Ariſteas, Laphaon, Evander, Bgeſidamus, Zenocides, Euriphemus, Ariſtomenes, Ageſarchus, Alcias, Xenophantes, Thraſeos, Arytus, Epiphron, Eiriſcus, Megiſteas, Leocydes, Thraſymides Euphemus, Proclus, Antimedes, Lacritus, Damotages, Pyrrhon, Rhexibius, Alopecus, Aſtylus, Dacydus, Aliochus, Lacrates, Glucinus.

Agrigentine.

Empedocles.

Eleate.

Pamenides.

Tarentines.

Philolaus, Arytus, Archytas, Theodorus, Ariſtippus, Lycon, Eſtiæus, Polemarchus, Aſteas, Cænias, Cleon, Eurymedon, Arceas, Clinagoras, Archippus, Zopyrus, Euthynus, Dicæarchus, Philonides, Phrontidas, Lyſis, Lyſibius, Dinocrates, Echecrates, Paetion, Accuſiladas, Iccus, Piſicrates, Clearatus, Lenteus, Phrinichus, Simicheas, Ariſtoclides, Clinias, Abroteles, Piſerrydus, Brias, Evander, Archemachus, Mimnomachus, Achmonidas, Sicas, Caraphantidas.

Sybarites.

Metopus, Hippaſus, Proxenus, Evanor, Deanax, Meneſtius, Diocles, Empedus, Timaſius, Polemæus, Evæus, Tyrſenus.

Parians.

Ætius, Phenecles, Dexitheus, Alcimachas, Dinarchus, Meton, Timæus, Timeſianax, Amcærus, Exmaridias.

Locrians.

Gyptius, Xenon, Philodamus, Euetes, Adicus, Sthenonidas, Soſiſtratus, Euthynus, Zaleucus, Timares.

Poſidonians.

Athamas, Simus, Proxenus, Cranius, Mayes, Bathylaus, Phædo.

Lucanians.

Ocellus and *Ocylus* (Brethren), *Oreſande, Cerambus, Dardaneus, Malias.*

Ægeans.

Hippomedon, Timoſthenes, Euelthon, Thraſydamus, Crito, Polyctor.

Laconians.

Antocharidas, Cleanor, Eurycratus.

Hyperborean.

Abaris.

Rhegians.

Ariſtides, Demoſthenes, Ariſtocrates, Phytius, Helicaon, Mneſibulus, Hipparchides, Athoſion, Euthycles, Opſimus.

Selinuntian.

Colæs.

Syracuſians.

Leptines, Phintias, Damon.

Samians.

Meliſſus, Lacon, Archippus, Glorippus, Heloris, Hippon.

Caulonians.

Callibrotus, Dicon, Naſtas, Drymon, Xentas.

Phliaſians.

Diocles, Echecrates, Polymnaſtus, Phanton.

Sicyonians.

Paliades, Demon, Soſtratius, Soſthenes.

Cyrenæans.

Prorus, Melanippus, Ariſtangelus, Theodorus.

Cyzicenes.

Pythodorus, Hyppoſthenes, Butherus, Xenophilus.

Catanæan.

Catanæan.
Charondas.

Corinthian.
Lysiades.

Tyrrhene.
Chrysippus.

Athenian.
Nausitheus.

Of Pontus.
Neocritus, Lyramnus.

In all, 208.

The *Pythagorean* Women eminent, are,

Tymicha, Wife of *Millius* the *Crotonian.*
Philtes, Daughter of *Leophron*, a *Crotonian*, Sister of *Bindæcus.*
Oecelo and *Eccelo*, of *Luca.*
Chilonis, Daughter of *Chilo* the *Lacedæmonian.*
Theano, Wife of *Brontinus* the *Metapontine.*
Muya, Wife of *Milo* the *Crotonian.*
Lasthenia of *Arcadia*, Daughter of *Abroteles* the *Tarentine.*
Echecrates, a *Phliasian.*
Tyrsenes of *Sybaris.*
Pysirrode of *Tarentum*, Daughter of *Nistiades.*
Salacera.
Bio of *Argos.*
Babelyma of *Argos.*
Cleæchma, Sister of *Antocharides*, a *Lacedæmonian.*

In all, 15. Thus *Jamblichus.*

Laertius saith, His Syſtem (or, as *Cassiodorus*, College) continued for nineteen Generations; for the laſt of the *Pythagoreans* (whom *Aristoxenus* saw) were *Xenophilus* the *Chalcidean* of *Thrace*, and *Phanton* a *Phliasian*; and *Echecrates*, and *Diocles*, and *Polymnestus*, who also were *Phliasians.* They heard *Philolaus* and *Eurytus*, both of *Tarentum.*

The Discipline and Doctrine of *PYTHAGORAS.*

CHAP. I.

The great Authority and Esteem of Pythagoras *amongst his Disciples.*

PYTHAGORAS, to render his Disciples capable of Philosophy, prepar'd them by a Discipline so strict and severe, as might seem incredible to have been undergone by free Persons, were it not founded upon the great Authority and Reputation which he had amongst them.

[a] The Credit of their Opinions they conceived to be this, That he who first communicated them was no ordinary Person, but a God; and one of these Acousmata is, Who *Pythagoras* was: for they say, he was *Hyperborean Apollo.* [b] In Confirmation hereof, they instance those Wonders related in his Life, and the like; which being acknowledged to be true, and it being impossible they should all be performed by one Man, they conceive it manifest, that these Relations are to be ascribed, not to a human Person, but to something above Mankind. This they acknowledge; for amongst them there is a Saying, that

[c] *Two-footed Man, and Bird*
Is, and another Third;

by which Third they meant *Pythagoras.* And [d] *Aristotle*, in his Book of Pythagorick Philosophy, relates, that such a Division as this was preserved by the *Pythagoreans* amongst their ineffable Secrets. Of rational Animals, one Kind is God; another, Man; a third, between both these, *Pythagoras.*

[e] They esteemed *Pythagoras* in the next place to the Gods, as some good Genius indulgent to Mankind: Some affirming, that he was *Pythian*; others, *Hyperborean Apollo*; some, one of those *Genii* which dwell in the Moon; others, one of the celestial Deities, appearing at that time in a human Shape, for the Benefit and Direction of mortal Life, that he might communicate the wholsome Illumination of Beatitude and Philosophy to mortal Nature; than which, a greater Good can never come, nor shall ever come, which is given by the Gods through the Means of this *Pythagoras.* Whence to this Day the Proverb of the Fair-hair'd *Samian* is used for a most reverend Person.

[f] *Porphyrius* saith, they reckon'd him amongst the Gods; and therefore whensoever they went to deliver to others any excellent Thing out of the Secrets of his Philosophy, whence many physical Conclusions

[a] Jamb. c. 28. p. 140. [b] Pag. 143. [c] Read *Nous.* See Etymolog. magni. [d] Jamb. c. 6. p. 31. [e] Jamb. c. 6. p. 30. [f] Pag. 18.

ons might be deduced, then they swore by the *Tetractys*, and calling *Pythagoras*, as some God, to witness, said,

Who the Tetractys *to our Souls expreſt,*
Eternal Nature's Fountain I atteſt.

[g] Which Oath they uſed, as forbearing, through Reverence, to name him; for they were very ſparing in uſing the Name of any God.

So great indeed was the Reſpect they bare him, that [h] it was not lawful for any one to doubt of what he ſaid, nor to queſtion him further concerning it; but they did acquieſce in all things that he deliver'd, as if they were Oracles. And when he went abroad to Cities, it was reported, he went not to teach, but to cure.

Hence it came to paſs, that [i] when they aſſerted any thing in diſpute, if they were queſtion'd why it was ſo, they uſed to anſwer, *Ipſe dixit*, He ſaid it; which *He* was *Pythagoras*. This [k] αὐτὸς ἔφα was amongſt them the firſt and greateſt of Doctrines, his Judgment being a Reaſon free from, and above all Examination and Cenſure.

CHAP. II.

The two Sorts of Auditors: and firſt of the Exoterick, *how he explored them.*

THE Auditors of *Pythagoras* (ſuch I mean as belonged to the Family) were of two Sorts, *Exoterick* and *Eſoterick*: the *Exotericks* were thoſe who were under Probation, which if they well performed, they were admitted to be *Eſotericks*. For of thoſe who came to *Pythagoras*, he admitted not every one, but only thoſe whom he liked: firſt, upon Choice; and next, by Trial.

[l] *The* Pythagoreans *are ſaid to have been averſe from thoſe who ſell Learning, and open their Souls like the Gates of an Inn, to every one that comes to them; and if they find not a Vent or Sale in this manner, then they run into Cities, and ranſack the* Gymnaſia, *and exact a Reward from diſhonourable Perſons: Whereas* Pythagoras *hid much of his Speeches; ſo as they who were purely initiated might plainly underſtand them. But the reſt, as* Homer *ſaid of* Tantalus, *grieve; for that being in the midſt of Learning, they cannot taſte of it. Moreover they ſaid, That they who for Hire teach ſuch as come to them, are meaner than Statuaries and Chariot-makers; for a Statuary, when he* [m] *would make a* Mercury, *ſeeks out ſome Piece of Wood fit to receive that Form; but theſe, of every Diſpoſition endeavour to make that of Virtue.*

[n] *When* (therefore) *any Friends came to him, and deſired to learn of him, he admitted them not, till he had made Trial and Judgment of them. Firſt, he enquired how they did heretofore converſe with their Parents and Friends; next, he obſerved their unſeaſonable Laughters, and unneceſſary Silence or Diſcourſe. Moreover, what their Inclinations were,* [o] whether poſſeſs'd with Paſſion and Intemperance, whether prone to Anger or unchaſte Deſires, or contentious or ambitious, and how they behaved themſelves in Contention and Friendſhip.] * *As likewiſe what Friends thoſe were with whom they were intimate, and their Converſation with them, and in whoſe Society they ſpent the greateſt part of the Day; likewiſe upon what Occaſions they joyed and grieved.*

[p] *Moreover he conſidered their Preſence and their Gaite, and the whole Motion of their Body; and, phyſiognomizing them by the Symptoms, he diſcovered by manifeſt Signs the occult Diſpoſitions of their Souls.* For [q] *he firſt ſtudied that Science concerning Men, thereby diſcovering of what Diſpoſition every one was: neither did he admit any into his Friendſhip and Acquaintance, before he had phyſiognomized the Man what he were.* This Word (ſaith [r] *Agellius* upon the ſame Occaſion) ſignifieth to make Enquiry into the Manners of ſome, by ſome kind of Conjecture of the Wit by the Face and Countenance, and by the Air and Habit of the whole Body.

[s] *If upon exact Obſervation of all theſe Particulars, he found them to be of good Diſpoſitions, then he examined whether they had good Manners, and were docile; firſt, whether they could readily and ingeniouſly follow that which he told them; next, whether they had any Love to thoſe things which they heard. For he conſidered what Diſpoſition they were of as to being made gentle, this he called* καταστιον; *for he accounted Roughneſs an Enemy to his way of teaching, becauſe it is attended by Impatience, Intemperance, Anger, Obtuſeneſs, Confuſion, Diſhonour, and the like; but Mildneſs and Gentleneſs by their Contraries.*

Likewiſe [t] *in making the firſt Trial of them, he conſidered, whether they could* ἐχμυθειν, *(for that was the Word he uſed) and examined, whether if they could learn that which they heard, they were able to be ſilent, and to keep it to themſelves.*

CHAP. III.

Purificative Inſtitution by Sufferings.

[v] *THE chiefeſt Scope which* Pythagoras *propos'd, was to deliver and free the Mind from the Engagements and Fetters in which it is confin'd from her firſt Infancy; without which Freedom, none can learn any*

[g] Jam. c. 28. p. 150. [h] Ælian. Var. Hiſt. 4. 27. [i] Cic. Nat. Deor. l. 1. [k] Greg. Naz. Orat. 3. [l] Jamb. c. 34.
[m] Apul. in Apolog. l. 1. cites this Sentence of *Pythagoras*. [n] Jamb. c. 17. [o] Ibid. c. 20. [*] Ibid. c. 17. [p] Ibid. c. 20.
[q] Porph. p. 185. [r] Lib. 1. c. 9. [s] Jamb. c. 20. [t] Ibid. c. 20. p. 95. [v] Porph. p. 201.

any thing ſound or true, nor can perceive by what that which is unſound in Senſe operates. For the Mind (according to him) ſeeth all, and heareth all, the reſt are deaf and blind.

This he performed by many Exerciſes which he appointed for Purification of the Mind, and for the Probation of ſuch as came to him, which endured five Years before they were admitted.

[w] *If upon this Examination* (which we declared) *he judged any Perſon capable, he then remitted him three Years to be deſpiſed, making a Teſt of his Conſtancy and true Love to Learning, and whether he were ſufficiently inſtructed as to deſpiſe Glory, to contemn Honour, and the like.*

[x] *He conceived it in general requiſite, that they ſhould take much Labour and Pains for the Acquiſition of Arts and Sciences; and to that End he appointed for them ſome Torments of cauteriſing and inciſion to be performed by Fire and Steel, which none that were of an ill Inclination would undergo.*

CHAP. IV.

Silence.

[y] *MOreover, he enjoined thoſe that came to him Silence for five Years, making Trial how firmly they would behave themſelves in the moſt difficult of all Continencies; for ſuch is the Government of the Tongue, as is manifeſt from thoſe who have divulged Myſteries.*

This πενταετὴς σιωπὴ, a quinquennial Silence, was called ἐχεμυθία, and ſometimes, but leſs frequently, ἐχεφημοσύνη [z] ἀπὸ τῦ ἐχειν ἔν ἑαυτῷ τ' λόγον, from keeping our Speech within ourſelves.

The Reaſon of this Silence was, [a] *That the Soul might be converted into herſelf from external Things, and from the irrational Paſſions in her, and from the Body even unto her own Life, which is to live for ever.* Or, as [b] *Clemens Alexandrinus* expreſſeth it, *That his Diſciples, being diverted from ſenſible things, might ſeek God with a pure Mind.* Hence [c] *Lucian* to the Demand, how *Pythagoras* could reduce Men to the Remembrance of the things which they had formerly known, (for he held Science to be only Reminiſcence) makes him anſwer, *Firſt, by long Quiet and Silence, ſpeaking nothing for five whole Years.*

Yet [d] *Agellus* affirms, That he appointed not the ſame Length of Silence to all, but ſeveral to ſeveral Perſons, according to their particular Capacities. And *Apuleius*, That for the graver ſort of Perſons, this Taciturnity was moderated by a ſhorter Space; but the more talkative were puniſhed, as it were, by Exile from Speech five Years.

[e] He who kept ſilence, heard what was ſaid by others, but was not allowed either to queſtion, if he underſtood not, or to write down what he heard. None kept ſilence leſs than two Years. *Agellus* adds, That theſe within the time of Silence and Hearing were called *Acouſtici*. But when they had learned theſe things, the moſt difficult of all, to hold their Peace, and to hear, and were now grown learned in Silence, which they called ἐχεμυθίαν, then they were allowed to ſpeak, and to queſtion, and to write what they heard, and what they conceived. At this time they were called *Mathematici*, from thoſe Arts which they then began to learn and to meditate. Thus *Agellus*, how rightly, I queſtion; for *Mathematici* and *Acouſmatici* were diſtinctive Appellations of the *Pythagoreans* not in Probation, but after Admiſſion, as we ſhall ſee hereafter.

Thus [f] *Apuleius* ſaith, He taught nothing to his Diſciple before Silence; and with him, the firſt Meditation, for one that meant to be a wiſe Man, was, wholly to reſtrain the Tongue of Words, thoſe Words which the Poets call Winged, to pluck off the Feathers, and to confine them within the Walls of our Teeth. This, I ſay, was the firſt Rudiment of Wiſdom, to learn to meditate, and to unlearn to talk.

CHAP. V.

Abſtinence, Temperance, and other ways of Purification.

[g] MOreover, he commanded them to abſtain from all things that had Life, and from certain other Meats alſo which obſtruct the Clearneſs of the Underſtanding; [h] and for the ſame End (*viz.* in order to the Inquiſition and the Apprehenſion of the moſt difficult Theorems) he likewiſe commanded them to abſtain from Wine, to eat little, to ſleep little; a careleſs Contempt of Honour, Riches, and the like; an unfeigned Reſpect towards Kindred, ſincere Equality and Kindneſs towards ſuch as were of the ſame Age, and a Propenſity to further the Younger without Envy.

[i] In fine, he procured to his Diſciples a Converſation with the Gods by Viſions and Dreams, which never happen to a Soul diſturbed with Anger or Pleaſure, or any other unbefitting Tranſportation, or with Impurity and a rigid Ignorance of all theſe. He cleanſed and purified the Soul divinely from all theſe, and enkindled the divine Part in her, and preſerved her, and directed in her that intellectual divine Eye, which is better (as [k] *Plato* ſaith) than a thouſand Eyes of Fleſh; for by the Help of this only, Truth is apprehended: After this manner he procured Purification of the Intellect; and ſuch was his Form of Inſtitution as to thoſe things.

Diodorus

[w] Jamb. c. 17. p. 72. [x] Ibid. c. 16. p. 68. [y] Ibid. c. 15. p. 72. [z] Heſych. Lex. [a] Simplic. in Epictet. c. 42. [b] Strom. 5. [c] In vit. act. [d] Lib. 1. c. 4. [e] Agel. ibid. [f] Florid. [g] Jamb. c. 16. p. 74. [h] Jam. ibid. [i] Jam. ibid. [k] For σωφίνας reading ὡς φησι κατὰ τὸν Πλάτωνα.

[l] *Diodorus* saith, they had an Exercise of Temperance after this manner: There being prepared and set before them all sorts of delicate Food, they looked upon it a good while, and after that their Appetites were fully provoked by the Sight thereof, they commanded it to be taken off, [m and given to the Servants] they themselves going away without dining: This they did, (saith *Jamblichus*) to punish their Appetite.

CHAP. VI.

Community of Estates.

IN this time all that they had (that is, their whole Estate) was made common [n put together and made one.] They brought forth, saith [o] *Agellius*, whatsoever they had of Stock or Money, and constituted an inseparable Society, as being that ancient Way of Association which truly is termed Κοινοβιον. This was given up to such of the Disciples as were appointed for that purpose, and were called *Politici & Oeconomici*, as being Persons fit to govern a Family, and to give Laws.

This was conformable to the Precepts of *Pythagoras*, (as [p] *Timeus* affirms) first, κοινὰ τὰ φίλων εἶναι, All common amongst Friends; and, φιλότης ἰσότης, Friendship, Equality; [q] and, Esteem nothing your own. By this means [r] he exterminated all Propriety, and increased Community even to their last Possessions, as being Causes of Dissension and Trouble; for all things were common amongst them, no Man had a Propriety to any thing.

But what *Agellius* terms *an inseparable Society*, is to be understood only conditionally, provided that they misliked not at any time this Community; for whosoever did so, [s] *took again his own Estate, and more than that which he brought into the Community, and departed.*

CHAP. VII.

Admission or Rejection.

[t] THEY who appeared worthy to participate of his Doctrines, judging by their Lives and Moderation, after their five years Silence, were made *Esotericks*, and were admitted to hear *Pythagoras* within the Screen, and to see him; but before that Time they heard him discourse, being on the outside of the Screen, and not seeing him, giving a long time experiment of their proper Manners by hearing only. But if they were rejected, they received their Estate double, and a Tomb was made by the Disciples, as if they had been dead; for so all that were about *Pythagoras* spoke of them, and when they met them, behaved themselves towards them, as if they had been some other Persons, but the Men themselves they said were dead.

CHAP. VIII.

Distinction.

[u] WHatsoever he discoursed to those that came to him, he declared either plainly or symbolically (for he had a twofold form of Teaching:) and of those who came to him, some were called *Mathematici*, others *Acousmatici*. The *Mathematici* were those who learnt the fuller and more exactly elaborate reason of Science. The *Acousmatici*, they who heard only the chief heads of Learning, without more exact Explication.

Thus [w] as there were two kinds of Philosophy, so were there two Sorts of those who studied Philosophy. The *Acousmatici* did confess that the *Mathematici* were *Pythagoreans*; but the *Mathematici* did not acknowledge that the *Acousmatici* were *Pythagoreans*; for they had their Learning, not from *Pythagoras*, but from *Hippasus*; who, some say, was of *Crotona*, others of *Metapontium*.

The Philosophy of the *Acousmatici* consists of Doctrines without Demonstrations and Reasons, but that, so it must be done, and the like, which they were to observe as so many divine Doctrines, and they did esteem those amongst them the wisest, who had most of these *Acousmata*. Now all these *Acousmata* were divided into three Kinds; some tell, *what something is*, others tell, *what is most such a thing*; the third sort tell, *what is to be done, and what not.* Those that tell *what a thing is*, are of this kind, *as* what is the Island of the Blessed? The Sun? The Moon? What is the Oracle at *Delphi*? The Tetractys? What is the Musick of the Syrens?

Those which tell *what is most*, as, *what is most just? To sacrifice. What is the wisest? Number; and in the next place that which gave Names to things. What is the wisest amongst us? Medicine. What the most beautiful? Harmony. What the most powerful? Reason. What the best? Beatitude. What the truest? That Men are wicked.* For which (they say) he commended *Hippodamas*, a Poet of *Salamis*, who said,

O Gods? whence are you? How so good? So blest?
O Men! whence are you? How with ill possest?

These and such like are the *Acousmata* of this kind; for every one of these telleth, what is most. The same it is with that which is called the Wisdom of

[l] Excerpt. Vales. p. 245. [m] Jambl. 31. [n] Jamb. c. 16. [o] Agel. 1. 9. [p] Jamb. c. 10. [q] Laert. 8. 10. [r] Jamb. c. 30. [s] Agel. 1. 9. [t] Jamb. c. 17. [u] Porph. p. 196. [w] Jamb. c. 18. p. 8[illegible].

of the ſeven Sages, for they enquired not what is good, but what is moſt good; not what is difficult, but what is moſt difficult, which is to know our ſelves; not what is facile, but what is moſt facile, which is the cuſtom of Nations. Thoſe *Acouſmata* ſeem to follow this kind of Wiſdom, for thoſe Sages were before *Pythagoras*. The *Acouſmata* which tell *what is to be done, or what is not to be done*, are thus, *As that we ought to beget Children, for we muſt leave behind us ſuch as may ſerve the Gods in our room*; *or, that we ought to put off the right Shoe firſt*; *or, that we ought not to go in the common Road*, and the like. Such were the *Acouſmata*; but thoſe which have moſt ſaid upon them, are *concerning Sacrifices*, at what times, and after what manner they are to be performed, *concerning removal* from our place of Habitation, and concerning *Sepulture*, how we muſt bury the Dead, for ſome whereof there is a *Reaſon* given. As, that *we ought to get Children, that we may leave in our Room another ſervant of the Gods*. But of others there is no reaſon: and, in ſome, that which follows the Precept ſeems to be allied to the Words, but in others is wholly diſtant, as, *that we ought not to break Bread, becauſe it conduceth to judgment in Hell*. But the Reaſons that are applied to theſe, are not *Pythagorean*, but given by ſome other who ſtudied *Pythagorean* Learning, endeavouring to apply ſome probable Conjecture to them: As of the laſt mentioned, that Bread is not to be broken; ſome ſay, he who gathers together, ought not to diſſolve. For anciently all Friends uſed after a barbarous manner to meet at one Loaf; others, that you muſt not give ſo bad an Omen, as when you are going about any thing, to break it off.

But there was one *Hippomedon*, [x] an *Agrinean*, a *Pythagorean* of the *Acouſmatick* Rank, who ſaid, that *Pythagoras* gave reaſons and demonſtrations of all theſe Things; but becauſe they were delivered by Tradition through many, and thoſe ſtill growing more idle, that the Reaſons were taken away, and the Problems only left. Now the mathematical *Pythagoreans* grant all this to be true; but the occaſion of the Difference they ſay was this: *Pythagoras* went from *Ionia*, and *Samus*, in the time of *Policrates*'s Reign, to *Italy*, which was then in a flouriſhing Condition, where the chiefeſt Perſons of the Cities became converſant with him. To the moſt ancient of theſe, and ſuch as had leaſt leiſure, (becauſe they were taken up with publick Employments, ſo that it would be very hard for them to learn Mathematicks and Demonſtrations) he diſcourſed barely, conceiving it did nothing leſs advantage them, even without the Cauſes, to know what they had to do; as Patients, not enquiring why ſuch Things are preſcribed them, nevertheleſs obtain Health. But to the younger, who were able to act and learn, he imparted by Demonſtrations and Mathematicks. The *Mathematici* profeſſed that they came from theſe; the *Acouſmatici*, from the others, chiefly from *Hippaſus*, who was one of the *Pythagoreans*. But becauſe he publiſhed [their Doctrine] and firſt wrote of the Sphere of twelve Pentagons, he died in the Sea as an impious Perſon, not obtaining the fame at which he aimed.

CHAP. IX.

How they diſpoſed the Day.

[y] WE ſhall next ſpeak concerning thoſe Things which he taught them in the Day; for, according to his Directions, thus did they who were taught by him. Theſe Men performing their morning Walks by themſelves, and in ſuch Places where they might be exceeding quiet and retired, where were Temples, and Groves, and other delightful Places; for they thought it was not fit they ſhould ſpeak with any one, till they had firſt compos'd their Souls, and fitted their Intellect, and that ſuch Quiet was requiſite for the Compoſure of their Intellect; for, as ſoon as they aroſe, to intrude among the People, they thought a tumultuous Thing. Therefore all the *Pythagoreans* ever made choice of the moſt ſacred Places.

After their morning Walk, they came to one another chiefly in the Temples, or in ſome ſuch Places. They made uſe of theſe times for Doctrines, and Diſciplines, and rectifications of their Manners.

After they had ſtudied a while, they went to their morning Exerciſes; the greater part uſed to anoint themſelves, and run Races; the fewer, to wreſtle in Orchards and in Groves; ſome, by throwing Sledges, or by grappling Hands, to make trial of their Strength; chuſing ſuch Exerciſes as they judged moſt convenient for them.

At Dinner they uſed Bread and Honey. Wine after Meals they drunk not. The time after Dinner they employ'd in political Affairs, as well foreign as domeſtick, according to the injunction of their Laws; for they endeavoured to manage every thing in the Afternoons. As ſoon as the Evening came, they betook themſelves again, not ſingly, as in their morning Walks, but two or three walked together, repeating the Doctrines they had learnt, and exerciſing themſelves in virtuous Employments. After their Walks, they uſed Baths and Waſhing; having waſhed, they met together to eat; but they did not eat together more than ten Perſons. As ſoon as they who were to come together were met, they uſed Libations, and Sacrifices of Meal and Frankincenſe: Then they went to Supper, that they might end it

[x] For ἀγρίου ἀνὸς, perhaps read Ἀγριανὸς. [y] Jamb. c. 20. p. 97. and c. 21.

before the Sun were ſet. They uſed Wine, and Maza, and Bread, and Broth, and Herbs, both raw and boiled: They likewiſe ſet before them the Fleſh of ſuch Beaſts as uſed to be ſacrificed. They ſeldom eat Broths of Fiſh, becauſe ſome of them are, in ſome reſpects, very hurtful; likewiſe (ſeldom) the Fleſh of ſuch Creatures as uſe not to hurt Mankind. After Supper, they offered Libations, then had Lectures: Their Cuſtom was, that the Youngeſt amongſt them ſhould read, and the Eldeſt ſhould, as Preſident, order what, and how he ſhould read. When they were to depart, he, who filled the Wine poured forth to them in Libation; and during the Libation, the eldeſt of them declared theſe Things, That none ſhould hurt or kill a domeſtick Plant or Fruit; beſides, that they ſhould ſpeak well, and think reverently of the Gods, Dæmons, and Heroes; likewiſe to think well of Parents and Benefactors; to aſſiſt Law, and oppoſe Rebellion. This ſaid, every one departed to his Houſe.

They wore a white and clean Garment; they had alſo Coverlets white and clean of [a] Linnen, for they uſed not any of Skins, becauſe they approved not the exerciſe of Hunting.

Theſe were the Traditions that were delivered to that Society of Men, partly concerning Diet, [of which hereafter more particularly] partly concerning the courſe of Life.

CHAP. X.

How they examined their Actions Morning and Evening.

THeſe and all other Actions of the day, they contriv'd in the Morning before they roſe, and examined at Night before they ſlept; thus, by a twofold Act, exerciſing the Memory. [a] *They conceived that it was requiſite to retain and preſerve in Memory all which they learnt; and that Leſſons and Doctrines ſhould be ſo far acquired, as until they are able to remember what they have learnt; for that is it which they ought to know, and bear in mind. For this reaſon they cheriſhed Memory much, and exerciſed it, and took great care of it; and in Learning they gave not over, until they had gotten their Leſſon perfectly by heart. A* Pythagorean *roſe not out of Bed, before he had called to mind the Actions of the Day paſt, which recollection he performed in this manner: He endeavour'd to call to mind what he firſt, as ſoon as he roſe, either had heard, or given in charge to his Servants; and what in the ſecond place, and what in the third, and ſo on in the ſame Order. And then for his going forth, whom he met firſt, whom next; and what Diſcourſes he had with the firſt, what with the ſecond, what with the third, and ſo of the reſt; for he endeavoured to repeat in memory all that hapned throughout the whole Day, in order as it hapned: And if at their up-riſing they had more leiſure, then after the ſame manner they endeavour'd to recollect all that hapned to them for three Days before. Thus they chiefly exerciſed the Memory; for they conceived, that* [b] *nothing conduceth more to Science, Experience, and Prudence, than to remember many Things.*

This was conformable to the Inſtitution of *Pythagoras*; for, [c] *He adviſed to have Regard chiefly to two times, that when we went to ſleep, and that when we roſe from ſleep; at each of theſe we ought to conſider, what Actions are paſt, and what to come. Of the paſt, we ought to require an Account of our ſelves; of the future, we ought to have a providential Care. Wherefore he adviſed every one to repeat to himſelf theſe Verſes* [*ſo ſoon as he came home,* or] *before he ſlept.*

Nor ſuffer Sleep at night to cloſe thine eyes,
Till thrice thy Acts that day thou haſt o'er-run.
How ſlipt? what deeds? what duty left undone?

And before they aroſe, theſe:

As ſoon as e'er thou wak'ſt, in order lay
The Actions to be done that following day.

To this effect *Auſonius* hath a *Pythagorical Acroaſis*, as he terms it. [d]

A good wiſe Perſon, ſuch as hardly one
Of many thouſands to Apollo *known,*
He his own Judge ſtrictly himſelf ſurveys,
Nor minds the Nobles or the Commons Ways:
But, like the World itſelf, is ſmooth and round,
In all his poliſht Frame no blemiſh found.
He thinks how long Cancer *the day extends,*
And Capricorn *the night: himſelf perpends*
In a juſt balance, that no flaw there be,
Nothing exuberant, but that all agree;
Within that all be ſolid, nothing by
A hollow Sound betray Vacuity.
Nor ſuffer Sleep to ſeize his Eyes, before
All Acts of that long Day he hath run o'er;
What Things were miſt, what done in time, what (not;
Why here Reſpect, or Reaſon there forgot.
Why kept the worſe Opinion? When reliev'd
A Beggar; why with broken Paſſion griev'd;
What wiſh'd which had been better not deſir'd;
Why Profit before Honeſty requir'd?
If any by ſome Speech or Look offended,
Why Nature more than Diſcipline attended?

All

[a] For ἰμαλίιναις perhaps read ἢ ἰμαλίιαλνα. Yet *Laertius* expreſly ſaith, that Linnen was not as yet uſed in thoſe Parts. [a] Jamb. c. 29. 165. [b] From Jamb. reſtore Diod. in Excerpt. Valeſ. p. 245. reading ἀδὲν γὰ μεῖζον πρὸς ἐπιςήμλω ἢ φρόνησιν, ἔτι δὲ τῶν πάντων ἀμπειρίαν, τὸ δυναθαι πολλὰ μνημονεύειν. [c] Porph. p. 198. [d] Auſon. Idyll. 16.

All Words and Deeds thus ſearcht from morn to night,
He ſorrows for the Ill, rewards the Right.

CHAP. XI.

Secreſy.

BEſides the Quinquennial Silence, παντελὴς ἐχεμυθία, of the *Pythagoreans*, whilſt they were Exotericks, there was another, termed παντελὴς ἐχεμυθία, a perpetual or compleat Silence, (or Secrecy) proper to the Exoreticks, not amongſt one another, but towards all ſuch as were not of their Society.

[e] The principal and moſt efficacious of their Doctrines they all kept ever amongſt themſelves, as not to be ſpoken, with exact *Echemythia* towards extraneous Perſons, continuing them unwritten and preſerv'd only by Memory to their Succeſſors, to whom they deliver'd them as Myſteries of the Gods; by which means, nothing of Moment came abroad from them. What had been taught and learnt a long time, was only known within the Walls; and if at any time there were any extraneous, and as I may ſay, profane Perſons amongſt them, the Men (ſo commonly were the *Pythagoreans* termed) ſignify'd their Meaning to one another by Symbols.

[f] Hence *Lyſis* reproving *Hipparchus*, for communicating the Diſcourſe to uninitiated Perſons, void of Mathematicks and Theory, ſaith, They report that you teach Philoſophy in publick to all that come, which *Pythagoras* would not do, as you, *Hipparchus* learnt with much Pains. But you took no heed after you had taſted (O noble Perſon) the *Sicilian* Delicacies, which you ought not to have taſted a ſecond time. If you are changed, I ſhall rejoice; if not, you are dead to me; for he ſaid, We ought to remember, that it is pious, according to the Direction of Divine and Human Exhortations, that the Goods of Wiſdom ought not to be communicated to thoſe whoſe Soul is not purify'd ſo much as in dream. For it is not lawful to beſtow on every one that which was acquir'd with ſo much Labour, nor to reveal the Myſteries of the *Eleuſian* Goddeſſes to profane Perſons; for they who do both theſe, are alike unjuſt and irreligious. It is good to conſider within ourſelves, how much time was employ'd in taking away the Spots that were in our Breaſts, that after five Years we might be made capable of his Diſcourſes. For as Dyers firſt waſh and wring out the Cloaths they intend to dye, that they may take the dye ſo as that it can never be waſhed out or taken away; in like manner, the Divine prepared thoſe who were inclined to Philoſophy, leſt he might be deceived by thoſe, of whom he hoped that they would prove good and honeſt. For he uſed no adulterate Learning, nor the Nets wherewith many of the Sophiſts intangle the young Men; but he was skilful in Things divine and human: Whereas they, under the Pretence of his Doctrine, do many ſtrange Things, inveigling the young Men unbeſeemingly, and as they meet them, whereby they render their Auditors rough and raſh. For they infuſe free Theorems and Diſcourſes, into Manners that are not free but diſorder'd. As if into a deep Well full of Dirt and Mire, we ſhould put clear tranſparent Water, it troubles the Dirt, and ſpoils the Water: The ſame is it as to thoſe who teach and are taught; for, about the Minds and Hearts of ſuch as are not initiated, there grows thick and tall Coverts, which darken all Modeſty, and Meekneſs, and Reaſon, hindring it from increaſing there. Hence ſpring all Kinds of Ills, growing up, and hindring the Reaſon, and not ſuffering it to look out. I will firſt name their Mothers, Intemperance and Avarice, both exceeding fruitful. From Intemperance ſpring up unlawful Marriages, Luſt, and Drunkenneſs, and Perdition, and unnatural Pleaſures, and certain vehement Appetites leading to Death and Ruin; for ſome have been ſo violently carried away with Pleaſures, that they have not refrained from their own Mothers and Daughters; but violating the Commonwealth, and the Laws, tyrannically impriſon Men, and carrying about their [g] *Jails* (or Stocks) violently hurry them to Deſtruction. From Avarice proceed Rapines, Theſts, Parricides, Sacrileges, Poiſonings, and whatſoever is allied to theſe. It behoves therefore firſt, to cut away the Matter wherein theſe Vices are bred, with Fire and Sword, and all Arts of Diſcipline, purifying and freeing the Reaſon from theſe Evils; and then to plant ſomething that is good in it. Thus *Lyſis*. Neither is that Expreſſion, [If you are not changed, you are dead to me] to be underſtood ſimply: For this *Hipparchus*, [h] becauſe he communicated, and publickly ſet forth by Writing, the *Pythagorick* Doctrines, was expelled the School, and a Tomb was made for him, as if he were dead, (according to the Cuſtom [i] formerly mentioned.) So ſtrict were the *Pythagoreans* in Obſervance of this Secrecy.

[e] Jambl. c. 32. p. 226. [f] Jambl. c. 17. p. 75. [g] Ἀγώναι. [h] Clem. Alex. Strom. 5. [i] Chap. 7.

The Doctrine of *PYTHAGORAS.*

CHAP. I.

Sciences preparative to Philoſophy.

THE Mind being purify'd [by Diſcipline [a] ought to be applied to Things that are beneficial; theſe he procured by ſome contrived Ways, bringing it by degrees to the Contemplation of eternal incorporeal Things, which are ever in the ſame State; beginning orderly from the moſt minute, leſt by the Suddenneſs of the Change it ſhould be diverted, and withdraw itſelf through its ſo great and long Pravity of Nutriment.

To this end, he firſt uſed the mathematical Sciences, and thoſe Speculations which are intermediate betwixt Corporeals and Incorporeals, (for they have a threefold Dimenſion, like Bodies, but they are impaſſable like Incorporeals) as Degrees of Preparation to the Contemplation of the Things that are; diverting, by an artificial Reaſon, the Eyes of the Mind from corporeal Things (which never are permanent in the ſame Manner and Eſtate) never ſo little to a Deſire of Aliment; by means whereof, introducing the Contemplation of Things that are, he rendred Men truly happy. This uſe he made of the mathematical Sciences.

Hence it was, that [b] *Juſtin Martyr* applying himſelf to a *Pythagorean*, eminently learned, deſirous to be his Diſciple, he demanded, Whether he were vers'd in Muſick, Aſtronomy, and Geometry: Or do you think, ſaith he, you may be able to underſtand any thing that pertains to Beatitude, without having firſt learned theſe, which abſtract the Soul from Senſibles, preparing and adapting her for her Intelligibles? Can you without theſe contemplate what is honeſt and what is good? Thus, after a long Commendation of theſe Sciences, he diſmiſs'd him, for that he had confeſs'd himſelf ignorant of them.

CHAP. II.

Mathematicks, its Name, Parts.

THeſe Sciences were firſt termed Μαθήματα by *Pythagoras* [c], upon Conſideration that all *Matheſis*, (Diſcipline) is Reminiſcence, which comes not extrinſecally to Souls as the Phantaſies which are formed by ſenſible Objects in the Phantaſy; nor are they an advantageous adſcitious Knowledge, like that which is placed in Opinion; but it is excited from Phænomena's, and perfected intrinſically by the Cogitation converted into itſelf.

[d] The whole Science of Mathematicks, the *Pythagoreans* divided into four Parts, attributing one to *Multitude*, another to *Magnitude*; and ſubdividing each of theſe into two. For Multitude either ſubſiſts by itſelf, or is conſider'd with reſpect to another; Magnitude either ſtands ſtill, or is moved. *Arithmetick* contemplates Multitude in its ſelf: *Muſick* with reſpect to another: *Geometry*, unmovable Magnitude; *Sphærick*, moveable.

Theſe [e] Sciences conſider not Multitude and Magnitude ſimply, but in each of theſe that which is determinate: For Sciences conſider this abſtracted from infinite, that they may not (in vain) attempt in each of theſe that which is infinite. When therefore the wiſe Perſons ſay thus, we conceive it is not to be underſtood of that Multitude which is in the ſenſible Things themſelves, nor of that Magnitude which we perceive in Bodies; for the Contemplation of theſe, I think, pertains to Phyſick, not to Mathematick. But becauſe the Maker of all Things took [f] Union, and Diviſion, and Identity, and Alterity, and Station, and Motion to compleat the Soul, and framed it of theſe Kinds, as *Timæus* teacheth, we muſt conceive that the Intellect, conſiſting according to the Diverſity thereof, and the Diviſion of Proportions and Multitude, and knowing itſelf to be both one and many; propoſeth Numbers to itſelf, and produceth them and the arithmetical Knowledge of them. According to the Union of Multitude and Communication with itſelf, and Colligation, it acquireth to itſelf Muſick: For which Reaſon Arithmetick excels Muſick in Antiquity, the Soul itſelf being firſt divided by the Maker, then collected by Proportions. And again eſtabliſhing the Operation within itſelf, according to its Station, it produceth Geometry out of itſelf, and one Figure, and the Principles of all Figures, but according to its Motion, Sphærick; for ſhe is moved by Circles, but conſiſts always in the ſame manner according to the Cauſes of thoſe Circles, the Straight and the Circular: And for this Reaſon likewiſe Geometry is precedent to Sphærick, as Station is to Motion.

But foraſmuch as the Soul produced theſe Sciences, not looking on the Excitation of Ideas, which is of infinite Power, but upon the Boundure of that which is

[a] Porph. vit. Pyth. p. 201. [b] Dial. cum Tryph. [c] Procl. in Eucl. 1. p. 13. [d] Procl. in Eucl. 1. 12. [e] Τὸ καθ ἑκάτερον ὡρισμένον. *Barocius* renders it otherwiſe. [f] Read ὡς ὁ τὴν καθ' ἑκάτερον ἀπειρίαν γνώσει λαβεῖν κτιστέον.

is limited [g] in their ſeveral Kinds, therefore they ſay that they take infinite from Multitude and Magnitude, and are converſant only about finite: For the Mind hath placed in herſelf all Principles both of Multitude and Magnitude; becauſe being wholly of like Parts within herſelf, and being one and indiviſible, and again diviſible, and producing the World of Ideas, it doth participate eſſential Finiteneſs and Infiniteneſs from the Things which it doth underſtand: But it underſtands according to that which is finite in them, and not according to the Infiniteneſs of its Life. This is the Opinion of the *Pythagoreans*, and their Diviſion of the four Sciences. Hitherto *Proclus*.

SECT. I.

Arithmetick.

OF [h] theſe four Methods, Which is that which ought neceſſarily to be learned the firſt, (*viz.* that which is by Nature pre-exiſtent to the reſt and chiefeſt, being as it were Principle, and Root, and Mother of the reſt)? *Arithmetick*: Not only for that it is pre-exiſtent before the reſt in the Intellect of the efficient God, as an ornative and exemplary Reaſon, according to which the Maker of the Univerſe cauſed all Things to be made out of Matter to its proper End, as after a προκειτμια and archetypal Pattern: But alſo becauſe being [i] naturally firſt generated, it together takes away the reſt with itſelf, but is not taken away with them. Thus Animal is firſt in Nature before Man: For taking away Animal, we take away Man, but not in taking away Man do we take away Animal. [Of this *Nicomachus* diſcourſeth more largely.]

As concerning Arithmetick, *Timæus* affirms, that [k] *Pythagoras addicted himſelf chiefly to it:* [l] Stobæus, that *he eſteemed it above all others, and brought it to Light, reducing it from the Uſe of Trading.* [m] Hence *Iſidore*, and others, ſtyle him *the Inventor of Arithmetick*; affirming [n] *he was the firſt who writ upon this Subject amongſt the* Græcians, *which was afterwards more copiouſly compoſed by* Nicomachus. *He ſtudied this Science exceedingly, and ſo much did he prefer it above all the reſt, that he conceived, The ultimate good of Man to conſiſt in the moſt exact Science of Numbers.*

CHAP. I.

Number, its Kinds; the firſt Kind, Intellectual in the Divine Mind.

[o] NUmber is of two Kinds, the Intellectual, (or Immaterial) and the Sciential. The intellectual is that [p] *eternal Subſtance* of Number, which *Pythagoras*, in his Diſcourſe concerning the Gods, aſſerted to be the *Principle moſt providential of all Heaven and Earth, and the Nature that is betwixt them.* Moreover, it is *the Root of divine Beings, and of Gods, and of Dæmons.* This is that which he termed [q] *the Principle, Fountain, and Root of all Things*; and defined it to be *that which before all Things exiſts in the Divine Mind; from which, and out of which all Things are digeſted into Order, and remain numbred by* [r] *an indiſſoluble Series.*

For all Things which are ordered in the World by Nature, according to an artificial Courſe in part and in whole, appear to be diſtinguiſh'd and adorn'd by Providence and the All-creating Mind, according to Number; the Exemplar being eſtabliſhed by applying (as the Reaſon of the Principle before the Impreſſion of Things) the Number pre-exiſtent in the Intellect of God, Maker of the World. This only in intellectual, and wholly immaterial, really a Subſtance, according to which, as being the moſt exact artificial Reaſon, all Things are perfected, Time, Heaven, Motion, the Stars, and their various Revolutions.

CHAP. II.

The other Kind of Number, Sciential; its Principles.

SCiential Number is that which *Pythagoras* defines *the Extenſion and Production into Act of the ſeminal Reaſons which are in the* [s] *Monad, or a Heap of Monads, or a Progreſſion of Multitude, beginning from Monad, and a Regreſſion ending in Monad.*

[t] The *Pythagoreans* affirmed the expoſitive Terms, whereby even and odd Numbers are underſtood to be the Principles of [Sciential] Numbers, as of three inſenſible Things, the [u] Triad; of four Inſenſibles, the Tetrad; and ſo of other Numbers.

They make a Difference betwixt the Monad and One, conceiving the Monad to be that which exiſts in Intellectuals; One, in Numbers [or as [w] *Moderatus* expreſſeth it, *Monad* amongſt Numbers, One amongſt Things numbred, one Body being diviſible into infinite: Thus Numbers and Things numbred differ, as Incorporeals and Bodies] in like manner Two is amongſt Numbers. The Duad is indeterminate; Monad is taken according to Equality and Meaſure, Duad according to Exceſs and Defect: Mean and Meaſure cannot admit more and leſs, but Exceſs and Defect (ſeeing that they proceed to infinite) admit it; therefore they call the Duad indeterminate, [x] holding Number to be infinite; not that Number which is ſeparate and incorporeal, but that which is [y] not ſeparate from ſenſible Things.

CHAP.

[g] Read κατὰ γένη. [h] Nicom. Ἀριθμητικῆς εἰσαγωγῆς, (ſo ſupply the Title, as at p. 30, 35, 44, 62, 76.) c. 4. [i] Read προγενέστερα ὑπάρχοντα, συναίρει, &c. *viz.* ἀριθμητικὴ. [k] Laert. 8. 12. [l] Phyſic. 2. [m] Chron. [n] Orig. 3. 2. Stob. Phyſ. 2. [o] Nicom. Arith. [p] Jambl. vit. Pyth. c. 28. [q] Theon. Smyrn. c. 2. [r] Nicom. Arithm. c. 5. [s] Moderat. ap. Stob. [t] Theon. Mathem. c. 4. [u] Anon. Phot. vit. Pythag. apud Stob. [w] Stob. Phyſ. 2. [x] Themiſt. in Phyſ. 3. [y] Ariſt. Phyſ. 3, 4.

CHAP. III.

The two Kinds of Sciential Number, Odd and Even.

OF [Sciential] Numbers *Pythagoras* aſſerted two Orders, one bounded, Odd; the other infinite, Even. [a] *Even Number*, (according to the *Pythagorick* Definition) is that which at once admits Diviſion into the greateſt and the leaſt; into the greateſt Magnitudes, (for halves are the greateſt Parts) the leaſt in Multitude (for two is the leaſt Number) according to the natural Oppoſition of theſe two Kinds. *Odd* is that which cannot ſuffer this, but is cut into two unequals.

[b] Herein the *Pythagoreans* differ from the *Platoniſts*, in that they hold not all Number to be infinite, but only the Even; for Even Number is the Cauſe of Section into equal Parts, which is infinite, and by its proper Nature generates Infinity in thoſe Things in which it exiſts. But it is limited by the Odd; for that being applied to the Even, hinders its Diſſection into two equal Parts.

[c] Odd Number is ſaid to have been found by *Pythagoras*, and to be of Maſculine Virtue, and proper to the Cœleſtial Gods ([d] to whom they ſacrificed always of that Number,) and to be [e] full and perfect. Even, is indigent and imperfect, and Female, and [f] proper to the ſubterraneous Deities, to whom they ſacrificed Even Things.

[g] Moreover, whatever is generated of Odd Number is Male, whatſoever of Even is Female; for Even Number is ſubject to Section and Paſſion, Odd is void of both, and is efficacious; wherefore they call one the Male, the other the Female. [h] A Number which ariſeth out of the Power and Multiplication of Even and Odd, is called ἀρρενόθηλυς, *Hermaphrodite*.

This Opinion *Pythagoras* ſeems to have derived from *Zarates*, his Maſter, [i] who call'd *Duad* the Mother of Number, *Monad* the Father; and therefore they ſaid, that thoſe Numbers which reſemble *Monad* (*viz.* the Odd) are the beſt.

[k] Odd Numbers they called *Gnomons*, becauſe being added to Squares, they keep the ſame Figures; ſo *Gnomons* do in Geometry.

CHAP. IV.

Symbolical Numbers.

THE [l] *Pythagoreans* (ſaith *Moderatus* of *Gades*, who learnedly compriſed their Opinions in eleven Books) uſing the Mathematical Sciences as Degrees of Preparations to the Contemplations of the Things that are, were ſtudiouſly addicted to the Buſineſs of Numbers, for this Reaſon. Seeing they could not clearly explain the firſt Forms and Principles in Diſcourſe (thoſe being the moſt difficult to underſtand and expreſs) had recourſe to Numbers for the better Explication of their Doctrine, imitating Geometricians, and ſuch as teach to read. For as theſe going about to explain Letters and their Powers, recur to Marks, ſaying, That theſe are, as it were, the firſt Elements of Learning; nevertheleſs afterwards they tell us, That they are not the Elements, but that the true Elements are known by them. And as the Geometricians, not being able to expreſs incorporeal Forms in Words, have Recourſe to the Deſcription of Figures, ſaying, This △ is a Triangle; not meaning that this which falleeth under the Sight is a Triangle, but that which hath the ſame Figure, and which is by the Help thereof, and repreſenteth the Knowledge of a Triangle to the Mind. The ſame did the *Pythagoreans* in the firſt Reaſons and Forms; for ſeeing they could not in Words expreſs incorporeal Forms, and firſt Principles, they had Recourſe to Demonſtration by Numbers. And thus they called the Reaſon of Unity, and Identity, and Equality, and the Cauſe of amicable Conſpiration, and of Sympathy, and of the Conſervation of the Univerſe, which continueth according to the ſame, and in the ſame manner, ONE. For the one which is in Particulars, is ſuch united to the Parts, and conſpiring by Participation of the firſt Cauſe. But the twofold Reaſon of Diverſity and Inequality, and of every thing that is diviſible and in Mutation, and exiſts ſometimes one way, ſometimes another, they called *DUAD*, for the Nature of the *Duad*, in particular Things, is ſuch. Theſe Reaſons are not only according to the *Pythagoreans*, and not (acknowledg'd by) others, but we ſee that other Philoſophers alſo have left certain unitive Powers, which compriſe all Things in the Univerſe; and amongſt them there are certain Reaſons of Equality, Diſſimilitude and Diverſity. Now theſe Reaſons, that the way of teaching might be more perſpicuous, he called by the Names of *Monad* and *Duad*; but it is all one amongſt them if it be called biform, or æqualiform, or diverſiform.

The ſame Reaſon is in other Numbers, for every one is ranked according to ſome Powers. In the Nature of Things exiſts ſomething which hath Beginning, Middle and End. To ſuch a Form and Nature they attributed the Number Three, ſaying, That whatſoever hath a middle is triform; ſo they called every perfect thing. And if any thing be perfect, they affirm it maketh uſe of this Principle, and is adorned according to it; which, ſince they could not

[a] Euſtrat. in Ethic. 1. [b] Themiſt. in Phyſ. 3. [c] Macrob. Saturn. 1. 13. [d] Serv. in Æned. 3. [e] Plutarch de Hom. Poeſi. [f] Serv. ad Æn. 3. [g] Anon. in Ptolem. Tert. bibl. l. 1. [h] Anon. Theolog. [i] Plut. de anima procr. [k] Simplic. in Phyſ. l. 3. [l] Porph. p. 202.

not name otherwiſe, they made uſe of the Term *Triad* to expreſs it; and when they endeavour to bring us to the Knowledge thereof, they lead us to it by the Form of this *Triad*. The ſame in other Numbers.

Theſe therefore are the Reaſons, according to which the foreſaid Numbers were placed; but theſe that follow are comprehended under one Form and Power, which they call *Decad*, q. *Dechad*, [from Comprehenſion.] Wherefore they ſay, that Ten is a perfect Number, even the moſt perfect of all Numbers, comprehending in it all Difference of Numbers, all Reaſons, Species and Proportions. For if the Nature of the Univerſe be defined according to the Reaſons and Proportions of Numbers; and that which is produced, and increaſed, and perfected, proceed according to the Reaſons of Numbers; and the *Decad* comprehends every Reaſon of Number, and every Proportion, and all Species: Why ſhould not Nature itſelf be termed by the Name of Ten, the moſt perfect Number? Hitherto *Moderatus*.

Thus from the ſymbolical Uſe of Numbers proceeded a multiplicious Variety of Names, attributed to them by *Pythagoras* and his Followers. Of which we ſhall ſpeak more particularly, beginning with the *Monad*.

CHAP. V.

The Monad.

THE[m] *Monad* is a Quantity, which in the Decreaſe of Multitude, being deprived of all Number, receiveth Manſion and Station; for below Quantity, *Monad* cannot retreat. The *Monad* therefore ſeems to be ſo called, either from ſtanding, or from remaining (μένειν) always in the ſame Condition, or from its Separation (μεμονῶσθαι) from Multitude.

To the *Monad* are attributed theſe Names.

Mind, (*Nicomachus* in *Photius*, and *Anon. Theologumena Arithmetices*) becauſe the Mind is ſtable, and every way alike, and hath the Preheminence. *(Alex. Aphrod. in Metaph.)*

Hermaphrodite, *(Nicom.)* it is both Male and Female, Odd and Even, *(Macrob. in Somn. Scip.* 1. 6.) it partakes of both Natures; being added to the even, it makes odd; to the odd, even. *(Ariſtot. in Pythagarico*, cited by *Theon. Smyrn. Mathem.* cap. 5.)

God, becauſe it is the Beginning and End of all, itſelf having neither Beginning nor End. *(Macrob.)*

Good, for ſuch is the Nature of one. *(Porphyr. vit. Pyth.)*

Matter, *Receptacle of all*, *(Nicom.)* becauſe it produceth *Duad*, which is properly Matter. *(Anon. Theol.)*

Chaos, *Confuſion*, *Contemporation*, *Obſcurity*, *Chaſme*, *Tartarus*, *Styx*, *Horrour*, *Impermiſtion*, *Subterraneous Barathrum*, *Lethe*, *Rigid Virgin*, *Atlas*, *Axis*, *Sume*, *Pyralios*, *Morpho*. *(Nicom. Anon.)*

Tower of Jupiter, (Nicom.) *Cuſtody of Jupiter*, *Throne of Jupiter*, (Simplic.) from the great Power which the Center hath in the Univerſe, being able to reſtrain the general circular Motion, as if the Cuſtody of the Maker of all Things were conſtituted therein. *(Procl. in Timæum.* com. 4.)

Seminal Reaſon, *(Nicom.)* becauſe this one only is one to the Retractors, and is alone, and the reſt are procreated of it, and it is the only Seminary of all Numbers. *(Mart. Capel.* 7.)

Apollo Prophet. (Nicom.)

Prometheus, as being Author of Life. *(Anon. Theol.)*

Geniture, becauſe without it no Number hath Being. *(Anon. Theol.)*

Subſtance, (Theolog.) becauſe Subſtance is primary. *(Alex. Aphr. Met.* 1.)

Cauſe of Truth, *Simple Exemplar*, *Conſtitution of Symphony*, (Anon. Theolog.)

In greater and Leſſer, *Equal*; in Intention and Remiſſion, *Middle*; in Multitude, *Mean*; *(Theolog.)* in Time, *Now*, the preſent; *(Anon. Theolog.)* becauſe it conſiſts in one Part of Time which is always preſent. *(Macrob. in Somn.* 1. 6.)

Ship, *Chariot*, *Friend*, *Life*, *Beatitude*. (Anon. Theolog.)

Form, (or *Species*) becauſe it circumſcribes, comprehends, and terminates, *(Anon.)* and becauſe it produceth the reſt of the Effects. *(Mart. Capel.)*

Jupiter, *(Anon. Procl. in Tim.)* becauſe he is Father and Head of the Gods, *(Mart. Cap.)* whence the Pythagorick Verſe:

Hear noble Number, Sire of Gods and Men.

Love, *Concord*, *Piety*, *Friendſhip*, becauſe it is ſo connected, that it cannot be divided into Parts. *(Mart. Cap.)*

Proteus, as containing all Forms, *(Anon.)*

Mnemoſyme, (Anonym.)

Veſta, or *Fire*, *(Plut. in Numa.)* For the Nature of *Monad*, like *Veſta*, is ſeated in the midſt of the World, and keeps that Seat, inclining to no Side.

Polyonymous. (Heſych.)

CHAP. VI.

The Duad.

THE Names of the *Duad* are theſe,

Genius, *Evil*, (Plut. Plac. Phil. 1. 3.)

Darkneſs, *Siniſter*, *Unequal*, *Unſtable*, *Moveable*, (Porphyr. vit. Pythag.)

Boldneſs,

[m] Moderatus apud Stob. Phyſ. 1, 2.

Boldneſs, (Nicom.) *Fortitude*, (Anon.) *Contention*, (Plut. de Iſid. & Oſirid.) becauſe it proceeds to Action, and firſt ſeparates itſelf from the *Monad*. (*Anon.*)

Matter, (*Nicom.*) becauſe indefinite; indeterminate *Duad*, proceeds from *Monad* as Matter. The Cauſe of Tumour and Diviſion. (*Simplic. Phyſ.* 1.)

Cauſe of Diſſimilars. (Nicom.)

Partition betwixt Multitude and Monad. (Nicom.)

Equal, becauſe, in Compoſition and Permiſtion, this only maketh Equality. (*Nicom.*) Two and two are equal to twice two.

Unequal, *Defect*, *Superfluity*, (*Nicom.*) according to the Motion of Matter. (*Anon.*)

Only Inform, *Indefinite*, *Indeterminate*, (Nicom.) becauſe from a Triangle and Triad, Polygones are actually procreated to infinite; in *Monad* they exiſt all potentially together: But of two right Lines or Angles is made no Figure. (*Anon.*)

Only Principle of Purity, yet not even, nor evenly even, nor unevenly even, nor evenly uneven. (*Nicom.*)

Erato, (*Nicom.*) becauſe through Love applying itſelf to *Monad*, as the Species, it procreated the reſt of the Effects. (*Anon.*)

Harmony, (Nicom.)

Tolerance, (Nicom.) becauſe it firſt underwent Separation. (*Anon.*)

Root, *but not in act*. (Nicom.)

Feet of Fountain-abounding Idea. (Nicom.)

Top, *Phanes*. (Nicom.)

Juſtice, becauſe of its two equal Parts. (*Anon. Mart. Cap.*)

Iſis, *Nature*, *Rhea*, *Jove's Mother*, *Fountain of Diſtribution*, *Phrygia*, *Lydia*, *Dindymene*, *Ceres*, *Eleuſinia*. (Nicom.)

Diana, (Nicom.) becauſe the Moon takes many Settings from all the fixed Stars, and becauſe ſhe is forked, and called Half-moon. (*Anon.*)

Love, *Dictinna*, *Aeria*, *Aſteria*, *Diſamus*, *Station*, *Venus*, *Dione*, *Micheia*, *Cythereia*, *Ignorance*, *Falſity*, *Permiſtion*, *Alterity*, *Contention*, *Diffidence*, *Fat*, *Death*, (Nicom.) *Impulſe*. (Anon.)

Opinion, becauſe it is true and falſe. (*Anon. Alex. Aphrod. Met.* 1. *Philop. ibid.*)

Motion, *Generation*, *Mutation*, *Diviſion*. (Anon.) (*Meurſius* reads διακρισις, Dijudication.) *Longitude*, (Anon.) or rather, *firſt Longitude*, (Simplic.) *Augmentation*, *Compoſition*, *Communion*. (Anon.)

Misfortune, *Suſtentation*, becauſe it firſt ſuffered Separation, (*Anon. Martian.*) *Diſcord*. (*Plut. de Iſid. & Oſirid.*)

Impoſition, (Heſych.)

Marriage, *Juno*; *Juno*, being both Wife and Siſter to *Jupiter*. (*Mart. Capel. Eulog. in Somn. Scip.*)

Soul, from Motion hither and thither. (*Philop. Metaph.* 1.)

Science, for all Demonſtration, and all Credit of Science, and all Syllogiſm collects from ſome Things granted, the Thing in Queſtion, and eaſily demonſtrateth another; the Comprehenſion of which Things is Science. (*Plut. de Plac.* 1. 3.)

Maia. (Nicom. apud Phot.)

CHAP. VII.

The Triad.

THE [n] Triad is the firſt Number, actually odd, and the firſt perfect Number, and Middle, and Proportion. It cauſeth the Power of the Monad to proceed to Act and Extenſion; it is the firſt and proper Coacervation of Unities: [o] For which Reaſon *Pythagoras* ſaid, *Apollo* gave Oracles from a Tripod; and he adviſed to offer Libation three Times.

The Names of the Triad are theſe:

Firſt, *Latitude*, not ſimply Latitude. (*Simp. de Anim.* 1.)

Saturnia, *Latona*, *Cornucopiæ*, *Ophion*, *Thetis*, *Harmonia*, *Hecate*, *Erana*, *Charitia*, *Polyhymnia*, *Pluto*, *Arctus*, *Helice*. Not deſcending to the Ocean, *Damatrane*, *Dioſcoria*, *Metis*, *Tridume*, *Triton*, *Preſident of the Sea*, *Tritogenia*, *Achelous*, *Nactis*, *Agyiopeza*, (perhaps αργυεοπεζα, as before, *Thetis*) *Curetis*, *Cratæis*, *Symbenia*, *Mariadge*, *Gorgonia*, *Phorcia*, *Triſamus*, *Lydius*. (Nicom.)

Marriage, *Friendſhip*, *Peace*, *Concord*, (*Nicom.*) becauſe it collects and unites, not Similars, but Contraries. (*Anon.*)

Juſtice, (Nicom.)

Prudence, *Wiſdom*; becauſe Men order the preſent, foreſee the future, and learn Experience by the paſt. (*Anon.*)

Piety, (Anon.) *Temperance*, (Anatol.) All Virtues depend upon this Number, and proceed from it.

It is the *Mind*; it is *Cauſe of Wiſdom and Underſtanding*. It is *Knowledge*, which is moſt proper to number.

It is the *Power and Compoſition of all Muſick*, and much more of *Geometry*: It hath all *Power in Aſtronomy*, and the Nature and Knowledge of Celeſtials, containing and impelling it to the Production of Subſtance.

[p] *The Cube of this Number* Pythagoras *affirmed to have the Power of the lunar Circle, inaſmuch as the Moon goeth round her Orb in 27 Days, which the Number* Ternio, *in* Greek Τειας, *the Triad gives in its Cube.*

[n] Anon. Theolog. [o] Jambl. vit. c. 28. [p] Agel. 1. 20.

CHAP.

CHAP. VIII.

The Tetrad.

THE [q] Tetrad was much honoured by the *Pythagoreans*, and [r] esteemed the most perfect Number, the [s] primary and primogenious, which they called the Root of all Things, and the Fountain of Nature.

[t] The Tetrads are all intellectual, and have an emergent Order, and (for that Reason) the empyreal Præfecture; they go round about the World, as the *Empyreum* passeth through all.

Even God himself *Pythagoras* expressed by the Tetrad.

[u] How God is a Tetrad, you will clearly find in the sacred Discourse ascribed to *Pythagoras*, wherein God is the Number of Numbers. For if all Beings subsist by his eternal Counsel, it is manifest, that Number in every Species of Beings depends upon their Causes; the first Number is there, from thence derived hither: The determinate Stop of Number is the Decad, for he who would reckon further, must return to 1, 2, 3, and number a second Decad; in like manner a third, to make up 30, and so on, till having numbred the tenth Decad, he comes to 100. Again, he reckons from 100, in the same manner, and so may proceed to infinite, by Revolution of the Decad. Now the Tetrad is the Power of the Decad; for, before we arrive at the Perfection of the Decad we find an united Perfection in the Tetrad, the Decad being made up by Addition of 1, 2, 3, 4.

Moreover, the Tetrad is an arithmetical mean betwixt 1 and 7, equally exceeding, and exceeded in Number. It wants 3 of 7, and exceeds 1 by 3. Monad, as being the Mother of Numbers, contains all their Powers within itself. The Hebdomad, as being Motherless, and a Virgin, possesseth the second Place in Dignity, for it is not made up of any Number within the Decad, as 4 is of twice two, 6 of twice 3, 8 of twice 4, 9 of thrice 3, 10 of twice 5. Neither doth it make up any Number within the Decad, as 2 makes 4, 3 makes 6, 5 makes 10. But the Tetrad lying betwixt the unbegotten Monad, and the Motherless Hebdomad, comprehends all Powers, both of the productive and produced Numbers; for this of all Numbers under 10, is made of a certain Number, and makes a certain Number; the Duad doubled makes a Tetrad, the Tetrad doubled makes 8.

Besides, the first solid Figure is found in a Tetrad; for a Point is correspondent to Monad, a Line to Duad, [because drawn from one Point to another] a Superficies to Triad, (because it is the most simple of all rectiline Figures) but a Solid properly agrees with the Tetrad: For the first Pyramis is in a Tetrad, the Base is triangular; so that at the bottom is 3, at the top 1.

Furthermore, the judicative Power in things are four, Mind, Science, Opinion, and Sense; for all Beings are dijudicated either by Mind, or Science, or Opinion, or Sense: [[w] for which reason *Pythagoras* affirmed, the Soul of Man to consist of a Tetrad.]

Finally, the Tetrad connects all Beings, of Elements, Numbers, Seasons of the Year, Coævous Society; neither can we name any thing which depends not on the Tetractys, as its Root and Principle: for it is as we said, the Maker and Cause of all things; Intelligible God, Author of celestial and sensible Good. The Knowledge of these things was deliver'd to the *Pythagoreans* by *Pythagoras* himself. Hitherto *Hierocles*.

For this reason the word *Tetractys* was used by *Pythagoras*, and his Disciples, as a great Oath; who likewise, out of respect to their Master, forbearing his Name, did swear by the Person that communicated the *Tetractys* to them,

Eternal Nature's Fountain I attest,
Who the Tetractys *to our Soul exprest.*

[x] But *Plutarch* interprets this *Tetractys*, (which he saith was also called κόσμος, World) to be 36, which consists of the first four odd Numbers, thus:



The Names of the Tetrad are these:

Another Goddess, *Multideity*, *Pantheos*, *Fountain of natural Effects*. (Nicom.)

Key-keeper of Nature, because the universal Constitution cannot be without it; to these Sciences it conferreth Constitution and Settlement, and reconcileth them; yea, it is Nature itself and Truth. *(Nicom.)*

Nature of Æolus, (Nicom.) from its various Property. *(Anon.)*

Hercules, *Impetuosity*, *most Strong*, *Masculine*, *Ineffeminate*, *Mercury*, *Vulcan*, *Bacchus*, *Soritas*, *Maiades*, *Erinnius*, *Socus*, *Dioscorus*, *Bassarius*, *Two-mother'd*, *of feminine Form*, *of virile Performance*, *Bacchation*. (Nicom.)

Harmony. (Nicom.) because it hath a *sesquitertia*. (Anon.)

Urania the Muse. *(Nicom.)* *World*. *(Plut.)*

Body, as a Point is 1, a Line 2, a Superficies 3.

[q] Protospath. in Hesiod dies. [r] Lucian pro lapsi. in salutar. adm. [s] Irenæus, l. 1. c. 1. [t] Simplic. ad Phys. 4. [u] Hierocl. in aur. carm. [w] Plut. plac. phil. l. 1. c. 3. [x] In procr. an. sec. Timæo.

Soul, becauſe it conſiſts of Mind, Science, Opinion and Senſe. *(Plut. Plac. Phil. 1. 3.)*

Firſt Profundity, as it is a Body. *(Simplic. de Anim. 1.)*

Juſtice. The Property of Juſtice is Compenſation and Equality. This Number is the firſt evenly even; and whatſoever is the firſt in any kind, is moſt that thing. This, they ſaid, was the Tetrad, becauſe being quadrate, it is divided into Equals, and is itſelf equal. *(Alex. Aphrod. Metaph. 5.)*

CHAP. IX.

The Pentad.

THE Pentad is the firſt Complexion of both kinds of Number, even and odd, two and three. Its Names theſe:

Ἀνεικία, *Reconciliation.* (Nicom.) becauſe the fifth Element, *Æther*, is free from the Diſturbances of the other four. *(Anon.)*

Alteration, *Light*, becauſe it changed that which was ſeparated threefold, into the Identity of its Sphere, moving circularly, and ingenerating Light. *(Anon.)*

Juſtice, (Nicom.) becauſe it divides 10 into two equal Parts. *(Johan. Port. in Heſ.)*

The leaſt and top of Livelihood. (Nicom.)

Nemeſis, (Nicom.) becauſe it diſtributes conveniently Celeſtial, Divine, and Natural Elements. *(Anon.)*

Bubaſtia, (Nicom.) becauſe worſhipp'd at *Bubaſtus* in *Egypt*. (Anon.)

Venus, *Gamelia*, *Androgynia*, *Cytherea*, *Zoneia*. (Nicom.) *Marriage*, (Anon.) becauſe it connects a maſculine and feminine Number. *(Anon. Plut. de* Εἰ *delph.)* conſiſting of 2, the firſt even, and 3 the firſt odd. *(Alex. Aphrod. in Metaph. Proteſp. in Heſiod.)*

Κυκλικὸς χορὸς, Preſident of Circles. *(Nicom.)*

Semi-goddeſs, (Nicom.) not only as being the half of 10, (which is divine) but for that it is placed in the middle. *(Anon.)*

Tower of Jupiter.

Didymæa, or *Twin*, (Nicom.) becauſe it divides 10 into two. *(Anon.)*

Firm Axis. (Nicom.)

Immortal, *Pallas*, implying the fifth Eſſence. *(Anon.)*

Καρδιακὸς, *Cordial*, (Nicom.) from Similitude with the Heart. *(Anon.)*

Providence, becauſe it makes Unequals equal. *(Anon.)*

Τέλειος, *Sound*, the fifth being the firſt Diaſteme. *(Plut. de An. procr. e Tim.)*

Nature, becauſe multiply'd by itſelf, it returns into itſelf. For as Nature receiving Wheat in Seed, and introducing many Forms by altering and changing it, at laſt returns it Wheat, at the End of the whole Mutation reſtoring the Beginning; ſo, whilſt other Numbers multiply'd in themſelves are increaſed, and end in other Numbers, only 5 and 6 multiply'd by themſelves, repreſent, and retain themſelves. *(Plut. de* Εἰ *delph.)*

This Number repreſents all ſuperior and inferior Beings; for it is either the ſupreme God, or the Mind born of God, wherein are contained the Species of all things, or the Soul of the World, which is the Fountain of all Souls, or Celeſtials, down to us; or it is Terreſtial Nature, and ſo the Pentad is repleat with all things. *(Macrob. in Somn. Scip. 1. 6.)*

CHAP. X.

The Hexad.

THE Pythagoreans held the Number Six to be perfect, reſpecting (as *Clem. Alexandrinus* conceives) the Creation of the World according to the Prophet. The Names of the Hexad are theſe:

Form of Form, *Articulation of the Univerſe*, *Maker of the Soul*, *Harmony*; (Nicom.) becauſe it hath the Power to ingenerate a vital Habit: Whence it is called *Hexad*, ἀπὸ τῆς ἕξεως; and *Harmony*, becauſe all Souls are harmonick, (Anon.)

Ὁλομέλεια, *Perfection of Parts*, (Nicom.) or (as Anon.) Ὁλομέλεια. The Pythagoreans called it thus, imitating *Orpheus*, either as being the only Number under ten, which is whole and equal in its Parts; or becauſe the whole Univerſe is divided into Parts by it. (Anon.)

Venus, (Nicom.) becauſe it procreates Harmony: 6 to 12 is a Diapaſon Concord; 6 to 9 Hemiolos; 6 to 8 Epitrites; that is, a Diateſſaron Concord: Whence it is named *Venus*, who was the Mother of Harmony. (Mart. cap. 7.)

Ζύγια, (Nicom.) Γαμήλια, (Nic.) Γάμος, *Marriage*, (Clem. Strom. 5.) becauſe of the Mixtion of the firſt even and firſt odd. (Plut. de An. procr. Sec. Tim.) For as Marriage procreates by a Male and Female; ſo this Number is generated of 3, which is odd and called Male; and of 2, which is even and called Female: for twice 3 make 6. (Clem. Alexand. Strom. 6.) It produceth Children like the Parents. (Theon. Smyr. Mathem. 45.)

Ζυγὸς Φιλοτησία, (Nicom.) or Φιλίωσις, *Conciliation*, becauſe it conciliates the Male and Female. (Anon.)

Ὑγιεία, *Health*; (Nicom. Anon.) a triple Triangle, which being alternately conjoined within itſelf, conſtituteth a Figure of five Lines: they uſed it as a Symbol to thoſe of their own Sect, and called it ὑγιεία, *Health*. (Lucian. prolapſ. in ſal. admiſſ.)

Ἀκμὴν,

[9] Theon. Smyrn. c. 44.

Ἀκμὼν, *Anvile*, (Nicom.) qu. ἀκάματον, unwearied; becauſe the principal Triangles of the mundane Elements have Share in it, being each of them ſix, if meaſur'd by three Perpendiculars. (Anon.)

Ἑκατηβόλεπις, being compounded of, and as it were ϛολήσασαν, the Triad, which is called Hecate. (Anon. Theol.)

Trioditis, from the Nature of that Goddeſs, or becauſe the Hexad firſt aſſumes the three Motions of Intervals, being divided into two Parts, each of which is on each ſide. (Anon.)

Διχρονία, the Diſtribution of all Time, of things above the Earth and under the Earth, which is done by the Hexad in the Zodiack; or becauſe Time is of the Nature of the Triad, conſiſting of three Parts, and the Hexad conſiſts of two Triads. (Anon.)

Perſæa, *Triform*. (Nicom.)

Amphitrite, (Nicom.) becauſe it hath a Triad on each ſide. (Anon.)

Neighbour to Juſtice, (Nicom.) as being neareſt to 5, which is named Juſtice. (Anon.)

Thalia, the Muſe; (Nicom.) becauſe of the Harmony of the reſt. (Anon.)

Panacæa, (Nicom.) in reſpect to Health mentioned already; or *q. Panarceia*, Omni-ſufficience, endued with Parts ſufficient for Totality. (Anon.)

Μεσευθὺς, *Middle-right*, being in the midſt betwixt 2 and 10, æquidiſtant from both. (Clem. Alexandr. Strom. 6.)

World, becauſe the World, as the Hexad, is often ſeen to conſiſt of Contraries by Harmony. (Anon.)

CHAP. XI.

The Heptad.

THE Heptad was ſo called, *qu.* σεπτὰς σεβασμῶ ἄξιος, worthy of Veneration; for [a] *Pythagoras* held this Number to be moſt proper to Religion. [b] He alſo held, that it is perfect; [c] thence it was, (as the Pythagoreans conceived) that Creatures born in the ſeventh Month live.

The names of the Heptad, are theſe.

Fortune, *Occaſion*; (Nicom.) becauſe it occurs caſually and opportunely to every Thing. (Anon.) Whatſoever is beſt amongſt ſenſible Things, by which the Seaſons of the Year and their Periods, are orderly compleat, participates of the Hebdomad, (Philo de die ſept.) the Moon having 7 days, meaſures all Time. (Johan. Philop. in Metaphyſ. 7.)

Ἀμήτωρ, *Motherleſs*, *Virgin*, (Hieroc. in aur. car. Nicom.) *Minerva*, as being a Virgin, unmarried, not born of a Mother (odd Number,) nor of a Father, (even Number;) but out of the crown or top of the Father of all, Monad. (Anon. Chalcid. in Tim. Theon. Smyrn. c. 45.

Mars, Nicom. Anon. Ἀκρέωσις, (Nicom.)

Ageleia, (Nicom.) an epithet of *Minerva* (Heſych.)

Ἀτρυτώνη, (Nicom.)

Φυλακίτις, *Cuſtody*, (Nicom.) becauſe the Stars which guard the Univerſe are ſeven. (Anon.)

Ὀβριμοπάρθα, *Tritogenia*, Γλαυκῶπις, Ἀλαλκομένεια, Παντυχία, Ἐργάνη, Πολυαρήτη, Οὐλομέλεια; *Stock of Amalphea*, *Ægis*, *Oſiris*, *Dream*, *Voice*, *Sound*, *Clio* the Muſe, *Judgment*, *Adraſtia*. (Anon.) Τελέσφορος, *leading to the End*; (Anon.) becauſe by it all are led to the End. (Philo. de Mund. opif.)

CHAP. XII.

The Ogdoad.

THE Ogdoad, they ſaid was the firſt Cube, and the only Number evenly even under Ten. (Anon.)

The Names of it.

Panarmonia, (Nicom.) becauſe of its excellent Convenience. (Anon.)

Cadmæa, *Mother*, *Rhea*, Θηλύτατος, *Cibele*, *Dindymene*, Πολιοῦχος, *Love*, *Friendſhip*, *Council*, *Prudence*, *Orcia*, *Themis*, *Law*, Ἡλιπόμπα, *Euterpe* the Muſe, Ἀσφάλεια, Ἑδεσμα, (Anon.) *Neptune*. (Plut. de Iſid. & Oſirid.)

Juſtice, becauſe it is firſt reſolved into Numbers, eſpecially equal. (*Macroch.* in Somn. Scip. 1. 5.)

CHAP. XIII.

The Ennead.

THE Ennead is the firſt ſquare of an odd Number. Its Names, theſe:

Ocean, *Horizon*; becauſe Number hath nothing beyond it, but it revolves all within it. (Anon.)

Prometheus, becauſe it ſuffers no Number to outgo it, and juſtly, being a perfect Ternary. (Anon.)

Concord, (Nicom. Anon.) *Peraſia*. (Anon.) *Halius*, (Nicom. Anon.) becauſe it doth not permit the conſent of Number to be diſperſed beyond it, but collects it. (Anon.)

Ἀνεικεία, becauſe of the revolution to Monad. (Anon.)

Ὁμοίωσις, becauſe it is the firſt odd Triangle, (Anon.)

Vulcan, becauſe to it, as Conflature and Relation, there is no return. (Anon.)

Juno, becauſe the ſphere of the Air hath the ninth Place. (Anon.)

[a] Nicom. apud Phot. Anon. Macrob. in Somn. Scip.
[b] Alex. Aphrod. Probl. 2. Quæſt. 47.
[c] Jul. Paul. recept. ſent. lib. 4. tit. 9.
[d] Apud Metam. lib. 11.

Sister and Wife to Jupiter, from Conjunction with Unity. (Anon.)

Ἑκάεργος ☉, because there is no Shooting beyond it. (Anon.)

Pæan, *Nysseis*, *Agyica*, *Ennalios*, *Agelia*, *Tritogegenia*, *Suada*, *Curetis*, *Proserpina*, *Hyperion*, *Terpsicore* the Muse. (Nicom. Anon.)

Τελέσφορος Τέλειος, because nine Months compleat the Infant.

CHAP. XIV.

The Decad.

[a]TEN, according to the Pythagoreans, is the greatest Number, as well for that it is the Tetractys, as that it comprehends all Arithmetical and harmonical Proportions. [c] *Pythagoras* said, that Ten is the nature of Number: Because all Nations Greeks, and Barbarians, reckon to it; and when they arrive at it, return to the Monad.

Names of the Decad.

World; because according to the Decad, all Things are ordered in general and particular. (Anon.) The Decad comprehends all Numbers, the World all Forms; (Philop. Metaph. 1.) for the same Reason termed also Sphere. (Anon.)

Heaven, (Nicom.) because it is the most perfect Term of Number, as Heaven the receptacle of all Things. (Anon.) The Decad being a perfect Number, the Pythagoreans desired to apply to it those things which are contained in Heaven, where finding but 9, (the Orbs, the seven Planets, and the Heaven of fixed Stars, with the Earth) they added an Antichthon, (another Earth opposite to this) and made Ten; by this means they accommodated them to the Decad. (Pachymer. in Metaphys. 3.)

Fate, (Nicom.) because there is no Property neither in Numbers nor Beings, according to the composition of Number, which is not seminally contained in the Decad. (Anon.)

Age. (Nicom.)

Power, (Nicom.) from the command it hath over all other Numbers. (Anon.)

Faith, *Necessity*. (Anon.)

Atlas; for as *Atlas* is fabled to sustain Heaven with his Shoulders, so the Decad all the Spheres, as the Diameter of them all. (Anon.)

Unwearied, *Ged*, *Phanes*, *Sun*, *Urania*, *Memory*, *Mnemosyne*. (Anon.)

First square, because made of the first four Numbers, 1, 2, 3, 4. (Chalcid. in Tim.)

Κλειδοῦχος, as the Magazine and Confinement of all Proportions; (Anon.) or, Κλωδοῦχος, because other Numbers branch out of it. (Cedren.)

Παντέλεια, because it perfects all Number, comprehends within itself all the Nature of even and odd, moved and unmoved, good and ill. (Anon.)

CHAP. XV.

Divination by Numbers.

UPon the near Affinity which *Pythagoras* (following *Orpheus*) conceived to be betwixt the Gods and Numbers, he collected a kind of Arithmonanty; not practised by himself only, but communicated to his Disciples, as is manifest from [f] *Jamblichus*, who cites this Fragment of *the sacred Discourse*, a Book ascribed to him: *Concerning the Gods of* Pythagoras, *Son of* Mnesarchus, *I learned this when I was initiated at* Libeth *in* Thrace, Aglaophemus *administring the Rites to me*; Orpheus *son of* Calliope, *instructed by his Mother, in the Pangæan Mountain, said, that Number is an eternal substance, the most provident Principle of the Universe, Heaven, and Earth, and middle Nature; likewise the root of divine Beings, and of Gods and Dæmons.*

Hence (saith *Jamblichus*) *it is manifest that* Pythagoras *received of Numbers the determinate Essence of the Gods, from the traditions of* Orpheus. *By these Numbers he framed a wonderful Divination and Service of the Gods, of nearest affinity to Numbers, as may be evinced from hence* (*for it is requisite to give an Instance for Confirmation of what we say,*) *whereas* Abaris *performed those kind of Sacrifices to which he was accustomed, and practised diligently Divination, after all the ways of the* Barbarians, *by Victims, principally of* Cocks, (*whose Entrails they conceived to be most exact for Inspection*) Pythagoras *willing not to take him off from his study of Truth, yet to direct him by a safer way, without Blood and Slaughter,* (*moreover esteeming the Cock sacred to the Sun*) *taught him to find out all Truth by the Science of Arithmetick.* Thus *Jamblichus*. [g] And elsewhere he saith, that *Pythagoras, instead of the art of divining by Sacrifices, taught him that kind of Prediction which is by Numbers, as conceiving that to be more sacred and divine, and more agreeable to the celestial numbers of the Gods.*

This Hint some have taken to impose upon the World, under the name of *Pythagoras*, and onomantick kind of Arithmetick, assigning particular Numbers *to the letters of the Alphabet, to the Planets, to the days of the Week, and to the signs of the Zodiack*, thereby resolving Questions concerning *Nativities*, *Victory*, *Life*, *or Death*, *Journies*, *Prosperity or Adversity*; as is set down by [h] *Flud*, who adds, *Apollonius hath delivered another way of Divination, according to the Pythagorick Doctrine; affirming, that future Things may be prognosticated by virtue of a Wheel*

[a] Athenag. apolog. pro Christ. [c] Plut. plac. 1. 3. [f] Vit. Pyth. c. 28. [g] Vid. Pyth. c. 18. [h] Microcosm.

Wheel invented by Pythagoras, *whereby is treated of Life and Death, of Fugitives, of litigious Buſineſs, of Victories, of the ſex of Children unborn, and infinite others of the like Kind. But concerning the expoſition of the Wheel, and the true poſition of Numbers therein, the ancient Authors have written very inconſtantly, ſo as the truth of its Compoſition cannot be comprehended otherwiſe than by conjecture.* What ancient Authors he means, I know not; the citation of *Apollonius*, I doubt to be no leſs ſuppoſititious, than the Wheel itſelf, which (l) *Trithemius* and others acknowledge to be an invention of later Times.

SECT. II.

Muſick.

(k) THE *Pythagoreans* define Muſick an apt compoſition of Contraries, and an Union of many, and conſent of Differents. For it not only coordinates Rythms and Modulation, but all manner of Syſtems. Its End is to unite, and aptly conjoin. God is the reconciler of Things diſcordant, and this is his chiefeſt Work according to Muſick and Medicine, to reconcile Enmities. In Muſick, ſay they, conſiſts the agreement of all Things, and ariſtocracy of the Univerſe: For, what is Harmony in the World, in a City is good Government, in a Family Temperance.

[1] Of many Sects (ſaith *Ptolemais*) that were converſant about Harmony, the moſt eminent were two, the *Pythagorick* and *Ariſtoxenian*; [[m] *Pythagoras* dijudicated it by Reaſon, *Ariſtoxenus* by Senſe.] [n] The *Pythagoreans* not crediting the Relation of hearing in all thoſe Things, wherein it is requiſite, adapted Reaſons to the differences of Sounds, contrary to thoſe which are perceived by the Senſes; ſo that by this critery (Reaſon) they gave occaſion of Calumny to ſuch as were of a different Opinion.

[o] Hence the *Pythagoreans* named that which we now call Harmonick, Canonick; not from the Canon or Inſtrument, as ſome imagine, but from Rectitude, ſince Reaſon finds out that which is right, by uſing harmonical Canons or Rules. Even of all ſorts of Inſtruments, framed by harmonical Rules, (Pipes, Flutes, and the like) they call the Exerciſe, Canonick; which although it be not Canonick, yet is ſo termed, becauſe it is made according to the Reaſons and Theorems of Canonick. The Inſtrument therefore ſeems to be rather denominated from its canonick Affection. A canonick in general is a Harmonick, who is converſant by Ratiocination, about that which conſiſts of Harmony. Muſicians and Harmonicks differ; Muſicians are thoſe Harmonicks who begin from Senſe, but Canonicks are *Pythagoreans*, who are alſo called Harmonicks; both Sorts are termed by a general Name, Muſicians.

CHAP. I.

Voice, its Kinds.

[p] OF human Voice, they who are of the *Pythagorean* School, ſaid, that there are (as of one Genus) two Species. One they properly named Continuous, the other Diaſtematick, (intermiſſive) framing Appellations from the Accidents pertaining to each. The Diaſtematick they conceived to be that which is ſung, and reſts upon every Note, and manifeſts the Mutation which is in all its Parts, which is inconfuſed, and divided, and disjoined, by the Magnitudes which are in the ſeveral Sounds, as coacerved, but not commixt; the parts of the Voice being apply'd mutually to one another, which may eaſily be ſeparated and diſtinguiſhed, and are not deſtroy'd together. Such is the muſical kind of Voice, which to the knowing, manifeſts all Sounds, of what Magnitude every one participates: for if a Man uſe it not after this manner, he is not ſaid to ſing, but to ſpeak.

The other kind they conceived to be *Continuous*, by which we diſcourſe one to another, and read, and are not conſtrained to uſe any manifeſt diſtinct tenſions of Sounds, but connect the Diſcourſe, till we have finiſhed that which we intended to ſpeak. For if any Man in diſputing, or apologizing, or reading, make diſtinct Magnitudes, in the ſeveral Sounds, taking off, and transferring the Voice from one to another, he is not ſaid to read, but to ſing.

Human Voice having in this manner two Parts, they conceived that there are two Places which each in paſſing poſſeſſeth. The place of continuous Voice, which is by Nature infinite in Magnitude, receiveth its proper Term from that wherewith the Speaker began, until he ends; that is, the place from the beginning of his Speech to his concluſive Silence, ſo that the Variety thereof is in our power. But the place of Diaſtematick Voice is not in our power, but natural; and this likewiſe is bounded by different Effects. The beginning is that which is firſt heard, the end that which is laſt pronounced; for from thence we begin to perceive the magnitude of Sounds, and their mutual Commutations, from whence firſt our Hearing ſeems to operate; whereas it is poſſible there may be ſome more obſcure Sounds perfected in Nature, which we cannot perceive or hear. As for inſtance, in things weigh'd there are ſome Bodies which ſeem to have no weight, as Straws, Bran, and the like; but when as by appoſition of ſuch Bodies, ſome beginning of Ponderoſity appears,

[l] Antip. Mal. 1, 3. [k] Theon. Smyrn. Matth. c. 1. [1] Porphyr. in Harm. Ptolomæi. [m] Plut. de Muſ. Porph. in Ptol. Harm. &c. [n] Ptolem. Harmonic. c. 2. [o] Ptolemais loco citato apud Porphyr. [p] Nicom. Harm. l. 1, c. 2.

appears, then we say, they first come within the compass of Statick. So, when a low Sound increaseth by degrees, that which first of all may be perceived by the Ear, we make the beginning of the Place which musical Voice requireth.

CHAP. II.

First Musick in the Planets.

[a] THE names of Sounds in all probability, were derived from the seven Stars, which move circularly in the Heavens, and compass the Earth. [b] *The circumagitation of these Bodies must of necessity cause a Sound; for Air being struck from the intervention of the Blow, sends forth a Noise; Nature herself constraining that the violent collision of two Bodies should end in Sound.*

[c] Now, (say the *Pathagoreans*) all Bodies which are carried round with Noise, one yielding and gently receding to the other, must necessarily cause Sounds different from each other, in the magnitude and swiftness of Voice, and in Place; which (according to the reason of their proper Sounds, or their Swiftness, or the orbs of Repressions, in which the impetuous Transportation of each is performed) are either more fluctuating, or on the contrary more reluctant. But these three differences of Magnitude. Celerity, and local Distance, are manifestly existent in the Planets, which are constantly with Sound circumagitated thro' the ætherial Diffusion; whence every one is called ἀστὴρ, as void of στάσις, Station; and ἀεὶ θέων, always in course, whence God and Æther are called Θεὸς and Ἀιθὴρ.

‖ *Moreover, the Sound which is made by striking the Air, induceth into the Ear something sweet and musical, or harsh and discordant: for, if a certain observation of numbers moderate the Blow, it effects a Harmony consonant to itself; but if it be temerarious, not governed by Measures, there proceeds a troubled unpleasant Noise which offends the Ear. Now in Heaven nothing is produced casually, nothing temerarious, but all things there proceed according to divine Rules, and settled Proportions; whence irrefragably is infer'd, that the Sounds which proceed from the conversion of the cœlestial Spheres, are musical. For Sound necessarily proceeds from Motion, and the Proportion which is in all divine Things causeth the harmony of this Sound. This* Pythagoras *first of all the* Greeks *conceived in his Mind; and understood that the Spheres sounded something concordant, because of the necessity of Proportion, which never forsakes cœlestial Beings.*

* From the motion of *Saturn*, which is the highest and furthest from us, the gravest sound in the diapason Concord, is called *Hypate*; because ὕπατον signifieth *highest*: but from the Lunary, which is the lowest and neareſt the Earth, *neate*; for νέατον signifyeth *lowest*. From those which are next these, *viz.* from the motion of *Jupiter* who is under *Saturn*, *parypate*; and of *Venus*, who is above the *Moon*, *paraneate*. Again, from the middle, which is the *Sun*'s Motion, the fourth from each Part, *mese*, which is distant by a Diatessaron, in the Heptachord from both Extreams, according to the ancient way; as the Sun is the fourth from each extream of the seven Planets, being in the midst. Again, from those which are neareſt the Sun on each side, from *Mars* who is placed betwixt *Jupiter* and the Sun, *Hypermese*, which is likewise termed *Lichanus*, and from *Mercury* who is placed betwixt *Venus* and the *Sun*, *Parameſe*.

† *Pythagoras* by musical Proportion calleth that a Tone, by how much the *Moon* is distant from the Earth: from the *Moon* to *Mercury* the half of that Space, and from *Mercury* to *Venus* almost as much: from *Venus* to the *Sun* sesquiple: from the *Sun* to *Mars* a Tone, that is, as far as the *Moon* is from the Earth: from *Mars* to *Jupiter* half, and from *Jupiter* to *Saturn* half, and thence to the Zodiack sesquible: thus there are made seven Tones, which they call a diapason Harmony, that is, an universal Consent: In which *Saturn* moves in the *Dorick* Mood, *Jupiter* in the *Phrygian*, and in the rest the like.

‡ Those Sounds which the seven Planets, and the Sphere of fixed Stars, and that which is above us, termed by them *Antichthon*, make, *Pythagoras* affirmed to be the nine Muses: but the Composition, and Symphony, and as it were connexion of them all, whereof as being eternal and unbegotten, each is a Part and Portion, he named *Mnemosyne*.

CHAP. III.

The Octochord.

[e] NOW *Pythagoras* first of all, [f] left the middle Sound by conjunction, being itself compared to the two Extreams, should render only a diatessaron Consent, both to the Neate and to the Hypate: but that we might have greater Variety, the two Extreams making the fullest Concord each to other, that is to say, the concord of Diapason, which consists in a double Proportion. Which inasmuch as it could not be done by two Tetrachords, he added an eighth Sound, inserting it betwixt the Mese and Parameſe, setting it from the Mese a whole Tone, and from the Parameſe a Semitone; so, that which was

[a] Nicom. Harm. c. 3. [b] Macrob. in Somn. Scip. 2. p. 82. [c] Nicom. ibid. ‖ Macrob. ibid. * Nicom. ibid.
† Plin. l. 2. c. 22. ‡ Porph. p. 21. [e] Nicom. c. 5. [f] The Heptachord was made up of two Tetrachords, which being conjoined, the middle Note was the end of one, and the beginning of the other.

was formerly the Parameſe in the Heptachord, is ſtill the third from the Neate, both in Name and Place; but that which was now inſerted is the fourth from the Neate, and hath a Conſent unto it of Diateſſeron, which before the Meſe had unto the Hypate; but the Tone between them, that is, the Meſe, and the inſerted, called the Parameſe, inſtead of the former, to which ſoever Tetrachord it be added, whether to that which is at the Hypate, being of the lower, or to that of the Neate, being of the higher, will render Diapente Concord; which is either way a Syſtem, conſiſting both of the Tetrachord itſelf, and the additional Tone, as the Diapente proportion (*viz.* ſeſquialtera) is found to be a Syſtem of ſeſquitertia, and ſeſquioctava, the Tone therefore is ſeſquioctava. [w] Thus the Interval of four Chords, and of five, and of both conjoined together, called Diapaſon, and the Tone inſerted between the two Tetrachords, being after this manner apprehended by *Pythagoras*, were determined to have this Proportion in Numbers.

CHAP. IV.

The Arithmetical Proportions of Harmony.

[x] PYthagoras *is ſaid to have firſt found out the Proportion and Concord of Sounds one to another, the Diateſſeron in ſeſquitertia, the Diapente in ſeſquialtera, the Diapaſon in duple.* The Occaſion and Manner is related by [y] *Cenſorinus*, [z] *Boethius*, [a] *Macrobius*, and others; but more exactly by [b] *Nicomachus*, thus:

Being in an intenſe Thought, whether he might invent any inſtrumental Help for the Ear, ſolid and infallible; ſuch as the Sight hath by a Compaſs and a Rule, and by a Dioptre; or the Touch by a Ballance, or by the Invention of Meaſures: As he paſt by a Smith's Shop, by a happy Chance he heard the Iron Hammers ſtriking upon the Anvil, and rendring Sounds moſt conſonant one to another in all Combinations except one. He obſerved in them theſe three Concords, the Diapaſon, the Diapente, and the Diateſſeron; but that which was between the Diateſſeron and the Diapente, he found to be a Diſcord in itſelf, though otherwiſe uſeful for the making up of the greater of them, (the Diapente). Apprehending this came to him from God, as a moſt happy thing, he haſted into the Shop, and by various Trials, finding the Difference of the Sounds to be according to the Weight of the Hammers, and not according to the Force of thoſe who ſtruck, nor according to the Faſhion of the Hammers, nor according to the turning of the Iron which was in beating out: Having taken exactly the Weight of the Hammers, [c] he went ſtraightway Home, and to one Beam faſtned to the Walls, croſs from one Corner of the Room to the other, (leſt any Difference might ariſe from thence, or might be ſuſpected to ariſe from the Properties of ſeveral Beams) tying four Strings of the ſame Subſtance, Length, Swiftneſs, and [d] Twiſt, upon each of them he hung a ſeveral Weight, faſtning it at the lower End, and making the Length of the Strings altogether equal. Then ſtriking the Strings by two at a time interchangeably, he found out the aforeſaid Concords, each in its own Combination; for that which was ſtretched by the greateſt Weight, in reſpect of that which was ſtretched by the leaſt Weight, he found to found a Diapaſon. The greateſt Weight was of 12 Pound, the leaſt of 6. Thence he determined, that the Diapaſon did conſiſt in double Proportion, which the Weights themſelves did ſhew. Next he found, that the greateſt to the leaſt but one, which was of eight Pound, ſounded a Diapente; whence he inferred this to conſiſt in the Proportion, called, Seſquialtera, in which Proportion the Weights were one to another, But unto that which was leſs than itſelf in Weight, yet greater than the reſt, being of nine Pound, he found it to ſound a Diateſſeron; and diſcovered, that, proportionably to the Weights, this Concord was Seſquitertia; which String of nine Pound is naturally Seſquialtera to the leaſt; for nine to ſix is ſo, (*viz.* Seſquialtera) as the leaſt but one, which is eight, was to that which had the Weight ſix, in Proportion Seſquitertia; and twelve to eight is Seſquialtera; and that which is in the middle between Diapente and Diateſſeron, whereby Diapente exceeds Diateſſeron, is confirmed to be in Seſquioctava Proportion, in which nine is to eight. The Syſtem of both was called Diapente, that is, both of the Diapente and Diateſſeron joined together, as duple Proportion is compounded of Seſquialtera and Seſquitertia; ſuch as are two, eight, ſix. Or on the contrary, of Diateſſeron and Diapente, as duple Proportion is compounded of Seſquitertia and Seſquialtera, as twelve, nine, ſix, being taken in that Order.

Applying both his Hand and Ear to the Weights which he had hung on, and by them confirming the Proportion of the Relations, he did ingeniouſly transfer the common Reſult of the Strings upon the croſs Beam, to the Bridge of an Inſtrument, which he called Χορδοτονον; and as for ſtretching them proportionably to the Weights, he did transfer that to an an-

[w] *Meibomius* ſeems to miſtake the Meaning of καταληφθεντα ἔχειν, and therefore puts a Point after λεγομενη. [x] Theon. Smyrn. [y] De die natali, c. 10. [z] Muſ. 1. c. 10, 11. [a] In Somn. Scip. 2. [b] Harm. enchirid. c. 6. repeated by *Jamblichus* de vit. *Pyth.* p. 26, &c. [c] Ἡρὸς ἑαυτὸν ἀπηλλάγη, *Meibomius* otherwiſe. [d] Ἰσοτρόφους, which *Meibomius*, contrary to all MSS. would change unneceſſarily into ἰσοβρίθεις, and renders *æque graves*.

answerable screwing of the Pegs. Making use of this Foundation, as an infallible Rule, he extended the Experiment to many Kinds of Instruments, Cymbals, Pipes, Flutes, Monochords, Trigons, and the like; and he found, that this Conclusion made by Numbers was consonant without Variation in all. That Sound which proceeded from the Number six, he named *Hypate*; that which from the Number eight, *Mese*, being Sesquitertia to the other; that from nine, *Parameſe*, being a Tone sharper than the *Mese*, viz. Sesquioctava; that from twelve, *Neate*. And supplying the middle Spaces according to the Diatonick Kind, with proportionable Sounds, he so ordered the Octochord with convenient Numbers Duple, Sesquialtera, Sesquitertia, and (the Difference of these two last) Sesquioctava.

Thus he found the Progress by a natural Necessity, from the lowest to the highest, according to the Diatonical Kind; from which again he did declare the Chromatick and Enarmonick Kinds.

CHAP. V.

The Division of the Diapason, according to the Diatonick Kind.

THIS Diatonick Kind seems naturally to have these Degrees and Progresses, Hemitone, Tone and Tone, (half Note, whole Note, and whole Note.) This is the System Diatesseron, consisting of two Tones, and that which is called a Hemitone; and then another Tone being inserted, Diapente is made, being a System of three Tones and a Hemitone. Then in order, after this there being another Hemitone, Tone and Tone, they make another Diatesseron, that is to say, another Sesquitertia. So that in the antienter Heptachord, all fourths from the lowest, sound a Diatesseron one to another, the Hemitone taking the first, second, and third Place, according to the Progression in the Tetrachord. But in the *Pythagorical* Octochord, which is by a Conjunction a System of the Tetrachord, and the Pentachord, and that either jointly of two Tetrachords, or disjointly of two Tetrachords, separated from one another by a Tone, the Procession will begin from the lowest, so that every fifth Sound will make Diapente, the Hemitone passing into four Places, the first, the second, the third, and the fourth.

CHAP. VI.

The Canon of the Monochord.

[c] PYthagoras, *as* Timæus *saith*, *found out the Canon of one Chord*, that is, the Rule of the Monochord. [f] *Aristides* relates, that *a little before he died, he exhorted his Friends to play on the Monochord, thereby implying, that the Heighth which is in Musick, is to be received rather by the Intellect through Numbers, than by the Sense through the Ears.*

Duris (cited by [g] *Porphyrius*) mentions a brazen Tablet, set up in the Temple of *Juno*, by *Arimnestus* Son to *Pythagoras*, on which were graven, besides other Arts, a musical Canon; which was afterwards taken away by *Simon* a Musician, who arrogated the Canon to himself, and published it as his own.

[h] *The Division of the Canon*, saith *Theon*, *is made by the Tetractys in the Decad, which consists of a Monad, a Duad, a Triad, a Tetrad*, 1, 2, 3, 4. *For it comprehends a Sesquitertia, a Sesquialtera, a Duple, a Triple, and a Quadruple Proportion.* The Section of the Pythagorical Canon, *according to the Intention of* Pythagoras *himself, not as* Eratosthenes *misunderstood it, or* Thrasillus [whose Operation *Theon* sets down] *but as* Timæus *the Locreon (whom* Plato *also followeth) to* 27. [i] *Nicomachus* mentions, as intending to deliver it in his larger Treatise of Musick. See also [k] *Euclid*, [l] *Aristides*, *Quintilianus*, and others.

CHAP. VII.

Institution by Musick.

[m] CONceiving, that the first Institution of Men was to be made by Sense, so that a Man might see those fair Figures and Forms, and might hear the most excellent Musick, he first began by teaching Musick by Songs and Rythms, by which the Cures of Manners and Passions were made, and by which the Harmonies of the Faculties of their Souls were reduced to their primitive Dispositions; and Cures of Distempers, both of Body and Mind were invented by him. And that which was above all these, worthy to be taken notice of, that he made for his Disciples, those which were called ἑξαρτήσεις and ἁπταί, [of Musick] both by Weight and by Sound, and composed them harmonically, in a strange way making the Commixtures of those Tones which are called Diatonick, Chromatick, and Enarmonick, by which he changed all the Passions of the Mind, which were newly raised in them without Reason, and which did procure Griefs, and Angers, and Pities, and unseemly Loves, and Fears, and all Kind of Desires, and Vexations, and Appetites, and Softnesses, and Idlenesses, and Impetuosities; correcting and directing every one of these towards Virtue, by convenient Harmonies, as by certain effectual Medicines. And at Night when his Disciples went to sleep, he delivered them from all the Noises and Troubles of the Day, and purify'd the Perturbations of their Minds,

[c] Laert. 11. [f] De Musica, l. 3. [g] Vit. Pyth. [h] Mathemat. [i] Manual. Music. l. 1. p. 24. [k] Sect. Canon. [l] Mus. l. 3. p. 116. [m] Jambl. vit. Pyth. c. 10.

Minds, and rendered their Sleeps quiet, with good Dreams and Predictions. And when they rose again from their Beds, he freed them from the Drowsiness of the Night, from Faintness and Sluggishness, by certain proper Songs, either set to the Lute, or some high Voice. As for himself, he never played on Instrument, or any thing, but he had it within him; and by an unconceivable Kind of Divinity, he applied his Ears and Mind unto the Harmony of the World, which he alone did understand; and understanding the universal Harmony and Consent of the Spheres, and those Stars that move in them, which makes a more full and excellent Musick than Mortals by reason of their Motion, which of unequal differing Swiftnesses and Bignesses overtaking one another, all which are ordered and disposed in a most musical Proportion one towards another, beautified with various Perfections, wherewith being irrigated, as having likewise orderly the Discourse of his Mind, as we may say exercising, he framed some Representations of these, to exhibit them as much as was possible, imitating (that Musick) chiefly by Instruments, or the Voice alone. For he conceived that to himself only of all upon the Earth, were intelligible and audible, the universal Sounds, from the natural Fountain and Root, and thought himself worthy to be taught and to learn, and to be assimilated by Desire and Imitation to the Celestials, one that was organized [in the Parts of the Body] by the Deity which begot him. But it was sufficient for other Men, that they, always looking upon him, and such Things as they received from him, be benefited by Images and Examples, as not being able to lay hold on the first clear Archetypes of all Things: As to them who cannot look upon the Sun by reason of its Splendor, we shew the Eclipse either in a Pond of Water, or by some boared pitched Thing, or by some dark-coloured Glass, fearing the Weakness of their Eyes, and framing another way of Perception, instead of looking on it, to those who love such Things, though something inferior. This *Empedocles* seemeth to imply concerning his extraordinary and divine Constitution above others, when he said:

'Mongst these was one in Things sublimest skill'd,
His Mind with all the Wealth of Learning fill'd.
He sought whatever Sages did invent;
And whilst his Thoughts were on this Work intent,
All Things that are, he easily survey'd,
And Search through ten or twenty Ages made.

Intimating by *sublimest Things*; and, *He survey'd all Things that are*; and, *The Wealth of the Mind*, and the like, the exquisite and accurate Constitution of *Pythagoras* beyond others, both for Body and Mind, in seeing, hearing, and understanding.

CHAP. VIII.

Medicine by Musick.

"*Pythagoras* conceived, that Musick conduced much to Health, if used appositely; for he was accustomed to make use of this Purification, not perfunctorily. This he called *Medicine by Musick*, which kind of Melody he exercised about the Spring-time. He seated him who play'd on the Lute in the midst, and those who could sing sat round about him; and so he playing, they made a Consort of some excellent pleasant Verses, wherewith they seemed exhilerated, and decently composed.

They likewise at another time made use of Musick as of a Medicine; and there were certain pleasant Verses framed, conducing much against the Affections and Diseases of the Mind, and against the Dejections and Corrodings of the same. Moreover, he composed others against Anger and Malice, and all such Disorders of the Mind. There was also another kind of Musick and Song invented, against unlawful Desires. He likewise used Dancing. He used no musical Instrument but the Lute. Wind-Instruments he conceived to have an ignoble Sound, and to be only fit for the common People, but nothing generous.

He likewise made use of the Words of Homer *and* Hesiod, *for the Rectification of the Mind. It is reported, that* Pythagoras, *by a Spondiack Verse* [o] *out of the Works* [perhaps of *Hesiod*, whose Poem bears that Title, Ἔργα] *by a Player on the Flute, assuaged the Madness of a young Man of* Tauromenium, *who being drunk, and having employ'd all the Night lasciviously with his Mistress, was going about to fire the Door of his Rival's House; for he was exasperated and inflamed by the* Phrygian *Mood. But* Pythagoras, *who was at that time busied in observing the Stars, immediately appeased and reclaimed him, by persuading the Piper to change his Air into the Spondiack Mood. Whereupon the young Man being suddenly composed, went quietly home, who but a little before would by no means hear the least Exhortation from* Pythagoras, *but threatned and reviled him. In like manner* Empedocles, *when a young Man drew his Sword upon* Anchitus *his Host, (for that he had in publick Judgment condemned his Father to Death) and was about to have killed him, straightway changing his Tune, sung out of* Homer,

Nepenthe calming Anger, easing Grief;

and by that means freed Anchitus *his Host from Death,*

[n] Jamb. c. 25. [o] Reading ἀπὸ τῶν ἔργων. This Example of *Pythagoras* seems to relate to *Hesiod*; the other of *Empedocles* to *Homer*.

and the young Man from the Crime of Murther; who from thenceforward became one of his Disciples, eminent amongst them.

Moreover, the whole School of Pythagoras *made that which is called* [p] ἐξάρτυσις, *and* συναρμογή, *and* ἐπῳδή, *by certain Verses suitable thereto, and proper against the contrary Affections, profitably diverting the Constitutions and Dispositions of the Mind. For when they went to bed, and resigned themselves to rest, they purified their Minds from the Troubles and busy Noises of the Day, by some Songs and proper Verses, whereby they render'd their Sleeps pleasant and quiet, and little troubled with Dreams, and those Dreams which they had were good. In the Morning, when they arose from the common Relief of Sleep, they expelled Drowsiness and Sleepiness of the Head with other Songs.*

Sometimes also, without pronouncing Verses, they expelled some Affections and Diseases, and reduced the Sick to Health, ἐπᾴδοντες, *by charming them. And from hence it is probable that the word* Epode *came to be used. After this manner,* Pythagoras *instituted a most profitable Correction of Manners and Life by Musick.* Hitherto *Jamblichus.* All which is ratify'd by other Testimonies: That *they had Verses against the Affections of the Mind, Grief, Anger, Lust,* is related also by [q] *Seneca*, who saith, that *Pythagoras composed the Troubles of his Soul by the Lute.* And [r] *Cicero*, That *the* Pythagoreans *used to deliver Verses, and some Precepts, and to reduce the Mind from Intenseness of Thoughts to Tranquility, by Songs and Instruments.* To which effect, [s] *Ælian* relates of *Clinius* the Pythagorean, that *if at any time he perceived himself inclining to Anger, he, before it took full Possession of him, play'd upon the Lute; and to those who asked him, Why he did so, answer'd, Because I am calmed.*

That he *danced*, [t] *Porphyrius* confirms, saying, *He danced some Dances, which he conceived to confer Agility and Health to the Body.*

That he *disallowed Flutes and Wind-Instruments*, appears from [v] *Aristides Quintilianus*, who saith, *He advised his Disciples to refrain from permitting their Ears to be defiled with the Sound of the Flute; but, on the contrary, to purify the irrational Impulsions of the Soul by solemn Songs to the Lute.*

That he *made use of* Homer *and* Hesiod *for Rectification of the Mind*, is thus related by [w] *Porphyrius*: *He had Morning-Exercises at his own House, composing his Soul to the Lute, and singing some old Pæans of* [x] Thales. *He likewise sung some Verses of* Homer *and* Hesiod, *whereby the Mind seemed to be render'd more sedate.*

The Story of the young Man is confirmed by [y] *Ammonius*, by [z] *Cicero*, related thus: *Whenas some young Men being drunk, and irritated by the Musick of Flutes, would have broken open the Door of a modest Matron's House, he bad the Woman-piper play a Spondiack Tune; which as soon as she did, their raging Petulancy was allayed by the Slowness of the Mood, and Solemness of the Tune.* [a] St. *Basil* relates another Story to the same purpose, That *Pythagoras meeting with some that came from a Feast drunk, bid the Piper (the Musician at that Feast) to change his Tune, and to play a Dorick Air; wherewith they were so brought to themselves, that they threw away their Garlands, and went home ashamed.*

That, *Evening and Morning, they used Musick to compose their Minds*, is affirmed by many others. [b] Quintilian: *It was the Custom of the* Pythagoreans, *as soon as they waked, to excitate their Souls with the Lute, that they might be the readier for Action; and before they went to sleep, to soften their Minds by it.* [c] Plutarch: *The Musick of the Lute the* Pythagoreans *used before they went to sleep, thereby charming and composing the passionate and irrational Part of the Soul.* [d] Censorinus: Pythagoras, *that his Mind might be continually season'd with Divinity, used (as they say) to sing before he went to sleep, and as soon as he awaked.*

As for the several Moods which, in musical Compositions, were observed by the Ancients for moving particular Passions, there is a remarkable Fragment of *Damon* the Musician, cited by [e] *Aristides*.

SECT. III.

Geometry.

PYthagoras (saith [f] *Jamblichus*) *is reported to have been much addicted to Geometry; for, amongst the* Egyptians [of whom he learned it] *there are many geometrical Problems, the most learned of them having been continually, for many Ages of Gods and Men, necessitated to measure their whole Country, by reason of the Overflowing and Decrease of* Nilus; *whence it is called Geometry.* [g] *Some there are who ascribe all Theorems concerning Lines, jointly to the* Egyptians *and the* Chaldeans; *and all these, they say,* Pythagoras *took, and augmenting the Science, explained them accurately to his Disciples.* [h] *Proclus* affirms, That he *first advanced the geometrical Part of Learning into a Liberal Science, considering the Principles more sublimely* (than *Thales, Ameristus,* and *Hippias,* his Predecessors in this Study) *and perscrutating the Theorems immaterially and intellectually.* [i] *Timæus* saith, That he *first perfected Geometry; the Elements whereof,* (as *Anticlides* affirms) *were invented by* Moeris. [k] *Aristoxenus*, That *he first introduced Measures and Weights amongst the* Grecians.

CHAP.

[p] See cap. 10. [q] De ira, 3, 9. [r] Tusc. quæst. 4. præem. [s] Lib. 14. c. 23. [t] Pag. 195. [v] Lib. 2. de Musica. [w] Page 195. [x] Not the Philosopher, but the *Cretan*. See the Life of *Thales*. [y] In quinque voc. [z] Cited by *Boethius*, l. 1, c. 1. [a] Homil. 24. [b] Lib. 9. cap. 4. [c] De Isid. & Osirid. [d] Cap. 12. [e] Musica, l. 2. p. 95. [f] Cap. 29. p. 158. [g] Ibid. [h] In Euclid. l. 2. [i] Laert. 8, 11. [k] Laert. ibid.

CHAP. I.

Of a Point, Line, Superficies, and Solid.

[l] *Pythagoras* asserted a Point to be correspondent in proportion to an Unite; a Line, to 2; a Superficies, to 3; a Solid, to 4.[m] The *Pythagoreans* define a Point, a *Monad* having Position.

[n] A Line being the second, and constituted by the first Motion, from indivisible Nature, they called *Duad.*

[o] A Superficies they compar'd to the Number 3; for that is the first of all Causes which are found in Figures: for a Circle, which is the Principle of all round Figures, occultly comprises a Triad in Center, Space, and Circumference. But a Triangle, which is the first of all rectiline Figures, is manifestly included in a Ternary, and receiveth its Form according to that Number. [p] Hence the *Pythagoreans* affirm, that the Triangle is simply the Principle of Generation, and of the Formation of things generable; whereupon *Timæus* saith, that all Proportions, as well natural, as of the Constitution of Elements, are triangular, because they are distant by a threefold Interval, and are collective of things every way divisible, and variously permutable, and are repleniſhed with material Infinity, and represent the natural Conjunctions of Bodies dissolved, as Triangles which are comprehended by three right Lines; but they have Angles which collect the multitude of Lines, and give an adventitious Angle and Conjunction to them. With reason therefore did *Philolaus* dedicate the Angle of a Triangle to four Gods, *Saturn*, *Pluto*, *Mars*, *Bacchus*, comprehending in these the whole quadripartite Ornament of Elements coming down from Heaven, or from the four Quarters of the Zodiack. For *Saturn* constituteth an Essence wholly humid and frigid; *Mars* wholly fiery; *Pluto* compriseth all terrestrial Life; *Bacchus* predominates over humid and hot Generation; of which Wine is a Sign, being humid and hot. All these differ in their Operations upon second Bodies, but are united to one another; for which reason *Philolaus* collected their Union according to one Angle. But if the Differences of Triangles conduce to Generation, we must justly acknowledge the Triangle to be the Principle and Author of the Constitution of sublunary Things; for the right Angle gives them Essence, and determines the Measure of its Being; and the Proportion of a rectangle Triangle causeth the Essence of generable Elements; the obtuse Angle giveth them all Distance; the Proportion of an obtuse-angled Triangle augmenteth material Forms in Magnitude, and in all kinds of Mutation; the acute Angle maketh their Nature divisible; the Proportion of an acute-angled Triangle prepares them to receive Divisions into infinite; and simply, the triangular Proportion constituteth the Essence of material Bodies, distant and every way divisible. Thus much for Triangles.

[q] Of quadrangular Figures, the *Pythagoreans* hold that the Square chiefly representeth the divine Essence, for by it they principally signify pure and immaculate Order; for Rectitude imitateth Inflexibility, Equality firm Power; for Motion proceedeth from Inequality, Rest from Equality. The Gods therefore, who are Authors in all things of firm Consistence, and pure incontaminate Order, and inevitable Power, are not improperly represented by the Figure of a Square. Moreover, *Philolaus* by another Apprehension calleth the Angle of a Square, the Angle of a *Rhea*, *Ceres*, and *Vesta*; for seeing that the Square constituteth the Earth, and is the neareſt Element to it, as *Timæus* teacheth, but the Earth itself receiveth genital Seeds and prolifick Power from all these Gods; he not unaptly compareth the Angle of a Square to all these Life-communicating Deities. For some call the Earth and *Ceres* herself *Vesta*; and *Rhea* is said wholly to participate of her, and that in her are all generative Causes. Whence *Philolaus* saith, the Angle of a Square by a certain terrestrial Power comprehends one Union of these divine Kinds.

SECT. II.

Propositions.

OF the many geometrical Theorems invented by *Pythagoras* and his Followers, these are particularly known as such.

[r] *Only these three* Polygones *fill up the whole Space about a Point, the æquilateral Triangle, and the Square, and the Hexagone æquilateral and æquiangle.* The æquilateral Triangle must be taken six times, for six two thirds make four right Angles; the Hexagone must be taken thrice, for every sex-angular Angle is equal to one right Angle, and one third; the Square four times, for every Angle of a Square is right. Therefore six æquilateral Triangles joined as the Angles, compleat four right Angles; as do also three Hexagones and four Squares. But of all other Polygones whatsoever, joined together at the Angles, some exceed four right Angles, others fall short. This *Proclus* calls *a celebrious Theorem of the* Pythagoreans.

[s] *Every Triangle hath the internal Angles equal to two right Angles.* This Theorem *Eudemus* the Peripatetick, ascribes to the *Pythagoreans*; their manner of Demonstration see in *Proclus.*

[t] *In rectangle Triangles, the square which is made of the side that subtendeth the right Angle, is equal to*

[l] Procl. in Euclid. l. 2. def. 2. def. 14. [m] Ibid. l. 2. def. 1. [n] Ibid. l. 2. def. 2. [o] Ibid. l. 2. def. 5. [p] Ibid. l. 2. [q] Ibid. l. 2. def. 34. [r] Ibid. l. 3. com. 20. [s] Ibid. l. 4. prop. 32. com. 6. [t] Euclid. l. 1. prop.

the ſquares which are made of the Sides containing the right Angle.

[u] This Theorem *Pythagoras* found out; and by it ſhewed how to make a Gnomon or Square (which the Carpenters cannot do without much difficulty and uncertainty) not mechanically, but according to Rule; for if we take three Rulers, one of them being three foot long, the Second four foot, the Third five foot, and put theſe three ſo together that they touch one another at the ends in a Triangle, they make a perfect Square: Now if to each of theſe Rulers be adſcribed a Square, that which conſiſted of three foot will have 9; that which of 4, will have 16; that which of 5, will have 25. So that how many feet the Area's of the two leſſer Squares of three and four make, ſo many will the Square of 5 make.

[w] *Apollodorus* the *Logiſtick*, and others, relate, that *upon the invention of this Theorem*, Pythagoras *ſacrificed a Hecatomb* [x] to the Muſes, in confirmation whereof they alledge this Epigram;

That noble Scheme Pythagoras *devis'd,*
For which a Hecatomb he ſacrific'd.

[y] *Plutarch* ſaith, it was only *an Ox*; and even that is queſtioned by [z] *Cicero*, as inconſiſtent with his Doctrine, which forbad bloody Sacrifices. *The more accurate therefore* (ſaith * *Porphyrius*) *ſay, he ſacrificed an Ox made of Flowers*; or, as [a] *Gregory Nazianzen, of Clay.*

But [b] *Plutarch* doubts, whether it were for the Invention of the forementioned Propoſition, that *Pythagoras* ſacrificed an Ox, or for *the Problem concerning the Area of a Parabole.* Indeed, [c] *the application of Spaces or Figures, to Lines, is*, as *Eudemus* his followers, *affirm, an invention of the Pythagorick Muſe, Parabole, Hyperbole, Elleipſis. From them the later Writers taking theſe Names, transferr'd them to conical Lines, calling one Parabole, another Hyperbole, another Elleipſis; whereas thoſe ancient divine Perſons* (the Pythagoreans) *ſignified by thoſe Names the deſcription of Places, applied to a determinate right Line. For when a right Line being propoſed, the Space given is wholly adequate to the right Line; then, they ſay, the Space is applied,* (παραβάλλειν); *but when you make the length of the Space greater than that of the right Line, then, they ſay, it exceeds;* (ὑπερβάλλειν) *but when leſs, ſo as the Space being deſcribed, there is ſome part of the right Line beyond it, then it falls ſhort* (ἐλλείπειν). *In this Senſe* Euclid *aſeth Parabole*, lib. 1. prop. 44. *and Hyperbole and Elleipſis, in the 6th Book.*

CHAP. III.

How he collected the Stature of Hercules.

[d] *Lutarch* in his Treatiſe, entituled, How great difference there is in the Souls and Bodies of Men, as to Ingenuity and Strength, relates, that *Pythagoras* reaſoned curiouſly and ſubtilly, in finding out and collecting the extraordinary Stature and Length of *Hercules* his Body: for, it being manifeſt, that *Hercules* meaſured with his Feet the running Courſe of Olympian *Jupiter* at *Piſa*, and that he made it 600 Feet long, and that all the other running Courſes in *Greece*, inſtituted afterwards by other Perſons were 600 Foot long, yet ſhorter than this; He eaſily underſtood the meaſure of *Hercules* his Foot, conſidering that it was proportionably ſo much longer that that of other Men, as the Olympick Courſe was longer than all others. And having comprehended the ſize of *Hercules* his Foot, he conſidered what length of Body did ſuit with that Meaſure, according to the natural proportion of all the Members one to another; and ſo collected the Conſequent, That *Hercules* was ſo much taller in Body than others, by how much the Olympick Courſe was longer than the reſt, which were made after the ſame number of Feet.

SECT. IV.

Aſtronomy.

[e] *NEither did they ſuperficially conſider the Speculation of celeſtial Things, in which* Pythagoras *was exquiſite*, as appears by theſe few Remains.

CHAP. I.

The Syſtem of the Spheres.

[f] THE word οὐρανὸς Heaven, is taken three ways; firſt, for the Sphere of fixed Stars; ſecondly, for all that is betwixt the ſphere of fixed Stars and Moon; laſtly, for the whole World, both Heaven and Earth.

[g] The anonymous Writer of the Life of *Pythagoras* affirms, that *he ſaid, there are twelve orders in Heaven, whereof the firſt and outmoſt is the fixed Sphere, next to this is the Star of* Saturn, *and then the other ſix Planets*, Jupiter, Mars, Venus, Mercury, Sun *and* Moon; *next theſe, the ſphere of Fire, then that of Air, then that of Water, laſt of all the Earth.*

But

[u] Vitruv. Archit. 9. 1. [w] Laert. 8. 12. [x] Vitruv. loco cit. [y] Non poſſe ſuaviter vivere. ſec. Epicur. [z] Nat. deor. 3. * Pag. 196. [a] Epiſt. 183. [b] Non poſſe ſuaviter vivere. ſec. Epicurum. [c] Procl. in Eucl. lib. 4. prop. 44. [d] Reading οὐ γὰρ ἂν ὀρθῶς ἐπικειμένης τὸ διὰθ᾽ χωρίον πᾶσι τὰ εὐθεῖα συμπερατεῖν τότε παραβαλεῖν ἐκεῖνο τὸ χωρίον φάσιν ὅταν δὲ μείζους, &c. [e] Agel. l. 1. c. 1. [f] Jamb. c. 29. p. 158. [g] Anon vit. Pyth. apud Phot. [h] Apud. Phot.

But they who ſeem more ſtrictly to follow the Mind of *Pythagoras* and his Diſciples, aver, *They held the celeſtial Spheres to be ten, whereof nine only are viſible to us*, (the fixed Sphere, the ſeven Planets, and our Earth) *the tenth is* Antichthon, an Earth above, or oppoſite to ours. This Antichthon they [i] *added, to make up the number of the moving Bodies.* For [k] *conſidering, that the affections and proportions of Muſick conſiſt in Numbers, but all other Things appear to be aſſimilated to Numbers, that Numbers are the firſt of all Nature, that the elements of Numbers are the elements of all Beings*; They aſſerted, that all Heaven is Harmony and Number, and that the affections and parts of Heaven are correſpondent to Number: and collecting theſe, they adapted them to the compoſition of the whole, wherein if any thing were wanting, they ſupplied it, that the whole might be alike compacted. As, becauſe that the Decad ſeems to be perfect, and to comprehend the whole nature of Numbers, therefore they aſſerted the celeſtial Spheres to be ten. Now there being nine only viſible to us, hereupon they conceived the tenth to be *Antichthon*, an Earth oppoſite to ours.

As concerning the Order and Syſtem of theſe, the *Pythagoreans* [l] held, *That in the middle of the World is Fire*; or (as [m] *Stobæus*) *in the midſt of the four Elements is the fiery Globe of Unity*, [n] which they term *Veſta* and *Monad*. *They* (ſaith *Simplicius*) *who underſtand this thing more intimately, ſay, that this Fire is the procreative, nutritive, and excitative Power, which is in the midſt of the Earth.* But *Simplicius* himſelf ſeems not to have apprehended the right meaning of the *Pythagoreans*, who by this *Fire*, or *fiery Globe of Unity*, meant nothing elſe but the Sun, ſeated in the midſt of the Univerſe, immoveable, about which the other parts of the World are moved. This Opinion *Pythagoras* ſeems to have derived from the *Ægyptians*, who hieroglyphically repreſented the Sun by a Beetle, [o] becauſe, as the Beetle having formed a ball of Cow-dung, and lying upon its Back rouls it about from Claw to Claw; ſo the other parts of the World are moved and rouled by and about the Sun.

That by this immoveable Fire in the midſt of the Univerſe, they underſtood not (as [p] *Simplicius* conceiveth) the Earth, is manifeſt, foraſmuch as they further held, that [q] the Earth is not immoveable, nor ſeated in the midſt of the Globe, but ſuſpended, as being [r] one of the Stars carried about the Fire which is in the middle, and that thereby it maketh Day and Night. [s] The Reaſon why the Earth ought not to have the middle Place, is, becauſe the moſt excellent Body ought to have the moſt excellent Place: but Fire is more excellent than Earth, and the Center more excellent than all Places without it; therefore they conceived, that not the Earth, but the Fire, is placed in the midſt. [t] Moreover, becauſe that which is the moſt excellent of the Univerſe, ought principally to be preſerved, and the Middle is ſuch, therefore they term the Fire, Διὸς φυλακὴν, *the cuſtody of* Jupiter.

[v] The ſame they held of the *Antichthon* alſo, [*viz.* That like our Earth it is ſuſpended, as being one of the Stars carried about the Fire, and thereby maketh Day and Night.] By this *Antichthon*, *Clemens* ſaith, they underſtood *Heaven*: *Simplicius*, the *Moon*, as being a kind of ætherial Earth, as well for that it eclipſeth the light of the Sun, which is proper to the Earth, as for that it is the bound of Cœleſtials, as the Earth of Sublunaries. But the contrary is manifeſt, as well from the compleating of the number Ten, (in reſpect whereof this *Antichthon* was imagined) as for that they held, [w] it is not viſible to us, by reaſon, that following the motion of this Earth, it is always oppoſite to, or beneath us, and the bigneſs of our Earth hinders us from ſeeing it: And *Ariſtotle* affirms there were ſome who conceived the *Antichthon* to be the cauſe why there are more Eclipſes of the Moon than of the Sun, which may likewiſe happen by reaſon of many other Bodies inviſible to us.

[x] *Laertius*, who ſaith *Philolaus* was the firſt that conceived the Earth to have a circular Motion, ſeems to mean no more, than that he firſt committed this Opinion of *Pythagoras* to writing, and firſt made it publick; for *Euſebius* expreſly affirms, that he committed to writing the Diſſertations of *Pythagoras*. His Opinion, as delivered by *Plutarch* and *Stobæus*, is exactly the ſame; for he placed Fire in the midſt, which he called the *Genius* of the Univerſe, and the Manſion of *Jupiter*, and the Mother of Gods, and Altar, and Ward, and Meaſure of Nature: he conceived that the ten celeſtial Bodies move about it. Heaven of the ſphere of fixed Stars, the five Planets, the Sun, the Moon, the Earth, and laſtly the *Antichthon*.

From the ſame Fountain ſeems *Ariſtarchus* the *Samian* to have derived this Hypotheſis, though ſome aſcribe the Invention thereof to him; for he ſuppoſeth, that [y] the Sun and Planets move not, but that the Earth moveth round about the Sun, which is ſeated in the middle. [z] *Plutarch* adds, that *Plato* in his old Age repented for that he had placed the Earth in the midſt of the Univerſe, and not in its proper Place.

This Opinion was of late revived by *Nicolaus Copernicus*, who conſidering how inconvenient and troubleſome it is to underſtand, and maintain the Mo-

[i] Plut. de Anim. procr. in Timæo. [k] Ariſtot. de cœlo, c. 13. [l] Ariſt. de Cœlo, lib. 2. [m] Phyſ. c. 25. [n] Plut. in Numa.
[o] Clem. Alex. Strom. lib. 5. [p] Ad Ariſt. de Cœlo, 2, 9. [q] Plut. in Numa. [r] Ariſtot. de Cœlo, lib. 2. [s] Ariſt. loc. cit. [t] Ariſt. ibid. [v] Ariſt. ibid. [w] Plut. de Anim. Procr. Simplic. ut ſupra. [x] Laert. 8. 85. [y] Archimed. in Arenar. Plut. plac. 3. 13. [z] In Platon. quæſt. and in Numa.

Motions of the Heavens, and immobility of the Earth, explained it with admirable Ingenuity, after the mind of the *Pythagoreans*. According to whose Hypotheſis, the Sun (as we ſaid) is ſettled in the midſt of the World, immoveable: The ſphere of fixed Stars in the extremity or outſide of the World, immoveable alſo; betwixt theſe are diſpoſed the Planets, and amongſt them the Earth as one of them; the Earth moves both about the Sun, and about his proper Axis. Its diurnal Motion by one Revolution, makes a Night and a Day; its annual motion about the Sun, by one Revolution makes a Year; ſo as by reaſon of his diurnal motion to the *Eaſt*, the Sun and other Stars ſeem to move to the *Weſt*; and by reaſon of its annual Motion through the *Zodiack*, the Earth itſelf is in one Sign, and the Sun ſeems to be in the Sign oppoſite to it: Betwixt the Sun and the Earth they place *Mercury* and *Venus*: Betwixt the Earth and the fixed Stars, *Mars*, *Jupiter*, and *Saturn*: The Moon being next the Earth, is continually moved within the great Orb betwixt *Venus* and *Mars*, round about the Earth, as its Centre: Its Revolution about the Earth is compleated in a Month; about the Sun (together with the Earth) in a Year.

CHAP. II.

The Motions of the Planets.

AS concerning the Courſe and Revolution of the Planets, [z] they affirm the great Year to be the revolution of *Saturn*; for the reſt of the Planets abſolve their Periods in a ſhorter time; but *Saturn* in no leſs than thirty Years, *Jupiter* in twelve Years, *Mars* in two; the Sun [ſpeaking according to the *Phænomenon*] in one; *Mercury* and *Venus* as the Sun, [or to ſpeak more exactly, *Mercury* in three Months, *Venus* in eight] the Moon, as being next the Earth ſooneſt, in a Month.

According to this Inequality, appears the motion of the Planets to our ſight, by reaſon that the Eye is out of the center of the Orb: But in the whole courſe of Aſtronomy (ſaith *Geminus*) are ſuppoſed the motions of the Sun, Moon, and five Planets, equal and circular, contrary to the diurnal Revolution of the World. The *Pythagoreans* firſt applying themſelves to theſe Diſquiſitions, ſuppoſed circular and equal motions of the Sun, the Moon, and the five Planets; for they admitted not ſuch irregularity in eternal and divine Bodies, that ſometimes they ſhould move ſwifter, ſometimes ſlower, and ſometimes ſtand ſtill, as the ſtationary Points in the Planets. Neither in any ſober, well-tempered Perſon could we admit ſuch irregularity of Pace. Indeed, the neceſſities of Life often cauſe Men to move faſter or ſlower; but in the incorruptible Nature of the Stars, there cannot be alledged any cauſe of Swiftneſs and Slowneſs. Wherefore the *Pythagoreans* propoſed this Queſtion, how the *Phænomena*'s might be ſalved by circular and equal Motions.

That *Pythagoras* himſelf obſerved theſe Irregularities, and the Ways to ſalve them, appears from *Jamblichus*, who ſaith, [a] he communicated a revelative right Knowledge of all manner of motions of the Spheres and Stars; ἐπιπροθήσεων τε, καὶ ὑπολείψεων, καὶ ὡμαλιῶν, ἐκκεντροτήτων τε, καὶ ἐπικύκλων. Ἐπιπρόθησις is the anticipation of any Planet, either in reſpect to ſome other Planet, or to the fixed Stars. Ὑπόλειψις is the *falling later* of any Planet, either in reſpect to ſome other Planet, or to the fixed Stars. Ἀνωμαλία, *Inequality*, is, when the ſame Planet moveth ſlower and faſter, according to its diſtance from the Sun, in the Pythagorick Hypotheſis; (or in the Ptolemaick, from the Earth) ſlower in its *Aphelium*, faſter in its *Perihelium*.

The two ways of ſalving theſe *Phænomena*'s, are by *Eccentricks*, or by *Epicycles*; for a *Hemocentrick* with an *Epicycle*, (as *Eudoxus* firſt demonſtrated) is equipollent to an *Eccentrick*. *Eccentricity* is, when the Center of their equal Motion is diſtant from the Center of their apparent Motion. Both theſe [b] *Jamblichus* aſcribes to *Pythagoras*, from whom perhaps they were derived to *Eudoxus*, to whoſe Invention [c] others aſcribe them.

CHAP. III.

The Intervals and Harmony of the Spheres.

PYthagoras (ſaith [d] *Cenſorinus*) aſſerted, that this whole World is made according to muſical Proportion, and that the ſeven Planets, betwixt Heaven and the Earth, which govern the nativities of Mortals, have a harmonious Motion, and Intervals correſpondent to muſical Diaſtemes, and render various Sounds, according to their ſeveral Heights, ſo conſonant, that they make moſt ſweet Melody; but to us inaudible, by reaſon of the greatneſs of the Noiſe, which the narrow paſſage of our Ears is not capable to receive. For, as *Eratoſthenes* collected, that the largeſt circumference of the Earth is 252000 *Stadia*; ſo *Pythagoras* declared how many *Stadia* there are betwixt the Earth and every Star. In this meaſure of the World, we are to underſtand the *Italick Stadium*, which conſiſts of 625 Feet; for there are others of a different Length, as the *Olympick* of 600 Feet, the *Pythick* of 500. From the Earth therefore to the Moon, *Pythagoras* conceived to be about 126000 *Stadia*, and that diſtance [according to muſical

[z] Anon. vit. Pyth. apud Phot. [a] Cap. 6. [b] Loc. cit. [c] Laert. Eudox. [d] De die natal. c. 13.

fical Proportion] is a Tone; from the Moon to *Mercury* (who is called στίλβων) half as much, as it were a *Hemitone*; from thence to *Phosphorus*, which is the Star *Venus*, almost as much, that is, another *Hemitone*; from thence to the Sun twice as much, as it were a *Tone* and a half. Thus the Sun is distant from the Earth three *Tones* and a half, which is called *Diapente*; from the Moon two and a half, which is *Diatessaron*; from the Sun to *Mars*, who is called Πυρόεις, there is the same Interval as from the Earth to the Moon, which makes a *Tone*; from thence to *Jupiter*, who is called Φαέθων, half as much, which makes a *Hemitone*; from thence to the supream Heaven, where the Signs are, a *Hemitone* also; so that the Diasteme from the supream Heaven to the Sun is *Diatessaron*, that is, two *Tones* and a half: from the same Heaven to the Top of the Earth six *Tones*, a *Diapason* Concord. Moreover he referred to other Stars many Things, which the masters of Musick treat of, and showed, that all this World is Enarmonick. Thus *Censorinus*. But [e] *Pliny* delivering this Opinion of *Pythagoras*, reckons seven *Tones* from the Earth to the supream Heaven; for whereas *Censorinus* accounts but a *Hemitone* from *Saturn* to the *Zodiack*, *Pliny* makes it *Sesquiple*.

CHAP. IV.

Of the Planet Venus.

[f] NExt the Sun (saith *Pliny*) there is a great Star, called *Venus*, alternately errant, in Names emulating both the Sun and Moon. For, preventing and rising before Morning, he takes the Names of *Lucifer*, as another Sun bringing on day; on the other side, shining at Sun-set, it is called *Vesper*, as proroguing Light, and performing the Office of the Moon; which its Nature *Pythagoras* the *Samian* first found out, about the forty-second *Olympiad*, which was of *Rome* the 147th Year. In Magnitude it exceeds all the other Stars, and is of so great Splendor, that this Star only casts a Shadow; whence it hath Diversity of Names; some call it *Juno*; others, *Isis*; others, *Mother of the Gods*. By the Nature hereof, all things are generated upon Earth; for, at either rising, it scattereth prolifick Dew, supplying not only the Conceptions of Earth, but likewise stimulating all living Creatures. It performs the Revolution of the *Zodiack* in 348 Days, never receding from the Sun more than 46 Parts, according to *Timæus*. Thus *Pliny*. That there is a Mistake in the Time, hath been already shewn; but the Thing itself is confirmed by *Laertius*, who affirms, *Pythagoras* first said, that *Vesper* and *Lucifer* are the same Star; yet elsewhere adds, that some ascribe this to *Parmenides*. But that it was a Doctrine of the *Pythagoreans*, appears from this Account given by *Timæus*; the Star *Juno* many call *Venus* and *Lucifer*. All Persons are not skilful in the Rules of sacred Astronomy, and in the Sciences of rising and setting; for the same Star is sometimes *Hesper*, when it followeth the Sun in such manner that it is conspicuous to us when the Sun is set; and sometimes *Eous*, when it goeth before the Sun, and riseth before Sun-rising.

[e] Lib. 9. cap. 21, 22. [f] Lib. 2. cap. 8.

The Doctrine of *PYTHAGORAS*.

CHAP. I.

Philosophy, its Name, Definition, Parts, Method.

THE [a] *Pythagoreans* being adorned with these Studies of Science, from thence ascended to perfect the Works of the World, and the Principles of Nature.

[b] *Pythagoras* first gave the Name to Philosophy, defining it, An Appetition, and Love to Wisdom. *Wisdom* is the Science of Truth in Things that are. *Things that are*, he called Immaterials, and Eternals, and sole Agents, which are the Incorporeals; the rest are equivocally called such, by Participation with these; *viz.* Corporeals, Materials, and Corruptibles, which indeed are not. Now *Wisdom* is the Science of those Things which are, but not of those which are equivocally; for Corporeals are not docible, nor admit certain Knowledge, being infinite, and not comprehensible by Science, and Things which (as it were) are not, according to the Difference of all Things, neither can be rightly described by any Definition. Of those whose Nature is such as that they cannot be known, it is impossible to frame a Science; wherefore neither is it likely that there can be a Love of a Science which is not. But rather about that which is converfant about those Things which properly are, and continue always the same, and like themselves, and co-exist always with a true Appellation. Upon the Knowledge of these followeth that which

[a] Agell. l. 9. [b] Jambl. c. 29. p. 144.

which is of equivocal Things (though not ſought after) as the Science of Particulars follows the Science of Univerſals: For, as *Architas* ſaith, *They who know Univerſals well, will plainly ſee what Particulars are.* Wherefore *Things that are,* are not of one kind only and ſimply, but of many various Kinds, Intelligibles and Incorporeals, whoſe Appellation is τὰ ὄντα, *Things that are.* Corporeal Things, ſubject to Senſe, are thoſe which are by Participation of thoſe that are. Concerning all theſe, he delivered moſt proper Sciences, leaving nothing unexcuſſed, and delivered alſo to Men the common Sciences, as the Demonſtrative, the Definitive, the Diviſive, as is manifeſt from the Commentaries of the *Pythagoreans.*

Hereupon he defined Philoſophy, [c] the Knowledge of Things that are, as Things that are, and [d] the Knowledge of Things divine and human, as alſo [e] the Meditation of Death, daily endeavouring to free the Soul from the Priſon of the Body, and the Reſemblance of God as far as is poſſible for Man.

For [f] the Scope of Philoſophy is to free the Mind, (the divine Part of the Soul) which is planted in us, and to ſet it at liberty, without which Liberty none can learn or perceive any thing ſolid or true by the Help or Benefit of Senſe; for the Mind, according to him, ſeeth all Things, and hears all Things; all Things elſe are deaf and blind.

In order hereunto it is, that Philoſophy being of two Kinds, Practick and Theoretick; the Practick, according to the Method of the *Pythagoreans*, precedes the Theoretick. The Reaſon receive thus explain'd by [g] *Hierocles.*

Philoſophy is the Purification and Perfection of human Life; Purification from material Irrationality and the mortal Body; Perfection, from the Recovery of its own excellent Life, reducing it to the divine Reſemblance. Virtue and Truth are chiefly able to effect theſe, that taking away Exceſs of Paſſions, this (rightly had) inducing the divine Form.

Firſt are laid down the Inſtructions of Practick Virtue; for we muſt compoſe the Irrationality which is in us, and then (ſo prepar'd) apply ourſelves to the Knowledge of the more divine Things. For as it is not poſſible for the Eye, being full of Dirt, and not cleanſed, to look upon things very bright; ſo neither can the Soul, not poſſeſſing Virtue, gaze upon the Beauty of Truth. For that which is not pure, is not capable of touching that which is pure. Practick Philoſophy produceth Virtue; Theoretick, Truth. As in theſe golden Verſes (of Pythagoras) *we find the Practick Philoſophy, called human Virtue, but the Theoretick celebrated as divine Virtue, when cloſing the Inſtructions of civil Virtue.*

Theſe labour (ſaith he) *ſtudy theſe, and theſe affect;*
To Divine Virtue theſe thy Steps direct.

Firſt therefore a Man muſt be made good, then a God: Good the Civil Virtues render a Man, but the Sciences conducing to the Divine Virtue divinify. But to thoſe who aſcend, the leſſer Things precede the greater; for which Reaſon in the Pythagorical Precepts, the Rules of Virtue are firſt delivered, teaching us to aſcend from the greateſt Uſe of Life, to the Divine Reſemblance.

[h] Three Ways, ſay they, Man may become better than himſelf; firſt, by Converſation with the Gods; for it is neceſſary, that he who addreſſeth himſelf to them, at that time, ſequeſter himſelf from all Evil, aſſimilating himſelf as near as he can to God. Secondly, by Well-doing, for that is proper to God, and therein he imitates God. Thirdly, by Death; for if the Soul in this Life, being a little ſeparated from the Body, becometh better, and beginneth to divine in Dreams by Viſions and Extaſies of Diſeaſes, it will be much better when it ſhall be wholly ſeparated from the Body.

Hence he affirmed, that [i] the moſt conſiderable of all Things human, is to inform the Soul concerning Good and Ill: That [k] Men have perfect Felicity when they have a good Soul; or that [l] the Knowlege of the Perfection of the Virtues of the Soul is the chief Felicity: That [m] every Man is appointed by God to know and to contemplate: That [n] Virtue is a Harmony, and ſo is all Good, even God himſelf: That [o] the End or chief Good is to reſemble God; whence he expreſly ſaid, Follow God, not viſible to the Eye, but intelligible to the Underſtanding, by the Harmony of the World: That the moſt excellent Things given by the Gods unto Men, are, to ſpeak Truth, and to benefit others, [Theoretick and Practick Virtue] and that each of theſe reſembled the Works of God; to this latter *Strabo* alludes, commending thoſe who ſaid, [p] Men imitate the Gods moſt when they benefit others: The former is confirmed by [q] *Porphyrius*, that he adviſed above all Things to ſpeak Truth, for that only is able to make Men like to the Gods; for God himſelf, as he learn'd of the *Magi*, who term him *Oromaſdes*, in his Body reſembles Light, in his Soul Truth. This is that θειότης, *(Divinity)* which [r] *Jamblichus* reckons laſt in his Recapitulation of the Heads of the Pythagorick Philoſophy, and is the ſame with which the golden Verſes conclude, thus,

Then ſtript of Fleſh up to free Æther ſoar,
A deathleſs God, Divine, mortal no more.

SECT.

[c] Pſell. compend. de quinque tribus. [d] Pſell. loc. cit. [e] D. Hieron. adv. Rufin. l. 3. [f] Porph. p. 201. [g] In aur. carm. [h] Anon. Phot. [i] Laert. 8. 32. [k] Laert, ibid. citing Alexander. [l] Clem. Strom. 2. citing Heraclides. [m] Jambl. protrept. c. 9. p. 58. [n] Laert. loco cit. [o] Stob. Eth. 2. p. 163. [p] Lib. 6. [q] P. 27. ſee alſo Stob. Serm. 11. [r] Cap. 6.

SECT. I.

Practick Philosophy, its Parts; and first of Pædeutick.

PRactick Philosophy seems to have been the Invention of *Pythagoras*; for *Aristotle* affirms that he first undertook to discourse concerning Virtue; That *Socrates* is generally esteemed the Author thereof, perhaps is only because, as *Aristotle* adds, coming after him he discoursed better and more fully thereupon.

To this Part of Philosophy alludes [t] this Sentence of *Pythagoras*; That the Discourse of that Philosopher is vain, by which no Passion of a Man is healed; for as there is no Benefit of Medicine, if it expel not Diseases out of Bodies, so neither of Philosophy, if it expel not ill out of the Soul.

Virtues being of two kinds, *private*, which respect ourselves, and *publick*, which have Reference to others; *Pythagoras* seems to have comprehended the first under *Pædeutick*, the second under *Politick*. [v] *Laertius* affirms he writ three Treatises, *Pædeutick*, *Politick*, *Physick*. The Heads of *Pædeutick*, according to the general Recapitulation of [w] *Jamblichus*, seem to have been these, *Institution*, *Silence*, *Abstinence from Flesh*, *Fortitude*, *Temperance*, *Sagacity*.

CHAP. I.

Institution, Silence, Abstinence.

COncerning Institution, *&c.* there are these Sentences and Precepts of *Pythagoras*, preserved by *Stobæus* and others.

[x] We ought to make choice of the best Course of Life; for Custom will make it pleasant. Wealth is a weak Anchor, Glory a weaker: The Body, Magistracies, Honours, all these are infirm and unable. What are then able Anchors? Wisdom, Magnanimity, Fortitude; these no Tempest shakes. This is the Law of God, that Virtue only is solid; all else are but trifles.

[y] To take away Bitterness from Wormwood, and Liberty from Speech, are both alike.

[z] Endeavour not to conceal thy Faults with Words, but to mend them by Reproof.

[a] It is not so hard to offend, as not to reprove an offending Person.

[b] As the Sickness of the Body, if hid or praised, is not healed; so the Soul cherished in its Ways, or concealed, is not reformed.

[c] Rejoice more in Reprovers than in Flatterers: Fly from Flatterers as Enemies.

[d] We ought either to be silent, or to speak things that are better than Silence.

[e] It is better to throw a Stone at random, than an idle Word.

[f] Comprehend not few things in many Words, but many things in few Words.

[g] We must faithfully restore to him that entrusts us, the *Depositum*, not only of Money, but of Words.

[h] Of Opinion, the *Pythagoreans* said thus: It is the Part of a Man void of understanding, to adhere to all Mens Opinions, especially to that which is maintained by the greatest Number: for to conceive and judge aright is proper to few; it only belongs to the knowing, who are not many: this Power therefore extends not to many. On the other side, it is no less Madness to contemn all Conception and Opinion. Such a Person must be unlearned and unrectifiable; for it is necessary, that he who is ignorant learn those things whereof he is ignorant; and that he who learneth, addict and resign himself to his Teacher. In a word, they said, It is necessary that such young Men as would be preserved, should addict themselves to the Conceptions and Opinions of their Elders, and such as lead a good Life.

Now in the whole Course of human Life, there are certain distinct Ages, which are not temeariously to be connected; for they are expelled by one another, unless a Man be well and rightly order'd from his Birth. It is requisite therefore, that from the Institution of a Child in Goodness, Temperance, and Fortitude, a great Part be transmitted to his Youth, when he arrives at that Age; likewise of his Youth instituted in Goodness, Fortitude and Temperance, a great Part be transmitted to his manly Estate. Herein the Course ordinarily taken, is ridiculous; for most think that Children ought to be well order'd, instructed in Temperance, and to abstain from all things odious and undecent; but when they come to be Youths, most leave them to their own Management, to do what they please; whereas at that Age they are subject to both sorts of Vices, of Children, and of Men. To shun Study and Order, and to follow Play and Wantonness, the Vice of Childhood, is likewise most proper to Youth. Again, vehement Desires, Ambition, and the like, the Affections of Manhood, insinuate into Youth; for which reason, this Age requireth Care above all the rest. In fine, a Man should never be so given over, as to do whatsoever he pleaseth; but that there should always be some Overseer president over the rest, a legitimate sitting Magistrate, whom every Citizen ought to obey. For a living Creature, as soon as ever it is neglected, falls into Ill and Wickedness.

[t] Stob. serm. 80. [v] Laert. 8. 6. [w] Cap. 6. [x] Stob. serm. 1. mention'd also by *Plutarch*, de exilio. [y] Stob. serm. 13. [z] Ibid. [a] Ibid. [b] Ibid. [c] Stob. 14. [d] Stob. 24. [e] Stob. 34. [f] Stob. 35. [g] Porph. p. 197. [h] Jamb. c. 6.

They affirm, That they often have enquir'd and examin'd, for what reaſon we give Children Food at ſet times, and moderately; the ordinary Anſwer is, That Order and Moderation are good: their Contraries, Diſorder and Immoderateneſs, ill; as is manifeſt, in as much as to be a Glutton, or a Drunkard, is eſteemed a great Reproach. For if none of theſe were uſeful and beneficial to us when we arrive at Man's Eſtate, it were needleſs to accuſtom ourſelves, whilſt Children, to ſuch Order. It is the ſame in other Habits. We ſee it manifeſt alſo in all other Kinds of living Creatures, which are taught by Man from the very Beginning, as Whelps, and the like, thoſe things which they are requir'd to practiſe when they are come to full Growth. Thus *Jamblichus*. Of *Silence*, *Abſtinence*, and the whole Courſe of his *Inſtitution*, we have formerly treated.

CHAP. II.

Fortitude.

[i] THE greateſt Argument of the *Pythagoreans* for Fortitude, was, for that they fully perſuaded themſelves, that of all human Chances, nothing ought to happen unexpectedly to any, but that they ſhould expect all things which were not within their own Power. Precepts of *Pythagoras*, tending to this Virtue, are theſe.

[k] *Do thoſe things which you judge to be good, altho' after you have done them, you ſhall be diſeſteemed; for the Vulgar is an ill Judge of all good things: As you deſpiſe their Praiſe, ſo deſpiſe their Diſpraiſe.*

[l] *He forbad to forſake the Protection and Station of this Life, without the Command of our ſupreme Lord.*

CHAP. III.

Temperance and Continence.

[m] HE often uſed this Apophthegm to all his Auditors, whether many or few: *We muſt avoid with our utmoſt Endeavour, and amputate with Fire and Sword, and by all other means, from the Body, Sickneſs; from the Soul, Ignorance; from the Belly, Luxury; from a City, Sedition; from a Family, Diſcord; from all things, Exceſs.*

[n] It is better to live lying on the Ground with a ſettled Confidence, than to have a golden Bed and be troubled.

[o] Temperance is the Strength of the Soul; for it is the Light of the Soul clear from Paſſion.

[p] To ſerve Paſſions is more grievous than to ſerve Tyrants.

[q] It is impoſſible he can be free, who ſerves Paſſions, and is governed by them.

[r] No Man is free who doth not command himſelf.

[s] The Labour of Continence precedes all excellent things.

[t] To poſſeſs Continence is the beſt Strength and Wealth.

[v] It is better to die, than to cloud the Soul by Intemperance.

[x] He ſaid, that Drunkenneſs is a little Madneſs; or, that it is the Study of Madneſs; or, as *Laertius*, that it is the Canker of the Flower of the Mind.

[y] The Voice of the Fleſh is, No Hunger, no Thirſt, no Cold.

[z] He admoniſhed all Men to ſhun Ambition and Vain-glory, becauſe theſe chiefly excite Envy.

[a] He diſcommended all Exceſs, ſaying, that we ought not to exceed a due Proportion in Labour and Food.

[b] We muſt conſider, there are three Kinds of things which deſerve to be purſued and acquired; the firſt is of thoſe which are honourable and virtuous; the ſecond, conducing to Life; the laſt, Pleaſures: Not the vulgar enchanting Pleaſure, for that he allowed not; but the ſolid and grave, free from blame. For, he ſaid, there are two Kinds of Pleaſure, whereof that which indulgeth to the Belly, and to Laſciviouſneſs, by Profuſeneſs of Wealth, he compar'd to the murtherous Songs of the *Syrens*; the other, which conſiſts in things honeſt and juſt, as alſo in the Neceſſaries of Life, is ſweet as well as the firſt, and withal it is not followed by Repentance. Hither perhaps alludes [c] *Clemens*, who ſaith, *Pythagoras* adviſed to eſteem the Muſes ſweeter than *Syrens*; teaching, that we ſhould ſtudy Learning not with Delight; whereby he condemned the other Delight of the Mind, which is fallacious.

[d] *Pythagoras* ſeeing one that made himſelf fat by exerciſing and eating; [e] *This Man* (ſaith he) *will not ceaſe to make a ſtricter Priſon for himſelf.*

* The *Pythagoreans* exhorted ſuch as came into their Society, to ſhun Pleaſure as much as any thing that ought to be avoided; for nothing ſo deceives us, and draws into Sin, as this Paſſion. In general, as it ſeems, they endeavour'd not to do any thing which might tend to Pleaſure, this Scope being for the moſt part undecent and hurtful; but that they ſhould aim at what is good and decent, to do what they ought. In the next place, to diſcern what is convenient and beneficial, it requireth a more than ordinary Judgment.

As to that which is called Deſire, they ſaid thus: Deſire is an Impulſion and Appetite of the Soul, either

[i] Jamb. c. 32. p. 189. [k] Stob. ſerm. 44. [l] Cic. de ſenect. [m] Porph. p. 190. [n] Stob. ſerm. 5. [o] Stob. 6. [p] Ibid. [q] Ibid. [r] Ibid. [s] Stob. 16. [t] Stob. 17. [v] Ibid. [x] Stob. 18. [y] Stob. 99. [z] Porph. p. 194. [a] Laert. 8. 9. [b] Porph. p. 197. [c] Strom. 1. p. 294. [d] D. Baſil. Hom. 21. [e] Perhaps ὅτος ἐφη ἐ παύση χαλεπώτερον ἑαυτῷ κατασκευάζων τὸ δεσμωτήριον. See Hom. in Pſal. xxix. p. 195. * Jamb. c. 31.

ther of some Repletion, or Derogation of some things belonging to Sense, or the sensitive Affection. This Passion is various, and the most multiplicious of all that belong to Man. Of human Desires many are acquir'd and framed by the Persons themselves; wherefore this Passion requireth greatest Care and Observation, and corporeal Exercises more than ordinary. For the Body, when its Aliment is evacuated, to desire Repletion, is natural; and again, being replete, to desire Evacuation, is natural also: But to desire superfluous Aliment, or superfluous and sumptuous Raiment and Lodging, or superfluous and various Houshold-stuff, and Utensils, and Cups, and Servants, and Herds of Cattle bred for Diet; in a word, of all human Passions, this is most such, that it never is at a Stay, but proceeds to infinite. Wherefore, from our very Childhood, Care must be taken, that we desire such things as are needful, and shun vain and superfluous Desires; being undisturbed, and clear from such Appetites, and contemning those who deserve Contempt, being fetter'd in their Desires.

It is of most Concernment to observe the vain, hurtful, superfluous Desires of those, who are transported by their Power: there is nothing so absurd, whereto the Souls of such Persons, Children, Men and Women, are not transported. The most various is that of Meats, infinite is the multitude of Fruits, infinite of Roots, used by Mankind. Besides this, all sorts of Flesh, making it their business to find, of terrestrial, volatile, and aquatile Creatures, wherewith to satisfy their Taste, and all Variety of dressing them, with the mixture of all kind of Juices, whereby Mankind is really prophetick and multiform, as to the Motion of the Soul; for every several sort of Meat is Cause of a peculiar Constitution. Now Men behold that these produce great Alteration, as Excess of Wine to such a degree exhilerates; further, causeth Frenzy and Disorder: But those things which discover not so much their Force and Efficacy, they are ignorant of, notwithstanding that whatsoever Food we take, is Cause of some peculiar Constitution. Wherefore it is a great Part of Wisdom to know and understand what Kind and Quantity of Meat is requisite for Nourishment. This Science was first communicated by *Apollo* and *Paon*, afterwards by the *Æsculapians*.

Concerning Generation, [f] he said thus: We ought principally to observe that which is called προφερὲς, *precocious:* for neither too forward Plants nor Animals, before the due Season, when they are in their full Strength. Youths therefore and Virgins ought to be educated in Labour, and Exercises, and Actions conducing to Fortitude, using Food convenient thereto, and in a laborious, temperant and tolerant Life. Of the things in human Life there are many, in which to be late conversant is best; of this kind is Coition. A Youth ought so to be educated, as not to addict himself thereto before twenty Years of Age; and when arrived at those Years, to use it seldom is best, if we esteem a good Habit of Body; for Intemperance and Good rarely meet in the same Person.

They commended the Rites and Laws of the Ancients, in the *Greek* Cities, not to lie with Mothers, or Daughters, or Sisters, nor in a Temple, nor in Publick, for this is evil; and to procure all possible Impediments thereof, is very profitable.

They were of Opinion, that all unnatural ignominious Generations ought to be taken away, and those only preserved which were according to Nature, with Temperance, and Lawful.

They conceived, that such as go about to beget Children, ought to have much Providence of their future Issue. The first and greatest Providence is, to prepare himself for that Action by a temperate, healthful Life; not eating too much at unseasonable Times, not using such Meats as deprave the Habits of the Body; but above all things, not to perform it when drunk: for they thought that by ill, and discordant, and disturbed Temperament, the Seed became adulterate. They also thought him a foolish, inconsiderate Person, who being desirous of Children, and taking a Wife to that End, should not with utmost Study foresee by what means his Issue might be most advantaged. They who love Dogs are very careful of their Breed, as of which they shall breed, and when, and accordingly the Whelps prove; the like do they who love Birds. But tho' it be well known, that they who breed any other kind of living Creature, use their utmost Endeavour to procure a generous Race; yet Men have no Respect to their own Offspring, but beget them inconsiderately, and bring them up negligently. This is the chief and most manifest Cause that so many Men are evil and wicked, the greater Part begetting their Children like Beasts, without any Consideration.

Finally, [g] Pythagoras *discoursing concerning the Benefit of venereal Pleasures, advised, in the Summer-time to abstain wholly from Coition; in the Winter, to use it but rarely; for it is generally hurtful: but the continual Use thereof causeth Debility, and is most pernicious. Laertius* saith, *He advised, that in the Winter and Spring it should not be used at all; in Summer and Autumn but sparingly; for at all times it is pernicious and prejudicial to the Health. And being asked, At what time a Man should use it? he answered, When he hath a mind to be weaker.*

[f] Reading αὐτὸν according to *Stobæus*, serm. 99. who cites this Fragment out of *Aristoxenus*; perhaps it belonged to his Book, *De vita Pythagoræ*.

[g] Diodor. excerpt. Vales. p. 247.

CHAP. IV.

Sagacity and Wiſdom.

TO *Wiſdom* (the laſt general Head of *Pædeutick*) belong the Sentences of *Pythagoras*.

[h] *The Strength, Wall, and Armour of a wiſe Man is Wiſdom.*

Call to mind, that moſt Men acknowledge Wiſdom to be the greateſt Good; but few endeavour to poſſeſs this greateſt Good.

[i] *The Sacrifices of Fools are the Food of Fire; their Donatives the Subſiſtence of ſacrilegious Perſons.*

[k] *A Horſe is not to be guided without a Bridle, nor Riches without Wiſdom.*

[l] *He conceived the Impoſition of Names on things to be the higheſt Part of Wiſdom.*

SECT. II.

Of Politick, the other Part of Practick Philoſophy.

THE Heads of Politick (according to [m] *Jamblichus*) are theſe: *Common Converſation, Friendſhip, Worſhip of the Gods, Piety to the Dead,* and *Law-making.*

[n] They hold *Pythagoras* to be the Inventor of all politick Diſcipline. He uſed to ſay, that amongſt Beings nothing is pure, but every thing partakes of ſome other, as Earth of Fire, Fire of Water and Air. In like manner, Honeſt partakes of Diſhoneſt, Juſt of Unjuſt, and the like. Hence it is, that Reaſon is carried away to either Side. There are two Motions, one of the Body, the other of the Mind; one Irrational, the other Elective. Commonwealths he compar'd to a rectangled Triangle, wherein one Side conſiſts of three Parts, the Baſe of five, the other Side of the Mean between them, of four. In the Coincidence of theſe Lines with one another, and their Squares, we behold delineated the beſt Form of a Commonwealth, [and of Juſtice.]

CHAP. I.

Common Converſation.

TO common Converſation belong theſe Maxims of *Pythagoras.*

[o] *A Stranger juſt, is to be preferr'd not only before a Countryman, but before a Kinſman.*

[p] *Eſteem it a great Part of good Education, to be able to ſuffer the want of Education in others.*

[q] *Deſire that they who converſe with you, ſhould rather reſpect than fear you: for Admiration accompanies Reſpect; Hatred, Fear.*

[r] There being a Juſtice in the mutual Converſation of Men one towards another; of this alſo the *Pythagoreans* deliver'd this manner. There is in the common Converſation of Men one opportune, another importune: They differ in Diverſity of Age, and in Dignity, and in Nearneſs of Affinity, and Beneficence, and, if there be any thing like theſe, in mutual Differences. For there is a kind of Converſation which appeareth, to the Younger towards the Younger, not to be importune; but, towards the Elder, it is importune: for no kind, neither of Anger, nor of Menacing, or Boldneſs, but all ſuch kind of Importunity ought diligently to be avoided by the Younger toward the Elder. In like manner is the Reaſon of Dignity; for coming to a Perſon endow'd with true Worth and Virtue, it is neither decent nor opportune to ſpeak much, or to commit any of the foremention'd things. Like theſe alſo are thoſe which concern ſuch as have oblig'd and deſerv'd well of others.

[s] There is a various and multiplicious Uſe of Opportunity. For of thoſe that are angry and incens'd, ſome do it opportunely, others importunely: and again, of thoſe who covet, and deſire, and have Appetite, it may be opportune for ſome to purſue thoſe things, not for others. The ſame Reaſon there is of other Affections, and Actions, and Diſpoſitions, and Converſations, and Interceſſions, and Diſcourſes. But Opportunity is of ſuch a Nature, that it is docible, and undeceivable, and capable of Act, and generally, and ſimply, having nothing of all thoſe in it. But the Conſequents are of ſuch a kind, that they together, decent, and convenient, and the like, attend the Nature of Opportunity.

They held that there is a Primacy in every thing, and that every-where there is one thing which is beſt, in Science, and in Experience, and in Generation; likewiſe in a Family, and in a City, and in an Army, and in all ſuch like Conſtitutions: But it is difficult to diſcern and underſtand the Nature of the Primacy in all the aforeſaid things; for in Sciences it is the Part of more than ordinary Intelligence, by clear Intuition, to diſcern and judge the Parts of the thing, which is the Primacy of them. But there is great Difference, and almoſt of the whole and general a Hazard, in not rightly taking the Primacy: for, in a word, nothing can afterwards be right, if the true Primacy be not known. The ſame Manner and Reaſon is in other kinds of Primacy; for neither can a Family be well governed, where there is not a true Maſter, and voluntary Government; for it is requiſite, that both theſe be voluntary in the Præfecture, as well he who is chief, as thoſe who are ſubject to him. As Learning is then right, when there is ſuch Conformity betwixt the Maſters and the Scholars, that they will teach, theſe will learn; for if either be refractory, it cannot be rightly performed. In this manner he conceived it to be fit for Inferiors to obey Superiors, Diſciples their Maſters.

CHAP. II.

Friendſhip.

[t] *Pythagoras* evidently demonſtrated, that there is a Friendſhip of all unto all; of Gods towards Men,

[h] Stob. ſerm. 3. [i] Ibid. 4. [k] Ibid. 90. [l] Cic. Tuſc. 1. 25. [m] Cap. 6. [n] Jamb. c. 27. [o] Stob. ſerm. 9. [p] Ibid. 19. [q] Ibid. 44. [r] Jamb. c. 30. [s] Ibid. c. 16.

Men, by Piety and religious Worſhip; of Doctrines to one another; of the Soul to the Body; of the rational Part to the Irrational, by Philoſophy and its Theory; of Men towards one another; betwixt Countrymen, by right Obſervation of Laws; betwixt Strangers, by right Phyſiology; of a Man to his Wife, or Children, or Brethren, and Servants, by unperverted Communion. In a word, of all towards all; moreover of ſome irrational Creatures, by Juſtice and natural Affinity and Communion; of the Body, in itſelf mortal, a Conciliation and Combination of the contrary Faculties, by Health and wholeſome Diet, and Temperance, in Imitation of the good Compoſure in the Elements. In all theſe, of one and the ſame, according to Comprehenſion of the Name Friendſhip, *Pythagoras* is acknowledg'd to be the Inventor and Lawgiver: And ſo admirable a Friendſhip did he deliver to thoſe who enquired of him, that, unto this Day, ſaith *Jamblichus*, we ſay of thoſe who are intimately joined together by Friendſhip, *they are of the* Pythagoreans.

We muſt add the Inſtitution of *Pythagoras* herein, and the Exhortations he uſed to his Diſciples. They were adviſed to take away all Contention, and Love of Controverſy, out of true Friendſhip; if poſſible out of all. But if that be not poſſible, at leaſt out of that which is our own Country, and generally that towards Elders. Likewiſe out of that towards Benefactors; for to become Antagoniſts, or conteſt with ſuch, when we are fallen into Anger, or ſome other Paſſion, is not conſiſtent with the Preſervation of the Amity we have with them. They ſaid, that in Friendſhip there ought to be leaſt Scratches and Cuts; and, if any happen, we ſhould fly and ſubdue Anger. It were beſt that both ſhould do ſo, but chiefly the younger; and that thoſe Exerciſes which they called παιδιστρόσεις, ought to be made from the Elder towards the Younger, with much Commendation and Benevolence. That there appear much Care and Tenderneſs in thoſe who give the Correction; for by this means the Correction ſhall be profitable. That we do not extirpate Credit out of Friendſhip, neither in jeſt nor in earneſt; for it is not eaſy to heal the Friendſhip betwixt Men, if once a Falſhood hath incurred into the Manners of thoſe who call themſelves Friends.

That we muſt not renounce Friendſhip for Adverſity, or any other Impotence which happens in Life. That Renunciation of Friendſhip only is commendable, which is made by reaſon of ſome great Wickedneſs and Miſdemeanour. But that we muſt not take away our Friendſhip from them, unleſs they become abſolutely wicked; and, before we take it off, we muſt ingeniouſly pauſe, to try, if by Conteſtation and Fight he may be diverted from this ill Habit, and become rectified. We muſt fight, not in Words, but Actions; the Fight is lawful and pious. Tho' Difference of Power be not a juſt Ground for one Man to fight with another, yet this is a juſt Ground, even the moſt juſt that is poſſible.

They ſaid, that to a Friendſhip that will prove true, are requir'd many Definitions and Rules; theſe muſt be well diſcern'd, and not confuſedly: Moreover, it ought to be accommodated to the Diſpoſition of others, that no Converſation be made negligently and vainly, but with Reſpect and right Order: Neither that any Paſſion be excited vainly, and wickedly, and ſinfully, as Concupiſcence or Anger. The ſame of the other Paſſions and Habits.

Much more admirable are thoſe things which they defin'd concerning the Community of the divine Good, and thoſe concerning the Unanimity of the Mind, and thoſe concerning the divine Mind. For they mutually exhorted one another, that they ſhould not tear aſunder the God which is in them. Thus their Study of Friendſhip by Words and Actions had reference to ſome divine Temperament, and to Union with God, and to Unity with the Mind, and the divine Soul. Thus *Jamblichus*.

[b] *He conceived the Extremity (or End) of Friendſhip, to be the making one of two.* [c] *Man ought to be one.* This Sentence (ſaith *Clemens*) is myſtick. [d] He firſt ſaid, κοινὰ φίλων, and φιλίαν ἰσότητα.

CHAP. III.

Worſhip of the Gods.

[e] THE Principles of worſhipping the Gods, propoſed by *Pythagoras* and his Followers, are theſe. That all which they determine to be done, aim and tend to the Acknowledgment of the Deity: This is the Principle; and the whole Life of Man conſiſts in this, that he follow God; and this the Ground of Philoſophy. For Men do ridiculouſly, who ſeek that which is good any where elſe than from the Gods. They do as if a Man in a Country, govern'd by a King, ſhould apply his Service to ſome Citizen of inferior Magiſtracy, and neglect the ſupreme Governor. In the ſame manner conceive they that ſuch Men do; for, ſince there is a God, we muſt confeſs that Good is in his Power. Now all, to thoſe whom they love and delight in, give good things; and to the contrary to theſe, their Contraries. Therefore it is manifeſt, that ſuch things are to be done in which God delights.

Thus he defined particularly of all things. To believe of the Divinity, that it is, and that it is in ſuch manner as to Mankind; that it overlooks them, and neglects them not; the *Pythagoreans*, taught by him, conceived to be profitable. For we have need of ſuch a Government, as we ought not in any thing to contradict; ſuch is that which proceeds from the Divinity; for the Divinity is ſuch, that it merits the Dominion of all. Man they affirmed to be, rightly ſpeaking,

[b] Cic. Off. 1. [c] Strom. 4. [d] Laert. 8. 10. [e] Jamb. c. 18.

ſpeaking, a Creature reproachful and fickle, as to his Appetites, Affections, and other Paſſions; he therefore hath need of ſuch Government and Guidance, from which proceeds Moderation and Order. Now they conceived, that every one being conſcious of the Fickleneſs of his own Nature, ſhould never be forgetful of Sanctity, and Service towards the Divinity; but always have (the Divinity) in their Mind, how it overlooks and obſerves human Life.

In fine, they ſay, that *Pythagoras* was an Imitator of the *Orphean* Conſtitutions, worſhipping the Gods after the manner of *Orpheus*, placed in brazen Images, not repreſenting the Forms of Men, but of the Gods themſelves, who comprehending and foreſeeing all things, reſemble in Nature and Form the whole. He declared their Purifications and Rites, which are called τελεται, having the moſt exact Knowledge of them.

Moreover they affirm, he made a Compoſition of the divine Philoſophy and Service; Part whereof he had learned from the *Orpheans*, Part from the *Egyptian* Prieſts; ſome from the *Chaldeans* and *Magi*; ſome from the *Eleuſinian* Rites, and thoſe in *Imber*, and *Samo-Thracia*, and *Delos*, and the *Celtæ*, and *Iberians*.

Amongſt the *Latins* alſo is read the ſacred Diſcourſe of *Pythagoras*; not to all, but to ſuch as are admitted to the Doctrine of excellent things, and are not addicted to ought that is diſhoneſt.

It preſcribes, that Men offer Libation thrice; and *Apollo* gives Oracles from a Tripod, becauſe Number firſt conſiſts in a Triad.

That we muſt ſacrifice to *Venus* on the ſixth Day, becauſe that is the firſt common Number of the Number of univerſal Nature. Now after all ways, the thing divided in like manner, aſſumes as well the Power of thoſe things which are taken away, as of thoſe which are left.

That to *Hercules* we ought to ſacrifice on the eighth Day of the Month, in reſpect of his being born at the End of ſeven Months.

It ſaith alſo, That we ought to enter into a Temple having a pure Garment, and in which none hath ſlept the Sleep of Slothfulneſs; black and ruſſet, teſtifying Purity in Ratiocinations of Equality and Juſtice.

It commanded, that if Blood be ſhed unwillingly in a Temple, that it be either taken up in a Diſh, or ſcatter'd into the Sea; for that is the firſt Element, and moſt eſtimable of all Creatures.

It ſaith likewiſe, that a Woman ought not to be brought to-bed in a Temple, for it is religious; that the Divinity of the Soul ſhould be annected to the Body in a Temple.

It commanded, that upon holy Days we cut not our Hair, nor pare our Nails; intimating, that the Increaſe of our Goods ought not to be preferr'd before the Empire of the Gods.

That we muſt not kill a Flea in the Temple, becauſe to the Deity we ought not to offer any ſuperfluous things, or Vermine; but that the Gods are to be worſhipped with Cedar, Laurel, Cypreſs, and Myrtle, &c.

[f] He ſaid, *Piety and Religion are chiefly converſant in our Minds, at ſuch time as we attend the divine Rites.*

[g] *That the Gods and Heroes are not to be worſhipped with equal Honours; but that the Gods muſt always be worſhipped with Applauſe,* (or Silence at the Celebration of their Rites) *we being white and pure; Heroes, only from Noon.* [h] He adviſed, that ſuch as ſacrifice ſhould preſent themſelves to the Gods, not in rich, but in white and clean Garments; and that not only the Body be clear from all Blemiſh, but that they bring alſo a pure Mind.] *Purity is acquir'd by Expiations, and Bathings, and Sprinklings; and by refraining from Murther, and Adultery, and all Pollution; and by abſtaining from the Fleſh of things that die of themſelves, and from Mullets, and Melanures, and Sheep, and oviparous Creatures, and Beans, and all other things which are commanded by thoſe who have the Care of ſacred Rites.*

[i] *He permitted not, that any ſhould pray for himſelf, becauſe none knoweth what is good for himſelf.*

[k] *An Oath is juſt, and therefore* Jupiter *is ſirnamed* Ὅρκιος. [l] He commanded his Diſciples to be very backward in taking an Oath; but that when they have taken it, they ſhould be very forward and diligent to keep it.

CHAP. IV.

Piety to the Dead.

PIety to the Dead was a Part, not the leaſt, of the *Pythagorick* Doctrine: Whence * *Cicero* ſpeaking of the Immortality of the Soul; *More prevalent with me,* ſaith he, *is the Authority of the Ancients, or our Anceſtors, who afforded the Dead ſo religious Rites; which certainly they had not done, if they had conceived that nothing pertains to them; or of thoſe who were in this Country, and inſtructed* Magna Græcia, *which now is aboliſh'd, but then flouriſh'd, with their Inſtitutions and Precepts.*

[m] *Pythagoras* allow'd not the Bodies of the Dead to be burned; herein imitating the Magi, as not willing that any Mortal ſhould participate of divine Honour. The *Pythagorick* Cuſtom, as deſcribed by [n] *Pliny*, was, to put the Dead into earthen Barrels, amongſt Leaves of Myrtle, Olive, and black Poplar.

To

[f] Cic. Leg. 2. excerpt. Valeſ. ibid. [g] Laert. 8. 35. * De Amicitiâ. [h] Diodor. excerpt. Valeſ. p. 247. [m] Jamb. c. 28. [i] Laert. 8. 35. [n] Lib. 35. 5. [k] Ibid. 8. 9. [l] Diod.

[o] To accompany the Dead at Funerals in white Garments, he conceiv'd to be pious; alluding to the ſimple and firſt Nature, according to Number, and the Principle of all things.

[p] The *Crotonians* delighting to bury their Dead ſumptuouſly, one of the *Pythagoreans* told them, he heard *Pythagoras* diſcourſing of divine Things, thus: The celeſtial Gods reſpect the Affections of the Sacrificers, not the Greatneſs of the Sacrifice. On the contrary, the terreſtrial Gods, as to whoſe Share the leſſer things belong, delight in Banquets, and Mournings, and funeral Libations, and coſtly Sacrifices; whence *Hades* (the Inferi) from its making Choice of Entertainment, is named *Pluto*; thoſe who pay Honours to him moſt ſparingly, he permitted to continue longeſt in the upper World; but of thoſe who are exceſſive in Mourning, he bringeth down ever and anon one, that thereby he may receive the Honours which are paid in Memory of the dead. By this Diſcourſe he wrought a Belief in his Auditors, that they who do all Things moderately upon ſuch adverſe Occaſions, further their own Safety; but as for thoſe who beſtow exceſſive Charge, they will all die untimely.

[q] *They forbore to make Tombs of Cypreſs, foraſmuch as* Jupiter's *Scepter was of that Wood; as* Hermippus, *in his ſecond Book of* Pythagoras, *affirms.*

CHAP. V.

Reverence of Parents, and Obedience to the Law.

[r] *NExt to Gods and Dæmons, we ought to reverence Parents and the Law, and to render ourſelves obedient to them, not feignedly, but really.* Or, as [s] *Porphyrius, He commanded to think and to ſpeak reverently of Gods and Dæmons, to be kind to Parents and Benefactors, and to obey the Law.*

They held (ſaith [t] *Jamblichus*) that we ought to believe, there is no greater Ill than Anarchy; for a Man cannot be ſafe where there is no Governor. They held alſo, that we ought to perſevere in the Cuſtoms and Rites of our own Country, though they be worſe than thoſe of other Countries. To revolt eaſily from ſettled Laws, and to be ſtudious of Novelty, they conceived to be neither advantageous nor ſafe.

[v] Seeing that Contumelies, Pride, and Contempt of Law, often tranſport Men to unjuſt Actions, he daily exhorted, [w] *that the Law ſhould be aſſiſted, and Injuſtice oppoſed.* To which End he alledged this Diſtinction: The firſt of Ills, which inſinuateth into Houſes and Cities, is *Pride*; the ſecond, *Contumely*; the third, *Deſtruction.* Every one therefore ought to expel and extirpate Pride, accuſtoming themſelves from their Youth to a temperate maſculine Life, and to be free from ſlanderous Repining, contentious Reproaching, and hateful Scurrility.

[x] *Wickedneſs diſobeys the Divine Law, and therefore tranſgreſſeth.*

[y] *A wicked Man ſuffers more Torment in his own Conſcience, than he who is puniſhed in Body and whipped.*

CHAP. VI.

Law-making.

MOreover, (ſaith [z] *Jamblichus*) *he conſtituted another excellent Kind of Juſtice, the Legiſlative Part, which commandeth that which ought to be done, and forbiddeth that which ought not to be done; which is better than the Judicative Part; for this reſembles that Part of Medicine which cureth the Sick, but the other ſuffers them not to fall ſick, but takes care afar off of the Health of the Soul.*

[a] *Varro* affirms, that *Pythagoras deliver'd this Diſcipline (of governing States) to his Auditors laſt of all, when they were now learned, now wiſe, now happy; for he ſaw ſo many rough Waves therein, that he would not commit it, but to ſuch a one as was able to ſhun the Rocks; or, if all fail'd, might ſtand himſelf as a Rock amidſt thoſe Waves.*

[b] *They who puniſh not ill Perſons, would have the Good injur'd.*

SECT. III.

Theoretick Philoſophy, its Parts; and firſt of the Science concerning Intelligibles.

WE come next to the Theoretick Part, to which more particularly belongs that Saying of *Pythagoras, That by Philoſophy he had this Advantage, to admire nothing; for philoſophical Diſcourſe takes away Wonder, which ariſeth from Doubt and Ignorance, by Knowledge and Examination of the Facility of every thing.*

Theoretick Philoſophy ſeems to have been divided by the *Pythagoreans* into two Parts: *They firſt* (ſaith [c] *Jamblichus*) *deliver'd the Science of Intelligibles, and the Gods; next which, they taught all Phyſick.* To the Science of Intelligibles belong theſe Heads, wherewith [d] *Jamblichus* begins his Recapitulation, *Of the Gods, of Heroes, of Dæmons.*

CHAP.

[o] Jamb. c. 28. [p] Ibid. c. 37. [q] Laert. 8. 10. [r] Jamb. c. 30. [s] Pag. 197. [t] Loco cit. [v] Jamb. c. 30. p. 153. [w] Mention'd by Laertius, 8. 23. [x] Stob. ſerm. 2. [y] Ibid. 25. [z] Cap. 30. [a] D. Auguſtin. de Ordine, c. 2. [b] Stob. ſerm. 44. [c] Cap. 6. [d] Ibid.

CHAP. I.

Of the Supreme God.

Pythagoras defined what God is, thus: [e] *A Mind which commeateth, and is diffused through every Part of the World, and through all Nature; from whom all Animals that are produced receive Life.*

[f] God is one. He is not (as some conceive) out of the World, but entire within himself, in a compleat Circle surveying all Generations. He is the Temperament of all Ages, the Agent of his own Powers and Works, the Principle of all things, one, in Heaven luminary, and Father of all things; Mind and Animation of the whole, the Motion of all Circles.

[g] God (as *Pythagoras* learned of the Magi, who term him *Oromasdes)* in his Body resembles Light, in his Soul, Truth.

[h] He said, that God only is wise.

[i] He conceived that the first (Being) God, is neither sensible, nor passible; but invisible, and intelligible.

CHAP. II.

Of Gods, Dæmons, Heroes.

NEXT to the supreme God, there are three Kinds of Intelligibles, *Gods, Dæmons, Heroes*; that *Pythagoras* thus distinguished them, is manifest from his [k] Precept, that *We must in Worship prefer Gods before Dæmons, Heroes before Men:* But in [l] *Jamblichus*, he seems either to observe a different Method, or to confound the Terms; teaching first of *Gods*, then of *Heroes*, last of *Dæmons:* which Order perhaps is the same with that of the *golden Verses*;

First, as decreed, th'immortal Gods adore:
Thy Oath keep: next great Heroes, then implore
Terrestrial Dæmons with due Sacrifice.

By *Terrestrial Dæmons* seems to be understood (not Princes, as *Hierocles*; but) the Dæmons themselves, confin'd to several Offices upon Earth: For,

[m] All the Air is full of Souls, which are esteemed Dæmons and Heroes: from these are sent to Men Dreams and Presages of Sickness, and of Health; and not only to Men, but to Sheep also, and to other Cattle; and to these pertain Expiations and Averruncations, and all Divinations, Cledones, and the like.

CHAP. III.

Of Fate and Fortune.

[n] ALL the Parts of the World above the Moon are govern'd according to Providence, and firm Order, and εἱμαρμένη, the Decree of God, which they follow; but those beneath the Moon by four Causes, by God, by Fate, by our Election, by Fortune. For Instance: To go aboard into a Ship, or not, is in our Power: Storms and Tempests to arise out of a Calm, is by Fortune; for the Ship being under Water to be preserved, is by the Providence of God. Of Fate, there are many Manners and Differences: It differs from Fortune, as having a Determination, Order, and Consequence; but Fortune is spontaneous and casual; as to proceed from a Boy to a Youth, and orderly to pass through the other Degrees of Age, happens by one manner of Fate. [Here the Text seems deficient.]

[o] Man is of Affinity with the Gods, by reason that he participates of Heat; wherefore God hath a providential Care of us. There is also εἱμαρμένη, a Fate of all things in general, and in particular the Cause of their Administration.

CHAP. IV.

Divination.

FOrasmuch as by Dæmons and Heroes, all Divination is convey'd to Men, we shall here add what *Pythagoras* held and practised therein. *Jamblichus* saith, that [p] *he honoured Divination not the least of the Sciences*; [q] for what things are agreeable to God cannot be known, unless a Man hear God himself, or the Gods, or acquire it by divine Art. For this reason they diligently studied Divination, as being the only Interpretation of the Benevolence of the Gods. It is likewise an Employment most suitable to those who believe there are Gods: but whoever thinks either (Belief of the Gods, or Divination) a Folly, to him the other is such also.

[r] Pythagoras *approved all Kinds of Divination, except that which is performed by the Sacrifice of living Creatures.*

[s] *He first used Divination by Frankincense.* [t] This was the only Burnt-offering by which he divined.

[v] *He also used Divination by Cledones, and by Birds*; which *Cicero* confirms, saying, that [w] *he would himself be an* Augur; and that [x] *the* Pythagoreans *observed not only the Voices of the Gods, but of Men also, which they call Omens. Cledones* are Observations of occurrent

[e] Lactant. Inst. l. 5. [f] Just. Mart. Serm. Protr. [g] Porph. vit. Pyth. [h] Clem. Alex. Strom. 4. [i] Plut. in Numa. [k] Laert. 8. 28. [l] Cap. 6. [m] Laert. 8. 32. [n] Anon. apud Phot. [o] Laert. ibid. [p] Cap. 29. [q] Jamb. c. 28. [r] Plut. Plac. Phil. lib. 9. [s] Porph. p. 185. [t] Laert. 8. 20. [v] Laert. ibid. [w] Cic. divinat. 1. 3. [x] Cic. ibid.

rent Speeches, collecting from what is accidentally said upon some other Occasion, the Effect of what is sought: An Instance whereof see in the Epigram of *Callimachus* upon [y] *Pittacus*.

The Interpretation of Dreams, (*Porphyrius* [z] saith) *he learned of the Hebrews*: He communicated it also to his Disciples; for *Jamblichus* relates, *he used Means to procure them quiet Sleeps, with good and prophetick Dreams*: Out of this respect some conceive it was, that he forbad flatulent and gross Meats, for that they obstruct the Serenity which is requisite thereto. Such Apparitions he held not to be fantastick, but real, [a] (not ὄναρ but ὕπαρ) as is manifest from one who *told him, that he dreamed he had talked with his Father* (*who was dead*), *and asked him what it portended*; *Nothing*, (saith he) *for you did really talk with him*; *as my speaking now to you portends nothing, no more did that*.

[b] He was skilful likewise in Judicial Astrology, if we credit *Apuleius*, who affirms, *the* Chaldæans *shewed him the Science of the Stars, the Number of the Planets, their Stations, Revolutions, and the various Effects of both in the Nativities of Men*.

[c] *Varro* relates him skilful in *Hydromancy*, which (saith he) *came from* Persia, *and was practised by* Numa, *and afterwards by* Pythagoras; *wherein they used Blood, and Invocation of Dæmons*. Hither perhaps alludes *Eustathius*, who saith, *the Pythagoreans affirm, that all Brass doth sound by some divine Spirit, for which Reason a Tripod of that Metal is dedicated to* Apollo; *and when the Winds are all laid, the Air calm, and all Things else quiet, yet the hollow Brass Caldrons seem to quake*: The same may be the Meaning of [d] *Pythagoras*, when he saith, *Sound which is made by Brass, is the Voice of the Dæmon inclosed in the Brass*; reading (perhaps) ἐναπειλημμένου, for so *Psellus* describes a kind of Hydromancy practised by the *Assyrians*; *They take a Bason full of Water convenient for the Dæmons to glide into the Bottom*; *the Bason of Water seems to make a Noise as if it breath'd*; *the Water in the Bason, in Substance, differs nothing from other Water, but through the Virtue infused thereinto by Charms is much more excellent, and made more ready to receive a prophetick Spirit. This is a particular Dæmon, Terrestrial, attracted by Compositions*; *as soon as he glideth into the Water, he maketh a little Sound inarticulate, which denotes his Presence*; *afterwards the Water running over, there are certain Whispers heard with some Prediction of the Future: This Kind of Spirit is very wandring, because it is of the Solar Order*; *and this Kind of Dæmons purposely speak with a low Voice, that by reason of the indistinct Obscurity of the Voice, their Lies may be less subject to Discovery*. Hitherto *Psellus*.

SECT. IV.

Physick.

THE general Heads of Physick are these, *Of the World, and of all Things in the World*; *of Heaven and of Earth, and of the Natures betwixt them* [e]. The Defect of the Fragments concerning these we shall endeavour to supply, by adding the Treatise of *Timæus* the Locrian upon the same Subject.

CHAP. I.

Principles.

THE most learned of the Naturalists (saith *Sextus* [f] *Empericus*) attributed so great Power to Numbers, that they thought them to be the Principles and Elements of all Things. These were the Disciples of *Pythagoras*: For, say they, such as treat of Philosophy aright, imitate those who study a Language; they first examine Words, because Language consists of Words; then, because Words consist of Syllables, they first consider Syllables; and because Syllables consist of Letters, they first examine Letters. In like manner, say the *Pythagoreans*, Natural Philosophers, when they make enquiry into the Universe, must first examine into what the Universe is resolved.

Now to affirm that something apparent to Sense is the Principle of all Things, is repugnant to Physick; for whatsoever is apparent to Sense, must be compounded of Things not apparent; whereas a Principle is not that which consists of any thing, but that of which the Thing consists. Therefore Things apparent cannot be said to be Principles of the Universe, but those of which Things apparent consist, themselves not being apparent.

They who maintain Atoms, or Homoiomeria's, or Bulks, or intelligible Bodies, to be the Principles of all Things, were partly in the right, partly not: As conceiving the Principles to be unapparent, they are in the right; as holding them to be corporeal, they err. For as intelligible unapparent Bodies precede the sensible, so most incorporeals precede intelligible Bodies. The Elements of Words, are not Words; nor of Bodies, Bodies: but they must either be Bodies, or Incorporeal, therefore they are wholly Incorporeal. Neither can we say, that Atoms are eternal, and therefore, tho' corporeal, the Principles of all Things; for first, they who assert Homoiomeria's, and Bulks, and Leasts, and Indivisibles, to be Elements, conceive their Substance eternal, so as in that respect, Atoms are no more Elements

[y] Life of *Pittacus*, c. 2. p. 180. [z] Cap. 15. [a] Jambl. c. 27. [b] Florid. l. 1. [c] August. civ. Dei, l. 8. In Iliad. π.
[d] Porph. p. 199. [e] Jambl. c. 6. [f] Adv. Math. l. 9.

than they. Again, though it were granted, that Atoms were eternal; yet, as they who conceive the World to be unbegotten, and eternal, enquire, by an imaginary way, the Principles whereof it firſt conſiſts; ſo we (ſay the *Pythagoreans*) treating of Phyſick, conſider in an imaginary way, of what Things theſe eternal Bodies, comprehenſible only by Reaſon, conſiſt. Thus the Univerſe conſiſts either of Bodies or Incorporeals; we cannot ſay Bodies, for then we muſt aſſign other Bodies whereof they conſiſt; and ſo proceeding to infinite, we ſhall remain without a Principle. It reſts therefore to affirm, that intelligible Bodies conſiſt of Incorporeals, which *Epicurus* confeſſeth, ſaying, By Collection of Figure, and Magnitude, and Reſiſtance, and Gravity, is underſtood a Body.

Yet it is not neceſſary, that all Corporeals preexiſtent to Bodies, be the Elements and firſt Principles of Beings. Idea's (according to *Plato*) are Incorporeals, pre-exiſtent to Bodies, and all generated Beings have reference to them; yet they are not the Principles of Being; for every Idea, ſingly taken, is ſaid to be one; when we comprehend others with it, they are two, or three, or four. Number therefore is tranſcendent to their Subſtance, by Participation whereof, one, two, or more, are predicated of them. Again, ſolid Figures are conceived in the Mind before Bodies, as having an incorporeal Nature; yet they are not the Principles. Superficies precede them in our Imagination, for Solids conſiſt of Superficies. But neither are Superficies the Elements of Beings, for they conſiſt of Lines; Lines preecede them; Numbers precede Lines. That which conſiſts of three Lines, is called a Triangle; that which of four, a Quadrangle. Even Line itſelf, ſimply taken, is not conceived without Number; but being carried on from one Point to another, is conceived in two. As to Numbers, they all fall under the Monad; for the Duad is one Duad, the Triad one Triad, and the Decad one Summary of Number.

This moved *Pythagoras* to ſay, That the Principle of all Things is the Monad; by Participation hereof, every Being is termed One; and when we reflect on a Being in its Identity, we conſider a Monad; but when it receives Addition by Alterity, it produceth indeterminate Duad, ſo called, in Diſtinction from the arithmetical determinate Duads; by Participation whereof all Duads are underſtood, as Monads by the Monad. Thus there are two Principles of Beings, the firſt Monad, and the indeterminate Duad.

That theſe are indeed the Principles of all Things, the *Pythagoreans* teach variouſly. Of Beings, (ſay they) ſome are underſtood by Difference, others by Contrariety, others by Relation. *By Difference*, are thoſe which are conſidered by themſelves, ſubjected by their proper Circumſcription; as, a Man, a Horſe, a Plant, Earth, Water, Air, Fire; each of theſe is conſidered abſolutely without any. *By Contrariety*, are thoſe which are conſidered by Contrariety of one to the other, as good and ill; juſt, unjuſt; profitable, unprofitable; ſacred, profane; pious, impious; moving, fixt; and the like. *By Relation*, thoſe which are conſidered by Relation to others; as, right, left; upwards, downwards; double, half. For right is underſtood by a relative Habit to left, and left by a relative Habit to right; upwards to downwards, and downwards to upwards; and ſo of the reſt. Thoſe which are underſtood by Contrariety, differ from thoſe that are underſtood by Relation. In Contraries, the Corruption of the one is the Generation of another; as, of Health, Sickneſs, Motion, and Reſt. The Induction of Sickneſs is Expulſion of Health, and the Induction of Health is the Expulſion of Sickneſs; the ſame in Grief and Joy, Good and Ill, and all Things of contrary Natures. But the Relative exiſt together and periſh together; for right is nothing unleſs there be left; double is nothing unleſs we underſtand the half whereof it is the double: Moreover, in Contraries there is no Mean, as between Health and Sickneſs, Life and Death, Motion and Reſt. But betwixt Relatives there is a Mean; as betwixt greater and leſſer, the Mean is equal; betwixt too much and too little, ſufficient; betwixt too flat and too ſharp, concord.

Above theſe three Kinds, Abſolute, Contrary, Relative, there muſt neceſſarily be ſome ſupreme Genus; every Genus is before the Species which are under it. For if the Genus be taken away, the Species are taken away alſo; but the Removal of the Species takes not away the Genus, the Species depending on the Genus, not the Genus on the Species. The tranſcending Genus of thoſe Things which are underſtood by themſelves, (according to the *Pythagoreans*) is the *One*; as that exiſts and is conſidered abſolutely, ſo they. Of Contraries, equal and unequal holds the Place of a Genus, for in them is conſidered the Nature of all Contrarieties; as of Reſt in Equality, it admits not Intenſion and Remiſſion; of Motion Inequality, it admits Intenſion and Remiſſion. In like manner, natural Inequality, it is the inſtable Extremity; preternatural Inequality, it admits Intenſion and Remiſſion. The ſame of Health and Sickneſs, Straightneſs and Crookedneſs. The Relative conſiſts of Exceſs and Defect, as their Genus; great and greater, much and more, high and higher, are underſtood by Exceſs; little and leſs, low and lower, by Defect.

Now foraſmuch as Abſolutes, Contraries and Relatives, appear to be ſubordinate to other Genus's, (that is, to One, to Equality, and to Inequality, to Exceſs and Defect) let us examine, whether thoſe Genus's may be reduc'd to others. Equality is reducible to One, for one is equal in itſelf; Inequality is either in Exceſs or Defect; of Unequals, one exceeds, the other is deficient: Exceſs and Defect are reducible to the indeterminate Duad; or the firſt

Exceſs and Defect is in two, in the excellent and the deficient. Thus the Principles of all Things appear in the Top above all the reſt, the firſt Monad, and the indeterminate Duad.

Of theſe is generated the Arithmetical Monad and Duad; from the firſt Monad, one; from the Monad and the indeterminate Duad, two, the Duad being not yet conſtituted amongſt Numbers; neither was here two, before it was taken out of the indeterminate Duad, of which, together with the Monad, was produced the Duad, which is in Numbers. Out of theſe, in the ſame manner proceeded the reſt of the Numbers, one continually ſtepping forward, the indeterminate Duad generating two, and extending Numbers to an infinite Multitude.

Hereupon they affirm, that, in Principles, Monad hath the Nature of the efficient Cauſe, Duad of paſſive Matter; and after the ſame manner, as they produced Numbers, which conſiſts of them, they compoſed the World alſo, and all Things in it. A Point is correſpondent to the Monad; the Monad is indiviſible, ſo is the Point; the Monad is the Principle of Numbers, ſo is the Point of Lines. A Line is correſpondent to the Duad, both are conſidered by Tranſition. A Line is Length without Breadth, extended betwixt two Points. A Superficies correſponds to the Triad; beſides Length, whereby it was a Duad, it receives a third Diſtance, Breadth. Again, ſetting down three Points, two oppoſite, the third at the Juncture of the Lines made by the two, we repreſent a Superficies. The ſolid Figure and the Body, as a Pyramid, anſwer the Tetrad; if we lay down, as before, three Points, and ſet over them another Point, behold the pyramidical Form of a ſolid Body, which hath three Dimenſions, Length, Breadth, Thickneſs.

Some there are who affirm, that a Body conſiſts of one Point, the Point by Fluxion makes a Line, the Line by Fluxion makes a Superficies, the Superficies moved to Thickneſs makes a Body, three ways dimenſurable. This Sect of the *Pythagoreans* differ from the former; they held, that of two Principles, the Monad and the Duad were made Numbers, of Numbers were made Points, Lines, Superficies, and Solids: Theſe, that all Things come from one Point, for of it is made a Line, of the Line a Superficies, of the Superficies a Body.

Thus are ſolid Bodies produc'd of Numbers precedent to them. Moreover, of them conſiſt Solids, Fire, Water, Air, Earth, and in a word, the whole World, which is governed according to Harmony, as they affirm again, recurring to Numbers, which comprize the Proportions that conſtitute perfect Harmony. [a] Harmony is a Syſtem conſiſting of three Concords, the Diateſſeron, the Diapente, the Diapaſon; the Proportions of theſe three Concords are found in the firſt four Numbers, one, two, three, four. The Diateſſeron conſiſts in a Seſquitertia Proportion. The Diapaſon in Seſquialtera, the Diapente in Duple; four being Seſquitertius to three, (as conſiſting of three and one third) hath a Diateſſeron Proportion; three being Seſquialter to two (as containing two and its half) a Diapente; four being the double of the Monad of two, a Diapaſon. The Tetractys affording the Analogy of theſe Concords, which make perfect Harmony, according to which all Things are governed, they ſtil'd it,

The Root and Fountain of eternal Nature.

Moreover, whatſoever is comprehended by Man, (ſay they) either is a Body, or Incorporeal; but neither of theſe is comprehended without the Notion of Numbers: A Body, having a triple Dimenſion, denotes the Number three. Beſides, of Bodies, ſome are by Connexion, as Ships, Chains, Buildings; others by Union, compriz'd under one Habit, as Plants, Animals; others by Aggregation, as Armies, Herds. All theſe have Numbers, as conſiſting of Plurality. Moreover, of Bodies, ſome have ſimple Qualities, others multiplicious, as an Apple, various Colour to the Sight, Juice to the Taſte, Odour to the Smell; theſe alſo are of the Nature of Numbers. It is the ſame of Incorporeals; Time, an Incorporeal, is comprehended by Number, Years, Months, Days, and Hours. The like of a Point, a Line, a Superficies, as we ſaid already.

Likewiſe to Numbers are correſpondent both Naturals and Artificials. We judge every thing by Criteries, which are the Meaſures of Numbers. If we take away Number, we take away the Cubit, which conſiſts of two half Cubits, ſix Palms, twenty four Digits; we take away the Buſhel, the Balance, and all other Criteries, which conſiſting of Plurality, are Kinds of Number. In a word, there is nothing in Life without it. All Art is a Collection of Comprehenſions. Collection implies Number; it is therefore rightly ſaid,

—To Numbers all Things Reference have.

that is, to dijudicative Reaſon, which is of the ſame Kind with Numbers, whereof all conſiſts. Hitherto *Sextus*.

[b] The Sum of all (as by *Alexander* in his Succeſſions, extracted out of the *Pythagorick* Commentaries) is this: *The Monad is the Principle of all Things. From the Monad came the indeterminate Duad, as Matter ſubjected to the Cauſe, Monad; from the Monad and the indeterminate Duad, Numbers; from Numbers,*

[a] Sext. Emp. adverſ. Mathem. l. 7. [b] Laert. 8. 25.

Numbers, Points; from Points, Lines; from Lines, Superficies; from Superficies, Solids; from these, solid Bodies, whose Elements are four, Fire, Water, Air, Earth; of all which, transmutated, and totally changed, the World consists.

CHAP. II.

Of the World.

[a] THE World, or comprehension of all Things, *Pythagoras* called Κόσμον, from its Order and Beauty.

[b] The World was made by God, [c] in Thought, not in Time; [d] He gave it a beginning from Fire, and the fifth Element: for there are five figures of solid Bodies, which are termed mathematical. Earth was made of a Cube, Fire of a Pyramis, Air of an Octaedre, Water of an Icosiedre, the Sphere of the universe of a Dodecaedre. In these *Plato* followeth *Pythagoras*.

[e] The World is corruptible in its own Nature, for it is sensible and corporeal; but it shall never be corrupted, by reason of the Providence and Preservation of God. [f] Fate is the cause of the order of the Universe, and all Particulars; [g] Necessity encompasseth the World.

[h] The World is animate, intelligible, spherical, enclosing the Earth in the midst of it.

[i] The *Pythagoreans* affirm, That what is without Heaven is infinite; for [k] beyond the World there is a Vacuum, into which, and out of which, the World respires.

[l] The right side of the World is the East, whence Motion begins; the left is the West.

CHAP. III.

Of the Superior or Ætherial Parts of the World.

[m] PYthagoras *first called* Heaven Κόσμος, *as being perfect in all kinds of Animals, and adorned with all kinds of Pulchritude.*

[n] *In the fixed Sphere resides the first Cause; whatsoever is next him, that they affirm to be best, and firmly compounded and ordered; that which is furthest from him, the worst. There is a constant Order observed as low as the Moon, but all things beneath the Moon are moved promiscuously.* For,

[o] *The Air which is diffused about the Earth, is unmoved and unwholsome, and all Things that are in it are mortal; but the Air which is above is perpetually in motion, and pure, and healthful; and all that are in it are immortal, and consequently divine.* [p] This they call, *The Free Æther*, (immediately above the Moon:) *Æther, as being void of Matter, and an eternal Body; Free, as not being obnoxious to material Disturbances.* Hence it followeth, that

The Sun, Moon, and the rest of the Stars, according to Pythagoras, *are Gods.*

The *Pythagoreans* held, that every Star is a World in the infinite Æther, which containeth Earth, Air, and Æther. This Opinion was also held by the Followers of *Orpheus*, that every Star is a World.

[q] The Sun is spherical, eclipsed by the Moon's coming under him.

[r] The body of the Moon is of a fiery Nature; she receives her Light from the Sun. [s] The eclipse of the Moon is a reverberation or obstruction from the Antichthon.

[t] The *Pythagoreans* affirm, that the Moon seems earthly, because she is round about inhabited as our Earth; but the Creatures are larger and fairer, exceeding us in bigness fifteen times, neither have they any Excrements; and their Day is so much longer.

[v] *Some of the* Pythagoreans *affirm, that a Comet is one of the Planets, but appears not in Heaven but after a long time, and is near the Sun, as it happens also to* Mercury; *for, because it recedes but little from the Sun, often when it should appear it is hid, so as it appears not but after a long time.* Or, as ([w] *Plutarch* expresseth it,) *A Comet is one of those Stars which are not always apparent, but rise after a certain Period.*

[x] Others hold, that it is the reflection of our sight on the Sun, like Images in Glasses.

[y] The Rain-bow he asserted to be the splendor of the Sun.

SECT. IV.

Of the sublunary Parts of the World.

OF the inferior sublunary Parts of the World, the [z] anonymous *Pythagorean* placeth *first the sphere of Fire, than that of Air, next that of Water; last, that of Earth.*

[a] The Bodies of all the Elements are round, except that of Fire, which is conical.

[b] Below the Moon, all Things move disorderly; Evil therefore necessarily exists about the Region of the Earth; that being settled lowest as the basis of the World, the receptable of the lowest Things.

[c] The Air, which is diffused about the Earth, is unmoved and unwholsome, and all Things in it are mortal.

[d] There is Generation and Corruption; for Things are produced by Alteration, Mutation, and Resolution of the Elements. Motion is a difference, or alterity in matter.

[e] In the World there is equally proportioned Light and Darkness, and Heat and Cold, and Siccity and Humidity; which when they are exuberant, the excess of Heat causeth Summer; of Cold, Winter: when they are equal, then are the best Seasons of the Year; whereof that which is growing up is the

[a] Plut. plac. 2. 1. Stob. phys. 1. [b] Plut. pla. 2. 4. [c] Stob. ph. 1. 1. [d] Plut. pl. 2. 6. [e] Plut. pl. 2. 4.
[f] Laert. 8. 27. [g] Plut. plac. 1. 25. [h] Laert. ibid. [i] Arist. phys. 3. 4. [k] Plut. pl. c. 2. 9. [l] Plut. plac. 2.
[m] Anon. vit. [n] Anon. vit. [o] Laert. 8. 26. [p] Hierocl. in aut. carm. pag. 313. [q] Laert. 8. 27. [r] Plut. ibid.
[s] Plut. ibid. [t] Plut. ibid. [v] Aristot. Meteor. 1. 6. [w] Plac. 3. 2. [x] Plut. ibid. [y] Ælian. var. 4. 27.
[z] Apud. Phot. [a] Plut. plac. 1. 14. [b] Anon. apud Phot. [c] Laert. 8. 26. [d] Plut. plac. lib. c. 24. [e] Laert. ibid.

the Spring, healthful; that which is decaying is Autumn, unhealthful. Even of the Day, the Morning is growing up, the Evening decaying, and therefore more unwholsome.

CHAP. V.

Of Living and Animate Creatures.

[f] *There penetrates a Beam from the Sun, through the Æther, which is cold and dry; (they call the Air cold Æther, and the Sun and Humidity grofs Æther) this Beam penetrates to the Abyfs, and thereby all Things vivificate; all Things live in as much as they participate of Heat; (wherefore even Plants are ζῶα, living Creatures) but all Things have not Soul; the Soul is a portion of Æther of Heat and Cold, for it participates of cold Æther; the Soul differeth from Life. She is immortal, becauſe that from which ſhe is taken is immortal.* Thus *Alexander* in his Succeſſions, out of the Commentaries of the *Pythagoreans*.

CHAP. VI.

Of the Generation of Animate Creatures.

[g] *Animate Creatures are generated of one another by Seed, (but of Earth nothing can be generated.) Seed is a diſtillation from the Brain,* [of the foam of the moſt uſeful part of the Blood, the ſuperfluity of the Aliment, as Blood and Marrow] *which being injected,* τῇ μήτρᾳ, *purulent Matter, and Moiſture, and Blood, iſſue from the Brain, whereof Fleſh, Nerves, and Bones, and Hair, and the whole Body conſiſts:* [the Power of Seed is incorporeal as the motive Mind; but the effuſed Matter corporeal.] *From the Vapour comes the Soul and Senſe; it is firſt compacted and coagulated in* 40 *Days: and being perfected according to harmonical Proportions in* 7, 9 *or* 10 *Months (at the fartheſt) the Infant is brought forth, having all proportions of Life; of which (aptly connected according to the proportions of Harmony) it conſiſts; all Things happening to it at certain times.* Thus *Alexander*, out of the Pythagorick Commentaries. The Proportions themſelves are moſt exactly deliver'd by [h] *Cenſorinus*; thus.

Pythagoras ſaid, that generally there are two kinds of Births, one leſſer, of 7 Months; which comes into the World the 207 day after the Conception: the other greater, of 10 Months; which is brought forth in the 274 Day. The firſt and leſſer is chiefly contained in the number 6: For that which is conceived of the Seed, (as he ſaith) the 6 firſt Days, is a milky Subſtance; the next 8 Days, Bloody; which 8 with the 6 make the firſt concord, Diateſſaron: The third degree is of 9 Days; in which time it is made Fleſh; theſe to the firſt 6 are in ſeſquialtera Proportion, and make the ſecond concord, Diapente: then follow 12 Days more, in which the Body is fully formed; theſe to the ſame 6 conſiſt in duple Proportion, and make the Diateſſaron concord: Theſe four Numbers, 6, 8, 9, 12, added together make 35 Days. Nor without Reaſon is the number 6 the foundation of Generation, for the *Greeks* call it τελειον, we *perfect*; becauſe its three Parts, ½ and ⅓ and ¼ (that is, 1, 2, and 3.) perfect it; now as the beginnings of the Seed, and that milky foundation of Conception, is firſt compleated by this Number; ſo this beginning of the Man now formed, and as it were another foundation of Maturity, which is of 35 Days, being multiplied by 6, makes 220 Days, in which this Maturity is fulfilled.

The other (greater) Birth, is contained in the greater number 7. And as the beginning of the former is in 6 Days, after which the Seed is converted into Blood; ſo that of this is in 7. And as there the members of the Infant are formed; ſo here (about) 40. Theſe 40 Days being multiplied by the firſt 7, make 280 Days, that is, 40 Weeks: but foraſmuch as the Birth happens on the firſt day of the laſt Week, 6 Days are ſubſtracted, and the 274th obſerved.

[i] He held that *Mankind had ever been; and never had beginning.*

CHAP. VII.

The Soul, its Parts, and firſt of the irrational Part.

[k] THE Power of Number being greateſt in Nature, *Pythagoras* defined the Soul, [l] *A ſelf-moving Number.*

[m] Of the *Pythagoreans* ſome affirm, that the Soul is in the Motes in the Air; others, that it is that which moves thoſe Motes.

[n] The Soul is moſt generally divided into two Parts, rational, and irrational; but more eſpecially into three; for the irrational they divided into iraſcible and deſiderative. [o] Theſe are termed νοῦς, φρὴν, θυμὸς. Νοῦς and θυμὸς are in other living Creatures, φρὴν only in Man. [*Yet*]

[p] The Souls of all animate Creatures are rational, even of thoſe which we term irrational; but they act not according to Reaſon, becauſe of the ill temperament of the Body, and want of Speech, as in Apes and Dogs, λαλοῦσι μὲν γὰρ ἔτοι, οὐ φεύζουσι δὲ, *They talk but cannot ſpeak.*

The beginning of the Soul, is from the heat of the Brain; that part which is in the Heart is θυμὸς, but φρένες and νοῦς are in the Brain. The Senſes are diſtillations from theſe; the rational Part is immortal, the reſt mortal. The Soul is nouriſhed by Blood, and

[f] Laert. 8. 27. [g] Laert. 8. 78. [h] De die natal. cap. 11. [i] Varro de re ruſt. lib. 2. cap. 1. Cenſor de die nat. cap. 4. [k] Nemeſ. de nat. hom. [l] Plut. de Plac. Phil. 4. 2. [m] Ariſt. de anima 1. 2. [n] Plut. plac. 4. 4. [o] Laert. 8. 31. [p] Plut. plac. 20.

and the Faculties of the Soul are Spirits. Both the Soul and her Faculties are inviſible, for Æther is inviſible: The Fetters of the Soul are Veins, Arteries, and Nerves; but when ſhe is ſtrong, and compoſed within herſelf, her Fetters are Reaſons and Actions.

[q] Every Senſe is derived from its proper Element; ſight from Æther, hearing from Air, ſmelling from Fire, taſte from Water, touch from Earth.

Senſe in general, and particularly Sight, is a Vapour very hot; and for this Reaſon we are ſaid to ſee through Air, and through Water, for the Heat pierceth the Cold; for if that which is in the Eyes were a cold Vapour, it would fight with the Air, which is like it, (hot.) In ſome Places he calleth the Eyes the gates of the Sun; the ſame he determined concerning Hearing, and the reſt of the Senſes.

[r] Sight is the judge of Colours. [s] Colour they call the ſuperficies of a Body. The kinds of Colour are Black, White, Red, Pale; or, (as the anonymous Writer delivers the opinion of *Pythagoras*) ten, Black, White, and the reſt between them, Yellow, Tawney, Pale, Red, Blue, Green, Bright, Grey. [t] The differences of Colours are derived from mixtions of the Elements, and in living Creatures from variety of Place, and of Air.

[v] The Image in a mirrour is made by reflection of the Sight, which being extended to the [w] Braſs, and meeting with a thick ſmooth Body, is repercuſſed, and returns into itſelf; as when the Hand is ſtretch'd forth, and again brought back to the Shoulder.

[x] Hearing, is the judge of Voice, ſharp and flat. [y] Voice is incorporeal; for not Air, but the figure and ſuperficies of Air, by a ſtroke becomes Voice; but no ſuperficies is a Body. And tho' it followeth the motion of the Body, yet itſelf hath no Body; as when a Rod is bent, the Superficies ſuffers nothing, the Matter only is bent.

[z] Smelling judgeth of Odours, good and ill, and the ſix between them, putrid, humid, liquid, vaporate.

Taſte judgeth of Savours, Sweet, Bitter, and the five between them, for they are in all ſeven, Sweet, Bitter, Sharp, Acid, Freſh, Salt, Hot.

Touching judgeth many things, Heavy, Light, and thoſe that are between them; Hot, Cold, and thoſe that are between them; Hard, Soft, and thoſe that are between them; Dry, Moiſt, and thoſe that are between them. The other four Senſes are ſeated in the Head only, and confined to their proper Organs; but Touching is diffuſed through the Head, and the whole Body, and is common to every Senſe; but exhibits its Judgment moſt manifeſtly by the Hands.

CHAP. VIII.

Of the rational Part of the Soul, the Mind.

IN *Pythagoras* his definition of the Soul, *A ſelf-moving Number*, [a] *Plutarch* ſaith, *he takes Number for Mind*; [b] The Mind νοῦς, is induced into the Soul, *ab extrinſeco*, from without, [c] by divine Participation, θεία μέρα, [d] delibated of the univerſal divine Mind. For [e] there is a Soul intent and commeant through the whole Nature of Things, from which our Souls are pluck'd. [f] She is immortal, becauſe that from which ſhe is taken is immortal; yet not a God, but the work of the eternal God. Thus [g] *Pythagoras* exceedingly confirmed the opinion of his Maſter *Pherecides*, who firſt taught, that the Souls of Men are ſempiternal.

[h] Our Souls (ſaid he) conſiſt of a Tetrad, Mind, Science, Opinion, Senſe: From which proceeds all Art and Science, and by which we our ſelves are rational. The Mind therefore is a Monad, for the Mind conſidereth according to a Monad. As for Example; there are many Men; theſe one by one are incomprehenſible by Senſe, and innumerable; but we underſtand this one Man, to which none hath Reſemblance; and we underſtand one Horſe, for the Particulars are innumerable. Thus every *Genus* and *Species* is according to Monad, wherefore to every one in particular they apply this Definition, a rational Creature, or, a neighing Creature. Hence is the Mind a Monad, whereby we underſtand theſe Things. The indeterminate Duad is Science: for all Demonſtration, and all Belief of Science, and likewiſe all Syllogiſm from ſome Things granted, infers that which is doubted, and eaſily demonſtrateth another Thing, the comprehenſion whereof is Science, therefore it is as the Duad. Opinion is juſtly a Triad, being of many. Triad implies a multitude, as, *Thrice happy* Greeks——[*The reſt of the Text is wanting.*]

[i] The *Pythagoreans* aſſert eight Organs of Knowledge, Senſe, Phantaſie, Art, Opinion, Prudence, Science, Wiſdom, Mind. Of theſe, we have common with divine Natures, Art, Prudence, Science, Mind; with Beaſts, Senſe and Phantaſie; only Opinion is proper to us. *Senſe*, is a deceitful knowledge through the Body; *Phantaſie*, a motion in the Soul; *Art*, a habit of operating with Reaſon. We add, *with Reaſon*, for a Spider alſo operates, but without Reaſon. *Prudence*, is a habit elective of that which is right in Things to be done; *Science*, is a habit of thoſe Things which are always the ſame, and

[q] Stob. phyſ. 1. pag. 150. [r] Anon. Phot. [s] Plut. plac. 1. 15. for δαίδεια perhaps δίκα. [t] Plut. ibid. [v] Plut. plac. 4. 14. [w] Of which the Ancients made their Mirrours, ſee Callim. Hymn. 5. [x] Anon. Phot. [y] Plut. plac. 4. 20. [z] Anon. vit. [a] Plac. phil. 4. 2. [b] Stob. phyſ. 1. [c] Clem. Alex. ſtrom. 5. [d] Cic. de ſenect. [e] Cic. nat. deor. 1. [f] Laert. [g] Cicer. Tuſc. quæſt. 1. [h] Anon. [i] Anon. apud Phot. de vit. Pyth.

and in the same manner; *Wisdom*, a knowledge of the first Cause; *Mind*, the Principle and Fountain of all good Things.

CHAP. IX.

Of the Transmigration of the Soul.

WHat he delivered to his Auditors (saith [k] Porphyrius) *none can certainly affirm, for there was a great and strict Silence observed amongst them; but the most known are these: First, he said, that the Soul is immortal; then, that it enters into other kinds of living Creatures.* [Or, as *Laertius* expresseth it, *He first asserted, that the Soul passing through the circle of Necessity, lives at several times in different living Creatures.*] *Moreover, that after some Periods, the same Things that are now generated, are generated again, and that nothing is simply New; and that we ought to esteem all animate Creatures to be of the same kind with us. These Doctrines* Pythagoras *seems to have brought first into* Greece. [l] *Diodorus Siculus* affirms, he learn'd them of the *Ægyptians*: [m] *They were the first who asserted, that the Soul of Man is immortal, and the Body perishing; it always passeth into another Body; and when it hath run through all Things terrestrial, marine, volatile, it again entereth into some generated human Body. Which Circuition is compleated in three thousand Years. This Opinion* (adds *Herodotus*) *some of the* Greeks *have usurped as their own; some more ancient, others later, whose Names knowingly I omit.*

Pythagoras, (saith *Theodoret*) *Plato*, *Plotinus*, and the rest of that Sect, acknowledging Souls to be immortal, asserted, That they are præexistent to Bodies; that there is an innumerable company of Souls; that those which transgress, are sent down into Bodies, so as being purify'd by such Discipline, they may return to their own Place. That those which, whilst they are in Bodies, lead a wicked Life, are sent down farther into irrational Creatures, hereby to receive Punishment, and right Expiation; the angry and malicious into Serpents, the ravenous into Wolves, the audacious into Lions, the fraudulent into Foxes, and the like.

[n] Upon this Ground (as some conceive) it was, that he forbad to eat Flesh: for, [o] *We ought to esteem all animal Creatures to be of the same kind with us*, and [p] *to have common Right with us*, and [q] *to be allied (in a manner) to us.* Whence a Bean is by *Horace* stiled, *cognata Pythagoræ*, because he forbad it to be eaten upon the same Grounds; [r] *for that Men and Beans arose out of the same Putrefaction.*

This Assertion he defended by many Instances, particularly of himself. [s] *Heraclides* relates, that he said, *he had been in former times* Æthalides, *esteemed the Son of* Mercury, [a powerful Orator, who wrote two Treatises, the one mournful, the other pleasant; so that, like *Democritus* and *Heraclitus*, he bewailed and derided the instability of Life, and was said to die and live from Day to Day] *and that* Mercury *had him request whatsoever he would, Immortality only excepted. That he desired, that he might preserve the remembrance of all Actions, alive and dead: whereupon he remembred all Things whilst he lived, and after Death retained the same Memory. That afterwards he came to be* Euphorbus, *and was slain by* Menelaus. *Now* Euphorbus *said, that he had been in former times* Æthalides, *and that he had received this Gift from* Mercury, to know *the Migration of the Soul, as it past from one Body to another, and into what Plants and Animals it migrated, and what things his Soul suffered after Death, and what other Souls suffered.* Euphorbus *dying, his Soul passed into* Hermotimus, *who desiring to profess who he was, went to the* Branchidæ, *and coming into the Temple of* Apollo, *shewed the Shield which* Menelaus *had hung up there*, [but [u] *Porphyrius* and [w] *Jamblichus* affirm, it was dedicated (together with other *Trojan* Spoils) to Argive *Juno* in her Temple at *Mycenæ*] *for he said, That at his return from* Troy, *he had dedicated that Shield to* Apollo, *it being then old, and nothing remaining but the Ivory Stock. As soon as* Hermotimus *died, he became* Pyrrhus, *a Fisherman of* Delus; *and again remembred all Things, how he had been first* Æthalides, *then* Euphorbus, *then* Hermotimus, *and lastly* Pyrrhus. *When* Pyrrhus *died, he became* Pythagoras, *and remembred all that we have said.* Others relate, that he said, he had been, *first* Euphorbus; *secondly*, Æthalides; *thirdly*, Hermotimus; *fourthly*, Pyrrhus; *and lastly*, Pythagoras. [x] *Clearchus* and *Dicæarchus*, that *he had been first* Euphorbus; *then* Pyrander; *then* Calliclea; *then a beautiful Courtezan, named* Alce. [y] *For this Reason, of all* Homer's *Verses, he did especially praise these, and set them to the Harp, and often repeated them as his own Epicedium.*

As by some Hand, a tender Olive set
In a lone Place, near a smooth Rivulet;
Fair she shoots up, and fann'd on ev'ry Side
By amorous Winds, displays her blooming Pride;
Until some churlish unexpected Gust
Plows up her Root, and buries her in Dust.
So by *Alcides* slain, *Euphorbus* lay,
Stretch'd on the Ground, his Arms the Victor's (Prey.
Hence

[k] Pag. 188. [l] Cited by *Euseb.* præpar. Evan. 10. 8. 13. [m] Herodot. l. 2. [n] Anon. vit. [o] Porph. loc. cit. [p] Laert. 8. 13. [q] Jamb. c. 24. [r] Porph. p. 200. [s] Laert 8. 4. [t] Tzetz. Chil. 2. [u] Pag. 192. [w] Capi 14. [x] Agell. 4. 11. [y] Porph. p. 191. c. 14.

Hence in his Perſon, [t] *Ovid.*

"O you, whom Horrors of cold Death affright,
Why fear you *Styx?* Vain Names, and endleſs Night,
The Dreams of Poets, and feign'd Miſeries
Of forged Hell? Whether laſt Flames ſurprize,
Or Age devours your Bodies, they not grieve,
Nor ſuffer Pains. Our Souls for ever live:
Yet evermore their antient Houſes leave
To live in new, which them, as Gueſts receive.
In *Trojan* Wars, I (I remember well)
Euphorbus was, *Pantheus* Son, and fell
By *Menelaus* Lance: my Shield again
At *Argos* late I ſaw in *Juno*'s Fane.
All alter, nothing finally decays;
Hither and thither ſtill the Spirit ſtrays;
Gueſt to all Bodies; out of Beaſts it flies
To Men, from Men to Beaſts, and never dies.
As pliant Wax each new Impreſſion takes,
Fixt to no Form, but ſtill the old forſakes,
Yet is the ſame: So Souls the ſame abide,
Though various Species their Reception hide.
Then leſt thy greedy Belly ſhould deſtroy
(I propheſy) depreſſed Piety,
Forbear t'expulſe thy Kindreds Ghoſts with Food
By Death procur'd, nor nouriſh Blood with Blood.

Neither did he inſtance himſelf only, but [w] *put many others alſo in mind of the Accidents of their former Life, how they had lived, before their Souls were confined the ſecond time to the Body. This he did* (adds [x] *Porphyrius*) *to thoſe whoſe Souls were rightly purify'd; ſuch was* [y] Millias *of* Crotona, *whom he cauſed to call to Memory, that he had been* Midas *Son of* Gordias. *Whereupon* Millias *went to* Epire, *to perform ſome Funeral Rites, as he appointed.*

CHAP. X.

The ſeparate Life of the Soul.

THE [z] Soul hath a twofold Life, Separate, and in the Body; her Faculties are otherwiſe *in anima*, otherwiſe *in animali.*

[a] The Soul is incorruptible; for when it goes out of the Body, it goes to the Soul of the World, which is of the ſame Kind.

[b] When ſhe goeth out upon the Earth, ſhe walketh in the Air like a Body. *Mercury* is the Keeper of Souls, and for that Reaſon is called Πομπεὺς, and Πυλαῖος, and Χθόνιος, becauſe he brings Souls out of Bodies in the Earth and the Sea; of which, thoſe that are pure, he leadeth into an high Place; the impure come not to them, nor to one another, but are bound by the Furies in indiſſoluble Chains.

[c] The *Pythagoreans* affirmed, that *the Souls of the Dead neither caſt a Shadow nor Wink*; for that it is the Sun which cauſeth the Shadow: But he who enters there, is by the Law of the Place deprived of the Sun's Light, which they ſignify in that Speech.

[d] *Pythagoras* held, that *Earthquakes proceed from no other Cauſe but the Meeting of the Dead.*

SECT. V.

Medicine.

TO Phyſick we ſhall annex, as its immediate Conſequent, Medicine. *Apuleius* affirms, that *Pythagoras* learnt the Remedies and Cures of Diſeaſes of the *Chaldeans*. *Laertius* [e], that he neglected not Medicine. *Ælian* [f] that he ſtudied it accurately. *Jamblichus*, that the *Pythagoreans* eſteem it not the leaſt of the Sciences. Laſtly, *Diogenes* [g] relates of *Pythagoras*, that whenſoever his Friends fell into any Indiſpoſition of Body, he cured them.

* Health, *Pythagoras* defined, *The Conſiſtence of a Form.* Sickneſs, *The Violation of it.*

CHAP. I.

Diætetick.

OF *Medicine, the* [h] Pythagoreans *chiefly applied themſelves to the Diætetick Part, and were moſt exact in that; and endeavoured firſt to underſtand the Proportion, not only of Labour, but likewiſe of Food and Reſt. Then concerning the dreſſing of ſuch Meats, they were almoſt the firſt who endeavoured to comment and to define.*

[i] *Foraſmuch as Diet doth much conduce to good Inſtitution, being wholeſome and regular, let us examine what he decreed therein. Of Meats he abſolutely diſallowed ſuch as are flatulent, and diſorder the Body; on the contrary, he approved and commanded thoſe which confirm and unite the Conſtitution; whence he judged Millet to be a convenient Food.*

But he alſo wholly forbad ſuch Meats as are not uſed by the Gods, becauſe they ſeparate us from the Correſpondence which we have with them.

Likewiſe he adviſed to abſtain from ſuch Meats as are eſteemed ſacred, which deſerve a Reſpect, and are nothing convenient for the ordinary Uſe of Man.

Whatſoever

[t] Lib. 15. [u] Engliſhed by my Uncle, Mr. *Sandys*. [w] Porph. p. 191. Jambl. c. 14. [x] Pag. 201. [y] Jambl. c. 28. p. 132. See alſo *Ælian.* var. Hiſt. [z] Stob. Phyſ. p. 109. [a] Plut. plac. 4. 7. [b] Laert. 8. 39. [c] Plut. quæ græc. p. 2. [d] Ælian. var. Hiſt. 4. 26. [e] Laert. 8. 12. [f] Var. Hiſt. 9. 22. [g] Porph. c. 29. [h] Laert. 8. 35. [i] Jambl. c. 29. p. 163. [k] Jambl. c. 24.

Whatsoever Meats obstructed Divination, or were prejudicial to the Purity and Sanctity of the Mind, or to Temperance and habitual Virtue, he advised to shun: As also those which are contrary to Purity, and defile the Imaginations which occur in Sleep, and the other Purities of the Soul, he rejected and avoided.

These Rules concerning Diet he prescribed generally to [k] *all Persons, but more particularly to Philosophers, who* [l] *are most addicted to Contemplation of the sublimest Things. He denied at once all superfluous Meats as were unlawful to be eaten, not permitting them at any time to feed on that which had Life, or to drink Wine, or to sacrifice to the Gods any living Creature, or hurt any of them; but commanded, with all Exactness, to preserve the Justice which belongs even to them. In this manner he lived himself, abstaining from the Flesh of living Creatures, and worshipping unbloody Altars, and both taking care, that others should not put tame Beasts to Death, and himself making the savage tame, and moderating and instituting them both by Words and Actions; but by no means would punish or kill them.*

He likewise commanded civil Lawgivers to abstain from the Flesh of living Creatures, because it behoveth them who would make use of the Heighth of Justice, no way to injure living Creatures, which are of Affinity with us. For how can they persuade other Men to do just Things, who themselves are transported by Avarice to feed on living Creatures, which are of Affinity with us, allied, in a manner, to us, through the Community of Life, consisting of the Temperament and Commistion of the same Elements?

But to [m] *others, whose Life was not extraordinary pure, and sacred, and philosophical, he prescribed a certain Time for Abstinence. To those he decreed, That they should not eat the Heart: That they should not eat the Brain. And these are prohibited to all* Pythagoreans; *for they are Leaders, and, as it were, Seats and Houses of Wisdom and Life. But these were consecrated by the Nature of the divine Word.*

In like manner he prohibited Mallows, as being the first Messenger and Interpreter of Celestial Affections, and (as I may say) Compassions towards Men.

Likewise he commanded to abstain from the Melanure, [a Fish so called from the Blackness of its Tail] *because it is peculiar to the Terrestrial Deities.*

He forbad also the Erythrine, for the like Reasons.

Also to abstain from Beans, for many Reasons, divine and natural, referring to the Soul.

[n] The Pythagoreans at Dinner used Bread and Honey. Wine they drank not (betwixt Meals.) At Supper, Wine, and Maza, and Bread, and Broth, and Herbs, both raw and boil'ed. They likewise set before them the Flesh of sacrificed Beasts. They seldom eat Broths of Fish, because some of them are in some respects very hurtful, likewise (seldom) the Flesh of such Creatures as use not to hurt Mankind.

[o] *As concerning the Diet of* Pythagoras *himself, his Dinner consisted* [p] *of Honey-Combs, or Honey; his Supper of Bread made of Millet, and* [his Opsonium] *of boil'd or raw Sallads, very seldom of the Flesh of sacrificed Victims, and that not promiscuously of every Part,* [and seldom of Sea-fish.]

[q] *When he designed to go into the private Places of the Gods, and to stay there a while, he used for the most part such Meats as expelled Hunger and Thirst. For the expelling of Hunger, he made a Composition of the Seed of Poppy, and Sesame, and the Skin of the Sea-Onyon well wash'd, till it be quite drain'd of the outward Juice; of the Flowers of the Daffidil, and the Leaves of Mallows, of Paste of Barley and Peas; of all which taking an equal Weight, and chopping them small, he made up into a Mass with Hymettian Honey. Against Thirst, he took of the Seeds of Cucumbers, and the fullest dried Raisins, taking out the Kernels, and the Flower of Coriander, and the Seeds of Mallows, and Purslain, and scraped Cheese, Meal and Cream; these he made up with wild Honey. This Diet, he said, was taught to* Hercules, *by* Ceres, *when he was sent into the* Lybian *Desarts.*

CHAP. II.

Therapeutick.

THE Therapeutick Part *Pythagoras* practised by Cataplasms, Charms, and Musick.

[r] *The* Pythagoreans *(saith* Jamblichus*) treated chiefly of* Cataplasms; *but Potions they less esteemed. And of those they used only such as were proper against Ulcerations; but Incision, and Cauterising they absolutely disallow'd.*

Magical Herbs, saith [s] Pliny, *were first celebrated in our Part of the World by* Pythagoras, *following the* Magi. [t] He *first wrote a Treatise of their Virtues, assigning the Invention and Original to* Apollo *and* Æsculapius, *Immortal Gods.*

[u] *By* Coriacesia, *and* Callicia, Pythagoras *affirms, that Water will be turned into Ice; the mention whereof I find not, saith* Pliny, *in others; nor in him, any more concerning them.*

[w] *He likewise speaks of* Menias, *which he also calls by another Name,* Corinthas; *the Juice whereof boiled in Water,* he saith, *immediately cures the biting of Serpents, fomenting the Part therewith. The same Juice being spilt upon the Grass, they who tread upon*

[k] The Pythagorists. [l] Ibid. [m] Ibid. [n] Jambl. c. 21. Athem. deipn. 10. [o] Porph. p. 195. [p] So *Laertius* also, 8. 16. [q] Porph. p. 195. [r] Cap. 34. [s] Lib. 24. 2. [t] Plin. 25. 11. [u] Plin. 74. 17. [w] Plin. loc. cit.

it, or are beſprinkled therewith, die irrecoverably: a ſtrange Nature of Poiſon, except againſt Poiſon.

[z] *There is an Herb called* Aproxis, *by the ſame* Pythagoras, *the Root whereof takes Fire at diſtance, as* Naptha, *of which, ſaith* Pliny, *we have ſpoken in the Wonders of the Earth. The ſame* Pythagoras *relates, That if any Diſeaſe ſhould happen to Men when the* Aproxis *is in its Flower, although they be cured, yet ſhall they conſtantly have ſome grudging thereof as often as it blows; and Wheat, and Hemlock, and Violet, have the ſame Quality. I am not ignorant, adds* Pliny, *that this Book is by ſome aſcribed to* Cleemporus, *the Phyſician; but pertinacious Fame, and Antiquity, vindicate it to* Pythagoras.

[a] Pythagoras *the Philoſopher wrote alſo one Volume concerning the Sea-Onyon, collecting the medicinal Properties thereof,* which *Pliny* profeſſeth to have taken from him, *lib.* 20. And [b] again, he ſaith, *Pythagoras affirms, that a Sea-Onyon, hung over the Threſhold of the Gate, hinders all ill Medicaments from entring the Houſe.*

Likewiſe, *Coleworts* (as [c] *Pliny* relates) *were much commended by* Pythagoras. He adds, [d] that *concerning the white Kind of the Eringo, (by the* Romans *call'd,* Centum-capita) *there are many Vanities delivered, not only by the* Magi, *but by the* Pythagoreans.

Beſides the Pharmaceutick, *Pythagoras* practiſed two other Ways of Cure, one by Muſick, the other by Charm. Of the firſt we have already ſpoken. Of the ſecond thus [e] *Jamblichus: There is alſo a way without the ſinging of Birds, by which they expell'd ſome Paſſions and Sickneſſes,* (as they ſay) *indeed by Incantation; whence it ſeems was derived the Word* ἐπῳδὴ. *The Way of Cure by Charm,* ſaith [f] the *Greek* Etymologiſt, *was of antient Uſe;* whence *Homer:*

——— *And ſtaid the black Blood by a Charm.*

And Pindar, *ſpeaking of* Æſculapius, ἀμφέπων, *with ſoft Charms.*

That *Pythagoras* made uſe of *Epodes,* is alſo affirmed by [g] *Porphyrius. He allayed,* ſaith he, *the Paſſions of the Soul and Body by Rhythms, and Verſes, and Epodes.* And *Diogenes,* cited by the ſame *Porphyrius, if his Friends fell into any Indiſpoſition of Body, he healed them;* if they were troubled in Mind, he aſſuaged their Grief, as we ſaid, partly by Charms and Magick Verſes, partly by Muſick. For he had ſome Verſes proper to the Cure of the Indiſpoſitions of the Body, by ſinging which, he reſtored the Sick to their former Health: He had other Verſes that procured Forgetfulneſs of Grief, aſſwaged Anger, and ſuppreſſed inordinate Deſires.

Of theſe Charms we find an Inſtance preſerved by [h] *Pliny,* who preſcribes, as *an Invention of* Pythagoras, *which ſeldom fails againſt Lameneſs, or Blindneſs, or the like Accidents, to apply to the Part, if on the Right-ſide, an uneven Number of Vowels of impoſitive Words; if on the Left, an even.*

[z] Plin. loc. cit. [a] Plin. 19. 5. [b] Lib. 20. 9. [c] Lib. 20. c. 9. [d] Lib. 22. c. 9. [e] Cap. 3. [f] In ἐπῳδὴ. [g] Pag. 93. [h] Lib. 28. c. 4.

The Doctrine of *PYTHAGORAS.*

CHAP. I.

Pythagoras *his Symbolical Way of Teaching.*

PYTHAGORAS [a] *had a twofold Manner of teaching: Whatſoever he communicated to his Auditors, was delivered, either plainly or ſymbolically.* Hitherto of the plain Way. We come now to the other, the ſymbolical.

[b] *He uſed by ſhort Sentences to vaticinate an infinite multiplicious Signification to his Diſciples, after a ſymbolical manner: no otherwiſe than* Apollo *by ſhort Anſwers exhibits many imperceptible Sentences; and Nature herſelf, by ſmall Seeds, moſt difficult Effects. Of this kind is,*

——— half is the whole's Beginning.

An Apophthegm of Pythagoras *himſelf. Neither in that Hemiſtick only, but in others of the ſame Kind, the moſt divine* Pythagoras *wrapped up Sparks of Truth, for ſuch as could enkindle them, in a ſhort Way of Speech, treaſuring up concealed a moſt copious Production of Theory; as in this,*

——— to Number all have reference.

And again, φιλότης, ἰσότης, Friendſhip, Equality; and in the Word Κόσμος, (World, or Heaven) *and in the Word* Philoſophy, *and in* τῶν τεττάκτων, *and in that celebrious Word* Tetractys. *All theſe, and many more,*

[a] Porph. p. 197. [b] Jambl. c. 29. p. 161, &c.

more, did Pythagoras *invent, for the Benefit and Reſtification of ſuch as converſed with him.*

Some Things likewiſe (ſaith [c] *Porphyrius*) he ſpoke in a myſtical Way ſymbolically, moſt of which are collected by *Ariſtotle*; as when he called the Sea [d] *a tear of Saturn*; the two Bears, *the hands of Rhea*; the Pleiades, *the lutes of the Muſes*; the Planets, *the dogs of Proſerpina* [the [e] Eyes, *the gates of the Sun.*]

[f] He had alſo another kind of Symbols, as, *Go not over a Balance*; that is, *ſhun Avarice*, &c. Thus *Porphyrius*. Theſe are variouſly recited and interpreted by ſeveral Authors; we ſhall begin with *Jamblichus*, as being herein of greateſt Credit.

CHAP. II.

The Symbols of Pythagoras, *according to* Jamblichus.

[g] THE laſt way of Exhortation to Virtue, and Dehortation from Vice, is that by Symbols; one way being proper to the Sect, not communicable to other Inſtitutions; another vulgar and common to them; the third is betwixt both, neither abſolutely Publick, nor wholly *Pythagorical*, nor quite different from either; ſuch are thoſe which they term Symbols; of which, as many as deſerve Commemoration, in our Opinion, of the adhortatory Form, we ſhall communicate, and add a ſuitable Interpretation; conceiving that hereby, the Exhortation to Philoſophy may be more prevalent on thoſe that hear them, than if delivered more at large. And foraſmuch as we ſhall inſert ſome exoterick Solutions, common to all Philoſophy, it is to be underſtood, as different from the meaning of the *Pythagoreans*. But inaſmuch as we ſhall intermix ſome of the moſt particular Opinions of the *Pythagoreans*, conſonant to each; this is wholly proper to them, and diſſonant from all other Philoſophers, but moſt fit to be alledged. This will inſenſibly lead us from the exoterick Notions, bringing us to the others, and acquainting us with them. And to the Exhortations framed according to this Sect, as a Bridge or Ladder, by which we aſcend from a Depth to a great Height, guiding the Minds of thoſe who addict themſelves genuinely thereto. For to this End it was framed, according to imitation of the Things already mentioned. For the moſt ancient, and ſuch as were contemporary with, and Diſciples to *Pythagoras*, did not compoſe their Writings intelligible, in a common vulgar Style, familiar to every one, as if they endeavoured to dictate Things readily perceptible by the Hearer; but conſonant to the Silence decreed by *Pythagoras*, concerning divine Myſteries, which it was not lawful to ſpeak of before thoſe who were not initiated; and therefore clouded both their mutual Diſcourſes and Writings by Symbols; which, if not expounded by thoſe that propoſed them, by a regular Interpretation, appear to the Hearers like old Wives Proverbs, trivial and fooliſh; [h but being rightly explained, and inſtead of dark, rendred lucid and conſpicuous to the Vulgar, they diſcover an admirable Senſe, no leſs than the divine Oracle of Pythian *Apollo*, and give a divine Inſpiration to the Philologiſts that underſtand them.] That therefore their Benefit may be known, and their adhortative Uſe manifeſt, we will give the Solutions of every Symbol, both after the exoterick and the aeroatick Way; not omitting thoſe Things which were preſerved in Silence, not communicable to uninitiated Perſons. The Symbols are theſe:

1. *When you go to the Temple Worſhip, neither do nor ſay any thing concerning Life.*
2. *If there be a Temple in your way, go not in, no not though you paſs by the very Doors.*
3. *Sacrifice and Worſhip barefoot.*
4. *Decline High-ways, and take the Foot-path.*
5. *Abſtain from the Melanure, for it belongs to the terreſtrial Gods.*
6. *Above all Things, govern your Tongue, when you follow the Gods.*
7. *When the Winds blow, worſhip the Noiſe.*
8. *Cut not Fire with a Sword.*
9. *Turn away from thy ſelf every Edge.*
10. *Help a Man to take up a Burthen, but not to lay it down.*
11. *Put on the Shoe firſt on the right Foot, but the left Foot firſt into the Baſon.*
12. *Diſcourſe not of Pythagorean Things without Light.*
13. *Paſs not over a pair of Scales.*
14. *Travelling from Home, turn not back; for the Furies go back with you.*
15. *Urine not, being turned towards the Sun.*
16. *Wipe not a Seat with a Torch.*
17. *A Cock keep, but not ſacrifice; for it is conſecrated to the Moon and the Sun.*
18. *Sit not upon a Chœnix.*
19. *Breed nothing that hath crooked Talons.*
20. *Cut not in the way.*
21. *Receive not a Swallow into your Houſe.*
22. *Wear not a Ring.*
23. *Grave not the Image of God on a Ring.*
24. *Look not in a Glaſs by Candle-light.*
25. *Concerning the Gods, disbelieve nothing wonderful, nor concerning divine Doctrines.*
26. *Be not taken with immoderate laughter.*
27. *At a Sacrifice, pare not your Nails.*

[c] Pag. 199. [d] For τὸν Θάλατταν ἐκάλει εἶνα δάκρυον; read ἐκάλει Κρόνε δάκρυον, for ſo Clemens Alexandrinus, Strom. lib. 5. p. 571. [e] Laert. [f] Porph. loco cit. [g] Jamb. protrept. cap. ult. [h] Vit. cap. 23.

28. *Lay not hold on every one readily with your right Hand.*

29. *When you riſe out of Bed, diſorder the Coverlet, and deface the Print.*

30. *Eat not the Heart.*

31. *Eat not the Brains.*

32. *Spit upon the cuttings of your Hair, and the parings of your Nails.*

33. *Receive not an Erythrine.*

34. *Deface the print of a pot in the Aſhes.*

35. *Take not a Woman that hath Gold, to get Children of her.*

36. *Firſt honour the Figure and Steps, a Figure and a Tribolus.*

37. *Abſtain from Beans.*

38. *Set Mallows, but eat it not.*

39. *Abſtain from living Creatures.*

CHAP. III.

An Explication of the Pythagorick *Symbols, by* Jamblichus.

ALL theſe Symbols are in general adhortative to all Virtue; and every one of them in particular conduceth to ſome particular Virtue, and part of Philoſophy, and Learning; as the firſt are adhortative to Devotion, and divine Knowledge.

SYMB. I.

FOR this, *When you go to the Temple Worſhip, neither do nor ſay any thing concerning Life*, obſerves the Divinity after ſuch a manner, as it is in itſelf, pure and incommixt. He joins pure to the pure, and takes care, that no worldly Buſineſs inſinuate itſelf into the divine Worſhip; for they are Things wholly different and oppoſite to one another. Moreover, this conduceth much to Science; for we ought not to bring to the divine Science any ſuch thing as human Conſideration, or care of outward Life. Thus nothing is hereby commanded, but that divine Diſcourſes, and ſacred Actions, ought not to be intermixt with the unſtable Manners of Men.

SYMB. II.

TO that is conſonant the next, *If a Temple lie in your way, go not in, not though you paſs by the very Doors.* For if Like is delightful to its Like, it is manifeſt that the Gods, having the chiefeſt Eſſence of all Things, ought to have the principal Worſhip: But if any Man doth it upon occaſion of any other Thing, he makes that the ſecond, which is the firſt and chiefeſt of all; and by that means he ſubverts the whole Order of Worſhip, and Science. The moſt excellent Good ought not to be ranked in the latter Place, as inferior to human Good; neither ought our own Affairs to have the place of the chief End and better Things, either in our Words or Thoughts.

SYMB. III.

THat which follows is an Exhortation to the ſame; for this, *Sacrifice and Worſhip barefoot*, ſignifieth one way, that we ought to ſerve the Gods, and perform their Knowledge decently and moderately, not exceeding the order in the Earth. Another way, that we ought to perform their Service and Knowledge, being free without Fetters. This the Symbol commands to be obſerv'd, not in the Body only, but in the Acts of the Soul, that they be not reſtrained by Paſſions, nor by the Infirmity of the Body, nor by our external Generation, but all free and ready for Communication with the Gods.

SYMB. IV.

THere is another Symbol of this kind, exhorting to the ſame Virtue; *Concerning the Gods, diſbelieve nothing wonderful, and concerning divine Doctrines.* This Rule is religious, and declareth the ſuperlative Excellence of the Gods; inſtructing us, and putting us in Mind, that we ought not to eſtimate the divine Power by our own Judgment. To us who are corporeal, and generated, and corruptible, and tranſitory, and obnoxious to ſeveral Diſeaſes, and to narrowneſs of Habitation, and to aggravation of Motion towards the Center, and to ſleepineſs, and to indigence, and to abundance, and to imprudence, and to infirmity, and to impediment of Soul, and the like; ſome Things will ſeem difficult, and impoſſible; yet have we many Excellencies by Nature: but we are quite ſhort of the Gods, neither have we the ſame Power, or Ability. This Symbol, therefore, chiefly adviſeth to knowledge of the Gods, as of thoſe who are able to do all Things; whence it admoniſheth *to disbelieve nothing concerning the Gods.* There is added, *nor concerning divine Doctrines*, meaning thoſe which are declared by the *Pythagorick* Philoſophy; becauſe they being ſettled by Mathematicks, and ſcientifick Speculation, will ſhow by Demonſtration, ſtrengthened by Neceſſity, that there are true Beings exiſtent void of Fallaciouſneſs.

Theſe may alſo exhort to the Science concerning the Gods, and perſuade that ſuch a Science is to be acquired, as by which we ſhall not [b] disbelieve any thing

[b] Perhaps ἀπιστήσομεν.

thing concerning the Gods: The ſame may adviſe to divine Doctrines, and to proceed by Mathematicks; for they only clear the Eyes, and are illuminative of all Beings, to him that will behold them; for by participation of Mathematicks, one thing is conſtituted before all; that we disbelieve not any Thing, either concerning the nature of the Gods, or their Eſſence, or their Power: nor of thoſe *Pythagorical* Doctrines, which ſeem monſtrous to Perſons not initiated into Mathematicks: Thus *disbelieve not*, is equivalent to, *acquire and poſſeſs* thoſe Things, by means whereof you ſhall not disbelieve; that is, Mathematicks, and ſcientifick Demonſtrations.

SYMB. V.

THE next Symbol tends (as I conceive) to the ſame Effect; *Declining High-ways, walk in Path-ways.* For it commandeth to leave the Publick popular courſe of Life, and to purſue that which is ſeparate, and divine: Likewiſe that we deſpiſe the common Opinions, and much eſteem the Private, which are not to be divulged; and to contemn the Pleaſure which tends towards Men; but to value exceedingly that Felicity which is joined with the divine Will: And to leave human Cuſtoms as vulgar; but to apply our ſelves to the Worſhip of the Gods, which far excels the ordinary courſe of Life. Allied to this, is that which followeth.

SYMB. VI.

ABſtain from the Melanure, for it belongs to the terreſtrial Gods. We ſhall ſay more upon it in our explication of the adhortative Symbols: It adviſeth to make choice of the heavenly Journey, and to adhere to the intellectual Gods, and to withdraw our ſelves from material Nature, and to direct our Courſe to that Life which is pure, void of Matter, and to make uſe of the beſt way of divine Worſhip, and that which is moſt ſuitable to the chief Deities. Theſe Symbols are adhortative to the Knowledge and Worſhip of the Gods.

SYMB. VII.

THE following Symbols exhort to Wiſdom; *Above all Things govern your Tongue, following the Gods*; for the firſt work of Wiſdom is to revert our Speech into itſelf, and to accuſtom it not to paſs forth, that it may be perfect within our ſelves, and in its Converſion towards our ſelves. Moreover *in following the Gods*: For nothing renders the Mind ſo perfect, as when a Man, being reverted into himſelf, followeth the Gods.

SYMB. VIII.

THis Symbol likewiſe, *When the Winds blow, worſhip the Noiſe*, is an exhortation to divine Wiſdom; For it implieth that we ought to love the ſimilitudes of divine Natures and Powers: and when they make a Reaſon ſuitable to their Efficacies, it ought exceedingly to be honoured and reverenced.

SYMB. IX.

THE next Symbol, *Cut not Fire with a Sword*, exhorts to Wiſdom; for it excites in us a convenient Knowledge, that we ought not to give ſharp Language to a Man full of Fire and Anger, nor to conteſt with him; for you may often by Words exaſperate and trouble a rude and unlearned Perſon. Of this *Heraclitus* witneſſeth; *To conteſt with Anger* (ſaith he) *is hard, for whatſoever it would have done, it will purchaſe tho' at the expence of Life.* And he ſaid truly; for many, gratifying their own Anger, have exchanged their Souls, and preferred Death before them: but from Continence of the Tongue, and Peacefulneſs, this happens, that out of Contention ariſeth Friendſhip, the wrathful Fire being extinguiſhed, and thou thy ſelf wilt appear not to be void of Reaſon. This Symbol is confirmed by that which followeth.

SYMB. X.

TUrn away from thy ſelf every Edge; for towards whomſoever it ſhall be turned, it will hurt him. This Symbol commandeth to uſe Prudence not Anger; for that Edge of the Mind which we call Anger, is void of Reaſon and Prudence; for Anger boileth like a Pot upon the Fire, never dividing the Mind to that which is paſt. You muſt therefore ſettle your Mind in Tranquility, diverting it from Anger, and often preventing your ſelf; as a Man maketh Braſs ſound, not without touching it. This Paſſion therefore muſt be ſuppreſt by Reaſon.

SYMB. XI.

THIS, *Help to lay on a Burthen, but not to take it off*, adviſeth to Fortitude; for, whoſoever layeth on a Burthen, ſignifieth Labour and Action; but he who taketh if off, Reſt and Remiſneſs. The Meaning therefore of the Symbol is this, Be not the Cauſe, either to thyſelf or any other, of Remiſneſs of Mind and ſoft Life; for every uſeful thing is acquired by Labour. This Symbol *Pythagoras* called *Herculean*, as being ſealed by his Labours; for whilſt he lived amongſt Men, he paſſed frequently through Fire and many Difficulties, ſhunning Idleneſs. From Actions and Labour proceeds a right Office, but not from Sloth.

SYMB.

SYMB. XII.

THIS, *Pluck off your right Shoe first, but put your left Foot first into the Baſon*, exhorts to active Prudence; that good Actions, as right, are to be ſet round about us; but the ill, as left, to be laid aſide and rejected.

SYMB. XIII.

THIS, *Diſcourſe not of Pythagorean things without Light*, is chiefly Adhortatory, that the Mind acquire Prudence; for that reſembles the Light of the Mind, which being indefinite, limits and reduces it, as it were, out of Darkneſs into Light; it is therefore chiefly requiſite to look upon the Mind, as Guide of all good Actions in Life: but in the *Pythagorick* Doctrines, this is moſt particularly neceſſary; for it is not poſſible to underſtand what they are without Light.

SYMB. XIV.

THIS, *Paſs not over a Balance*, commands to do juſtly; and above all things, to reſpect Equality and Mediocrity, and to know Juſtice, the moſt perfect Virtue, which compleats the reſt, and without which, the reſt profit nothing: neither muſt we know it ſuperficially only, but by Theorems, and ſcientifick Demonſtrations. This Knowledge is the Work of no Art and Science, but only of the Philoſophy of *Pythagoras*, which preferreth Mathematicks before all things elſe.

SYMB. XV.

TO the ſame purpoſe is this, *Travelling from home, turn not back, for the Furies go back with you.* This Symbol exhorteth to Philoſophy, and free Action about the Mind. It likewiſe manifeſtly teacheth thus: When thou ſtudieſt Philoſophy, ſeparate thyſelf from all corporeal and ſenſible things, and truly make a Meditation of Death unto things intelligible, which are always the ſame, and after the ſame manner; proceeding (without turning back) by Mathematicks, conducing thereto. For Travel is the Change of Place, Death is the Separation of the Soul from the Body. But we muſt ſo ſtudy Philoſophy, as to make uſe of the pure Mind ſincerely, without the Acts of corporeal Senſes, to the Comprehenſion of the Truth which in things that are, which is acknowledg'd to be Wiſdom. But after you have once applied yourſelf to ſtudy Philoſophy, turn not back, nor be drawn back to the former corporeal things, in which you were bred up; for you will much repent hereof, being hinder'd from ſacred Comprehenſions, by the Darkneſs which is in corporeal things. Repentance they call *Erinys*, or *Fury*.

SYMB. XVI.

THIS, *Urine not, being turned towards the Sun*, admoniſheth, that we offer not to do any beſtial Action, but to ſtudy and practiſe Philoſophy, looking upon Heaven and the Sun; and remember, that in the Study of Philoſophy you never bear a low Mind, but by the Contemplation of heavenly things aſcend to the Gods, and to Wiſdom. And having applied yourſelf to ſtudy Philoſophy, and to the Light of Truth that is in it, purifying yourſelf, and converting yourſelf wholly to that Deſign, to Theology, and Phyſiology, and Aſtronomy, and Ætiologick, which is above all the reſt, do nothing irrational or beſtial.

SYMB. XVII.

THE ſame Meaning is of the next, *Wipe not a Seat with a Torch*; for not only becauſe a Torch is purificative, as partaking of much Quick-fire, like Sulphur, it adviſeth that this ought not to be defiled, its Nature being ſuch, as it diſpelleth all things that defile; nor ought we to oppoſe natural Habitude, by defiling that whoſe Nature is repugnant to defiling. Much leſs ought we to join and mix things proper to Wiſdom, with thoſe which are proper to Animality. For *a Torch*, in reſpect of its Brightneſs, is compared to Philoſophy; *a Seat*, in reſpect of its Lowneſs, to Animality.

SYMB. XVIII.

THIS, *Breed a Cock, but not ſacrifice it, for it is ſacred to the Moon and the Sun*; admoniſheth us to nouriſh and cheriſh (and not to neglect, ſo as to ſuffer them to periſh and corrupt) the great Evidences of the Union, and Coagmentation, and Sympathy, and Conſpiration of the World. It therefore adviſeth, to addreſs ourſelves to Contemplation of the Univerſe, and to Philoſophy; for the Truth of all things being by Nature concealed, and hard to be found out, yet requiſite to be ſought, and inveſtigated by Man, chiefly through Philoſophy, (for to do it by any other Study is impoſſible) which receiving ſome little Sparks from Nature, blows them up, and makes them greater and more perſpicuous by its Doctrines. Philoſophy therefore ought to be ſtudied.

SYMB. XIX.

THIS, *Sit not upon a Chœnix*, may appear to be more *Pythagorical*, from what was already ſaid; for becauſe Aliment is to be meaſured by Corporeity and Animality, not by the Chœnix, reſt not, nor lead thy Life uninitiated into Philoſophy; but applying thyſelf thereto, take greateſt care of that in thee which is moſt divine, the Soul; and in the Soul, chiefly

chiefly the Mind, whoſe Aliment is not meaſured by the Chœnix, but by Contemplation and Diſcipline.

SYMB. XX.

THIS, *Breed nothing that hath crooked Talons*, adviſeth to a thing which is yet more *Pythagorical*; be free and communicative, and endeavour to make others ſuch alſo, accuſtoming thyſelf to give and receive without Grudging or Envy; not to take all things inſatiably, and to give nothing. For the natural Condition of thoſe Fowls which have crooked Talons, is, to receive and ſnatch readily and quickly, but not eaſily to let go, or impart to others, by reaſon of the Tenacity of their Talons, being crooked; as the Nature of Shrimps is ſuch, that they quickly lay hold of a thing, but very hardly part with it, unleſs they be turned upon their Backs. Now we having Hands given us by Nature, proper to communicate, and ſtraight, not crooked Fingers, ought not to imitate thoſe which have crooked Talons, unlike us; but rather mutually to communicate to, and participate from, one another; as being excited thereto by thoſe who firſt gave Names to things, who named the more honourable Hand δεξιὰν, *the Right*, not only ἀπὸ τῦ δέχεσθαι, *from receiving*; but likewiſe, ἀπὸ τῦ πρόκειν ἑτοίμως ἔχειν ἐν τῷ μεταδίδοναι, *from being ready to receive in communicating*. We muſt therefore do juſtly, and for that reaſon philoſophiſe; for Juſtice is a return and remuneration, exchanging and ſupplying Exceſs and Defect.

SYMB. XXI.

THIS, *Cut not in the way*; that Truth is one, Falſhood multiplicious; which is manifeſt from this, that what every Thing is, ſpeaking plainly, is expreſſed but one way; but what it is not, is expreſſed infinite ways. Philoſophy ſeems to be a way; it therefore ſaith, chuſe that Philoſophy, and that way to Philoſophy, in which thou ſhalt not cut (or divide) nor eſtabliſh contrary Doctrines, but thoſe which are conſtituted and confirmed by ſcientifick Demonſtration, by Mathematicks and Contemplation; which is, *Philoſophiſe Pythagorically*. It may be taken alſo in another Senſe, foraſmuch as that Philoſophy which proceeds by Corporeals and Senſibles, (with which Philoſophy the younger Sort are ſatisfied, who conceive, that God, and Qualities, and the Mind, and Virtues, and in a word, all the principal Cauſes of things, are Bodies) is eaſily ſubverted and confuted, as appears by the great Diſagreement amongſt them, who go about to ſay any thing therein. But the Philoſophy which is of Incorporeals, and Intelligibles, and Immaterials, and Eternals, which are always the ſame in themſelves, and towards one another, never admitting Corruption or Alteration, is firmly eſtabliſhed, and the Cauſe of irrefragable Demonſtration. Now this Precept adviſeth us, when we philoſophiſe, and perfect the Way which is manifeſt, that we ſhun the Snares and Entertainments of Corporeals and Diviſibles, and intimately apply ourſelves to the Subſtance of Incorporeals, which are never unlike themſelves, by reaſon of the Truth and Stability which they naturally have.

SYMB. XXII.

THIS, *Receive not a Swallow into your Houſe*, adviſeth, that you admit not a ſlothful Perſon (who is not a conſtant Lover of Labour, neither will perſevere to be a Diſciple) unto your Doctrines, which require continual Labour and Patience, by reaſon of the Variety and Intricateneſs of the ſeveral Diſciplines. He makes uſe of the Swallow to repreſent Sloth, and cutting off Times, becauſe this Bird comes to us but in one Seaſon of the Year, and then ſtays but a ſhort while with us; but is abſent from us, and out of Sight, a much longer Space.

SYMB. XXIII.

THIS, *Wear not a Ring*, is likewiſe adhortatory after the *Pythagorick* way, thus: Foraſmuch as a Ring encompaſſeth the Finger of the Wearer in nature of a Chain, but hath this Property, that it pincheth not, nor paineth, but is ſo fit, as if it naturally belonged to that Part; and the Body is ſuch a kind of Chain to the Soul; *Wear not a Ring*, ſignifies, *Philoſophiſe truly*, and ſeparate your Soul from the Chain which goeth round about it. For Philoſophy is the Meditation of Death, and Separation of the Soul from the Body. Serioufly and earneſtly therefore apply yourſelf to the *Pythagorick* Philoſophy, which ſeparates the Soul, by the Mind, from all Corporeals, and is converſant about Intellectuals and Immaterials by Theoretick Doctrines. But unty and looſe your Sins, and all things that pluck you back and hinder philoſophiſing, Diverſions of the Fleſh, exceſſive Eating, unſeaſonable Repletion, which, as it were, fetter the Body, and continually breed infinite Diſeaſes.

SYMB. XXIV.

THIS, *Grave not the Image of God in a Ring*, adviſeth thus, Philoſophiſe, and, above all things, think that the Gods are incorporeal. This Symbol is, beyond all others, the Seminary of the *Pythagorick* Doctrines; of it all things (almoſt) are fitly adapted, and by it are eſtabliſhed to the End. Think not that they uſe Forms that are corporeal, neither that they are received into material Subſtance, fetter'd (as it were) to the Body, like other living Beings. The Figures engraved in Rings, in the very Ring expreſs a Chain, and Corporeity, and ſenſible

ſible Form, as it were the Figure of ſome Animal, perceptible by Sight; from which we muſt abſolutely ſeparate the Gods, as being eternal and intelligible, and always the ſame in themſelves, and towards one another; as is largely diſcourſed in the Treatiſe concerning God.

SYMB. XXV.

THIS, *Look not in a Glaſs by Candle-light*, adviſeth more *Pythagorically* thus: Philoſophiſe, purſuing not the Phantaſies of Senſe (which give a kind of Light to Comprehenſions, like a Candle, neither natural nor true) but thoſe which procure Science, and are converſant in the Mind, by which a moſt bright Purity is conſtituted in the Eye of the Soul, of all Notions and Intelligibles, and the Speculation of them, but not of Corporeals and Senſibles, for they are in continual Fluxion and Mutation, (as hath often been ſhewn) no way ſtable or exiſting like themſelves, whereby they might uphold a firm and ſcientifick Comprehenſion, as the others do.

SYMB. XXVI.

THIS, *Be not ſeized with immoderate Laughter*, ſheweth that we ſhould vanquiſh Paſſions: Put thyſelf in mind of right Reaſon; be neither blown up in good Fortune, nor caſt down in bad; admitting no Thought of Change in either. He named *Laughter* above all other Paſſions, becauſe that is moſt apparently ſhewn in the Face itſelf; perhaps alſo, becauſe this is proper to Man only of all living Creatures; whence ſome define Man, A riſible living Creature. This Precept ſhews that we ought to take Humanity only, as it were in our way, like Gueſts; but to acquire the Imitation of God, as far as we are able; by Philoſophiſing, ſecretly withdrawing ourſelves from the Property of Men, and preferring the Rational before the Riſible, in Diſtinction from other Creatures.

SYMB. XXVII.

THIS, *At a Sacrifice pare not your Nails*, is adhortative to Friendſhip: for of Domeſticks and Allies, ſome being nearly related to us, as Brothers, Children, Parents, are like our Limbs and Parts, which cannot be taken away without much Pain and Maim: others who are allied to us at a great Diſtance, as the Children of Uncles, or of Couſins, or their Children, or ſuch like, reſemble thoſe Parts which may be cut off without Pain, as Hair, Nails, and the like. Intending therefore to ſignify thoſe Allies, whom, by reaſon of this Diſtance, we at other Times neglect, he uſeth the Word *Nails*, ſaying, Caſt not thoſe quite away; but, in Sacrifices, (though at other Times neglected) carry them along with you, and renew your Domeſtick Familiarity with them.

SYMB. XXVIII.

THIS, *Lay not hold on every one readily with your Right Hand*, ſaith, Give not your Right Hand eaſily, that is, Draw not to you, nor endeavour to draw out improper and uninitiated Perſons, by giving them your Right Hand. Moreover, to ſuch as have not been long tried by Diſciplines and Doctrines, nor are approved as worthy to participate of Temperance, and of the Quinquennial Silence, and other Trials, the Right Hand ought not to be given.

SYMB. XXIX.

THIS, *When you riſe out of Bed, wrap the Coverlets together, and confound the Print of your Body*; adviſeth, that having undertaken to philoſophiſe, you ſhould acquaint yourſelf with Intellectuals, and Incorporeals: Therefore as ſoon as you riſe from the Sleep of Ignorance, and that Darkneſs which reſembles Night, draw not to yourſelf any corporeal Thing to the Light of Philoſophy which reſembles the Day, but blot out of your Remembrance all Prints of that Sleep.

SYMB. XXX.

THIS, *Eat not the Heart*, ſignifieth, that we ought not to tear aſunder the Unity and Conſpiration of the Whole: Moreover it implieth, Be not envious, but obliging and communicative; hereupon it exhorted to philoſophiſe. For of all Arts and Sciences, only Philoſophy envieth not the Good of others, nor grieveth thereat, nor rejoiceth in the Ill of a Neighbour; but declareth that all Men are by Nature allied to one another, and Friends, and alike affected, and ſubjected alike to Fortune, and alike ignorant of the Future; and therefore commands them to commiſerate and love one another, as becomes a Creature, ſociable and rational.

SYMB. XXXI.

LIKE that, is this, *Eat not the Brain*, for that is the principal Inſtrument of Wiſdom; it ſignifieth therefore that we ought not with Reproaches to bite and tear in pieces Things well intended, and Doctrines. Thoſe are well intended, which are exactly conſidered by the principal Reaſon of Mind, like to Things comprehended by Science; for theſe are beheld not by the Organs of the irrational Soul, that is, by the Heart and the Liver, but by the pure rational Part of the Soul; wherefore it is a Folly to oppoſe them. This Symbol rather adviſeth to worſhip the Fountain of Minds, and next Inſtrument of Intelle-

Intellection, by whoſe Means we acquire Speculation and Science, and (in a word) all Wiſdom, and truly philoſophiſe; and not to confound and deface the Prints that are therein.

SYMB. XXXII.

THIS, *Spit upon the Cuttings of thy Hair, and Parings of thy Nails*, ſaith thus, Thoſe Things are eaſily contemned which are born with thee, but are more diſtant from the Mind; as, on the other ſide, thoſe are more eſteem'd, which are nearer to the Mind. So having addicted thy Mind to Philoſophy, above all, reverence thoſe Things which are demonſtrated by the Soul and Mind, without the Organs of Senſe, by ſpeculative Science; but contemn and ſpit upon thoſe Things which are ſeen without the Light of the Mind, by the ſenſitive Organs which are born with us; which are not capable of reaching the Eternity of the Mind.

SYMB. XXXIII.

THIS, *Receive not an Erythrine*, ſeems to reſpect the Etymology of the Word; Entertain not an impudent bluſhleſs Perſon; nor, on the other ſide, one over-baſhful, ready to fall back from the Mind, and firm Intellection; whence is underſtood alſo, Be not ſuch yourſelf.

SYMB. XXXIV.

THIS, *Deface the Print of a Pot in the Aſhes*, ſignifieth, that he who applies his Mind to Philoſophy, muſt forget the Demonſtrations of Confuſion and Groſſneſs, (that is, of Corporeals and Senſibles) and wholly make uſe of Demonſtrations of Intelligibles: By *Aſhes* are meant the Duſt or Sand in Mathematical Tables, wherein the Demonſtrations and Figures are drawn.

SYMB. XXXV.

BUT *Approach not her to get Children who hath Money*, is not meant of a Woman, but of a Sect of Philoſophy, which hath in it much Corporeity and Gravity tending downwards; for of all Things in the Earth Gold is the moſt heavy, and apteſt to move towards the Center, which is the Property of Corporeal Weight: To *approach*, means not only *Coition*, but to apply ourſelves, and to be *aſſiſtant*.

SYMB. XXXVI.

THIS, *In the firſt place honour the Figure and the Degrees, the Figure and the Tribolus*; adviſeth to philoſophiſe, and ſtudy Mathematicks, not ſuperficially, and by them, as by Degrees of Aſcenſion, arrive at our propoſed End; but deſpiſe thoſe Things which others prefer before theſe; and chiefly reverence the *Italick* Philoſophy, which conſiders Incorporeals in themſelves, before the *Ionick*, which firſt looks upon Bodies.

SYMB. XXXVII.

THIS, *Abſtain from Beans*, adviſeth to beware of every Thing that may corrupt our Diſcourſe with the Gods, and Preſcience.

SYMB. XXXVIII.

THIS, *Plant Mallows, but eat it not*, ſignifies that ſuch Things are turned with the Sun. *Plant*, that is, inſiſting on its Nature and Application to the Sun, and Sympathy, neither abſtain from it, nor wholly adhere to it; but transfer your Mind and Intellect, and tranſplant them as it were to Plants and Herbs of the ſame Kind; and to Animals which are not of the ſame Kind, and to Stones and Rivers, and in a word, to all Natures; for thou wilt find that which deſigned the Unity and Conſpiration of the World, to be fruitful and full of Variety, and admirably copious, as if it ſprung from a Mallows-root: Therefore not only eat not, nor deface ſuch Obſervations, but on the contrary increaſe them, and multiply them, as it were by Tranſplantation.

SYMB. XXXIX.

THIS, *Abſtain from living Creatures*, exhorts to Juſtice, and Reſpect of Alliance by a like Kind of Life, and the like.

By theſe is explained the ſymbolical adhortative Form; containing much that is common with the Cuſtoms of the Antients, and *Pythagorical*. Thus *Jamblichus*.

CHAP. IV.

The ſame Symbols explained by others.

MOST of theſe Symbols are mentioned alſo by others, with different Explications. The firſt [a] *Olympiodorus* aſcribes to *Philolaus*, delivering it thus, *When you come into a Temple, turn not back. Jamblichus* [b], in the Life of *Pythagoras*, cites it in the ſame Words, adding this Expoſition, *That we ought not to perform divine Rites curſorily and negligently.*

Upon the Second, *Adore not the Gods, as it were, in paſſing by*: [c] *Plutarch* ſaith, *We ought to go from*

[a] In Plat. Phædon. [b] Cap. 23. [c] In Numa.

Home with that expreſs Intent. And for this Reaſon the Cryers uſed, upon Feſtival Days, to go before the Prieſts, and commanded the People to forbear working.

The ſame Expoſition [d] *Jamblichus*, in the Life of *Pythagoras*, gives of the Third, *Sacrifice, and go to ſacred Rites barefoot.*

To the Fourth, *Concerning the Gods, disbelieve nothing wonderful, and concerning divine Doctrines,* may be applied to what *Jamblichus* ſaith in the Life of *Pythagoras*: [e] *Many Precepts were introduc'd into the Practice of divine Rites, foraſmuch as they gave firm Credit to theſe Things, conceiving them not to be fantaſtick Boaſts, but to derive their Beginning from ſome God. All this the* Pythagoreans *believe to be true, as the fabulous Reports concerning* Ariſtæus *the Proconnecian, and* Abaris *the Hyperborean, and the like. And they did not only believe all theſe, but alſo endeavour themſelves to frame many Things that ſeem fabulous, derogating from nothing which relates to the Deity. In all ſuch Things he conceived not that the Perſons themſelves were fooliſh, but thoſe only who gave no Belief to it. For they are not of Opinion, that the Gods can do ſome Things, others they cannot, as the Sophiſts imagine; but, that all Things are poſſible. And the ſame in the Beginning of the Verſes which they aſcribe to* Linus, *but perhaps were made by* Pythagoras:

Hope all Things; for to none belongs Deſpair:
All Things to God eaſy and perfect are.

The Fifth, *Decline High-ways,* is mentioned by many; only *Laertius* delivers it quite otherwiſe, *Go not out of the High-way*; but, in the Expoſition, differs not from the reſt, that *we ought not to follow the Opinions of the Vulgar, which are without Judgment, and not indiſputable; but thoſe of the few and learned.*

The Sixth, *Abſtain from the Melanure, for it belongs to the terreſtrial Gods,* [f] *Plutarch* interprets, as forbidding to converſe with Perſons black in Impiety. *Tryphon*, as forbidding Falſhood and Lies, which are black in their Cloſe. The *Melanure* is a kind of Fiſh, ſo named from the Blackneſs of its Tail.

The Ninth, *Cut not Fire with a Sword,* is one of thoſe Symbols which are aſcribed to *Andocides*, the *Pythagorean.* [g] *Porphyrius*, [h] *Plutarch*, *Laertius*, and [i] *Athenæus*, interpret it, as adviſing, *not to exaſperate an angry Perſon, but to give way to him. Fire is Anger, the Sword Contention.* St. *Baſil* expounds it *of thoſe who attempt an Impoſſibility.*

The Tenth, *Laertius* reads thus, *Turn away a ſharp Sword*; it is generally expounded, Decline all Things dangerous.

The Eleventh, *Help to lay on a Burthen, but not to take it off,* is expounded by *Porphyrius* [k], that *we ought to further others, not in Sluggiſhneſs, but in Virtue and Labour.* Or, as [l] *Jamblichus*, that *we ought not to be the Cauſe of another's being idle. Laertius* and *Olympiodorus* cite it thus, *Lay not Burthens down together, but take them up together*; expounding it, that *we muſt work together in the Courſe of Life, and co-operate with others in Actions, tending not to Idleneſs but to Virtue.*

The Twelfth, which is cited by *Suidas* out of *Ariſtophanes*, in Verſe, thus:

Into the Shoe firſt the right Foot,
The left firſt in the Baſon put.

He expounds it not as a Symbol, but a Proverb, *of thoſe who perform Things dextrouſly.*

The Fourteenth, *Paſs not over a Balance,* is generally interpreted by [m] *Plutarch*, *Laertius*, [n] *Clemens Alexandrinus*, *Porphyrius*, and others, that *we ought to eſteem Juſtice, and not to exceed it. Athenæus* and *Porphyrius* expound it, as dehorting *from Avarice, and adviſing to purſue Equality.*

The Fifteenth *Laertius* delivers thus, *When you go to travel, look not back upon the Bounds.* [o] *Plutarch* thus, *When you come to the Borders, return not back.* They both interpret it, that *when we are dying, and arrived at the Bound or End of our Life, we ſhould bear it with an equal Mind, without Grief, not to deſire a Continuance of the Pleaſures of this Life.* See alſo [p] *Porphyrius.*

The Sixteenth *Laertius* reads thus, *Wipe not a Seat with Oil.*

The Seventeenth *Laertius* and *Suidas* deliver thus, *Touch not a white Cock, for it is ſacred to the Moon, and a Monitor of the Hours.*

The Nineteenth, *Sit not upon a Chœnix, Plutarch* and *Porphyrius* interpret, that *we ought not to live idly, but to provide Neceſſaries for the Future.* For, a Chœnix, according to *Laertius* and *Suidas*, is the ſame which *Clearchus* calls *Hemerotrophen*, a Proportion of Food daily ſpent. But *Clemens Alexandrinus* interprets it, as adviſing to conſider not the preſent Day, but what the future will bring forth: To be ſollicitous, not of Food, but prepar'd for Death.

The Twentieth, *Breed nothing that hath crooked Talons*, is aſcribed to *Andocides* the *Pythagorean.*

The Twenty firſt, *Olympiodorus* delivers thus, *Cleave not Wood in the Way*; *whereby*, ſaith he, *the* Pythagoreans *adviſed, not to diſquiet Life with exceſſive Cares, and vain Solicitude.*

The Twenty ſecond, *Entertain not a Swallow under your Roof,* [q] *Plutarch* interprets, *Take not unto you*

[d] Cap. ibid. [e] Cap. 28. [f] De Educ. lib. [g] Pag. 199. [h] De Educ. lib. [i] Lib. 10. [k] Pag. 199.
[l] Vit. Pyth. ibid. [m] De Educ. lib. [n] Strom. 5. [o] De Educ. lib. [p] Pag. ibid. [q] Sympoſ. quæſt. 58.

you an ungrateful and unconſtant Friend and Companion; for only this Bird, of all the leſſer Kind, is reported to prey upon Fleſh. [s] *Clemens Alexandrinus* and *Porphyrius* interpret it, as forbidding *to admit into our Society a talkative Perſon, intemperate of Speech, who cannot contain what is communicated to him.*

The Twenty third, [s] *Plutarch* alledgeth thus, *Wear not a ſtrait Ring*; that is, ſaith he, *Follow a free Courſe of Life, and fetter not yourſelf.* Or, as St. *Hierom, that we live not anxiouſly, nor put ourſelves into Servitude, or into ſuch a Condition of Life as we cannot free ourſelves from, when we ſhould have a Mind to do it.*

The Twenty fourth, *Wear not the Picture of the Gods in Rings,* [t] *Porphyrius* expoundeth, *Diſcourſe not of the Gods inconſiderately, or in publick.* [u] *Jamblichus*, in the Life of *Pythagoras*, delivers it thus, *Wear not the Image of God in a Ring, leſt it be defiled; for it is the Image of God.* [w] *Clemens Alexandrinus* affirms the Meaning to be, that *we ought not to mind Senſibles; but to paſs on to Intelligibles.*

In the Twenty eighth, *Lay not hold on every one readily with your Right Hand.* *Plutarch* omits ῥᾳδίως, *Suidas* πάντι. It is generally expounded thus, *Be not haſty and precipitate in contracting Friendſhip with any.*

The Twenty ninth, *When you riſe out of Bed, wrap the Coverlet together, and confound the Print of your Body*; *Plutarch* referreth it to the *Modeſty and Reſpect due to the Bed.* [x] *Clemens Alexandrinus* ſaith it ſignifies, that *we ought not in the Day-time to call to Mind any Pleaſures, even of Dreams which we had in the Night. Perhaps alſo*, ſaith he, *it means, that we ought not to confound dark Phantaſy with the Light of Truth.*

The 30th and 31ſt, *Eat not the Heart and the Brain*; [y] *Jamblichus*, in the Life of *Pythagoras*, ſaith, *he enjoined; foraſmuch as theſe two are the Seats of Life and Knowledge.* *Porphyrius* to the firſt, and *Plutarch* to the ſecond, give one Interpretation, *Conſume not yourſelf with Grief, nor afflict your Mind with Cares.*

The Thirty ſecond, *Laertius* delivers contrary to *Jamblichus*; *Upon the Parings of your Nails or Cuttings of your Hair, neither urine nor tread.*

The Thirty fourth, *Deface the Print of a Pot in the Aſhes*; *Plutarch* and *Clemens Alexandrinus* expound, as adviſing, *that upon Reconcilement of Enmity, we utterly aboliſh, and leave not the leaſt Print or Remembrance of Anger.*

The Thirty ſixth concerning *the Figure and three Oboli*, ſeems to have Reference to the Story related in the ſixth Chapter of his Life.

Of the Thirty ſeventh, *Abſtain from Beans*, there are alledg'd many different Reaſons. *Ariſtotle* [z] ſaith, *He forbad them, for that they reſemble αἰδοῖα, or the Gates of the Inferi*; *or, for that they breed Worms*; [a little ſort of Maggots called *Midæ*] *or, for that they reſemble the Nature of the Univerſe*; *or, for that they are Oligarchick, being uſed in Suffrages.* This laſt Reaſon is confirmed by *Plutarch*, who explains this Symbol, *Abſtain from Suffrages*; *which of old were given by Beans.* *Porphyrius* ſaith, *He interdicted Beans, becauſe the firſt Beginning and Generation being confuſed, and many Things being commixed, and concreſcent together, and computrified in the Earth by little and little, the Generation and Diſcretion broke forth together*; *and living Creatures being produced together with Plants, then out of the ſame Putrefaction aroſe both Men and Beans*; *whereof he alledg'd manifeſt Arguments. For, if any one ſhould chew a Bean, and having minced it ſmall with his Teeth, lay it abroad in the warm Sun, and ſo leaving it for a little time, return to it, he ſhall perceive the Scent of human Blood. Moreover, if any one at the time when Beans ſhoot forth the Flower, ſhall take a little of the Flower which then is black, and put it into an earthen Veſſel, and cover it cloſe, and bury it in the Ground ninety Days, and at the End thereof take it up, and take off the Cover*; *inſtead of the Bean, he ſhall find either the Head of an Infant, or γυναικὸς αἰδοῖον.* The ſame Reaſon [a] *Origen* aſcribes to *Zaratus*; from whom perhaps *Pythagoras*, being his Scholar, received them. Hence it is that *Pliny* ſaith, *He condemned Beans, becauſe the Souls of the Dead are in them.* And *Porphyrius* elſewhere, *Becauſe they moſt partake of the Nature of a living Creature:* Some of whom, as *Cicero* ſays, It was becauſe they diſturb the Tranquility of the Mind. *Wherefore to abſtain from them*, ſaith *Porphyrius*, *makes our Dreams ſerene and untroubled.* [b] *Agellius* ſaith, he meant, *from venereal Delights.* And *Plutarch* ſaith, He forbad Beans, becauſe they conduce thereto. On the contrary, [c] *Clemens Alexandrinus* affirms they were prohibited out of no other Reaſon, than that *Women feeding on them, became barren.*

For the Thirty ninth, *Abſtain from the Fleſh of living Creatures*; the moſt general Reaſon is, becauſe they are of the ſame Nature and Temperament with us; and, in a manner, allied unto us. But of this formerly.

CHAP. V.

Other Symbols.

TO the foregoing Symbols collected by *Jamblichus*, may be added theſe:

Take not up what falls from the Table; meaning, that Men ſhould not accuſtom themſelves to eat intemperately.

[s] Strom. 5. [s] De Educ. lib. [t] Pag. 84. [u] Cap. 18. [w] Strom. 5. [x] Strom. 5. [y] Cap. 109. [z] Laert. 8. [a] In Philoſ. [b] Lib. 4. [c] Strom. 5.

temparately. Or, alluding to some religious Rite; for, *Aristophanes* saith, That which falls so, belongs to the Heroes; saying in his *Heroes*,

Taste not what from the Table falls [a].

Break not Bread; Divide not Friends. Others refer it to the Judgment in the infernal Places. Others, that it implieth Fear in War. *(Laert.)*

Set down Salt, in remembrance of Justice; for Salt preserves all Things, and is brought out of the purest Thing, Water. *(Laert.)*

Pluck not a Crown; that is, Offend not the Laws, for Laws are the Crown of Cities. *(Porphyrius.)*

Offer Libations to the Gods, just to the Ears of the Cup; signifying that we ought to worship and celebrate the Gods with Musick, for that passeth in at the Ears. *(Porph.)* And drink not of that Libation. *(Jamb.* c. 18. p. 87.*)*

Eat not (which are unlawful) *Generation, Augmentation, Beginning, End, nor that of which the first Basis of all Things consists.* Meaning, we must abstain from the Loins, ὀσφύων αἰδοίων, Marrow, Feet, and Head of Victims. He called the Loins, Basis, because living Creatures are settled upon them as their Foundation; ὀσφὺς ϗ αἰδοῖα, Generation, for without the Help of these, no living Creature is engendred. Marrow he called Increase, it being the Cause of Augmentation in living Creatures. The Beginning, the Feet; the Head, the End; which have most Power in Government of the Body. *(Porph.)*

Eat not Fishes. (Laert.) Some apply this to Silence, *(Athen. Deipn.* l. 7.*)*

Others say, he disapproved them, because not used in Sacrifice to the Gods.

Put not Meat in a Chamber-pot; meaning, communicate nothing that is wise to a rude and foolish Person. *(Plut.* de Educ. Lib.*)*

Sleep not at Noon. For at that time the Sun sheweth its greatest Force, *(Olympiad. in Plat. Phædon.)* We ought not to shut our Eyes against the Light, when it is most manifest.

Quit not your Station without the Command of your General: Our Souls ought to be kept in the Body, neither may we forsake this Life without special leave from him who gave it us, lest we seem to despise the Gift of God. *(Cicer. in Cat.* and *de Repub.)*

Roast not what is boiled; that is, change not Meekness to Anger, *(Jambl.)*

Heap not up Cypress; Of this Wood they conceived the Scepter of *Jupiter* to be made. *(Laert.)*

Sacrifice even Things to the Celestial Deities, odd to the Terrestrial. Of this, already in his Arithmetick.

When it thunders, touch the Earth, calling to mind our own Mortality: *(Jambl.)* or, When a King is angry, the Offender ought to humble himself.

Eat not sitting in a Chariot. (Plut.) Some expound it, that we ought to eat in quiet; or, that we ought not to give ourselves to Luxury in a time of Business.

Go into the Temple on the Right-hand, go out on the Left. Right and Left seem to refer to the Ceremonial Numbers; of which already.

Where Blood hath been shed, cover the Place with Stones; that is, abolish the very Remembrance of any War or Dissention. *(Jamb.)*

Hurt not a mild Plant. (Laert. Porph.) Some expound it, Harm not the harmless.

Pray aloud; implying, not that God cannot hear such as pray softly, but that our Prayers should be just, *(Clem. Alex. Strom.* 4.*)* such as we need not care who hears.

Sail not on the Ground; signifying, that we ought to forbear raising Taxes, and such Revenues as are troublesome and unstable. *(Clem. Strom.* 5.*)*

Beget Children; For it is our Duty to leave behind us, such as may serve the Gods in our Room. *(Jambl.* vit. cap. 18.*)*

Neither dip in a Bason, nor wash in a Bath. (Jamb. ibid.*)*

Put not away thy Wife, for she is a Suppliant. *(Jamb.* ibid.*)*

Counsel nothing but what is best, for Counsel is a sacred thing: *(Jamb.* ibid.*)*

Plant not a Palm; (Plut. in Isid. and Osir.)

Lastly, Hither may be referred the Symbolical Letter Y. *They said that the course of human Life is like that Letter, for every one arriving at the first state of Youth, where the Way divides itself into two, stands at a gaze, not knowing which to take; if he meets with a Guide that leads to the better, that is, if he learn Philosophy, Oratory, or some honest Art, which may prove beneficial, but cannot be attain'd without much Labour, they affirm that he shall lead an honourable and plentiful Life. But if not lighting upon such a Master, he takes the left hand way, which seems at first to be the better, and to lead to Virtue, that is, if he gives himself over to Sloth and Luxury, which seem pleasant at first to him who is ignorant of true Good, he shall e'er long lose both his Credit and Estate, and live thence forward ignominously, and miserably.* Thus [b] *Lactantius*, perhaps alluding to the old Verses.

The Pythagorick Letter two ways spread,
Shows the two Paths in which Man's Life is led.
The right hand Track to sacred Virtue tends,
Though steep and rough at first, in rest it ends.

The

[a] Laert. 8. 35. &c. [b] De vero cultu, lib. 6. cap. 3.

The other broad and smooth, but from its Crown,
On Rocks the Traveller is tumbled down.
He who to Virtue by harsh Toils aspires,
Subduing Pains, Worth and Renown acquires:
But who seeks slothful Luxury, and flies
The labour of great Acts, dishonour'd dies.

The GOLDEN VERSES of *Pythagoras.*

A Summary of the *Pythagorick* Doctrine is extant in Verse, Entituled, *The Golden Verses of Pythagoras:* or as others, of the *Pythagoreans. For that,* saith *Hierocles, as Gold is the best and purest of Metals, so these are the best and most divine of Verses.* They are these.

First, in their Ranks, the immortal Gods adore,
Thy Oath keep; next, great Heroes; then implore
Terrestrial Dæmons with due Sacrifice.
Thy Parents Reverence, and near Allies.
Him that is first in Virtue make thy Friend,
And with observance his kind Speech attend:
Nor (to thy Power) for light Faults cast him by:
Thy Pow'r is Neighbour to Necessity.
These know, and with intentive Care pursue;
But Anger, Sloth, and Luxury subdue.
In sight of others or thy self forbear
What's ill; but of thy self stand most in fear.
Let Justice all thy Words and Actions sway;
Nor from the even course of Reason stray:
For know, that all Men are to die ordain'd,
And Riches are as quickly lost as gain'd.
Crosses that happen by divine Decree,
(If such thy Lot) bear not impatiently.
Yet seek to remedy with all thy Care,
And think the Just have not the greatest Share.
'Mong st Men, Discourses good and bad are spread:
Despise not those, nor be by these misled.
If any some notorious Falshood say,
Thou the Report with equal Judgment weigh.
Let not Men's smoother Promises invite,
Nor rougher Threats from just Resolves thee fright.
If ought thou shouldst attempt, first ponder it;
Fools only inconsiderate Acts commit;
Nor do what afterwards thou may'st repent;
First learn to know the Thing on which thou art bent.
Thus thou a Life shalt lead with Joy replete.
Nor must thou care of outward Health forget.
Such Temp'rance use in Exercise and Diet,
As may preserve thee in a settled Quiet.
Meats unprohibited, not curious, chuse;
Decline what any other may accuse.
The rash Expence of Vanity detest,
And Sordidness: A Mean in all is best.
Hurt not thy self: Before thou act, advise;
Nor suffer Sleep at Night to close thine Eyes,
Till thrice thy Acts that Day thou hast o'er-run,
How slipt, what Deeds, what Duty left undone?
Thus thy Account summ'd up from first to last,
Grieve for the Ill, joy for what Good hath past.
These study, practise these, and these affect;
To sacred Virtue these thy Steps direct.
Eternal Nature's Fountain I attest,
Who the Tetractys on our Souls impress.
Before thy Mind thou to this Study bend,
Invoke the Gods to grant it a good End.
These, if thy Labour vanquish, thou shalt then
Know the connexure both of Gods and Men;
How every Thing proceeds, or by what staid,
And know (as far as fit to be survey'd)
Nature alike throughout; that thou may'st learn
Not to hope hopeless Things, but all discern;
And know those Wretches whose perverser Wills
Draw down upon their Heads spontaneous Ills:
Unto the Good that's nigh them, deaf and blind:
Some few the Cure of these Misfortunes find.
This only is the Fate that harms, and rolls
Through Miseries successive, human Souls.
Within is a continual hidden Fight,
Which we to shun must study, not excite.
Great Jove! *how little Trouble should we know,*
If thou to all Men wouldst their Genius show?
But fear not thou; Men come of heav'nly Race,
Taught by diviner Nature what t'embrace:
Which if pursu'd, thou all I nam'd shalt gain,
And keep thy Soul clear from thy Body's Stain.
In time of Pray'r, and Cleansing, Meats deny'd
Abstain from; thy Mind's Reins let Reason guide:
Then stripp'd of Flesh up to free Æther soar,
A deathless God, Divine, mortal no more.

TIMÆUS the *Locrian.*

Of the Soul of the World, and of Nature.

[a] TIMÆUS, the *Locrian*, ſaid theſe things: There are two Principles of all things: the *Mind*, of things effected according to Reaſon; *Neceſſity*, of thoſe which are by Violence according to the Powers of Bodies. Of theſe, one is of the nature of Good, and is called *God*, and is Principle of the beſt things; the Conſequent and Concauſals are reduced to *Neceſſity*. For all things are the Off-ſpring of theſe, Idea, Matter, Senſibles. The firſt is ungenerated, immoveable, permanent, of the nature of Identity, intellectual, the Exemplar of things that are made, and immutable. This is Idea. Matter, is the Print, Mother, Nurſe, and Productrix of the third Eſſence; for, receiving Likeneſs into itſelf, and being, as it were, characteriſed by them, it perfects all Productions. This Matter he aſſerted to be eternal, but not immoveable in Form of itſelf, and without Figure; but receiving all Forms. In Bodies it is diviſible, and of the nature of Alterity: They call Matter, Place and Religion. Theſe two Principles are contrary. Form hath the nature of Male and Father; Matter, of Female and Mother; the third is their Off-ſpring. Theſe being three, are known three ways; Idea, by Intellect, according to Science; Matter, by ſpurious Ratiocination, not being underſtood by direct Comprehenſion, but by Analogy; their Off-ſpring, by Senſe and Opinion. Before Heaven was made, we muſt conceive, that there was Idea, and Matter, and God, the Maker of the better, [*viz.* Idea.] Now foraſmuch as the elder is better than the younger, and the orderly than the diſorderly; God, being good, and ſeeing Matter receive Idea, and become totally changed, yet diſorderly; ſaw alſo it was needful to bring it into Order, and from indefinite Tranſmutations to fix it determinately, that Bodies might have proportionate Diſtinctions, and not receive promiſcuous Variations.

Of all this Matter he framed the World, [b] (making it the Bound of the nature of Being, ſince it comprehends all other things) one only-begotten, perfect, animate, and rational, (for theſe are better than inanimate and irrational) and a ſpherical Body, that being more perfect than other Figures. Deſigning therefore to make the beſt Production, he made this God, generate, not corruptible by any other Cauſe, but by the ſame God only which compos'd it, if it ſhould pleaſe him at any time to diſſolve it. But he who is good, will not be carried on to the Deſtruction of the faireſt Production. Wherefore it is permanent, and being ſuch, incorruptible, unperiſhable, and bleſſed. It is the beſt of Productions, being made by the beſt Cauſe, who looked not upon Patterns made by Hands, but upon the Idea, the intellectual Eſſence; after which, this being exactly made, is the faireſt of all, and not to be demoliſh'd. It is perfect, as to ſenſible things; for the Exemplar comprehended in itſelf all intelligible Creatures, left nothing out, it being the perfect Bound of Intelligibles, as the World is of Senſibles; which being ſolid, tactile, and viſible, is divided into Earth, Fire, and (betwixt theſe) Air, and Water. It conſiſts of perfect Bodies, which exiſt entirely in it, ſo as no Part remains beyond it, that the Body of the Univerſe might be ſelf-ſufficient, and not liable to diſſolution by any external Accidents; for there are no other things beſides theſe, and what are contained in them, they being, after the moſt excellent Analogy, connected in equal Power, neither predominating over the other in any Part, nor being predominated, that whereby ſome might increaſe, others decreaſe; but it reſteth in an indiſſoluble harmonious Concord, according to the beſt Proportion. For there being three Bounds, and the Intervals diſtant from each other in the ſame Proportion, the middle is that to the firſt which the third is to it, and ſo reciprocal, according to diſpoſure of Place and Order. But to number theſe without the help of another thing equal to them, is abſolutely impoſſible. It is well ordered both for Figure and Motion: As to the firſt being round, it is every way like itſelf, and able to contain all other Figures. As to it its circular Motion, it keepeth a perpetual Tenor: for a Sphere only, whether in Reſt or in Motion, is ſo adapted to the ſame Place, as that it never ceaſeth nor removes; all its Parts being equidiſtant from the Center. Now its outward Superficies being exactly ſmooth, it needs not the weak Organs, which are beſtow'd on other living Creatures, for their Accommodation.

[c] The Soul of the World God enkindled in the midſt, but diffuſed beyond it, covering the Univerſe with it, and tempering it with a Temperament of indiviſible Form, and diviſible Subſtance, ſo as theſe two make one Temperament; with which he mingled two Powers, Principles of the two Motions of Identity and Alterity; which (Soul) being not eaſily miſcible, was not without difficulty contemperated.

All

[a] Principles. [b] The World. [c] The Soul of the World.

All theſe Proportions are mixed according to harmonical Numbers; which Proportions he cunningly divided, that it might be known of what, and by what, the Soul conſiſteth. This Soul God did not ordain (as we affirm) after corporeal Subſtance, (for that which is moſt honourable, is firſt both in Power and Time) but made it before the Body, removing one, the firſt of four Monads, into eight Decads, and three Centuries. Of this, the duple and triple is eaſily collected, the firſt being ſettled. All theſe, with their Complements, and Seſquioctaves, will amount to thirty-ſix. The whole Sum will be one hundred and fourteen thouſand ſix hundred and ninety-five. The Diviſions are one hundred and fourteen thouſand ſix hundred and ninety-five. After this manner he divided the Soul of the Univerſe.

[4] The Mind only ſeeth the Eternal God, the Ruler and Father of all Things. That which is generated we behold with our Eyes, this World, and its Parts; the Ætherial are two-fold, ſome of the nature of Identity: others, of Alterity. Of theſe, ſome extrinſically carry about all that is within them, from Eaſt to Weſt, by an univerſal Motion. The reſt, being of the Motion of Alterity, intrinſically turn about from the Weſt to the Eaſt, moved by themſelves. They are carried round by Accident, with the Motion of Identity, having the greateſt Force in the World. The Motion of Alterity, divided according to harmonical Proportions, is diſpoſed to ſeven Circles; the *Moon* being neareſt the Earth, performeth her Courſe in a Month: next her, the *Sun* perfects his courſe in a year. There are two of equal Courſe with the *Sun*, *Mercury*, and the Star *Juno*, which many call *Venus*, and *Lucifer*. All Perſons not being skilful in the Rules of ſacred Aſtronomy, and the Obſervations of Riſing and Setting: The ſame Star is ſometimes *Heſper*, when it ſo followeth the *Sun*, that it is conſpicuous to us when the *Sun* is ſet: ſometimes *Eous*, when it goeth before the *Sun*, and riſeth before him. *Lucifer* therefore many times is the Star *Venus*, when ſhe runs along with the *Sun*: and likewiſe are many of the fixed Stars and Planets; for any Star of viſible Magnitude, uſhering the *Sun* above the Horizon, foretells Day. The other three, *Mars*, *Jupiter*, and *Saturn*, have peculiar Velocities, and unequal Years: but they compleat their Courſe in certain and comprehenſible Regularities, and Appearances, and Occultations, and Eclipſes, and Riſings, and Settings. They have, beſides their *Phaſes*, Riſing and Setting in regard of the *Sun*: who maketh Day in performing his Courſe from Eaſt to Weſt: Night, by Motion from Weſt to Eaſt: whilſt he is carried about with Motion of Identity, a Year, by his own proper Motion. By theſe two Motions, the *Sun* performs a double Courſe, one, as being carried about with the general Motion of Heaven, the other by an oblique Motion: One diſtinguiſheth the Times of the Day and the Seaſons: The other, by which he is carried about after the rapid Motion of the fixed Stars, at every Revolution maketh Night Day. Theſe are parts of Time called Periods, ordained by God together with the World: for before the World there were no Stars, and conſequently neither Year nor Seaſons, by which this generable World is commenſurated. This Time is the Image of that which is ingenerate, called Eternity: for as this Univerſe was formed after the eternal Exemplar of the Ideal World, ſo was this Time ordained together with the World after its Pattern, Eternity.

The Earth being eſtabliſhed in the midſt, the Seat of the Gods is the Bound of Night and Day, of Riſing and Setting, according to the Section of Horizons, as they are circumſcribed by the Sight, and by Section of the Earth. It is the moſt ancient of all Bodies in the Univerſe; for Water was not produc'd without Earth, nor Air without Humidity: and Fire cannot ſubſiſt without Humidity and Matter, which it kindles. So that the Earth is ſettled upon its own Weight, as the Root and Baſis of all things. The Principle therefore of generated things, as to the Subject, is Matter; as to Form, Idea. The Productions of theſe are Bodies; Earth, Water, Air, and Fire, whoſe Generation is thus: Every Body conſiſts of Superficies's; a Superficies of Triangles; of which this is a rectangled equi-crural Semiquadrangle; the other unequilateral, having the greater Angle in Power, triple to the leſſer. The leaſt Angle in it is one third of a right Angle: double to this is the middle Angle, conſiſting of two thirds; the greateſt is a right Angle, ſeſquialter to the middle, triple to the leaſt. Now this Triangle is a Seſquiquadrangle to an equilateral Triangle, the Perpendicular from the top to the bottom being divided into two equal Parts: there are therefore in each two rectangled Triangles; but in one, the two Sides which include the right Angle are equal; in the other, all the three Sides are unequal. This Figure is called *Scholion*. This Semi-quadrangle is the Principle of which the Earth was conſtituted; for the Quadrangle is compounded of theſe four Semi-quadrangles. Of the Quadrangle is generated the Cube, the firmeſt and moſt ſettled of all Bodies, having ſix Sides, eight Angles. For this reaſon Earth is the moſt heavy Body, and unapt for Motion, and not tranſmutable into any other, as being incommunicable with any kind of Triangle; for the Earth only hath a ſtable Principle, which is the Semi-quadrangle, the Element of the other Bodies, Fire, Air, and Water: for the Semi-quadrangle being ſix times compounded, there ariſeth an equilateral Triangle; of

[4] The Parts of the World.

of which a Pyramis, with four Baſes, and four equal Angles, is compounded; the Form of Fire moſt apt to Motion, and of rareſt Parts. Next theſe, Octaedron, with eight Baſes and ſix Angles, the Element of Air. The third, Icoſiedron, of twenty Baſes and twelve Angles, the Element of Water, being fulleſt of Parts, and heavieſt. Theſe being compounded of the ſame Element, are tranſmutated into one another. The Dodecaedron, he made the Image of the Univerſe, as neareſt to a Globe. Fire, by reaſon of the Rarity of its Parts, penetrates all things; Air, all things but Fire; Water, Earth. All things therefore are full, and admit no Vacuity. They are carried about by the Circumvolution of the Univerſe, and by reaſon of their Solidity grate one another, rendring an unintermitted Alteration to Generation and Corruption. Theſe God uſed in framing the World, tactile by reaſon of Earth; viſible by reaſon of Fire, the two Extremes. By Air and Water, he connected it in a moſt firm Band, Proportion, capable to contain both itſelf, and the things that are compriſed in it. If then that which is connected be a Superficies, one Medium is ſufficient; if a Solid, it requires two. To the two Mediums he adapted the two Extremes, Fire to Air, Air to Water, Water to Earth; and again, Fire to Air, Air to Water, and Water to Earth; and again, as Earth to Water, Water to Air, and Air to Earth; and reciprocally, as Earth to Air, Water to Fire. And foraſmuch as all theſe are equal in Power, their Proportions are equal likewiſe. Thus is the World one, and by a happy Connexure proportionable. Each of theſe four Bodies have divers Species; the Fire, Flame, Light, Splendor, by reaſon of the Inequality of the Triangles of each of theſe. The Air is partly clear and dry, partly humid and cloudy. The Water, fluid and concrete, as Snow, Froſt, Hail, and Ice. Of humid, one ſort is fluid, as Honey, Oil; another compact, as Pitch, Wax. Of the compact are two kinds, one fuſile, as Gold, Silver, Braſs, Tin, Lead; the other frangible, as Sulphur, Bitumen, Nitre, Salt, Allom, and Stones of that kind.

After he had made the World, he * proceeded to the Production of mortal Creatures, that it might be perfect and compleatly wrought according to its Pattern. Having contemperated and diſtributed the Soul of Man by the ſame Proportions and Powers, he deliver'd it over to that Nature which had the Power of changing. She ſucceeding him in the producing mortal tranſitory Creatures, inſtilled their Souls, ſome from the Moon, ſome from the Sun, ſome from the other Stars which wander in the Region of Alterity, excepting one Soul in the Power of Identity, which he mingled in the rational Part, an Image of Wiſdom to thoſe who make uſe of good Fate. For of the human Soul, one Part is rational and intellectual, the other irrational and fooliſh; of the irrational, the better is of the nature of Identity; the worſe, of that of Alterity. Each of theſe is reſident about the Head, that all the other Parts of the Soul and Body may be ſubſervient to it, according to the Analogy of the Body of the Univerſe. Of the irrational Part, one is iraſcible, placed about the Heart; the other deſiderative, about the Liver.

As for the Body, the Principle and Root of Marrow is in the Brain, wherein is the Hegemonick of the Soul. From the Brain iſſues a Defluxion along the Spondyles of the Back, from whence it is diſtributed into Seed and generative Subſtance. The Bones are the Caſe of the Marrow; the Fleſh is the Tegument of the Bones; the Joints he connected by Nerves for Motion. Of the inward Parts, ſome were made for Nouriſhment, others for Converſation. Of the Motions, thoſe which come from without, and flow into the apprehenſive Part, are ſenſible; thoſe which fall not under Comprehenſion are inſenſible, whether by reaſon that the affected Bodies are more earthy, or that the Motions are weaker. Whatſoever Motions change Nature, are painful; whatſoever comply with her, are named Pleaſures.

Of the Senſes, God enlighten'd our Sight for Contemplation of Celeſtials, and Apprehenſion of Science. Hearing, he framed perceptive of Diſcourſe and of Muſick. Of this, if any be deſtitute from his Birth, he will alſo be uncapable of ſpeaking. Whence we ſay, this Senſe is neareſt ally'd to Reaſon. All that are termed Affections of Bodies, are denominated with reference to the Touch, and their Inclinations to a Place; for the Touch dijudicates vital Faculties; warm, cold; dry, moiſt; ſmooth, rough; yielding, reſiſting; ſoft, hard; but heavy and light, the Touch prejudicates. Reaſon defines by Inclination to move to the middle, and from the middle; below, and the middle, they affirm to be the ſame thing; for the Center of a Globe is below; whatſoever is betwixt that and the Circumference, is above. Heat ſeems to conſiſt of rare Parts, and diſgregates Bodies; Cold, of more denſe Parts, and bindeth the Pores. The Taſte reſembles the Touch in Concretion and Diſcretion, and in Penetration of the Pores, and in its Objects, which are either harſh or ſmooth. Thoſe which have an abſterſive Faculty, ſtupifying the Tongue, are bitter; thoſe which are moderately abſterſive, ſalt; thoſe which inflame and pierce further into the Fleſh, acid. Contrary to theſe, are ſmooth and ſweet. The Kinds of Odor are not diſtinct; for they inſinuate through narrow Pores, which are too ſolid to be contracted and dilated by Putrefaction, and Concoction of Earth and earthly things. They are ſweet or ſtinking. Voice is a Percuſſion in the Air, paſſing to the Soul thro' the Ears, whoſe Pores extend to the Liver. In the Ears is a Spirit, whoſe Motion is Hearing. Of Voice

* Animals.

Voice and Hearing ſome are ſwift, the ſharp; ſome ſlow, the flat; the mean are incommenſurable. Again, one is much and diffuſed, the *loud*; another ſmall and contracted, the *low*: one is ordered according to Proportions, the *harmonious*; another diſorderly and unproportionate, the *inharmonious*. The fourth Kind of Senſibles is moſt various and multiform, termed Viſibles, compriſing all Colours, and innumerable coloured things. The primary Colours are four, White, Black, Bright, Purple; the reſt are made by Commixtion of theſe. White diſperſeth the Sight, Black contracts it; as Hot diffuſeth the Touch, Cold contracts it; Bitter contracteth the Taſte, and Sweet diſſipates it.

The Bodies of Creatures that breathe Air, are nouriſhed by Aliment, diſtributed by the Veins thro' the whole Frame defluxively, as by Channels, and irrigated by the Spirit, which diffuſeth it to the utmoſt Bounds. Reſpiration is made (there being no Vacuity in Nature) by Influxion, and Attraction of the Air in the room of that which iſſueth forth at inviſible Vents, out of which alſo Sweat evaporates. Now ſomething of it being waſted by the natural Heat, it is neceſſary ſomething be introduced to ſupply that which was conſumed; otherwiſe there wou'd be a Vacuity, which is impoſſible: for a living Creature could not be reſtor'd by perpetual Fluxion, and entire, if the Body were disjoin'd by Vacuity. The like Compoſition of Organs is likewiſe in inanimate things, with an analogical Reſpiration; a Cupping-glaſs and Amber are Reſemblances of Reſpiration, for the Spirits evaporate through the Body, and enter again at the Mouth and Noſtrils by Reſpiration: then again, like *Euripus*, it is brought round into the Body, which by theſe Effluxions is extended. The Cupping-glaſs, the Air being conſumed by Fire, attracts Moiſture; the Amber, by Emiſſion of Spirits, attracts the Body that is like to it. All Aliment is taken into the Body from the Root of the Heart, and the Fountain of the Ventricle; if the Acceſſion be more than the Defluxion, it is termed Growth; if the contrary, Decay. The *Acma* conſiſts in the Confine betwixt theſe two, and is conceived to be the Equality of Acceſſion and Defluxion. When the Ligaments of the Conſtitution are diſſolved, ſo as there is no Paſſage for the Breath, or Diſtribution of Aliment, the Animal dies. There are many things which are pernicious to Life, and cauſe Death; whereof one is termed, Sickneſs. The Origins of Sickneſs are the Diſproportions of the primary Faculties: If the ſimple Faculties, Heat, Cold, Humidity, Siccity abound, or are deficient, then follow Mutations and Alterations of the Blood by Corruption, and Depravations of the conſumptive Fleſh: If according to the Changes into ſharp, or ſalt, or acid (Humours) the Turnings of the Blood, or Conſumptions of the Fleſh be cauſed; from hence are generated Choler and Flegm. Unwholſome Chyles, and Putrefaction of Humours, are inconſiderable except they be deep; but thoſe whoſe Cauſes lie in the Bones, are not eaſily cur'd; thoſe which ariſe out of the Marrow are painful. The Extremities of Diſeaſes are Wind, Choler, Flegm, increaſing and flowing into Places not proper to them, or into the vital Parts; for then obtaining a better Place, they expel their Neighbours, and ſettle there, and afflicting the Bodies, they reſolve them into themſelves.

Theſe are the Diſeaſes of the Body. Out of theſe ariſe many Sickneſſes of the Soul, ſeveral of ſeveral Faculties; of the Senſitive, Stupidity; of the Reminiſcent, Forgetfulneſs; of the Deſiderative, Loathing, and exceſſive Appetite; of the Pathetick, wild Paſſions, and furious Frenzies; of the Rational, Indocility and Indiſcretion. The Forces of Vice are Pleaſures and Griefs, Deſires and Fears, raiſed out of the Body, mingled with the Soul, and expreſs'd by various Names, Loves, Deſires, diſſolute Affections, impetuous Angers, deep Malices, various Longings, inordinate Delights. In a word, to behave ourſelves amiſs as to Paſſions, or to ſubdue them, is the Bound betwixt Virtue and Vice; for to be exceſſive in them, or too hard for them, put us in a good or bad Condition. To theſe Inclinations the Temper of the Body may contribute much: if vehement, fervent, or any way extraordinary, it tranſports us to Melancholy and extravagant Luſts. For the Parts being overflown by theſe Defluxions, make the Conſtitution of the Body rather hydropical than ſound; whence ariſe Sadneſs, Forgetfulneſs, Folly, and Conſternation. The Cuſtoms alſo whereunto a Man hath conformed himſelf in the City, or Family, where he was born and bred, conduce much; as alſo the daily Courſe of Life, whether ſoftning or corroborating the Soul: for living abroad, Diet, Exerciſe, and the Manners of thoſe with whom we converſe, greatly avail to Virtue or Vice; and theſe Occaſions are derived rather from our Parents and Elements, than from ourſelves; for they are not ineffectual, we ourſelves ſo eaſily receding from thoſe * Actions which are good.

To the Well-being of an Animal, it is requiſite that the Body have the Virtues competent to it, Health, perfect Senſe, Strength, and Beauty. The Principles of Beauty are a Symmetry of the Parts amongſt themſelves, and with the Soul; for Nature made the Body as an Inſtrument, obedient, and accommodate to all the Buſineſſes of Life. In like manner, the Soul muſt be order'd to Virtues anſwerable to thoſe; to Temperance, as the Body to Health; to Wiſdom, as the Body to perfect Senſe; to Fortitude, as the Body to Strength; to Juſtice, as the

* Πεθαχόνταν perhaps is for προσηκόντων. Doricè.

Body to Beauty. The Principles of these are from Nature, their Means and Ends from Industry; those of the Body are attained by Exercise and Medicine; those of the Soul by Institution and Philosophy. For these Faculties nourish and strengthen both the Soul and Body, by Labour, Exercise, and Pureness of Diet; these by Medicaments; those instituting the Soul by Chastisements and Reprehensions; for they strengthen it by Exhortation, by exciting the Inclination, and enjoining those things which are expedient for Action. The Aleiptick Art, and, its nearest Ally, Medicine, are design'd for the Cure of Bodies, reducing the Faculties to the best Harmony; they purify the Blood, and make the Spirits flow freely; so as if any thing unwholesome settle, the Vigors of the Blood and Spirits being thus confirmed, overmaster it. Musick, and its Director, Philosophy, ordained by the Gods, and by the Laws, for Reformation of the Soul, inure, compel and persuade the irrational Part to obey the rational, and in the irrational molify Anger, and quiet Desire; so as they neither move nor rest without Reason, the Mind summoning them either to Action or Fruition. The Bound of Temperance is Obedience and Fortitude. Now Science and venerable Philosophy, purifying the Mind from false Opinions, bring her to Knowledge, and reducing her from great Ignorance, raise her to Contemplation of divine things; wherein if a Man be conversant with Contentedness as to human things, and endeavour in a moderate way of living, he is happy. For he to whom God hath allotted this Estate, is undoubtedly guided to a most happy Life. But if a Man be stiff and refractory, he shall be pursued by Punishment according to the Laws, and those Discourses which declare things Cœlestial and Infernal. For irremissible Punishments are prepar'd for the unhappy Dead, and many other things; for which I commend the *Ionick* Poet, who makes Men religious by ancient fabulous Traditions. For as we cure Bodies with things unwholsome, when the wholsome agree not with them; so we restrain Souls with fabulous Relations, when they will not be led by the true. Let them then, since there is a Necessity for it, talk of these strange Punishments, as if Souls did transmigrate; those of the Effeminate into the Bodies of Women given up to Ignominy; of Murtherers, into those of Beasts, for Punishment; of the Lascivious, into the Forms of Swine; of the Light and Temerarious, into Birds; of the Slothful and Idle, Unlearned and Ignorant, into several Kinds of Fishes. All these in the second Period, *Nemesis* decrees, together with the vindictive and terrestrial Dæmons, the Overseers of human Affairs, to whom God, the Disposer of all things, hath committed the Administration of the World, replenish'd with Gods, Men, and all other living Creatures: all which are formed after the best Image, of the ungenerate and eternal Idea.

An Explication of the *Pythagorick* Doctrine.

By [b] *JOHN REUCHIN.*

CHAP. I.

Of Pythagoras *his Way of Teaching by Silence and Symbols.*

[c] THE indocible and abstruse Tradition of *Mysteries* and *Symbols* is not to be investigated by Acuteness of human Wit, (which rather affects us with a doubtful Fear, than an adherent Firmness) it requires ample Strength of thinking and believing; and above all things, Faith and Taciturnity. Whence *Pythagoras taught nothing* (as [d] *Apuleius* saith) *to his Disciples before Silence; it being the first Rudiment of contemplative Wisdom to learn to meditate, and to unlearn to talk.* As if the *Pythagorick* Sublimity were of greater Worth, than to be comprehended by the Talk of Boys. This Kind of Learning (as other things) *Pythagoras* brought into *Greece* from the *Hebrews*, that the Disciple being to ask some sublime Question, should hold his Peace; and being question'd, should only answer, αὐτὸς ἔφα, *He said.* Thus the Cabalists answer, אמכו חכמי *The Wise said*; and Christians, πίστευσον, *Believe.*

[e] Moreover, all the *Pythagorick* Philosophy (especially that which concerns divine things) is mystical, expressed by *Ænigms* and *Symbols.* The Reasons these: *First*, The Ancients used to deliver Wisdom by Allegories: all their Philosophers and Poets are full of Riddles, avoiding, by Obscurity, Contempt of

[b] E Cabalæ libro 2. [c] Page 664. Out of which *Paulus Scbalichius* collects his first Canon, *de Mysteriis Pythagoricis*, Myst. Philos. cap. 7. [d] Florid. 2. [e] Page 685.

of the Vulgar; for the moſt apt Interpreter of things, not perceptible by human Infirmity, is Fable: *That befits Philoſophers, which is declared under the pious Veil of Fictions, hidden in honeſt Things, and attired in honeſt Words; for, what is eaſily found, is but too negligently purſu'd. Secondly*, It ſometimes happens, that we cannot expreſs abſtruſe Things without Circumlocution, unleſs by ſome ſhort Ænigm. *Thirdly*, as Generals uſe Watch-words to diſtinguiſh their own Soldiers from others; ſo it is not improper to communicate to Friends ſome peculiar Symbols, as diſtinctive Marks of a Society. Theſe, among the *Pythagoreans*, were a chain of indiſſoluble Love. *Pythagoras* was ſtudious of Friendſhip; and if he heard of any that uſed his Symbols, he preſently admitted him into his Society. Hereupon all became deſirous of them, as well thereby to be acceptable to their Maſter, as to be known *Pythagoreans*. *Laſtly*, As memorial Notes; for, intreating of all Things divine and human, the vaſtneſs of the Subject requires ſhort Symbols, as conducing much to Memory.

CHAP. II.

The Triple World.

[f] THE *Pythagoreans* reduce all *Beings*, ſubſiſtent or ſubſtant, immediately to *Ideas* which truly are; and thoſe to the *Idea of Ideas*. Hereupon they aſſerted *three Worlds*, whereof the third is infinite; or rather not finite; and that all Things conſiſt of Three. *The Pythagoreans* (ſaith *Ariſtotle*) *affirm that the whole, and all Things are terminated by Three: Some are Bodies and Magnitudes, others keep and inhabit Bodies and Magnitudes, others are the Rulers and Origines of the Inhabitants.* This we underſtand of three Worlds, the *Inferior*, the *Superior*, and the *Supreme*. The *Inferior* containeth Bodies and Magnitudes, and there appropriate Intelligence, Movers of the Spheres, Overſeers, and Guardians of Things generable and corruptible, who are ſaid to take care of Bodies, each according to the particular Task aſſign'd him; by the Ancients named ſometimes *Angels*, ſometimes *Gods*, and (in reſpect of the anxious Solicitude of Things whereto they are confin'd) *Dæmons*.

Next over it, immediately ſhineth the *Superior* World; this containeth the ſuperior Powers, incorporeal Eſſences, divine Exemplars, the Seals of the inferior World, after whoſe Likeneſs, the Faces of all inferior Things are formed. Theſe [g] *Pythagoras* calls *Immortal Gods*, as being the Principles of things produc'd out of the divine Mind, eſſential ἀρχαὶ, *Cauſes* of thoſe Forms which dwell in Bodies, and inform the compounded Subſtances of the lower World. There are alſo other Gods, incorporeal Beings, individual, differing (not by material, but) by formal Number; Spirits void of Matter, ſimple, unmixt, ſeated beyond the ſenſible Heaven, confin'd neither to Time nor Place, neither ſuffering Age nor Tranſmutation, much leſs any Alteration; In a word, not being affected with any Paſſion, they lead a ſelf-ſufficient excellent Life, and inhabit Eternity, which is ἀιὼν ἀεὶ ὤν, *always being*, becauſe it always was, is, and ſhall be intemporally in the divine Mind; yet by the Energy of God, it was created and placed beyond the Convex of the viſible Heavens, as being the lucid Manſion of the bleſſed Spirits, [whom the *Pythagoreans* believe Gods] placed in the higheſt Region of Æther, Æviternal, inveſted in the immortal Ævum.

The *third* World, *Supreme*, containing all other Worlds, is that of the Deity, conſiſting of one divine Eſſence, exiſtent before *Ævum*; for it is the Age of Ages, the præ-exiſtent Entity and Unity of Exiſtence, Subſtance, Eſſence, Nature.

Theſe three Worlds are called *Receptacles*, in different Reſpects; the firſt, of *Quantity*; the ſecond, of *Intelligences*; the third, of *Principles*. The firſt, *circumſcriptively*; the ſecond, *definitively*; the third is not received, but receiveth, becauſe it is everywhere, and is called a Receptacle *repletively*.

Through the ſuperior World is communicated from the *Tetractys* to the inferior, Life, and the being (not accidental, but ſubſtantial) of every Species; to ſome, clearly; to others, obſcurely. This the *Pythagoreans* collect from thoſe Words of their Maſter:

——— [h] *the* Tetractys *to our Souls did ſend*
The Fountain of Eternal Nature———

The *Tetractys* is the *Divine Mind* communicating, the *Fountain* is the *exemplar Idea* communicated, and *eternal Nature* is the *eſſential Idea* of things received. Idea, conſidered as to God, (ſay they) is his *Knowledge*; as to the ſenſible World, *Exemplar*; as to itſelf, *Eſſence*.

Now as in the ſenſible World, the ſuperior Sphere hath an Influence on all the Spheres beneath it; ſo in the intelligible World, not only every ſuperior Chorus of Angels, hath an Influence upon all the inferior; but the whole ſuperior World hath an Influence upon the whole inferior, whereby all things are reduced according to their Capacities, as far as poſſible, momentary to eternal, inferior to ſuperior. But to the third World, nothing that is merely a Creature can be reduced, incapable of its own Nature of that Sublimity which is proper only to God.

[f] Pag. 664. Scalich. can. 4. [g] Aur. carm. [h] Carm.

CHAP. III.

The Supreme World.

THE ſupreme World, being (as we ſaid) that of the Deity, is one divine, continual, conſtant Eſſence of Sempiternity, poized (as it were) with immovable Weight; not unfitly termed, παντοκρατωρικὴ ἕδρα, *the All-governing Throne*. It is not confined to Genus, Place, Time or Reaſon, but is the free, unlimited Preſident over all theſe; infinitely ſupreme in Place, Power, Poſſeſſion, Excellence, above all Eſſence, Nature, Ævum, Age.

This Divine Mind, the Receptacle of Principles, *Pythagoras* ſymbolically terms *Number*, ſaying, *Number is the Principle of all things*. (For none can believe ſo meanly of ſo wiſe a Perſon, as that he ſhould conceive the ordinary Numbers by which we caſt account, to be the Principle of all things; which are far from being antecedent to things, for they are conſequential Accidents.) So [k] *Plutarch*, *by Number* Pythagoras *underſtands the Mind*; a Symbol not improper; in Incorporeals nothing more divine than the *Mind*, in Abſtractions nothing more ſimple than *Number*.

The divine Eſſence therefore, exiſtent before Ævum and Age, (for it is the Age of Ages) the præexiſtent Entity and Unity of Exiſtence, Subſtance, Eſſence, Nature, was by *Pythagoras* called ἓν *one*, by *Parmenides* ὂν *being*, both upon a like Ground; becauſe it is the ſuper-eſſential Unite and Being, from which, and by which, and through which, and in which, and to which, all things are, and are ordered, and perſiſt, and are contained, and are filled, and are converted.

Of this firſt *One*, and firſt *Ens*, Ariſtotle thus; *Plato and the Pythagoreans* (ſaith he) *hold no other concerning Ens or One, but that this is their Nature, their Eſſence is the ſame, to be One and a Being. Xenophanes* declared this *One* to be *God*, herein agreeing with *Pythagoras*, [l] who aſſerted *Infinite*, and *One*, and *Number*, to be the firſt Principles of things; by *Infinite* ſignifying the *Power*; for nothing can be imagined before Power, which in God is infinite, or rather it is infinite God: in him *eſſe* and *poſſe* are not diſtinct, who containeth the Eſſences, Virtues and Operations of all Producibles. With *Pythagoras* agreeth [m] *Anaxagoras*, ſaying, *for all things were together*; Democritus, *for all things were in Power*. This alſo is the *commixion of Things* mentioned by *Empedocles*, and *Anaximander*; not confuſedly in *Chaos*, *Erebus*, or *Night*, but diſtinctly and orderly, in *full Light*, in the moſt perfect Splendor of the divine Light, intuitive Knowledge, that is the *Idea*, (from εἶδω γινώσκω) whoſe Power is Being, including all, whether Mental, Rational, Intelligible, Senſible, Vital, Subſtantial, Adhæſible or Adhæſive; and is not only all Things that are, but thoſe that are not: This is no other than the divine Eſſence, within which (before all things) *one* produced *two*. *Two* is the firſt Number, *one* is the Principle of Number, *one* is God; and the Production of *two* being within the divine Eſſence, (for Number is conſtituted of itſelf, and next *one* is naturally only the Number *two*) this *two* muſt neceſſarily be God alſo, for within God is nothing but God. Thus theſe three, (*One* and *Two*) being the Principle and firſt, and not exceeding the Eſſence of God, are indeed one God: for his Eſſence is not divided by the Production of *two* out of *one*. In like manner, it often happens in Corporeals, that *one* being moved to *two*, proceeds to *three*, the Subſtance of things continuing; as, in a Tree, of Boughs and Branches; in Man, the Body, Arms, and Fingers. Of *one* therefore in the Divinity producing, and *two* produced, ariſeth a *Trinity*, to which if there be added an Eſſence formally diſtinct from them, there will be a formal *Quaternity*, which is the infinite one and two, the Subſtance, Perfection, and End of all Number. *One*, *two*, *three*, *four*, by a collective Progreſſion make *ten*; beyond ten there is not any thing. This *Pythagoras* meant, when he aſſerted all things *Tetractys*; he underſtood God by it; for he ſwore by it, and ſeems to have transferr'd the Hebrew Tetragrammaton, into a Greek Symbol.

[n] Thus the moſt apt Symbol, of the Principles of things, is *one* and *two*; for when we make Enquiry into the Cauſes and Origin of all things, what ſooner occurs than one and two? That which we firſt behold with our Eyes, is the ſame, and not another; that which we firſt conceive in our Mind is *Identity* and *Alterity*, *one* and *two*. (*Alcmæon*, contemporary with *Pythagoras*) affirmed *two* to be many, which he ſaid were *contrarieties*, (perhaps the ſame with *Empedocles*'Ερις) yet unconfin'd and indefinite, as White and Black, Sweet and Bitter, Good and Evil, Great and Small. Theſe multiplicious Diverſities the *Pythagoreans* deſigned by the Number *ten*, as finite and infinite, even and odd, one and many, right and left, male and female, ſtedfaſt and moved, ſtraight and crooked, light and darkneſs, good and ill, ſquare and oblong. Theſe Pairs are two, and therefore contrary; they are reduced all into ten, that being the moſt perfect Number, as containing more kinds of Numeration than the reſt; even, odd; ſquare, cube; long, plain; the firſt uncompounded, and firſt compounded, than which nothing is more abſolute, ſince in ten Proportions, four cubick Numbers are conſummated, of which (according to the *Pythagoreans*) all Things conſiſt. By this all Nations reckon, (not exceeding it,)

[k] Plac. phil. [l] Scalich. Canon. 2. [m] Laert. on Anax. [n] Pag. 686. d.

it) as by the natural Account of ten Fingers; Heaven itſelf conſiſts of ten Spheres. *Architas* includeth *all that is*, in the Number *Ten*; in Imitation of whom *Ariſtotle* nameth ten Kinds of Ens, *Categories*, reducible to two, *Subſtance* and *Accident*, both ſpringing from one Eſſence; for *ten* ſo loves *two*, that from *one* it proceeds to *two*, and by *two* it reverts into *one*. The firſt *Ternary* is of *one* and *two*, not compounded, but conſiſtent; *one* having no Poſition, makes no Compoſition; an Unite whilſt an Unite hath no Poſition; nor a Point whilſt a Point. There being nothing before One, we rightly ſay, *one* is firſt; *two* is not compounded of Numbers, but a Co-ordination of Unites only. It is therefore the firſt Number, being the firſt Multitude; not commenſurable by any Number, but by Unite the common Meaſure of all Number; for one, two, is nothing but two; ſo that the Multitude which is called *Triad*, Arithmeticians term *the firſt Number uncompounded*, the *Dual* being not an uncompounded Number, but rather *not-compounded*.

[o] Now the *Triad*, through its Propenſity to multiply, and communicate its Goodneſs to all Creatures, proceeds from Power to Operation, beholding with a perpetual Intuition that Fæcundity of Multitude which is in it, productive (as it were) of Number from Number, and that Eſſentiality which is one in it, the Fountain of all Production, the Beginning of all Progreſſion, the Permanence of all immutable Subſtance; it reverts itſelf into itſelf, multiplying itſelf (as it were) by Unity and Duity, ſaying, *Once twice two are four*. [p] This is the *Tetractys*, the Idea of all created things; for all Progreſſion is perfected in four. Hence ariſeth the *Decad*, the ten moſt general Kinds of all things; *one*, *two*, *three*, *four*, going out of Omnipotency to Energy, (out of Power to act) produce *ten*, the half whereof is *five*; now in the midſt put *five*, on the right Hand the next ſuperior Number *ſix*, on the left Hand the next inferior *four*: theſe added, make *ten*. Again, the next ſuperior *ſeven*, and the next inferior *three*, make *ten*. Again, the next ſuperior *eight*, and the next inferior *two*, make *ten*. Laſtly, *one* and *nine* make *ten*. This *ten* being carried up to *twenty*, comes again to *one*; and ſo on, in all the cardinal Numbers, to a *hundred*: For, as twice one make two, thrice one three, four times one four, and ſo forward; ſo twice ten makes twenty, thrice ten thirty, four times ten forty, and ſo on; the like in a hundred, a thouſand, and forward. And becauſe the Decad ariſeth out of, and ends in a Monad, the *Greeks* expreſs ten by ῑ, the *Hebrews* by a Point, which Marks (as well amongſt the Barbarians as in *Latin*) denote one. [q] Hitherto alludes the *Pythagorick* Symbol, *One*, *Two*, by *Zaratas* (the Maſter of *Pythagoras*) uſed as the Names of Propagation; *one*, the Father; *two*, the Mother; one and two (in the divine Eſſence) producing *four*, the *Tetractys*, the Idea of all things, which are conſummated in the Number ten. This *Pythagoras* ſtiles

Eternal Nature's Fountain ——

No other than *the Knowledge of things in the divine Mind intellectually operating*. From this *Fountain of eternal Nature* floweth down the *Pythagorick* Number, One and Two, which from Eternity, in the Fountain of the immenſe Ocean, was, ſhall be, or rather always is, plenteouſly ſtreaming. This one was by the Ancients termed Ζεὺς, *Jupiter*; two, Ἥρα, *Juno*, Wife and Siſter to *Jupiter*; of whom * *Homer*:

Golden-thron'd Juno, *with Eyes full of Love,*
Beheld her Spouſe and Brother, ſacred Jove,
Sitting on th' Top of fount-abounding Ide.

In *Ida* (ἀπὸ τῦ ἰδεῖν, from *Preſcience*) *Jupiter* and *Juno* ſat as *one* and *two*, in the ſtreaming Idea of the *Tetractys*, whence flow the Principles of all things, *Form* and *Matter*.

CHAP. IV.

The Intelligible World.

[r] THE *Intelligible World* proceeds out of the Divine Mind, after this manner: The Tetractys reflecting upon its own Eſſence, (the firſt Unite Productrix of all things) and on its own Beginning, (the firſt Product) ſaith thus: *Once one*, *twice two*, immediately ariſeth a *Tetrad*, having on its Top the higheſt Unite, and becomes a Pyramis, whoſe Baſe is a plain Tetrad, anſwerable to a Superficies, upon which the radiant Light of the Divine Unity produceth the Form of incorporeal Fire, by reaſon of the Deſcent of *Juno* (Matter) to inferior things. Hence ariſeth eſſential Light, not burning, but illuminating. This is the Creation of the *middle World*, (which the *Hebrews* call the *Supreme*, the World of the Deity, admitting no Compariſon.) It is termed *Olympus*, ὁλολαμπεῖς, *wholly lucid*, and replete with ſeparate Forms, where is the Seat of the immortal Gods,

——*Deum domus alta,*

whoſe Top is Unity, Wall, Trinity, Superficies, Quaternity.

Number emanating from the Divinity by degrees, declineth to the Figure of Creatures; inſtead of the Tetractys a Tetragone, in each of its Angles a Point, for ſo many Unites the Unite at the Top, which now

[o] Scalich. can. 9. [p] Ibid. can. 10. [q] Ibid. can. 11. * Iliad. 14. [r] Page 689. d.

now begins to have Position, elevated as much as is possible. Thus the former Sides elevated will be four Triangles, built upon their quadrangular Latitude, and carried on to one high Point. This is the Pyramis itself, [s] *the Species of Fire, of which a Pyramis, having four Bases and equal Angles, is compounded, the most immoveable and penetrant Form*, without Matter, essential separate Light, next to God, sempiternal Life. The Work of the Mind is *Life*, the Work of God is Immortality, *eternal Life*. God himself is not this created Light, but the Author of all Light; whereof in the divine Trinity he containeth a most absolute Pyramid, which implieth the Vigor of Fire. Whence the *Chaldeans* and *Hebrews* affirm, that God is Fire. But the Pyramid which this divine Tetractys produceth, is the fiery Light of the immaterial World, of separate Intelligences, beyond the visible Heaven, termed αἰὼν, *Age*, *Eternity*, *Æther*. *Having overcome these things* (saith [t] *Pythagoras) thou shalt know* σύσταν, *the Cohabitation of the immortal Gods, and mortal Men.* In which Words are imply'd three Properties of this middle World, (which he terms the *free Æther*; *free*, as being separated from the Power of Matter; *Æther*, as receiving Ardor from God, and heating all Inferiors by an insensible Motion) *Condition*, *Chorus*, *Order*.

Condition, It is repleniſhed with Forms simple, immaterial, separate, both universal and individual, containing all idæated Ideas of Genus's and Species, the Exemplars imitated in lesser Copies, their Original being in the divine Mind. Thus the World of the Deity is the absolute Exemplar in the intelligible World; the abstract Example; and, in the sensible World, not Example, but Contraction of Exemplars, as Seal, Figure, and sealed Wax.

Chorus, the infinite Joy of the blessed Spirits, their immutable Delight, styl'd by *Homer* ἄσβεστος γέλως, *inextinguishable Laughter*. For what greater Pleasure, than to behold the serene Aspect of God; and next him, the Ideas and Forms of all Things, more purely and transparently, than secondarily in created Beings? and to communicate these Visions to Inferiors, the Office of the Gods, called θεοὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ θεᾶσθαι, *from Speculation and Vision*; Angels, from communicating their Visions to others; not that we imagine them equal to the supreme God, who is ineffable. No Dæmons, how good soever, are admitted into this *Chorus*; so *Plotinus*, (the most exact Follower of the *Pythagorick* Mysteries, as *Porphyrius* and *Longinus* attest.) [u] *The kind of Gods we conceive to be void of Passion; but to Dæmons we adjoin Passions, saying, they are sempiternal in the next Degree after the Gods. It is better to call none in the intelligible World, Dæmon; rather, if a Dæmon be placed there, to esteem him a God.*

Order, thus explained by *Pythagoras*: [w] *If thou live according to right Reason, grieving for what is ill done, and rejoicing in what is well done, and prayest the Gods to perfect thy Work:*

Then stript of Flesh, up to free Æther soar,
A deathless God, divine, mortal no more.

This is the Order in the Acquisition of Man's Beatitude. The incorporeal Heaven of the middle World, the invisible *Olympus* of the blessed, admits nothing impure; therefore Vices are to be shunn'd, and Virtues to be embrac'd. The Preservation of Men is by the Mercies of God; therefore the Divinity is to be worshipped, and the superior Powers to be invocated, that they would perfect our Work. Lastly, nothing material, corporeal, mixt, is received there. Therefore we must die, and holily put off the Body, before we can be admitted to the Society of the Gods.

CHAP. V.

The Sensible World.

[x] WE now come down to the *sensible* World. Its *Exemplar* is, the *World of the Deity*, its *Example* the *intelligible World of Ideas*, the αὐθυπόστατον, Subsistence of Exemplars in itself. As *One* is the Beginning of the intelligible World, so *Two* is of the corporeal; which were not corporeal, if it did not consist of these four, *Point*, *Line*, *Superficies*, *Solidity*, after the Patern of the Cube, made by *one*, *two*, *three*, *four*. *One*, fixed by Position, creates a *Point*; a *Line*, being protracted from one Point to another, is made of the Number *two*; a *Superficies* ariseth from *three* Lines; a *Solid* from *four* Positions, *before*, *behind*, *upwards*, *downwards*. *Two* multiplied in itself produceth *four*; retorted into itself (by saying twice two twice) makes the first *Cube*. Next *five* (the Tetragonical Pyramis Principle of the intelligible World) is the Cube of *eight* with six Sides, Architect of the sensible World. Amongst Principles, the *Heptad* hath no place, being a Virgin, producing nothing, and therefore named *Pallas*. This first Cube is a fertile Number, the Ground of Multitude and Variety, constituted of two and of four. *Zaratas* termed *two* the *Mother*; we the *Cube* that proceedeth from it, *Matter*, the Bottom and Foundation of all natural Beings, the Seat of substantial Forms. [y] Timæus, *of the Tetragon is generated the Cube, the most settled Body, stedfast every way, having six Sides, eight Angles.* The Form immers'd in this solid Receptacle is not received loosely, but fixtly; and singly it becomes individual and incommunicable, confin'd

[s] Timæus de anima mundi. [t] Aur. carm. [u] De amore Deor. [w] Aur. carm. [x] Page 694. f.
[y] De anima mundi.

fin'd to Time and Place, loſing its Liberty in the Servitude of Matter. Thus the two Principles of temporal things, the *Pyramis* and *Cube*, *Form* and *Matter*, flow from one Fountain, the *Tetragon*, whoſe Idea is the *Tetractys*, the divine Exemplar.

Now there is requiſite ſome third thing to unite theſe two, *Matter* and *Form*; for they flow not into one another ſpontaneouſly, or caſually; the Matter of one thing doth not contingently receive the Form of another. When the Soul departs out of Man, the Body becomes not Braſs or Iron, neither is Wool made of a Stone. There muſt then be a third thing to unite them, (not *Privation*; Privation and Power act nothing ſubſtantively; nor *Motion*; an Accident cannot be the Principle of a Subſtance; but) *God*, as [z] *Socrates* and *Plato* acknowledge, ſaying, *There are three Principles of things, God, Idea, and Matter*; ſymbolized before by *Pythagoras* in theſe three ſecret Marks, *Infinite*, *One* and *Two*; by *Infinite*, deſigning *God*; by *Unity*, *Form*; by *Alterity*, *Matter*. Infinite in the *ſupreme* World; One, or Identity, in the *Intellectual*; Two, or Alterity, in the *ſenſible*; for Matter is the Mother of Alteration.

The Tetragonal Baſes of theſe Figures joined together make a *Dodecaedre*, the Symbol of the Univerſe. [a] Alcinous, *the Dodecaedre God uſed in making the Univerſe*, this World. If upon an octangle Cube we erect a Pyramis by four æqui-crural Triangles, it makes a Dodecaedre, wherein the Cube is, as it were, Mother, and the Pyramis Father. Thus [b] *Timæus*, *Form hath the Nature of Male and Father*; *Matter*, *of Female and Mother*; the Compoſitions are their Off-ſpring.

Of theſe are produced all things in this World, by their ſeminal Faculties; which things appear in a wonderful variety, by reaſon of the various commenſuration of Forms to their Matter, and the admixtion of innumerable Accidents, by exceſs and defect, diſcord and amity, motion and reſt, impetuoſity, and tranquility, rarity and denſity. Hence ariſes the Spheres, the Stars, the four Elements, out of which evaporate hot, moiſt, cold, dry, and all the objects of ſenſe, the tranſmutation of Forms, and variety of Colours in ſeveral things.

The Gods are natural, the Gods of Gods ſupernatural; thoſe inhabit the Inferior World, theſe the Superior. The Gods of Gods are moſt ſimple and pure, as being no where; they are ſuperceleſtial, as being every where; they are with us; here Strangers, there natives; Never in our World, but when ſent; *Angels*, Meſſengers from Heaven, appearing in what Form they pleaſe, kind and beneficial to us. The inferior Spirits never aſcend to the ſuper-celeſtial, but are ſent ſometimes on embaſſy to us, whence termed *Angels*, as the others. God himſelf inhabits the loweſt, the higheſt, and the middlemoſt, intimately; ſo that there is no Being without God. Moreover the Gods of this World are more excellent than the Souls of Men; though thoſe aſſiſt, theſe inform Bodies. Betwixt them, are placed *Dæmons* and *Heroes*; Dæmons next the Gods, Heroes next Souls; mentioned by *Pythagoras* in his *Golden Verſes*, who aſſigns to each a peculiar Worſhip.

CHAP. VI.

The State of the Soul after Death.

RAtional [c] *Man* is more noble than other Creatures, as more divine; not content ſolely with one Operation, (as all other things drawn along by Nature, which always acts after the ſame manner) but endu'd with various Gifts, which he uſeth according to his Free-will; in reſpect of which Liberty,

—— ([d]) *Men are of heavenly race,*
Taught by diviner Nature what t' embrace.

By *Diviner Nature* is meant the Intellectual Soul; as to Intellect, Man approaches nigh to God; as to inferior Senſes, he recedeth from God: Reaſon teaching us *what to embrace*; when it converts itſelf to the Mind, renders us bleſſed; when perverted by the Senſes, wretched. For Men often ſtraying from the Rule of Right Reaſon, precipitate themſelves into Miſery, ἀυθαίρετα πήματ' ἔχοντες, in *Pythagoras*'s word, *incurring ills voluntary*.

Thus is man placed between Virtue and Vice, like the Stalk betwixt the two Branches in the Pythagorical Y; or young *Hercules*, deſcribed by *Prodicus*. As therefore none can be called Happy before their Death, (as [e] *Solon* ſaid to *Crœſus*) ſo none is to be eſteemed unhappy whilſt he is in this Life: *We muſt expect the laſt Day of a Man.* If when he hath put off his Body, he remaineth burdened with Vices, then begins he to be truly miſerable. This Miſery after Death, *Pythagoras* divides into two kinds. The unhappy are either near Beatitude, which though at the preſent they enjoy not, yet are they not oppreſſed with extream Miſery, being hereafter to be delivered from their Puniſhment: Or, wholly diſtant from Beatitude, in endleſs infinite Pains. Thus there are two Manſions in the Inferi, *Elizium*, poſſeſt by thoſe that are to aſcend into Bleſſedneſs; and *Tartarus*, by thoſe who endure infinite Torments, ἔθεν ὔπαξ ἐκβαίνυζιν, (as *Plato*, imitating *Pythagoras*, ſaith) *whence they never come out.* But when a Man, who hath lived juſtly, dieth, his Soul aſcends to the pure Æther, and lives in the happy Ævum with the Bleſſed, as a God with the Gods.

Man

[z] Scalich. can. 3. [a] Dr. Plat. [b] De Anima mundi. [c] Pag. 675. [d] Aur. carm. [e] Xenoph. memor. lib.

[f] Man is the Image of the World; he, in many things, metaphorically, receives the name of the World. The *Mind* of Man (as the ſupreme Mind) is termed God, by participation; the *rational Soul*, if directed by the Mind, it inclines the Will to Virtue, is termed the *good Dæmon* or *Genius*; if by Phantaſy and ill Affections, it draweth the Will to Vices, the [g] *evil Dæmon*. Whence *Pythagoras* deſires of God, *to keep us from ill, and to ſhew every one the Dæmon he ought to uſe*. Leaving the Body, the Soul, if defiled with the Vices, becomes an evil Dæmon: Its Life, δυσδαιμονία, *Infelicity*; but if having forſaken Vice, it retain a ſolicitous affection to the good Exerciſes and Virtues which it practiſed in this Life, it ſhall become a *good Dæmon*, and in the Amenity of that World live happily; reflecting with joy upon the good Actions it hath done, and retaining the ſame willingneſs to the right doing of them. This Life is εὐδαιμονία, [h] *Felicity*, of which *Virgil*:

> ——— *the ſame Care*
> *Which heretofore, breathing this vital Air,*
> *Of Chariots, Arms, and ſleekt-skin'd Steeds they had,*
> *Purſues them now in Earth's cold Boſom laid.*

Theſe Souls the Ancients termed *Lemures*; of theſe, that which lives in, and takes care of any particular Houſe, is *Lar-familiaris*; that which for its Demerits in this Life, wanders up and down in the Air, a Terror, vain to good Men, but to the bad hurtful, is *Larva*; thoſe which are not certainly known to be *Larvæ* or *Lares*, are called *Dii manes*; *Dii* out of Reverence, who having performed the courſe of their Lives prudently and juſtly, died holily.

CHAP. VII.

Of the Pythagorical Tranſmigration.

[i] IT is commonly averred *Pythagoras* was of opinion, that the Souls of Men after death informed the Bodies of Beaſts. We cannot imagine this of ſo knowing a Perſon. This Suſpicion of this Tranſanimation, ſeems rather to have been raiſed by ſuch, as were partly ignorant, partly envious, of the *Pythagorick* Myſteries; as *Timon*, *Xenophanes*, *Cratinus*, *Ariſtophon*, *Hermippus*, and others, who have aſcribed many things to *Pythagoras* which he never ſaid nor wrote, and have perverted what he did ſay. [k] He holds, *that* the ſubſtantive Unity of one Number, is not the Unity of another Number. *That* the Monads in the Duad are inconnexive to thoſe in the Triad. *That* the participate Eſſence of every thing is One, which will not occupate the Eſſence of another thing. No Animal (then) can tranſmigrate into the Life of a different Animal; but muſt continue under the Law of its own Nature in its proper Office; ὅτε τὸ εἶδος εἴδει συνέζευκται, *Species not being coincident with Species*. One Seal may make many Impreſſions upon ſeveral pieces of Wax; but one piece of Wax cannot bear the Form of many Seals. [l] The Seal of human Form (the Image of God) is not permitted to ſet an Impreſſion upon inferior Nature; implied by *Pythagoras* in this Symbol, *We muſt wear the Image of God in a Seal-ring*. The Image of God (Man's Soul) cannot ſeal or form the other Natures that are near it. So *Hermes Triſmegiſtus*, *Of Man, one part is ſimple, which we call the Form of divine Similitude*. And again, *There are two Images of God, the World and Man*.

This is the meaning of *Pythagoras* concerning the Tranſmigration of Souls after Death, and their Deſcenſion into Life. Others thought the Soul educed out of the Power of Matter; *Pythagoras* aſſerted it infuſed by God into the Body, and therefore before it, not in Time, but in Purity and Dignity. This Infuſion he termed, *The Deſcent of the Soul*; not underſtood of its Situation, or its Motion from the intellectual World through the ſeveral Spheres of the Elementary, as *Proclus* and others; but of the natural Series or Form; the rational Soul being the ultimate Perfection of human Body.

[m] That *Pythagoras* ſaid, he was in times paſt *Euphorbus*, the meaning is this: The Ancients called the Inclinations and Wills of Men their *Minds*; whence ſuch as are of one Study, Intention, Inclination, Motion, and Senſe, are termed *Unanimous*. Thus the antient Philoſophers call the motive and ſenſitive Faculty, *The Soul*. *An Animate differs from an Inanimate* (ſaith *Ariſtotle*) *chiefly in two things, Motion and Senſe*. Whoſoever therefore are alike affected, and moved by the ſame Object, are ſaid to have *the ſame Soul*. The *Metempſychoſis* then is nothing elſe, but equal Care, Motion, and Study of ſome dead Perſon, appearing in ſome living Perſon. Thus *Pythagoras* might arrogate the Soul of *Euphorbus*, *Callicles*, *Hermotimus*, *Pyrrhus*, *Pyrander*, *Calidona*, *Alce*, as having an Inclination to the ſeveral Excellencies that were in thoſe Perſons.

[n] Again, in ſaying he was *Euphorbus*, *Pythagoras* ænigmatically taught (not the Tranſmigration of Souls, but) the Tranſmutation of Bodies out of firſt Matter; which is not only ſuſceptible, but covetous of all Forms; continually deſiring, never ſatiated with any; as, *if a Comedy* (to uſe the compariſon of [o] *Ariſtotle*) *ſhould ſay, I was firſt a Tragedy, becauſe both Tragedy and Comedy are form'd of the ſame Letters*

[f] Pag. 697. [g] Aur. carm. [h] Æneid. 6. [i] Pag. 626. [k] Scalich. can. 6. [l] Ibid. can. 5. [m] Ibid. can. 8. [n] Page 681. [o] De Gener.

Letters and Elements. [p] Thus *Apollonius*, demanding of the Indian Bracmans, what their Opinion was concerning the Soul, *Jarchus* answered, "*According as* Pythagoras *delivered to you, we to the* "*Ægyptians.*" *Apollonius* replies, "*Will you then* "*affirm you were one of the* Trojan *Captains, as* Py- "thagoras *said he was* Euphorbus?" *Thespasian* warily askt, "*Whom he thought the most worthy of* "*them?* Achilles (saith *Apollonius*) *if we believe* "Homer." Then *Jarchus*, "*Look on him as my* "*Progenitor, or* πρόγονον σῶμα, *progeniting Body*; "*for such* Pythagoras *esteemed* Euphorbus."

Or if he meant historically, παλιγγενεσία, that is, the Soul separate from the Body, may by the Power of God, be brought again, the same into the same Body: The Body in which *Pythagoras* was so often revived, though called by several Names, was one and the same, not in Quantity, but Substance; as the Sea is one and homogeneous in itself, yet is here called *Ægean*, there *Ionian*; elsewhere, *Myrtæan* and *Colsean*; so one Man often renate, is named *Æthalides*, *Euphorbus*, *Hermotimus*, *Pyrrhus*, and lastly *Pythagoras*. These Generations he ascribes not to the Power of Nature, but to *Mercury*, God only; none can revive but by the Divine Power of God, whom he acknowledgeth, ψύχωσις πάντων, *Animation of all Things*. He infuseth Soul into all Men, and being infused, taketh it away; and being taken away, restores it, when, and as often as he pleaseth.

[p] Philost. vit. Apollon.

EMPEDOCLES.

CHAP. I.

His Country, Parents.

IN the Catalogue of the *Pythagoreans*, we find *Empedocles* not the least eminent amongst them. He was of *Agrigentum*, the most considerable City, next *Syracuse*, of *Sicily*; built by a Colony [q] of *Geloans*, 108 Years after their own Foundation. *Gela* was built 45 Years after *Syracuse*; *Syracuse* in the 11th Olympiad; *Gela* therefore in the 22d, *Agrigentum* in the 48th. It had its Name from the River, and [r] grew in a short while to so vast an Increase, that in the time of *Empedocles* it contained 800000 Inhabitants. Eminent it was for many things, but for none so much as the Birth of [s] *Empedocles*: Whence *Lucretius*:

[t] *An* Agrigentine *Citizen 'mongst these*
Is chief and principal, Empedocles:
Born on the Shore of Sicil's *triquile Bounds*,
Which the Ionian *in wide Bays surrounds.*
Leaving its Cliffs with azure Waves, whose Force
And rapid Current Italy *divorce*
By a small Strait. Here's vast Charibdis *Seat*,
And here the murm'ring Ætna's *Flames do threat*
To re-inforce once more their dreadful Ire,
And vomit yet again devouring Fire;
Belching it forth out of his sooty Jaws,
Which he at Heaven in lightning Flashes throws.
Altho this Isle for sundry things may seem
Famous, and many Nations it esteem,
Renown'd for Wealth and many gallant Men;
Yet never had it ought more glorious, than
This Personage; nought more miraculous,
More holy, or which was more precious.
His Verse divine, and his Inventions rare;
The Fruits of that rich Breast do so declare
An universal Knowledge, that some doubt
Whether or no he sprung from human root.

Of his Parentage, *Laertius* gives this Account. *Empedocles*, as *Hippobotus* saith, was an *Agrigentine*, Son of *Meto*, Son of *Empedocles*; which *Timæus* confirms in his Sixteenth Book of *Histories*, saying, that there was one *Empedocles* an eminent Person, Grandfather to the Poet. *Hermippus* saith the same. Likewise *Heraclides*, in his Treatise concerning Islands, affirms that his Grandfather was of a noble Family, and kept Chariot Horses. And *Erotosthenes*, in his *Olympionicæ*, saith, that the Father of *Meto* was Victor in the 71st Olympiad, upon the Testimony of *Aristotle*. But *Apollodorus* the Grammarian saith, it was that *Empedocles* who was Son of *Meto*. *Glaucus* writes, that he came to the *Thurians*, at such time as they had newly built their City; and not long after adds, They who relate that he was banished his Country, and came to *Syracuse*, and fought with the *Syracusians* against the *Athenians*, seem to me to be quite mistaken. For either *Empedocles* at that time was dead, or very old; the latter is not likely, for *Aristotle* saith, that he and *Heraclitus* dy'd in the Sixtieth Year of their Age. But he who won the Race in the Seventy-first Olympi-

[q] Thucid. l. 6. [r] Laert. 8. 63. [s] Lucret. l. 1, 2. 717. [t] By Mr. Evelin.

ad, was of the ſame Name, as *Apollodorus* hath ſet down the Time. *Satyrus* in his *Lives*, ſaith, that *Empedocles* was Son of *Exænetus*, and that he himſelf had a Son named *Exænetus*; and that in the ſame Olympiad *Empedocles* won the Horſe-race, and the Son was Victor at Wreſtling, or, as *Heraclides*, won the Foot-race. But I find in the Commentaries of *Favorinus*, that in the Olympiac Games, *Empedocles* ſacrific'd an Ox made of Honey and Flower, and that he had a Brother named *Callicratides*. But *Telauges*, Son of *Pythagoras*, in his Epiſtle to *Philolaus* ſaith, that *Empedocles* was Son of *Archinomus*: That he was of *Agrigentum* in *Sicily*, he himſelf profeſſeth in his *Luſtrations*, beginning thus:

Friends, who in ſpacious Agrigentum *dwell*, &c.

Thus much (ſaith *Laertius*) of his Deſcent.

CHAP. II.

His Maſters.

[a]*TIMÆUS*, in the Ninth Book of his Hiſtory affirms, he heard *Pythagoras*; adding, that he was taken ſtealing a Diſſertation of his, (as *Plato* alſo was) and thereupon expelled out of their Society; and that he mentions *Pythagoras* in his Verſes, ſaying,

'Mongſt theſe was one in things ſublimeſt skill'd;
His Mind with all the Wealth of Learning fill'd.

But ſome there are who ſay, he meant this of *Parmenides*. *Neanthes* relates, that until *Philolaus* and *Empedocles*, the *Pythagoreans* communicated their Diſcourſes; but, after that *Empedocles* divulged them in his Poems, they made an Order not to communicate any thing to an Epick Poet. They ſay likewiſe, that *Plato* was prohibited in the like manner.

But which of the *Pythagoreans Empedocles* heard, he tells not; the Epiſtle which goes abroad under the Name of *Telauges*, affirming *Empedocles* was Diſciple to *Hippaſus* and *Brontinus*, deſerves no Credit.

Theophraſtus ſaith, he was an Emulator and Imitator of *Parmenides* in his Poetry; for he among other things writ a Diſcourſe concerning Nature.

Hermippus ſaith, he was not an Emulator of *Parmenides*, but of *Xenophanes*, with whom he lived, and imitated his Poetry, and afterwards applied himſelf to the *Pythagoreans*. But *Alcidamas*, in his Phyſick, relates, that *Zeno* and *Empedocles* heard *Parmenides* at the ſame time; at laſt both left him. *Zeno* went and ſtudied Philoſophy by himſelf; *Empedocles* went and heard *Anaxagoras* and *Pythagoras*; and imitated the one in his Gravity of Life and Deportment; the other in his Phyſiology.

Empedocles, ſaith *Philoſtratus*, repeated by *Suidas*, is reported to have followed the *Pythagorean* Philoſophy; which is confirmed by many Verſes of his, as this:

Farewel, Friends; mortal I ſhall be no more.

And this,

A Boy I was, then did a Maid become.

Beſides, the Ox which he made of Meal, and ſacrificed in *Olympia*, ſhews, that he approved the way of *Pythagoras*.

CHAP. III.

How he lived amongſt the Agrigentines; *his Power and Authority.*

[*]*NEanthes* relates, that *Meto* dying, there began a Tyranny: But *Empedocles* perſuaded the *Agrigentines* to give over Sedition, and to endeavour a Civil Parity; and that he himſelf being very rich, beſtowed Dowries upon many Virgins that had none, and thereupon clothed himſelf in Purple, and wore a golden Girdle, as *Phavorinus* affirms, and a Delphick Crown, and had Servants attending on him; his Look ſevere and conſtant. After this manner he went. And the Citizens that met him paid ſuch Reſpect to him, as if thoſe had been the Marks of Regal Authority.

Nevertheleſs, he was, as *Ariſtotle* affirms, very free, and averſe from taking any Government upon him; for he refuſed a Kingdom which was offered him, (as *Xanthus* ſaith in his Book concerning him) preferring a moderate Condition. *Timæus* relates the ſame, adding the Reaſon of his being Democratically affected; for being invited by one of the Governors, and the Company falling to drink, he commanded, that Supper ſhould be brought in. He who had invited him, ſaid, That he ſtaid for the chief Magiſtrate. As ſoon as he came, he was made Sympoſiarch, Maſter of the Feaſt; for ſo it was ordered by him who invited them. He began to diſcover a tyrannical Kind of Humour, commanding, either that he ſhould drink, or that it ſhould be poured on his Head. *Empedocles* for the preſent held his Peace. But the next Day citing them to the Court, he condemned them both to Death, the Inviter, and the Sympoſiarch. Of ſo great Authority was he in the Commonwealth.

Again,

[a] Laert. 8. 54. [*] Laert. 8. 71.

Again, when *Acro* the Physician petition'd for a Place, to build a Monument for his Father, *Empedocles* stood up and opposed it, and discoursed very largely of Parity; and withal asked, what Epitaph should be inscribed on the Tomb? This:

Ἄκρον ἰητῆρ' ἄκρων ἀκραγαντῖνον πατρὸς ἄκρα
Κεύθει κρημνὸς ἄκρος παλείδος ἀκρότατος.

playing upon his Name *Acro*. Others recite the second Verse thus:

Ἀκρότατος κορυφῆς τύμβ' ἄκρ' κατέχει.

This, some ascribe to *Simonides*.

Afterwards *Empedocles* dissolved the Council of a thousand Senators, and constituted it Triennial; so that it consisted, not only of the rich, but of the ordinary sort.

But *Timæus*, in his first and second Books, (for he often mentions him) saith, that he seems to be of an Opinion contrary to the Democracy; sometimes proud and self-conceited in his Poetry; as when he saith,

A deathless God am I, mortal no more.

CHAP. IV.

Wonders related of him.

HE was so excellent, not only in natural Philosophy, but in Medicine also, that by his Skill in both these, he performed many admirable Things.

[b] *Timæus* relates, that the *Etesian* Winds blowing very strongly, insomuch that they destroy'd the Fruits; he gave order, that many Asses should be flead, and Bottles made of their Skins, and placed on the Tops of the Hills to receive the Blasts; by which means the Winds gave over: and upon him was conferred the Attribute of *Colusanemos*, or *Alexanemos*, The Chaser away of the Winds.

Not unlike to this is that which *Plutarch* [c] reports of him, that by stopping up a Cleft in a Mountain, out of which there came an unwholsome southern Blast to the Plains, it is conceived that he drove away the Plague out of that Country.

The same Cure he wrought among the *Selinuncians*, by a different Means; for they being, as *Diodorus* the *Ephesian* saith, infested by a Plague, caused by the Noisomness of the River, whereof the Men died, neither could the Women be, without much Difficulty, delivered; *Empedocles* contrived, and at his own Charge conveyed two other Rivers that ran near into this Channel; by which Mixtion, the Water became sweet, and the Plague ceased.

[d] Another time, a young Man drawing a Sword upon *Anchytus*'s Host, (for that he had in publick Judgment condemned his Father to Death) and being about to have killed him, *Empedocles* prevented it, and immediately changing his Tune, and singing out of *Homer*,

Nepenthe *calming Anger, easing Grief.*

freed *Anchytus*'s Host from Death, and the young Man from the Crime of Murder; who, from thenceforward, became one of his Disciples, eminent amongst them.

[e] *Hermippus* saith, that he cured *Panthea*, a Woman of *Agrigentum*, given over by all the Physicians.

But the most memorable Cure was that which he performed upon a Woman that had lain seven Days *dead*, as *Pliny* terms it; but as *Galen*, more exactly out of *Heraclides*, describes it, *breathless, and without Pulse; differing in nothing from a dead Body, saving that she had a little Warmth about the middle Parts of her Body. The Book of* Heraclides *was intituled,* The breathless Woman. *And it was a Controversy amongst the Physicians that were present, whether she were dead or alive.* [f] *Heraclides* adds, that *Empedocles acquainted* Pausanias *with the whole Business, and that the breathless Woman could preserve herself thirty Days, without breathing or eating.* Whence he terms *Empedocles* both a Physician and a Prophet; confirmed even by his own Verses:

Friends, who in spacious Agrigentum *dwell,*
Busied in noble high Designs, farewel.
A deathless God I am, mortal no more;
Honour'd by all, with Garlands cover'd o'er:
Which, 'soon as e'er I come to any Town,
Both Men and Women pay to me Renown.
Thousands of Men enquire the Way to Wealth,
Some would divine, others restore to Health.

Some there were who ascribe these to *Goetick Magick*. *Satyrus* in his *Lives* relates, that *Gorgias* the *Leontine*, who had been Disciple to *Empedocles*, used to say, that he himself had been present with him when he practised *Goetick*; and that *Empedocles* makes a Profession thereof in his Poems, when he saith:

Med'cines to strengthen Age, and cure Disease,
Thou shalt be taught, for I am skill'd in these.
The Wrath of restless Winds thou shalt assuage,
Which blast the Corn in their pernicious Rage.

[b] Laert. 8. 60. [c] Lib. de Curios. [d] Jambl. vit. Pyth. c. 25. [e] Laert. 7. 69. [f] Laert. Suid. 8. 62.

And when thou call'ſt, they ſhall come back again.
Rain thou ſhalt change to Drought, and Drought to Rain;
By whoſe kind Moiſture Trees may ſprout and thrive,
And make the dead quit Pluto, *and revive.*

In fine, he was ſo much admired for theſe Things, that when he went to the Olympick Games, the Eyes of all Men were fixed on him; neither was their Diſcourſe of any thing ſo much as of *Empedocles*.

CHAP. V.

His Death.

HIS Death (ſaith [g] *Laertius*) is variouſly reported. *Heraclides* having related the Story of the breathleſs Woman, how much *Empedocles* was admired for raiſing a dead Woman to Life, adds, that he appointed a Sacrifice in the Field of *Piſianax*, and invited thither many of his Friends, amongſt whom was *Pauſanias*. After the Feaſt was done, the Company withdrew themſelves to Reſt, but he ſtirr'd not out of the Place where he lay at Supper. The next Morning when they aroſe, he alone was miſſing, which giving them occaſion to enquire after him of the Servants, they ſaid they knew not what was become of him; only one of them ſaid, that about Midnight he heard a great Voice calling *Empedocles*; whereupon riſing up, he ſaw a heavenly Light, and a Splendor of Torches, but nothing elſe. They were all amazed at this Accident, and *Pauſanias* going down, ſent forth others to enquire more ſtrictly, but was at laſt perſuaded not to trouble himſelf any further, ſaying, that the thing that had fallen out deſerved Prayer, and that Sacrifice ſhould be made to him as to a God. *Hermippus* ſaith, that he made the Sacrifice upon the Cure he wrought on *Panthea*, and that the Perſons invited were eighty.

Hippobotus affirms, that he roſe up from his Place and went to *Ætna*, where he leaped into the Fire, that he might leave behind him an Opinion that he was a God; and that afterwards it was diſcovered by one of his Sandals, which the Fire caſt up again, for his Sandals were of Braſs. But this Report *Pauſanias* contradicts.

Diodorus the *Epheſian*, having told how he cured the *Selinuncians* of the Plague, adds, that the *Selinuncians* upon a time feaſting by this River, *Empedocles* appeared to them, and they riſing up, worſhipped him, and prayed to him as a God; which Opinion he deſiring to continue, caſt himſelf into the Fire.

This Relation [h] *Timæus* contradicts, affirming, that he departed into *Peloponneſus*, and never returned; whereby it came to paſs, that the manner of his Death is not known. He likewiſe in his fourth Book expreſly confutes *Heraclides*; for he proveth that *Piſianax* was a *Syracuſian*, and had not any Eſtate or Field at *Agrigentum*; that *Pauſanias*, upon that Report, erected in Memory of his Friend, either a little Image or Chapel, as to a God, for he was rich. And how, ſaith he, could he caſt himſelf into the Flames of *Ætna*, of which being ſo far diſtant, he never makes any mention? Indeed he died in *Peloponneſus*, and it is no wonder that his Tomb is not known, for it hath happen'd ſo to many others beſides. Thus *Timæus*; adding, that *Heraclides* tells extraordinary Things; as among the reſt, the Story of a Man that fell out of the Moon.

Hippobotus affirms, that a Statue of *Empedocles* cover'd, which ſtood firſt at *Agrigentum*, was afterwards plac'd before the Senate-houſe at *Rome* uncover'd, being brought thither by the *Romans*, of which ſaith *Laertius*, there are yet ſome Pictures.

Neanthes relates, that going in his Chariot to a great Solemnity at *Meſſena*, he fell and broke his Thigh, of which he died, being ſeventy ſeven Years old. His Sepulchre is at *Megara*; but in the Account of his Years *Ariſtotle* differs, who ſaith he died at ſixty. Yet others affirm, he lived to an hundred and nine Years of Age. He flouriſhed in the 84th Olympiad.

But *Demetrius* the *Trœzenian* relates, in *Homer*'s Words, that,

About his Neck he knit a Rope, and fell
From a high Cliff; his Soul went down to Hell.

In the forementioned Epiſtle of *Telauges*, it is ſaid, that being exceeding old, he fell into the Sea, and ſo died. Thus much for his Death.

CHAP. VI.

His Writings.

Ariſtotle [i] in his Sophiſt affirms, that *Empedocles* firſt found out Rhetorick, *Zeno* Dialectick; and in his Book concerning the Poets, that *Empedocles*'s Style was *Homerical*, and that he was weighty in his Expreſſions, uſing Metaphors much, and other poetical Figures; and that having written, among other Poems, the Paſſage of *Xerxes* over the *Helleſpont*, and a Hymn to *Apollo*, they were both burnt by a Siſter, or, as *Hieronimus*, a Daughter of his; the Hymn upon miſtake; the *Perſian* Poem wittingly, for that it was imperfect. He adds, that he wrote Tragedies alſo, and Politicks; but *Heraclides*, Son of *Serapion*, aſcribes the Tragedies to another. *Hieronimus* ſaith, he lighted upon forty three of them; *Neanthes*,

[g] Laert. 8. 67. [h] Laert. 8. 71. [i] Laert. 8. 57.

Neanthes, that he wrote Tragedies when he was young, and that he had a Sight of them.

Moreover he wrote Books concerning *Nature* and *Luſtrations*, which extended to 5000 Verſes, and a *Medicinal Diſcourſe*, containing 600 Verſes.

His *Luſtrations*, *Clemens* the Rhapſodiſt collected, and ſung at the Olympick Games, as *Phavorinus* ſaith in his Commentaries.

CHAP. VII.

His Opinions.

HE held that there are [k] four Elements, Fire, Air, Water, Earth; and two principal Powers, Amity and Diſcord; one unitive, the other diſcretive; for thus he writes:

To the four Roots of all, Attention give;
The Æther Jove; Juno, *by whom we live;*
Next theſe is Pluto; Neſtis *laſt, whoſe Eyes*
Afford the mortal Fountain freſh Supplies.

He calls the Heat and Æther, *Jupiter*; the Air, vital *Juno*; the Earth, *Pluto*; the Water, *Neſtis*, and the Mortal Fountain. *Laertius* cites it thus:

White Jove, *and vital* Juno, Pluto *then*,
And Neſtis *giving Tears to the Eyes of Men.*

The Fire, ſaith he, he calls *Jupiter*; the Earth, *Juno*; the Air, *Pluto*; the Water, *Neſtis*. Theſe are in an inceſſant Mutation, whereby there is ſuch an eternal Production of Things; whence he adds,

Sometimes by Friendſhip all are knit in one;
Sometimes by Diſcord ſever'd and undone.

[l] Before the four Elements, there are certain leſs Fragments, [m] as it were Elements of Elements, of ſimilar Parts, and round.

[n] The World is one; the World is not the Univerſe, but a little Part of the Univerſe; the reſt is ſluggiſh Matter.

[o] Nature is nothing but the Mixture and Separation of the Elements; for ſo he ſaith in the firſt of his Phyſicks:

We otherwiſe; there's no ſuch Thing at all
As that which Mortals Death or Nature call.
To Mixtion and Diſcretion all we owe,
On which the Names of Nature Men beſtow.

[p] The World is circumſcribed by the Circulation of the Sun, and that is the Bound of it.

[q] The Right-ſide of the World is that which is towards the Summer Tropick, the Left that which is towards the Winter Tropick.

[r] He as all thoſe who held the World to be made of little Bodies, introduced Concretions and Diſcretions, but deny'd Generation and Corruption; ſaying, That Compounds are not made by Quality and Alteration, but by Quantity and Coagmentation.

[s] Heaven is ſolid, being made of Air condens'd by Fire, like Cryſtal; it containeth a fiery and aerial Nature in both Hemiſpheres.

The [t] Stars are fiery, conſiſting of that Fire which the Æther containing in itſelf ſtruck forth in its firſt Secretion.

[u] The fixed Stars are faſten'd to the Cryſtal of the Heavens, the Planets are looſe.

[w] The Sun is a great Heap of Fire, bigger than the Moon.

[x] There are two Suns, one an archetypal Fire in the other Hemiſphere of the World, filling this Hemiſphere, which is continually oppoſite to its Splendor. As for that which we ſee, it is the Light in that other Hemiſphere, repleniſhed with Air, mixed with Heat; and the ſame is occaſioned by Refraction from the Earth, that is more round, entring into the Sun, which is of a Cryſtalline Nature, and yet is trained and carried away together with the Motion of that Fire. But to ſpeak more plainly and diſtinctly, this is as much as to ſay, The Sun is nothing elſe but the Reflection of that Light of the Fire which is about the Earth.

[y] He aſcribed the Reaſons of the Solſtices, or Tropicks of the Sun, to the Sphere that containeth him, and hindreth him from paſſing further; as alſo to the two Tropicks.

[z] The Moon is in Form like a Diſh.

[a] The Moon is twice as far from the Sun, as ſhe is from the Earth.

[b] Winter cometh when the Air is predominant in Thickneſs, and is forced upward; Summer, when the Fire is in like manner predominant, and is driven downward.

[c] The Sea is the Sweat of the Earth, burnt by the Sun, which ſqueezeth the Sweat out of it.

[d] The Soul puts on the ſeveral Forms of all living Creatures and Plants; whence he ſaid of himſelf:

A Boy I was, then did a Maid become:
A Plant, Bird, Fiſh, and in the vaſt Sea ſwum.

The

[k] Plut. plac. phil. 1. 3. [l] Plut. pl. 1. 13. [m] Stob. Ecl. Phyſ. 1. 17. [n] Plut. pl. 1. 5. [o] Plut. 1. 30. [p] Plut. 2. 1.
[q] Plut 2. 10. [r] Plut. 1. 24. [s] Plut. 2. 11. [t] Plut. 2. 13. [u] Ibid. [w] Laert. 8. 77. [x] Plut. 2. 20. [y] Plut. 2. 23.
[z] Plut. 2. 27. Laert. 8. 77. [a] Plut. 2. 31. [b] Plut. 3. 8. [c] Plut. 3. 16. [d] Laert. ibid.

[e] The particular Senſes are affected according to the Proportion of their Pores and Paſſages, namely, as the proper Object of each Senſe is well diſpoſed and fitted.

[f] Reſemblances in Mirrours come by the means of certain Defluxions gathered together, upon the Superficies of the Mirrour, and accompliſhed by the Fire that ariſeth from the ſaid Mirrour; and withal, tranſmuteth the Air that is before it, into which thoſe Fluxions are carried.

[g] *Plutarch* ſaith, he mingled the viſual Images and Beams together, calling that which is made thereof, The Rays of a compound Image.

[h] Hearing is perform'd by means of a Wind within the hollow of the Ear, turned in manner of a Screw, fitted and framed of Purpoſe within the Ear, hanging up, and beaten upon in manner of a Bell.

[i] The Hegemonick is the Conſiſtence of the Blood.

[e] Plut. 4. 9. [f] Plut. 4. 14. [g] Plut. 4. 13. [h] Plut. 4. 16. [i] Plut. 4. 5.

EPICHARMUS.

EPICHARMUS [a] alſo heard *Pythagoras*. He was of *Coos*, Son of *Helothales*. At three Months old, he was carried from *Sicily* to *Megara*, and from thence to *Syracuſe*, as he himſelf ſaith in his *Commentaries*. On his Image was this Inſcription:

As Stars exceeded by the radiant Sun,
Streams by the Ocean, into which they run;
So all by Epicharmus *are ſurpaſt,*
On whoſe Head Syracuſe *this Garland plac'd.*

He wrote Commentaries, in which he diſcourſed Phiſiologically, and Sententiouſly, and Medicinally; and added little Notes to his Commentaries, by which they are known to be his. He died ninety Years old.

[a] Laert. 8. 78.

ARCHYTAS.

ARCHYTAS [a] was of *Tarentum*, Son of *Mneſagoras*, or (as *Ariſtoxenes*) of *Heſtyæus*. He alſo heard *Pythagoras*. This was he, by whoſe means *Plato*, when *Dionyſius* had a mind to put him to Death, was delivered. He was generally admired for all Sorts of Virtue. He was ſeven times General of his own Countrymen, whereas all others were but once, the Law prohibiting that they ſhould be oftner. There is extant an Epiſtle of his to *Plato*, to this Effect.

Archytas to *Plato*, Health.

IT is well that you are recover'd of your Sickneſs, for beſides what you wrote, Damiſcus *hath informed us ſo. We took care of the Commentaries, and went to the* Lucanians, *where we diſcourſed with the Sons of* Ocellus. *Part, concerning Laws, and a Kingdom, and Piety, and the Generation of all Things we have; and part we have ſent; the reſt are not to be found at preſent: as ſoon as we find them, you ſhall have them.*

Plato returned this Anſwer:

Plato to *Archytas*, Ευ πραττειν.

THE Commentaries which you ſent, we received with much Joy, and exceedingly admire the Author, who ſeems to us to be a Perſon worthy his Anceſtors, who were Myræans, *ſome of thoſe* Trojans *who went with* Laomedon, *good Men, as the Story ſpeaks them. As for my Commentaries, concerning which you wrote, they are not poliſhed, but as they are I have ſent them; as for the Cuſtody of them, we are both agreed, ſo that I ſhall need to enquire nothing of you. Farewel.*

Ariſtoxenus ſaith, he was never worſted in the Field; but once, thro' the Envy of others, reſign'd his Charge, and then all his Soldiers were taken. It appears by *Horace* [b] that he periſhed by Shipwreck; who brings in a Mariner expoſtulating with him upon it, thus:

Thee

[a] Laert. 8. 79. [b] Lib. 1. Od. 28.

Thee the Surveyor of the Sea and Land,
And the innumerous Sand,
A little Share of these small dusty Grains,
Archytas *now contains,*
Hard by the Marine Shore. It nought avail'd,
Since die thou must, t'have scal'd
Th' aerial Orbs, or that thy soaring Soul
O'rerun the wheeling Pole.

ARCHYTAS Answers.

And so dy'd Pelop's *Father, at whose Feasts*
The Gods themselves were Guests;
And Tithon, *who* Aurora *entertain'd;*
Minos, *whom* Jove *design'd*
Admission to his Counsels; and again
Dark Tartara *detain,*
Panthous *Son, who, by his Target known,*
And from the Shrine ta'ne down,
Attested, that in Trojan *Wars he breath'd,*
And to black Death bequeath'd
Nothing but Skin and Nerves, whom thou wilt yield
In Truth and Nature skill'd.
But all Men to one endless Night are led,
And once to Death's Path must tread.
Some are stern Mars's *Trophies; Seas become*
The greedy Sailor's Tomb.
The Fates of young and old together croud,
No Head is disallow'd
By merciless Proserpina; *and me*
Into th' Illyrian *Sea*
The Wind, which doth Orion's *Star pursue,*
Unruly Auster *threw.*
But grudge not thou, kind Mariner, to spread
On my unburied Head
And Bones, some few of these loose Sands; so may
Fierce Eurus *turn away*
Whatever threatens the Hesperian *Floods,*
On the Apulian *Woods,*
Securing thee from Harm; a swelling Tide
Of Wealth on every Side
Flow on thee, by great Jove *and* Neptune *sent.*
Tarentum's *President,*
If thou neglect, thou may'st in future Age
Thy guiltless Sons engage
In this Offence; perhaps Fate may return
What's due unto thy Scorn.
Vengeance may on my poor Petition wait,
And thee nought expiate.
The Stop is small, as thou sail'st on, thou may'st
Dust thrice upon me cast.

He invented [c] Cranes and Screws, and made a Pigeon of Wood that flew; but when she once rested, could not rise. Of the Duplication of a Cube, I have spoken formerly in the Life of *Plato*.

Being angry with a [d] Countryman, he said, What would I have done to thee if I had not been angry?

He [e] was very modest, and abstained from obscene Expressions; and if there were a Necessity of any, he wrote it upon the Wall.

He said, That if a Man should go to Heaven, and behold the Nature of the World, and Beauty of the Stars, he would find, that the Admiration of them, otherwise the most pleasing thing in the World, would be very unpleasant to him, if he had not one to communicate it unto.

He said, That it is as hard to find a Man without Deceit, as a Fish without Bones.

He said, That the Judge and Sanctuary is one; for he who hath received Wrong, flies to both.

He said, That every Commonwealth consists of three Things, the Ruler, the Ruled, and the Laws; whereof the best ought to command; the worst, to be commanded.

Cicero [f], in the Person of *Cato*, gives an Account of an Oration of *Archytas* to this Effect: That there is no Pestilence more capital given by Nature to Men, than corporeal Pleasure, by which they are incited to run headstrong, and unbridled on, to enjoy the Lust of that greedy Pleasure. Hence proceed Betrayings of our Country; hence, Subversions of Commonwealths; hence private Treaties with Enemies. In fine, there is no Wickedness, no Mischief to the undertaking whereof, this lusting after Pleasure will not impel us: Rapes, Adulteries, and all such Lewdness, are provoked by no other Allurements than those of Pleasure. And whereas Nature, or some God, hath not bestowed on Man any thing more excellent than a Mind, there is nothing so contrary to this divine Gift, as Pleasure; for, as long as Pleasure rules, there is no Place for Temperance; nor can Virtue subsist under the Jurisdiction of Pleasure: Which, to understand the better, he advised to fancy to ourselves some Man, provoked by corporeal Pleasure the greatest imaginable; and he conceived, that no Man will doubt, but that as long as he took Joy therein, he could fix his Reason, his Mind, his Thoughts, upon nothing else. Wherefore there is nothing so detestable, nothing so pestilent, as Pleasure; for if it be great and long, it extinguisheth all the Light of the Mind.

[g] There were four of this Name; the first, this Philosopher; the second, of *Mitilene*, a Musician; the third, wrote concerning Agriculture; the fourth, an Epigrammatick Poet. Some add the fifth, an Architect.

ALCMÆON.

[c] Laert. 8. 83. [d] Cic. de Amic. [e] Æl. var. Hist. 14. 19. [f] De Senect. [g] Laert. 8. 82.

ALCMÆON.

[a] ALCMÆON was of *Crotona*; he also heard *Pythagoras*. He was chiefly addicted to Medicine, but studied Phisiology also, saying, there are many Causes of human things. *Phavorinus* thinks him the first that wrote a Physical Dissertation. He asserted, that the Moon hath an eternal Nature. He was Son of *Perithus*, as appeareth by the beginning of his Book; Alcmæon *a* Crotonian, *Son of* Perithus, *saith thus to* Brontinus, *and* Leon, *and* Bathyllus, *Of invisible and immortal things, the Gods have a certain Knowledge, Men, Conjecture*, &c. He asserted the Soul to be immortal, and that it moveth perpetually like the Sun.

[b] He asserted, that the Planets hold an opposite Course to the Fixed Stars, from West to East.

[c] We hear by the Hollow of the Ear; that resoundeth when the Wind entereth into it, because all empty things make a Sound.

[d] By Moisture and Warmth in the Tongue, together with the Softness thereof, all Objects of Taste are distinguished.

[e] Reason, the principal part of the Soul, is within the Brain, and that by it we Smell, drawing in Scents and Smells by respirations.

Why Mules are Barren, see *Plut. plac. phil. lib. 5. cap. 14.*

[f] The Infant in the Womb feeds by the whole Body; for it sucketh and draweth to it, like a Spunge, of all the Food, that which is good for Nourishment.

[g] The Head is first made, as being the Seat of Reason.

[h] Sleep is made by the return of Blood into the confluent Veins: Waking, is the diffusion of the said Blood; Death, the utter departure thereof.

[i] The equal Distribution of the Faculties of the Body, Moisture, Heat, Driness, Cold, Bitter, Sweet, and the rest, is that which maintaineth Health; the Predominance of any of them causeth Sickness; for the Predominance of one is the Corruption of all the other, and is the Cause of Indisposition; the Efficient, in respect of excessive Heat or Cold; the Material in respect of Abundance, or defect of Humours; as in some there is want of Blood or Brain; whereas Health is a proportionable Contemperation of all these Qualities.

[a] Laert. 8. 84. [b] Plut. pl. Phil. 2. 16. [c] Plut. 4. 16. [d] Ibid. 4. 18. [e] Ibid. pl. 4. 17. [f] Ibid. 5. 16. [g] Ibid. 5. 17. [h] Ibid. 5. 24. [i] Ibid. 5. 30.

HIPPASUS.

[k] HIPPASUS was a *Metapontine*, (or, as some affirm, a *Sybarite*) a *Pythagorean* also. [l] *Jamblichus* saith he was drown'd in the Sea; a just Reward for his Impiety, for that he had publish'd the Doctrine of *Pythagoras*.

[m] He asserted that Fire is the Principle of all things, of which all things are made, and into which all things resolve. All things are made by Extinction of this Fire: first, the grosser Part of it being contracted, becometh Earth; then the Earth being loosen'd by the Nature of the Fire, becomes Water; the Water exhaled, becomes Air. Again, the World and all Bodies shall be dissolved in a Conflagration; Fire therefore is the Principle, for all things were made of it; and the End, because all things are resolved into it.

Likewise he held that there is a determinate Time of the Mutation of the World, and that the Universe is bounded and always moved.

Demetrius saith, he left nothing extant in writing.

There was another of this Name, a *Lacedemonian*, who wrote five Books of the *Lacedemonian* Commonwealth.

[k] Laert. 8. 84. [l] De vit. Pythag. [m] Laert. Ibid.

PHI-

PHILOLAUS.

[n] PHILOLAUS was of *Crotona*, a *Pythagorean*: of him it was that *Plato* wrote to *Dion*, to purchaſe ſome *Pythagorean* Books; he was put to death upon ſuſpicion that he aimed at the Tyranny.

He aſſerted, that all things are made by Neceſſity and Harmony; and was the firſt that ſaid the Earth moveth circularly: which ſome aſcribe to *Hicetus* of *Syracuſe*.

He wrote one Book, which *Hermippus* (citing ſome other Author) affirms, that *Plato* when he went to *Sicily* to *Dionyſius*, purchaſed of the Kinſmen of *Philolaus*, paying for it forty *Alexandrian* Minæ, and out of it took his *Timæus*. Others ſay that *Dionyſius* gave it him, having taken it from a young Man, Diſciple to *Philolaus*, whom he freed out of Priſon.

Demetrius ſaith, that *Philolaus* firſt publiſh'd a *Pythagorick* Diſcourſe concerning Nature, beginning thus: *Nature, and the whole World, and all things in it, are aptly connected of Infinites and Finites.*

Plutarch relates, that after the *Pythagorean* Aſſociations were expelled the Cities, thoſe who kept ſtill together, being aſſembled in a Houſe at *Metapontum*, the [o] *Cylonians* ſet the Houſe on fire, and burnt them all except *Philolaus* and *Lyſis*, who being young Men, ſtrong and active, eſcaped through the Fire. *Philolaus* fled to the *Lucanians*, where ſome other Friends came to him, who gathering themſelves together, over-maſter'd the *Cylonians*. But of this formerly, in the Life of *Pythagoras*.

He affirmed, that there is a twofold Corruption: one while by Fire falling from Heaven; another, by Water out of the Moon, poured forth by the Circumgyration of the Air; the Exhalations whereof become the Food of the World.

[p] The Subſtance of the Sun is, as it were, of Glaſs, receiving the Reverberation of all the Fire in the World, and tranſmitting the Light thereof to us, as it were through a Strainer, as that fiery Light in Heaven reſembleth the Sun; then that which proceedeth from it, is in Form of a Mirrour: and thirdly, there is a Splendor, which by way of Reflection from that Mirrour is ſpread upon us; and this we call the Sun, as it were the Image of an Image.

[q] The Earth moveth round about the Fire in an oblique Circle, as the Sun and Moon do.

[n] Laert. 8. 84. [o] So read here, and afterward. [p] Plut. 2. 20. [q] Ibid. 3. 13.

EUDOXUS.

[r] EUDOXUS was of *Gnidus*, Son of *Æſchines*: He was an Aſtrologer, Geometrician, Phyſician, and Lawgiver: He learnt Geometry of *Arthytas*; Medicine of *Philiſtio* the *Sicilian*, as *Callimachus* affirms.

Sotion ſaith, he heard *Plato* alſo: for being 23 Years old, and in a very mean Condition, he was invited by the Fame of the *Socratick* Philoſophers to go to *Athens*, with *Theomedon* a Phyſician that maintained and much affected him. He lived in the *Pyræum*, and went up every Day to *Athens*, where he heard the Sophiſts, and return'd. Thus he lived two Months, and then went home; where his Friends making a Collection of Money for him, he travelled to *Egypt* with *Chryſippus* a Phyſician, carrying along with him Letters of Recommendation from *Ageſilaus* to *Nectabis*, who recommended him to the Prieſts. There he lived a Year and four Months, ſhaving his Eye-brows; and wrote, as ſome think, his Hiſtory of eight Years. Thence he went to *Cyzicus*, and to *Propontis*, teaching Philoſophy; and to *Mauſolus*. At laſt, having gotten together many Diſciples, he return'd to *Athens* to vex *Plato*, as ſome conceive, for having formerly rejected him. Some ſay, that *Plato* making a Feaſt, he taught him the way of placing his Gueſts in the Figure of a Semicircle.

Nicomachus, Son of *Ariſtotle*, ſaith, he aſſerted Pleaſure to be the chief Good.

He was much honour'd in his own Country, as appears by the Decree made concerning him. He was very eminent alſo among the *Greeks*; for he gave Laws to ſome Cities, and taught them (as *Hermippus* affirms) Aſtrology and Geometry, and many other excellent things.

He had three Daughters, *Actis*, *Philtis*, and *Delphis*. *Eratoſthenes* affirms, he wrote Κυνῶν Διαλόγους; but others, that the *Egyptians* wrote them in their own Language, and that *Ariſtoxenus* tranſlated them into *Greek*.

From him *Chryſippus* the *Gnidian*, Son of *Erineus*, received all that he wrote concerning the Gods, and the World, and Meteors.

[r] Laert. 8. 86.

He left many excellent Writings.

He had a Son, *Ariſtagoras*, Father to *Chryſippus*, the Diſciple of *Aethlius*.

He flouriſhed in the 103d Olympiad, died 53 Years old. When he lived in *Egypt* with *Ichonuphus*, a *Heliopolitane*, an Ox licked his Garment; whereupon the Prieſts foretold that he ſhould be very eminent, but not long-liv'd. Thus *Laertius*.

If therefore he lived about the 103d Olympiad, and in the 23d Year of his Age heard *Plato*, *Euſebius* ſeems to be miſtaken, who affirms, he flouriſhed in the Beginning of the 97th Olympiad, which was ſeven Years after the Death of *Socrates*; at what time *Eudoxus* could not have attained any Eminence, if he were Diſciple to *Plato*, as *Cicero* alſo affirms he was; *Strabo*, that he went with *Plato* into *Egypt*; *Suidas*, that he was Contemporary with him.

Of his Writings are mentioned *Octaeteres*; ſee *Cenſorinus de Die Natali*, cap. 18.

Τῆς περιόδου, cited by *Athenæus* and others; perhaps the ſame *Strabo* calls Τὴν τοῦ Εὐδόξου ἱστορίαν; it conſiſted of many Books, the ſeventh cited by *Stephanus* and *Porphyrius*.

Phænomena; mentioned by the anonymous Writer of the Life of *Aratus*.

There were others of this Name; [s] one of *Rhodes*, a Hiſtorian; another of *Sicily*, a Comic Poet; another of *Gnidus*, a Phyſician; [t] another of *Cyzicus*. Hitherto of the *Pythagorean* Philoſophers.

[s] Laert. 8. 90.

[t] Plin. 26. 7.

THE

THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY.

THE TENTH PART,

Containing the *HERACLITIAN* Sect.

HERACLITUS.

CHAP. I.

His Country, Parents, Maſters.

AS the *Ionick* Sect, which was ſo named from the Place of its Inſtitution, communicated that Denomination in general to all the Sects that were deſcended from it, though founded in other Places; ſo the *Pythagorean* Sect, being from the Country where it was planted termed *Italick*, all the Sects that ſprung out of it, though ſome of them had their Beginning far from *Italy*, were included under the general Notion of *Italick*. Of theſe there were four; the *Heraclitian*, the *Eleatick*, the *Septick* (or *Phyrronian*) and the *Epicurean*.

The Author of the firſt was *Heraclitus*, an [y] *Epheſian*; his Father, by *Laertius*, called *Plyſo*; by *Cleanens*, *Bauſo*; by *Suidas*, *Bloſſo*, or *Bleuto*, or (ſaith he) as others, *Heracion*. He had alſo an Uncle, *Heracleodorus*, whom he mentions in his [x] Epiſtles.

[y] *Ariſtonymus* ſaith, That whilſt he was yet young, he was the wiſeſt of all Men, becauſe he knew that he knew nothing: *Laertius*, that he was admirable from his Childhood; for, whilſt he was young, he uſed to ſay, that he knew nothing; and when he was grown up, that he knew all things.

Laertius adds, That *he heard no Man, but profeſs'd that he himſelf made Enquiry, and ſought out all things of himſelf.* But the learned *Caſaubon* juſtly doubts, that *Laertius* miſtakes the Meaning of thoſe Words; and that they rather refer to a ſtrict Enquiry, which he uſed to make into himſelf, according to the *Delphian* Motto, *Know thyſelf*; to which effect, [z] *Plutarch* commends as a memorable Saying of his, *I have been ſeeking out myſelf.* And *Laertius* himſelf acknowledgeth, upon the Teſtimony of *Sotion*, that *ſome affirmed he heard Xenophanes*; to whom *Suidas* adds, *Hippaſus* the *Pythagorean*.

[a] He flouriſhed about the 69th Olympiad, [b] in the Time of *Darius Hyſtaſpis*.

[y] Cic. Tuſc. Quæſt. 5. 36. Laert. 9. 1. [x] Ad Amphid. 2. [y] Stob. Serm. 21. [z] Adv. Colot. [a] Laert. 9. [b] Suid.

CHAP. II.

How he lived at Ephesus.

[c] *Laertius* saith, *He was of a high Spirit, contemning others, as appears by a Book of his* (perhaps the fifth Book of Politicks, out of which [d] *Clemens* seems to cite the same Sentence) *wherein he saith,* " *Much Learning instructs not the Mind; for then it* " *would have instructed* Hesiod *and* Pythagoras, *as* " *also* Xenophanes *and* Hecatæus: *for there is but one* " *wise thing, which is to know when to govern all by* " *all. He also said, That* Homer *deserved to be* " *thrown out of the Schools and beaten, as also* Archi- " lochus."

As a further [e] Argument of the Greatness of his Spirit, *Antisthenes* relates, That he gave the Kingdom to his Brother; *Laertius*, That being desired to take upon him the supreme Power, he slighted it, because the City was prepossess'd with an ill Way of Government; and retiring to the Temple of *Diana*, play'd at Dice there with the Boys, saying to the *Ephesians* that stood about him, " *Worst of Men, what do you* " *wonder at! Is it not better to do thus, than to go-* " *vern you?*

Much offended was he with the *Ephesians*, for that they had banished his Friend *Hermodorus*, in whose behalf he reproved them sharply, writing thus: *The* Ephesians *deserve to die all Children, and to leave their City to Children, for that they cast out* Hermodorus, *the most excellent amongst them, saying, Let not one of us be more excellent than the rest; and if there be any such, let him go to another Place, and live amongst other People.*

Darius [f] King of *Persia* wrote to the *Ephesians* to repeal the Banishment of *Hermodorus*, and to restore him to his Patrimony. He wrote also to *Heraclitus*, inviting him to come and live with him; the Letter was to this effect:

[g] I King *Darius* salute *Heraclitus* the *Ephesian*, a wise Person.

YOU have put forth a Book concerning Nature, hard to be understood and interpreted; but by so much as I understand of it, it seems to promise the Theory of the whole World, and of the things that depend hereon, which consists in divine Motion; and by many Questions and Doctrines, as well to those who are skilful in the Greek *Learning, as to others vers'd in* Meteorology, *and other Learning, to doubt what is the true Meaning of what you have written. King* Darius *therefore, Son of* Hystaspes, *desires to participate of your Learning, and of the* Greek *Institution. Come as soon as you can to my Presence, and Royal Palace; for the* Greeks, *for the most part, are not obsequious to wise Men, but despise the good things which they deliver. With me you shall have the first place, and daily Honour and Titles; your way of living shall be as noble as your Instructions.*

But *Heraclitus* refused his Offer, returning him this Answer:

Heraclitus to *Darius* the King, Son of *Hystaspes*, Health.

ALL Men living refrain from Truth and Justice, and pursue Unsatiableness and Vain-glory, by reason of their Folly; but I, having forgot all Evil, and shunning the Society of inbred Envy and Pride, will never come to the Kingdom of Persia, *being contented with a little, according to my own Mind.*

[h] *Demetrius* affirms, he slighted the *Athenians* also, who had a great Respect for him.

He continually bewailed the wicked Lives of Men, and *as often as he came abroad amongst them fell a weeping, considering that all things which are done are Misery.*

CHAP. III.

His Retirement.

AT the last, saith *Laertius*, *growing into a great Hatred of Mankind, he retir'd to the Mountains, and lived there, feeding upon Grass and Herbs*; the Dislike which he had of the *Ephesians* being much exasperated by a Disrespect they shewed to him; whence [i] *Demetrius* affirms, that *the* Ephesians *slighting him, he betook himself to a private Life:* The Occasion is related by himself in two Epistles to *Hermodorus*; the first is this,

Heraclitus to *Hermodorus*.

BE not angry any longer in your own Cause, *Hermodorus*; *Euthycles*, Son of that *Nychophon* who committed Sacrilege, hath indicted me of Impiety (overcoming me by his Ignorance, who am excellent in Wisdom) for that upon the Altar by which I stood, I wrote my Name, making of myself, of a Man, a God. Thus I shall be condemned of Impiety by the Impious. What think you? I shall seem impious to them for dissenting from them in Opinion concerning the Gods. If blind Men were to judge of Sight, they would say that Blindness were Sight: but, O ye ignorant Men, teach us first what God is, that when you declare us to be impious, you may be believed. Where is God shut up in Temples? O pious Men, who place God in the Dark!

[c] Laert. 9. 1. [d] Strom. 1. where perhaps read πολυμαθίη νόον οὐχὶ διδάσκει. [e] Laert. ibid. [f] Epist. Græc.
[g] Epist. Græc. & Laert. ibid. [h] Laert. 8. 13. [i] Laert. 8. 15.

dark! It is a reproach to a Man to tell him, he is a Stone; but of God you profeſs, as a Truth and in his Commendations, he is born of a Rock. You ignorant People! you know not, that God is not made with Hands, neither hath he any Baſis from the Beginning, nor hath one Circumference; but the whole World, adorned with living Creatures, Plants and Stars, is his Manſion. But if you yourſelves are unlearned, let not my Learning be conſtrued Impiety. Learn Wiſdom, and underſtand it; but you will not, neither will I force you. You grow Old with Ignorance, and rejoice in your own Wickedneſs. *Hercules* was not, as *Homer* bely'd him to be, a Murtherer of Strangers. What was it that deified him? his own Integrity and Fortitude, by which he perform'd ſo many Labours. Am not I then, O ye Men, good alſo? I was miſtaken when I asked you; for though you ſhould ſay the contrary, yet I am good, and have performed many difficult Labours. I have overcome Pleaſures; I have overcome Riches; I have overcome Ambition; I have maſter'd Cowardice; I have maſter'd Flattery: Fear hath nothing to object againſt me; Drunkenneſs hath nothing to object againſt me: Sorrow is afraid of me; Anger is afraid of me; I have won the Garland in fighting againſt theſe Adverſaries, a Task which was impoſed on me by my ſelf, not by *Euriſtus*. Will you not give over to ſlander Wiſdom, and to preſs your own Sins and Crimes upon your ſelves? If you could return to Life 500 Years hence, you would find *Heraclitus* ſtill alive, but not the leaſt Print of your Name. I ſhall equalize, by reaſon of my Learning, the Lives of Cities and Nations; I ſhall never be ſilenc'd. If the City of the *Epheſians* were razed to the Ground, and all their Altars deſtroy'd, yet will the Souls of Men be the Places to preſerve my Memory. I will alſo marry *Hebe*, not the *Hebe* of *Hercules*; he will always be with her himſelf; mine is another. Virtue hath brought forth many, and beſtow'd one upon *Homer*, another upon *Heſiod*, and to every good Man one, which is the Renown of his Learning. Am not I wiſer than *Euthycles*, who alone know God? But thou being Bold and Impious thy ſelf, think'ſt him God, who is not God. If the Altar of God be not erected, there is not God; but if the Altar of One that is not God be erected, then he is God, as if Stones were Witneſſes of the Gods. His Works ſhould bear witneſs of him, as thoſe of the Sun, Night and Day, bear witneſs; the four Seaſons of the Year are his Witneſſes; the whole fruitful Earth is his Witneſs; the Moon is his Work, a heavenly Teſtimony.

The other Epiſtle is this.

To Hermodorus.

I Underſtand that the *Epheſians* are about to make a Law againſt me, moſt illegally; for it is not a Law which is made for a ſingle Perſon, but Judgment: the *Epheſians* know not that a Judge is different from a Lawgiver; and this is ſo much the better, for that it is uncertain who ſhall tranſgreſs it: but the Judge ſeeth before his Eyes the Perſon that is to ſuffer. They know, *Hermodorus*, that I aſſiſted you in the framing of Laws, and therefore will baniſh me, but not before they have confuted themſelves. They decree, that he who laughs not, and hates Mankind, ſhall depart the City before the Sun riſe; this is the Law they would make. There is no Man, *Hermodorous*, but laughs, except *Heraclitus*; and ſo they baniſh me. O ye Men; Will ye not learn why I never laugh? It is not that I hate Men, but their Wickedneſs. Write your Law thus, Whoſoever hateth Wickedneſs, let him depart the City, and I will be the firſt that ſhall go, willing to forſake, not my Country, but the Malice of my Countrymen. Write your Decree over again. But if you grant there is Wickedneſs and Vice amongſt the *Epheſians*, and that I hate you for it, why ſhould not I make a juſter Law, that they, who through their Wickedneſs are the occaſion that *Heraclitus* never laughs, ſhould depart this Life? Or rather let them be fined great Sums, for the loſs of Wealth will more afflict you; this is death to you. You have done me wrong in taking away that which God gave me, and baniſhing me unjuſtly. Shall I therefore love you? Firſt, for that you have taken all Joy away from me, and not ceaſing there, oppreſs me with Laws and Exile; for whilſt I live in the City, I am baniſhed from you? With whom do I commit Adulteries? With what Company do I commit Murther? With whom am I drunk? With whom do I join in Wickedneſs? I corrupt none; I injure none; I am alone in the City. You have made it a Deſart by your Wickedneſs. Hath *Heraclitus* made your *Forum* honeſt? No; but *Heraclitus* would have made you and the whole City good, but you would not. I would do it, and am a Law to others; I am the only Perſon that ought not to be puniſhed by the City. Do you wonder that I never laugh? I wonder at you, that you can rejoice, and do wrong; for thoſe that do unjuſtly ought to have a ſowre Look. If you would give me an Opportunity of Laughter, live in Peace, and conteſt not unjuſtly: You carry Swords in your Tongues, plunder Wealth, raviſh Women, poiſon Friends, commit Sacrilege, betray the Truſt the People repoſe in you, take away Mens Lives by Torture; every Man is full of ſeveral Wickedneſs. Shall I laugh when I ſee Men do theſe things? Their Garments, Beards and Heads order'd with unneceſſary Care; a Mother deſerted by a wicked Son, or young Men conſuming their Patrimony, or a Citizen whoſe Wife is taken from him, or a Virgin raviſh'd, or a Concubine entertained as a Wife, or one impudent young Man courted by the whole City, or deadly Poiſons by Unguents, or ſome at Feaſts

Feasts filling their Bellies more with Poison than with Dainties, or the People treating of publick Affairs in the Theatre? Virtue, more rigid than Vice, would strike me blind, if I should laugh at your Ways. By Musick, Pipes, and Stripes, you are excited to things contrary to all Harmony. Iron, a Metal more proper for Ploughs and Tillage, is fitted for Slaughter and Death. You injure the Gods, warlike *Minerva*, and *Mars*, firnamed *Enyalius:* Men, raising Armies against Men, covet to kill one another, punish them who forsake the Field, for not being murderous; and honour, as valiant, such as are drunk with Blood: But Lions arm not themselves against one anothere; Horses betake not themselves to Swords; the Eagle buckles not a Breast-plate against an Eagle. No other Creatures use Instruments of War, their Limbs are their Weapons. Horns are the Arms of those, Beaks of these, Wings of others; Swiftness to some; Bigness, Smallness, Swimming to others; to many their Breath; no irrational Creature useth a Sword, but keeps itself within the Laws to which it is design'd by Nature; but Man doth not so, more blameable, because more understanding. You must wish for an end of your Wars, if you would take me off from the Severity. Nor worse than these internal Dissentions, is your Depopulations of Cities, tormenting aged Persons, ravishing Wives, taking away Children from their Mothers and Nurses, defiling Beds, vitiating Virgins, abusing Boys, casting free Persons into Bonds, demolishing the Temples of the Gods, digging up the Monuments of the Heroes, triumphing in Wickedness, and offering gratulatory Sacrifices to the Gods for these unjust Actions. About these, without laughing, you contest in Peace by Argument, and in War with Steel. You force away Justice by your Swords. *Hermodorus* is banished for writing Laws: *Heraclitus* is banished for Impiety; the Cities are deserted of Justice, the Desarts of Injustice. The People have built Walls, as Testimonies of the Wickedness of the Inhabitants, shutting up your own Lives. You are all fenced with Houses; there are other Walls of Wickedness; Enemies within you, your own Countrymen; Enemies without you, Strangers; All Enemies, no Friends. Can I laugh, seeing so many Enemies? You think the Wealth of other Men is your own; you think the Wives of other Men are your own. You lay the Yoke of Servitude upon free Persons; you devour the Living; you violate the Laws; you ratify Wickedness by a Law; you do violence to all such as consent not to your Justice. Your Laws themselves convince you of Injustice; for if they were not, you would go wholly unpunished; whereas now you are a little restrained, and, by Fear of Punishment, with-held from the utmost Injustice.

There is a third Epistle of his to the same Person, expressing no less Disaffection to the *Ephesians*.

Heraclitus to *Hermodorus*.

GIVE me notice, *Hermodorus*, when you intend to go to *Italy*; may the Gods and Dæmons of that Place receive you kindly. I dreamt, that I beheld all the Diadems of the whole World make their Address to your Laws, and, shutting their Mouths after the *Persian* manner, adore them, they being seated above all the rest. The *Ephesians* will adore thee when thou art dead, when thy laws shall bear a general Sway; then Necessity will force them to use them; for God hath taken away the Power from them, and they have acknowledg'd themselves worthy of Servitude. This I learnt from the more Ancient. All *Asia* is reduced by the King [of *Persia*] and the *Ephesians* are spoiled. They are not accustomed to true Liberty and Dominion, and now it is very likely will be obedient, if they are commanded to lament and accuse the Gods for not giving them Riches. It is the part of blind Men, not of a good Man, to value the Goods of Fortune. The Sybil frequently hinted this, that from *Greece* there should come a wise Man into *Italy*. The Sybil knew thee so many Ages since, *Hermodorus*; even then thou wert in being: but the *Ephesians* will not yet see him whom Truth acknowledged by the Mouth of a Woman divinely inspir'd. A Testimony is given of your Wisdom; but the *Ephesians* disallow the Testimony of a God: they shall smart for their Insolence, and even now do smart for it, having an ill Opinion of us also. God punisheth not by taking away Riches, he rather allows them to the Wicked, as an Aggravation of their Crimes, that, abounding in Wealth, their Offences may be more notorious to all Men; for Poverty is a Veil. I wish Fortune may not forsake you, that all Men may see your Wickedness. But farewel they; as for you, acquaint me with the Time of your Departure, for I would by all means meet you, and discourse with you a little, amongst other things, concerning Laws. I had committed to writing, but that I thought it fit rather to be conceal'd: nothing is more conceal'd than when one Man speaks to another alone, and especially when *Heraclitus* to *Hermodorus*. The ordinary Sort of Men differ not from broken Pitchers, which can hold nothing, but let it run out by babbling. The *Athenians*, being *Autochtones*, knew the Nature of Men, that being made of Earth, they have crasy Minds, and therefore instituted them in a Secrecy and Silence of Mysteries, that they might hold their peace through Fear, not out of Judgment, and that it might be no longer hard for them to practise Silence.

CHAP.

CHAP. IV.

His Sickneſs and Death.

[k] THE Diet which he uſed in the Mountains being nothing but Graſs and Herbs, brought him into a Dropſy, whereupon he was conſtrained to return to the City. The Account of his Sickneſs receive from himſelf, in [l] two Epiſtles to *Amphidamas*. The firſt is this.

Heraclitus to *Amphidamas*.

I Am fallen ſick, *Amphidamas*, of a Dropſy. Whatſoever is in us, if it get the Dominion, it becomes a Diſeaſe. Exceſs of Heat is a Fever; Exceſs of Cold, a Palſey; Exceſs of Wind, Cholick. My Diſeaſe comes from Exceſs of Moiſture. The Soul is ſomething divine, that keeps all theſe in due Proportion. The firſt thing is Health: Nature herſelf is Health; we cannot foreſee what is contrary to Nature, but after that it happens. I know the Nature of the World; I know that of Man; I know Diſeaſes, I know Health; I will cure myſelf, I will imitate God, who makes equal the Inequalities of the World, committing it to the Sun. *Heraclitus* ſhall not die of this Diſeaſe; the Diſeaſe of *Heraclitus* ſhall die by good direction. In the Univerſe moiſt things are dried up, hot things are made cold. My Wiſdom knoweth the Ways of Nature; it knows the Cure of Sickneſs: but if my Body be over-preſs'd, it muſt deſcend to the deſtin'd Place; nevertheleſs my Soul ſhall not deſcend, but being a thing immortal, ſhall fly up on high to Heaven. The ætherial Manſions ſhall receive me, and I will accuſe the *Epheſians*. I ſhall converſe, not with Men, but with Gods; I ſhall not build Altars to others, but others to me. *Euthycles* ſhall not charge me with Impiety; but I him of Malice. They wonder, that *Heraclitus* look'd always ſad; they wonder not that Men are always wicked. Withhold from your Wickedneſs, and perhaps I ſhall ſmile. My Sickneſs is the more gentle to me, for that I am not amongſt Men, but alone; and perhaps for that my Soul preſageth ſhe ſhall ſhortly be freed out of this Priſon, and looking through her ſhatter'd Body, calls to mind her own Country, from whence ſhe came to encompaſs this tranſitory mortal Body, which to others ſeems built up of Flegm, Choler, purulent Matter, Blood, Nerves, Bones, and Fleſh; for unleſs Paſſions did contrive Pains, we would never go out of it.

The ſecond Epiſtle was to this effect.

To the Same.

THE Phyſicians, *Amphidamas*, met together, and were very diligent about the Cure of my Sickneſs, but knew neither Art nor Nature; they would have it to be this, and to be that, but knew neither. They did nothing but ſoften my Belly with feeling it, as if it had been a Leather Bottle; yet ſome of them would have undertaken the Cure, but I would not allow it, before I had required an Account of the Diſeaſe, which they could not give me; neither were they too hard for me, but I for them. How, ſaid I, can you be Maſters of piping, when one that is not a Piper hath over-match'd you? I ſhall cure myſelf ſooner than you can, if you will but teach me how a Drought may be made of a Shower; but they, not underſtanding my Queſtion, held their peace, and where much at a loſs in their own Science. I have known others cured, not by them, but by Chance. Theſe Men, *Amphidamas*, do wickedly, profeſſing Arts which they have not, and undertaking the Cure of that which they underſtand not, bringing Death to Men under the Pretext and Name of Art, doing wrong both to Art and Nature. It is abominable to profeſs Ignorance, but more abominable to profeſs an Art, of which we are ignorant. What Delight take they in lying, but that by Deceit they grow rich? It were better for them to beg, for then they would be pitied; but now they are hated for doing wrong, and lying. Other Arts are more fortunate; theſe are eaſily confuted, the better more hardly. Theſe were the Men that took Compaſſion of me in the City; not a Phyſician amongſt them, but all Cozeners and Impoſtors, who ſell Cheats of Art for Money. They kill'd *Heracleodorus*, my Uncle, and took Money for it, and were not able to tell me the Cauſe of my Diſtemper, and how a Drought might be made out of an Exceſs of Moiſture. They are ignorant that God cures the great Bodies in the World, reducing their Inequality to an even Temper; that he makes whole thoſe that are broken, ſtops ſuch as are falling, gathers the diſperſed together into one Body, poliſheth the deformed; thoſe which are taken, he puts into Cuſtody; thoſe which fly, he purſues; illuminates the Dark with his Light, terminates the Infinite with certain Bounds, gives Form to thoſe which have none, gives Sight to things void of Senſe, permeates through all Subſtance, Striking, Compoſing, Diſſolving, Condenſing, Diffuſing; he diſſolves the dry into moiſt, he condenſeth the looſe Air, and continually moveth the things above, ſettleth thoſe beneath. This is the Cure of the ſickly World: This I will imitate in myſelf; to all the reſt, I bid farewel.

[m] Thus having demanded of the Phyſicians ænigmatically, whether they could of a Shower make a Drought; they not underſtanding him, he ſhut himſelf up in an Oxe-ſtall, hoping that the Hydropical Humours would be extracted by the Warmth of

[k] Laert. [l] Epiſt. Græc. [m] Laert. 8. 3.

of the Dung; but that doing him no good, he died, having lived 60 years.

Hermippus relates, that he demanded of the Phyſicians, whether they could ſqueeze the Water out of the inward Parts of his Body; which they acknowledging they could not do, he laid himſelf in the Sun, and commanded his Servant to plaiſter him all over with Cow-dung, in which Poſture he died the next Day, and was buried in the Forum. *Neanthes* of *Cyzicum* ſaith, that they could not get off the Cow-dung, and not being known in that Condition by the Dogs, they tore him to pieces.

But *Ariſto* ſaith, he was cur'd of this Dropſy, and dyed afterwards of ſome other Diſeaſe, which *Hippobotus* confirms.

[f] *Laertius* reckons five of this Name. This Philoſopher the *firſt*.

The *ſecond*, a Lyrick Poet, who writ an Encomium of the twelve Gods.

The *third*, an Elegiack Poet, of *Halicarnaſſus*; upon whom *Callimachus* hath an Epigram.

The *fourth*, of *Lesbos*, who writ the Macedonick.

The *fifth*, a Jeſter. To whom add, mentioned by *Athenæus*, another of *Mitylene*, a Juggler: and laſtly, one of *Tarentum*, a Luteniſt, who play'd at the Marriage of *Alexander*.

[g] It is reported of *Heraclitus* the Philoſopher, that he perſuaded *Melancomas* a Tyrant to lay down his Crown.

CHAP. V.

His Apothegms.

OF his Apothegms, and moral Sentences, are remembred theſe: [h] He ſaid, that we ought to take more care to extinguiſh Contumely, than the hotteſt Fire: And that a People ought to fight for their Laws, as well as for their Walls.

[i] Deriding the Sacrifices, whereby they thought that the Gods were pacify'd; Theſe, ſaith he, cleanſe themſelves by polluting themſelves with Blood, as if a Man ſhould go into the Dirt to waſh himſelf.

[k] He ſaith, that he wholly contemned his Body, and eſteemed it more vile than Droſs; yet would take care for the Cure of it, as long as God ſhould command him to uſe it as an Inſtrument.

[l] Of all the Diſcourſes that ever I heard, none came ſo far as to prove, that Wiſdom is ſomething ſeparate from all other things: A ſolitary Man is either a God or a Beaſt.

[m] Even the Eyes and Ears of Fools that have rude Minds, are tainted with ill.

[n] It concerneth every Man to know himſelf, and to govern himſelf prudently.

[o] Being deſired by the Citizens, to make ſome Diſcourſe concerning Concord, he went up into the Chair, and taking a Cup full of Water, ſprinkled ſome Meal and Penny-royal into it, and having drunk it off, went away; giving them to underſtand, That Cities might be preſerved in Peace and Concord, if the Inhabitants would be content with a little, and not affect coſtly Superfluities.

[p] It is hard to conceal Rudeneſs at any time, but eſpecially in Wine.

[q] A drunken Man reels, and is led by a Child; his Soul is wet, and knows not whither ſhe goeth; a dry Soul is the wiſeſt and beſt.

[r] He ſaid, That the Wit of a Man is his Genius.

[s] Being asked by one, why he held his Peace? he anſwer'd, That you may ſpeak.

[t] He ſaid, That the King to whom the *Delphian* Oracle belongs, neither Speaks, nor Conceals, but gives Signs.

[u] It is all one to be Living and Dead, Waking and Sleeping, Young and Old; for each of theſe alternately changeth into the other.

[w] He ſeemed to blame Generation, ſaying, That thoſe who are born will Live and Die, or rather Reſt, and leave behind them Children to die alſo.

[x] Unleſs a Man hopeth that which is not to be hoped for, he ſhall not find that which is inſcrutable, and hath no Paſſage whereby he may come at it. This, *Clemens* calls a kind of Paraphraſe upon that of the Prophet, (Iſa. 6.) *Unleſs you believe, you ſhall not underſtand.*

[y] Reproving ſome incredulous Perſons, he ſaid, They can neither Hear nor Speak.

[z] How can that Light, which never ſets, be hidden or obſcured, (meaning God?)

[a] Juſtice ſhall ſeize upon the Framers and Witneſſes of falſe Things.

CHAP. VI.

His Writings.

THE Treatiſe (ſaith *Laertius*) which goeth abroad under his Name, is a continued Diſcourſe of Nature. It is divided into three Books; One, concerning the *Univerſe*; the Second, *Politick*; the Third, *Theologick*. This Book he depoſited in the Temple of *Diana*, and, as ſome affirm, he affected to write obſcurely, (whence called σκοτεινὸς, dark) that he might be read only by the more learned, and not

[f] Laert. 8. 17. [g] Clem. Alex. Strom. 1. [h] Laert. 9. 2. [i] El. Cret. in Nazianz. Orat. 23. [k] Suid. [l] Stob. Ser. 3. [m] Ser. 4. [n] Ibid. 5. [o] Plut. de Garrul. [p] Stob. Ser. 17. [q] Ser. 5. [r] Ibid. 102. [s] Laert. 9. 12. [t] Plut. de Pyth. Orac. [u] Conſol. ad Apollon. [w] Clem. Strom. 5. [x] Strom. 2. [y] Ibid. 6. [z] Ibid. 2. [a] Ibid. 5.

not become contemptible, by being read by the Vulgar; which *Timon* implies, saying,

Mongſt theſe the great Confounder did ariſe,
Dark Heraclitus, *he that doth deſpiſe*
The Multitude ——

And perhaps it conduceth not a little to the Obſcurity of his Writings, that, through Exceſs of Melancholy, as *Theophraſtus* ſaith, he began many Things, and left them unfiniſh'd, and many times wrote contrary Things.

Ariſto relates, that *Euripides* brought this Book of *Heraclitus* to *Socrates* to be read; and asking his Opinion of it, "The Things, ſaid *Socrates*, which I "underſtand in it, are excellent, and ſo, I ſuppoſe, "are thoſe which I underſtand not; but they require "a *Delian Diver*, (one that is able to explain Ora-"cles.)" But *Selucus* the Grammarian, citing one *Croto*, ſaith, That a certain Perſon, named *Crates*, brought this Book firſt among the *Grecians*, and ſaid, It required a *Delian Diver*, for only ſuch a one could eſcape drowning in it. Some entitle it, *The Muſes*; others, *Concerning Nature*; Diodotus, *An exact Rule to ſteer Life by*; others, *The Judgment of Manners, the Ornament of one Inſtitution above all.*

[b] Yet *Laertius* gives this Judgment of that Treatiſe, that ſometimes he writes ſo clearly and plainly, that any Man may underſtand it, and diſcern the Height of his Mind; adding, that his Style was very ſhort and ſound.

There were many that explain'd and commented upon his Book: of whom were *Antiſthenes*, and *Heraclides* of *Pontus*, and *Cleanthes* of *Pontus*, and *Sphærus* the Stoick; as alſo *Pauſanias*, who was ſurnamed the *Heraclitis*, and *Nicomedes*, and *Dionyſius*; and, of Grammarians, *Diodotus*, who denies the Book concerning *Nature* to be his; but admits that of *Politick*, alledging, that what he ſaid of Nature, is only brought in by way of Example.

Hieronymus ſaith, that *Scythimus*, an *Iambick* Poet, wrote againſt him in Verſe.

CHAP. VII.

His Doctrine.

Laertius [c] ſaith, That his Writings gained ſo great a Reputation, that the Followers of his Sect were, from him, called *Heraclitians*. His Aſſertions were theſe:

SECT. I.

That Fire is the Principle of all Things.

He held, that [d] Fire is the Principle of all Things; for of Fire all Things are made, and into Fire all Things ſhall reſolve: Or, as *Laertius*, That Fire is the Element, and the Viciſſitude of Fire generates all Things by Rarefaction and Condenſation, (but he delivers nothing plainly.) That all Things are made by Contrariety, and the whole flows like a River. That the Univerſe is bounded, and that there is one World, which was made of Fire; and ſhall again be ſet on Fire by certain Periods for ever, and that this is done by Fate. That, of the Contraries, that which conduceth to Generation is named War and Contention; That which to Conflagration, Concord and Peace. That Mutation is a way up and down, and that the World is made by it; for the Fire being condenſed, groweth humid, and ſettles into Water; the Water condenſed turns into Earth, this is the way down. Again, the Earth is diffuſed, of which is made Water; of the Water, almoſt all Things elſe, meaning the Exhalation out of the Sea, this is the way up. That there are made Exhalations from the Earth and from the Sea, ſome whereof are bright and pure, others dark: the Fire is augmented by the bright, the Water by the reſt; but what that is which includes all, he declares not. Hitherto *Laertius*.

[e] *Plutarch* delivers it thus: That all Things are made by Extinction of this Fire; firſt the groſſer Part of it being contracted, becometh Earth; then the Earth being looſened by the Nature of the Fire, becomes Water; the Water exhaled, becomes Air. Again, the World and all Bodies ſhall be diſſolved in a Conflagration: Fire therefore is the Principle, for all Things were made of it; and the End, becauſe all Things are reſolved into it.

This is further explain'd by [f] *Clemens Alexandrinus*, out of the Words of *Heraclitus*. That he held, (ſaith *Clemens*) the Univerſe to be eternal, is manifeſt; for that he ſaith, *the Univerſe was not made by any, either God or Man, but was, is, and ſhall be an ever-living Fire, kindling Meaſures, and quenching Meaſures.*

That he held this World was generated, and ſhall periſh, is manifeſt alſo from his ſaying, *The Converſions of Fire, firſt Sea, then the half of Sea, Earth, the Half-preſter, meaning, that by the Power of that Fire, the Word and God, who governeth all Things, turneth by Air into Moiſture, the Seed as it were of*

[b] Ibid. 6. [c] Laert. 9. 6. [d] Plut. plac. 1. 3. [e] Loc. cit. [f] Strom. 5.

the Diſpoſer of the World, which he calleth Sea. Of this again is generated Heaven and Earth, and all Things that are in them.

Laſtly, how it returns to its firſt Condition, and becomes Fire again, he ſhews thus: *The Sea is diffuſed, and meaſured according to the ſame Proportion as it was firſt, before it was Earth, the like happens to the other Elements.* Thus *Clemens.*

Moreover he held, [g] that the Soul of the World is an Exhalation of the humid Parts thereof, and that [h] the Eſſence of Fate is a Reaſon (or Proportion) permeating through the Univerſe; which Fate is an æthereal Body, the Seed of the Generation of all Things; for all Things are done by Fate.

This Opinion (that Fire is the Principle of all Things) was aſſerted alſo by *Hippaſus* the *Pythagorean*; whom *Plutarch*, in the Account which he gives of it, joins with *Heraclitus*, and it is probable that *Heraclitus*, being his Diſciple, received it from him.

[i] *Plutarch* adds, that *he introduced* ψηγμάτα τίνα ἐλάχιστα, *certain Sharings, the leaſt of Things, and not diviſible.*

SECT. II.

Of the Stars, Sun, Moon, Day, Night, &c.

IN the World [k] there are certain *Schaphæ*, Things in the Faſhion of Boats, the hollow Sides whereof are turned towards us, in which certain ſhining Exhalations are crowded, which cauſe Flames. Theſe Flames are the Stars, nouriſhed by Exhalations, ariſing out of the Earth. Of theſe, the Flame of the Sun is the brighteſt and hotteſt, by reaſon that the other Stars are more diſtant from the Earth, and therefore ſhine and heat leſs.

[l] The Sun is juſt as big as it ſeems to be, [m] his Figure like that of a Boat, the hollow Part turned downwards. [n] He is in a tranſparent and unmixt Place, [o] (that is, in the purer Air) and keeps a proportionable Diſtance from us, by which means he heateth and ſhineth more than the Moon. [p] He happens to be eclipſed by reaſon of his Boat-like Figure, when the Hollow thereof is turned upwards, and the convex Part downwards towards us.

[q] The Moon is a Kind of Earth encompaſſed with a Miſt, [r] in Form like a Boat; ſhe is nigheſt the Earth, and moved in a Place that is not pure, the groſſer Air. [s] She is eclipſed, when the hollow Part is turned upwards; and the Variety of Appearrances, which ſhe hath in a Month, are cauſed by the turning of her hollow Part upwards by degrees.

[t] Day, Night, Months, Hours, Years, Showers, Winds, and the like, are cauſed by different Exhalations: for a ſplendid Exhalation, flaming in the Circle of the Sun, makes it Day; the contrary, being predominant, makes it Night; the Heat of the Splendid increaſing, maketh Summer; the Moiſture of the Dark abounding, maketh Winter. Suitably to theſe he explained the Cauſes of other Things; but of the Earth he ſaid nothing, nor of the *Schaphæ.*

SECT. III.

Of the Ebbing and Flowing of the Sea.

[u] THE Ebbing and Flowing of the Sea is cauſed by the Sun, which ſtirreth, raiſeth and carrieth about with him the moſt part of the Winds, which coming to blow upon the Ocean, cauſe the *Atlantick* Sea to ſwell, and ſo make the Flux or High-Water; but when the ſame are allay'd, the Sea falleth low, and ſo cauſeth a Reflux and Ebb.

SECT. IV.

Of Living Creatures.

OF the Nature [w] of the Soul, he ſaid, It is ſo profound, as that it cannot by any means be found out: He only aſſerted, [x] That it is, as all other Things are, an Exhalation; that which is without, and that which is within, being all of one Nature: it is incorporeal and always in Fluxion. That it is moved, is evident from its being moved: [y] Of Souls, the dry is the wiſeſt and beſt.

[z] Man beginneth to be perfect about his ſecond ſeventh Year, at what time the generative Vigour beginneth to move: for then Trees begin to be perfect, when they begin to bring forth; for as long as they bear no Fruit, they are immature, and imperfect. Moreover, at that time a Man comes to the Knowledge of Good and Ill, and is capable of being inſtructed therein.

[g] Plut. plac. 4. 3. [h] Plut. plac. 1. 28. [i] Plac. 1. 13. [k] Laert. 9. 6. [l] Laert. ibid. [m] Plut. plac. 2. 22. [n] Laert. ibid. [o] Stob. S. 15. [p] Plut. plac. 2. 24. Laert. [q] Plut. plac. 2. 25. [r] Plut. plac. 2. 27. [s] Plut. p. [t] Laert. [u] Plut. plac. 3. 17. [w] Laert. ibid. [x] Plut. plac. 4. 3. Ariſt. de an. 1. 3. [y] Stob. ſe. 17. [z] Plut. plac. 5. 23.

THE

THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY.

THE ELEVENTH PART,

Containing the *ELEATICK* Sect.

XENOPHANES.

CHAP. I.

His Life.

THE *Eleatick* Sect was denominated from *Ela* a City of *Magna Græcia*, founded in the Time of *Cyrus* by a Colony of *Phocæans*; of whom being beſieged by *Harpagus*, ſome made their eſcape by Night, and came into this Part of *Italy*, where they built a City which they named *Elea*, *Helea*, or *Hyela*, either from *Elea* the River of that Place, or, [a] as ſome conceive, in Alluſion to the Marſhes round about it,

Of this City were *Parmenides*, *Zeno*, and *Leucippus*; who being eminent Perſons of one Sect, from them the Sect itſelf was termed *Eleatick*.

But its firſt Inſtitutor was *Xenophanes*. *The Eleatick Sect*, ſaith [b] Clemens, *was begun by* Xenophanes *the* Colophonian, *who (as* Timæus *affirms) lived in the Time of* Hieron *King of* Sicily, *and of* Epicharmus *the Poet: But* Apollodorus, *that he was born in the fourth* Olympiad, *and his Life extended to the Time of* Darius *and* Cyrus. Parmenides *was Diſciple to* Xenophanes; Zeno *to him*; *then* Leucippus; *then* Democritus. *The Auditors of* Democritus *were* Protagoras *the* Abderite, Metrodorous *the* Chian, *and* Diogenes *the* Smyrnæan, *whoſe Diſciple was* Anaxarchus.

[c] Xenophanes *was* (as was ſaid) *a* Colophonian, *Son of* Dexius, *or (as* Appollodorus) *of* Orthomenes, *praiſed by* Timon; *who ſaith of him*,

Xenophanes, *not wholly free from Pride,*
The Fictions of old Homer *did deride.*

Being baniſhed his Country, he lived at Zande *and* Carana *in* Sicily. *Some affirm, he had no Maſter*; *others, that he heard* Botho *the* Athenian; *others* Archelaus, [*which is leaſt probable, for*] *he was (as* Sotion *relates) contemporary with* Anaximander. *He wrote in Verſe Elegies and Iambicks againſt* Heſiod *and* Homer, *reprehending what they deliver'd concerning the Gods. He alſo wrote the building of* Colophon, *and the beginning of the Colony into* Elea *in Italy, which conſiſted of two thouſand Verſes.* But [d] *Strabo*, who affirms *he writ the Silli*

[a] Strabo, l. 6. [b] Strom. 1. [c] Laert. 9. 18. [d] Lib. 14.

Silli in Verſe, ſeems to have aſcribed to him what was indeed written by *Timon* the Sceptick; his Miſtake perhaps ariſing from hence, that [e] the ſecond and third Books of that Poem were written by way of Dialogue, wherein *Timon* queſtions *Xenophanes* about every thing, who gives anſwers to all.

Xenophanes *ſung his own Works. It is farther ſaid that he aſſerted Doctrines contrary to* Thales *and* Pythagoras, *and ſomewhat againſt* Epimenides. *He flouriſh'd in the* 60*th* Olympiad. Demetrius Phalereus, *and* Panætius *the* Stoick *relate, that like* Anaxagoras *he buried his Sons with his own Hands. He lived to a great Age; for he ſaith of himſelf,*

Sixty ſeven years in *Greece* I now have told;
And when I came was twenty five years old.

Lucian *therefore reckons amiſs, affirming he liv'd ninety one years; for this Account of ſixty ſeven and twenty five amounts to ninety two.* [f] Cenſorinus *ſaith, he lived above a hundred years.*

[g] Empedocles *ſaying to him, that he could not find a wiſe Man; That may very well be, ſaith he, for you are not capable to know a wiſe Man.*

He was redeemed by Parmeniſcus *and* Oreſtades, Pythagoreans, *as* Phavorinus *relates.*

There was another Xenophanes *of* Lesbus, *an Iambick Poet.*

CHAP. II.

His Opinions.

XEnophanes, [h] *as* Socion *affirms, held all things to be incomprehenſible, and* [i] *reproved the Arrogance of thoſe Perſons, who not capable of knowing any thing, durſt ſay, they knew; nevertheleſs he did maintain many dogmatical Aſſertions; affirming,*

[k] Not all at firſt the Gods to Men reveal'd,
But by long Search they find out things conceal'd.

Whence it is, that *Timon* the Sceptick calls him ἀοίνιφον, *not wholly free from Pride*, or dogmatical Self-conceit.

He held, that God is one, and incorporeal, eternal, [l] *in Subſtance and Figure round, no way reſembling Man; that he is all Sight, and all Hearing, but breathes not; that he is all Things, the Mind and Wiſdom, not generate, but eternal, impaſſible, immutable, and rational,*

[m] Greateſt of Gods and Men, one God we find,
Like Mortals not in Body, not in Mind.

Moreover, [n] *he reproved and confuted the fabulous Narrations of* Homer *and* Heſiod *concerning the Gods; and* [o] *the Deſcriptions which the* Grecians *made of them, as that they are of human Form, and ſubject to human Affections; every one fancying them after their own Likeneſs; the* Æthiopians *black and flat-nos'd, the* Thracians *ruddy and grey-ey'd; and ſo for their Minds or Diſpoſitions, the* Barbarians *believed them fierce and cruel, the* Grecians *more mild, yet obnoxious to Paſſions.*

Men think the Gods like them begotten were,
And that like them their Form, Shape, Garments are.

[p] That this (God, or) One, is all things; the Univerſe conſiſts of this eternal One. [q] Whatſoever is, is eternal; for it is impoſſible that ſomething ſhould be made of nothing. The World is eternal, without Beginning or End, [as being ingenerate, for] [r] he firſt aſſerted, that whatſoever is generated, is corruptible.

[s] That there are infinite Worlds, and thoſe immutable.

[t] That there are four Elements.

[v] That the Stars are made of certain Clouds ſet on Fire, which are extinguiſhed every Day, and kindled again at Night: for the riſing and ſetting of the Stars is nothing elſe, but their enkindling and extinguiſhng. [x] As for thoſe Lights which appear about Ships, (commonly termed *Caſtor* and *Pollux*) theſe are little Clouds ſet on Fire, and ſhining by reaſon of ſome Motion; and that all Comets, Falling-ſtars and the like, are Clouds kindled by Motion.

[y] That the Sun conſiſts of a Collection of little Fires made by a humid Exhalation, or that it is a [z] fiery Cloud. [a] That the Eclipſe of the Sun is cauſed by Extinction, and that there riſeth a new Sun in the Eaſt. He further avers, that the Sun hath been eclipſed for a whole Month together.

[b] That the Moon is a cloſe compacted Cloud; *Cicero* [c] ſaith, he held that ſhe is habitable, containing many Cities and Mountains.

[d] That the Sun is requiſite for the Generation of the World and living Creatures, but the Moon of no Uſe thereunto.

[e] That there are many Suns and many Moons, according to the ſeveral Climates and Zones of the Earth; and that when the Sun goeth ſometimes to ſome Part of the Earth unknown to us, he ſeemeth to be eclipſed; that the Sun goeth forward to infinite, but to us ſeemeth to move circularly by Reaſon of the great Diſtance.

That

[a] Laert. in Timone. [b] De die nat. c. 15. [c] Laert. 9. 19. [d] Laert. 9. 19. [e] Clem. Alex. Strom. 5. [f] Laert. 9. 18. [g] Laert. 9. 19. [h] Ibid. [i] Ibid. [k] Stob. ſer. 27. [l] Laert. 9. 19. [m] Stob. phyſ. 1. p. 55. [n] Plut. Plac. 2. 24. [o] Clem. Alex. Strom. 7. [p] Cic. Acad. quæſt. 4. [q] Ariſtot. de Xenoph. Plut. plac. 2. 20. [r] Laert. 9. 19. [s] Ibid. [t] Ibid. [v] Plut. plac. Stob. Phyſ. 52. [x] Plut plac. 2. 18. [y] Plut. [z] Plut plac. 2. 25. [a] Acad. quæſt. 4. [b] Stob. phyſ. 55. [c] Stob. phyſ. 1.

[f] That the Clouds are a Vapour drawn up by the Sun to the Heavens.

[g] That the Earth was first founded and rooted as it were in an infinite Depth.

[h] That the Soul is a Spirit, and that there are many things beneath the Mind.

[i] *Cicero* saith, that he was the only Philosopher that believed there were Gods, and yet denied Divination; but [k] *Plutarch* joins *Epicurus* with him in this Assertion.

[f] Laert. 9. 19. [g] Plut. Plac. 3. 11. [h] Laert. ibid. [i] De Divinat. 1. [k] Plac. Phil. 5. 1.

PARMENIDES.

CHAP. I.

His Life.

Parmenides [l] was of *Ela*, Son of *Pyretes*; he heard *Xenophanes: Theophrastus*, in his Epitome, saith, that he heard *Anaximander*. But though he heard *Xenophanes*, yet he did not follow him. He conversed also with *Aminias*, and with *Diochætes* the Pythagorean, (as *Socion* saith) a Person indigent, but good and honest, whom he chiefly follow'd; and when he died, built a Temple to him as to an *Hero*. *Parmenides* being of a noble Family, and rich, he was reduced to a Privacy of Life by *Aminias*, not by *Xenophanes*.

He flourished in the 69th Olympiad.

[m] *Athenæus* therefore, not without reason, blames *Plato* for supposing him contemporary with *Socrates*.

He is also said to have given Laws to his Countrymen, as *Spusippus* saith in his Book of Philosophers.

He wrote Philosophy in Verse, as did also *Hesion*, *Xenophanes*, and *Empedocles*.

But *Callimachus* saith, that he wrote not any Poem.

There was another *Parmenides*, an Orator, who wrote concerning that Art.

CHAP. II.

His Opinions.

He [n] asserted that Philosophy is twofold, one according to Truth, the other according to Opinion; wherefore he somewhere saith,

—— All things I would that thou enquire,
As well the Heart that doth sweet Truth pursue,
As Mens Opinions, whose Belief's untrue.

That Reason is the Criterie, and that the Senses are not certain; whence he saith,

Trust not thy self into the various way,
Nor thy rash Eye, or Ear, or Tongue obey;
But poise with Reason every Argument.

That [o] the Principle of all things is *one*, and that it is immoveable; that one is all, that *Ens* is infinite; whatsoever is besides *Ens*, is *non Ens*, and consequently nothing; but *Ens* is one, therefore, whatsoever is besides one, is nothing; therefore all is one.

[p] That hot and cold are the Principles or Elements of things; these he called Fire and Earth; one hath the Office of Maker, the other of Matter.

That no things are generated and corrupted, but only seem so to us.

[q] That the Moon is of equal Brightness with the Sun, yet borroweth her Light from him.

[r] That the Galaxie is a Mixture of dense and rare.

[s] He first asserted, that the Earth is round, and seated in the midst; and [t] first set out and limited the habitable Parts of the Earth, betwixt the cold Zones and the Tropicks.

[v] That the Earth is every way equidistant, and evenly poised; so that there is no Reason she should incline more to one Side than to another; yet is she shaken, but not removed.

[x] That Men were generated of [y] Slime, and consist of hot and cold, whereof all things are compounded.

That (contrary to *Empedocles*) Men [z] were first produced in the northern Parts of the World, those being most dense; the first Woman in the southern, those being most rare. That [a] Males now are generated on the right Side of the Mother; Females, on the left. [b] That the *Hegemonick* is seated in the Breast.

Phavorinus

[l] Laert. 9. 21. [m] Deipnos. 11. [n] Laert 9. 22. [o] Arist. Phys. 1, 2, 3. [p] Laert. 9. 32. [q] Plut. plac. 2. 26.
[r] Ibid. 3. 11. [s] Laert. 9. 23. [t] Plut. plac. 3. 11. [v] Ibid. 3. 15. [x] Laert. 9. 22. [y] So read. [z] Plut. plac. 5. 7.
[a] Ibid. [b] Ibid. 4, 5.

[c] *Phavorinus* aſcribes to his Invention the Obſervation, that Veſper and Luciſer are the ſame Star; others attribute this to *Pythagoras*.

Phavorinus alſo ſaith, [d] he uſed the Argument called *Achilles*, by others aſcribed to *Zeno*.

CHAP. III.

Of Ideas.

BUT the Aſſertion for which he became moſt eminent, was that of *Ideas*, delivered by *Plato* in a Dialogue, which he entitl'd *Parmenides*, or *of Ideas*; the Sum whereof is this:

All is One, and Many; One the *Archetype*, *Idea*; Many the Singulars.

There are *Ideas*, that is, certain common Natures, which include all Singulars, and are the Cauſes of them, from which they have both their Eſſence and Name. Theſe are εἰδῆ *Species*, the many exiſt, as they participate of one, in theſe *Species*.

The *Species* ſo include all Singulars, as that they may combine them, and difference them; for there is a twofold Power of ſpecifick Differences, compoſitive and diſcretive.

The viſible things ſhew the Power of this one; all Singulars are reduced to a One, that is, to their reſpective Communities; and ſo particular things can neither ſubſiſt nor be apprehended, but in this Community of *Species*; therefore the *Species* is one thing, the *Individua* contained in the *Species*, another.

Theſe *Ideas* ſubſiſt two ways; in our Minds, as Notions; in Nature, as Cauſes. In our Minds they exiſt, as they are variouſly comprehended by us, according to divers manifold Reſpects. In Nature they exiſt, as they are ideal Forms, and have the Power both of Exiſtence and Denomination. All Beings are reduced to this Unity of *Idea*. Thus are they inſenſible viſible things, and the Kinds of them are Similitude, Diſſimilitude, Unity, Multitude, Reſt, Motion, *&c.* Things viſible are, or are denominated like, inaſmuch as they participate of Similitude, which is the *Idea* of things like; great or little, inaſmuch as they participate of the *Idea* of Greatneſs or Littleneſs, *&c.* The like of Man himſelf, for many individual Men are ſuch by Participation of the *Idea* of Man, (as if we ſhould ſay Homoneity) which hath a permanent Subſiſtence, whereas particular Men are in perpetual Fluxion and Mutation.

The ſame Power of the One in *Ideas*, is alſo in things comprehended by Diſcourſe: they likewiſe have a Form ſubſiſtent by and of itſelf; ſo that to know the Nature of Intelligibles, they muſt be recalled to the Unite of *Idea*. For inſtance; if we would underſtand the Nature of good Things, we muſt proceed in ſuch manner as that we may arrive at the *Idea* of Good, which is the very Form of Good, whence all things that participate thereof, are, and are called good. So that there are two diſtinct things, the Form of things, which ſubſiſts of itſelf, and the Things themſelves, ſenſible or intelligible.

Idea is twofold, αὐτὸ τὸ καλὸν ὅ ἔστι καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν, *the fair, which is alſo the good*, and all the things which we underſtand as being *Ideas*; the firſt is God, the ſecond the *Species* of things in the Order of Nature.

As concerning the ſecond *Ideas*, there is a One, that is the Foundation of all Singulars; out of which, as from a Thread, the whole Web (as it were) of *Individuums* is woven.

One and the ſame *Species* in many Individuals, which exiſt ſeparately, is wholly together One, and not ſeparate from itſelf, but whole in itſelf.

The Many (that is, Singulars) ſo participate of their *Ideas*, in ſuch manner as that the *Ideas* are not diviſible, but preſerve their own Eſſence in themſelves, over and above all the Singulars; that is, they have their Eſſence in themſelves, and not in reference to us.

Ideas are Notions of the Mind, and ſubſiſt in our Mind; yet ſo, as that primarily, and of themſelves, they exiſt in Nature. So as theſe Notions ſubſiſt no otherwiſe in our Minds, than as they reſemble thoſe eternal Forms of Nature, that is, not as real Beings, but as Similitudes and Images of Beings. So that from theſe *Ideas*, which ſubſiſt of themſelves, as a Communication is derived to the Notions that are in our Mind; for otherwiſe, if the *Ideas* themſelves, or the whole *Species*, were in our Minds, Notions would not be Notions, and *Ens*, *non Ens*, foraſmuch as the things themſelves are variouſly perceived by ſeveral Men.

Beſides, there would follow a great Confuſion and Diſorder in the things themſelves, if there were continually produced new Forms of things at Man's Pleaſure; which muſt needs be, if the Mind of Man could form them, and that whatſoever a Man imagined in his Mind, became immediately a *Species*.

Again, by this means the moſt excellent Science of all things that is in God, would be denied to be in him, whoſe Mind is the Original of all things; ſo as it were a great Abſurdity to attribute to Man, a Mind procreative of *Species*, and to deny it to God, who governs all things.

Therefore *Species* have not their Dependance on the Mind of Man; on the contrary, they are unknown to human Nature, or Mankind. The *Genus*, and Eſſence of every thing is of itſelf, not exiſting in the Singulars, but the Support and Foundation of the Singulars.

Moreover, if there were not certain *Species* of things, there would be a great Confuſion in all Sciences, they being of Univerſals; for no Man comprehends

[c] Laert. 9. 23.

[d] Ibid.

prehends in his Mind all Individuals; it were infinite and full of Diſorder to take that Courſe; ſo that all Philoſophy and Diſſertation would loſe the Truth and certain Knowledge of things: whereas, on the contrary, in all Science, the true Courſe of Learning is to reduce Particulars to their proper *Species*, whence may appear their Nature and Qualities.

Of the Primary Archetypal *Idea*, the eſſential Properties; and they are theſe.

Firſt, it is not Many (that is, it is not intermingled with generated Beings, of which it is the Original;) for it is void of Parts and Figure, being infinite.

Secondly, it is void of all Motions and Mutation, remaining always immoveable and the ſame.

Thirdly, it is void of all Age and Time, being eternal, neither elder nor younger, nor any way partaking of Time, ſubject to no Circumſtances of Time, all things being always preſent to it.

Fourthly, it partakes not of that Eſſence by which Singulars are ſaid to be, but communicates the Power and Faculty of Being to all Singulars, itſelf being beyond all Eſſence. Eſſence is diſtributed amongſt the many of Beings, and is not wanting in any Being whatſoever, neither leaſt nor greateſt.

Fifthly, the firſt *Idea* is ſo diffuſed into all things whereto it gives the Power and Faculty of Being, as that it circumſcribes and limits the Multiplicity, and almoſt Infinity of Singulars, within the Bounds of the *one*: ſo that the *one*, which of itſelf is infinite and void of Parts, is as it were terminated in Singulars.

Of the ſecondary *Ideas* (which are natural Cauſes, the Works of the primary *Idea*) the Properties are theſe.

Firſt, they, as well as the primary *Idea*, are *one*; for all Singulars compriſed within them are determinately reduced to their reſpective Claſſes; but in this they differ from the primary *Idea*, that the *one* in ſecondary *Ideas* is truly finite, having Beginning, Middle, and End.

Secondly, they conſiſt entire in the Singulars, not as deriving their Eſſence from them; for they exiſt in the divine Mind, yet they are conſpicuous in Singulars; as if you would know what is Homoneity, or the *Species* of Man, you muſt look upon the Singulars of Men, in which the *Species* itſelf is viſible. The ſecondary *Ideas* in ſenſible things are ἐσχηματισμένα, figurate.

Thirdly, the ſecondary *Ideas* are *the ſame* and *another*; the ſame, in themſelves; another, in the Singulars; and conſequently both reſt and move: whereas the primary *Idea* is void of all Mutation, amidſt the Viciſſitudes of tranſient Things.

In the Order of Nature, the *one* in the *Species* is of itſelf, and derives not its Eſſence from Singulars, but is ſelf-ſubſiſtent, as being a *Species*; by whoſe Power all the many (*i. e.* Singulars) ſubſiſt.

Fourthly, the others (*i. e.* Singulars) proceed from the *one*; but the one, which is ſeen in the others, hath its Eſſence from a third; that is, Individuals exiſt by theſe ſecondary *Ideas*, yet ſo as that the ſecondary *Ideas* have from the primary *Idea* their Eſſence, and the Power by which they give to Singulars a Subſiſtence.

Fifthly, the ſecondary *Ideas* act from contrary Principles, yet ſo as that thoſe Contraries are connected in one tye of Similitudes, whence a third thing reflects. To the Production of natural things three things concur, two ἅψεις, and the third that ties them together; ἅψεις are Beings mutually touching one another (that is, the natural things themſelves.) The third is the Analogy betwixt the other two, the Similitude of their Proportions. There can be no ἅψεις without two things at the leaſt; nor can they produce any thing without the third, Combination. The ἅψεις muſt be diſſimilar, that *one* and *equal* may be introduced.

Sixthly, the ſecondary *Idæas* are not without Time, but what they do, they do in Time; whereas (as we ſaid) to the primary *Idæa* all things are preſent. Natural things exiſt and periſh according to Time, but their *Species* or *Idæas* are conſtant and permanent.

MELISSUS.

CHAP. I.

His Life.

MEliſſus[1] was a *Samian*, Son of *Ithagenes*; he heard *Parmenides*, and converſed alſo with *Heraclitus*, at what time the *Epheſians* had ſuch a miſapprehenſion of him, as the *Abderites* had of *Democritus*. He was a Perſon converſant in Civil Affairs, and much honoured by his Countrymen, who made him their Admiral, and particularly admired him for his Virtue. He flouriſh'd,

[1] Laert. 9. 24.

riſh'd, according to *Apollodorus*, about the 84th Olympiad.

His Opinions.

HE aſſerted (as *Parmenides*) that [t] the Principle of things is *One*, which is Immoveable; that this *One* is All; that *Ens* is Infinite; arguing thus, that which is made, hath a Principle, therefore that which is not made hath no Principle: But the Univerſe, or that which is, is not made; therefore it hath no Principle, and therefore no End; therefore it is Infinite; therefore *One*, for there cannot be more Infinites; therefore Immoveable, for it occupates all things, and hath not any thing whereby it may be moved.

[u] That the Univerſe is infinite and Immutable, and immoveable, and one like itſelf, and full. [w] He proved that it is Immoveable thus; becauſe, if it were moved, there muſt neceſſarily be a *Vacuum*, but there is not a *Vacuum* amongſt Beings.

[x] That there is not Motion, but that it only ſeems to be; and [y] that things are not generated and corrupted, but only ſeem ſo to us.

[z] As for the Gods, he ſaid, that we ought not to aſſert any thing concerning them, foraſmuch as we have not any knowledge of them.

[t] Ariſt. Phyſ. 1. 1, 2, 3. [u] Laert. 9. 24. [w] Ariſt. Phyſ. 4. 8. [x] Laert. ibid. [y] Ariſt. de Cœl. 3. 1. [z] Laert. ibid.

ZENO.

CHAP. I.

His Life.

[a] ZENO was of *Elea*; *Apollodorus* ſaith, he was Son of *Pyretes*; [b] but *Pyretes* indeed was Father to *Parmenides*. *Zeno* was by Nature Son of *Teleutagoras*; by Adoption, Son of *Parmenides*, whom he heard, and was much beloved of him. *Plato* ſaith, he was tall, and calls him the *Eleatick Palamedes*. He was a Perſon excellent, as well for Philoſophy as Politicks; his Writings being full of much Learning.

[c] *Valerius Maximus* ſaith, he forſook his own Country, where he could not enjoy Security and Freedom, and went to *Agrigentum*, which at that time was oppreſſed with miſerable Servitude, out of a Confidence, that by his own Wit and Courage he might deliver the People there from the ſavage Tyranny of the Tyrant *Phalaris*; and perceiving, that he was carried on more by a cuſtomary way of Rule, than ſound Counſel, he excited in the young Men of the City a Deſire to free their Country: which being diſcovered to the Tyrant, he called the People together into the *Forum*, and began to torture him ſeveral ways, demanding of him, who were privy to the Conſpiracy beſides himſelf? *Zeno* would not diſcloſe them, but names one that was moſt in favour with the Tyrant, and reproving the *Agrigentines* for their Cowardice and Timidity, raiſed ſuch a ſudden Courage in them, that they immediately fell upon the Tyrant, and ſtoned him to death. Thus not a ſuppliant Prayer, nor pitiful Crying out, but the valiant Exhortation of an old Man, ſtretch'd upon the Rack, chang'd the Minds and Fortune of the whole City.

But others relate this after a different manner. [d] *Satyrus* in his Epitome of *Heraclides* ſaith, that conſpiring againſt *Nearchus*, or, as others, *Diomedon*, a Tyrant, he was taken, and being queſtion'd concerning the Conſpirators, and the Arms he had convey'd into *Lipara*, he named all ſuch as were Friends to the Tyrant, as privy to the Plot, that thereby he might leave him deſtitute of Aſſiſtants; and further, telling him that he had ſomething to ſpeak in his Ear, he bit him by the Ear, and would not let go his hold, till they run him through; ſuffering in the ſame manner as *Ariſtogiton*, who ſlew *Hipparchus* the Tyrant of *Athens*. *Demetrius* affirms, he bit off his Noſe; *Antiſthenes* relates, that having named all the Tyrant's Friends, and being demanded by him, Whether there were any more? anſwered, Yes; Thou, that art the Deſtruction of the City. And then turning to the Standers-by, ſaid, I wonder at your Cowardice, that you can endure to be Slaves to a Tyrant, only though fear of ſuffering what I now ſuffer; which ſaid, he bit off his Tongue, and ſpit it in the Tyrant's Face: whereupon the Citizens unanimouſly fell upon the Tyrant and ſtoned him. Theſe relate the Story after this manner; but *Hermippus* ſaith, he was bray'd to death in a Stone Mortar.

Beſides his other Virtues, he had a magnanimous Contempt of great Perſons, as well as *Heraclides*; and

[a] Laert. 9. [b] The Text ſeems to require to be thus ſupplied. [c] Lib. 3. c. 3. [d] Laert. 9. 26.

and therefore preferred his own Country *Ela*, firſt named *Hyela*, a Colony of the *Phoceans*, a little Town, only for that it brought forth honeſt Men, before the Pride and Glory of the *Athenians*; never travelling thither, but living for the moſt part at home.

It is reported of him, that being reviled, he appeared much troubled at it, anſwering one that reproved him for it, If I ſhould be pleaſed with Reproaches, I could not delight in Praiſes.

He flouriſhed in the 79th. *Olympiam.*

CHAP. II.

His Invention of a Dialectick.

ARISTOTLE (cited by *Laertius*, [e] *Sextus Empirius*) *affirms, that* Zeno *Eleates was the Inventor of Dialectick, as* Parmenides *of Rhetorick*; which [f] *Galen* likewiſe confirms, ſaying, Zeno *is remembred as Author of the Eriſtick Philoſophy.* But the Names of *Eriſtick* or *Dialectick* ſeem to have been later; for, as [g] *Laertius* deſcribes the Succeſſion of it, *Euclid* [who was of *Megara*] *learning the* Parmenidean *Philoſophy, his Diſciples were called* Megaricks, *afterwards* Eriſticks, *laſtly* Dialecticks; *which Name* Dionyſius *the* Carthaginian *firſt gave them, for that they made Diſſertations by way of Queſtion and Anſwer.* That by *the Parmenidean Philoſophy*, he means no other than *Dialectick*, may be evinc'd from *Sextus Empiricus*, who alledgeth, that *Parmenides ſeemeth not to have been ignorant of* Dialecticks, *for that, as* Ariſtotle *conceives*, Zeno, *his Diſciple, invented it.* Hence perhaps may *Cicero* be explain'd, who, for this reaſon ſeems to include the *Eleatick* Philoſophers under the Title of [h] *Megaricks, who had*, ſaith he, *a noble Diſcipline; of which, as I find it written, the Prince (or Author) was* Xenophanes *lately mentioned. Then did* Parmenides *and* Zeno *follow him; ſo they were named* Eleatick *Philoſophers from theſe. Afterwards* Euclid, *Diſciple of* Socrates, *a* Megarean, *from whom the ſame were called* Megaricks; *who held, that only to be good, which is one and the ſame, and like, and always. Theſe alſo borrowed much from* Plato, *being called, from* Menedemus, Eretriacks, *for that he was an* Eretrian. Thus *Cicero.*

CHAP. III.

His Opinions.

HE held, [i] that it is impoſſible, that if there be any thing, it can be Generated, or Made; aſſerting this of God: For it is neceſſary, that whatſoever is generated, is generated, either of things like, or of things unlike; but neither of theſe is poſſible: For a thing like may as well generate its like, as be generated of it; foraſmuch as amongſt things equal and alike, all things are in a like reſpect to one another. But neither can an unlike be generated of a like; for whether a ſtronger be made of a weaker, or a greater of a leſſer, or a worſe of a better; or on the contrary, the better be made of the worſe, of a *non Ens* will be made ſomething, which can no way be. For this reaſon, he aſſerted God to be Eternal: And if God be that which is the moſt excellent of all things, it is requiſite, ſaith he, that he be *One*; for if there were two or more, he could by no means be the moſt excellent of all; foraſmuch as every God of them, being like him, would be ſuch as he. Now God, and the Power of God, is ſuch, as that it governs, but is not governed; it governs all things, ſo that if there were any thing better then he, he could not be God. If therefore there were many, and of theſe ſome were better, others worſe, they could not be Gods, for God cannot be inferior, or ſubjected, or governed. Neither if they were equal, could God be more excellent than all things elſe; for what is equal muſt neither be better nor worſe than that to which it is equal; therefore if there be a God, and he be ſuch, this God muſt be only One; otherwiſe, he could not do all things that he would; becauſe, if there were more, the *One* could not be of abſolute Power. Now God being *One*, he further affirms, that he is every way like himſelf, as to ſeeing, and hearing, and all other Senſes; for otherwiſe, the Parts of God would not be moſt excellent, but exceeded by one another; which is impoſſible. Now being every way alike, he muſt be round; for he muſt not be partly of one faſhion, partly of another. Thus being eternal, and one, and round, he is neither finite nor infinite; infinite he is not, for that hath neither Middle, nor Beginning, nor End, nor any other Part; but an *Ens* cannot be ſuch as is a *non Ens*. If there were many, they would bound one another; but *One* is neither like to a *non Ens*, nor to many; for *One* hath nothing whereby it may be bounded. Moreover, God being ſuch an *One*, is neither moved nor immoveable, for that which is immoveable is *non Ens*. Neither can any thing paſs into it, nor it into another. Again, the things which are moved are more than one; for a thing muſt be moved into another; now if that which is not, is not moved, foraſmuch as that which is not, is no where; and thoſe things which are moved, muſt be more than one; hence he affirmeth, that thoſe which are moved are two, or more than one; and that *non Ens* reſts, for it is immoveable, but *One* neither reſts nor moveth, foraſmuch as it is neither *non Ens*, nor many. Thus he aſſerted, that

[e] Adv. Math. [f] Hiſt. Phil. [g] In Euclid. 2. 136. [h] Acad. 4. 42. [i] Ariſtot. de Zenon.

God is Eternal, and One, and Like, and Round; neither Infinite, nor Finite; neither Quiescent, nor Moveable.

[k] Moreover he asserted, that there are many Worlds; that there is no *Vacuum*; that the Nature of all things consists of Hot and Moist, and Cold and Dry, mutually interchanged; that Man was made of Earth, and his Soul contemperated of those four, neither of them being predominant.

[l] Against Place he argued thus; If every *Ens* be in a Place, there must be a Place of that Place, and so to infinite.

Against Motion, he alledged four Arguments: The first, that Nothing is moved; for whatsoever makes a Progression, must come to the Middle, before it comes to the End. The second is that which is termed *Achilles*, that a slow thing will never be overtaken by a swift; for the thing which followeth must necessarily come to the Place from which that which went before departed, therefore that which went before makes a continual Progression as well as the other. The third, if every thing rests when it is in its just Place; and, in every moment, every thing is in its just Place, an Arrow flying is immoveable. The fourth, that if things were moved; as for Example, if equal Bulks were moved, one from the Beginning of the Race, another from the Middle, alike swiftly, it would come to pass, that the Half of Time would be equal to the Whole.

[k] Laert. 9. 29. [l] Arist. Phys. 6. 9.

LEUCIPPUS.

[m] *Leucippus* was of *Elea*, or, as some say, an *Abderite*, or, as others, a *Melian*: He heard *Zeno*.

His Assertions are thus delivered by *Laertius*; that all things are infinite, and transmutated into one another; that the Universe is *Vacuum* and Full, (that is, little Bodies, or Atoms.) That the Worlds are made by the falling of those Bodies into the *Vacuum*, and entangling with one another, from which Motion, by Coagmentation of them, the Stars were made. That the Sun is moved in a greater Circle about the Moon. That the Earth is moved about the Centre, and is in Figure like a Drum. He first asserted Atoms to be the Principles of all Things. This is the Sum of his Doctrine; the Particulars these.

He held, that the Universe, as we said, is infinite; one Part of it is full, the other vacuous; these are the Elements of which infinite Worlds are made, and resolve into them. The Worlds were generated after this Manner: out of the Infinite there were carried, by a kind of Abscission (from the rest) into a great *Vacuum*, many Bodies of all Sorts of Figures, which being crouded up together, caused a Circumgyration; by which means hitting against one another, and rolling about all manner of Ways, those which were alike, separated themselves from the rest, and joined with their equal like; but being of equal Weight, and not able, by reason of their Multitude, to move round; those of them which were rare, leaped forth to the exterior *Vacuum*; the rest stayed together, and entangled themselves by running one within another, and made a first Compound round. This was like a Kind of Membrane or Skin containing all Kinds of Bodies; which Bodies moving round about the Middle, the Membrane that enclosed them became more thin, there flowing together continually more Bodies unto those in the Middle, and engaging themselves in their Motion. By this Means was the Earth made, those which went to the Middle being settled together. Moreover, the outer Circumference or Membrane, as it were, was continually increased by the Accession of new Bodies from without, and, as it turned about, got hold of all that came at it. Some of these, entangling with one another, first made a humid, and, as it were, a dirty Kind of Mass; but being dried in their Motion together with the whole, and afterwards enkindled, the Stars were made of them. The outmost is the Orb of the Sun, that of the Moon is next the Earth, the rest are betwixt these; the Stars are kindled or set on fire by the Swiftness of their Motion, the Sun by the Stars, the Moon borrows a little Fire from the Sun. The Sun and Moon happen to be eclipsed, by reason that the Earth inclines towards the South; the Northern Parts are continually oppress'd with Snow and Frost; the Sun is seldom eclipsed, the Moon continually, because their Orbs are not equal. In the same manner as the World was made, it increased, will diminish, and perish, by a certain kind of Necessity. Hitherto *Laertius*. What is more to be said of his Opinions, we shall insert amongst those of *Democritus*, who borrowed most of them.

[m] Laert. 9. 30.

DEMO-

DEMOCRITUS.

CHAP. I.

His Country, Parents, Brethren, Time.

Democritus [a] is by ſome ſuppoſed to have been a *Mileſian*; but the more general Opinion is, that [b] he was of *Abdera*, a Town of *Thrace*, noted for the [c] Simplicity of the Inhabitants, which grew even to a Proverb. He was of a noble Family [d]; being deſcended from the Brother of *Hercules*. His Father is by [e] ſome called *Hegeſiſtratus*; by others [f] *Damaſippus*. *Democritus* was the youngeſt of three Sons; the other two, *Herodotus* [g] and *Damaſus*, or (as [h] *Suidas*) *Damaſtes*.

[i] Democritus *was born (according to* Apollodorus *in his Chronology) in the* 80*th Olympiad*; which is confirmed by what he [k] ſaith of himſelf in his little *Diacoſmus*, *that he was young when* Anaxagoras *was old, being forty Years younger than he. Anaxagoras* was born in the firſt Year of the 70th Olympiad; the 40th Year after it, excluſively, falleth upon the firſt of the 80th Olympiad, *Thraſyllus* therefore is not to be followed, [l] who *affirms*, *he was born in the third Year of the* 77*th Olympiad, being a Year older than* Socrates.

[m] *Pliny* and [n] *Agellius* affirm he flouriſhed chiefly in the time of the *Peloponneſian* War. *Pliny* ſaith, after the Building of *Rome* 300 Years; *Agellius*, 323 Years; by which it appears that *he was Contemporary*, as *Agellius* adds, *with* Socrates, and perhaps (as *Laertius*) *with* Achelaus *the Diſciple of* Socrates, *and with* Oenipodes, *for he mentions him, as likewiſe the Opinion of* Zeno *and* Parmenides *concerning* One, *as Perſons moſt eminent in his Time, and* Protagoras *the* Abderite, *whom all acknowledge* (ſaith he) *to have been in the Time of* Socrates. That he is ſaid to have written his little *Diacoſmus* 730 Years after the taking of *Troy*, agrees with this Account. For, according to *Eratoſthenes*, from the taking of *Troy* to the firſt *Olympiad* are 407 Years, to which add 323 Years (to make up 730) and it falls upon the 84th Olympiad.

CHAP. II.

His firſt Education and Maſters.

Democritus, (ſaith [o] *Valerius Maximus*) *may well be reckon'd amongſt the rich, for his Father was able to entertain the Army of* Xerxes. *Laertius* adds, from the Teſtimony of *Herodotus*, *that the King in requital, left with him ſome* Magi *and* Chaldeans; *referring perhaps to* [p] *that Text of* Herodotus, *where he relates, that* Xerxes, *in his Return to* Aſia, *came to* Abdera, *and was entertained by the* Abderites, *and beſtowed on them a golden Scimitar, and the Tiara embroidered with Gold; and, as the People there affirm, this was the firſt Place where he untied his Zone, ſince he fled from* Athens *(which I believe not) ſo great was his Fear.* Abdera *is nearer to the* Helleſpont *than the Bay of* Strymon, *ſo that he took Shipping from hence.* Thus *Herodotus.* From theſe *Magi* and *Chaldæans*, *Democritus* firſt received Learning, [q] *of whom, whilſt yet a Boy, he learnt Theology and Aſtronomy.*

[r] He next applied himſelf to *Leucippus* [s]. *Some affirm, he was Diſciple alſo to* Anaxagoras; *but* Phavorinus, *in his various Hiſtory, relates, that* Democritus *ſaid of* Anaxagoras, *that thoſe Opinions which he delivered concerning the Sun and Moon, were not his, but more ancient, and that he ſtole them. He likewiſe undervalued his Aſſertions concerning the Fabrick of the Univerſe, and the Mind; How then* (ſaith *Phavorinus*) *was he, as ſome hold, his Diſciple?*

No leſs doubted is the Report of his going to *Athens*, where [t] *Valerius Maximus* ſaith, *he dwelt many Years, making uſe of every Moment of Time, towards the Perception and Exerciſe of Learning. He lived unknown in that City, as he himſelf atteſts in one of his Books.* Laertius *adds, he kept himſelf undiſcover'd, out of a Contempt of Glory; and knew* Socrates, *but was not known to him; whereupon he ſaid of himſelf,* "*I went to* Athens *and no Man knew me.*" *If the Rivals* (ſaith *Thraſillus*) *be a genuine Dialogue of* Plato, *this is the Anonymous Perſon there, who, beſides the two who were buſied concerning* Oenipodes *and* Anaxagoras, *diſcourſeth concerning Philoſophy with* Socrates, [u] *to whom he ſaid that a Philoſopher reſembles a Pentathlus*, (a Perſon skilful in five Exerciſes) *and indeed he was* (continues [w] *Thraſillus*) *a Pentathlus in Philoſophy, for he was skilful in Phyſick, Ethick, Mathematick, the liberal Sciences, and all Arts. But* Demetrius Phalereus, *in his Apology for* Socrates, *ſaith, he never went to* Athens; *and this* (ſaith *Laertius*) *is far greater, that he could deſpiſe ſo eminent a*

[a] Laert. 9. 34. [b] Laert. ib. id. [c] Cic. ad Attic. 4. 16. [d] Abderit. Ep. ad Hippocr. [e] Laert. ib. id. Suid. [f] Laert. Ælian 4. [g] Laert. ibid. Plin. 18. 35. [h] In Democr. [i] Laert. ibid. [k] Laert. ibid. [l] Laert ibid. [m] Lib. 30. Cap. 1. [n] Lib. 17. Cap. 21. [o] Lib. 8. [p] Lib. 8. [q] Laert. 9. 34. [r] Laert. ibid. [s] Laert. ib. id. [t] Lib. 8. Cap. 7. [u] Reading ὦ φησιν, ὡς πεντάθλῳ ἔοικε ὁ φιλόσοφος; See the Place in *Plato*, which makes it manifeſt. What *Magnenus* means, who relates this as ſpoken by *Anaxagoras* to *Socrates* of *Democritus* (*Democr. reviv.* pag. 28.) I know not. [w] The Words ſeem to be his.

City, desiring rather to give Honour to a Place, than to receive it from a Place.

More certain it is, that he heard some *Pythagorean* Philosopher. [x] *Thrasillus* affirms, *that he imitated the* Pythagoreans, *and mention'd even* Pythagoras *himself, admiring him in a Treatise bearing his Name. He seems to have taken all from him, and might be thought to have heard him, but that the Times agree not. But* Glaucus *of* Rhegium, *who lived at the same Time, affirms, he heard one of the* Pythagoreans. Apollodorus *of* Cyzicus *conceives him to have been Contemporary with* Philolaus. [y] Duris, *that he heard* Arimnæstus, *Son of* Pythagoras.

So studious was he even from his Youth, that [z] *Demetrius* affirms, "he retired to a little Summer-"house belonging to the Orchard, and shut himself "up; and on a time his Father bringing thither an "Ox to be sacrific'd, and tying it there, he knew "nothing of it a good while, until his Father rou-"sed him up, and told him the Business concerning "the Ox."

CHAP. III.

His Travels.

HIS Father dying, the three Brothers divided the Estate. Democritus [a], *the youngest, made choice of that Part which consisted in Money, as being, though the least Share, yet the most convenient for Travel. And notwithstanding it was the least, yet were they jealous of him, as if he had an Intention to defraud them.* Demetrius *affirms, his Portion amounted to an hundred Talents, and that he spent it all,* not gave it (as *Valerius Maximus* relates) to his Country. Hence is it that *Cicero* saith, *he neglected his Patrimony, left his Fields untill'd, seeking nothing else but a happy Life.*

[b] *Laertius* (citing *Demetrius* and *Antisthenes*) relates, that *he travelled to* Egypt *to the Priests, to learn Geometry, to* Persia, *to the* Chaldæans, *and went to the* Red-Sea; *some affirm, that he conversed with the* Gymnosophists *in* India, *and travelled to* Æthiopia, *and* [c] *learnt the several Wisdoms of each of these Nations:* [d] With the *Ægyptians* he lived (as he himself affirms) 80 Years.

For these Things (saith [e] *Ælian*) Theophrastus *commends him, because by his Travels he collected better Things than either* Menelaus *or* Achilles; *for they went up and down no otherwise than like* Phænician *Merchants; they gathered Money, and that was the Occasion of their Travels by Sea and Land.* Not without Reason therefore was it, that he said of himself, [f] *Of any Man in my time, I have been the greatest Traveller, and made the furthest Enquiries, and seen most Variety of Air and Earth, and heard the most learned Persons; and in making Demonstrations by Lines, none yet have gone beyond me, no not those* Ægyptians, *who are called* Arpedonaptæ.

CHAP. IV.

How he lived at Abdera, *after his Return from Travel, and governed there.*

LAertius [g] saith, that *at his Return from Travel he was in a very mean Condition, having spent all his Estate; whereupon his Brother* Damasus *(in regard of his Indigence) received him kindly, and maintain'd him. But after that he had foretold some Things, which fell out accordingly, People from thenceforward, honour'd him as a God: Moreover, there being a Law, that whosoever had consumed his Patrimony, should not be allow'd Burial in his own Country,* Antisthenes *relates, that to prevent being liable to some envious Persons and Sycophants, he read to the People his Book entituled the great* Diacosmus, *which was the most excellent of all his Writings, and for it was rewarded with* 500 *Talents; and not only so, but with brazen Statues also.* Hitherto *Laertius.*

Of these Predictions, *Pliny* [h] gives two Instances. *It is reported,* saith he, *that* Democritus *who first understood and demonstrated the Correspondence betwixt Heaven and Earth, the most wealthy of the Citizens despising this his Pains, foreseeing a future Dearth of Olives, from the future Rising of Pleiades, (after the same manner as we have mentioned, and shall declare more fully hereafter) with extraordinary Profit, by Reason of the Expectation of Olives, bought up all the Olives in that Country, to the Admiration of all those who knew he chiefly affected Poverty, and the Quiet of Learning. But as soon as the Reason appeared, together with the great Gain of Money, he restor'd the Bargain to the anxious and greedy Repentance of the Owners, contenting himself to have thus proved, that he could easily be rich whensoever he pleased.*

The other is this: [i] *His Brother* Damasus *being employ'd about reaping in an extraordinary hot Day, he desired him to let the rest of the Corn alone, and to cock that which was already reaped as fast as he could; within few Hours, a terrible Tempest ratify'd his Prediction.* Clemens [k] *adds, that he foretold it by some Stars; and that they, giving Credit to him, cock'd their Crop, for, it being Summer,* [l] *it was not yet inned in the Barn; but the rest lost theirs by the great and unexpected Rain.*

[m] *By these* (and the like) *Predictions, he gained so great Esteem amongst the People, that from thenceforward*

[x] Laert. 9. 36. [y] Porph. vit. Pythag. [z] Laert. ibid. [a] Laert. 9. 35. [b] So also Ælian. l. 4. c. 20. [c] Suid. [d] Clem. Alex. Strom. 1. [e] Lib. 4. c. 20. [f] Clem. Strom. 1. [g] Laert. 9. 39. [h] Lib. 18. c. 28. [i] Plin. 18. 35. [k] Strom. 6. [l] Reading ἐν τῇ ἀλωᾷ γενέσθαι ἦσαν. [m] Laert. 9. 39.

ward they honoured him as a God; *Clemens* ſaith, they called him σοφίαν, *Wiſdom*; Ælian, *Philoſophy*; as *Protagoras* was termed *Logos*, Diſcourſe. [n] *So much indeed was he reverenc'd for his extraordinary Wiſdom, that they conferred the ſupreme Government of* Abdera *upon him.*

CHAP. V.

His Retirement.

BUT being naturally more inclined to Contemplation, than delighted with publick Honours and Employments, he withdrew himſelf from them, and [o] "endeavoured, as *Antiſthenes* relates, to make "ſeveral Trials of Phantaſies (meaning the Impreſſions of Things appearing to the Phantaſy, not the Phantaſy itſelf) "often living alone, and in Se-"pulchres." [p] *Lucian* adds, that ſhutting himſelf "up in a Tomb without the Gates of the City, he "continued there writing and compoſing Night and "Day: And that ſome young Men intending to de-"ride and fright him, attired themſelves like Ghoſts, "in black Garments, with Vizards like Deaths-"heads, and came about him dancing and skipping; "whereat he was nothing moved, nor would ſo "much as look on them, but continued to write. "Leave fooling, ſaith he; ſo firmly did he believe, "that Souls are nothing after they are out of the "Bodies."

Such Places he made choice of, as were moſt conducing to Contemplation, by reaſon of their Solitude and Darkneſs. And [q] *Agellius* reports, "out of "the Monuments of the Greek Hiſtory, now not "extant, That for the ſame Reaſon he put out his "own Eyes, becauſe he conceived the Cogitations "and Meditations of his Mind in contemplating the "Reaſons of Nature, would be more vigorous and "exact, if free from the Allurements of Sight, and "Impediments of the Eyes; which Act, together "with the manner whereby he eaſily procured Blind-"neſs, by a moſt ſubtle Ingeniouſneſs, *Laberius* "deſcribed; feigning another Cauſe of his voluntary "Blindneſs, converting it to his own Purpoſe.

Democritus, *the* Abderite, *well skill'd*
In natural Philoſophy, a Shield
Plac'd to Hyperion's *riſing oppoſite*
And with the Sun's Beams thus put out his Sight;
That bad and impious Men he might not ſee
Triumphant in their full Proſperity.

The former Reaſon given by *Agellius* (that he might ſtudy Philoſophy the better) is alledged alſo by *Cicero* [r], *Plutarch*, and others. "For though, ſaith "*Cicero*, having loſt his Eyes he could not diſcern "black and white, yet could he good and ill, juſt and "unjuſt, honeſt and diſhoneſt, profitable and unprofi-"table, great and little; he might live happy with-"out the Variety of Colours, but he could not with-"out the Knowledge of Things. Thus he concei-"ved, that the Acuteneſs of the Mind was obſtructed "by the Sight of the Eyes." *Tertullian* [s] alledgeth another Reaſon, *becauſe he could not look on Women without inordinate Deſires.* But *Cicero* [t] elſewhere ſpeaks doubtfully concerning the Truth of the Thing itſelf; and not without Reaſon, ſince the contrary appears manifeſt by this following Narration.

CHAP. VI.

His Communication with Hippocrates.

Democritus [u] thus neglecting all outward Things, living Day and Night privately in Caves and ſolitary Places, the *Abderites* imagined that he was Melancholy even to Madneſs; which Suſpicion was confirmed by his continual Laughing upon all Occaſions whatſoever. Hereupon they ſent *Ameleſagoras*, one of the chief Perſons of their City to *Hippocrates*, that moſt eminent Phyſician, who lived at *Cos*, with this Epiſtle.

The Senate and People of Abdera *to* Hippocrates, *Health.*

Our City, *Hippocrates*, is in very great Danger, together with that Perſon, who, we hoped, would ever have been a great Ornament to it. But now, O the Gods! it is much to be feared, that we ſhall only be capable of envying others, ſince he, through extraordinary Learning and Study, by which he gained it, is fallen ſick; ſo as it is much to be feared, that if *Democritus* become mad, our City *Abdera* will become deſolate; for, wholly forgetting himſelf, watching Day and Night, laughing at all things little and great, and eſteeming them as nothing, he after this manner leadeth his whole Life. One marries a Wife; another trades; another pleads; another performs the Office of Magiſtrate; goeth on Embaſſy, is choſen Officer by the People, is put down, falls ſick, is wounded, dies; he laughs at all theſe, beholding ſome to look diſcontented, others pleas'd. Moreover, he enquireth what is done in the infernal Places, and writes of them, and affirms the Air to be full of Images, and that he underſtands the Language of Birds, and often riſing in the Night ſingeth to himſelf, and ſaith, That he ſometimes travels to the Infinity of Things, and that there are innumerable *Democritus*'s like him; thus, together with

[n] Suid. [o] Laert. 8. 38. [p] Φιλοψευδ. [q] Lib. 16. 7. [r] Tuſc. Quæſt. [s] Apolog. adv. gent. [t] De Finib. 5. [u] Epiſt. Græc.

with his Mind, he deſtroyeth his Body. Theſe are the Things which we fear, *Hippocrates*; Theſe are thoſe which trouble us. Come therefore quickly, and preſerve us by your Advice; and deſpiſe us not, for we are not inconſiderable; and if you reſtore him, you ſhall not fail either of Money or Fame: And tho' you prefer Learning before Wealth, yet accept of the latter, which ſhall be offer'd to you in great abundance.

To reſtore *Democritus* to health, if our City were all of Gold we would give it: We think our Laws, *Hippocrates*, are ſick: Come then, beſt of Men, and cure a moſt excellent Perſon. Thou wilt not come as a Phyſician, but as a Founder of all *Ionia*, to encompaſs us with a ſacred Wall. Thou wilt cure not a Man, but a City, a languiſhing Senate, and prevent its Diſſolution; thus becoming our Lawgiver, Judge, Magiſtrate, and Preſerver. To this purpoſe we expect thee, *Hippocrates*; all theſe (if you come) you will be to us. It is not a ſingle obſcure City, but all *Greece*, which beſeecheth thee to preſerve the Body of Wiſdom. Imagine that Learning herſelf comes on this Embaſſy to thee, begging, that thou wilt free her from this Danger. Wiſdom certainly is nearly allied to every one, but eſpecially to us who dwell ſo near her. Know for certain, that the next Age will own itſelf much obliged to thee, if thou deſert not *Democritus*, for the Truth which he is capable of communicating to all. Thou art allied to *Æſculapius* by thy Family, and by thy Art; he is deſcended from the Brother of *Hercules*, from whom came *Abderus*, whoſe Name, as you have heard, our City bears; wherefore even to him will the Cure of *Democritus* be acceptable. Since therefore, *Hippocrates*, you ſee a whole People, and a moſt excellent Perſon falling into Madneſs, haſten we beſeech you to us. It is ſtrange, that the Exuberance of Good ſhould become a Diſeaſe; *Democritus*, by how much he excelled others in Acuteneſs of Wiſdom, is now in ſo much the more danger of falling mad, whilſt the ordinary unlearned People of *Abdera* enjoy their Wits as formerly; and even they, who before were eſteemed fooliſh, are now moſt capable to diſcern the Indiſpoſition of the wiſeſt Perſon. Come therefore, and bring along with you *Æſculapius*, and *Epione*, the Daughter of *Hercules*, and her Children, who went in the Expedition againſt *Troy*; bring with you the Receipts and Remedies againſt Sickneſs; the Earth plentifully affords Fruits, Roots, Herbs, and Flowers to cure Madneſs, and never more happily than now, for the Recovery of *Democritus*. Farewel.

Hippocrates returned this Anſwer.

Hippocrates *to the Senate of* Abdera, *Health.*

Your Countryman, *Ameleſagoras*, arrived at *Co* the ſame Day on which with us was celebrated th Suſception of the Rod, which, as you know, is a annual Convention, and great Solemnity amongſ us, held at a Cypreſs Tree, which are born by thoſe who are particularly conſecrated to the God.

But finding both by the Words and Countenanc of *Ameleſagoras*, that your Buſineſs required much haſte, I read your Letter, and much wondred t find your City no leſs troubled for one Man, than i the whole City were but one Man. Happy indeed are the People who know, that wiſe Men are thei Defence; not Walls or Bulwarks, but the ſound Judgments of wiſe Perſons. I conceive, that Arts are the Diſpenſations of the Gods; Men the Works o Nature: And be not angry, ye Men of *Abdera*, if I conceive, that it is not you, but Nature herſelf which calls me to preſerve her Work, which is in danger of failing.

Wherefore, obeying that which is the Invitation of Nature and of the Gods, rather than yours, I ſhall make haſte to cure the Sickneſs of *Democritus*, if it be a Sickneſs, and not, as I hope, an Error in you. And it would be yet a greater Teſtimony of your Good-will, if you were troubled only upon Suſpicion. Neither Nature nor the Gods have promiſed me any thing for my coming, and therefore (Men of *Abdera*) do not you force any thing upon me, but ſuffer the Works of a free Art to be free. They who take Rewards compel Sciences to Servitude, and make them Slaves, bereaving them of their former Freedom. Beſides, it is impoſſible that ſuch may diſſemble, in a great Diſeaſe, and deny in a little; and when they have promiſed, not come; and come, when they are not ſent for. Miſerable indeed is human Life, for that the unſatiate Deſire of Wealth continually invades it, as a Winter Wind. I wiſh that all Phyſicians would rather join together to cure it of this Diſeaſe, which is worſe than Madneſs, notwithſtanding it is thought happy, but indeed a peſtilential Sickneſs. All Diſtempers of the Mind, are, as I conceive, High-madneſs, for they ſtir up in the Reaſon ſtrange Opinions and Fantaſies, which Reaſon muſt be purify'd and cur'd by Virtue. As for me, if at all I made it my deſign to be rich, I would not, ye Men of *Abdera*, come to you for ten Talents, but would rather have gone to the great King of *Perſia*, where there are vaſt Cities full of all kind of Wealth, there I would have practis'd by Phyſick. But I refuſed to cure a Nation which are Enemies to *Greece*, and, to the beſt of my Power, have my ſelf oppoſed the *Barbarians*. I thought it a Diſhonour to accept of the Wealth of a King, Foe to our Country,

Country, by which means I might become a Deſtroyer of *Greece*. To get Wealth by all means, is not to be Rich; the Rites of Virtue are ſacred and juſt. Do you not think it an equal Offence to cure our Enemies, as to take Money for the Cure of our Friends? But this is not my Cuſtom; I raiſe not Gain out of Sickneſs; nor did wiſh, when I heard that *Democritus* was mad, that it might prove ſo indeed; if he be well, he is a Friend; if he happen to be cured of his Sickneſs, more a Friend. I underſtand that *Democritus* is a Perſon of firm and ſettled Parts, the Ornament of your City.

In order to this Voyage, he ſent to his Friend *Dionyſius*, that he would take care of his Family in his Abſence; to *Damagetus*, that he would provide a Ship for him; to *Cratevas*, that he would furniſh him with Simples. The day before he arrived at *Abdera*, he dreamt that *Æſculapius* appear'd to him, and told him, that he would have no need of his Aſſiſtance, but only the direction of a Woman, whom he brought along with him; and having preſented her to him, departed. The Woman promiſed, that ſhe would meet on the Morrow at *Democritus*'s Houſe; he asked her Name, ſhe told him ſhe was called *Truth*; and, pointing to another Woman that followed her, added, that her Name was *Opinion*, and that ſhe lived with the *Abderites*. This was the Dream of *Hippocrates*. How he was received the next day at *Abdera*, he gives this account to his Friend *Damagetus*.

To *Damagetus*, Health.

It was, as I conjectur'd, *Damagetus*: *Democritus* is not mad, but is extraordinary wiſe, and hath taught us Wiſdom, and by us all Men. I have ſent back, with many Thanks, the *Æſculapian* Ship, on the Prow whereof, to the Picture of the *Sun*, may be added *Health*; for we made a quick Voyage, and arrived the ſame Day that I had ſent word I would be there at *Abdera*. I found all the People flocking together at the Gate, in expectation, as it ſhould ſeem, of our coming; not only the Men, but the Women, the Old, the Young; and by *Jove*, the very Children; ſo much were they troubled at the Madneſs of *Democritus*, who, at that time, was ſeriouſly employ'd in Philoſophy. As ſoon as they ſaw me, they ſeem'd a little to be comforted, and to have ſome Hope. *Philopœmen* offer'd to conduct me to my Lodging, as all of them likewiſe deſir'd; but I told them, "Men of *Abdera*, I will do nothing "till I have ſeen *Democritus*;" which, as ſoon as they heard, they applauded and rejoic'd, and brought me immediately along the *Forum*; ſome following, others running before, crying out, Great King *Jupiter*, help, heal. I adviſed them to be of Comfort, for that it being the Seaſon of the *Eteſian* Winds, I was confident that there was not any Sickneſs that would continue long; and in ſaying thus, on I went. The Houſe was not far, nor indeed the City; we went to it, it being next the Walls, whither they brought me quietly. Behind the Tower there was a high Hill, very full of tall Poplars, from whence we beheld the Habitation of *Democritus*. *Democritus* himſelf ſat under a thick, but low, plain Tree, in a thick Gown, all alone, ſqualid, upon a Seat of Stone, wan and lean, with a long Beard; at his right Hand ran a little Brook down the Hill, upon the Hill there was a Temple conſecrated, as it ſhould ſeem, to the Muſes, encompaſſed round about with Vines, which grew there naturally. He ſat very compoſedly, having a Book upon his Knees, and round about him lay other Books, and the Bodies of many living Creatures diſſected. Sometimes he wrote haſtily, ſometimes pauſed, ſeeming to revolve things within himſelf. Soon after he roſe up and walked, and looked intently into the diſſected Creatures; then laid down again, and return'd to his Seat. The *Abderites* ſtanding about me, and hardly refraining from Tears, ſaid, "You ſee, *Hippocrates*, the Life of *Democritus*, how mad he is, "and knoweth not either what he would have, or "what he doth." One of them, that would have given me a farther Deſcription of his Madneſs, on the ſudden fell a ſobbing, and howled like a Woman at the Death of her Son, and then began to lament like a Traveller robb'd of his Goods: which *Democritus* hearing, ſometimes ſmiled, ſometimes laughed, not writing any longer, but often ſhaking his Head. "Men of *Abdera* (ſaid I) ſtay you here, "whilſt I go nigher to him, that by hearing him "ſpeak, and obſerving his Conſtitution, I may "judge the Truth of his Diſtemper;" and in ſo ſaying, I went gently down: the Place was very ſteep, ſo that I could hardly keep myſelf from falling. At ſuch time as I came nigh him, it happen'd that he was writing ſomething as in a Rapture, earneſtly; whereupon I made a ſtand, waiting when he would give over. It was not long e're he did ſo; and ſeeing me coming towards him, ſaid, "Hail, Stran-"ger." I anſwer'd, "Hail alſo, *Democritus*, the "wiſeſt of Men." He, as I imagine, a little troubled that he had not ſaluted me by Name, reply'd, "What may I call you? for my Ignorance of your "Name is the Reaſon that I ſtiled you, Stranger." "My Name (ſaid I) is *Hippocrates*, a Phyſician." "You are (reply'd he) the Glory of the *Æſculapi-*"*ans*, the Fame of whoſe Worth and Knowledge "in Phyſick is arrived as far as to me. What Buſineſs hath brought you hither? but firſt ſit down. "This Seat, you ſee, is pleaſant, green, and ſoft, "better than high Thrones, which are ſubject to the "Envy of Fortune. As ſoon as I was ſet, Is it a "publick or private Buſineſs, *faith he*, which "brought

* Epiſt. Hippocr.

" brought you hither? Tell me freely, and we shall " to our utmost Power assist you. I answer'd, It is " for your sake that I come hither, to be acquainted " with you, a wise Person, the Occasion being af- " forded me by an Embassy from your Country. He " reply'd, Then let my House entertain you."

Having thus made Trial of him several ways, and not finding any thing of Madness in him, " You " know (said I) *Philopœmen*, one of this Town. " Exceeding well, *answer'd he*; you mean the Son " of *Damon?* He lives near the *Hermæan* Foun- " tain. The same, *reply'd I*; he hath been my old " Acquaintance, and received me for his Guest. " But you, *Democritus*, I intreat to afford me a " better Entertainment, and first tell me, What it " is that you are writing? *He, after a little Pause,* " *answer'd*, Concerning Madness. Good *Jupiter*, " *said I*, you write seasonably against the City! " What City, *Hippocrates, answer'd he?* I reply'd, " that I only spoke at random. But what is this " that you write of Madness? What else, said he, " but what it is, and how it comes to be ingender'd " in Man, and how it may be cured. These Creatures " which you behold, I have dissected for that end; " not as *hating* the Works of the Gods, but to make " Enquiry into the Nature and Seat of Choler; for " you know, that where this abounds too much, it " most commonly causeth Madness in Men. It is " in every Nature, but in some less, in others more: " Its Excess causeth Diseases, as being a Matter " partly good, partly bad. By *Jove*, said I, *De-* " *mocritus*, you speak truly and wisely; and I judge " you happy, who can enjoy such Quiet, as I can- " not partake of. And why cannot you? *saith he.* " I answer'd, Because either Travel, or Children, " or Estate, or Sickness, or Deaths, or Servants, " or Marriages, or the like, interrupt my Leisure."

Hereupon he fell into his usual Passion, and laugh- ed a while exceedingly, giving over Discourse. " Why, *said I*, *Democritus*, do you laugh? Whe- " ther is it, that I have spoken well or ill?" Here- at he laughed more than before; which the *Abderites*, who stood aloof off, seeing, some beat their own Heads, others their Foreheads, others tore their Hair; for, as they afterwards said, they observed him to laugh at that time more than ever he had done. " *Democritus*, thou best of wise Men, *con-* " *tinued I*, I desire to know the Reason of this Pas- " sion, wherein that which I said seems ridiculous? " That if it proves such, I may reform it; but if " otherwise, that you may desist from this unsea- " sonable Laughter. By *Hercules*, said he, if you " can convince me, *Hippocrates*, you will perform " a Cure greater than any you have yet done. " And why, *said I*, should you not be convinced? " Know you not, that you do absurdly in laughing " at the Death of a Man, or at Sickness, or Mad- " ness, or Murther, or any thing that is worse " than these; and on the other side, at Marriages, " at Assemblies, at the Birth of Infants, at solemn " Rites, at Magistracies, at Honours, and generally " at every thing that hath the Name of Good? At " those things which deserve to be pitied, you " laugh; and at those things for which we should " rejoice, you laugh also; insomuch that you seem " not to put any Difference betwixt Good and Bad. " *Then he*, You say well, *Hippocrates*; but you are " not acquainted with the Reason of my Laughing; " which, as soon as you know, I am confident you " will prefer it before the Cause for which you came " hither, and carry it along with you as a Medicine " to your Country, thereby improving both your- " self and others: and in requital of it, perhaps will " think yourself obliged to teach me Physick, when " you shall understand what Pains all Men take for " things that deserve not Pains, but are of no Value, " and consume their Lives unprofitably in Pursuit of " things that deserve only to be laugh'd at. What! " *said I*, Is all the World sick, and knows it not? " If so, they can send no whither for Help; for " what is beyond it? *He reply'd*, There are infinite " Worlds, O *Hippocrates!* Have not so mean an " Esteem of the Riches of Nature. Teach me this, " *said I*, *Democritus*, at some other time: for I am " afraid, that if you begin to talk of this Infinity, " you will fall again into your Fit of Laughter; " but now, tell me the Reason, why you laugh at " the Accidents of Life.

Then, looking stedfastly upon me, " You think, " *saith he*, there are two things which occasion my " Laughter, Good and Ill; whereas indeed I laugh " but at one thing, Man, full of Folly, destitute of " right Actions, playing the Child in all his Designs, " undergoing great Toils for no Benefit, travelling " to the Ends of the Earth, and sounding bottomless " Depths, to get Silver and Gold, never ceasing to " hoard them up, and with their Store increasing his " own Troubles, lest, if he should want them, he " might be thought not happy. He digs into the " Bowels of the Earth by the Hands of Slaves, " whereof some are buried by the Earth falling upon " them; others dwell there, as if it were their na- " tive Soil, searching for Gold and Silver, sifting " one Sand from another, cutting and tearing their " Mother-Earth, which they both admire and tread " on. How ridiculous is this, that they should love " that Part of the Earth that lies hid, and contemn " that which lieth open unto them? Some buy " Dogs, others Horses; some delight in having " large Possessions, which they may call their own, " and would command many others, when they " are not able to command themselves. They " marry Wives, and in a short time put them a- " way; they love, and then hate; they take delight " in their Children, and when they are grown up, " disinherit them; they war, and despise Quiet;

" they conſpire againſt Kings; they murther Men; " they dig the Earth to find Silver; with the Silver, " which they have found, they buy Land; what " the Land which they have bought yields, of Corn " or Fruits, they ſell, and receive Silver again. To " what Changes and Miſchances are they ſubject? " When they have not Riches, they deſire them; " when they have, they hide or ſcatter them: I " laugh at their ill-deſigned Actions, I laugh at " their Misfortunes. They violate the Laws of " Truth by Contention and Enmity with one ano- " ther: Brethren, Parents, and Countrymen fight " and kill one another for thoſe Poſſeſſions, of which, " after Death, none of them can be Maſters. They " purſue an unjuſt Courſe of Life; they deſpiſe the " Poverty of their Friends and Country; mean " and inanimate things they account for Riches; " they will part with a whole Eſtate to purchaſe " Statues, becauſe the Statues ſeem to ſpeak; but " thoſe who ſpeak, indeed they hate. They affect " things hard to be got; they who dwell in the Con- " tinent, covet the things of the Sea; they who " dwell in the Iſlands, the things of the Continent, " perverting all things to their own depraved De- " ſires. In War they praiſe Valour, whilſt they " are daily ſubdued by Luxury, Avarice, and all " Paſſions, and in the Courſe of his Life every Man " is a *Therſites*. Why did you, *Hippocrates*, re- " prove my Laughter? No Man laughs at his own " Madneſs, but at the Madneſs of another. They " who think themſelves to be ſober, laugh at thoſe " who ſeem to them to be drunk; ſome laugh at " Lovers, whilſt they themſelves are ſick of a worſe " Diſtemper; ſome, at thoſe who travel by Sea; " others, at thoſe who follow Husbandry: for they " agree not with one another, neither in Arts nor " Actions. All this, *ſaid I*, *Democritus*, is true; " neither is there any Argument that may better " prove the unhappy Eſtate of Man: but theſe " Actions are preſcribed by Neceſſity, by reaſon of " the Government of Families, the Building of " Ships, and other civil Offices, wherein a Man " muſt neceſſarily be employ'd; for Nature did not " produce him to the end he might reſt idle. A- " gain, Height of Ambition cauſeth many Men to " go aſtray, who aim at all things, as if there were " nothing amiſs in them, not being able to foreſee " the Darkneſs that attends them. For, *Democri- " tus*, what Man is there, that when he marries, " thinks of Divorce or Death? Who is there, that " whilſt he bringeth up his Children, thinketh of " loſing them? The like in Husbandry, Navigati- " on, Dominion, and all other Offices of Life. " No Man foreſees that it may go amiſs with him, " but every one flatters himſelf with Hopes of good " Succeſs, and does not look upon the worſt. Why " therefore is this ridiculous?"

Democritus replied, " You are yet far from un- " derſtanding me, *Hippocrates*, neither perceive, " through want of Knowledge, the Bounds of In- " diſturbance and Perturbation. For if they did or- " der theſe things prudently, they might be eaſily " diſcharged of them, and evade my Laughter; and " whereas now they are blind as to the Offices of " Life, and, with Minds void of Reaſon, are car- " ried on by inordinate Appetites; it were enough " to make them wiſe, if they would but conſider " the Mutability of all things, how they wheel a- " bout continually, and are ſuddenly changed; " whereas they looking upon theſe, as if they " were firm and ſettled, fall into many Inconveni- " encies and Troubles, and coveting things harm- " ful, they tumble headlong into many Miſeries. " But if a Man would rightly conſider and weigh " in his Mind all things that he attempts, under- " ſtanding himſelf and his own Abilities, he would not " let his Deſires run to infinite, but follow Nature, " out of whoſe Store all are plentifully nouriſhed and " ſupplied. As a fat Body is in greateſt Danger of " Sickneſs, ſo an high Eſtate is in greateſt Danger " of falling; great Minds are known in Extremi- " ties. Some there are, who, taking no warning " at that which happeneth to others, periſh by their " own ill Actions, minding things manifeſt no more " than as if they were not manifeſt; whereas yet " they have a large Precedent by which to guide " their Life, of things done and not done, by which " we ought to foreſee the future. This is the Oc- " caſion of my Laughter, fooliſh Men puniſhed by " their own Wickedneſs, Covetouſneſs, Luſt, En- " mity, Treachery, Conſpiracy, Envy. It is a " hard thing to give a Name to many of theſe Ills, " they being innumerable, and practiſed ſo cloſely. " Their Behaviour, as to Virtue, is yet worſe; " they affect Lies, they follow Pleaſure, diſobeying " the Laws; my Laughter condemns their Inconſi- " derateneſs, who neither ſee nor hear; whereas the " Scene of Man only, of all others, is able to fore- " ſee Futures. They hate all things, and then a- " gain apply themſelves to them; they condemn " Navigation, and then they put to Sea; condemn " Husbandry, and then fall a Ploughing; they put " away their Wives, and then marry others; they " bury their Children, and beget more, and bring " them up; they wiſh to live long, and when old " Age comes, are grieved at it; never remaining " conſtant in any Eſtate whatſoever. Kings and " Princes commend a private Life; private Perſons, " a publick; he that ruleth a State, praiſeth the " Tradeſman's Life, as free from Danger; the " Tradeſman his, as full of Honour and Power. " For they regard not the direct, ſincere and ſmooth " Way of Virtue, in which none of them will en- " dure to walk; but they take crooked and rough " Paths, ſome falling down, others running them- " ſelves out of Breath to overtake others. Some are

" guided by Incontinence to the Beds of their Neighbours; others are ſick of a Conſumption through " inſatiate Avarice; ſome by Ambition carried up " into the Air, and by their own Wickedneſs " thrown down headlong. They pluck down, and " then they build; they do good, and oblige others, " and then, repenting of it, break the Laws of " Friendſhip, and do wrong, and fall at Enmity, " and fight with their neareſt Relations; of all " which, Avarice is the Cauſe. Wherein do they " differ from Children that play, whoſe Minds, " being void of Judgment, are pleaſed with every " thing they light on? in their Deſires they differ " not much from brute Beaſts, only the Beaſts are " contented with that which is enough. What Lyon is there, that hides Gold under Ground? what " Bull fights for more than he needs? what Leopard is inſatiately greedy? the Wolf, when he " hath devoured as much as ſerves for his neceſſary " Nouriſhment, gives over. But whole Nights " and Days, put together, are not enough for Men " to feaſt and riot. All brute Beaſts have their yearly ſet Times of Coition, and then leave; but " Man is continually tranſported with Luſt. How " can I, *Hippocrates*, but laugh at him that laments " the Loſs of his Goods? and eſpecially, if without " regard to Dangers, he travels over Precipices, and " on the Sea; how can I forbear to laugh exceedingly? Shall I not laugh at him, who drowns a " Ship by lading it with rich Merchandize, and " then blames the Sea for drowning it? If I ſeem " wrongfully to laugh at theſe, there is at leaſt in " them ſomething that deſerves to be lamented. " Theſe ſtand not in need of the Phyſick or Medicines of your Predeceſſor *Æſculapius*, who, preſerving Men, was himſelf requited with Thunder. " Do you not ſee, that I alſo am partly guilty of " Madneſs, who, to enquire into the Cauſes of " Madneſs, diſſect theſe ſeveral living Creatures, " whereas indeed I ought to ſearch for it in Man " himſelf? Do you not ſee, that the whole World " is full of Inhumanity, ſtuffed as it were with infinite Hatred againſt Man himſelf? All Man is from " his very Birth a Diſeaſe: when firſt born he is " uſeleſs, and ſues for Relief from others; when he " grows up, fooliſh, wanting Inſtruction; at full " Growth, wicked; in his decaying Age, miſerable, toyling throughout all his Time imprudently; " ſuch is he from the Womb. Some being of furious angry Diſpoſitions, are continually engaged " in Broils, others in Adulteries and Rapes, others " in Drunkenneſs; others in coveting the Goods of " their Neighbours; others in conſuming their " own; ſo that if the Walls of all Houſes were " tranſparent, we ſhould behold ſome eating, others " vomiting, others wrongfully beaten, others mixing Poiſons, others conſpiring, others caſting Accounts, others rejoicing, others weeping, others " plotting againſt their Friends, others raving mad " with Ambition. Some Actions there are " more remote within the Soul, ſome young, ſome " old, ſuing, denying, poor, rich, ſtarved, luxurious, ſordid, impriſon'd, murther'd, buried, deſpiſing what they enjoy, and aiming at what they " have not; impudent, niggardly, inſatiate, vainglorious; ſome ſetting their Minds on Horſes, o- " thers on Men, others on Dogs, others on Stone " or Wood; ſome affect Embaſſy, others the Command of Armies, others ſacred Rites; ſome wear " Crowns, others Armour; ſome fight at Sea, o- " thers at Land, others till the Ground, ſome plead " in the Forum, others act on the Theatre, every " one is ſeverally employ'd; ſome affect Pleaſure " and Intemperateneſs, others Reſt and Idleneſs, " how then can I but laugh at their Lives? and it " is to be feared, that your Art of Phyſick will nothing pleaſe them, for Intemperance makes them " froward, and they eſteem Wiſdom Madneſs; and " I doubt much that many Things in your Art are " openly reproached, either through Envy or Ingratitude; for the Sick, as ſoon as they are cured, " aſcribe the Cauſe either to the Gods, or to Chance; " and many are of ſuch a Diſpoſition, as to hate " thoſe that have obliged them, and can hardly re- " frain from being angry if they need their Help; " many alſo, being themſelves ignorant, preſer Ignorance before Science; Fools give their Suffra- " ges, neither will the Sick commend, nor they " who are of the ſame Art give their Approbation, " through Envy. And it cannot be, but that you " muſt have ſuffered Wrong in this Kind, for I " know very well, that you have been often trea- " ted unworthily, and reproached by Malice and " Envy."

There is no Knowledge nor Atteſtation of Truth in ſaying this; he ſmiled and ſeemed to put on a divine Look, caſting off that which he had before. " *Then* I, Excellent *Democritus*, I ſhall carry back " with me to *Cos* the great Gifts of your Hoſpitality, " full of your wiſe Inſtructions, I ſhall return to " proclaim your Praiſes, for that you have made En- " quiry into human Nature, and underſtood it; I " ſhall go away cured in Mind, it being requiſite " that I take Care for the Cure of the Bodies of o- " thers. To morrow, and afterwards, we ſhall " meet here again."

Which ſaid, I aroſe, and he readily accompanied me. A Man came to him, from whence I know not, to whom he delivered his Books. When I came to the *Abderites*, who all this while ſtayed for me; " Men of *Abdera*, *ſaid I*, I return you many " Thanks for the Meſſage you ſent me, for I have " ſeen *Democritus*, the wiſeſt of Men, who only is " able to reduce Men to ſound Underſtanding. " This (*Damagetus*) is all, which I had to relate

" unto

" unto you with Joy, concerning *Democritus*.
" Farewel."

This Account *Hippocrates* gives of *Democritus*; neither did their Acquaintance and Friendſhip end here, but continued after the Departure of *Hippocrates* to *Cos*, as appears by the Correſpondence of two Letters betwixt them. The firſt, from *Democritus* to *Hippocrates*, in theſe Words.

You came to us, *Hippocrates*, as to give *Hellebore* to a mad Man, at the Inſtigation of fooliſh People, who think Study Madneſs; I was at that Time buſied in writing concerning the Fabrick of the World, and the Poles and the Stars of Heaven; as ſoon as you underſtood the Nature of theſe Things, how excellently they are framed, and how far from Madneſs, you commended my Employment, and condemned them as ſtupid and mad. All thoſe things which paſs to us through the Air by Images, and are ſeen in the World, and ſucceed one another, my Mind, making a Scrutiny into theſe, hath clearly found out the Nature of them, and brought it to Light; witneſs the Books that I have written. You ought not therefore, *Hippocrates*, to converſe with ſuch Men, whoſe Minds are wavering and unconſtant; for if, as thoſe Men deſired, you had given me *Hellebore*, as being mad, you had, of wiſe, made me mad indeed, the Guilt whereof would have lain upon your Art: for *Hellebore*, adminiſter'd to ſound Perſons, clouds their Underſtandings; but to the Mad it doth good. I believe, that if you had found me not writing, but lying down or walking, revolving things in my Mind, ſometimes laughing, and not minding ſuch Friends as came to me, but wholly taken up with Contemplation of ſomething, you would have inferred from what you beheld, that I was Mad. A Phyſician therefore muſt not judge of the Affections or Paſſions by the Sight only, but by the Actions themſelves, and obſerve, whether they are in their Beginning, or in the Middle, or in the End, and to conſider the difference of Time and Age, before he undertake to cure the Body; for by all theſe, the Diſeaſe will be diſcovered.

To which Hippocrates *return'd this Anſwer.*

In the Art of Phyſick, that which happens ſucceſsfully, Men for the moſt part commend not, but commonly aſcribe to the Gods; but if any thing happen amiſs in it, ſo as that the Patient dieth, they let the Gods alone, and accuſe the Phyſician. And indeed, I perceive that I gain more Blame than Credit by my Art; for tho' now very old, I have not yet arrived at the height of Medicine, neither did *Æſculapius* himſelf who invented it, as appears in that he many times diſſents from thoſe who have written hereupon. Your Letter to us condemns the adminiſtration of Hellebore; I was ſent for indeed, *Democritus*, to cure a Mad-man, neither at that time could I gueſs in what condition you were: But aſſoon as I had converſed with you, I knew you to be far from Madneſs, and worthy of all Reſpect. I acknowledged you to be the moſt excellent Interpreter of Nature, and the World; and judged thoſe that ſent for me, mad, and to ſtand in need of Phyſick. But ſince this Accident hath begot an Acquaintance betwixt us, you will not do amiſs in writing oftner, and in communicating your Works to me. I have ſent you a Treatiſe concerning the uſe of *Hellebore*. Farewel.

Hence it is, that ſome held *Hippocrates* to have been the Diſciple of *Democritus*, as *Cornelius Celſus* affirms. Indeed, that *Hippocrates* learnt much Philoſophy of him, as well by his Diſcourſe, as Communication of his Writings, is manifeſt from the precedent *Epiſtles*.

CHAP. VII.

His Death.

HE [a] lived to a great Age; *Laertius* ſaith, *above 100 Years*; *Phlegon* and *Lucian* more expreſly, 104. [b] *Cenſorinus*, 108. [c] *Hipparchus*, 109. *Laertius* ſaith, *he died of Age*; *Phlegon*, for want of Food; the Manner related thus by *Hermippus*. Being very old, and drawing nigh his End, his Siſter was extremely troubled, that he ſhould die within the Time of the Feſtival of *Ceres*; but he bad her be of good Comfort, and bringing him every Day ſome hot Bread, which holding to his Noſe, he prolonged his Life, till the Days of the Feſtival were paſt, which were three: And then without any Pain gave up the Ghoſt, [d] and was buried at the publick Charge.

CHAP. VIII.

His Writings.

Thraſyllus. [e] who diſpoſed the Writings of *Plato* according to Tetralogies, digeſted alſo thoſe of *Democritus* into Order thus:

ETHICK.

Pythagoras.
Of the Diſpoſition of a wiſe Man.
Of the things that are in the Inferi; to which perhaps the *Abderites* alluded in their Epiſtle to *Hippocrates*.
Tritogenia; that all human things conſiſt of Three.
Of Goodneſs, or Virtue.

[a] Cic. de ſenect. [b] De die nat. [c] Laert. 9. 43. [d] Laert. 39. [e] Laert. 9. 45.

Amalthæa's Horn.
Of Tranquility of Mind.
Commentaries, or of *Houſes*, *Oeconomical.*
Felicity (εὐέργω) not extant in the Time of *Thraſyllus.*

PHYSICK.

The great Diacoſmus, conſiſting of 12 Books. *Theophraſtus* aſcribes it to *Leucippus:* but *Antiſthenes* affirms, *Democritus* recited it in publick as his own; and as His is it cited by *Epicurus*, in his Epiſtle to *Herodotus.* To this Work it was perhaps that *Cicero* alludes, ſaying, *What ſhall I ſay of* Democritus? *Whom can we compare with him, who durſt begin thus*, Hæc loquor de Univerſis? *He excepts nothing, whereof he profeſſeth not to treat; for what can be beyond all things?*
The little Diacoſmus.
Of the Planets; In which Treatiſe he proved that there are more than Seven.
Of Nature, The firſt.
Of the Nature of Man, or *of Fleſh*; the ſecond. Dedicated to *Hippocrates.*
Of the Mind. Of the Senſes, Theſe two ſome put together, and entitled, *Of the Soul.*
Of Sapours.
Of Colours.
Of Different Figures (ῥυσμοὶ.)
Of the reciprocation of Figures. This and the foregoing Treatiſe perhaps tended to ſhew the Nature of Qualities, which, according to him, ariſe from the various Diſpoſure of Atoms, according to their particular Figures.
Κρασυλήεια, or, *Of the Mixtures of the things aforeſaid.*
Of an Image, or, *Of Foreſight.*
Of Peſtilences (*Gaſſendus* reads περὶ λογικῶν, *Of Logicks*) Canon. 1, 2, 3.
Of Effluctions.

EXTRAORDINARY.

Celeſtial Cauſes.
Aerial Cauſes.
[f] *Plain ſuperficial Cauſes*; perhaps, what things are made of plain Atoms; for that which immediately followeth, is oppoſite to it.
Cauſes of Fire, and things in Fire; theſe conſiſt of round Atoms.
Cauſes of Sounds.
Cauſes of Seeds, and Plants and Fruits.
Cauſes of Animals, three.
Mixt Cauſes.
Of Stone.

MATHEMATICK.

Περὶ διαφορῆς γνώμης, or, *Of the Contact of a Circle and a Sphere.*
Of Geometry.
Geometrick.
Numbers.
Of ſurd Lines, and ſolid. Two.
Ἐκπετασμαῖα.
The great Year, or, *Aſtronomy.*
Parapegma; *Salmaſius* makes this all one with the other; reading, *The great Year, or Parapegma of Aſtronomy. Parapegma* is a Table deſcribing the riſing and ſetting of the Stars, Equinoxes, Solſtices, and the like.
The Contention or Examination of the Hour-glaſs.
Uranography.
Geography.
Pelography.
Actinography.

MUSICK.

Of Rythms and Harmony.
Of Poetry.
Of the Neatneſs of Verſes.
Of ſweet-ſounding, and harſh-ſounding Letters.
Of Homer; or, *of right verſifying and ſpeaking.*
Of Songs.
Of Words; *a Dictionary.*

MECHANICK, or concerning ARTS.

Prognoſtick.
Of Diet, or, *Diætetick*, or a *Medicinal Rule.*
Cauſes of things ſeaſonable and unſeaſonable.
Of Agriculture, or *Geometrick.*
Of Painting.
Tactick, and *of Arms.*

To which ſome, out of his Commentaries, annex theſe:

Of the ſacred Letters in Babylon; to which perhaps [g] *Clemens Alexandrinus* alludes: *Democritus*, ſaith he, writ *Babylonian* moral Diſcourſes; for he is ſaid to have inſerted into his own Writings the Senſe of the Pillar of *Acicarus.*
Of the things that are at Meroe.
A Voyage on the Ocean.
Of Hiſtory.
A Diſcourſe of Chaldæa.
A Diſcourſe of Phrygia.
Of the Fever and Cough in Sickneſs.
Chernica, or Problems. Perhaps the ſame which [h] *Pliny* terms *Chirocineta*, [i] *Vitruvius*, *Chirotoniton*; adding, that *in it he made uſe of a Ring, and drew the Figures of the Experiments in Wax and Red-lead.*
The reſt (ſaith *Thraſillus*) *that go under his Name, are partly made out of his Writings, partly acknowledged to be the Writings of other Men.* Of which kind

[f] Magnenus planæ cauſæ: *See his interpretation*, p. 16. [g] Strom. 1. [h] 24. 17. [i] 3. 9.

kind perhaps is his Book *of the Virtue of Herbs*, mentioned by [k] *Pliny*, and that of [l] *Commentaries upon Apollonices, Capridenes, and Dardanus*; from whence he argues *Democritus* to have been skilful in Magick: [m] *Agellius* much blames him for aſcribing to *Democritus* ſuch *prodigious Fables*.

[n] *Ariſtoxenus* affirms, that *Plato* had an Intent to have burned all the Writings of *Democritus*, and for that end had made a Collection of a great many of them; but was diverted by *Amyclas* and *Clinias*, Pythagoreans.

CHAP. IX.

Phyſick.

HE compleated the *Eleatick* Sect, and brought it to Perfection, inſiſting upon and improving the Principles of thoſe that went before, but moſt particularly thoſe of *Leucippus*. His Aſſertions theſe.

SECT. I.

Of the Principles of Things, Atoms, and Vacuum.

THE Principles of all things are Atoms [o] (ſolid, [p] full) and Vacuum, [q] whereof one is *Ens*, the other *Non-ens*. [r] *Ens* is full and ſolid; *Non-ens* is vacuous and rare. *Ens* participates no more of Being than doth *Non-ens*, nor of Body more than doth Vacuum. Theſe are the Cauſes and Matter of Beings.

[s] Bodies muſt either conſiſt of Atoms, or of nothing; for if every Body be diviſible, let us ſuppoſe it actually divided, and then there will remain either Atoms or Nothing; but of nothing, nothing is made, and nothing goes away into nothing.

[t] Neither of theſe Principles is made of the other; but the common Body itſelf is the Principle of all Things, differing only in Magnitude and the Figure of its Parts.

They are both infinite: Atoms [u] *in Number*, Vacuum in Magnitude.

* The Properties of Atoms are two, Figure and Magnitude. [w] As to Figure, they are infinite; [x] angulous, not-angulous, ſtrait, round; [y] ſome are ſmooth, others rugged, ſome pointed, ſome crooked, and as it were hooked.

As to their Magnitude, [z] *they are by reaſon of their Littleneſs, inviſible*; [a] *by reaſon of their Solidity, indiviſible*, [b] *impaſſible, and unalterable*.

To theſe two Properties aſcribed to Atoms by *Democritus*, [c] *Plutarch* ſaith, that *Epicurus* added a third, Weight; but [d] *Ariſtotle* affirms, that *Democritus held one Atom to be heavier than another, according as it exceeded that other in Bigneſs*.

Of all other Qualities they are deſtitute, having neither native Whiteneſs, nor Blackneſs, nor Sweetneſs, nor Bitterneſs, nor Heat, nor Cold, nor any other Quality.

[e] *Cicero* who calls *Democritus* the Inventor and Author of this Aſſertion of Atoms, elſewhere aſcribes it to *Leucippus*; adding, that [f] Democritus *herein followed him, but was far more full in the reſt*. But neither ſeems it to have been invented by *Leucippus*; for *Poſidonius* the Stoick aſcribes it to *Moſchus* a Phœnician, whom *Strabo* affirms to have lived before the *Trojan* War. But perhaps the *Eleatick* Philoſophers derived it from *Pythagoras*: Of which Opinion [g] *Ariſtotle* ſeems to be; *In ſome manner*, ſaith he, *they make all Things that are, Numbers, and to conſiſt of Numbers: for tho' they ſay it not expreſly, yet this is their Meaning*. Whence perhaps it is, that [h] *Automedon* gives them the Pythagorick Denomination, *Monads*.

SECT. II.

Of the Motion of Atoms in a Vacuum, whereby all Things are made.

THESE [i] Atoms, or firſt Bodies, are continually moved in the infinite [k] Vacuum, in which there is neither high, nor low, nor middle, nor laſt, nor extreme.

This Motion had not any Beginning, but was from all Eternity.

[l] *This Motion is but of one kind, oblique.* Herein *Epicurus* diſſents from him, aſſerting a twofold Motion, direct and declining.

The little Bodies being carried in this Region or Space, are entangled with one another, or hit againſt one another, or rebound, or ſeparate, or aſſociate with one another; by whoſe Concuſſions and Complications all Things are made. Thus [m], whatſoever is, or is made, is made by natural Weights or Motions.

Thus [n], *all Things are done by a Neceſſity; the rapid Motion of the Atoms (which he called Neceſſity) being*

[k] 25. 3. [l] 30. 1. [m] 10. 12. [n] Laert. 9. 40. [o] Ariſt. Phyſ. 1. 6. [p] Cic. Acad. 4. Ariſt. Met. 1. 4. [q] Ariſt. loc. cit. [r] Ariſt. Met. 14. [s] Ariſtot. [t] Ariſt. Phyſ. 3. 4. [u] Ariſt. de gen. & cor. 1. 1. & de cœlo, 3. 4. Laert 9. 44. * Ariſt. de gen. & cor. 1. 1. [w] Laert. ibid. [x] Ariſt. Phyſ. 1. 6. [y] Cic. Nat. Deor. 1. 24. [z] Philop. in 1. Phyſ. [a] Cic. de finib. 1. 6. [b] Plut. plac. phil. 1. 15. *Laert. Magnenus* interprets this of the vulgar Elements, Fire, Water, Earth, *p.* 41. 42. adding, as an Aſſertion of *Democritus*, *Atomis mutabiles eſſe figuras*, and proves it out of *Ariſtole* as ſtrangely, *p.* 42. [c] Plac. [d] De Gen. 1. 8. [e] De fato. [f] Acad. 4. 37. [g] De Cœlo, 3. 4. [h] *Anthology*. 1. 15. [i] Ariſt. de Cœlo 3, 4. Cic. de finib. 1. [k] *Magnenus* will have *Democritus* to underſtand by this Vacuum, the Air; and endeavours to prove it by Authorities of *Ariſtotle, Galen, Virgil*, which intimate the contrary, *p.* 37. and 42. [l] Stob. Phyſ. 1. 23. [m] Cic. Acad. quæſt. 4. [n] Laert. 38. Cic. de fato, Plut. plac. 1. 25.

being the Cauſe of the Production of all Things. [q] This Neceſſity is Fate, and Juſtice, and the Providence which made the World; which is no other than [r] the Reſiſtance, Lation, and Percuſſion of Matter.

SECT. III.

Of the Generation, Corruption, Alteration, and Qualities of Compounds.

THE [s] *Elements* (as we ſaid) *or Principles of all Things are two, Full, and Vacuum. One is* Ens, *the other* non Ens; *the full and ſolid is* Ens, *the vacuous and rare,* non Ens. Ens *participates not more of Being than* non Ens, *nor a Body more than Vacuum. Theſe are the Cauſes and Matter of Beings.*

"And [t], as they who aſſert a Subject to be one in "Subſtance, various as to its Affections, make rare "and denſe to be the Principles of thoſe Affections; "in like manner they (*Leucippus* and *Democritus*) "affirm, that the Differences are the Cauſes of all "the reſt. Theſe Differences they hold to be three, "Figure, Order, and Poſition; for they ſay that *Ens* "differs only ῥυσμῷ and διαθιγῇ and τροπῇ. ῥυσμὸς "is Figure, διαθιγὴ Order, τροπὴ Poſition: A and N "differ in Figure; AN and NA in Order; Z and "N in Poſition.

"Thus [u] they ſuppoſe Figures of which they make "Alteration and Generation: Generation and Cor-"ruption, by Congregation and Segregation (*of* "*Atoms*); Alteration, by Order and Poſition.

"Now [w] foraſmuch as they conceived, that what "is apparent to Senſe is true, ſeeing that apparent "Things are contrary to one another, and infinite "in Number, they conceived that there are infinite "Figures (*of Atoms*;) ſo that by ſeveral Tranſmu-"tations of the Compound, the ſame thing ſeemeth "contrary to another, and ſo another thing; and "by Immixture of ſome ſmall thing to be tranſ-"mutated, and to appear quite different; and being "tranſmutated, one thing to appear to be quite ano-"ther thing; for a Comedy and Tragedy are made "of the ſame Letters.

"*Hence it is, that* [x] Plutarch *and others affirm,* "he did reject Qualities, aſſerting that Colour is "νόμῳ, white νόμῳ, ſweet νόμῳ, hot νόμῳ, cold "νόμῳ, and all other Qualities; νόμῳ ἐστὶ *is here com-*"*monly expounded (after the uſual Acception of the* "*Word)* lege eſſe, to be by law. * *Magnenus in-*"*terprets it,* that by a certain Law and Proportion "betwixt the Agent and Patient, the ſame thing is "ſweet to one which is bitter to another. [y] *The* "*learned* Gaſſendus, *metaphorically, that* as the Ju-"ſtice, Injuſtice, Decency, Indecency, Laudabili-"ty, Culpability, &c. of human Actions, depend "on the Conſtitutions of Laws; ſo the Whiteneſs, "Blackneſs, Sweetneſs, Bitterneſs, Heat, Cold, "&c. of natural Things, depend on the various Po-"ſitions and Ordinations of Atoms. Whence you "ſee (*ſaith he*) how in *Laertius* is to be underſtood, "Ἀρχὰς εἶναι τῶν ὅλων ἄτομον καὶ κένον, τὰ δ' ἄλλα πάν-"τα νενομίσθαι, That Atoms and Vacuum are the "Principles of all Things, *cætera omnia lege ſanciri. Thus* Gaſſendus.

But νόμῳ, which (as *Suidas* ſaith) is πολυώνυμος λέξις, *a Word of various Significations,* ſeems here to be taken in Oppoſition to ἐτῇ; in which Senſe *Laertius* explicates it by νενομίσθαι, (from whence it ſeems derived) and νενομίσθαι by δοξάζεσθαι, for ſo perhaps ſhould the Text be diſtinguiſh'd, τὰ δ' ἄλλα πάντα νενομίσθαι δοξάζεσθαι, *cætera omnia cenſeri vel exiſtimari*; the latter being only a Gloſs and Expoſition of the former. So that in the Senſe of *Democritus,* (who affected a particular Uſe of Words, as appears by ῥυσμὸς, διαθιγὴ, τροπὴ, σὺν, &c.) νόμῳ is no other than δόξῃ. Thus he ſeems to have oppoſed ἐτῇ and νόμῳ, as the Schools *Ens reale* and *rationis*; as if he ſhould ſay, there is nothing really exiſtent but Atoms and Vacuum, all things elſe are only *quoad nos,* viz. *in Opinion.* This may be further confirmed by a noted Place of *Galen* [z], who dilates upon it in this manner.

"The firſt Element of Things is void of Quality, "having not in its own Nature Whiteneſs, nor "Blackneſs, nor Sweetneſs, nor Bitterneſs, nor "Heat, nor Cold, nor any other Quality. Colour "is (νόμῳ) in Opinion, Bitterneſs is in Opinion, "Sweetneſs is in Opinion; but Atoms and Vacuum "are indeed, ſaith *Democritus,* conceiving that all "ſenſible Qualities are made by the Concuſſion of "Atoms, according as they are, as to us, who have "the Senſe of them; but that nothing is by Nature "white, or yellow, or red, or bitter, or ſweet. By "νόμῳ he means as it were *νομιστὶ*, by Opinion, and "as to us; not in the Nature of the Things them-"ſelves; for that on the other ſide he calls ἐτῇ, ma-"king the Word from ἐτὸν, which ſignifies true. "The whole meaning of the Sentence is this, Men "do opiniate or think (νομίζεσθαι) that white is ſome-"thing, and black, and ſweet, and bitter; but tru-"ly and indeed (ἐν) One, and (μηδὲν) Nothing are "all. All Atoms are little Bodies, void of Quali-"ties; Vacuum is a Region or Space in which all "theſe Bodies are carried upwards and downwards "everlaſtingly, or are intangled within one another, "or hit againſt one another, or rebound, or ſepa-"rate from, or aſſociate with one another; where-"by they make all Compounds, and eſpecially our "Bodies,

[q] Stob. Phyſ. c. 8. [r] Plut. plac. 1. 26. [s] Ariſt. Metaph. 1. 4. [t] Ibid. [u] Ariſt. de gen. & cor. 1, 2. [w] Ibid. [x] Adv. Colot. l. 1. * Democ. revivi, p. 436. [y] Animadv. p. 231. [z] Lib. 1. de Elem. c. 1.

" Bodies, and their Paſſions and Senſes. Hitherto " *Galen.*

Democritus [y] alone, contrary to the reſt of the Philoſophers, aſſerted, that the Agent and the Patient muſt be the ſame and like; for he conceived it not to be poſſible, that Things different and divers can ſuffer from one another: And if any different Things act upon one another, this happens to them not as being different, but as they have ſomething in them that is the ſame.

Broad [z] Iron ſwims on the Water, becauſe the Atoms of Heat, which aſcend out of the Water uphold the broad Atoms even of things that are weighty; but the narrow ſlide down, becauſe theſe which reſiſt them are but few. But then, objects he, This will be done much more in the Air; whereto he anſwers, that the *Soun* is not carried one way, meaning by *Soun* the Motion of Bodies aſcending.

Things [a] become liquid or concrete, by Converſion or Contaction.

SECT. IV.

Of the World.

THere [b] are infinite Worlds in the infinite Space, according to all Circumſtances; ſome [c] of which are not only like to one another, but every way ſo perfectly and abſolutely equal, that there is no Difference betwixt them. [d] Theſe all are generated and corrupted.

The World is [e] inanimate, [f] round, [g] compaſſed about with a Coat, as it were, interwoven with Stars.

[h] *The Atoms being* (as we ſaid) *rapidly carried thro' the Univerſe; by this means all Things were made, Fire, Water,* [i] *Air, Earth.*

To the [k] Fire, he and *Leucippus* aſcribed a round Figure; but Air, Water, and the reſt, he diſtinguiſhed only by Greatneſs and Littleneſs, becauſe their Nature is the Pan-ſpermia, or univerſal Diſſemination of the Elements or Atoms.

SECT. V.

Of the Heavens.

THE [l] Sun and Moon conſiſt of ſmooth little Bodies which are carried round. [m] *Plutarch* affirms, he held, with *Anaxagoras*, that the Sun is a burning Plate or Stone; *Laertius* adds, *he ſaid of* Anaxagoras, *that thoſe Opinions which he delivered concerning the Sun and Moon, were not his, but more ancient, and that he had ſtoln them.*

[n] He conceived the Sun to be very big; for, adds *Cicero*, he was exceeding skilful in Geometry.

[o] The Moon is a fiery Firmament; containing Plains, Mountains, Vallies.

[p] He placed the Stars in this Order; firſt, the fixed Stars, then the Planets, then the Sun, *Lucifer*, and the Moon.

[q] All the Stars move from Eaſt to Weſt. [r] Thoſe which are neareſt to the Earth are leſs apt to be carried about by the rapid Circumvolution of Heaven. Whence it comes to paſs, that the Sun and the inferior Stars, eſpecially the Moon, move much ſlower than the reſt.

[s] He held, as *Anaxagoras*, that Comets are the Co-apparition of Planets, which coming near one another ſeem to be all one.

SECT. VI.

Of Air, Earth, Water.

WHEN [t] in a narrow Vacuum there are many little Bodies, there followeth Wind; and contrary the Air is quiet and calm, when in a great Vacuum there are but a few little Bodies. For as in a Market-place or Street, as long as the People are but few, they walk without any Trouble, but when they run into ſome narrow Place, they juſtle and quarrel with one another; ſo in this Space which encompaſſeth us, when many Bodies croud into one Place, they muſt neceſſarily juſtle one another, and be thruſt forward, and driven back, and entangled, and ſqueezed; of which is made the Wind, when they which conteſted yield; and, having been long toſs'd up and down uncertainly, ſhrink; but when a few Bodies ſtir up and down in a large Space, they can neither drive, nor be driven impetuouſly.

[u] The Earth at firſt wandred up and down, as well by reaſon of its ſmallneſs as lightneſs; but in time growing thick and heavy, it ſettled down immovable. [w] Its Breadth is the Cauſe of its Settledneſs, for [*it is of the Faſhion of a Diſh, hollow in the midſt, and*] it [x] divides not but covers the Air which is beneath it; as appears by broad Bodies, which are not eaſily ſtirred by the Winds, but ſtick faſt: Thus doth the Earth, by reaſon of its breadth, to the Air; and the Air, not having a Place whereto it might go ſufficient to receive it, reſteth underneath, as Water within

[y] Ariſtot. Gen. 1. 7. [z] Ariſtot. de Cœlo. 4. 6. [a] Ariſt. de gen. & cor. 1. 2. [b] Plut. plac. 2. 1. [c] Cic. Acad. Queſt. 4. 17. [d] Laert. 9. 44. ibid. [e] Plut. [f] Stob. Phyſ. 1. 18. [g] Ibid. 1. 71. [h] Laert. ibid. [i] What *Magnenus* means, I know not, when he ſaith, *p.* 42. *aeris ab eo non ſit mentio tanquam de Elemento proprie dicto*; upon which the whole ſecond Chapter of his firſt Diſputation is founded. [k] Ariſtot. de Cœlo, 3. 4. [l] Laert. 9. [m] Plac. 2, 20. [n] Cic. de finib. 1. 6. [o] Plut. plac. 2. 25. [p] Ibid. 2. 15. [q] Plut. plac. 2. 16. [r] Lucret. l. 5. v. 622. [s] Ariſt. Meteor. 1. 6. [t] Senec. nat. quæſt. 5. 2. [u] Plut. plac. 4. 13. [w] Ariſt. de Cœlo, 2. 13. [x] Plut. plac. 3. 12.

within Veſſels which cover it. That the Air can uphold a great Weight, they demonſtrate many ways.

[y] Now by reaſon that this Air is weaker towards the South, the Earth, as it groweth and increaſeth bendeth to that Side; for the Northern Parts are intemperate, the Southern temperate, whence they produce more and fairer Fruits.

[z] He imputeth the Cauſe of Earthquakes to Water; for [a] the Earth being full of Water, and receiving to it much Rain-water, this cauſeth the Earthquake: For there coming more, becauſe it is not able to receive it, forcing its Caverns, it maketh it ſhake, and being dried and attracted into empty Places from the more full, in its Paſſage cauſeth that Motion.

[b] The Sea continually decreaſeth, and at laſt will dry up.

[c] The overflowing of *Nilus* is cauſed by the melting and diffuſion of the Snow in the Northern Parts under the Summer Tropick; from the Vapours, Clouds are condenſed, which being driven towards the South, and to *Egypt*, by the Eteſian Winds, they are diſſolved into great and vehement Showers, wherewith are filled as well the Lakes, as the River *Nilus*.

SECT. VII.

Of the Generation of living Creatures.

MEN [d] were firſt generated of Water and Mud; from which Opinion *Epicurus* little differs.

[e] The Diſtinction of Sexes, Male and Female, is made [f] in the Womb, not by reaſon of heat or cold, but according to that Party of the two, whoſe Seed proceeding from the Part which diſtinguiſheth Male and Female, is predominant; or of that Party whoſe Seed firſt takes up the Place.

[g] The Infant in the Womb is nouriſhed at the Mouth, wherefore as ſoon as it is born, it layeth the Mouth to the Dug.

SECT. VIII.

Of the Soul.

Democritus [h] held, that the Soul is a kind of Fire and Heat; [i] for there being infinite Figures of Atoms, he ſaith, the round make Fire, and the Soul, becauſe that Figure is moſt capable to permeate through the Univerſe; and to move the reſt, the Soul itſelf being moved alſo. Thus he and *Leucippus* held the Soul to be that which giveth Motion to living Creatures. Hence it comes to paſs, that Reſpiration is the Bound of Life, for when that which encompaſſeth the Bodies, compreſſeth them, and ſqueezeth out thoſe Figures which give motion to living Creatures, foraſmuch as they never reſt, there is a Relief by the coming in of others of the ſame Kind through Reſpiration; for this hinders thoſe which are in the Animals from being ſqueezed out, they driving forward together that which compreſſeth and faſtneth. All Animals [[k] *breathe, and they*] live as long as they can do thus.

[l] The Soul is corruptible, and periſheth with the Body.

[m] The Soul hath two Parts; the rational, ſeated in the Breaſt; the irrational, diffuſed through the whole Body; but [n] the Soul and Mind are all one.

[o] There are more than five Senſes of irrational Animals, God and wiſe Men.

[p] Senſation and Intellection are made by the Inſinuation of Images from without, which flow from ſolid Bodies and certain Figures. [q] So the Image in a Looking-glaſs is made alſo.

He conceived, as *Ariſtotle* ſaith, that *all Senſibles are Tangibles*, that all Senſation is cauſed by a Touch or Stroke upon the Organ; and further affirmed, that [r] *Whiteneſs is Smoothneſs*, [the Light being reflected from a ſmooth Superficies upon the Eye, exhibits a white Colour.] [s] *Blackneſs is Roughneſs*; [the ſame Light reflected from a rough Superficies, exhibits Blackneſs;] in like manner [t] *He referred Sapours to Figures.* [u] The round Atoms, and ſuch as are of a Bulk ſuitable [to the Contexture of the Organ,] make a *ſweet* Sapor; the great, a *ſowre*; the multangulous and nothing round, a *harſh*; the acute, conical, crooked, not ſlender nor round, a *ſharp*; the round, ſlender, angulous, crooked, an *acrimonious*; the angulous diſtorted equicrural, a *ſalt*; the round, light, diſtorted, ſmall, a *bitter*; the ſlender, round, ſmall, a fat or *luſcious*.

[w] The Mind is the ſame with the Soul, conſiſting of ſmooth little Bodies. [x] The *Hegemonick* is ſeated in the whole Head; [y] Cogitation is made by Incurrence of Images; [z] ſo alſo are Dreams.

SECT. IX.

Of the Gods.

Democritus (ſaith [a] *Cicero*,) in my Opinion, wavers, and ſeems uncertain, concerning the Nature of the Gods; for ſometimes he conceives, that there are Images indued with Divinity in the Univerſe;

[y] Plut. plac. 3. 12. [z] Plut. plac. 3. 15. [a] Ariſt. Meteor. 2. 7. [b] Ariſt. Met. 23. [c] Plut. plac. 3. 1. [d] Cenſor. de die nat. 4. [e] Ariſt. de gen. animal. 5. 1. [f] Perhaps reading μητρα. [g] Plut. plac. 5. 16. [h] Ariſt. de anima, 1, 2. [i] Perhaps reading ἀτόμων τῶν ὄντων σχημάτων τ' ἀτόμων. See Ariſt. de gen. & cor. 11. *cited above in the firſt Section.* [k] Ariſt. de reſp. cap. 2. [l] Plut. plac. 4. 7. [m] Plut. plac. 4. 4. [n] Ariſt. de an. 1, 2. [o] Plut. plac. 4. 10. [p] Plut plac. 4. 8. [q] Plut. plac. 4. 14. [r] Ariſt. de denſ. & ſenſ. cap. 4. [s] Ariſt. loc. cit. [t] Ariſt loc. cit. [u] Theophraſt. de Odorib. [w] Laert. 9. 44. [x] Plut. plac. 4. 5. [y] Cic. de finib. 1. Plut. plac. 4. 8. [z] Plut. plac. 5. 2. [a] De nat. deor. 1. 43.

verſe; ſometimes he calleth the Principles and Minds in the ſame Univerſe, God; ſometimes animate Images, which uſe either to profit or to harm us; ſometimes certain vaſt Images, ſo great, that they extrinſically embrace the whole World.

[a] *Sextus Empiricus* delivers his Opinion thus: There are certain Images which come to Men, ſome of which do good, others hurt; whence he wiſheth, that he might light upon good Images; theſe are large and extraordinary vaſt, not eaſily periſhable, nor abſolutely unperiſhable. They foretel Events to Men by Diſcourſe and Speech, the Ancients having received an Impreſſion of theſe in their Fantaſies, from thence imagined that there is a God; whereas beſides theſe there is no God, or a Nature that is not ſubject to Diſſolution.

[b] He approved the Preſention of future Things, that is, Divination; and conceived, that [c] the Ancients did wiſely inſtitute, that the Entrails of ſacrificed Victims ſhould be looked into; from the Conſtitution and Colour whereof may be perceived ſigns of Health or Peſtilence; ſometimes alſo what Dearth or Plenty ſhall follow.

CHAP. X.

Ethick.

HE [d] aſſerted, the chief End or Good to be εὐθυμία: not placing it in Pleaſure, as ſome have miſunderſtood him; but in a ſerene, ſecure State of Mind, not diſtracted with any Fear, or Superſtition, or any other Paſſion.

Of his moral Sentences theſe have been preſerved by *Stobæus* and others.

[e] *'Tis eaſy Wickedneſs to circumvent:*
For whilſt on Gain alone it is intent,
It blindly ſtrays, and any way is bent.

[f] It is eaſy to praiſe what we ought not, and to blame; but both are Signs of a depraved Diſpoſition.

[g] Wiſdom not admiring any thing, merits all things, being moſt honourable.

[h] The Bounds of profitable and unprofitable, are, pleaſant and unpleaſant.

[i] It is the Work of Prudence to prevent an Injury; of Indolence, when done, not to revenge it.

[k] There ariſeth a great Delight from beholding good Actions.

[l] From good things ariſe ill to Men, if they know not how to manage or bear the Good.

[m] To yield to the Law, the Magiſtrate, and a wiſe Perſon, is decent.

[n] Temperance augments Things that are pleaſant, and maketh the Pleaſure itſelf greater.

[o] Sleeps in the Day ſignifieth either Diſtemper of the Body, or Grief of the Mind, or Sloth, or Dulneſs.

[p] Coition is a ſhort Apoplexy; One Man is ſtruck out of another.

[q] Not he only is valiant who vanquiſheth his Enemy, but he alſo who ſubdueth Pleaſure; yet ſome there are, who command Cities, and are Slaves to Women.

[r] It is good not only to do no harm, but not ſo much as to will it.

[s] Where ill Actions acquire Wealth, the Infamy is the greater.

[t] Hope of ill Gain is the beginning of Loſs.

[u] We ought to ſpeak Truth where it is beſt.

[w] It is better to blame our own Faults, than thoſe of others.

[x] Freedom of Speech is proper to Generoſity, but the difference of Occaſions render it dangerous.

[y] To praiſe good Things is good, but to praiſe the Ill is proper to a counterfeit deceitful Soul.

[z] He is well diſpoſed who grieves not for what he hath not, and rejoiceth for what he hath.

[a] Of pleaſant Things, thoſe which we have moſt ſeldom, delight moſt.

[b] If a Man exceeds Moderation, the ſweeteſt Things prove the moſt bitter.

[c] He is valiant who vanquiſheth, not Enemies only, but Pleaſures.

[d] They who indulge to the Pleaſures of the Belly, conſuming the Time in Eating, Drinking, or Wantonneſs; in all theſe there are ſhort Pleaſures, which laſt as long as they are Eating and Drinking, but many Griefs: For they are in a continual Deſire of theſe Things, and when they have obtain'd them, the Pleaſure paſſeth away, and there is nothing in them but a momentary Titillation; the Pleaſure is ſhort, and they ſoon need the ſame again.

[e] To reſiſt Anger is difficult, but to vanquiſh it is proper to an underſtanding Perſon.

[f] He who contends with his Superior, ends in Infamy.

[g] Wicked Men, after they have eſcaped the Danger, keep not the Oaths which they had made in their Extremity.

[h] More are made good by Exercitation, than by Nature.

[a] Adv. Mathem. [b] Cic. de divinat. 1, 3. [c] Cic. de divinat. ibid. [d] Laert. 9. 45. [e] Ser. 2. [f] Ibid. [g] Ser. 3. [h] Ibid. [i] Ibid. [k] Ibid. [l] Ser. 4. [m] Ser. 5. [n] Ibid. [o] Ser. 6. [p] Ibid. [q] Ser. 7. [r] Ser. 9. [s] Ser. 10. [t] Ibid. [u] Ser. 12. [w] Ser. 17. [x] Ibid. [y] Ser. 14. [z] Ser. 17. [a] Ibid. [b] Ibid. [c] Ibid. [d] Ibid. [e] Ser. 20. [f] Ser. 22. [g] Ser. 28. [h] Ser. 29.

[i] All Labours are ſweeter than Reſt, when Men obtain that for which they labour; but if a Man be fruſtrate of his Deſigns, there is one Remedy, if all Things are alike troubleſome and difficult.

[k] Neither ſay nor do ill, though alone; learn to ſtand more in awe of thy ſelf than of others.

[l] It is a defrauding of others, to deſire to ſpeak all, and to hear nothing.

[m] A man muſt either be good, or ſeem ſuch.

[n] They whoſe Manners are orderly, their Life is orderly.

[o] A good Man cares not for the Reproofs of ill Men.

[p] The Laws would not have prohibited every Man from living according to his own Will, if one were not injurious to another; for Envy cauſeth the Beginning of Sedition.

[q] To live in foreign Countries teacheth Frugality; Maza, and a graſſy Bed are ſweet Cures of Hunger and Labour.

[r] Every Country is pervious to a wiſe Man; for the whole World is the Country of a wiſe Soul.

[s] The Law requires, that the Life of Man ſhould do good to others; this may be done if they will ſuffer, for it declares its own Virtue to the Obedient.

[t] Civil War hurts both Parties; the Harm is equal to the Victor, and to the Vanquiſhed.

[u] By Concord, beſides other great Things, War may be undertaken by Cities; without it, not.

[w] It is better for the Unwiſe to be governed, than to govern.

[x] It is Juſtice to do thoſe things which ought to be done; Injuſtice not to do them, but to decline them.

As concerning the killing and not killing of Animals, the Buſineſs ſtands thus: Thoſe who do, or would do Injury, he who killeth is blameleſs; nay, ſuch ought rather to be killed, than not.

[y] We ought to kill all that do Injury, and Injuſtices; and he who kills them, ought to have, throughout the whole World, Eſteem and Privilege of his Deſire, and Juſtice, and Courage, and Poſſeſſion.

[z] As it is written concerning Beaſts and Serpents, that are in Enmity with us, ſo alſo in my Opinion may we do with Men. According to the Laws of our Country, an Enemy may be kill'd in any Part of the World, where no Law forbiddeth it; but Law forbiddeth ſometimes, and they have ſacred Rites, Covenants, and Oaths.

[a] Any Man that either kills with his own Hand, or cauſeth to be killed by command or vote, a Thief, is to be eſteemed innocent.

[b] It is a grievous Thing to be ruled by a worſe Perſon.

[c] They who ſuffer Injuries are to be defended to the utmoſt, and not to be deſpiſed; for this is juſt and good, the other unjuſt and ill.

[d] They who commit any thing deſerving Baniſhment, or Bonds, or any other Puniſhment, ought not to be acquitted, but condemned; if any Man ſhould acquit them either for Gain or Favour, he doth unjuſtly.

[e] He hath the greateſt part of Juſtice and Virtue, who honours thoſe that are worthy.

[f] Stand not more in awe of other Men than of thyſelf; nor commit more Offences, though no Man were to know it, than if all Men: Imprint this Rule in thy Mind; and do no ill.

[g] Men are more mindful of Wrongs than of Benefits, and it is but juſt it ſhould be ſo: as he who reſtores a *Depoſitum*, deſerves no Commendation; but he who detains it, Blame and Puniſhment. The ſame Caſe it is in a Ruler, who is choſen not to do ill, but good.

[h] To be naturally fitted for Command, is proper to the moſt excellent Perſons.

[i] Boldneſs is the Beginning of an Action, the End is guided by Fortune.

[k] Make uſe of Servants, as of the Parts of your own Body; appoint to each a ſeveral Office.

[l] She that is belov'd, eaſily forgiveth the Offence of her Lover.

[m] A Woman is ſharper-witted for Miſchief than a Man.

[n] To ſpeak little, becomes a Woman; plain Attire adorns her.

[o] To obey a Woman is the greateſt Ignominy to a Man.

[p] I approve not the having of Children; for I ſee the Troubles of them are many and great; the Comforts and Pleaſures few and ſmall.

[q] A rich Man, in my Opinion, ſhall do well to adopt the Son of ſome Friend; for, by this means, he may have ſuch a one as he hath a mind to; for he may chuſe where he pleaſeth, and take ſuch a one as may beſt agree with him. There is a great Difference betwixt theſe two; he who adopts a Son, hath the Liberty to make choice out of many that are good, and will pleaſe him; he that begets one, runs the hazard whether he will prove ſuch, or no.

[r] The begetting of Children ſeemeth to come from a moſt ancient Inſtitution, and Inſtinct of Nature; as is manifeſt even from brute Beaſts, who beget young ones, though without hopes of receiving any Advantage by them: As ſoon as they are brought forth, they feed and bring them up, and are ſollicitous for them

[i] Ser. 29. [k] Ser. 31. [l] Ser. 36. [m] Ser. 37. [n] Ibid. [o] Ibid. [p] Ibid. [q] Ser. 38. [r] Ibid. [s] Ser. 41. [t] Ibid. [u] Ibid. [w] Ser. 42. [x] Ibid. [y] Ibid. [z] Ibid. [a] Ibid. [b] Ibid. [c] Ser. 43. [d] Ser. 44. [e] Ser. [f] Ibid. [g] Ibid. [h] Ibid. [i] Ser. 46. [k] Ser. 49. [l] Ser. 61. [m] Ibid. [n] Ser. 62. [o] Ibid. [p] Ser. 74. [q] Ibid. [r] Ibid.

them even in the leaſt things; and if they come to any hurt, they grieve at it. Such is the Diſpoſition of all Animals; how much more of Man, who hopes for a Benefit from his Off-ſpring.

[h] The Excellency of Sheep conſiſteth in being fat; of Men, in being virtuous.

[i] As of Wounds, the worſt is that which gangrenes; ſo, of the Diſeaſes of the Mind, is inſatiate Avarice.

[k] A prudent Uſe of Money conduceth to the Practice of Liberality and Relief of others: He that uſeth Money fooliſhly, makes it the Prey of all Men.

[l] To get Money, is not ill; but to get it unjuſtly, is the worſt of Ills.

[m] Poverty and Riches are the Names of Want and Sufficiency: He who wants, ought not to be called Rich; nor he who wants not, Poor.

[n] If you deſire many things, many things will ſeem but a few.

[o] To deſire little, makes Poverty equal with Riches.

[p] Good things are hardly obtained by thoſe that ſeek after them; the Ill come without ſeeking.

[q] We muſt conſider that the Life of Man is brittle and momentary, involved in many Troubles.

[r] He is happy who is chearful, though poſſeſſing little; he unhappy who is troubled, amidſt much Wealth.

[s] He that will lead a ſecure quiet Life, muſt not engage himſelf in many things, neither publick nor private; nor attempt any thing above his own Ability and Nature: but have ſuch Regard to himſelf, that he decline any Exuberance of Fortune that is offer'd him, aſſuming no more than he is well able to bear; for the Convenience of what we enjoy is more excellent than the Largeneſs of it.

[t] A publick Calamity is greater than a private, for it affords no Hope of Relief.

[u] The Hopes of wiſe Men may come to paſs, but thoſe of Fools are impoſſible.

[x] The Hopes of Fools are beyond Reaſon.

[y] They who rejoice in the Misfortunes of their Neighbours, know not that Fortune is common to all, and that they have not a Propriety in Joy.

[z] Strength and Beauty are the Goods of the Body: Temperance and Prudence the Crown of old Age.

[a] It is certain, that the old Man was once young; but whether the young Man ſhall ever come to be old, is uncertain. A good thing that is compleat, is better than that which is to come, it being uncertain.

[b] Old Age is an univerſal Imperfection; it hath all things, and yet wants all things.

[c] Some Men, not underſtanding the Nature of moral Diſſolution, and being conſcious of their own ill Actions in Life, are, during the whole Courſe of their Lives, miſerably diſtracted with Fears, fancying and feigning to themſelves many things that are falſe, as if they were to happen after Death.

[d] *His alſo was this Saying,* [e] *Speech is the Shadow of Action.*

[f] He held, that from publick Offices, and the Favour of great Perſons, accrue many Ornaments which grace and ſet off this Life.

[g] He ſaid, that Nature thruſt down Truth, and hid her quite in the bottom.

[h] He ſaid, that none can be a great Poet without Madneſs.

To his moral Sentences may be added, what is related of him by [i] *Julian* the Emperor, That not being able by Diſcourſe to comfort *Darius*, who was extremely afflicted at the Death of his beautiful Wife, he promiſed him to reſtore her to Life, if he would ſupply him with ſuch things as were requiſite for Performance thereof. *Darius* bad him not ſpare any thing, which he thought might help him to bring it to paſs. Soon after he came to *Darius*, and told him, that he had furniſhed himſelf with all things except only one, which he could not get; but that he, who was King of all *Aſia*, might haply procure it with little Difficulty. *Darius* demanding what it was, that no Man could get but the King himſelf? *Democritus* told him, that if he could write on her Tomb the Names of three Perſons that have never grieved, ſhe would return to Life. *Darius* perplexed hereat, there being no Man to whom ſome Occaſion of Grief hath not happen'd; *Democritus*, after his uſual manner, laughed, ſaying, Can you then, the moſt unreaſonable of all Men, weep with ſuch Confidence, as if you were the only Perſon that ever ſuffer'd Affliction, and yet are not able to find out, through all the Ages of Mankind, one Perſon that hath not received ſome particular Croſs?

[h] Ser. 84. [i] Ibid. 90. [k] Ibid. 92. [l] Ibid. [m] Ibid. 95. [n] Ibid. [o] Ibid. [p] Ibid. 96. [q] Ibid.
[r] Ibid. 101. [s] Ibid. [t] Ibid. 102. [u] Ibid. 109. [x] Ibid. [y] Ibid. 111. [z] Ibid. 112. [a] Ibid.
[b] Ibid. 115. [c] Ibid. 119. [d] Laert. [e] *Magnenus* miſtakes it for the Title of a Book; but the contrary is manifeſt from *Plut. de educ. liberis.* [f] Plut. non poſſe ſuav. viv. [g] Cic. Acad. quæſt. 4. [h] Cic. de divina. [i] Epiſt.

PROTAGORAS.

CHAP. I.

His Country, Father, and the Occaſion upon which he ſtudied Philoſophy.

[k] PRotagoras was an *Abderite*, Son of *Artemon*; or, as *Apollodorus* and *Dinon*, of *Mæandrius*; but *Eupolis* ſaith, he was a *Teian*.

He was firſt a Porter, as *Epicurus* relates, and by that Occaſion came into Favour with *Democritus*: Being young, ſaith *Agellius*, he was conſtrained, for his Suſtenance, to take upon him the Office of a Porter; and, from ſome Places adjoining, carry'd Burthens of Wood to *Abdera*, of which City he was. *Democritus*, who was alſo of the ſame City, a Perſon eminent for his Virtue and Philoſophy, going abroad into the Fields, ſaw him coming nimbly along loaden with one of his uſual Burthens; and when he came near him, obſerving that the Wood was neatly placed, and handſomly bound up, ſpoke to him to reſt himſelf a little; which he did, and *Democritus*, in the mean time, took great notice of the Bundle, that it was tied up as it were geometrically. He asked him, who put his Wood in that Order? and he anſwering, that it was he himſelf had done it, *Democritus* deſir'd him to unty it, and put it into the ſame Order again; which he did. *Democritus* admiring the Ingenuity of a Perſon wholly void of Learning; Young Man, *ſaith he*, ſeeing you have the Wit to know how to do well, there are better and greater things which you may do with me; and immediately carrying him home, kept and maintained him, and made him that which afterwards he was.

CHAP. II.

His Opinions, and Writings.

[l] HE firſt ſaid, That every thing hath two Reaſons or Arguments, one contrary to the other; which way of arguing he firſt uſed.

He began one of his Books thus; *Man is* πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον, *the Meaſure of all things: of Beings as they are; of not Beings, as they are not.* By μέτρον he means the Critery, by χρημάτων, πραγμάτων, of things; which is as much as to ſay, Man is the Critery of all things; of Beings as they are, of not Beings as they are not. Hereupon he aſſerts the Phænomena's to be particular to every one.

He ſaith, that Matter is fluid, and being in perpetual Fluxion, Appoſitions are made inſtead of Subſtractions; and the Senſes are tranſmutated and changed, according to the ſeveral Ages and Conſtitutions of the Body.

He ſaith alſo, the Reaſon (or Powers) of all Phænomena's are ſubjected in Matter; ſo that Matter in itſelf is all things which it appears unto all. But Men at different times perceive things different, by reaſon of their different Habits. He whoſe Conſtitution is ſound, of the things which are in Matter, perceiveth thoſe which are capable of appearing to ſuch Perſons; they who are otherwiſe diſpoſed, perceive the things which are capable of appearing to Perſons of a contrary Conſtitution. The ſame reaſon there is in the Difference of Ages, in ſleeping and waking, and in all kinds of Habits. Man therefore is the Critery of things that are; for all things which appear to Men, are; thoſe which appear not to any Man, are not.

He held, that the Soul is nothing more than the Senſes, as *Plato* in his *Thætetus* affirms; and that all things are true.

Another of his Books he began thus; *Of the Gods I know nothing, neither that they are, nor that they are not; for there are many things which hinder us from this Knowledge, the Blindneſs and Shortneſs of human Life.* For the Beginning of this Book he was baniſh'd by the *Athenians*, and his Books burnt in the open Market-place, after that they had been diligently exacted of all that had any of them, by the publick Cryer.

He was the firſt that took a hundred Minæ for a Gratuity. He, and *Prodicus* the *Teian*, got Money by reciting Orations in publick.

He firſt defined the Parts of Time, and explained the Power of Opportunity, and inſtituted Diſputations by way of Conteſt; and propoſed Sophiſms to the Diſputants, ſlipping beſides the Senſe and playing upon the Word, introducing the light, ſuperficial, eriſtick way; whence *Timon* ſaith of him,

Protagoras, *well in Contention read.*

He firſt abrogated the *Socratick* way of Diſputation, and firſt examined the Argument of *Antiſthenes*, whereby he endeavours to demonſtrate, that it could not be contradicted, as *Plato* ſaith in his *Euthydemus*; and firſt produced Epicheirems againſt Poſitions.

He firſt divided an Oration into four Parts, Requeſt, Interrogation, Anſwer, Command: Some ſay

[k] Laert 9. 50. [l] Ibid. 10. 51.

ſay into ſeven; Narration, Interrogation, Anſwer, Command, Enuntiation, Requeſt, Appellation; which Parts he called the Foundations of Orations. But, as *Alcidamas*, four; Affirmation, Negation, Interrogation, Appellation.

He firſt recited his Diſcourſe concerning the Gods (the Beginning whereof we formerly mentioned) at *Athens*, in the Houſe of *Euripides*, or, as ſome ſay, of *Megaclides*: Others ſay, in the *Lyceum*, and that *Archagoras*, his Diſciple, Son of *Theodotus*, ſpoke it for him. He was accuſed by *Pythodorus*, Son of *Polyzelus*, one of the 400 Senators; but *Ariſtotle* ſaith, that *Evathlus* accuſed him.

His Writings which are now extant, ſaith *Laertius*, are theſe;

The Eriſtick Art.
Of Wreſtling.
Of Mathematicks.
Of Politicks.
Of Ambition.
Of Virtues.
Of Settlement of Government.
Of the things in the Inferi.
Of the things that are done amiſs by Men.
Preceptory.
Judgment upon Reward.
Antilogicks 2.

[m] Laert. 9. 55.

Theſe were his Books. *Plato* wrote a Dialogue, and intituled by his Name.

CHAP. III.

His Death.

[m] *Philochorus* relates, that as he was ſailing to *Sicily*, the Ship wherein he went was caſt away; and this he ſaith, is confirmed by *Euripides* in his Ixion. Others relate, that he died by the way, having attained to ninety Years; *Apollodorus* ſaith, to 70. and that he had been a Sophiſt forty Years; and that he flouriſh'd about the 74th Olympiad. *Laertius* hath this Epigram upon him:

And thee, Protagoras, *flying, they ſay,*
From Athens, *Death did ſeize on by the way.*
Thou might'ſt eſcape from Pallas *and her Town,*
But Pluto *would not loſe what was his own.*

ANAXARCHUS.

Anaxarchus was an [n] *Abderite*; he heard *Diomenes* of *Smyrna*; or, as others, *Metrodorus* of *Chios*, who ſaid he did not know ſo much as this, that he knew nothing. *Metrodorus*, as ſome ſay, heard *Neſſus* a *Chian*; as others, *Democritus*. *Anaxarchus* lived with *Alexander*, and flouriſh'd about the 110th Olympiad, and was a great Enemy to *Nicocreon* King of *Cyprus*; inſomuch that *Alexander* at a Feaſt demanding what he thought of the Entertainment? he anſwered, All things, great King, are very magnificent; only there is wanting the Head of ſome Satrapa, reflecting upon *Nicocreon*. After the King's Death, *Nicocreon* bearing this Injury in mind, laid hold of *Anaxarchus*, (who againſt his Will was caſt upon the Shore of *Cyprus*) and cauſed him to be put into a Mortar, and pounded with Iron Peſtles: Whilſt he, deſpiſing the Pain, often repeated this celebrious Speech, *Pound the Cauſe of* Anaxarchus, Anaxarchus *himſelf you hurt not.* Hereupon the Tyrant commanding them to cut out his Tongue, he bit it off, and ſpit it in his Face.

He, from his Apathy and the Tranquillity of his Life, had the Attribute of *Fortunate* beſtow'd on him. He likewiſe had an excellent Faculty in reducing others to Moderation; as he reformed *Alexander*, who would conceit himſelf a God, by pointing to his Finger when it bled, and ſaying, This is Blood, and not

——*The Juice that from immortal Gods doth flow.*

Yet *Plutarch* relates, that *Alexander* himſelf ſaid this to his Friends.

Another time, *Anaxarchus* drinking to him, pointed to the Cup, ſaying,

A mortal Hand one of the Gods ſhall wound.

When *Alexander* came near *Babylon*, the *Chaldeans* diſſuaded him from entring the City, affirming, that if he did, it would be fatal to him; whereupon he paſſed by, and went to *Burſia*, a City on the other ſide of *Euphrates*. But *Anaxarchus*, and other *Greeks*, perſuaded him by philoſophical Reaſons to contemn the Predictions of the Magi as falſe and uncertain; whoſe Advice he following, brought back his Army to *Babylon*, where he died.

[n] Laert. 9. 58.

THE

THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY.

THE TWELFTH PART,

Containing the *SCEPTICK* Sect.

PYRRHO.

CHAP. I.

His Country, Parentage, Time, Maſters.

OUT of *Elia* there ſprung another Sect, no leſs Eminent than the former; its Author was [a] *Pyrrho*, an *Elian*. His Father, as *Diocles* affirms, was named *Pliſtarchus*, of obſcure and mean Quality; for ſuch [b] *Antigonus* relates *Pyrrho* himſelf at firſt to have been; his Siſter *Philiſta*, a Midwife.

Suidas ſaith, he was in the Time of *Philip* King of *Macedon*, about the 101ſt Olympiad: But this ſeems rather to have reference to the Time of his Birth, than to that wherein he flouriſhed; for *Anaxarchus* (his Maſter) was contemporary with *Alexander* the Son of *Philip*, and is, by *Laertius*, ſaid to have flouriſhed in the 110th Olympiad; for which reaſon perhaps it is, that *Suidas* adds, *And thence-forward.* [c] He was firſt (as *Apollodorus* relates) a Painter; *Ariſtocles* ſaith, an ill one: But [d] *Antigonus* affirms, That in the *Gymnaſium* at *Elis* was preſerved a very good Piece of his doing, repreſenting Torch-bearers.

[e] Afterwards (ſaith *Apollodorus*) he applied himſelf to Philoſophy. *Ariſtocles* ſaith, He lighted upon ſome Writings of *Democritus*. *Alexander* in his Succeſſions, That he heard *Dryſo*, Son of *Stilpo*, whom *Suidas* terms *Bryſo*; adding, He was Diſciple to *Glinomachus*, a Dialectick, contemporary with *Stilpo*.

[f] Next he addicted himſelf to *Alexander*, Diſciple of *Metrodorus* the *Chian*, whoſe Maſter was *Metrodorus* the *Abderite*.

[g] Afterwards he heard *Anaxarchus*, [the *Abderite*] whom he followed every-where, inſomuch as he converſed with the *Gymnoſophiſts* in *India*, and with the *Magi*.

CHAP. II.

His Inſtitution of a Sect.

"HE ſeemeth (ſaith [h] *Aſcanius* the *Abderite*) to "have found out a noble way of philoſophi- "zing, introducing Incomprehenſion, and the way "of

[a] Laert. 9. 61. [b] Ibid. 9. 62. [c] Ibid. 9. 58. [d] Ibid. 9. 61. [e] Ibid. 9. 62. [f] Suid.
[g] Laert. ibid. [h] Laert. 9. 61.

" of Suſpenſion. For he aſſerted nothing, neither " honeſt nor diſhoneſt, juſt nor unjuſt; and ſo of " every thing. That there is nothing indeed ſuch, " but that Men do all things by Law and Cuſtom; " that in every thing, *this* is not rather than *that*.

[i] This was called the *Zetetick* Philoſophy, from its continual Enquiry after Truth; *Sceptick*, from its continual Inſpection, and never finding; *Ephectick*, from the Affection which follows upon this Inquiſition, Suſpenſion; *Aporetick*, from doubting of all dogmatical Opinions; [k] *Pyrrhonian*, from *Pyrrho*. But *Theodoſius*, in his *Sceptick* Summary, ſaith, That the *Sceptick* Philoſophy ought not to be called *Pyrrhonian:* For if the Motion of another's Intellect be incomprehenſible to us, we cannot know how *Pyrrho* was affected; and, not knowing it, we cannot be called *Pyrrhonians*. Beſides, neither was *Pyrrho* the firſt that found out *Scepticiſm*, *To aſſert no Doctrine*. It ſhould rather be called, *Like the Courſe of* Pyrrho. Thus *Theodoſius*.

On the other ſide, *Numenius*, (and he *only*, as *Laertius* obſerves) affirmed, *That* Pyrrho *dogmatizeth*. But of this more hereafter.

CHAP. III.

His Manner of Life.

COnformable [l] hereunto was his Manner of Life; he ſhunned nothing, nor took any heed, but went ſtraight on upon every thing; Chariots, if it ſo hapned, Precipices, Dogs, and the like; not turning out of the way, nor having any regard to Senſe; being ſaved, as *Antigonus* ſaith, by his Friends that followed him. But *Æneſidemus* affirms, That though he diſcourſed philoſophically upon Suſpenſion, yet all his Actions were not inconſiderate.

[m] He uſed to walk forth ſolitary, ſeldom ſhewing himſelf to thoſe of his Family. This he did upon hearing a certain *Indian* reproach *Anaxarchus* for teaching, That no Man but himſelf was good, and yet in the mean time he frequented the Courts of Princes.

[n] He was always in the ſame State, inſomuch that if any Man in the midſt of his Diſcourſe went away, he nevertheleſs continu'd his Diſcourſe till he had ended it. Though in his Youth he was fickle, he took many Journeys, never telling any whither he went, and choſe ſuch Company as he pleaſed.

[o] *Anaxarchus*, falling into a Ditch, he went on, not offering to help him; which when ſome blamed, *Anaxarchus* himſelf commended his Indifference and want of Compunction.

[p] Being found talking to himſelf, and demanded, Why he did ſo? *I ſtudy*, ſaith he, *how to be good.*

[q] In Arguments he was ſlighted by none, foraſmuch as he had an extraordinary way of ſpeaking to the Queſtion; with which he took *Nauſiphanes*, being a very young Man. He ſaid, that his Affection ought to be *Pyrrhonian*, his Words his own. *Epicurus*, often admiring the Converſation of *Pyrrho*, continually queſtion'd him concerning himſelf. So much was he honour'd by his Country, as that they made him chief Prieſt, and, for his ſake, made a Decree of Immunity for all Philoſophers. He had many that imitated his Unconcernedneſs; whence *Timon* ſaith of him in his *Pytho*, and *Silli*;

How learnd'ſt thou (aged Pyrrho*) to untye*
The ſlaviſh Bands of empty Sophiſtry?
The Air of Greece *thou mind'ſt not, nor to know*
Whence things are made, and into what they go.

And again in *Indalmis*;

Pyrrho, *I long to be inform'd by Thee,*
How Thou, a Man, liv'dſt like a Deity?

Diocles (cited by *Laertius*) affirms the *Athenians* made him free of their City, for killing *Cotis* the *Thracian:* But this, as the learned *Cauſabon* hath obſerved, ſeems to be a Miſtake, occaſion'd by the Nearneſs of the Names; for it was *Pytho*, Diſciple to *Plato*, who ſlew *Cotis*, as is manifeſt from *Plutarch*.

[r] *Eratoſthenes* relates, That he lived piouſly with his Siſter, and often carried to Market Birds; or, as it happened, Pigs to ſell, and managed his Houſhold Affairs with the like Indifference, inſomuch as he is reported to have waſhed a Sow.

[s] But as once *Philiſta*, his Siſter, was ſacrificing, (who being diſappointed by a Friend, who promiſed to give her things for the Sacrifice, *Pyrrho* himſelf was conſtrain'd to buy them) he was very angry, and fell out with her for it; whereupon one of his Friends ſaying, " That his Actions were not an- " ſwerable to his Diſcourſe, nor ſuch as his Profeſſi- " on of Apathy, or Indifference, required; he an- " ſwer'd, *Indifference is not to be ſhewn towards Wo-* " *men*.

[t] On a time, a Dog flying upon him, he was troubled at it, [and got to a Tree] for which they who were by, deriding him, and cavilling at it, he ſaid, " It is hard to put off Man quite, yet we muſt firſt " ſtrive as far as poſſible, with Action againſt Things, " and if not ſo with Reaſon.

[u] They ſay, that upon occaſion of ſome Wound, he underwent corroſive Medicines, Inciſion and Cauteriſing. His Greatneſs of Courage is atteſted by *Timon*.

Philo

[i] Laert. 9. 70. [k] Reading πυῤῥώνειος. *See* Sext. Empir. hypoc. 1. 3. [l] Laert. 9. 62. [m] Ibid. 2, 65. [n] Ibid. [o] Ibid. [p] Ibid. [q] Ibid. [r] Ibid. [s] Ariſtot. apud. Euſeb. Præp. 14. 18. Laert. 9. 66. [t] Ariſt. *and* Laert. [u] Laert. 9. 67.

Philo the *Athenian*, who was his Diſciple, ſaith, He mentioned *Democritus* with greateſt Reſpect, and next him *Homer* with much Admiration, continually ſaying,

Juſt like the Race of Leaves is that of Men; and for that he compared Men to Flies and Birds. He uſed alſo to repeat theſe Verſes,

But die, my Friend, why ſhould'ſt thou thus lament?
Patroclus *dy'd too, who Thee far out-went.*

And all things whatſoever that declar'd the Inconſtancy, Vanity, and Childiſhneſs of Mankind.

Poſidonius relates of him, That, being at Sea in a Storm, his Companions dejected, he, with a quiet Mind, ſhewed them a Pig feeding in the Ship, ſaying, *A wiſe Man ought to be ſettled in ſuch Indiſturbance.*

CHAP. IV.

His Death, and Diſciples.

HE [x] died 90 Years old, [y] leaving nothing behind him in writing.

[z] Of his Diſciples, ſome were very eminent, of which Number were theſe:

Eurylochus, of whom is related this Extravagance: On a time he was ſo far tranſported with Fury, that, ſnatching up the Spit with the Meat upon it, he purſued the Cook into the *Forum:* And at *Elis*, being weary of thoſe that diſputed with him, he threw off his Cloke, and ſwam croſs the River *Alpheus*. He was a great Enemy to the *Sophiſts*, as *Timon* ſaith.

Philo, [an *Athenian*] who frequently talked to himſelf; whence *Timon* of him:

Of private, talking with himſelf alone,
Not minding Glory, or Contention.

Hecatæus of *Abdera*.

Timon, the *Phliaſian*, who writ the *Silli*.

Nauſiphanes, a *Teian*, whom, they ſay, *Epicurus* heard.

Theſe all were called *Pyrrhonians* from their Maſter; *Aporeticks*, and *Scepticks*, and *Ephectick*s, and *Zeteticks*, from their (as it were) Doctrine.

[x] Laert. 9. 62. [y] Ibid. [z] Ibid.

TIMON.

CHAP. I.

His Life.

APollonides the [a] *Nicean*, in his firſt Book of Commentaries upon the *Scilli*, dedicated to *Tiberius Cæſar*, ſaith, That the Father of *Timon* was named *Timarchus*, by Country a *Phliaſian*; and that *Timon*, whilſt in his Youth, taught to dance; but afterward changing his Mind, he took a Journey to *Megara* to ſee *Stilpo*, and having had Converſation a while with him, returned home and married. Then he went to *Elis* to ſee *Pyrrho*, taking his Wife along with him, who, during the time of his being there, bare him Sons; the Elder he called *Xanthus*, whom he taught Phyſick, and left him his Succeſſor in the Courſe of Life he himſelf had led.

Sotion in his tenth Book affirms, he was very eminent. Wanting neceſſary Proviſions, he went to the *Helleſpont* and *Propontus*, and profeſſing Philoſophy at *Chalcedon*, was exceedingly honour'd. From thence having now gotten a good Stock, he went to *Athens*, and lived there to his End, except that once he made a ſhort Journey to *Thebes*. He was known to *Antigonus* the King, and *Ptolomæus Philadelphus*, as he himſelf atteſts in his Iambicks.

He was, as *Antigonus* ſaith, a Lover of Wine, and gave himſelf much Diverſion from philoſophical Studies, as appears by his Writings.

He took much delight in Gardens and Solitude, as *Antigonus* reports; whereupon *Hieronymus* the Peripatetick ſaid, That *as the* Scythians *ſhoot both when they fly, and when they purſue; ſo of Philoſophers, ſome get Diſciples by running after them, others by running from them, as* Timon.

He was of an acute Apprehenſion, and quick in deriding; a great Lover of writing, very skilful in compoſing poetical Fables and Drama's. In his Tragedies he had much of *Homer*, and of *Alexander*. When Servants or Dogs diſturb'd him, he gave over, aiming above all things at a quiet Life.

Aratus demanding of him by what means he might procure an uncorrupt Copy of *Homer?* he anſwer'd, If

[a] Laert. 9. 109.

If you can light upon old Copies, not those that have been lately corrected.

His own Poems were thrown up and down, confusedly, and many times torn; insomuch as when *Zopyrus* the Orator read something of his, he made it up out of his own Memory; but when he came to the midst, there was a great Gap, which he was ignorant of.

He was so indifferent, that he observed no time for Dinner.

Seeing *Arcesilaus* walking amongst Flatterers, he said, What do you here where we Freemen are?

Of those who judge by the Senses and Mind, he continually said, *Attagas* and *Numinius* are met.

[u] He often used to sport after this manner: To one that admired all things, *Why then*, saith he, *dost thou not admire, that we, being but three, have four Eyes*; for he, and *Dioscorides* his Disciple, had each of them but one Eye, [x whence he used to call himself *Cyclops*] the other to whom he spoke had two. And on a time, being demanded by *Arcesilaus*, Why he came from *Thebes* to *Athens*, he said, *That I might laugh to see you fly.* But though in his *Silli* he abused *Arcesilaus*, yet in his Treatise entituled, *The funeral Banquet of* Arcesilaus, he commends him.

CHAP. II.

His Death and Writings.

[y] HE died almost 90 years of Age, as *Antigonus*, and *Sotion* in his 11th Book affirm.

There was another Timon, *the Man-hater*; of whom, see *Lucian* and *Suidas*.

He writ *Poems*, and *Verses*, and *Tragedies*, and *Satires*, *Comical Drama*'s 30. and *Tragical* 60. and *Silli* and *Cinædi*. There were also several Writings of his in *Prose*, amounting to 20000 Paragraphs.

Of his *Silli* there are three Books, in which, as a Sceptick, he reproached and derided all the Dogmatists: The *First* written in his own Person, in a continued way. The *Second* and *Third* by way of Dialogue. He question'd *Xenophanes* the *Colophonean* about every thing, who answers to all. In the *Second*, he treats of the more ancient; in the *Third*, of the later Philosophers, whence some entitle it the *Epilogue*. The *first* Book contains the same things, only deliver'd in another way, the Poem having but one Person. It begins thus:

Now busy Sophists all, come follow me.

CHAP. III.

Succession of the School.

ALthough, as Disciples of *Timon*, are mentioned by *Laertius*, *Xanthus* his Son, and *Dioscorides*; and, by *Suidas*, *Pyrrho* a *Phliasian*, Son of *Timarchus*; yet [z] *Monodotus* affirms, "That *Timon* had "no Successor, but that the Institution was intermitted, until *Ptolomy* a *Cyrenæan* renew'd it; "whose Auditors (according to *Hippobotus* and *Sotion*) were *Dioscorides* a *Cyprian*, *Niolochus* a *Rhodian*, *Euphranor* a *Seleucian*, and *Praylus* of *Troas*, who was of so settled a Constancy, that being "accused of Treason, he chose rather to undergo "the Punishment unjustly, than to plead to his "Countrymen.

"*Eubulus* an *Alexandrian* heard *Euphranor*; "him, *Ptolomy*; him, *Sarpedon* and *Heraclides*; "Disciple to *Heraclides* was *Æneside mus* a *Gnossian*, "[who flourished, as *Aristocles* saith, at *Alexandria*] "he wrote eight Books of *Pyrrhonian* Discourses. "Him, *Zeuxippus* of *Polis* heard; him, *Zeuxis*, "surnamed Γωνιοπὲς; him, *Antiochus*, a *Laodicean* "of *Lycus*; him, *Menodotus* of *Nicomedia*, an *Empirical* Physician, and *Theodas* of *Laodicea*; Disciple to *Menodotus* was *Herodotus* of *Tarsis*, Son "of *Arieus*; to *Herodotus*, *Sextus Empiricus*, *whose Ten Books of Sceptick Philosophy are extant, and other excellent Treatises.* [This *Sextus* may probably be esteemed that *Sextus Cheronensis*, Nephew of *Plutarch*, whom *Marcus Aurelius* the Emperor so honoured, that he admitted him to sit in Judicature with him.] "Disciple to *Sextus* was *Saturninus* a "*Cythenæan*, who was also surnamed *Empiricus*." Hitherto *Laertius*.

"HAving spoken of the Author of the *Sceptick* "Philosophy, and its Succession, our Me"thod leads us to set forth the Doctrine itself; "which being already excellently handled by *Sextus* "*Empiricus*, I think it would be more for the Read"er's Advantage, to have it deliver'd in his "Words than in my own. The Treatise, I con"fess, may seem long; and indeed I had some "Thoughts of abridging it: But when I consider'd, "how difficult it were so to prune it as to please all "Persons, and that itself was intended but as a Sum"mary; and that if it had been my Case to have "received it from some other Hand, I should ra"ther have desir'd to have it entire, of what Length "soever, than mangled even by a skilful Artist; I "hope I shall be excused, if I so deal with the "Reader, as I should desire to have been dealt with"al myself. Neither can I suppose it will be un"pleasant to those, who have been conversant in "the more severe and knotty Disquisitions of the "Schools; for the Author is learned and acute, even "beyond the Subject he handles, and hath many "Passages of the Ancients, which are not elsewhere "to be had. But if any who have accustomed

[u] Laert. 9. 114. [z] Laert. 9. 112. [y] Laert. 9. 112. [x] Laert. 9. 109.

" themſelves only to lighter Studies ſhall think it te-
" dious, it is no great pains to turn over ſome
" Leaves, and ſee if they can find ſomething elſe
" more acceptable.

A Summary of *SCEPTICISM.*

Sexti Empirici, Pyrrhoneæ Hypotypoſes.

The FIRST BOOK.

CHAP. I.

The Three Differences of Philoſophers in general.

IT is likely that they who ſeek muſt either find, or *deny that they have or can find*, or *perſevere in the Enquiry*. Hence (it may be) ſome of thoſe who profeſs Philoſophy, declare they have found the Truth; others hold it impoſſible to be found; others ſtill enquire. They who ſuppoſe they have found it, are called *Dogmatiſts*; ſuch are the *Peripateticks*, the *Epicureans*, the *Stoicks*, and others; they who think it incomprehenſible, are *Clitomachus*, *Carneades*, and other *Academicks*; they who ſtill enquire, are the *Scepticks*. So as there ſeemeth to be three Kinds of Philoſophy, *Dogmatick*, *Academick*, *Sceptick*. The two firſt we leave to others, intending a Summary of the *Sceptick:* profeſſing before-hand, that we are not ſure any thing we ſay is abſolutely ſo as we affirm; but we ſhall plainly diſcourſe on every thing, as it appeareth to us for the preſent.

CHAP. II.

The Parts of Scepticiſm.

OF *Sceptick* Philoſophy there are two Parts, *General* and *Special*; the *General* is that, wherein we explain the Character of *Scepticiſm*; declaring, (1.) the Signification of it; (2.) the Principles; (3.) the Reaſons; (4.) the Criterie, (or Inſtrument of Judication;) (5.) the End; (6.) the Common-places of Suſpenſion; (7.) how the Sceptical Phraſes are to be underſtood; (8.) the Difference of *Scepticiſm* from thoſe Philoſophies that are moſt like it.

The *Special* is that, wherein we contradict every Part of that which is called Philoſophy. But firſt of the *General*.

CHAP. III.

The Names of Scepticiſm.

THE *Sceptick* Inſtitution is called alſo *Zetetick*, *(Inquiſitive)* from the Act of Enquiring; *Ephectick*, *(Suſpenſive)* from the Affection rais'd by Enquiry after things; *Aporetick*, *(Dubitative)* either (as ſome ſay) from doubting of, and ſeeking after all things, or from being in doubt whether to aſſent or deny; *Pyrrhonian*, in as much as *Pyrrho* deliver'd it to us more ſubſtantially and clearly than thoſe before him.

CHAP. IV.

What Scepticiſm *is.*

SCepticiſm *is a Faculty oppoſing* Phænomena's (Appearances) *and* Intelligibles *all manner of ways; whereby we proceed through the Æquivalence of contrary Things and Speeches, firſt to Suſpenſion, then to Indiſturbance.*

We call it a *Faculty*, from the Power thereof; by *Phænomena's* we underſtand Senſibles, which we oppoſe to Intelligibles. Theſe Words, *all manner of ways*, may be referred to Faculty, taking the word Faculty (or Power) ſimply. [a] It may likewiſe be applied to the Oppoſition betwixt *Phænomena's* and *Intelligibles*, ſince we oppoſe them ſeveral ways; *Phænomena's* to *Phænomena's*, or *Intelligibles* to *Intelligibles*, or *One* to the Other. Wherefore, to include all Oppoſitions, we ſay, *all manner of ways*; or, all manner of ways, of *Phænomena's* and *Intelligibles*; not enquiring how *Phænomena's* ſeem, or how *Intelligibles* are underſtood, but taking them ſimply.

By

[a] Καὶ τὸ ἀντιθετικῇ, &c. M. S. καὶ τῶν, read τῷ.

By *contrary Speeches*, we mean not only Affirmation and Negation, but ſimply thoſe which are repugnant. *Æquivalence* we call an Equality as to Belief or Unbelief; ſo as neither of the repugnant Speeches is preferred as more credible than the other. *Suſpenſion* is a Settlement of the Intellect, whereby we neither affirm nor deny any thing. *Indiſturbance* is a Compoſure and Tranquility of Mind: how Indiſturbance is induced by Suſpenſion, we ſhall diſcourſe when we come to ſpeak of the End.

A *Pyrrhonian* Philoſopher is wholly addicted to the *Sceptick* Inſtitution; for he is ſuch an one as participates of this Faculty.

CHAP. V.

The Principles of Scepticiſm.

THE final Cauſe (*End* or *Aim*) of *Scepticiſm* we hold to be, Hope of *Indiſturbance:* for Man's Mind being troubled at the Unſettledneſs in things, and doubting what to aſſent unto, enquireth what is true and what falſe, that by Determination thereof it may be quiet. But the chief Ground of *Scepticiſm* is, *that to every Reaſon there is an oppoſite Reaſon equivalent*, which makes us forbear to dogmatize.

CHAP. VI.

Whether the Sceptick *dogmatizeth, and hath a Sect, and treats of Phyſick.*

WE ſay, *The Sceptick doth not dogmatize:* not underſtanding *Dogma* as ſome do in the general Acceptation, an *Aſſent to any thing* (for the *Sceptick* aſſenteth to thoſe Affections [or Impreſſions] which are neceſſarily induced by Phantaſy, as (being hot or cold) he will not ſay, *I think I am not heated or cool'd*; but we ſay, he doth not dogmatize in their Senſe, who take *Dogma* for an *Aſſent to any of thoſe non-manifeſt things which are enquired into by Sciences.* For a *Pyrrhonian* Philoſopher aſſents to nothing that is not manifeſt; neither doth he dogmatize when he pronounceth the *Sceptick* Phraſes concerning things not manifeſt, as, *Nothing rather*, or, *I aſſert nothing*, or any of the reſt, of which hereafter. For he who dogmatizeth, aſſerteth the thing, which he is ſaid to dogmatize, to be ſuch; but a *Sceptick* uſeth theſe Expreſſions not as poſitive, for he conceiveth that this Propoſition, *All things are falſe*, (amongſt the reſt) declareth itſelf alſo to be falſe; in like manner this, *Nothing is true*; ſo this, *Nothing rather* (amongſt others) implies itſelf is nothing rather to be credited; ſo as (together with the reſt) it circumſcribeth itſelf. The ſame we hold concerning the reſt of the *Sceptick* Phraſes. Now if he who dogmatizeth, aſſerteth that which he dogmatizeth to be ſuch; but the *Sceptick* delivers his Expreſſions in ſuch manner as they may be circumſcribed by themſelves, he cannot be ſaid to dogmatize. Moreover, in theſe Expreſſions he ſpeaketh that which appeareth ſo to him, and declareth how he is affected, without engaging his Opinion (or Judgment) but aſcertaining nothing concerning external Objects.

The ſame Courſe we obſerve, being demanded *Whether the* Sceptick *hath a Sect:* If a Man underſtand *Sect* to be an Inclination to many Dogma's or Tenets, which have a mutual Conſequence, and likewiſe *Phænomena's*, and take *Dogma* to be an Aſſent to ſomething not manifeſt, we ſay he hath not a *Sect*. But taking *Sect* to be an Inſtitution, which, according to the *Phænomenon*, adhereth to ſome kind of Reaſon, that Reaſon ſhewing how to live rightly (meaning rightly, not only according to Virtue, but more ſimply, and tending to Suſpenſion of Aſſent) we ſay, he hath a *Sect*; for we follow ſome certain Reaſon according to the *Phænomenon*, which ſheweth how to live according to the Rites, Laws, and Inſtitutes of our Country, and our own Affections.

The like we ſay to thoſe who enquire, *Whether the* Sceptick *treats of Phyſick*; as to Aſſention grounded on a firm Belief of any phyſical Dogm, we have nothing to do with Phyſick: But, as to equal Oppoſition of all Speeches, even in Phyſick, we obtain Indiſturbance; and thus alſo we deliver the *Logick* and *Ethick* Parts of that which is called Philoſophy.

CHAP. VII.

Whether the Scepticks *take away* Phænomena's.

THEY who ſay, *the Scepticks take away* Phœnomena's, ſeem not to underſtand what we have ſaid; for we ſubvert not thoſe Patheticks in Phantaſy, which force us againſt our Wills to an Aſſent, (as we ſaid before.) Such are *Phænomena's*: For, when we enquire whether the Subject be ſuch as it appears, we grant that it appears; but we enquire (not of the *Phænomenon*, but) of that which is ſaid concerning the *Phænomenon*. For inſtance, Honey ſeemeth to us to be ſweet; this we grant, for we find it ſuch to our Senſe; but whether ſweet come within the Reach of Reaſon, we doubt: This is not the *Phænomenon*, but that which is ſaid concerning the *Phænomenon*. Moreover, when we raiſe Queſtions concerning the *Phænomenon*, we endeavour not to ſubvert the *Phænomena's* (theſe we preſuppoſe) but only to diſcover the Temerity of the Dogmatiſts. For if Reaſon be ſo fallacious, that it almoſt takes away *Phænomena's* from our Eyes, how can we but miſtruſt it in Things not manifeſt, rather than precipitately follow it?

CHAP. VIII.

The Criterie of Scepticiſm.

THAT we acquieſce in *Phænomena's*, is manifeſt from what we ſay concerning the Criterie of the *Sceptick* Inſtitution. *Criterie* is underſtood two

ways; *One is*, that whereby we believe a Thing to be, or not be, (of this hereafter, when we come to refel the Opinions of others concerning it;) the *other* is of Action, whereby we judge in the Courſe of Life what Things are to be done, what not; this laſt is that of which we now ſpeak. We ſay the Criterie of *Scepticiſm* is the *Phænomenon*; ſo call we Phantaſy in Power; for when it proceeds to Perſuaſion and coactive Paſſion, it is not queſtionable. As to the Appearance, whether the Subject be ſuch or ſuch, perhaps none doubteth; but whether it be ſuch as it appeareth, is queſtioned. Thus acquieſcing in *Phænomena*'s, we live (without engaging Opinions or Judgments) according to the ordinary Courſe of Life, in regard we cannot be free from acting [as we may from aſſenting.]

This Courſe of Life ſeems to be four-fold; converſant partly in *natural Inſtruction*, partly in the *Impulſion of Paſſions*, partly in *giving Laws and Cuſtoms*, partly in *teaching Arts*. In *natural Inſtruction*, by which we are naturally endued with Senſe and Intellect; in *Impulſion of Paſſions*, as Hunger leads us to Meat, Thirſt to Drink; *in giving Laws and Cuſtoms*, by which we learn that to live virtuouſly is good, to live viciouſly, ill; in *teaching Arts*, by which we are not idle in thoſe Arts which we receive. All this we ſay, without engaging our Opinion (or Judgment.)

CHAP. IX.

The End of Scepticiſm.

IT follows that we treat of the End of *Scepticiſm*. The End is, *That for which all things are acted or contemplated, but itſelf is not for any other*; or *the laſt of things appetible*. We ſay that the End of the *Sceptick* is ἀταραξία, *Indiſturbance*, in whatſoever belongs to Opinion; and μετριοπάθεια, *Moderation*, in whatſoever belongs to Compulſion. For beginning to ſtudy Philoſophy, that he may diſcern and comprehend which Phantaſies are true, which falſe, and by that means not to be diſquieted, he lights upon an equivalent Contrariety, of which not being able to judge, he ſuſpends; and whilſt he is accidentally in this Suſpence, there follows it an Indiſturbance as to things opinionative: For he who is of Opinion there is ſomething good or bad in its own Nature, is continually diſturbed; when thoſe Things which ſeem to him good are not preſent, he imagineth himſelf a tormented with Things ill in their own Nature, and purſueth that he conceives to be good; which having obtained, he falleth into more Troubles. For being unreaſonably and immoderately tranſported, and fearing a Change, he uſeth all Endeavour that he may not loſe thoſe Things which he conceives good. Whereas he who defines nothing concerning things naturally good or bad, neither flyeth nor purſueth any thing eagerly, ſo that he remains undiſturbed.

Thus it happens to the *Sceptick*, as to *Apelles* the Painter, who having drawn a Horſe, and trying to paint his Foam, it ſucceeded ſo ill, that in deſpair he threw the Spunge, wherewith he uſed to blot out Colours, at the Picture, which lighting upon the Place, made an exact Repreſentation of Foam. In like manner, the *Scepticks* hoped to obtain Indiſturbance by judging of the Unſettledneſs in *Phænomena*'s and Intelligibles; which not being able to do, they ſuſpended, and whilſt they were in ſuſpence, as it were accidentally, Indiſturbance overtook them, as a Shadow follows the Body.

Yet we conceive not the *Sceptick* to be abſolutely free from Trouble; we grant he is troubled by external Impulſions, he ſuffers Cold, Thirſt, and the like. But in theſe, the ordinary ſort of Men are doubly affected, firſt, with the Paſſions themſelves; and again, no leſs, that theſe Things are naturally ill; whereas the *Sceptick*, taking away the Opinion that they are naturally ill, undergoes them more moderately. Hence we ſay, that the *Sceptick*'s End is, in Opinionatives, Indiſturbance; in Impulſives, Moderation; to which ſome eminent *Scepticks* add *Suſpenſion in Diſquiſitives*.

CHAP. X.

The general Ways (or Places) of Scepticiſm.

INdiſturbance following Suſpenſion, it is requiſite that we declare how we attain Suſpenſion.

It ariſeth, (to ſpeak generally) from the oppoſition of things; we oppoſe either *Phænomena's* to *Phænomena's*, or *Intelligibles*, to *Intelligibles*; or the former to the latter. *Phænomena's* to *Phænomena's*, as when we ſay, the ſame Tower ſeemeth afar off, Round, Near, Square: *Intelligibles* to *Intelligibles*, as when to him, who from the order of the Celeſtial Bodies, argues, there is a Providence, we oppoſe, that good Men are often Unfortunate; bad Men, Fortunate; and thence infer, there is no Providence. *Intelligibles* to *Phænomena's*, as *Anaxagoras*, to *Snow is White*, oppoſed that *Water is Snow concrete*; but Water is Black, therefore Snow is Black.

Again, we ſometimes oppoſe things *Preſent* to the *Preſent*, as thoſe we laſt inſtanced; ſometimes the *Preſent*, to the *Paſt*, or the *Future*, as when an Argument is propoſed, which we are not able to reſolve, we ſay; "As before the Author of the Sect, "to which you addict yourſelf, was born, the Rea- "ſon thereof did not ſeem found, and yet the Thing "was the ſame in Nature; ſo it is likely, that a "Reaſon (or Argument) contrary to this which you "have

[a] Perhaps προλαβεῖσθαι.

" have alledged, may be ſubſiſtent in Nature, and " not yet appear to us; wherefore we ought not to " aſſent to any Argument, how convincing ſoever " it ſeems."

To ſhew theſe Oppoſitions more exactly, I will lay down the Common-Places by which Suſpenſion is collected; not aſſerting any thing of their Number or Power; for it is poſſible, they may be of no Force, or more in Number than we reckon.

CHAP. XI.

The ten Common-Places of Suſpenſion.

THE ancient *Scepticks* have deliver'd ten Moods, whence Suſpenſion ſeems to be collected, which they call alſo *Reaſons* and [b] *Places*. They are theſe; the firſt, from the *Variety of living Creatures*; the ſecond, *from the Difference of Men*; the third, from the *Difference of the Organs of Senſe*; the fourth, from *Circumſtances*; the fifth, from *Poſitions, and Diſtances, and Places*; the ſixth, from *Commiſſions*; the ſeventh, from the *Quantities and Conſtitutions of Subjects*; the eighth, from *Relations*; the ninth, from *rare Accidents*; the tenth, from *Inſtitutions, Cuſtoms, Laws, fabulous Perſuaſions, and dogmatical Opinions*.

This is the Order which we lay down. But there are three Moods which comprehend the reſt; firſt, from the Thing *judging*; ſecondly, from the Thing *judged*; thirdly, from *both*. Under that of the Thing judging, are comprehended the firſt *four*; the Thing judging is either an Animal, or a Man, or Senſe, or in ſome Circumſtance; under the Thing judged, the *ſeventh* and the *tenth*; under that which conſiſts of both, the *fifth*, *the ſixth*, *the eighth*, and the *ninth*. Again, theſe three are comprehended in the Mood of *Relations*; ſo as the moſt *general* is, that of Relations; the *ſpecial*, the other three, under which are comprehended the ten. Thus much we probably hold as to their Number; now as concerning their Power.

CHAP. XII.

The firſt Common-place.

THE firſt Common-place we hold to be that whereby, *through the Difference of living Creatures*, Phantaſies not the ſame are derived from them. This we collect both from the Difference of their *Generations*, and from the Difference of the *Conſtitutions* of their Bodies. Of their *Generations*, becauſe of living Creatures, ſome have their Being *without Coition*; others by *Coition*. Of thoſe which are produced *without Coition*, ſome come of Fire, as the Crickets in Chimnies; ſome of *corrupted Water*, as Gnats; ſome of *ſowre Wine*, as Snipes; ſome of *Earth*, whereof ſome of *Slime*, as Frogs; ſome of *Dirt*, as Worms; ſome of *Aſhes*, as Beetles; ſome of *Plants*, as Caterpillars; ſome of *Fruits*, as Maggots; ſome of *putrify'd Animals*; as of *Bulls*, Bees; and of *Horſes*, Waſps.

Of thoſe which are produced by *Coition*, ſome are begotten by Creatures of the *ſame Species*, ſuch are the greateſt part; others by Creatures of *different Species*, as Mules. Again, of living Creatures, ſome are brought forth *alive*, as Man; others come from *Eggs*, as Birds; ſome from a Lump of *Fleſh*, as Bears. It is therefore probable, that the Diſſimilitudes and Differences of theſe Generations effect great Antipathies, receiving thereby contrary Temperament, Diſcordance, and Repugnance.

Moreover the *Difference of ſeveral Parts* of the Body (eſpecially of thoſe which Nature made for Judgment and Senſe) may cauſe a great Repugnance of Phantaſies, according to the Diverſity of living Creatures. Thoſe Things which to us ſeem white, they who have the *Yellow Jaundice* affirm to be Yellow, and they who have a *Hyphoſphagme* in their Eyes, Red. As therefore, of living Creatures, ſome have Eyes Blood-red, others Whitiſh, others of other Colours, it is likely they perceive Colours after different manners. Even to us, if we gaze a while upon the Sun, and immediately after look upon a Book, the Letters will ſeem of Gold, and as if they moved round.

Foraſmuch alſo, as ſome living Creatures have naturally a certain *Brightneſs* in their Eyes, and emit from them a quick rare Light, ſo as they can ſee in the Night, we think it probable, that external Objects incur not into *their* Senſe, like what they ſeem to *ours*.

Again, Jugglers, by anointing Candles with a Liquor made of the Ruſt of Braſs, or with the Blood of the Fiſh *Sepia*, cauſe the Standers-by to ſeem either *of the Colour of Braſs*, *or Black*, by that little Inſpertion of Unguent; much more likely [c] is it, that the Humours, mixed in the Eyes of living Creatures, being different, they have different Phantaſies, from the ſame Object.

Again, if we pinch the Eye, the Forms and Figures of viſible Things ſeem *long* and *narrow*; it is therefore likely, that all living Creatures which have Eye-balls oblique and narrow (as Goats, Cats, and the like) have a peculiar Phantaſy of Objects, different from thoſe which have round Balls.

Looking-glaſſes, according to their ſeveral Forms, ſometimes repreſent the Object *leſs*, as when they are concave; ſometimes *oblong and narrow*, as the convex; ſome there are that repreſent the Head of the Beholder *downward*, and his Feet *upward*. As therefore

[b] Reading perhaps τόπους, for ſo *Laert.* κατὰ δέκα τόπους.

[c] M. S. ἐυλογίστερον.

therefore of the Organs of Sight, ſome are exuberant, ſome hollow, ſome plain, it is likely that the Phantaſies are different; and that Dogs, Fiſhes, Lions, Men, Lobſters, behold not Things as great, or in the ſame Form, as they are in themſelves, but according to the various Impreſſions which the Sight ſuffereth from the Object.

It is the ſame in other Senſes; for how can we ſay, That Creatures covered with Shells, with Fleſh, with Prickles, with Feathers, with Scales, are alike affected as to the Touch? Or, that they which have the Hole of their Ear narrow, and they which have it wide; thoſe which have Ears full of Hair, and thoſe which have ſmooth Ears, receive Sound alike? Seeing that we ourſelves, [d] preſſing the Ear, hear it different from that which it ſeems otherwiſe.

Moreover, the *Smelling* may differ according to the Difference of living Creatures; for, ſince we ourſelves are affected one way, when we have caught cold, and are oppreſs'd with Flegm; another way, when the Parts of, and near the Head, abound with Blood, (diſliking thoſe Scents which to others ſeem ſweet, and thinking ourſelves, as it were, hurt by them:) And ſince of living Creatures, ſome are naturally flegmatick, others ſanguine; ſome cholerick, others melancholick, it is poſſible, that from thence, Scents ſeem different to them.

The like as to the *Taſte*; ſome have a Tongue rough and dry, others very moiſt, (even we ourſelves having our Tongues drier than ordinary in Fevers, think, that ſuch Things as are given us taſte earthy, unſavoury, or bitter.) This we ſuffer thro' the different Prevalence of Savours in us. Since therefore in living Creatures, the Organs of Taſte are different, and abound with different Humours; hence they may in Taſte receive different Phantaſies from the ſame Objects.

For, as Meat digeſted turns here into Veins, there into Arteries; here into Bone, there into Sinews, and ſo of the reſt; manifeſting a different Power, according to the Difference of the Parts which receive it. And as Water, one and the ſame ſpecifically, being infuſed into Trees, here turns into Leaves, there into Boughs; here into Fruit, Figs, Pomegranats, and the reſt. And as one and the ſame Blaſt of a Muſician in a Pipe, here is Flat, there Sharp; and the Touch of the Hand upon the Lute, makes ſometimes a high, ſometimes a low Sound; ſo is it likely, that external Objects are differently apprehended, according to the different Conſtitutions of the living Creatures, to which the Phantaſies occur.

This we learn more evidently from the Appetite and Averſion of living Creatures. Unguents ſeem ſweet to Men, but to Beetles and Bees are intolerable: Oil is wholeſome to Men, but kill Waſps and Bees, if ſprinkled upon them: Sea-water, to Men is unpleaſant of Taſte and unwholſome; to Fiſhes ſweet and potable. Swine delight more to wallow in filthy Mire, than in pure Water.

Moreover, of living Creatures, ſome eat Herbs, ſome Boughs, ſome Sperm, ſome Fleſh, ſome Milk, ſome love putrified Meat, ſome freſh; ſome raw, ſome roaſted. Generally, What is pleaſant to ſome, is to others unpleaſant, diſtaſteful, and poiſonous; as Hemlock fattens Quails, Henbane Swine; Swine delight alſo to eat Salamanders, as Stags do Serpents, and Swallows Cantharides. Piſmires and Snipes are unpleaſant and unwholſome for Men to take down; but the Bear, if he fall ſick, recovers his Strength by feeding on them. The Viper, if it touch a Bough of a Beach Tree, is taken with a Giddineſs; ſo the Bat, if it touch the Leaf of a Plane-Tree: The Elephant flies from the Ram; the Lion from the Cock; Whales, from the crackling of bruiſed Beans; the Tiger from the Sound of a Drum. We might inſtance many more, but not inſiſt too long hereupon; if the ſame Things are to ſome pleaſant, to others diſtaſteful; but pleaſant and diſtaſteful conſiſt in Phantaſies; then different Phantaſies are arrived to ſeveral living Creatures from the ſame Object. Now if the ſame Things ſeem different to ſeveral Creatures, what the Object appears to *us*, we can ſay, but as to what it is in its *own* Nature, we will ſuſpend; for we are not competent Judges betwixt our own, and other Creatures Phantaſies, ourſelves being Parties in the Difference, and conſequently requiring a Judge, rather than being in a Capacity of judging.

Again, neither without Demonſtration can we prefer our own Phantaſies before thoſe of irrational Creatures, nor with Demonſtration; for to prove that there is no Demonſtration, perhaps the Argument or Demonſtration will either be apparent to us, or not apparent; if not apparent, we ſhall not entertain it with Belief; but if apparent, ſeeing the Queſtion is concerning *(Phænomena's)* Things apparent to living Creatures, and the Demonſtration ſeems apparent to us, who are in the Number of living Creatures, the Demonſtration itſelf will be queſtioned, (foraſmuch as it is apparent) whether it be true. But it is abſurd, to endeavour to prove a thing in queſtion, by a thing which is likewiſe in queſtion, for ſo the ſame thing ſhall be credible and incredible; credible, as uſed in Demonſtration; incredible, as requiring to be demonſtrated. We ſhall not therefore find a Demonſtration, whereby to prefer our own Phantaſies before thoſe of other living Creatures, called irrational. Now if Phantaſies be different, according to the Variety of living Creatures, and it be impoſſible to judge of them, it is neceſſary we ſuſpend as to the external Objects.

CHAP.

[d] Perhaps ἀκούεται.

CHAP. XIII.

Whether the Creatures, commonly termed Irrational, have Reaſon.

WE will (over and above) compare the Creatures termed irrational, with Men, as to their Phantaſy, that we may, after the more ſerious Reaſons, ſport with the ſelf-conceited Opinion of the *Dogmatiſts*. Moſt of our Party conſer irrational Creatures in general, ſimply with Men; but becauſe the *Dogmatiſts* cavil hereat, we the better to deride them, will inſiſt only upon one Creature, the *Dog*, than which none ſeemeth more contemptible. By this means we ſhall know, that the Creatures of which we now diſcourſe, are nothing inferior to us, as to credit of *Phænomena*'s.

Now that this Creature excelleth us in Senſe, is acknowledged by the *Dogmatiſts*; it is of a much quicker Scent, whereby it purſueth Beaſts unſeen; it diſcovers them ſooner by the Eye than we, and is likewiſe more acute of hearing.

Come we therefore to Diſcourſe, which is twofold, *Internal* and *Enunciative*. Let us firſt examine the *Internal*; This, according to (our greateſt Adverſaries amongſt the Dogmatiſts) the *Stoicks*, ſeemeth to be converſant in theſe Things; in Election of Things convenient, and Evitation of their Contraries; in Knowledge of the Arts conducing hereto; in Comprehenſion of the Virtues belonging to their Nature concerning Paſſions. Now the Dog, in whom we inſtance, chuſeth Things convenient, and flieth the hurtful; he purſueth his Food, and runneth away from the Whip; he hath likewiſe the Art of acquiring Things proper for him. Neither is he deſtitute of Virtue; Juſtice being diſtributive to every one according to their Merit; the Dog, who fawneth upon his Friends and Benefactors, and revengeth himſelf upon his Enemies, by whom he is injur'd, is not void of Juſtice. And if he hath this Virtue, all the Virtues being linked together, he hath all the reſt, which the wiſeſt allow not the ordinary ſort of Men. We ſee he is valiant in revenging wrong; prudent, by the Teſtimony of *Homer*, who makes *Ulyſſes*, not diſcover'd by any of his Friends, owned by *Argus* the Dog; not deceived, either by the Alteration in the Body of the Man, ſwerving from his own comprehenſive Phantaſy, (which is manifeſt) he hath in a degree above Man. But, according to *Chryſippus*, (who oppugns irrational Creatures with moſt eagerneſs) he partakes of their ſo much cried up *Dialectick*; for he ſaith, When the Dog cometh into a Way divided into three, he makes choice of the third by ſeveral [e] Indemonſtrables; for having ſcented the two Ways by which the Beaſt did not paſs, he runs ſtrait upon the third, without ſcenting it; which is as much (ſaith the old Philoſopher) as to diſcourſe thus; *The Beaſt paſſed either this Way, or this Way, or this Way; but neither this Way, nor this Way, therefore this Way.*

Moreover, he apprehends and cures his own Sickneſs: If a Splinter get into his Foot, he preſently ſtrives to get it out, by rubbing his Foot againſt the Ground, and with his Teeth. If he be wounded, (Wounds that are kept clean being eaſily cur'd, the putrid not eaſily) he continually licks the Hurt. He likewiſe ſtrictly obſerves the Rule of *Hippocrates*; the Cure of the Foot conſiſting in Reſt; he, if hurt in that Part, holds it up, and ſtirs it as little as he can. If he be troubled with ill Humours, he eats Graſs; by which means, vomiting up that which diſagreed with him, he is cured. Now if this Creature can chuſe what is convenient for him, and fly what is inconvenient; if he hath the Art of acquiring Things proper to him, and can apprehend and cure his own Sickneſs, and is not void of Virtue, in all which conſiſts the Perfection of intrinſical Diſcourſe, the Dog muſt be perfect, as to that. For which Reaſon, as I conceive, [f] ſome Philoſophers choſe to be called by Name of that Creature.

As to *Enunciative* Diſcourſe, it is not neceſſary to examine it; for there are [g] ſome Dogmatiſts who condemn it, as contrary to Virtue; whence they kept Silence all the Time of their Inſtitution. Beſides, though we ſhould ſuppoſe a Man to be dumb, yet none will ſay, he is void of Diſcourſe (irrational;) and on the other ſide, we ſee many living Creatures which have the Speech of Man, as Pyes, and the like. To omit which, though we underſtand not the Voices of Creatures (termed) irrational, it is nevertheleſs likely they diſcourſe among themſelves. We underſtand not the Language of Foreigners, it ſeems a continued Sound without Variety. But we hear that the Voice of the Dog is different; of one kind, when he aſſaults; of another, when he howls; of another, when he is beaten; of another, when he fawns. In a word, he who examines it curiouſly, will find a great Variety of Voice, not only in this Creature, but in others, according to the Diverſity of Accidents. So that the Creatures, called Irrational, may juſtly be ſaid to participate of Enunciative Diſcourſe; and if they come not ſhort of Men in Acuteneſs of Senſe, nor in Intrinſical Diſcourſe, nor in Enunciative, (tho' that be not neceſſary) certainly they are no leſs creditable, as to Phantaſy, than we.

It is poſſible, perhaps, to ſhew the ſame Diſcourſe in all other Creatures; as, who will deny Birds to have a Sagacity, and Enunciative Diſcourſe, ſeeing they know not only Things preſent, but the future, which they declare to ſuch as are able to comprehend

[e] What *Indemonſtrables* are, ſee afterwards, l. 2. c. 13. [f] The Cynick. [g] Pythag.

hend it, (amongſt many other ways) by [h] Voice. But this Compariſon is added, as I ſaid before, more than neceſſary, without which, we have ſufficiently, I conceive, declared, That our own Phantaſies are not to be preferred before the Phantaſies of irrational Creatures. Now if irrational Creatures are no leſs creditable than we, in Dijudication of Phantaſies, and Phantaſies are different, according to the Variety of the Creatures; what every Object *appeareth* to me, I am able to ſay; but what it *is* in itſelf (for the Reaſons alledged) I ſuſpend.

CHAP. XIV.

The ſecond Common-place.

THE ſecond Common-place of Suſpenſion we hold to be, *from the Diverſity of Men*; for, though we ſhould grant it were more Reaſonable to ſtand to the Judgment of Men, than of any other living Creature; yet ſhall we find ſo much difference amongſt ourſelves, as may well induce Suſpenſion. Man, they ſay, conſiſts of two Parts, *Soul* and *Body*; in both theſe we differ one from another: in *Body*, by *Form* and *Conſtitution*; The Body of a *Scythian* differs in Form from the Body of an *Indian*. This difference ariſeth, as we ſaid, from the different prevalence of Humours; and from the different prevalence of Humours ariſe Phantaſies, as we ſaid upon the firſt ground; whence in Election and Evitation of external things, there is great Difference among them. *Indians* delight in ſome things, we in others; but to delight in ſeveral things, argueth a Reception of different Phantaſies from the ſame Objects.

We differ alſo in *Conſtitution*; there are ſome who can digeſt Beef eaſier than Anchovies; ſome, upon drinking of *Lesbian*-Wine, are troubled with Choler. It is reported of an old *Athenian* Woman, That ſhe drank four Drams of Hemlock without any hurt; and *Demophon*, *Alexander*'s Sewer, whilſt he was in the Sunſhine, or in a Bath, was cold; in the Shade, was hot. *Athenagoras*, the *Argive*, felt no Pain at the biting of Scorpions or Phalangies. The People called [i] *Pſylli* never take hurt by the biting of Serpents or Aſps. [k] The *Tintiritæ* of *Ægypt* take no hurt by Crocodiles. The *Æthiopians*, that live oppoſite to *Meroe*, along the River *Hydaſpes*, eat Scorpions, Snakes, and the like, without danger. *Rufinus* of *Chalcis* when he drunk *Hellebore* never vomited, nor was purged any way by it, but digeſted it as ordinary Drink. *Chriſermus*, the *Herophillian*, if at any time he eat Pepper, was taken with *the Paſſion of the Heart*, even to hazard of his Life. In *Soterius* the Chyrurgion, the Smell of the Fiſh *Silurus* excited Choler. *Andron* the *Argive* was ſo little ſubject to Thirſt, that when he travelled through the Deſarts of *Lybia* he did not need Drink. *Tiberius Cæſar* ſaw in the dark. *Ariſtotle* mentions a [l] *Thaſian*, who thought the Apparition of a Man went always before him. Now there being ſo great Diverſity in the *Bodies* of Men, (it is ſufficient that we inſtance theſe few, out of the multitude acknowledged by the *Dogmatiſts*) it is probable, that Men differ from one another in *Soul* alſo; for the Body is a kind of Image of the Soul, as the Phyſiognomy Science ſheweth. But the greateſt Evidence of the infinite Difference of Men, as to Intellect, is the Diſcordance amongſt them in Election and Evitation; rightly expreſſed by the Poets; as *Pindar*,

Some joy in ſwift-heel'd Courſers; ſome,
In living wantonly at home;
And others on the Ocean roam.

And the Poet.

In ſeveral Actions, ſeveral Men delight.

The *Tragedians* are full of this; as

If all Men what is good did ſee
Alike, they would not diſagree.

And again.

Alas! that ſome Men take Delight
In things which grieve another's ſight.

Since thererefore Appetition and Averſion conſiſts in Pleaſure and Hatred, but Pleaſure and Hatred conſiſts in Phantaſy; and ſince the ſame things are purſued by ſome, ſhunned by others; we may infer this Conſequence, That they are not alike affected by the ſame things, otherwiſe they would all alike deſire to ſhun them. Now if theſe things affect differently, according to the diverſity of Men, there may juſtly be induced Suſpenſion; ſince what every Subject appeareth, every one perhaps according to his particular Apprehenſion may expreſs; but what it is in its own Nature, we cannot aſſert. For we muſt either give Credit to all Men, or to ſome few; if to All, we undertake Impoſſibilities, and admit Repugnancies; if to ſome Few, let them tell us, which thoſe Few are. The *Platoniſts* will ſay, we muſt aſſent to *Plato*; the *Epicureans*, to *Epicurus*; and by their confuſed Diſagreement, reduce us again to Suſpenſion. If any Man alledge, we ought to aſſent to the greater Number; he argues childiſhly, ſince none can overrun all Men, and examine what every one thinks beſt; and it is poſſible that in Countries unknown to

[h] Augur. [i] Procop. Hiſt. Mir. 19. [k] The Text is defective; but *Franciſcus Mirandula* renders it thus, *Qui Tyntiritæ dicuntur, incolæ, Ægypti, inter Crocodilos impunè verſantur.* De vanit. Gen. *Lib.* 2. *cap.* 23. [l] Antipheron Oretanus.

to us, what things are rare to us, are there frequent; and what happens frequently to us happens there very ſeldom. As for Inſtance, in ſuch a Country there are many who receive no harm by the Biting of Phalangies, few who receive harm thereby. And ſo in all other Conſtitutions: wherefore it is alſo neceſſary to induce Suſpenſion, by reaſon of the Diverſity of Men.

CHAP. XV.

The third Common-place.

FOraſmuch as *Dogmatiſts* are ſo ſelf-conceited as to affirm, That their Judgment in things ought to be preferred before all others; though we know how abſurd this Poſtulation is, (for they are Parties in the Controverſy, and having firſt prejudged themſelves, if then they judge *Phænomena's*, even before they begin to judge, they ſeize on the *Phænomena's* as already judged:) yet that, in our Diſpute, fixing the Diſcourſe upon one Man (that wiſe Man they dream of) we may arrive at Suſpenſion, let us examine the third Common-place.

This we derive *from the Difference of the Senſes*. That the Senſes differ from one another is manifeſt. *Pictures* ſeem to the Eye riſing and falling, but not ſuch to the Touch. Many eſteem *Honey* pleaſant to the Tongue, unpleaſant to the Eye; whence it is impoſſible to ſay, whether it is ſimply pleaſant, or unpleaſant. The like of *Unguents*, they pleaſe the Smell, diſpleaſe the Taſte. *Euphorbium* is hurtful to the Eyes, but not to any other Part of the Body: therefore, whether it be ſimply hurtful to the Body, we cannot ſay. *Rain-water* is good for the Eyes, but frets the Arteries and Lungs; as Oil doth alſo, though it ſmooths the Skin. The *Sea-Tortoiſe*, applied to the extreme Parts of the Body, cauſeth Numbneſs, but laid to any other part makes no alteration. Thus, what each of theſe things is in its own Nature, we cannot affirm; but how it appears to others, we may. We might inſtance more; but, not to inſiſt longer hereon than our Deſign permits, let us ſay, Every ſenſible *Phænomenon* ſeemeth to incur a ſeveral way into our Senſes, as an Apple ſmooth, fragrant, ſweet, yellow. It is therefore unmaniſeſt, whether it really hath theſe Qualities, or whether it hath but one Quality, which ſeemeth different, according to the Diverſity of the Senſes; or whether it hath many more Qualities, ſome of which incur not to our Senſes. For, that it hath but one Quality, may be argued from what was ſaid before, concerning the Nutriment of living Creatures, the Growth of Trees by Rain, the unequal Sound of the Breath in Pipes, and other Inſtruments. It is therefore poſſible, the Apple may have but one Quality, and yet be looked upon as different, by reaſon of the Difference of the Organs of Senſe, by which it is apprehended. Again, That it is poſſible the Apple may have more Qualities than appear to us, we argue thus: Let us ſuppoſe a Man, endued from his Birth with Touch, Smell, and Taſte; but wanting Sight and Hearing, he will think there is nothing Viſible, nothing Audible: So it may be, that we having Five Senſes, of all the Qualities of an Apple, perceive only thoſe, whereof ourſelves have the apprehenſive Faculty; yet in the mean time, it may have other Qualities, incident to other Organs of Senſe, which we have not. Therefore neither can we perceive what their ſenſible Operations are.

But Nature, may ſome object, hath equally commenſurated the Senſes according to the Senſibles. What Nature; there being ſo confuſed a Diſagreement among the *Dogmatiſts* concerning her Eſſence? For if any Man judge what Nature is, if he be one of the Unlearned, he is, according to them, not worthy Credit; if a Philoſopher, he is intereſted in the Difference, being one of the Parties to be judged, not the Judge. Now if it be nothing abſurd to ſay, The Apple hath all the Qualities we ſeem to apprehend, and more than theſe; or, on the contrary, that it hath not even thoſe which incur to our Senſes, it will be unmaniſeſt to us how the Apple is qualited. The ſame of other Senſibles. And if the Senſes comprehend not external Objects, neither can the Intellect comprehend them. Thus Suſpenſion may be induced from external Objects.

CHAP. XVI.

The fourth Common-place.

THAT as well over-running in our Diſcourſe every Senſe, as receding from Senſe, and receding from Senſe, we may arrive at Suſpenſion, we come to the fourth Ground.

This is ſaid to be *from Circumſtances*. By περιστάσεις (Circumſtances) we underſtand Diſpoſitions; we ſay it conſiſts in being according *to Nature* (ſound;) or *contrary to Nature* (unſound;) in *Waking* or *Sleeping*, in Difference of *Age*, in *Motion* or *Reſt*, in *Hate* or *Love*, in *Want* or *Satiety*, in *Drunkenneſs* or *Thirſt*, in *Prediſpoſitions*, in *Courage* or *Fear*, in *Joying* or *Grieving*. According as we are ſound or unſound, things occur variouſly to us; Frantick, and Divinely-inſpired Perſons think they hear Spirits, we not; and thoſe kind of Perſons often ſay, they ſmell Perfumes of Storax or Frankincenſe, when we ſmell none. Again, the ſame Water poured upon any Part that is inflamed, ſeems ſcalding, to us lukewarm: The ſame Garment to thoſe that have a Hypoſphagm in their Eyes, ſeems bloody, to me not: The ſame Honey to me is ſweet, to thoſe that are troubled with the over-flowing of the Gall, bitter.

If any ſhall alledge, that the Admiſtion of ſome Humours, in thoſe who are unſound, excites Phantaſies not conformable to their Objects; we anſwer, foraſmuch as they who are in Health have commixed Humours, thoſe Humours may cauſe external Objects (which perhaps appear to thoſe who are unſound, ſuch as they are indeed in themſelves) to appear to the healthful, ſuch as they are not in themſelves. For, to attribute the Power of changing Objects to the Humours of the one, and not to thoſe of the other, is vain; ſince as they who are in Health, are according to the Nature of the healthful, but contrary to the Nature of the ſick; ſo they who are ſick, are contrary to the Nature of the healthful, and according to the Nature of the ſick: So that theſe alſo are to be credited, as being according to Nature.

From *Sleep* and *Waking* ariſe alſo different Phantaſies; we have not the ſame Phantaſies ſleeping, which we have waking; nor the ſame waking, which we have ſleeping; therefore their Exiſtence is not ſimple, but relative. Thus in Sleep we ſee things, which when we wake, are inexiſtent; not that they are inexiſtent in themſelves, for they exiſt in ſleep, as well as thoſe things which are ſaid to exiſt when we are awake.

From *different Ages*; the ſame Air to old Men ſeems cold, to the youthful temperate; the ſame Meat to old Men heavy, to the young light. So the ſame Voice to ſome ſeemeth low, to others loud. In like manner are they, who differing in Age, differently incline to deſire, or abhor things. Children delight in Whips and Tops; they who come to Man's Eſtate, prefer other things; old Men, others. Whence may be inferr'd, That different Phantaſies are derived from the ſame Object, according to the Difference of Ages.

From *Motion* or *Reſt*, things appear unlike; that which ſeems unmoved to us, while we ſtand ſtill, when we ſail we think it moves.

From *Love* or *Hate*; ſome abhor Swines Fleſh, which others eat with much Delight. Many that have deformed Miſtreſſes think them beautiful.

From *Hunger* or *Satiety*; The ſame Meat to an hungry Man ſeems pleaſant; to a Man that is full, unpleaſant.

From *Drunkenneſs* and *Sobriety*; Things, which when we are ſober we eſteem undecent; drunk, ſeem not ſuch to us.

From *Prediſpoſitions*; the ſame Wine to ſuch as have eaten Dates or Figs a little before, ſeems ſowre; to ſuch as have eaten Nuts or Pulſe, ſweet. The [m] *Paraſtas* of a Bath warms thoſe that go in, cools thoſe who go out, if they have ſtay'd any while in it.

From *Courage* or *Fear*; the ſame thing to a timorous Man ſeems dreadful, to a Valiant nothing ſo.

From *Sorrow* and *Joy*; the ſame things which trouble the ſorrowful, delight the joyful.

Now there being ſo great Difference and Diſproportion of Habits, and Men being conſtituted ſometimes in one Habit, ſometimes in another, what every Object *ſeems* to any, perhaps it is eaſy to declare; but what it *is*, is not eaſy, ſince the Difference is indijudicable. For he that judgeth it, either is converſant in one of the forementioned Habits, or in none: To ſay he is in none, that is, he neither is well nor ſick, neither moveth nor reſteth, nor is of any Age, and wholly void of the other Habits, is moſt abſurd: On the other ſide, if being in any of theſe Habits, he judgeth Phantaſies, he is himſelf a Party in the Controverſy, and conſequently cannot be a ſincere Judge of external Objects, being infected with the Habits in which he is. For he who is awake, cannot compare the Phantaſies of thoſe who are aſleep, with the Phantaſies of thoſe who are awake; nor he, who is in Health, compare the Phantaſies of the ſound and the ſick: for we ſooner aſſent to ſuch things as are preſent, and move us, than to things not preſent.

Moreover, the Difference of ſuch Phantaſies is indijudicable another way. He that prefers one Phantaſy before another, and one Circumſtance (or Habit) before another, either doth it without Judgment and Demonſtration, or upon Judgment and Demonſtration. Not without, for then he is of no Credit; nor with, for if he judge Phantaſies, he muſt do it by a Critery; this Critery muſt be either the true or falſe; if falſe, neither is it to be credited; if he ſay it is true, he affirms it, with Demonſtration or without. If without Demonſtration, it will be uncreditable; if with Demonſtration, it is abſolutely neceſſary that the Demonſtration be true, otherwiſe neither will that be creditable. He will therefore ſay, the Demonſtration alledged to prove the Judicatory creditable, is true. Whether doth he affirm this, as having judged, or not judged? If not having judged, he is not to be credited; if as having judged, he muſt acknowledge he hath judged it by a Critery, of which Critery we ſhall require a Demonſtration, and then of that Demonſtration a Critery. Thus the Demonſtration will continually require a Critery to confirm it, and the Critery a Demonſtration to ſhew it is true: Therefore the Demonſtration cannot be true, unleſs a true Critery precede it; nor can the Critery be true, unleſs the Demonſtration be firſt credited. Thus the Critery and the Demonſtration fall into the *Alternate Common-Place*, wherein both will be found not creditable; for either wants Credit, till the other afford its Aſſiſtance to confirm it.

If therefore we cannot prefer one Phantaſy before another, neither without a Demonſtration and Critery,

[m] See Vitruv. Architect. lib. 6. cap. 10.

tery, nor with them; the Phantasies which different Habits produce, will be indijudicable. Thus Suspension is induc'd from the Nature of external Objects.

CHAP. XVII.

The Fifth Common-place.

THE fifth Common-place is from *Positions*, *Distances*, and *Places*: for through any of these, the same things seem different: the same Walk, to him that is entring into it, seems narrow at the further end; to him who is in the middle, equally broad. The same Ship, at a Distance, seems little and fix'd; near, great and in Motion. The same Tower seems afar off, round; near, square. This for *Distance*.

From *Place*; the Light of a Candle in the Sunshine seems dim; in the Dark, bright: The same Oar under Water, seems broken; above Water, straight. An Egg in the Fowl is soft; in the Air, hard. The *Lyncurium* [a Stone concrete of the *Lynx* his Urine] in the *Lynx* is humid, in the Air, hard. Coral is soft in the Water, hard in the Air. A Voice sounds diversly through a Pipe, through a Flute, and in the open Air.

From *Position*; the same Image, laid flat, seems smooth, but inclining, seems to have Extuberances and Cavities; the Neck of a Pigeon, as it is variously turned, seems to have a different Colour.

Since then all *Phænomena's* are seen in some *Place*, at some *Distance*, and in some *Position*, every one of which (as we said) causeth a great Alteration in Phantasies, we shall be hereby reduced to Suspension. For he who would prefer one of these Phantasies before another, attempts an Impossibility; for if he assert it of them simply, without Demonstration, he shall not be credited; if he would use Demonstration, and acknowledge that Demonstration to be false, he confutes himself: If he say it is true, it will be required he bring a Demonstration to prove it true, and a third to prove the second, because that also must be true, and so to infinite; but to alledge infinite Demonstrations will be impossible. Therefore one Phantasy cannot be preferred before another by Demonstration. And if the aforesaid Phantasies can neither be judged with Demonstration, nor without it, there must be inferred Suspension; since what every thing *seems* according to this *Position*, this *Distance*, or in this *Place*, we may indeed affirm; but what in itself it *is*, (for these Reasons) we cannot.

CHAP. XVIII.

The Sixth Common-Place.

THE Sixth Place is from *Commixtions*: Whence we infer, That no Object incurreth into our Senses simply, but together with some other; what this Mistion *is*, as well from the external Object, and from that together with which it is seen, it is perhaps possible to say, what it seems to us; but what the external Object is, purely in itself, we cannot say: For no external thing incurreth into our Sense purely of itself, but with some other; whence, as I conceive, it seems different to Beholders. Our Complexion seems of one Colour in warm Air, of another in cold; neither can we say what our Colour is naturally, but what it seemeth with these Circumstances. The same Voice seems different in a thin Air, and in a thick. Perfumes are of stronger Scent in a Bath, or in the warm Sun, than in the Cold; a Body surrounded with Water, is light; with Air, heavy.

Moreover, (setting aside external Commistion) even our Eyes have in themselves Tunicles and Humours. Visible Objects therefore, because we cannot see without these, are not perhaps perceived exactly and purely, for we perceive them with Admistion. Hence to those who have the Jaundice, all things seem yellow; to those who have a Hyposphagm, red. And forasmuch as the same Voice seemeth different in open and straight Places, from what it seems in narrow and crooked; in calm Air, from what it seems in tempestuous; it is probable, we perceive no Voice purely. For our Ears have narrow oblique Holes, and are said to be troubled and prepossess'd by Vapours from the Parts next the Head.

Likewise by our Nostrils, and the Instruments of Taste, when Objects are presented, we perceive their Smell, and Taste, but not purely. Wherefore what external Objects are exactly in themselves, the Senses cannot perceive, by reason of Commistions. Neither can the Intellect, because the Senses, her Guides, err. Perhaps also the Intellect alters that which it receiveth from the Senses; by intermixing something of its own. For in the Parts wherein the Hegemonick, according to the Dogmatists, is placed, we see there are certain Humours, as in the Brain, or the Heart, or what part soever they shall place it in. Thus, by this Common-place, seeing that we can determine nothing concerning the Nature of the external Objects, we suspend.

CHAP. XIX.

The Seventh Common-Place.

THE Seventh Place is, *from the Quantities and Constitutions* of Subjects, generally stiled *Compositions*. That we are enforced upon this ground to Suspension concerning the Nature of things, is manifest; as, the shaving of Goats-horn seems white, but in the Horn itself black; Filings of Silver seem black, but in the whole white; the Pieces of the *Tænarian* Stone polish'd seem white, the whole seems yellow; Sands taken singly seem rugged; all together

in a heap, ſmooth; *Hellebore* eaten young and downy, ſuffocates, but at full Growth it doth not; Wine drunk moderately, ſtrengthens; exceſſively, weakens: Meat commonly ſhews a different Power, according to the Quantity; Exceſs thereof, for the moſt part, oppreſſeth the Body with Crudities and cholerick Humours. Now as to theſe we are able to ſay, What the thin Parts of the Horn ſeem ſeparated, and what they ſeem compacted; what the minute Parts of Silver, and what the whole conſiſting of thoſe Parts; what a little Piece of the *Tænarian* Stone, and what the whole: So likewiſe in Sands, *Hellebore*, Wine, Meat, we can expreſs what they are relatively; but the Nature of the things themſelves we cannot, by reaſon of the Difference which happens in Compoſition. Generally, healthful things are hurtful, if we take too much of them; and hurtful things hurt not, if we take but little of them. This is moſt evident in Medicine; a juſt Meaſure in their Compoſition is beneficial; but ſometimes to put in ever ſo little more or leſs, is not only not beneficial, but deſtructive, and often deadly. Thus Quantities and Compoſitions confound the Exiſtence of external Objects, whereby we are juſtly reduced to Suſpenſion, not being able to affirm any thing of the external Object.

CHAP. XX.

The Eighth Common-Place.

THE Eighth Place is, *From Relation*; for every thing having Relation to ſome other, what they are ſimply in their own Nature, we ſuſpend from affirming. (The term [*Is*] here and elſewhere we uſe improperly for *Seems*; which is as much as to ſay, Every thing ſeems to have relation to ſome other.) This is ſaid to be two ways; one is to the thing judging, for the External Object appeareth ſuch to the Thing judging; the other is to the Things which are conſidered together with it, as Right to Left.

That all things are relative, we argued before, as well *to the thing judging*; for the Appearance of a thing is what it ſeems to this Animal, to that Man, to ſuch a Senſe, to ſuch a Habit: As likewiſe *to the things ſeen together with it*; for every thing appears by ſuch a Commiſtion, ſuch a Manner, ſuch a Compoſition, ſuch a Quantity, ſuch a Poſition.

That all things are relative, may alſo be argued thus: Whether are different things different from Relatives, or not? If not different, then they are Relatives; if different, ſince every thing that differs from another is relative, (as implying a relation to that from which it differs) they are relative by Difference.

Again, of things, ſome, according to the Dogmatiſts, are Supreme *Genus's*; others, moſt Special *Species*; others, *Genus's* and *Species*: But all theſe are relative, therefore there is nothing that is not relative.

Moreover they ſay, that of things, ſome are manifeſt, ſome unmanifeſt. The manifeſt (*Phænomena's*) ſignify the unmanifeſt; the unmanifeſt are ſignify'd by the *Phænomena's*, for they hold *Phænomena's* to be the Sight of the unmanifeſt things; but the ſignificant and the ſignificate are Relatives, therefore all things are relative.

Beſides, of things, ſome are like, ſome unlike; ſome are equal, others unequal; but theſe are Relatives, therefore all things are relative.

Even he who ſaith, *All things are not relative*, confirmeth that they *are relative*: For by the Arguments wherewith he oppugns us, he ſheweth, that this Aſſertion, *All things are relative*, hath reference only to us, but not to all in general.

Thus all things being relative, what every Object is in its own Nature we cannot ſay, but only what it appears in Relation: Whence it follows, that, as to the Nature of the things, we ſuſpend.

CHAP. XXI.

The Ninth Common-Place.

THE [a] Ninth Place is *from frequent or rare Contingence*, thus deduced: The Sun is certainly much more wonderful than a Comet; yet becauſe one is ſeen every Day, the other ſeldom, the Comet makes us wonder ſo much, as to think ſome ſtrange thing is portended thereby, the Sun not ſo. But if we ſhould imagine the Sun to appear but ſeldom, and as ſoon as he had enlightned all things, preſently to withdraw, and leave all in Darkneſs, we ſhould therein find much Cauſe of wonder. Earthquakes trouble us far more at firſt, than when we are us'd to them. How doth a Man admire the Sea at firſt View? Even corporeal Beauty ſtrikes us much more at the firſt Sight, than after we have been accuſtomed and acquainted with it. Moreover, things that are ſcarce are eſteemed, the common not eſteemed. If Water were hard to be got, how much would it be prized above all things which we now value at ſo high Rates? If Gold were as common as Stones, who would hoard it up? Since therefore the ſame things are ſometimes eſteemed wonderful or precious, ſometimes not ſuch, according to their Scarcity or Commonneſs, we infer, that, How things ſeem according to their frequent or rare Contingences, we may perhaps ſay; but ſimply, what theſe external

[a] This Ninth place *Laertius* ſaith that *Phavorinus reckons the eighth, and* Sextus *and* Æneſidemus *the tenth*; *and that which is the tenth*, Sextus *makes the eighth*, Phavorinus *the ninth*. But in the Editions, and *MSS. of Sextus*, the ninth is the ſame as with *Laertius*; the tenth is with *Laertius* the fifth.

nal Objects are in themſelves, we cannot; and therefore ſuſpend.

CHAP. XXII.

The Tenth Common-Place.

THE Tenth Place chiefly concerns *Morals*, as being drawn from *Inſtitutions*, *Cuſtoms*, *Laws*, *Fabulous Perſuaſions*, and *Dogmatick Opinions*.

Inſtitution is the Election of a Courſe of Life, or any other thing, which is done by one or many; as by *Diogenes*, or the *Lacedemonians*.

Law is a Covenant written by the Magiſtrate, which whoſoever tranſgreſſeth is puniſhed.

Cuſtom (ἔθος or συνήθεια, they differ nothing) is the Approbation of ſomething by the common Conſent of many, which he who tranſgreſſeth is not puniſhed; as, it is a Law that we commit not Adultery; a Cuſtom, that we lie not with our Wives in publick.

Fabulous Perſuaſion is the Approbation of feigned Things which never were; ſuch are the Stories of *Saturn*, which yet ſome believe true.

Dogmatick Opinion is the Approbation of ſomething which ſeems to be confirmed by ſome Reaſon or Demonſtration; as that Atoms, Homoiomeria's, Leaſt-parts, or the like, are the Elements of Things.

Of theſe, we oppoſe ſometimes *one of the ſame kind to another of that kind*; ſometimes *one kind to another*. For Example, *Cuſtom* to *Cuſtom*, thus; Some *Æthiopians* paint the Skins of their Children, we do not ſo. The *Perſians* think it decent to wear Garments ſtained like Flowers, we think it indecent. Some *Indians* lie with their Wives in publick, moſt People think it unſeemly.

Law to *Law*, thus: Amongſt the *Romans*, he who quits his Inheritance doth not quit his Father's Name; amongſt the *Rhodians* he is forced to quit it. At *Tauris* in *Scythia*, there was a Law, That Strangers ſhould be ſacrific'd to *Diana*; amongſt us, it is prohibited to put a Man to Death in a Temple.

Inſtitution to *Inſtitution*; as, that of *Diogenes* to that of *Ariſtippus*; that of the *Lacedemonians* to that of the *Italians*.

Fabulous Perſuaſions to *Fabulous Perſuaſions*; as, when we ſay, that *Jupiter* is ſometimes called Father of Men and Gods; ſometimes the Ocean is ſo called, as,

Ocean *the Sire of Gods*, Thetys *the Mother*.

Dogmatick Opinions, *one to another*; as when we ſay, Some aſſert one Element, others infinite; and ſome hold the Soul to be mortal, others immortal; ſome hold the World to be governed by Providence, others not.

Again, we oppoſe *Cuſtom* to ſomething of different kind, as to *Law*; when we ſay, Adultery is forbidden amongſt us, uſed amongſt the *Maſſagetes* as a thing indifferent; according to *Eudoxus* the *Gnidian*, in his firſt Book. It is prohibited amongſt us to lie with our Mothers; in *Perſia* nothing ſo frequent as to marry them. The *Egyptians* marry their Siſters, which we are forbidden by Law.

To *Inſtitution*; as there are very few who will lie with their Wives in publick; yet *Crates* did ſo with *Hipparchia*. *Diogenes* wore his upper Coat continually; it is not our uſe to do ſo.

To *Fabulous Perſuaſions*: As it is fabled, that *Saturn* eat his Children; but with us it is a Cuſtom to bring up our Children. Again, we uſe to worſhip the Gods, as good, not ſubject to ill; but the Poets feign them to be wounded, to envy, and the like.

To *Dogmatical Opinion*: It is a Cuſtom with us to pray to the Gods for good Things; but *Epicurus* denies the Gods take any care of us. Again, *Ariſtippus* thought it an indifferent thing to wear a Woman's Garment, we think it indecent.

We oppoſe *Inſtitution* to *Law*, thus: There is a Law, that no Man ſhall ſtrike a free Perſon; yet Wreſtlers ſtrike one another, following the Inſtitution of their Life. *Homicide* is forbidden, yet *Gladiators* kill one another, upon the ſame ground.

Fabulous Perſuaſions to *Inſtitution*; as when we ſay, Fables tell us that *Hercules* ſerved *Omphale*, ſpun, and did other Actions of a moſt effeminate Perſon; but *Hercules*'s Inſtitution of Life was generous.

To *Dogmatick Opinion*; as Wreſtlers addicted to the Purſuit of Glory, as of a good thing, chuſe a laborious kind of Life; but many Philoſophers aſſert Glory to be an ill thing.

We oppoſe *Law* to *Fabulous Perſuaſion*; as, The Poets introduce the Gods committing Adulteries, and the like; but, with us, the Law prohibits ſuch things.

To *Dogmatick Opinion*; as, *Chryſippus* holds it a thing indifferent to lie with Mothers or Siſters; the Law forbids it.

We oppoſe *Fabulous Perſuaſions* to *Dogmatick Opinion*. As, the Poets ſay, *Jupiter* came down on Earth to lie with mortal Women; but the *Dogmatiſts* think this impoſſible. Again, the Poets ſay, that *Jupiter*, through exceſſive Grief for *Sarpedon*, let fall Drops of Blood upon the Earth; but it is a Tenet of Philoſophers, that the Gods are not ſubject to any Paſſion. Likewiſe the *Dogmatiſts* take away *Hippocentaurs*, inſtancing them as Examples of Inexiſtency. Many other Preſidents might be alledged, but let theſe ſerve.

Now there being ſo great difference, (as appeareth alſo by this Place) what the Subject *is* in its own Nature, we cannot ſay; but only what it *ſeems* as to that Inſtitution, this Law, this Cuſtom, &c.

Wherefore,

Wherefore, upon this ground alſo we ſuſpend concerning the Nature of external Objects.

CHAP. XXIII.

The Five Common-Places.

THE [a] later *Scepticks* deliver Five Common-Places of Suſpenſion; the firſt *from Diſagreement*; the ſecond *reducing to Infinite*; the third *from Relation to ſomething*; the fourth, *Hypothetick*; the fifth *Alternate*.

The firſt Place, *from Diſagreement*, is that by which we find an indetermined Diſagreement concerning the thing in the Practice of Life, and amongſt Philoſophers; whence, not being able to prove or diſprove either ſide, we are reduced to Suſpenſion.

The ſecond Place, *from Infinite*, conſiſteth in this; whatſoever is alledged in proof of the Thing propoſed, we ſay requireth ſomething elſe whereby that may be proved; and that likewiſe ſomething elſe, and ſo to infinite; ſo that not having a ground whereon to fix our Beginning, we ſuſpend.

The Third, *from Relation:* Of this Place we have treated already.

The Fourth, *Hypothetick*, is when the *Dogmatiſts*, perceiving themſelves reduc'd to infinite, begin upon ſome ground which they prove not, but would have it ſimply granted without Demonſtration.

The Fifth, *Alternate*, is when that by which we ſhould prove a thing, requireth itſelf to be proved by that thing; then, becauſe we cannot aſſume either to maintain the other, we ſuſpend.

That all Queſtions may be reduced to theſe Places, we ſhew briefly thus. Whatſoever is propounded, is either ſenſible or intelligible; but which ſoever it be, there is Diſagreement concerning it. Some hold that Senſibles only are true, ſome that Intelligibles only; others, that ſome Senſibles, and ſome Intelligibles. Whether will they ſay, the Controverſy is dijudicable, [capable of Deciſion] or indijudicable? If indijudicable, it is fit we ſuſpend; for in things indijudicably repugnant, it is not poſſible to aſſert: But if dijudicable, we ask how it ſhall be judged? As a Senſible, (for we will firſt take that for Inſtance) whether by a Senſible or by an Intelligible? If by a Senſible, foraſmuch as we diſagree concerning Senſibles, even that Senſible will require another for its Proof; which other, if it be Senſible, will require another, and ſo to infinite: But if a Senſible require to be determined by an Intelligible, foraſmuch as Intelligibles alſo are controverted, that (as being intelligible) will require Adjudication and Proof; which way ſhall it be proved? If by an Intelligible, they run, as before, into infinite. If by a Senſible, foraſmuch as Intelligible was aſſumed for proof of a Senſible, and a Senſible for proof of an Intelligible, the *Alternate Common-place* is brought in.

But if to avoid this, the Diſputant would aſſume ſomething as granted, without demonſtrating it, whereby to demonſtrate the Conſequent, *the hypothetical Place* occurs, which is inextricable. For if he be creditable in Things which he requires to be granted and ſuppoſed, we likewiſe may be creditable, in requiring their Contraries to be granted. If that be true which he ſuppoſeth, he renders it ſuſpicious by ſuppoſing (not proving) it; if falſe, his Foundation is unſound. Further, if ſuch a Suppoſition conduce any thing to Proof, let him ſuppoſe the Thing in Queſtion, rather than another Thing by which he would prove it. If it be abſurd to ſuppoſe the thing controverted, it is alſo abſurd to ſuppoſe the ground upon which we build it. That all Senſibles are *Relatives* is manifeſt, for (as ſuch) they relate to thoſe who have Senſe. It is therefore evident, that whatſoever ſenſible Thing is propoſed to us, may eaſily be reduced to one of theſe five Places.

So likewiſe we argue concerning Intelligibles. If the Controverſy be indijudicable, we ſhall be allowed to ſuſpend; if dijudicable by an Intelligible, it runs into *Infinite*; if by a Senſible, we drive them to *the Alternate Place:* For the Senſible being controverted, as not capable of being judged by itſelf, becauſe of running into infinite, will require an Intelligible, as the Intelligible the Senſible. He who hereupon would aſſume any thing as granted, is as fooliſh on the other ſide. Further, an Intelligible is relative, for it is ſuch in reference to the Intelligent; and if it were indeed ſuch as it is named, it would not be controverted. Thus we reduce Intelligibles alſo to theſe five Places. Whereupon we are neceſſitated to ſuſpend our Aſſent upon any Propoſition. Theſe are the five Places introduced by the later *Scepticks*, not to exclude the other ten, but more variouſly to reſel the Temerity of the *Dogmatiſts*.

CHAP. XXIV.

The two other Common-Places.

THEY likewiſe deliver two Places more of Suſpenſion; for ſeeing that whatſoever is comprehended, ſeems to be comprehended (or underſtood) either *through itſelf*, or *through ſome other*; they ſeem to introduce an abſolute Inextricability of all Things. That nothing is comprehended *through itſelf*, they ſay, is manifeſt, from the Controverſy amongſt natural Philoſophers, concerning (I think) all Senſibles and Intelligibles: which Controverſy is indijudicable, (not to be determined) by reaſon that we cannot uſe either a Senſible or an Intelligible Criterie; for,

[a] *Laertius* aſcribes theſe to *Agrippa*.

for, whichſoever we take, it will be uncreditable, as being controverted.

For the ſame Reaſon they conceive that nothing can be comprehended *through ſome other*; for if that through which it is comprehended, will continually require to be comprehended through ſome other, they run into *the Alternate Place*, or into *Infinite*. But if a Man will aſſume any thing as comprehended thro' itſelf, by means whereof he would comprehend ſome other thing, to this it is repugnant, that nothing can be comprehended through itſelf for the Reaſons before alledged. But how that which is repugnant can be comprehended either through itſelf, or any other, we doubt, ſince there appeareth no Criterie of Truth or Comprehenſion; but without Demonſtration, Signs are deſtroy'd, as we ſhall prove hereafter. Hitherto of the Places of Suſpenſion.

CHAP. XXV.

The Places for Confutation of Ætiologicks.

IN like manner, as we have delivered theſe Places of Suſpenſion, ſome have laid down others, particularly againſt Ætiologies, (Allegations of Cauſes or Reaſons) becauſe the Dogmatiſts pleaſe themſelves exceedingly therein. *Æneſidemus* delivers eight Places, whereby he conceives all Dogmatick Ætiology may be refelled, as defective.

The *Firſt*, for that the kind of Ætiology, which is converſant in Things not apparent, hath not an acknowledged Proof from apparent Things.

The *Second*, for that there are many great Reaſons to induce an Inclination, and but one alledged.

The *Third*, for that of Things done orderly, Reaſons are given that ſhew no Order.

The *Fourth*, for that taking *Phænomena*'s as they are, they think they comprehend Things not apparent, as they are likewiſe; for Things not apparent are perhaps effected the ſame way as *Phænomena*'s, perhaps ſome other peculiar way.

The *Fifth*, for that all (very nigh) give Reaſons, according to their own particular ſuppoſed Grounds, not according to the general and univerſally received ways of Diſputation.

The *Sixth*, for that they often take for granted ſuch Things as are eaſily comprehenſible; but omit their Contraries, tho' equally probable.

The *Seventh*, for that they alledge Reaſons not only repugnant to *Phænomena*'s, but even to their own Suppoſitions.

The *Eighth*, for that the Things which appear, and thoſe which are controverted, being equally dubious, they would prove their Opinion concerning doubtful Things, by Things as doubtful.

He addeth, that it is poſſible, in Ætiologicks ſome may err by other Places dependent upon theſe.

But perhaps, the five Places of Suſpenſion are ſufficient againſt Ætiologicks. For a Man muſt either alledge a Reaſon which agreeth with all Sects of Philoſophy, and with *Scepticiſm*, and with *Phænomena*'s, or not: But to alledge ſuch a Reaſon is impoſſible, for all *Phænomena*'s and Non-apparents diſagree; and diſagreeing, it will be required that a Cauſe or Reaſon thereof be given. Now if he alledge a *Phænomenon* for Reaſon of a *Phænomenon*, or a Not-apparent for Reaſon of a Not-apparent, he runs into *Infinite*. If he prove one kind by the other, he incurs *the Alternate Place*. If he make a ſtand any where, or ſay, that the Cauſe (or Reaſon) is ſuch, as that it conſiſts with the thing by him alledged, he falleth into the Place of *Relation*, taking away that which is according to the proper Nature of the Thing; or if he aſſume ſomething by way of Suppoſition, we ſhall diſallow it. Thus alſo may the Temerity of the *Dogmatiſts* in Ætiology be confuted.

CHAP. XXVI.

The Phraſes of the Scepticks.

FOraſmuch as in uſing theſe Places of Suſpenſion, we expreſs ourſelves by ſome particular Phraſes, which declare the ſceptical Affection, and our own Paſſion, as, *Not more*, *Not to be defined*, and the like, it follows, that we treat of theſe.

Let us begin with this, *Not more*, for which ſometimes we ſay, *Nothing more*; not uſing (as ſome conceive) *not more* in particular Queſtions; and *nothing more*, in the general; but both promiſcuouſly. We therefore will treat of them both under one. It is an imperfect Expreſſion, as when we ſay οὐδὲν μᾶλλον, we imply ἴσα οὐδὲν μᾶλλον; and when πλατεῖα, we imply πλατεῖα ὁδός; ſo when we ſay, *Not more*, it is as much as to ſay, *Not more this than that*, upwards nor downwards. There are ſome Scepticks, who for the Interrogation ὅ uſe τί, *Which more, this or that?* taking τί, caſually, as if they ſhould ſay, διὰ τί, *Why more this than that?* Interrogations are commonly uſed for [m] Axioms; as,

To what Man is the Wife of Jove *unknown?*

And Axioms for Interrogations, as, *I would know where* Dion *dwells?* and, *I demand for what Cauſe a Poet is admir'd? Menander* uſeth τί for διὰ τί; as Τί δ' ἐγὼ καταλείπομεν.

This Phraſe, *Not more this than that*, declareth likewiſe our Affection, by which we are brought, by reaſon of the Equivalence of contrary things, to ἀφασία; we mean *Equivalence*, in that which appeareth probable to us. Contraries are thoſe which generally

[m] What Axioms are, ſee in the Doctrine of the *Stoicks*.

generally oppugn one another; Ἀφασία is an inclining to neither. Now this Phraſe, *Not more*, tho' it ſeem to imply Aſſent or Denial, we uſe not that manner, but indifferently and improperly, either by way of queſtion, or for *I know not to which of theſe I ſhould aſſent, and to which I ſhould not aſſent.* But being requir'd to declare what ſeemeth to us, we uſe the Phraſe by which we declare it indifferently. Know likewiſe, that when we ſay, *Not more*, we aſſert not that the Doubt is true, but only expreſs what appeareth to us.

The next is *Aphaſia*; *Phaſis* is taken two ways, generally and particularly: generally for any Speech, declaring Aſſertion or Denial, as, *It is Day*, *It is not Day*: particularly, for Aſſertion only; in which Acception, the Negatives are not called φάσεις. *Aphaſia* therefore is a Renunciation of *Phaſis*, in the general Signification, which comprehends both Affirmation and Negation. It is that Affection by which we neither aſſert a thing, nor deny it. We aſſume *Aphaſia*, not becauſe the Nature of things is ſuch, as neceſſarily move it; but declaring, that at preſent we are thus affected, as to theſe or thoſe Queſtions. Always remember, that we neither aſſert nor deny any thing unapparent, but yield to thoſe which move us pathetically, and neceſſarily compel us to aſſent.

Theſe Phraſes, τάχα ἢ ὁ τάχα, ἔξεστι ἢ οὐκ ἔξεστι, ἐνδέχεται ἢ οὐκ ἐνδέχεται, *Perhaps*, and *Not perhaps*, we uſe for, *Perhaps it is*, *Perhaps it is not*. Thus, for brevity, we take, *Not perhaps*, for, *Perhaps it is not*. Here again we conteſt not about Words, nor enquire what they naturally ſignify, but take them indifferently. Theſe Phraſes declare an *Aphaſia*; for he who ſaith, *Perhaps it is*, implies its contrary to be as probable, becauſe he aſſents not that this is. The ſame of the reſt.

Ἐπέχω, *I ſuſpend*, we take for, *I cannot ſay whether I ought to believe or disbelieve the thing propoſed*, declaring, That the things ſeem equal to us, as to Belief and Unbelief; whether they are equal in themſelves, we aſſert not, but ſpeak of the *Phænomenon*, as it incurs into our Senſe. Ἐποχὴ, *Suſpenſion*, is ſo called, ἀπὸ τῆς ἐπέχειν τὴν διάνοιαν, *from the Mind's being held in Suſpenſe*, betwixt aſſerting and denying, through Equivalence of the thing queſtion'd. The ſame we ſay concerning

Οὐδὲν ὁρίζω, *I determine nothing*; ὁρίζειν, we conceive to be, not ſimply to ſpeak a thing, but to pronounce an unmaniſeſt thing with Aſſent. Thus perhaps the *Sceptick* will be found to determine nothing, not ſo much as this, *I determine nothing*. For it is not a dogmatical Opinion, (that is, an Aſſent to ſomething not maniſeſt) but a Phraſe declaring our Affection. When therefore the Sceptick ſaith, *I determine nothing*, he meaneth, *I am ſo affected at the preſent, as not dogmatically to aſſert or deny any of the things controverted.* This he ſaith, as expreſſing how they appear to him, not pronouncing it enunciatively with Perſuaſion.

Ἀοριστία is a Paſſion of the Mind, whereby we neither aſſert nor deny things dogmatically controverted, that is, not maniſeſt. When therefore the *Sceptick* ſaith, *All are undefinable*, he taketh *are* for *appear* ſo to him; he ſaith *All*, not *Beings*, but thoſe *not manifeſt*, controverted by the *Dogmatiſts*. *Indefinable*, that is, *Not to be preferred before their Contraries, or common Repugnants, by Belief or Disbelief.* And as he who ſaith, *Ambulo*, implieth, *Ego ambulo*; ſo he who ſaith, *All things are indefinite*, implieth, *as to us*, or, *as it ſeemeth to me.* The Meaning therefore is this, *All things controverted by the* Dogmatiſts *appear ſo to me, as that I think none of them more worthy Belief than its contrary.*

The ſame is our Meaning when we ſay, *All are incomprehenſible*; we take [*all*] in the ſame Senſe, and imply [*to me*;] as if we ſhould ſay, *All things controverted among the* Dogmatiſts *ſeem to me incomprehenſible.* We affirm not, they are incomprehenſible in their own Nature, but declare our own Affection, that we conceive we underſtand them not, by reaſon of the Equivalence of Contraries.

Likewiſe the Phraſe, ἀκαταληπτῶ, and ὁ καταλαμβάνω, declares our own Affection; by which the *Sceptick*, for the preſent, neither aſſerts nor denies any of the things not maniſeſt that are in Controverſy. This is evident from what hath been ſaid upon the other Phraſes.

When we ſay, *To every Speech an equal Speech is oppoſite*, we mean, to every Speech that we have examined. *Speech*, we take not ſimply, but for that which aſſerteth ſomething dogmatically, that is, of a thing not maniſeſt, not only by Premiſes and Concluſion, but any other way. *Equal*, we take not ſimply, but as to Belief and Disbelief. *Is oppoſite*, we take generally for is repugnant, implying, *as I think.* When therefore we ſay, *To every Speech there is an equal Speech oppoſite*; the Meaning is, *To every Speech that I have examined, which aſſerteth any thing dogmatically, there ſeemeth to me to be oppoſite another Speech, aſſerting likewiſe dogmatically, equal to it for Belief or Disbelief.* Thus this Expreſſion is not dogmatical, but the Signification of an human Affection, which is that which appeareth to the Perſon affected. Some there are who pronounce it thus, *To every Speech, to oppoſe an equal Speech*; laying this down as a Precept, That to every Speech dogmatically aſſerting any thing, we ſhould oppoſe the Speech which dogmatically aſſerteth its contrary. Thus, addreſſing their Words to the *Sceptick*, they uſe the Infinitive for the Imperative, *To oppoſe*, for, *Let us oppoſe.* They adviſ'd the *Sceptick* not to be deceived by the *Dogmatiſts*, nor to give over his Inquiſition; for the Indiſturbance which they conceive accompanies thoſe who ſuſpend their Aſſent in every thing, as we ſaid before.

It is not neceſſary to alledge more of theſe Phraſes; even of theſe alledged ſome might have been ſpared;

ſpared; but take it for a Rule, In all the Sceptical Phraſes, we affirm not that the Phraſes themſelves are true; for we ſay, that ſome may be taken away by others, and are circumſcribed by thoſe very things of which they are ſpoken; as purgative Medicines expel not only Humours, but, together with the Humours, themſelves out of the Body. Moreover, we ſay that we uſe them not, as properly ſignifying the thing to which they are applied, but indifferently, or (if they will ſo call it) improperly; for it becomes not the *Sceptick* to conteſt about Words. This we may the better do, in that the Words are ſaid not to ſignify any thing purely in themſelves, but relatively, and therefore as well in reference to the *Scepticks*. Furthermore, it muſt be remember'd, that we pronounce them not generally of all things, but of the not manifeſt, and thoſe which are dogmatically controverted. The *Phænomenon* (that which appeareth to us) we declare; but of the Nature of the external Object, we affirm nothing. By what hath been ſaid, I conceive, that all Sophiſms brought againſt the Sceptical Phraſes may be reſolved.

CHAP. XXVII.

Wherein Scepticiſm *differs from thoſe Philoſophical Sects which are moſt like it; and firſt, wherein it differs from the Philoſophy of* Heraclitus.

HAving declared the *Signification* of Scepticiſm, its *Parts*, its *Criterie*, its *End*, its *Places of Suſpenſion*, its *Phraſes*, and its *Character*; it followeth that we explicate briefly, *wherein it differs from thoſe Sects which ſeem moſt like it*, that by this means we may the better underſtand it.

We will begin with the Philoſophy of *Heraclitus*. That this differs from our Inſtitution, is evident; for *Heraclitus* aſſerteth dogmatically concerning many things not manifeſt, which (as I ſaid before) we do not. But foraſmuch as the Followers of *Æneſidemus* ſaid, the *Sceptick* Inſtitution is the Way to the *Heraclitian* Philoſophy; becauſe that *Contraries appear in the ſame thing*, is precedent to *Contraries are in the ſame thing:* But the *Scepticks* ſay, *Contraries appear in the ſame thing*; and the *Heraclitians* go on farther, affirming, *Contraries are in the ſame thing*: we anſwer, That Contraries appear in the ſame thing, is not a Doctrine of the *Scepticks*, but a thing evident by Senſe, not to the *Scepticks* only, but to all other Philoſophers and Men; as none dare deny, but Honey to the Sound is ſweet; to ſuch as have the Overflowing of the Gall, bitter. Hereupon, the *Heraclitians* begin from the common Prænotion of Men, as we do alſo, and perhaps other Sects: Wherefore if they had taken this Sentence, *There are Contraries in the ſame thing*, as from this Saying, *All are incomprehenſible*, or from, *I determine nothing*, or ſome other of that kind, perhaps they might collect rightly what they ſay; but ſince they have ſome Principles incident not only to us, but to other Philoſophers, and even to the Courſe of Life itſelf, why ſhould any ſay our Inſtitution is preparative to the Philoſophy of *Heraclitus*, more than to any other Sect, or to the Courſe of Life itſelf, ſeeing all of us uſe theſe in common? Neither know I whether the *Sceptical* Inſtitution divert not from the *Philoſophy* of *Heraclitus*, rather than conduce to it; ſince the *Sceptick* reprehends, as temerarious, all that *Heraclitus* aſſerted dogmatically, contradicting his *Conflagration*, contradicting alſo his Tenent, *That there are Contraries in the ſame thing*; and to every Doctrine of *Heraclitus*, (deriding the Temerity of the *Dogmatiſts*) he ſaith, *I comprehend not, I determine not*, (as before) which oppugns the *Heraclitians*. But it is abſurd to ſay, That an Inſtitution, which oppugns another, is the Way preparative to the Diſcipline it oppugns. Therefore it is abſurd to ſay, That the *Sceptical* Inſtitution is the Way to the *Heraclitian* Philoſophy.

CHAP. XXVIII.

Wherein Scepticiſm *differs from the Philoſophy of* Democritus.

IN the like manner, the Philoſophy of *Democritus* is ſaid to be all one with *Scepticiſm*, in that it ſeems to uſe the ſame Matter; for from the Appearance of Honey, to ſome ſweet, to ſome bitter, *Democritus* argued, that in itſelf it is neither ſweet nor bitter, and thereupon uſed to ſay, *Not more*, a Sceptick Phraſe. But this Phraſe, *Not more*, is taken by the *Scepticks*, and by the *Democritians*, after a different manner. The *Democritians* ſignify by it, that *neither is*; but we, *that we know not whether both of the* Phænomena's *are, or whether neither is:* Herein we diſſent from them. But far greater is the Difference in that *Democritus* ſaith, *Atoms and Vacuum truly* are; that herein he differs from us, (though he begin with the Inequality and Diſagreement of Phænomena's) I conceive it needleſs to prove.

CHAP. XXIX.

Wherein Scepticiſm *differs from the* Cyrenaick *Sect.*

SOME affirm the *Cyrenaick* Sect to be the ſame with *Scepticiſm*, foraſmuch as it holds, *that the Affections themſelves only are comprehended.* Nevertheleſs it is different from *Scepticiſm*; for it holds *Pleaſure, and a light Motion of the Fleſh*, to be the *End*; we, *Indiſturbance*, to which the End they propoſe is contrary. For whether Pleaſure be preſent or abſent, he who aſſerts it to be the End is diſturbed, as we ſaid [n] before. Beſides, we ſuſpend only

[n] Chap. 7.

from asserting any thing concerning external Objects; but the *Cyrenaicks* affirm they are of an incomprehensible Nature.

CHAP. XXX.

Wherein Scepticism *differs from the Institution of* Protagoras.

PROtagoras will have Man to be πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον, *the Measure of all things; of Beings, as they are; of not Beings, as they are not.* By μέτρον, he means the Criterie; by χρημάτων, πραγμάτων, *of Things*; which is as much as to say, *Man is the Criterie of all things; of Beings, as they are; of not Beings, as they are not.* Hereupon he asserts the *Phænomena's* to be particular to every one, and thus brings in the *relative Common-place*, whereby he seems to have Community with the *Pyrrhonians*; but he differs from them, as we shall easily find in explicating his Opinion. He saith, *Matter is fluid, and being in perpetual Fluxion, Appositions are made instead of Substractions, and the Senses are transmutated and changed, according to the several Ages and Constitutions of the Body.* He saith also, *The Reasons* (or Powers) *of all* Phænomena's *are subjected in Matter; so that Matter*, in itself, is all things which it appears unto all. *But Men at different times perceive things different, by reason of their different Habits: He whose Constitution is sound, of the things which are in Matter, perceiveth those which are capable of appearing to such Persons; they who are otherwise disposed, perceive the things which are capable of appearing to Persons of a contrary Constitution. The same Reason there is in the Difference of Ages, in Sleeping and Waking, and in all kinds of Habits. Man therefore*, according to him, *is the Criterie of things that Are; for all things which appear to Men, Are; those which appear not to any Man, Are not.* Thus, we see, he dogmatically asserted, *That Matter is fluid*, and that *the Reasons of all* Phænomena's *are subjected in it*; wherein we, as being things not manifest, suspend our Assent.

CHAP. XXXI.

Wherein Scepticism *differs from the* Academick *Philosophy.*

SOME hold the *Academick* Philosophy to be the same with *Scepticism*; let us therefore examine it. It is said, there were no more than three *Academies*; One, the most *ancient*, instituted by *Plato*; the Second, and middle *Academy*, by *Arcesilaus*, Disciple of *Polemon*; the Third, and new *Academy*, by *Carneades* and *Clitomachus*. There are who reckon a Fourth, instituted by *Philo* and *Charmides*; some also a Fifth, by *Antiochus*. We will begin with the most *ancient*. Some hold *Plato* to be *Dogmatick*, others *Aporematick* (dubitative;) others, in some things, *Dogmatick*; in some, *Aporematick*. For in his Gymnastick Discourses, where *Socrates* is introduced deriding or disputing with the *Sophists*, they say he hath a *Gymnastick* and *Aporematick* Character; but when he declareth his own Opinion in the Person of *Socrates*, *Timæus*, or the like, a *Dogmatist*. As for those who say he is a *Dogmatist*, or in some things *Dogmatick*, in others *Aporematick*, we shall not need to meddle with them; for they acknowledge that he dissents from us. Whether he be purely *Sceptick*, we discourse at large in our *Hypomnemata*; we shall now only examine it briefly, according to *Permedotus* and *Æneſidemus*, (for they chiefly undertook this Task) who say, that *Plato*, when he asserted *concerning Idea's*, or that *there is Providence*, or that *Life joined with Virtue is to be preferred before Life joined with Vice:* If he assent to these as existent, he averreth dogmatically; if he assent as to the more probable, he differs from the *Sceptick* Character, in preferring one before the other, as to Belief and Disbelief, as is manifest from what hath been said already. Nor though he pronounce things *sceptically* in his *Gymnasticks*, is he therefore a *Sceptick*; for he who asserteth any one thing dogmatically, or preferreth any Phantasy before another, for Belief or Disbelief of a thing not manifest, followeth the *Dogmatick* Character, as *Timon* sheweth, speaking of *Xenophanes:* For (having often commended him, insomuch that he writes his *Silli* in his Person) he maketh him to complain, and say,

I wish my Soul were subtle, and her Eye
So sharp, as might ° *both Sides at once descry.*
Lost in the doubtful Way, I long have strait;
Even though (grown old) I had with Care essay'd
Every Opinion, search'd all Theory:
For unto which could I my Mind apply?
All into one Resolve; and this One ever
Drawn into One like Nature doth persevere.

Whence he also calls him ἀτάυφον, and not absolutely ἄυφον, *void of Pride*, thus;

P Xenophanes, *not wholly free from Pride,*
The Fictions of old Homer *did deride;*
And fram'd a God, ᵠ *whose Figure doth dissent*
From Men; equal each way; intelligent.

He calls him ἀτάυφον, as being not quite ἄυφον; and Ὁμηροπλήκτην ὑπάρχοντα, for that he reproached and blamed the ʳ fabulous way of *Homer*. Now *Xenophanes*

° M. S. Ἀμφισφαίρωλεπτος. P Laert. Ξενοφάνης. ᵠ M. S. Ἐκτὸν; perhaps ξέσον. *Laertius* saith, *He held that God is of a Spherick Form, nothing like to Men.* This seems to be meant ἀπάνθρωπον, to the Figure refer ἴσον ἅπαντα, such is a Globe. ʳ His Stories concerning the Gods. *Laert. in Xenoph.*

Xenophanes asserted, besides *Prænotions* (as others also) that the *Universe is one*, and that *God is of the same Nature with all things*; that *He is Spherical, Impassible, Immutable, and Rational:* Whence it is easy to shew that *Xenophanes* differs from us. Moreover, from what we said, it is manifest that *Plato*, though of some things he doubt, yet because in others he asserts, concerning the Essence of things not manifest, and of things not manifest, preferreth some before others, is no *Sceptick*.

Those of the *new Academy*, though they say *all things are incomprehensible*, differ from the *Scepticks* perhaps in saying, that all things are incomprehensible; for they assert this, but the Sceptick *admits it possible that they may be comprehended*. But more apparently they differ from us in the Dijudication of Good and Evil. For the *Academicks* say, that something is Good and Ill, not after our manner, but as being persuaded, it is more probable, that what they call Good is Good, than the contrary: Whereas we say not that any thing is Good or Ill, as thinking what we say is probable; but without Opinion, we follow the ordinary Course of Life, or otherwise we should do nothing. Moreover we hold Phantasies to be equal, as to Belief and Disbelief; but they, that some are *Credible*, others *Incredible*. The *Credible* also they subdivide into many Kinds; some they hold to be *Credible* only; some to be *Credible* and *Circumcurrent*; some to be *Credible* and *Circumcurrent*, and *Undistracted*; as, a Rope lying loose in a dark Room, a Man receives a *Credible* Phantasy from it, and runs away; another considering it more exactly, and weighing the Circumstances, as that it moves not, that it is of such Colour, and the like, to him it appears a Rope, according to *Credible* and *Circumcurrent* Phantasy. *Undistracted* Phantasy is after this manner. It is reported, that *Hercules* brought *Alcestis* back from the *Inferi* after her Death, and shew'd her to *Admetus*. He receiv'd a true and *Circumcurrent* Phantasy of *Alcestis*; but remembring she was dead, his Phantasy was distracted from Assent, and inclined to Disbelief. Now the new *Academicks*, before Phantasy, which is simply *Credible*, prefer that which is *Credible* and *Circumcurrent*; and before both, that which is *Credible*, and *Circumcurrent*, and *Undistracted*. For though both *Academicks* and *Scepticks* say they believe some things; yet herein is a manifest Difference between their Philosophies: *To believe*, is taken several ways; sometimes for *not to resist*, as a Boy is said to believe his Master; sometimes for *assenting to another, with an earnest resolute Desire of the thing*; as a Prodigal believes him, who persuades him to live sumptuously: Now *Carneades* and *Clitomachus* using the word *Believe* and *Credible*, as with vehement Inclination, we only for yielding, without Propensity to any thing; herein also we differ from them.

We differ likewise from the *new Academy*, as to what belongs to the *End:* They use in the Course of Life what is *Credible*, we following Laws, Customs, and natural Affections, live without engaging our Opinion. We might add more Instances of the Difference between us, if it were not too large for our Design.

But *Arcesilaus*, Institutor and President of the *middle Academy*, seems to me to participate so much of the *Pyrrhonian* Reasons, as that his Institution and ours is almost the same. For neither is he found to assert concerning the Existence or Inexistence of any thing, neither doth he prefer one thing before another for Belief or Disbelief; but in all things he suspends, holding *Suspension* to be the *End*; which, as we said, brings us to *Indisturbance*. He likewise holds particular Suspensions to be good, particular Assertions to be ill. But if we may believe what is related of him, they say, at first Sight he appears a *Pyrrhonian*, but was indeed a *Dogmatist*; and that making trial, by Doubts, of his Disciples, whether they were capable of *Plato*'s Doctrine, he was thought to be *Aporetick*, but that to his more ingenious Friends he taught the Doctrine of *Plato:* Whence *Ariston* of him;

Pyrrho *behind*, Plato *before*,
And in the middle, Diodore.

For, though a *Platonick*, he used the Dialectick of *Diodorus*.

Plato saith, *As to (the Stoical Criterie) comprehensive Phantasy, things are incomprehensible; as to the Natures of the things themselves, comprehensible. Antiochus* transferr'd the *Stoick* Sect into the *Academick:* whence it was said of him, That he taught the *Stoick* Doctrine in the Academy; for he shewed, that the *Stoical* Tenents were in *Plato*. Hereby it appears, the *Sceptick* Institution is different from the fourth and fifth *Academy*.

CHAP. XXXII.

Whether Empirical Medicine be the same with Scepticism.

SOME hold *Empirical Medicine* to be the same with the *Sceptick Philosophy*; but we must know (notwithstanding it holds, that things not manifest are incomprehensible) it is not the same with *Scepticism*, neither is this Sect fit for a *Sceptick*, who, in my Opinion, ought rather to pursue that which is called *Methodick*; which alone, of all the Sects of Medicine, seems to behave itself not temeariously in things not manifest; nor arrogantly to determine whether they are comprehensible or incomprehensible; but following *Phænomena's*, it takes from them what seemeth profitable, according to the Course of the *Scepticks*. For, as we said before, the common Life of a *Sceptick* consists of four Parts, conversant

in the *Inſtruction of Nature*, in the *Impulſion of Paſſions*, in the *Conſtitutions of Laws and Cuſtoms*, and in the *Tradition of Arts*. As a *Sceptick* therefore, by the Impulſion of Paſſions, is brought from Thirſt to Drink, from Hunger to Meat, and the like; ſo a Methodick Phyſician is guided by the Paſſions to that which is convenient, from Conſtriction of the Pores to Relaxation, as when we ſhun the Condenſation of Cold, by going into the Sunſhine; from Relaxation of the Pores to Conſtriction, as when ſweating immoderately in a Bath, we retire to the cooler Air. That the things contrary to Nature lead him to thoſe that are agreeable to Nature, is manifeſt even from a Dog, who having got a Thorn in his Foot, endeavours preſently to get it out. Not to reckon up every thing, which were to exceed the Scope of a Summary, I conceive, that all things ſaid in this manner by the Methodicks, may be referred to the Impulſion of our Paſſions, as well thoſe which are agreeable to Nature, as thoſe which are not. Herein indeed theſe two Inſtitutions agree, both diſclaim Opinion, and both uſe Words indifferently; as the *Sceptick*, *I deſign nothing*, *I comprehend nothing*; the Methodick, κοινόπως, δύκειν, and the like. The word ἔνδειξις alſo he takes, without Opination, for an Action, whereby we are deduced from apparent Paſſions, natural and preternatural, to thoſe which ſeem convenient, as I ſhewed in Thirſt and Hunger. The Methodicks therefore are nearer ally'd to the *Scepticks* than any other Medicinal Sect, as appears by comparing them. Thus having diſcourſed of thoſe, which are of neareſt Reſemblance to the *Sceptick* Inſtitution, we conclude the general Part of *Scepticiſm*, and the firſt Book of our Summary.

Of *DIALECTICK*.

The SECOND BOOK.

CHAP. I.

Whether a Sceptick can examine and diſpute againſt Aſſertions.

HAVING undertaken an Inquiſition of the *Dogmatiſts*, we will briefly, and by way of Summary, examine every Part of that which they call Philoſophy. But firſt let us anſwer them who cry, *A Sceptick is not capable to examine or comprehend Dogmatick Aſſertions.* They argue thus: *A Sceptick either comprehends Aſſertions, or not; if he comprehend them, how can he doubt of that, which by his own Confeſſion he comprehends? If he doth not comprehend them, he cannot diſcourſe upon that which he comprehends not. For, as he who knows not (for Example) what is* τὸ καθ' ὃ παράδειγμα, *or*, a Theorem by two Topicks, *is not able to ſay any thing of them: So, he who knows not the particular Aſſertion of the* Dogmatiſts, *cannot diſpute againſt that, of which he knows anothing; therefore a* Sceptick *cannot examine or diſpute gainſt the Aſſertions of* Dogmatiſts.

Who argue thus: Let them ſay in what Senſe they uſe the word [*comprehend*] whether ſimply, for *to underſtand without affirming ought concerning the Beings of the things whereon we diſcourſe*; or not only to underſtand, but to *grant the being of thoſe things.* If they ſay, To *comprehend*, is *by Diſcourſe to aſſent to comprehenſive Phantaſy*, foraſmuch as comprehenſive Phantaſy proceeds from a thing that hath Being, impreſſed and ſealed according to the Being thereof, in ſuch manner as cannot be derived from that which hath no Being, perhaps even they themſelves will not be capable of examining or diſputing againſt that which they comprehend not: As when the *Stoick* diſputed againſt the *Epicurean*, who affirms that *Subſtance is divided*; or, that *God orders not the World by Providence*; or, that *Pleaſure is a Good*; Doth he comprehend, or not? If he *comprehend*, he, in ſaying theſe things *are*, wholly ſubverts the *Stoick* Doctrine; if he comprehends not, neither can he ſay any thing againſt it. The ſame may be objected to thoſe of all other Sects, when they offer to diſpute againſt Opinions, which they conceive heterodox; ſo as none of them can diſpute againſt another, upon any pretence whatſoever. Beſides, (not to trifle) in a word, all their *Dogmatick* Learning will be ſubverted, and the *Sceptick* Philoſophy firmly eſtabliſhed, if it be granted, that none can diſpute of any thing, which is not thus comprehended. For whoſoever aſſerts *dogmatically* concerning a thing not certain, aſſerts, either as having comprehended it, or not; if he hath not comprehended it, what he ſaith will not be creditable; if he hath comprehended it, he muſt ſay, that he did it either through the very thing

thing itſelf, and by ſome Act incident to it, or by ſome Inquiſition and Examination. If *through itſelf by ſome Act incident to it* a thing not manifeſt be comprehended, it cannot be ſaid to be not manifeſt, but equally apparent to all, granted and not controverted. But concerning every thing not manifeſt, there is an irreconcilable Difference amongſt them; wherefore the *Dogmatiſt*, who aſſerts concerning the Being of a thing not manifeſt, doth not comprehend it through itſelf, and by an Act incident to it. But, if *by ſome Inquiſition*, how is he capable of enquiring or diſputing, before he comprehends the thing itſelf, according to the Hypotheſis propoſed? For Inquiſition requiring that the thing after which we enquire be exactly comprehended; and on the other ſide, the Comprehenſion of the thing whereof we enquire, requiring firſt Inquiſition, by the *alternate Common-place* of Suſpenſion, it will be impoſſible for them to enquire and aſſert dogmatically concerning things not manifeſt. If they would begin from *Comprehenſion*, we object, that they muſt firſt enquire before they can comprehend; if from *Inquiſition*, that they muſt comprehend before they can enquire. Wherefore they can neither comprehend, nor poſitively affirm concerning things not manifeſt. So that this fooliſh *dogmatick* Flouriſh will be taken away, and, as I conceive, the *Ephectick* Philoſophy come in of itſelf.

Now if they ſay, They conceive it not neceſſary, that ſuch Comprehenſion precede Inquiſition, but ſimple Intellection only; it is not impoſſible but they, who ſuſpend as to things not manifeſt, may diſpute alſo; for the Sceptick, as I think, is not excluded from Intellection, which ariſeth from Phænomena's that occur, and actually affect us. Neither doth this neceſſarily infer, that Intelligibles are exiſtent; for we underſtand not only things exiſtent, but the inexiſtent; whence the Ephectick, whether enquiring or underſtanding, continueth in his Sceptick Inſtitution. For, that he aſſents to things that occur to him by paſſive Phantaſy, as they appear to him, is manifeſt.

Let us now ſee, whether the Dogmatiſts themſelves are not excluded from Inquiſition. It is not incongruous, that they who confeſs themſelves ignorant of the Nature of things, ſhould yet enquire after them, but that they who think they know them exactly ſhould do ſo; for theſe are arrived, as they think, at the End of Inquiſition, the others ſtill retain the Ground of Inquiſition, *to think they have not found*. We ſhall briefly enquire into every Part of that which they call Philoſophy. And foraſmuch as there is great Controverſy among the Dogmatiſts, concerning the Parts thereof; ſome aſſerting one, others two, others three, (which it is to no purpoſe here to enlarge,) we will explain the Opinion of thoſe who ſeem moſt perfectly converſant therein, and accommodate our Diſcourſe to that.

CHAP. II.

From whence the Inquiſition againſt Dogmatiſts ſhould begin.

THE Stoicks and ſome others ſay, The Parts of Philoſophy are three, *Logick*, *Phyſick*, *Ethick*; they begin with the Logick, teaching that firſt (yet there is no little Controverſy, which of them they ſhould begin withal.) Theſe we ſhall follow, without engaging our Opinion. And becauſe the Aſſertions in theſe three Parts require Judgment and a Criterie, and the Diſcourſe concerning the Criterie ſeemeth to belong to Logick, we will begin with the logical Part; and firſt of the Criterie.

CHAP. III.

Of the Criterie.

WHereas they call a Criterie, *that whereby Eſſence and Exiſtence* (as they ſay) *are judged*; as alſo, *that wherein we acquieſce in the Courſe of Life*: Our purpoſe now is to diſcourſe of that which they call, *The Criterie of Truth*; for of Criterie in the other Senſe, we diſcourſed formerly [a] in the firſt Book,

The *Criterie* of which we now diſcourſe is taken three ways, *Commonly*, *Properly*, *Moſt properly*. *Commonly*, *for every Meaſure of Comprehenſion*; *in which Senſe Naturals alſo are called Criteries*, *as*, *Sight*. *Properly*, *for every artificial Meaſure of Comprehenſion*; *as*, *a Ruler*, *a Pair of Compaſſes*. *Moſt properly*, *for every artificial Meaſure of Comprehenſion of a thing not manifeſt*; *in which Senſe*, *thoſe things which belong to the Actions of Life are not called Criteries*, *but the rational only*, *and thoſe which dogmatick Philoſophers alledge for Invention of Truth*. Our Deſign is, as we ſaid, to diſcourſe of the *rational Criterie*; and of this alſo there are three Kinds; *in which*, *by which*, *according to which*; as, *in which*, the Man; *by which*, the Senſe, or the Intellect; *according to which*, the Application of the Phantaſy; according to which a Man attempts to judge by one of the fore-named. This it was neceſſary firſt to lay down, for underſtanding the Subject of the Queſtion. It remains we confute thoſe, who unadviſedly affirm they comprehend the Criterie of Truth; we will begin with that.

CHAP. IV.

Whether there be any Criterie of Truth.

OF thoſe who have diſcourſed concerning the Criterie, ſome hold, that it is, as the Stoicks and others;

[a] Chap. 8.

others; some, that there is none, as (among the rest) *Xeniades* of *Corinth*, and *Xenophanes* of *Colophon*, who saith,

——*in every thing Opinion's fram'd.*

But we suspend, whether there be, or be not.

This Controversy they must hold to be either dijudicable, (that is, determinable) or indijudicable, (indeterminable.) If indijudicable, they grant, we ought to suspend in it; if dijudicable, let them say whereby it shall be judged, when as we have not a Criterie acknowledged by all, neither know we whether there indeed be one, but enquire.

Moreover, to judge this Controversy of the Criterie, it is requisite we have a Criterie acknowledged, by which we may judge it; and to have a Criterie acknowledged, it is necessary, that the Controversy concerning the Criterie be first judged. The Dispute thus incurring *the alternate Common-place*, it cannot be resolved whether there be a Criterie or no. For we grant them not a Criterie by supposition; and if they judge a Criterie by a Criterie, force them to go on *into infinite*.

Again, Demonstration requiring a Criterie demonstrated, and the Criterie a Demonstration dijudicated, they fall into the *alternate Common-place*.

This we conceive sufficient to confute the Confidence of the Dogmatists, in what they assert concerning a Criterie. It is not from the purpose to insist longer hereon, and to shew several other ways, whereby they may be confuted; but we shall not mention all their particular Opinions herein, (for it cannot be expressed, how much they differ among themselves concerning it; and this would put us out of the right Method in our Dispute.) Because therefore the Criterie after which we enquire seems threefold, *in which*, *by which*, *according to which*, we shall examine every one of these apart, and shew its Incomprehensibility. Thus our Discourse will be most methodical and perfect. We will begin with that *in which*, for the rest seem in some manner dubious by reason of it.

CHAP. V.

Of the Criterie, In which.

NOW *Man*, (in my opinion) by what the Dogmatists say, is not only not to be comprehended, but not to be understood; for we hear *Socrates* (in *Plato*) plainly confessing, *he knows not whether he is a Man or some other thing*. And when they would declare the Notion of *Man*, they first disagree among themselves, next they speak foolishly; for *Democritus* saith, *Man is that which we all know*; by which we cannot know what Man is; for we know a Dog, and according to this, a Dog shoul be a Man; some Men we know not, and therefo they should not be Men. But indeed, according t this Notion there will be no Man at all; for if it b necessary that a Man be known by all, there is n Man known to all Men, and consequently there i no Man at all. That we say not this sophistically but as a Consequence to his Doctrine, is apparent for he holds, that *nothing really exists but Atoms an Vacuum*, *which* (he saith) *exist not in Animals only but in all compounded things*; by these we cannot understand the Property of Man; for they are common to all, but there is in these nothing else within our Capacity; we have nothing therefore whereby we may distinguish Man from other Creatures, and understand him simply.

Epicurus saith, that *Man is such a kind of figured animate Being*: Now, according to this, seeing Man is only such a kind of Being, as is shewn, (by him, who thus describes him) that Person who is not such as is thus shewn, is not a Man: and if a Man (in describing Man after this manner) shew a Woman, the Man himself will not be a Man; or if a Woman shew a Man, the Woman will not be of Mankind. The same we may argue from the Difference of *Circumstances* mention'd in the fourth Common-place of Suspension.

Others say, *a Man is an Animal, rational, mortal, capable of Understanding and Science*: Now having shewn in the *first Common-place* of Suspension, that no Animal is irrational, but that all are capable of Understanding and Science, by their own Confession, we know not what they mean. Again, the Accidents which are inserted into a Definition, are meant either actual or potential. If actual, he is no Man who hath not attained perfect Science, and hath not perfect Science or Discourse, and is not in the State of Death, for that is to be mortal actually. If potential, he who hath perfect Reason, and hath attained Understanding and Science, is no Man; which were more absurd than the former.

Plato, who will have a Man to be *an Animal without Feathers, with two Feet, with broad Nails, capable of political Science*, dares not affirm this positively. For if a Man be, [z] as he holds, one of those things which are generated, but indeed are not; it is impossible (as he acknowledgeth) to affirm positively concerning things that are not. Neither doth *Plato* himself lay down this Position as certain, but discoursing, as he useth, according to the most probable.

But though we should grant, that Man may be understood, we shall nevertheless find that he cannot be comprehended. For we consist of Soul and Body, but neither Soul nor Body (perhaps) can be com-

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[z] So *Plato* distinguisheth often, especially in *Timæo*, where he at large explained τί τὸ ὂν μὲν ἀεὶ, γινόμενον δ' οὐ πώποτε, & τί γινόμενον μὲν, ὂν δ' οὐδέποτε.

rehended, therefore not Man. That *the Body is not comprehended*, appears from this; the Accidents of a thing are distinct from the thing to which they are Accidents; now when Colour, or the like, presents itself to us, the Accidents of the Body are presented to us, but not the Body itself. A Body, they say, hath three Dimensions; we must therefore, to comprehend the Body, comprehend the Length, Breadth, and Depth; but if this did present itself to us, we might discern Silver that is gilt: Therefore the Body cannot be comprehended.

Besides this, a Man shall be found to be incomprehensible, because *his Soul is incomprehensible*. That his Soul is incomprehensible, is manifest, thus. Of those who have discoursed concerning the Soul, (to omit the great undetermined Contest amongst them) some said that *there is no Soul*, as the Followers of *Dicæarchus* the *Messenian*; others, that *there is*; others *suspended*. This Controversy therefore, if the Dogmatists acknowledge to be indijudicable, they grant the Incomprehensibility of the Soul; if dijudicable, let them say, by what they judge and determine it. By Sense they cannot, for they hold the Soul to be intelligible; if by Intellect, we object, the Intellect is the most unmanifest thing in the Soul; as they shew, who agree in the Existence of the Soul, but disagree concerning her Intellect. If therefore they would comprehend the Soul, and determine the Controversy concerning her by Intellect, they would determine that which is less in Controversy, by that which is more in Controversy, which is absurd. Therefore neither by Intellect can the Question concerning the Soul be judged and determined, therefore by nothing; therefore it is incomprehensible, and consequently Man cannot be comprehended.

But tho' we should grant, that Man may be comprehended, yet perhaps it cannot be proved, that Things should be judged (and determined) by him. For he who saith, that Things should be judged by Man, saith it either without Demonstration or with Demonstration. Not with Demonstration, for Demonstration ought to be true and adjudged; but, we knowing none, who by the Consent of all, is able to judge the Demonstration, (for the Criterie *in which* is in question) we are not able to judge the Demonstration, and consequently cannot demonstrate the Criterie *in which*, the Subject of our Discourse. If it be said, that Things may be judged by Man without Demonstration, it will be incredible, because we have not any thing whereby to ascertain, that the Criterie *in which* is Man. From what shall it be judged, that the Criterie *in which* is Man? For if they say it without Judgment and Determination, it will not be admitted; if as determined by Man, the Question is begged; if, as by any other Creature, how can any such be allow'd, to determine that Man is the Criterie? If without Determination, it is of no credit; if with Determination, that Criterie must again be judged by some other, to be capable of determining; if by itself, the Absurdity continues, for the Thing in question is determin'd by the Thing in question. If by Man, the *alternate Common-place* comes in. If by any other besides these, we shall again require a Criterie *in which*, and so to infinite. Therefore, we cannot say, Things are to be determined by Man.

But if it be granted, that Man ought to determine Things; yet seeing there is so great Dissention amongst Men, the Dogmatists must agree among themselves, what one Man they ought to follow, before they impose it upon us. Otherwise, if,

As long as Streams shall flow, and tall Trees bloom,

they are like to disagree upon this, why do they press us so earnestly to assent to any one Person? If, say they, we must believe a wise Man; we shall ask, What kind of wise Man, whether an *Epicurean*, or a *Stoick*, or a *Cynick?* They cannot agree which. If any require us to lay down this Question concerning the wise Man, and simply to believe him who is wiser than all others; first, they will herein also disagree, who is wiser than the rest; and, tho' they could agree in some one Person, acknowledging him wiser than all that are, or ever were, yet neither will he be worthy to be credited; for there being a great, and, almost infinite Intension and Remission, as to Wisdom, we say, it is possible, there may be another wiser than this Man, whom they hold to be wiser than all that either are or were. As therefore they require of us to give credit to him, that is said to be wiser than all that are, or ever were, in respect of his Wisdom; so, if one comes after him wiser than he, this last is to be believed before him; and whilst this second lives, we may hope for another wiser than he; after whom, another; and so to infinite. Now whether these will agree with one another, no Man knows. So that tho' it were granted, that there is one Man wiser than all that are, or ever were; yet because we cannot affirm, there shall never be any one wiser than he, (for that is uncertain,) we ought always to expect the Judgment of that future wisest Person, and not assent to him who is wisest at present.

But tho' we should grant, that there is not, was not, nor ever shall be, any Person wiser than him whom they suppose, yet neither is it convenient to believe him; for wise Persons affect most (in the Construction of Things) to maintain Paradoxes, making the unsound seem sound and true. When therefore the sagacious Person says any thing, we cannot tell whether he speaks it according to the Nature of the Thing itself, or alledgeth a Falsity as if it were a Truth; persuading us to believe it, he being wiser than all Men, and therefore we not able to contradict

dict him. Thus ought we not to assent to him, as judging Things rightly, because we may imagine, the Things which he saith are not true, but represented as such, by the extraordinary Advantage he hath over us in Sagacity. For these Reasons, we ought not, in the Judgment of Things, to believe him, who seemeth the most sagacious of all Men.

If any shall say, we ought to believe the Agreement of many. We answer, That to do so is foolish; for first, Truth perhaps is rare, and therefore one may be wiser than many. Again, every Criterie hath more Adversaries than those who agree in defence thereof. For all those who maintain any other Criterie whatsoever, oppose them who agree in the Defence of one, and are therefore of much greater Number than the others. Besides, they who agree, either are in different Affections, or in one. In different they are not, at least as to this, for then they would not agree in it. If in one, seeing that he who affirmeth any thing, different from this which they agree in, hath one Affection, and all they who agree in it have but one; as to the Affections which we follow, there is no Advantage in the Number: Wherefore we ought not to follow many rather than one. As also, because the Difference of Judgment, as to their Multitude, is incomprehensible, as we shewed from the *fourth Common-place* of Suspension; for there are infinite Men, if we consider them singly, neither are we able to examine the Judgments of all, and so to say what the greater part holds, what the fewest. It is therefore in this respect absurd also, to prefer some Judges before others, because of their Number. And if the Judgment of all in general is not to be followed, neither shall we find any at all by whom Things may be judged, tho' we should grant never so much otherwise. Wherefore by all this, the Criterie *in which* all Things are judged appears to be incomprehensible; and the other Criteries being circumscribed by this, (for each of them is either a part, or a Passion, or an Action of Man) it followeth, we need not perhaps speak of them,[a] having here discoursed of them already. But lest we should seem to decline the Confutation of every one in particular, we will say something over and above of them; and first of the Criterie called, *By which*.

CHAP. VI.

Of the Criterie, By which.

GREAT, almost infinite, is the Disagreement amongst the Dogmatists concerning this; but we, observing our first Method, shall only say; Forasmuch as, according to them, Man is the Criterie *in which* Things are judged, but he hath nothing *by which* he can judge (as they all agree) besides Sense and Intellect; if we shew he cannot judge neither by *Sense* alone, nor by *Intellect* alone, nor by *both* together, we shall compendiously refute all their particular Assertions.

Let us begin with the *Senses*. Whereas some hold that *the Affections of the Senses are vain*, (and that none of those Things which we think that we perceive, are subjected to them.) Others, that *all the Things by which the Senses think they are moved, are subjected to them*. Others, that *some of them are subjected to the Senses, others not*. We know not to which of these we should assent, for we cannot determine the Controversy, neither by Sense, (for the Question is, whether that be vainly affected, or comprehended truly) nor by any other; for there is no other Criterie whereby it ought to be determined, (according to the Hypothesis); it will therefore be indeterminable and incomprehensible, whether Sense be vainly affected, or comprehendeth any thing. Whence it followeth, that we ought not to rely wholly upon Sense in the Determination of Things, when as we cannot say that it comprehendeth any thing.

But let us grant the Senses to be comprehensive, yet will they be found to be nothing the less uncreditable, as to Determination concerning external Objects. The Senses are contrarily moved by Externals, as the Taste by the same Honey is sometimes affected sweetly, sometimes bitterly. The Sight thinketh the same Colour sometimes red, sometimes white. Neither doth the Smell agree with itself. He who hath some kind of Obstructions in the Head, thinketh Unguents not to be sweet; he who hath not, saith they are sweet. Persons divinely inspired, and fanatick, imagine they hear others discoursing with them, whom we hear not. The same Water, to those who are troubled with an Inflammation, seems excessive hot, to others moderately warm. Now whether shall we say, All these Phantasies are true, or all false; or some false, some true? To say, that all are false, is impossible, for we have not any Criterie uncontroverted, whereby to determine that which we prefer; neither have we any true determined Demonstration, seeing that the Criterie of Truth, whereby true Demonstration ought to be determined, is still in question. For this Reason, he who conceived we ought to give credit to those who are well, and not to those who are not, speaks absurdly; for saying this without Demonstration, he shall not be believed; but a true adjudged Demonstration he cannot have, for the Reasons alledged.

But though we should grant that the Phantasies of those who are well, are creditable, others not; nevertheless it will be found, that external Objects cannot be judged by the Senses only. The Sight, in Persons that are well, judgeth the same Tower some-

[a] Reading ἀκόλουθον μὴ ἂν.

ſometimes to be round, ſometimes ſquare; the Taſte judgeth the ſame Meats upon Repletion ſowre, in Hunger pleaſant; the Hearing perceiveth the ſame Voice in the Night loud, in the Day low; the Smell, what moſt Men declare to be ſtinking, in Tanners commonly denies it; the ſame Touch when we enter a Bath is warmed by the Paraſtas, when we come out cooled by it. Wherefore ſeeing the Senſes of ſuch as are well, diſagree amongſt themſelves, and their Diſagreement is indeterminable, (for we have not any thing univerſally acknowledged, whereby they may be determined) the Doubt muſt neceſſarily be inſolvable. Many other Things might be alledg'd out of the Common-places of Suſpenſion. Thus perhaps it is not true, that Senſe alone can judge of external Objects.

Let us now come to *Intellect*. They who conceive, that Intellect only is to be followed in the Judication of Things; Firſt, they cannot demonſtrate it to be comprehenſible, that there is Intellect; for *Gorgias*, in ſaying, *There is nothing*, ſaith, that there is not Intellect. Others aſſert, *It exiſts*. How will they determine this Controverſy? Not by Intellect, (for that were to beg the Queſtion) nor by any other; for they ſay, there is no other (according to the Hypotheſis) by which the Things may be judged. It remains therefore indeterminable and incomprehenſible, whether there be Intellect or not. Whence it followeth, that we ought not to rely upon Intellect only, in the Dijudication of Things, being itſelf is not yet comprehended.

But let us admit Intellect to be comprehended, and grant, by way of Suppoſition, that it exiſts; notwithſtanding, I ſay, it cannot determine of Things; for it ſeeth not itſelf exactly, but diſagreeth concerning its own Eſſence, and the manner of its Generation; how then can it exactly comprehend other Things? Beſides, though we grant Intellect to be capable to determine of Things, yet we ſhall not find how to determine by it. For there being much Difference as to Intellect; one Intellect of *Gorgias*, according to which he ſaith, *Nothing is*; another of *Heraclitus*, according to which he ſaith, *All Things are*; another of thoſe who affirm, *Some things are, others are not:* We ſhall not find any way to dijudicate theſe Differences of Intellects, nor be able to ſay, This Intellect is to be preferred before that, or that not to be preferred before this. For if we would judge it by any Intellect, we yield to Parties in the Difference, and beg the Queſtion; if by any other than by Intellect, we are deceived, becauſe we ought to judge things by Intellect only. Moreover, from what we ſaid upon the Criterie *by which*, may be demonſtrated, that we can neither find a Sagacity exceeding the Sagacity of others; nor if we could find an Intellect more ſagacious, than any ever had, or have been; yet, (foraſmuch as it is uncertain whether there will not be one more ſagacious than it) we ought not to follow it. And though we ſhould ſuppoſe an Intellect more ſagacious, than any ſhall ever be hereafter, yet ought we not to follow him who judgeth by it, leſt alledging ſome falſe Reaſon, he perſuade us, by the Acuteneſs of his Wit, that it is true. Therefore neither doth Intellect only judge things.

It remaineth we ſay, that Things are judged *by both*, which likewiſe is impoſſible; for the Senſes are ſo far from guiding the Intellect to Comprehenſion, that they contradict one another. Honey ſeems ſweet to ſome, bitter to others; *Democritus* held, *it is neither ſweet nor bitter*; *Heraclitus*, that *it is both*. 'Tis the ſame in other Senſes, and other Senſibles. So as the Intellect, impelled by the Senſes, is conſtrained to affirm things different and repugnant. But ſuch a kind of Criterie is far from comprehenſive.

Moreover, they muſt ſay, That they judge Things either by all the Senſes, and all [b] Intellects; or, by ſome. By all, it is impoſſible; there appearing ſo great Controverſy amongſt ſeveral Senſes and Intellects, (likewiſe the Intellect of *Gorgias* declaring, that *neither the Judgment of Senſe or Intellect ought to be followed*, the Argument will be retorted:) If by ſome, Who can judge, that we ought to adhere to the Senſes, and this Intellect, and not to thoſe, not having an acknowledged Criterie, by which to judge different Senſes and Intellects. If we ſay, that they judge Senſes and Intellects by Intellect and Senſe, [c] they beg the queſtion, which is, Whether we can judge by theſe.

Again, either he judgeth Senſes and Intellects by Senſe, or Senſes and Intellects by Intellect; or Senſes by Senſe, and Intellects by Intellect; or Intellects by Senſe, and Senſe by Intellect. If they ſay, they judge theſe by Senſes or Intellect, they judge not by Senſe and Intellect, but by one of them, which they make choice of, and conſequently incur the Difficulties alledged formerly. If Senſes by Senſe, and Intellects by Intellect, there being ſo great Repugnance of Senſes to Senſes, and Intellects to Intellects, which ſoever they take of the repugnant Senſes to judge the reſt of the Senſes, they beg the queſtion; for they aſſume Part of the Difference, as creditable, for Dijudication of Things equally controverted with it. It is the ſame in Intellects. If they judge Intellects by Senſes, and Senſes by Intellects, the *alternate Common-place* occurs, ſhewing, that to judge Senſes we prejudge Intellects, and to examine Intellects we muſt prejudge Senſes. Wherefore ſeeing that Criteries of one kind cannot be judged by Criteries of the

[b] Read here and after, διανοίαις. [c] Betwixt κριτηρίῳ & τινί, there is a Breach and Defect, in the *M. S.* of Mr. *Caſaubon* and Sir *Henry Savile*; which the printed Edition not taking notice of, confounds the Senſe.

ſame kind, nor both kinds by one kind, nor reciprocally one kind by the other kind; nor can we prefer Intellect before Intellect, or Senſe before Senſe; it follows, That we have not any thing whereby to judge. For if we cannot judge by all Senſes and Intellects, nor know by which we ought to judge, and by which not to judge, we ſhall not have any thing by which to judge things. Wherefore there is no Criterie *by which*.

CHAP. VII.

Of the Criterie, According to which.

LET us next examine the Criterie *according to which* Things are judged. In the firſt place we may hold that Phantaſy is unconceivable; for they ſay *Phantaſy is an Impreſſion in the Hegemonick part of the Soul*. Seeing therefore that the Soul and the Hegemonick is a Spirit, or ſomething more ſubtle than Spirit, as they themſelves hold; no Man can conceive that there is in himſelf an Impreſſion, either by Extuberance and Depreſſion, as we ſee in Scales; or by the wonderfully invented Heteræotick; for he could retain in Memory ſo many Theorems, as make up an Art, becauſe by ſucceeding Heteræoſes, the precedent would be defaced.

But tho' there were ſuch a thing as Phantaſy, yet would it be incomprehenſible, for it is a Paſſion of the Hegemonick; the Hegemonick, as we ſhew'd, is not comprehended; therefore neither can we comprehend its Affection.

Moreover, tho' we ſhould grant that Phantaſy is comprehended, yet Things cannot be judged according to it; for it doth not (ſay they) apply itſelf to Externals, and conceive Phantaſies in itſelf, but by the Senſes. Now the Senſes comprehend not the external Objects, but their Affections only: For Honey, and my being ſweetly affected, are not all one thing; neither is Wormwood the ſame with my being bitterly affected; they differ. But if the Affection differ from the external Object, the Phantaſy will not be of the external Object, but of ſome other thing different from it. Therefore if the Intellect judge according to the Phantaſy, it will judge amiſs, and not according to the Object; whence it is abſurd to ſay, external Objects are judicated according to the Phantaſy.

Neither can it be ſaid, that the Soul comprehends ſenſible Objects by ſenſible Affections, becauſe the Affections of the Senſes are like their external Objects; for how can the Intellect know whether the Affections of the Senſes are like the ſenſible Objects, when as itſelf meddles not with external Objects, neither do the Senſes declare the Natures of them to her, but only their own Affections, as we argued in the *Common-places of Suſpenſion?* For as he who knows not *Socrates*, if he look upon his Picture knows not whether it be like *Socrates*; ſo that Intellect, beholding the Affections of the Senſes, but not ſeeing the external Objects themſelves, cannot tell whether the Affections of the Senſes are like their external Objects. Therefore neither by Aſſimilation can it judge thoſe things according to the Phantaſy.

But let us grant that the Phantaſy cannot only underſtand and comprehend, but is able alſo to judge things of itſelf, (tho' we have proved the contrary) it follows that either we muſt believe all Phantaſies, (one whereof ſaith, that all Phantaſies are incredible, by which means the Argument will be retorted, that all Phantaſies, by their own Acknowledgment, are not capable to judge things) or if we muſt believe only ſome, How ſhall we judge, which Phantaſies are to be believed, which not? If without Phantaſy, then they grant, that Phantaſy is not requiſite to the Judgment of Things, inaſmuch as they ſay they can judge things without it. If with Phantaſy, How will they aſſume that Phantaſy by which they mean to judge all other Phantaſies? Or again, they will need another Phantaſy to judge the Phantaſy by which they judge all Phantaſies, and another to judge that, and ſo to infinite; but it is impoſſible to judge to infinite; therefore it is impoſſible to find what Phantaſies ought to be uſed as Criteries, what not. Since therefore, which way ſoever we grant that things ought to be judged according to Phantaſies, the Argument will be retorted, whether by all, or by ſome only; we conclude, that Phantaſies ought not to be uſed as Criteries, to judge things.

This may ſerve for an Anſwer, by way of Summary, to the Criterie, *according to which*: But take notice that our Purpoſe is not to prove there is no Criterie of Truth exiſtent (for that were dogmatical) but becauſe the Dogmatiſts ſeem probably to have evinced that there is a Criterie of Truth, we have propoſed Arguments that ſeem probable againſt them; not that we think them true, or more probable than the contrary; but foraſmuch as theſe Arguments, and thoſe of the Dogmatiſts, ſeem alike probable, we are driven to Suſpenſion.

CHAP. VIII.

Of True and Truth.

THough we ſhould grant, (by way of Suppoſition) that there is ſome Criterie of Truth, yet will it be uſeleſs and vain, if we prove, (even out of what the Dogmatiſts themſelves ſay) that Truth is not, neither can it be. We ſhew it thus: *True is ſaid to differ from Truth three Ways; by Eſſence, by Conſtitution, by Power. By Eſſence; for True is incorporeal, (as being an Axiom and a Dicible) but Truth is a Body, as being the enunciative Science of all true things; but Science is the Hegemonick after ſuch a manner, as the Fiſt is the Hand after ſuch a manner, but the Hegemonick*

gemonick is a Body, for (according to them) it is a Spirit.

By Conſtitution; for True is ſomething ſimple, as, I diſcourſe; but Truth conſiſts of the Knowledge of many true Things.

By Power; for Truth adhereth to Science; True doth not abſolutely; whence they ſay that Truth can only be in a wiſe Perſon, but True in a wicked; for a wicked Man may ſpeak ſomething that is true. Thus the Dogmatiſts.

But we continuing our firſt Deſign, will diſcourſe only concerning *True:* For *Truth*, which is ſaid to be *the Science of the Knowledge of Things True*, is included therein. Again, foraſmuch as of Arguments, ſome are general, by which we take away the Subſtance of True; others particular, whereby we ſhew that Truth is neither in Speech, nor in a Dicible, nor in the Motion of the Intellect, we conceive it ſufficient to uſe only the General. For, as when the Foundation of a Wall is taken away, all the Superſtructures fall; ſo the Subſiſtence of True being taken away, the particular Conceits of the Dogmatiſts are thereby excluded alſo.

CHAP. IX.

Whether True be ſomething in Nature.

THere being a Diſagreement amongſt the Dogmatiſts concerning Truth (ſome holding, that True is ſomething, others that it is not) the Controverſy is not capable to be judged. For he who ſaith, that *True is ſomething*, if he ſay it without Demonſtration, will not be credited, becauſe of the Diſagreement; if he alledge a Demonſtration, and acknowledge it to be falſe, he is increditable; if he ſay, that it is True, he runs into the *alternate Common-Place*. It will be required of him, that he produce a Demonſtration to demonſtrate that to be True, and another to prove, and ſo to infinite; but it is impoſſible to demonſtrate Infinites, therefore it is impoſſible to know whether *True* be *ſomething*.

Again, this *ſomething*, which they hold to be the moſt General of all things, is either true or falſe, or neither true nor falſe, or both true and falſe. If they ſay, it is falſe, they confeſs that all things are falſe: For, as becauſe an Animal is ſomething Animate, therefore every Animal in particular is Animate; in like manner, if this *ſomething*, being the moſt General of all Things, be falſe, all Things in particular will be falſe, and nothing true. Whence alſo may be inferred that *nothing is falſe*; for this Propoſition, *all Things are falſe*, this other *ſomething is falſe*, including all Things, will be falſe. And if ſomething be True, all Things will be True, and conſequently nothing will be True; for this Propoſition, *Nothing is true*, will be True.

If ſomething be both true and falſe, every thing in particular will be both true and falſe; whence it will follow, that nothing is in its own Nature true; for that which is true in its own Nature, cannot by any means be falſe.

If ſomething be neither true nor falſe, they confeſs, that all things in particular being ſaid to be neither true nor falſe, are not true, and therefore it is not manifeſt to us whether this be true.

Moreover, either things manifeſt only are true, or only Things not manifeſt; or of true Things, ſome are manifeſt, others not manifeſt: But neither of theſe, as ſhall be proved; therefore nothing is True. If only Things manifeſt are true, they muſt ſay that all the manifeſt are true, or ſome only; if *all*, the Argument will be retorted, ſaying *it is manifeſt, that nothing is True*; if *ſome*, none can ſay, without Dijudication, *this is True, that falſe*. If he uſe a Criterie, he muſt grant it to be either manifeſt or unmanifeſt; not unmanifeſt, for the manifeſt only are now ſuppoſed true; if manifeſt, we demand, which manifeſt things are True, which falſe? The Thing manifeſt, aſſumed to judge Things manifeſt, will itſelf require another Criterie, and that another, and ſo to infinite; but it is impoſſible to judge to infinite; therefore it is impoſſible to comprehend, which manifeſt Things only are True.

He who ſaith, *only unmanifeſt* Things are True, holdeth not that all Things are True, (for he will not ſay, *that the Stars are even and that they are odd, is alike true*); if *ſome*, by what ſhall we judge that theſe unmanifeſt Things are true, thoſe falſe? Not by any thing manifeſt, and if by any thing unmanifeſt, that unmanifeſt Thing will require another to judge, and this another, and ſo to infinite. Wherefore, neither are only Things unapparent True.

It remains, that we ſay of the True, ſome are manifeſt, others unmanifeſt, which alſo is abſurd. For either all things both manifeſt and unmanifeſt, are True, or ſome of the manifeſt, and ſome of the unmanifeſt. If all, the Argument will be retorted, granting it to be True, that *nothing is True*. He likewiſe grants it to be True, *that the Stars are even, and that they are odd*. If of the manifeſt ſome only are True, and of the unmanifeſt ſome only, by what ſhall we judge that of the manifeſt, theſe are True, theſe Falſe; if by a thing manifeſt, we run into infinite. If by an unmanifeſt, foraſmuch as the unmanifeſt requires Dijudication alſo, by what ſhall that unmanifeſt be judged? If by a manifeſt, the *alternate Common-place* occurs; if by an unmanifeſt, the Common-place of *infinite*. The ſame may be ſaid of the unmanifeſt; for he who undertakes to judge it by an unmanifeſt, is forc'd to run into infinite; he who by a manifeſt, either aſſuming a manifeſt, runs into the Common-place of *infinite*, or paſſing to an unmanifeſt, into the *alternate*. It is

therefore falſe to ſay, that of the True ſome are manifeſt, others not manifeſt.

Now if neither the manifeſt only are true, nor only the unmanifeſt, nor ſome of the manifeſt, and ſome of the unmanifeſt, then nothing is True; and if nothing be True, the Criterie conducing to the Judgment of Truth, would be uſeleſs and vain, tho' we ſhould grant it had a Being. Now if we muſt ſuſpend concerning this Queſtion, *whether True be ſomething*, it will follow, that they who ſay, *Dialectick is the Science of Things True, Falſe, and Neuter*, ſpeak raſhly; ſince the Criterie of Truth appears to be undeterminable; neither can we affirm any thing, either concerning thoſe Things which ſeem *evident*, as the Dogmatiſts call them, or concerning the unmanifeſt; for ſince the latter, (as the Dogmatiſts conceive) are comprehended by the former, if we are inforced to ſuſpend concerning the Evident, how dare we aſſert concerning the Unmanifeſt?

But we ſhall (over and above) alledge our Arguments againſt particular Things; and foraſmuch as theſe ſeem to be comprehended by *Sign*, and *Demonſtration*, we ſhall ſhew that we ought to ſuſpend our Aſſent concerning Sign and Demonſtration. We will begin with *Sign*, for Demonſtration is a Species of Sign.

CHAP. X.

Of Sign.

OF Things (according to the Dogmatiſts) *ſome are* manifeſt, others unmanifeſt. *Of the unmanifeſt, ſome are* abſolutely unmanifeſt, *others* unmanifeſt for a Time, *others* unmanifeſt by Nature. *Manifeſt they hold to be thoſe things which of themſelves come into our Knowledge, as,* it is Day. *Abſolutely unmanifeſt, thoſe which come not within the Reach of our Comprehenſion, as, that the Number of the Stars is even. Unmanifeſt for a time, thoſe which are manifeſt in their own Nature, but by reaſon of ſome external Circumſtances, they are for a time not manifeſt to us, as the City of* Athens *is to me at this preſent. Unmanifeſt by Nature, are thoſe which have a Nature not ſubject to be manifeſt to us, as Pores; for theſe never appear to us of themſelves, but are comprehended from ſome others, as by Sweat or the like. Manifeſt things, ſay they, require not a Sign, (for they are comprehended of themſelves); neither thoſe which are abſolutely unmanifeſt, for they are no way to be comprehended; but the unmanifeſt for a Time, and the unmanifeſt by Nature, are comprehended by Signs, yet not by the ſame; the unmanifeſt for a Time, by the Hypomneſtick, (admonitive) the unmanifeſt by Nature, by the Endictick (indicative.) Of Signs therefore, ſome are according to them, Hypomneſtick, others Endictick. A Hypomneſtick Sign, they call that which being obſerved to be together with a Significate, evident, as ſoon as ever the Sign evidently incurreth to our Senſe, tho' the Significate appear not, yet it cauſeth us to remember that which was concomitant to it, tho' at preſent not evident, as Smoke and Fire.*

An Endictick Sign (ſay they) *is that which is not obſerved together with an evident* [a] *Significate, but of its own Nature and Conſtitution ſignifieth that whereof it is a Sign; thus the Motions of the Body are Signs of the Soul.*

Hereupon they define Sign thus, *Sign is a demonſtrative Axiom, antecedent in a ſound Connex, detective of that which followeth.*

Of theſe two kinds of Signs we oppoſe not both, but only the Endictick, as ſeeming to be forged by the Dogmatiſts; the Hypomneſtick is creditable in the Courſe of Life; for whoſoever ſees Smoke knows that Fire is ſignified; and ſeeing a Scar, ſaith, it had been a Wound. So as we not only not contradict the common Courſe of Life, but maintain it, aſſenting, inopiniatively, to that in it which is creditable, but oppoſing what is particularly forged by the Dogmatiſts. Thus much it was requiſite to ſay for Explication of the Queſtion. We now proceed to Confutation, not endeavouring to ſhew that the Endictick Sign is wholly inexiſtent, but the apparent Equivalence of Arguments on both Sides, for its Exiſtence and Inexiſtence.

CHAP. XI.

Whether there be any Endictick Sign.

A Sign therefore, by what the Dogmatiſts ſpeak of it, is unintelligible. The *Stoicks*, who have diſcourſed with moſt Exactneſs hereupon, to ſhew the Notion of Sign, ſay, "A Sign is an Axiom antecedent in a ſound Connex, detective of that "which follows. Axiom, *they ſay*, is a Dicible, "Self-perfect, Enunciative as it is within itſelf. A "ſound Connex is that which beginneth not from "true, and endeth in falſe; for a Connex either be-"ginneth from true, and endeth in true; as if it is Day, "it is Light; or it beginneth from falſe, and endeth "in falſe, as, if the Earth flyeth, the Earth has "Wings: Or, it beginneth from true, and endeth "in falſe; as, if the Earth is, the Earth flies: Or, "it beginneth from falſe and endeth in true; as, if "the Earth flyeth, the Earth is. Of theſe they hold "that only to be unſound which beginneth from "true and endeth in falſe, the reſt are all true. An-"tecedent they call that, which goeth foremoſt in a "Connex, beginning from true and ending in true; "it is detective of that which followeth, for in this "Connex, if ſhe hath Milk, ſhe hath conceived; "Theſe

[a] M. S. Συμαινομένῳ.

" Theſe Words, She hath conceived, are declared by " thoſe, She hath Milk." *Thus they.*

Now we firſt ſay, That it is uncertain whether there be a *Dicible:* For ſeeing that of the Dogmatiſts, the *Epicureans* ſay, there is no *Dicible*; the *Stoicks*, that there is; when the *Stoicks* ſay, that a *Dicible* is ſomething, either they uſe Aſſertion only, or Demonſtration alſo. If Aſſertion only, the *Epicureans* will oppoſe it with the contrary Aſſertion, that a *Dicible* is nothing. If by Demonſtration, foraſmuch as Demonſtration conſiſts of dicible Axioms, nothing that conſiſts of *Dicibles* can be aſſumed to prove that a *Dicible* is ſomething. For he who allows not a *Dicible* to be, How will he grant a Collection of *Dicibles to be?* Thus, whoſoever ſhall endeavour by a Collection of *Dicibles* to prove that there is a *Dicible*, goes about to prove a thing controverted, by a thing controverted. If therefore neither ſimply, nor by Demonſtration, it cannot be proved that there is a *Dicible*, it is not manifeſt that there is a *Dicible*, and conſequently that there is an Axiom; for, an Axiom is a *Dicible.*

Yet, though by way of Suppoſition, we ſhould grant, that there is a *Dicible*; an Axiom will be found notwithſtanding to be inexiſtent, which conſiſts of *Dicibles* not coexiſtent with one another. As for Example in theſe, *If it is Day, it is Light*; when I ſay, *it is Day*, I have not yet ſaid *it is Light*; and when I ſay *it is Light*, I had before ſaid that *it is Day.* If therefore whatſoever is compounded of any thing cannot exiſt unleſs its Parts coexiſt with one another, but the Parts whereof an Axiom is compounded coexiſt not with one another, therefore an Axiom will not exiſt.

But beſides all this, *a ſound Connex* will be found to be incomprehnſible. For, *Philo* ſaith, *That is a ſound Connex which beginneth not from true and endeth in falſe, as (it being Day and I diſputing) this, If it is Day, I diſpute. But* Diodorus *ſaith, That beginning from true it neither could nor can end in falſe, according to whom that Connexion ſeemeth to be falſe; for it being Day, and I being ſilent, it will begin in True and end in Falſe. But this is a true one. If the Elements of Things are not indiviſible, the Elements of Things are indiviſible, for beginning always from falſe (the Elements of Things are not indiviſible) it will end in true, the Elements of Things are indiviſible. But they who introduce* Synarteſis, *ſay, That is a ſound Connex, when that which is contrary to that which ends in it, is contrary to that which is antecedent in it, according to whom theſe Connexes which we have inſtanced are unſound; but this is a true one, If it is Day it is Day. They who judge by Emphaſis, ſay, That is a true Connex whoſe Conſequent is potentially contained in the Antecedent; according to whom this, If it be Day it is Day; and every Reduplicate connex'd Axiom perhaps will be falſe, for a Thing cannot contain itſelf.* Thus this Controverſy ſeems indeterminable; for neither ſhall we be creditable, if we prefer any of the fore-mentioned Propoſitions without Demonſtration, nor with Demonſtration; for the Demonſtration ſeemeth then to be ſound, when its Concluſion followeth the Conjunction of its Sumptions or Premiſes, as the Conſequent the Antecedent. As thus; If it is Day it is Light; but it is Day, therefore it is Light. But if we demand how the Conſequence of the Conſequent to the Antecedent ſhall be judged, they incur *the Alternate* Common-place; for to demonſtrate the Dijudication of the Connex, the Concluſion as we ſaid muſt follow the Sumptions of the Demonſtration. Again, that this may be credited, the Connex and the Conſequence ought to be determined, which is abſurd. Therefore a ſound Connex is incomprehenſible.

Likewiſe the Antecedent is undeterminable. For *the Antecedent*, (ſay they,) *is that which goeth foremoſt, in ſuch a Connex as beginneth from true and endeth in true.* Now if it be a Sign detective of the Conſequent, either the Conſequent is manifeſt or unmanifeſt; if manifeſt, it needs no detective, for it will be comprehended together with the other; neither is it a Significate, and therefore this is not its Sign; if unmanifeſt, foraſmuch as there is an undetermined Controverſy concerning Things not manifeſt, which of them is true, which falſe, and whether any of them be true, it will be unmanifeſt whether the Connex ſpeak true; whence it followeth, that it is alſo unmanifeſt, whether the Antecedent in it precede (rightly.)

But beſides this, Though there be a Significate to the Sign, yet it cannot be detective of the Conſequent, even for this Reaſon, becauſe it is comprehended together with it: For Relatives are comprehended together; as Right cannot be comprehended before Left, as being Right in relation to Left, not on the contrary Right without Left. The like in all other Relatives; ſo it is impoſſible that the Sign can be comprehended before the Significate; but if the Sign be not comprehended before the Significate, it cannot be detective of it, the Significate being comprehended together with it, and not after it. Thus from their diſagreeing Opinions, we may gather that a Sign is unintelligible, for they ſay that it is Relative, and Detective of the Significate to which it is Relative; whence it followeth, That if it be Relative to the Significate, it muſt neceſſarily be comprehended together with the Significate, as Right with Left, Upwards with Downwards, and the like: But if it be detective of the Significate, it is neceſſary that it be comprehended before it, that, being firſt known, it may bring us to the Notion of the Thing which is known by it; but it is impoſſible to underſtand a Thing which cannot be known but by the Fore-knowledge of another thing which cannot be known before it. Therefore it is impoſſible to underſtand any thing which is not only relative to, but detective alſo of, that to which

which it is relative: But a Sign, ſay they, is both relative to, and detective of the Significate, therefore it is impoſſible to underſtand the Sign.

Moreover, it was a Controverſy before our Time, ſome affirming, that there is an Endictick Sign, others that there is none; now he who ſaith that there is an Endictick Sign, either affirmeth it barely without Demonſtration, or with Demonſtration. If with bare Affirmation, he will not be creditable; if he would demonſtrate it, he begs the Queſtion. For the Genus of Demonſtration being Sign, when we queſtion whether there be Sign, we queſtion whether there is Demonſtration; as, If we queſtion whether there be an Animal, we queſtion whether there be a Man, for Man is an Animal; but to demonſtrate a thing controverted by a thing controverted, or by itſelf, is abſurd; therefore it cannot be demonſtrated that there is a Sign. And if it can neither be affirmed ſimply nor demonſtratively, it is impoſſible to frame a comprehenſive Enunciation of it. Now if Sign be not exactly comprehended, neither can it be ſaid to be ſignificant of any thing, it not being acknowledged itſelf; therefore there will be no Sign. Whence, according to this Argument, Sign is unexiſtent and unintelligible.

Again, Signs either are apparent only, or unapparent only, or ſome apparent, others unapparent; but none of theſe is true, therefore there is no Sign. That Signs are not unapparent, is ſhewn thus. What is unapparent is not manifeſted by itſelf, according to the Dogmatiſts, but occurreth to us through ſome other; a Sign therefore if it be unapparent will require another Sign, which alſo will be unapparent (for according to the propoſed Hypotheſis, no Sign is apparent) and that another, and ſo to infinite: But it is impoſſible to take infinite Signs, therefore it is impoſſible to comprehend a Sign, it being unapparent. For which Reaſon it will be inexiſtent, not capable to ſignify any thing, as to be a Sign, becauſe it cannot be comprehended. On the contrary, If all Signs are apparent, foraſmuch as the Sign is relative to the Significate, and Relatives are comprehended together with one another, the Significate being comprehended together with the Apparent, will be alſo apparent. For as Right and Left incurring to us together, Right is not ſaid to be more apparent than Left, or Left than Right; in like manner the Sign and the Significate being comprehended together, it cannot be ſaid that the Sign is more apparent than the Significate: But if the Significate be apparent, it is not a Significate, as not needing any to ſignify and detect it. Whence taking away Right, we take away Left alſo; ſo taking away the Significate, the Sign cannot exiſt. Thus the Sign will be found to be inexiſtent, if we ſay that Signs only are apparent. It remains, we ſay, that of Signs ſome are apparent, ſome unapparent; but this alſo incurs the ſame Difficulties; for the Significates of apparent Signs will be apparent, as we ſaid, not requiring any thing to ſignify them, and conſequently they will not be Significates. Whence neither will the other be Signs, as ſignifying nothing; the unmaniſeſt Signs requiring ſomething to detect them. If they ſay, they are ſignified by unmaniſeſt, the Argument running into Infinite, they will be found to be Incomprehenſible, and conſequently Inexiſtent, as we ſaid. If by apparent, they will alſo be apparent, as being comprehended together with their apparent Signs, and conſequently will alſo be inexiſtent, for it is impoſſible a thing ſhould be by Nature apparent and unapparent; but the Signs, of which our Diſcourſe is, being ſuppoſed unapparent, will be found to be apparent, by retorting the Argument. If therefore neither all Signs be apparent, nor all unapparent; nor ſome apparent, others unapparent; and that there be nothing more than this, as they acknowledge, what they call Signs will be inexiſtent. Theſe few Arguments, alledged out of many, may ſuffice to ſhew, that there is no Endictick Sign.

Let us now lay down the Arguments of thoſe who hold a Sign to be, that we may ſhew the Equivalence of contrary Reaſons. Either the Words alledged againſt Sign ſignify ſomething, or they ſignify nothing; if inſignificant, how can they take away the Exiſtence of Sign: If they ſignify what Sign is, they are demonſtrative againſt Sign, or not demonſtrative; if not demonſtrative, they do not demonſtrate that Sign is not; if demonſtrative, Demonſtration being a *Species* of Sign, detective of its Concluſion, Sign will be. Whence is argued thus, If Sign be ſomething, there is Sign; and if there be not Sign, there is Sign; for that there is no Sign muſt be proved by Demonſtration, which is a Sign. Now either Sign is, or it is not, therefore it is not.

Upon this Argument followeth another in this manner; If there be not ſome Sign, there is no Sign: and if a Sign be that which the *Dogmatiſts* hold it to be, it is no Sign; for the Sign of which we diſcourſe, according as it is underſtood, and as it is relative to, and detective of, the Significate, is found to be inexiſtent, as we ſhewed before. Now either Sign is, or it is not; therefore it is not.

As concerning the Words which are ſpoken of Sign, let the *Dogmatiſts* anſwer, whether they ſignify any thing, or not; if they ſignify nothing, they prove not that there is Sign; if they ſignify, the Significate followeth them, which is, there is Sign; whence it followeth, as we ſhewed, that this is Sign, by retorting the Argument. Since therefore Reaſons equally probable may be alledged, to prove there is Sign, and that there is not Sign, we ought not to ſay either rather than the other.

CHAP. XII.

Of Demonſtration.

FROM what hath been ſaid, it is manifeſt that neither is Demonſtration a thing acknowledged. For if we ſuſpend as to Sign, and Demonſtration be a Sign, we muſt neceſſarily ſuſpend as to Demonſtration; for we ſhall find that the Arguments alledged againſt Sign will ſerve alſo againſt Demonſtration: It ſeemeth to be relative to, and detective of, its Concluſion; upon which will follow almoſt all that we alledged againſt Sign. But if ſomething muſt be ſaid of Demonſtration in particular, I will comprize the Diſcourſe in a narrow Compaſs, firſt laying down what Demonſtration, according to them, is.

" Demonſtration (as they ſay) is a Reaſon which, " by Collection of acknowledged (indubitate) Sumptions, detecteth a thing unmanifeſt. *But clear* " *will it ſeem by this that followeth*: Reaſon *(or Argument)* is that which conſiſts of Sumptions and a " Concluſion: Its Sumptions are ſaid to be the Axioms taken ſuitably for Conſtruction of the Concluſion concordantly.

" Inference or Concluſion is the Axiom framed " out of the two Sumptions, as in this: If it is Day, " it is Light; but it is Day, therefore it is Light: " Therefore it is Light, is the Concluſion, the reſt " are the Sumptions. Of Reaſons, ſome are concluſive, others not concluſive: Concluſive, when " the Connex, beginning from Complication of the " Sumptions of the Argument, and concluding in " the Inference thereof, is found; as the inſtanced " Reaſon is concluſive, becauſe to this Complication " of its Sumptions, it is Day; and if it is Day, it " is Light; it is *conſequent*, it is Light, in this Connex, if it is Day; and if it is Day, it is Light. " Not concluſive are thoſe, which are not after this " manner.

" Of the concluſive, ſome are true, others not " true: True, when not only the Connex, as to " Complication of the Sumptions and the Inference, " is, as we ſaid, ſound; but the Concluſion, and " that which is a Complication of the Sumptions is " true, which is the Antecedent, and the Connex. " A *true* Complication is that which hath all true, " as, It is Day; and, if it is Day, it is Light. Not " true, is, when they are not thus; for this Reaſon, " if it is Night, it is dark, but it is Night; therefore it is dark; is indeed concluſive, becauſe the " Connex is ſound, if it is Night, and if it is Night, " it is dark; but it is not true; for the conſequent " Complicate is falſe, it is Night, and if it is Night " it is dark; it containing this Falſity, for it is a " falſe Complicate whatſoever containeth in itſelf a " Falſity. Whence they ſay, A true Reaſon is " that, which, from true Sumptions, inferreth a " true Concluſion.

" Again, of true Reaſons, ſome are *(Apodeictick)* " demonſtrative, others not demonſtrative. Demonſtrative are thoſe, which, from things manifeſt, collect ſomething not manifeſt; not demonſtrative are thoſe which are not ſo; as this reaſon, " If it be Day, it is Light; but it is Day, therefore " it is Light, is not demonſtrative; for its Concluſion, it is Light, is manifeſt. But this, if Sweat " pierce through the Skin, there are Pores intelligible; but Sweat pierceth through the Skin, " therefore there are Pores intelligible, is demonſtrative; for its Concluſion, therefore there " are Pores intelligible, is unmanifeſt.

" Again, of thoſe which collect ſomething unmanifeſt, ſome bring us by the Sumptions to the " Concluſion inductively only, others inductively " and detectively. Inductively, thoſe which ſeem " to depend upon Belief and Memory, as this; if " one tell you, that ſuch a Man ſhall grow rich, he " ſhall grow rich; but this God (as ſuppoſing *Jupiter)* tells you, that ſuch a Man ſhall grow rich, " therefore he ſhall grow rich. We aſſent to the " Concluſion not ſo much for any Neceſſity of the " Sumptions, as for that we believe what the God " ſaith. Others not only inductively, but detectively alſo lead us to the Concluſion; If Sweat iſſue " through the Skin, Pores are intelligible; but the " firſt, therefore the ſecond; for this, Sweat iſſueth " forth, is detective of the other, there are Pores; " foraſmuch as we preconceive that moiſture cannot " penetrate through a Body not porous.

" Thus Demonſtration muſt be a Reaſon concluſive and true, and have an unmanifeſt Concluſion detective by the Power of the Sumptions; " and therefore Demonſtration is ſaid to be a Reaſon, having indubitate Sumptions, and by Collection detecting an unmanifeſt Inference." By this we may underſtand the Notion of Demonſtration.

CHAP. XIII.

Whether there is Demonſtration.

THAT Demonſtration is not, may be argued from what they themſelves ſay, by overthrowing every Particular that is included in the Notion. For Example; A Reaſon or Argument conſiſts of Axioms, but a compound thing cannot exiſt, unleſs the things whereof it is compounded coexiſt one with another (as a Bed, and the like:) But the Parts of a Reaſon are not coexiſtent one with another; for whilſt we are ſpeaking the firſt Sumption, the other Sumption nor the Inference do not yet exiſt; and while we are ſpeaking the ſecond, the firſt is no longer exiſtent, and the Inference exiſts not yet; and when we pronounce the Inference, the Sumptions

ons are no longer existent. Thus the Parts of a Reason are not coexistent with one another, and therefore the Reason itself seemeth not to exist.

Besides, *A conclusive Reason* is incomprehensible; for, if it be judged from the Consequence of the Connex, but the Consequence of the Connex be undeterminably controverted, and perhaps is incomprehensible, (as we shewed in our Discourse concerning a Sign;) conclusive Reason will also be incomprehensible.

Moreover the *Dialecticks* say, that "A not conclusive Reason is made, either by Incoherence, or "by Defect, or by being in an ill Figure, or by "Redundance. By Incoherence, when the Sumptions have no Coherence with one another, nor "with the Inference; as, If it is Day, it is Light; "but Corn is sold in the Market, therefore *Dion* "walks.

"By Redundance; when there is found some redundant Sumption superfluous to Collection of the "Reason; as, If it is Day, it is light; but it is "Day, and *Dion* walks, therefore it is light.

"By being in an ill Figure; for these are as they "call them *Syllogisms*. [a] *If it is Day, it is light; but "it is Day, therefore it is light*; And, *If it is not "light, it is not Day; but it is not light, therefore "it is not Day.* But this is an inconclusive Reason, "If it is Day, it is light; but it is Day, therefore "it is light; because the Connex promising that "its Consequent is in its Antecedent, the Antecedent being assumed, the Consequent is also assumed; and the Antecedent being taken away, the "Consequent is also taken away; for if the Antecedent be, the Consequent must be also. But "assuming the Consequent, the Antecedent is not "always assumed also; for the Connex doth not "promise that the Antecedent shall follow upon "the Consequent, but only the Consequent upon "the Antecedent. Hereupon a Reason, which "collects the Consequent from the Connex of the "Antecedent, is said to be Syllogistick; and that "which from the Connex, and from the contrary "of the Consequent collects the contrary of the Antecedent: But that which from the Connex and "the Consequent collects the Antecedent is inconclusive, as we said before. Whence its Sumption "being true, it collects a Falsity, if it be spoken "in the Night-time by the Light of a Candle: for "this, If it is Day, it is light, is a true Connex; "and so is this Assumption, But it is Light; but the "Inference, Therefore it is Day, is false.

"By Defect; a Reason is faulty, when there is "omitted something of those which are requisite to "Collection of the Conclusion; as this Reason being, as they conceive, sound, Riches are either "good, or ill, or indifferent; but neither ill nor "indifferent, therefore good. This other is un"sound by Defect, Riches are either good, or ill "or indifferent; but not ill, therefore good."

Now if I shall shew, that, according to them, n Difference of inconclusive Reasons can be judged b the conclusive, I shall have cleared, that the conclu sive Reason is incomprehensible, and that all thei Ostentation in Dialectick is Folly. I prove it thus *A Reason inconclusive by Incoherence, is said to b known from its Sumptions, not having any Coherenc one with another, and with the Conclusion*; now for asmuch as the Knowledge of Coherents must precede the Judgment of the Connex, the Connex will be indijudicable, (according to our usual Argument and consequently so will the Reason, *Inclusive by Incoherence*, be also. For he who saith. That a Reason is inconclusive by Incoherence, if he do it by simple Enunciation, we oppose the contrary Enunciation; if he demonstrate it by a Reason, we shall tell him, he must first demonstrate that Reason to be conclusive, and afterwards prove the Sumptions of a Reason defective by Incoherence, to be incoherent; but whether his Reason be demonstrative we cannot know, not having a generally acknowledg'd Judgment of the Connex, whereby to judge, whether the Conclusion cohere with the Complication of the Sumptions in the Reason. Therefore we have not whereby to judge the Difference betwixt the conclusive Reason, and the defective by Incoherence.

The same we object to him, who saith, that a Reason is faulty by *being in an ill Figure:* For he that goeth upon this Ground, that there is some Figure ill, will not have acknowledged conclusive Reason, whereby to collect what he saith.

In the same manner may those be confuted, who say, that a Reason is *inconclusive by Defect:* for if the Perfect be indijudicable, the Defective must be so also. Again, he who would prove by some Reason, that there is something wanting to Reason, unless he hath an acknowledged Judication of the Connex, whereby he may judge the Coherence of the Reason which he alledgeth, he cannot judicially and rightly say, that the other is defective.

Likewise, that Reason which is said to be faulty by Redundance, is not dijudicable by the Demonstrative; for as to Redundance, even those very Reasons which the *Stoicks* cry up as *Indemonstrable*, will be found to be inconclusive; which, if they should be taken away, all Dialectick will be overthrown. These are they which (they say) need not Demonstration to establish them, but by them are demonstrated the other conclusive Reasons. That these are redundant, will appear plainly if we lay them down and discourse upon them. They dream, "that there are many Indemonstrables, but assert chiefly Five, whereto all the rest seem to "be

[a] So supply the Text.

" be referred. The First, from the Connex and " the Antecedent, collects the Consequent; as, If " it is Day, it is light; but it is Day, therefore it " is light. The Second, from the Connex and the " contrary of the Consequent, collects the contrary " of the Antecedent; as, If it is Day, it is light; " but it is not light, therefore it is not Day. The " Third, from the negative Complicate, and one " of the Parts of the Complicate, collects the con- " trary of the other Part; as, It is not Day and " Night also, but it is Day, therefore it is not " Night. The Fourth, from the Disjunct and one " of the Conjuncts, collects the contrary of the " other; as, Either it is Day, or it is Night; but it " is Day, therefore it is not Night. The Fifth, " from the Disjunct and the contrary of one of the " Conjuncts, collects the other; as, Either it is " Day, or it is Night; but it is not Day, therefore " it is Night." These are the Reasons which they cry up as indemonstrable; but they all seem to me inconclusive by Redundance. For to begin with the first; Either it is acknowledged [as undoubted] that this Part, *it is Day*, followeth upon this other, *it is light*; which is the Antecedent in this Connex, *if it is Day it is light*; or, it is not manifest: If unmanifest, we shall not allow the Connex as acknowledged; but if it be manifest that if this be, *it is Day*, this other must necessarily be also, *it is light*, in saying, *it is Day*, we collect the other, *it is light*; and this Connex, *it is Day, it is Light*, is redundant.

The same may be said of the *second Indemonstrable*; for either it is possible the Antecedent may be, the Consequent not being, or it is not possible. If possible, it is not a sound Connex; if not possible, as soon as ever the word *Not* is spoken in the Consequent, it declareth the *Not* in the Antecedent, so as this is a redundant Connex, *It is not Light, therefore it is not Day.*

The same may be said of the *third Indemonstrable*; either it is manifest, that those which are in the Complication cannot possibly coexist, or not manifest; if not manifest, we shall not allow the Negative of the Complication; if manifest, as soon as one is laid down, the other is taken away, whereby the Negative of the Complicate is redundant, thus: *It is Day, therefore it is not Night.*

The like we say of the *fourth* and *fifth Indemonstrables*; either it is manifest, that in the Disjunct one is true, the other false, with perfect Opposition, (as the Disjunct promiseth) or it is not manifest. If unmanifest, we shall not grant the Disjunct; if manifest, as soon as one is laid down, the other is taken away; and one being taken away, it is manifest that the other is; as, *It is Day, therefore it is not Night: It is not Day, therefore it is Night.*

The like may be said of the *Categorick Syllogisms* used chiefly by the *Peripateticks*, such as this; *Just is Honest, Honest is Good, therefore Just is Good*; either it is manifest that Honest is Good, or it is doubted and unmanifest: If unmanifest, it will not be granted upon this Argument, and consequently the *Syllogism* will not convince; if it be manifest, that *whatsoever is Honest is Good*, in saying, It is Honest, is implied, it is Good also; so that this were enough, *Just is Honest, therefore Just is Good*; and the other Sumption, in which *Honest* is said to be *Good*, is redundant. The like in this Reason, Socrates *is a Man, every Man is a living Creature, therefore* Socrates *is a living Creature.* If it be not manifest in itself, that whatsoever is Man is also a living Creature, the universal first Proposition will not be acknowledged, neither shall we grant it in the Argument. But if from being a Man, it followeth that he is a living Creature, and therefore the first Proposition, *Every Man is a living Creature*, is acknowledged true; then, as soon as ever *Socrates* is said to be a *Man*, it is imply'd, that he is *a living Creature*; and therefore the first Proposition is redundant, *Every Man is a living Creature.* The like Method may be used against all categorical Reasons, not to insist longer hereon. Seeing therefore these Reasons whereupon the Dialectick ground their Syllogisms are redundant, as to Redundance all Dialectick will be subverted, we not being able to judge the redundant inconclusive Reasons, from the conclusive, called Syllogisms. And if any will not allow *Monolemma*'s Reasons, (that have but one Sumption) they will not be more creditable than *Antipater*, who allows them.

Thus a true Reason is impossible to be found, as well for the Causes alledged, as becaufe it ought to end in true; for the Conclusion, which is said to be true, must be either apparent or unapparent; not apparent, for then it would not require the Sumptions to detect it, it being of itself manifest to us, and no less apparent than the Sumptions themselves; if unapparent, forasmuch as there is an undeterminable Controversy concerning Unapparents, (as was said formerly) it is therefore incomprehensible. Thus the Conclusion of the Reason which they call true, will be incomprehensible; and if that be incomprehensible, we shall not know whether that which is collected be true or false, therefore we shall not know whether the Reason be true or false; and consequently the Reason which they call *true* cannot be found.

Moreover, that Reason which collects a thing unmanifest from a manifest, cannot be found out; for if the Inference follow the Complication from its Sumptions, that which followeth [the Consequent] is relative to the Antecedent; but Relatives are comprehended together with one another, as we said before. If therefore the Conclusion be unmanifest, the Sumptions will also be unmanifest; if the Sumptions are manifest, the Conclusion will also be manifest, as being comprehended together with the manifest (Sumptions.) So as nothing unmanifest can be collected from what is manifest. Hereupon the Infe-

rence cannot be detected by the Sumptions, whether it be unmanifeſt and not comprehended, or manifeſt and not needing Detection. Now if *Demonſtration* be ſaid to be *a Reaſon according to Connexion*, that is, *concluſive by ſome acknowledged true thing, detecting an unmanifeſt Inference*; and we have proved, that it neither is a Reaſon, nor concluſive, nor true, nor by ſome things manifeſt collecting an unmanifeſt, nor detective of the Concluſion; it appeareth there is no ſuch thing as Demonſtration.

Likewiſe we ſhall otherways find Demonſtration to be inexiſtent and unintelligible: for he who ſaith there is Demonſtration, aſſerts either general Demonſtration or particular; but neither general nor particular Demonſtration are poſſible, (as we ſhall prove;) and beſides theſe, there is no other can be underſtood; therefore no Man can aſſert Demonſtration to be exiſtent.

That there is no general Demonſtration, we prove thus: Either it hath Sumptions and an Inference, or it hath not; if it hath not, it is no Demonſtration; if it hath, foraſmuch as every thing that is demonſtrated, and alſo that which doth demonſtrate is particular, it will be a particular Demonſtration, therefore there is no general Demonſtration.

But neither is there any particular Demonſtration. For either they muſt ſay, it conſiſts of Sumptions and an Inference, or of Sumptions only; but neither of theſe, therefore there is no particular Demonſtration. That which conſiſts of Sumptions and an Inference, is not a Demonſtration: Firſt, as having one Part unmanifeſt (the Inference) it will be unmaniſeſt, which were abſurd; for if the Demonſtration be unmanifeſt, it rather will require to be demonſtrated by ſomething, than be capable to demonſtrate by ſomething. Again, foraſmuch as they ſay the Demonſtration is relative to the Inference, and Relatives, as they alſo ſay, are different from one another; the thing demonſtrated muſt be different from the Demonſtration. If therefore the Concluſion be the thing demonſtrated, the Demonſtration will not be underſtood together with the Concluſion. For either the Concluſion conferreth ſomething towards demonſtrating itſelf, or no; if it confer, it will be detective of itſelf; if it confer not, but be redundant, it will be no Part of the Demonſtration, for ſuch a Demonſtration will but fortify Redundance. Neither is that which conſiſts of Sumptions only a Demonſtration; for who will ſay that this, *If it is Day, it is light; but it is Day, it is light*, either is a Reaſon, or indeed inferreth any thing? Wherefore neither is that which conſiſts of Sumptions only a Demonſtration; whence it follows, that there is no particular Demonſtration. Now if there be no particular Demonſtration, nor no general, and beſides theſe is no Demonſtration intelligible, there cannot be Demonſtration.

Moreover, the Inexiſtence of Demonſtration may be proved this way: If there be Demonſtration, either an apparent detects an apparent, or an unmaniſeſt an unmaniſeſt, or an unmaniſeſt an apparent, or an apparent an unmaniſeſt; but none of theſe can be underſtood; it is therefore unintelligible. For if an apparent detect an apparent, the thing detecting will be at once apparent and unmaniſeſt; apparent, or being ſuppoſed ſuch; unmaniſeſt, as requiring ſomething to detect it, and not maniſeſtly of itſelf incurring to us. If an unmaniſeſt an unmaniſeſt, itſelf will require ſomething to detect it, rather than be capable of detecting another, which is inconſiſtent with the Nature of a Demonſtration. Neither can an unmaniſeſt be the Demonſtration of a maniſeſt, nor a maniſeſt of an unmaniſeſt, for this reaſon, becauſe they are relative. Relatives are comprehended together with one another; if that which is ſaid to be demonſtrated be comprehended together with the maniſeſt Demonſtration, it is maniſeſt itſelf. Thus the Reaſon will be retorted, and it will not be found, that the maniſeſt can demonſtrate the unmaniſeſt. If therefore there be not Demonſtration, neither of an unmaniſeſt by an unmaniſeſt, nor of an unmaniſeſt by a maniſeſt, nor of a maniſeſt by an unmaniſeſt, and more than theſe, they ſay, there is not any, we muſt ſay, that Demonſtration is nothing.

Moreover, there is Controverſy concerning Demonſtration; ſome ſay, that it is not; as they who hold, that there is none; others, that it is, as moſt of the *Dogmatiſts*; we ſay *neither rather* that it is, or that it is not. Again, Demonſtration muſt neceſſarily contain ſome Doctrine; but every Doctrine is controverted, and therefore every Demonſtration muſt be controverted. For if, for Example, the Demonſtration to prove Vacuum being acknowledged, Vacuum alſo be acknowledged, it is maniſeſt, that they who doubt whether there be Vacuum, doubt alſo the Demonſtration thereof. It is the ſame in all other demonſtrated Doctrines. Thus all Demonſtration is doubted and controverted. Since therefore Demonſtration is unmaniſeſt, as appears by the Controverſy concerning it, (for things controverted, inaſmuch as controverted, are unmaniſeſt) it is not evident in itſelf, but muſt be evinced to us by Demonſtration. Now an acknowledged indubitate Demonſtration to prove Demonſtration, there cannot be (the Queſtion being, Whether there be any Demonſtration at all?) but if it be controverted and unmaniſeſt, it will require another Demonſtration, and that another, and ſo to infinite; but it is impoſſible to demonſtrate Infinites, therefore it is impoſſible to prove there is Demonſtration.

Neither can it be detected by a Sign; for it being queſtioned whether there be a Sign, and the Sign conſequently requiring a Demonſtration of itſelf, it runs into the *Alternate* Common-place; the Demonſtration requiring a Sign, the Sign a Demonſtration, which is abſurd. Neither can the Controverſy concerning

cerning Sign be judged, becauſe Dijudication wanteth a Critery, it being controverted, as we ſhewed, whether there be a Critery; and the Critery conſequently requiring a Demonſtration to prove that there is a Critery, it runs again into the alternate Place. If therefore neither by Demonſtration, nor by Sign, nor by Critery, it can be proved that there is a Demonſtration, and it be not manifeſt of itſelf, as we have ſhewn, it will be incomprehenſible whether there be Demonſtration; therefore Demonſtration is inexiſtent: for it is underſtood by demonſtrating, but not being comprehended it cannot demonſtrate, therefore there will be no Demonſtration. This, by way of Summary, may ſerve againſt Demonſtration.

But the Dogmatiſts, on the other ſide, ſay, The Reaſons alledged againſt Demonſtration, either are demonſtrative, or not demonſtrative; if not demonſtrative, they are not able to prove there is no Demonſtration; if demonſtrative, they themſelves, by Retortion, prove the Subſiſtence of Demonſtration. Hereupon they argue thus, If there is Demonſtration there is Demonſtration; if there is not Demonſtration there is Demonſtration, therefore there is Demonſtration. Upon the ſame Grounds they alſo propoſe this Reaſon, That which followeth from Contraries is not only true, but neceſſary; but there is Demonſtration, and there is not Demonſtration, are oppoſite one to another; from both which it followeth, that there is Demonſtration, therefore there is Demonſtration.

But this may be contradicted; as for Example, if we ſay thus: Foraſmuch as we conceive that there is not any Reaſon demonſtrative, neither do we conceive that the Reaſons alledged againſt Demonſtrations are abſolutely demonſtrative, but that they ſeem probable to us; but Probables are not neceſſarily demonſtrative; therefore if the Demonſtratives are (which we allow not) neceſſarily true, but true Reaſons collect true from true, their Inference is not true; and if not, it is no Demonſtration; therefore (by way of Retortion) there is no Demonſtration. Beſides, as purgative Medicines expel themſelves, together with the Humours which they purge, it is poſſible that theſe Reaſons may exclude themſelves, together with thoſe which are ſaid to be Demonſtratives. For this is not abſurd, ſeeing that this Sentence, *That there is nothing true*, not only takes away all other things, but itſelf amongſt the reſt. Moreover, this Argument (If there be Demonſtration there is Demonſtration, if there is not Demonſtration there is Demonſtration; but either there is, or there is not, therefore there is) may many ways be ſhewn to be inconcluſive; but, for the preſent, we ſhall be contented with this Epicherem. If this Connex (If there is Demonſtration there is Demonſtration) be not faulty, the contrary of its Conſequent (that is, there is not Demonſtration) muſt be repugnant to its Antecedent, there is Demonſtration, for that is the Antecedent of the Connex: But, according to them, it is impoſſible that a Connex can be ſound, if it conſiſts of contrary Propoſitions; for a Connex promiſeth, that if its Antecedent be, its Conſequent is alſo; but in Oppoſites quite contrary, which of them ſoever is, the other muſt not be. Therefore if this be a true Connex, If there is Demonſtration there is Demonſtration, this other cannot be true, If there is not Demonſtration there is Demonſtration.

Moreover, If we grant by Suppoſition that this is a ſound Connex, If there is not Demonſtration there is Demonſtration, this Part, if there is not Demonſtration, may coexiſt with the other, there is Demonſtration: But if it may coexiſt with it, it cannot be repugnant to it; ſo that in this Connex, if there is Demonſtration there is Demonſtration, the contrary of the Conſequent is not repugnant to the Antecedent, therefore it is not ſound. Again, If this Connex, which, by way of Conceſſion, is laid down for ſound, and this Part, there is no Demonſtration, be repugnant to that Part, there is not Demonſtration, neither will this be a good Disjunct, Either there is Demonſtration, or there is not Demonſtration; for a good Disjunct promiſeth that one of its Parts is true, and that the other is falſe and repugnant. Or if the Disjunct be ſound, this, If there is not Demonſtration there is Demonſtration, will again be ſound to be faulty, a Connex conſiſting of Repugnants. Wherefore the Sumptions in the foreſaid Reaſon are inconſiſtent, and deſtroy one another, therefore the Reaſon is not ſound. But neither can they ſhew that ſomething followeth upon Repugnants, not having a Critery of the Conſequents, as we argued before. But this is ſaid over and above. Now if the Reaſons for Demonſtration be probable, and the Reaſons againſt Demonſtration be probable alſo, we muſt ſuſpend, ſaying no more, that there is Demonſtration, than that there is not.

CHAP. XIV.

Of Syllogiſms.

CONcerning thoſe which they call *Syllogiſms*, perhaps it were ſuperfluous to diſcourſe, as well for that they are ſubverted by taking away Demonſtration, (for if there be no Demonſtration, there is no demonſtrative Reaſon) as alſo, foraſmuch as what we have already ſaid may ſerve for Confutation of them; whereas we over and above deliver'd a Method, to ſhew, that all the demonſtrative Reaſons of the *Stoicks* and *Peripateticks* are inconcluſive. But perhaps it would not be amiſs to ſay ſomething in particular concerning theſe, eſpecially ſeeing they have a high Conceit of them. But whereas many things might be alledged, to ſhew they cannot exiſt; yet we, purſuing our Deſign of a Summary, will uſe our firſt Method.

Let us first speak of Indemonstrables; for if they be taken away, all other Reasons are overthrown, as being by them demonstrated to be Conclusive. Now this Proposition, *Every Man is a living Creature*, is inductively proved by Particulars; because from *Socrates*'s being a Man, and a living Creature, and so *Plato*'s and *Dion*'s, and every one in particular, it seemeth possible to be proved, that every Man is a living Creature. For if there be but one Particular, which seemeth contrary to the rest, the universal Proposition will not be sound. As for Example, Although the greatest Part of living Creatures move the lower Jaw, only the Crocodile the upper, this Proposition is not true, All living Creatures move the lower Jaw. When therefore they say, *Every Man is a living Creature*, Socrates *is a Man*, *therefore* Socrates *is a living Creature*; intending from this universal Proposition, *Every Man is a living Creature*, to collect this particular Proposition, *therefore* Socrates *is a living Creature:* This being one of those by which the universal Proposition was (as I said) inductively proved, they fall into the *alternate Common-place*, proving the universal Proposition by the Particulars, and the Particular by the Universal. In like manner, in this Reason, Socrates *is a Man*; *but no Man is four-footed*, *therefore* Socrates *is not four-footed:* This Proposition, *No Man is four-footed*, endeavouring to prove inductively by Particulars, and to prove every particular syllogistically out of this, they run into the *alternate Common-place* inextricably.

In like manner, let us examine the rest of the Reasons, which the *Peripateticks* call demonstrable; for this, *If it be Day*, *it is Light*, they say, is conclusive of this, *it is Light*; and again, this, *It is Light*, together with the other, *It is Day*, is confirmative of this, *If it is Day*, *it is Light:* For the aforesaid Connex would not be thought sound, if the first Part, *It is Light*, were not always coexistent with, *It is Day*. If therefore it must first be comprehended, that when there is Day there is necessarily Light, for the framing of this Connex, *If it is Day*, *it is light*; hence is inferred, that in these, *When it is Day*, *it is light:* This Connex, *If it is Day it is light*, (as far as concerns the present indemonstrable Reason) proving the Co-existence of this, *It is Day*, and of this, *It is light*; and reciprocally their Existence, confirming the Connex here again, by the *alternate Common-place*, the Existence of Reason is subverted.

The same may be said of this Reason, *If it is Day*, *it is light*; *but it is not light*, *therefore it is not Day:* For, inasmuch as there cannot be Day without Light, this is conceived to be a sound Connex, *If it be Day*, *it is light*; but if we should suppose some Day to be, and Light not to be, it will be said to be a false Connex. Now as to the foresaid Indemonstrable, that, *If there is not Day*, *there is not Light*, is collected from this, that, *If there is Day*, *there is Light*; so as either is requisite to the Proof of the other, and incurs the *alternate Common-place.*

Likewise, forasmuch as some things are inconsistent one with the other, as Day and Night, and the Negative of the Complicate, *(It is not Day*, *and it is not Night*,) and the Disjunct is thought to be sound; but that they are inconsistent, they conceive to be proved by the Negative of the Complicate, and by the Disjunct, saying, *It is not Day and Night*; *but it is Night*, *therefore it is not Day.* Or thus, *Either it is Day or Night*; *but it is Night*, *therefore it is not Day.* Or, *but it is not Night*, *therefore it is Day.* Whence we again argue, that if to Confirmation of the Disjunct, and of the Negation in the Complicate, it be necessary that we first comprehend the Axioms contained in them to be inconsistent; but that they are inconsistent, seems to be collected from the Disjunct, and the Negative of the Complicate, they run into the *alternate Common-place*, seeing that we can neither credit the foresaid Modals, unless we first comprehend the Inconsistence of the Axioms that are in them, nor can affirm their Inconsistence, before we can affirm the Coagulation of the Syllogisms which is made by the Modals. Wherefore not having whereupon to ground our Belief first, (they being reciprocal) we must say, that neither the third, nor fourth, nor fifth, of the Indemonstrables (as far as appeareth by this,) have Subsistence. Thus much for Syllogisms.

CHAP. XV.

Of Induction.

Induction, as I conceive, may easily be overthrown; for, seeing that by it they would prove an Universal from Particulars, either they must do it, as having examined all Particulars, or only some. If some only, the *Induction* will not be valid, it being possible, that some of the omitted Particulars may be found contrary to the universal Proposition. If they would examine all, they attempt Impossibles, for Particulars are infinite, and undeterminate. Thus it happens, that Induction cannot subsist either way.

CHAP. XVI.

Of Definitions.

FOrasmuch as the *Dogmatists* are highly conceited of themselves, as to the framing of *Definitions*, (which they rank under the Logical Part of Philosophy) let us discourse a little hereupon. The *Dogmatists* say, that *Definitions* conduce to many things, but perhaps all their necessary use may be reduced to two general Heads; they shew that *Definitions* are necessary, either to Comprehension or to Instruction.

on. Now if we prove they are uſeful to neither, we overthrow their vain Labour. We argue thus: If he who knoweth not that which is defined, cannot define that which he knoweth not; and he who knoweth firſt, and afterwards defineth, comprehends not, by the Definition, that which is defined, but applies the Definition to that which he already comprehends; then Definition is not neceſſary to the Comprehenſion of Things. And foraſmuch as if we would define all Things we cannot define any, becauſe we ſhall run into infinite; and if we ſay, that ſome things may be comprehended without Definitions, we ſhew that Definitions are not neceſſary to Comprehenſion: As thoſe which are not defined are comprehended, ſo we might comprehend all the reſt without Definitions, either we ſhall define nothing at all, becauſe of proceeding to infinite, or we alledge Definitions not neceſſary.

For the ſame Reaſons ſhall we find, that neither are they neceſſary to Inſtruction: For, as he who firſt knoweth a thing, knoweth it without Definition; in like manner, he who teacheth it, may teach it without a Definition.

Moreover from the Things defined they judge Definitions, ſaying, Thoſe are faulty Definitions, which include ſomething which is not in the Things defined, either in all or in ſome. So as if we ſay, *A Man is a living Creature, Rational, Immortal*; or, *A living Creature, Rational, Mortal, Learned*; foraſmuch as there is no Man immortal, and that there are ſome Men not learned, they ſay it is a faulty Definition. Therefore Definitions, perhaps, are indijudicable, by reaſon of the Infinity of the Particulars by which they ought to be judged. Beſides, they cannot make us comprehend and learn the things of which themſelves are dijudicated, inaſmuch as they are already known and comprehended. Is it not therefore ridiculous to ſay, That Definitions conduce to Comprehenſion, or Inſtruction, or Declaration, when they involve us in ſuch Obſcurity? As for Example, (to ſport a little) if one Man meaning to ask another, Whether he met a Man on Horſeback, with a Dog following him, ſhould do it after this manner: *O living Creature, Rational, Mortal, capable of Intellect and Science, Didſt thou not meet a living Creature, Viſible, Broad-nail'd, capable of political Science, mounted upon a living Creature that hath the Faculty of Neighing, leading a four-footed living Creature that hath the Faculty of Barking.* Who would not laugh to ſee a Man, that knows the Things themſelves, puzzled by their Definitions? We muſt therefore acknowledge Definitions to be unneceſſary, whether it be a Speech, which, by a ſhort Explication, brings us to Knowledge of the Thing meant by the Words, (which, by what we have ſaid, it appeareth, that it doth not) or whether it be a Speech declaring what a thing is, τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, or even what they pleaſe. For when they go about to ſhew what Demonſtration is, they fall out among themſelves irreconcilably, of which, for Brevity's Sake, we will not take notice.

CHAP. XVII.

Of Diviſion.

FOraſmuch as ſome of the Dogmatiſts ſay, That Dialectick *is a Science Syllogiſtick, Inductive, Definitive*; after our Diſcourſe of the *Critery*, and of *Demonſtration*, and of *Syllogiſms*, and of *Inductions*, and of *Definition*, we will come to ſay ſomething of *Diviſion*, conceiving it not to be from our Purpoſe.

They ſay, That of *Diviſion, there are four Kinds*; *Of the Word into Significations*; *Of the Whole into Parts*; *Of the* Genus *into* Species; *Of the* Species *into Individuals*. But that there is not a diviſive Science of any of theſe, I think may eaſily be ſhewn, by examining them ſeverally.

CHAP. XVIII.

Of the Diviſion of a Word into Significations.

THE Sciences they hold to be by Nature, not by Impoſition; and juſtly, for Science muſt be a thing ſtable and unmovable: But thoſe things which are by Impoſition, are very ſubject to Mutation, being varied according to the Diverſity of Impoſitions which are in our Power. Now foraſmuch as Words ſignify by Impoſition and not by Nature, (otherwiſe all Men would underſtand all Languages, both *Greeks* and *Barbarians*, beſides it is in our Power to declare our Meaning by other Words) how is it poſſible there ſhould be a diviſive Science of the Word into Significations? Or how can *Dialectick* be (as ſome conceive,) the Science of Significants, and Significates?

CHAP. XIX.

Of Whole and Part.

CONcerning *Whole* and *Part*, we ſhall diſcourſe in that which they call *Phyſick*; at preſent, we ſhall only ſpeak of the Diviſion of the Whole into its Parts. We ſay thus, When the *Decad* is ſaid to be divided into *One*, and *Two*, and *Three*, and *Four*, it is not divided into theſe; for as ſoon as the firſt Part (granting this by the way of Suppoſition) is taken away, (as the *Monad*), there is no longer the *Decad*, but the *Ennead*, a thing quite different from the *Decad*; therefore the Subſtraction and Diviſion of the reſt concerns not the *Decad*, but other Numbers according to the ſeveral Subſtractions.

Let us now ſee, whether it be poſſible to divide the Whole into thoſe Things which they ſay are its Parts. If the Whole is divided into its Parts, the Parts

Parts before the Diviſion either are contained in the Whole, or not contained: To uſe our firſt Example, the *Decad*; They ſay, that 9 is one of its Parts, for it is divided into 1, and 9; ſo is 8 alſo, for it is divided into 8 and 2. So alſo is 7, and 6, and 5, and 4, and 3, and 2, and 1. Now if all theſe are contained in the *Decad*, and compounded with it, they making 55, the *Decad* muſt contain 55, which is abſurd. Therefore are not the Parts, as they call them, contained in the *Decad*; neither can the *Decad* be divided into them, as a Whole into Parts, ſince they are not to be found in it. The ſame may be objected againſt Magnitudes, as if we ſhould divide a Magnitude into ten Cubits; perhaps therefore it is not poſſible to divide the Whole into Parts.

CHAP. XX.

Of Genus and Species.

IT remains to treat of *Genus* and *Species*, of which elſewhere we ſhall ſpeak more largely, but now compendiouſly. If *Genus* and *Species* are Notions, the Arguments which we brought againſt the Hegemonick and Phantaſy, ſubvert them; but if they allow them to have a peculiar Subſiſtence, What will they anſwer to this? If there are *Genus*'s, either there are as many as there are *Species*, or there is one common *Species*, or *Genus*, in all thoſe which are called *Species*. If there be as many *Genus*'s, as there are *Species* of them, there will not be one common *Genus* which is divided into them; but if it be ſaid, there is one *Genus* in all its *Species*, then every *Species* muſt participate of the Whole *Genus*, or of Part thereof; but not of the Whole, for it is impoſſible, for one thing contained at once, in one, and another, to be wholly in one. If of Part only, firſt, the whole *Genus* will not follow the *Species*, as they conceive it doth, for Man will not be a living Creature, but Part of a living Creature, as a Subſtance, but neither animate nor ſenſible. Again, either all the *Species* will be ſaid to participate of the ſame Parts of their *Genus*, or ſome of ſome Part, others of others. That they ſhould participate of the ſame is impoſſible, for the Reaſon aforeſaid. If ſome of ſome, others of others, the *Species* will not be like to one another, according to their *Genus*, (which they will not admit) and beſides, every *Genus* will be infinite, being divided into infinite, not only as to *Species*, but as to Particulars, in which it is conſider'd with thoſe *Species*; for *Dion* is not only ſaid to be a Man, but a living Creature. But if theſe things be abſurd, neither do the *Species* participate of Part of their *Genus*, it being one; but if neither doth every *Species* participate of its *Genus* in Whole, nor in Part, how can one *Genus* be ſaid to be in all its *Species* ſo as to be divided into them? None ſure can ſay any thing hereto, unleſs he frame ſome kind of Images; and yet even thoſe will be ſubverted, according to th ſceptical Method, by their own indeterminate Con ſequences.

We ſhall add this; *Species's* are either ſuch or ſuch their *Genus's* are either ſuch and ſuch, or they ar ſuch and they are not ſuch, or they are neither ſuc nor ſuch. As for Inſtance; Foraſmuch as of thei or thoſe, ſome are Corporeal, others Incorporea and ſome True, others Falſe, and ſome peradven ture White, others Black, and ſome very Great others very Little: This word *Thing*, for Example which ſome ſay is moſt general, will either be Al or Some, or Nothing; but if it be abſolutely No thing, neither will it be *Genus*, and ſo there is a End of the Controverſy. If they ſay it is All, be ſides that it is impoſſile it ſhould be ſo, it muſt be a the *Species*, and every particular in them. For be cauſe an Animal, as they ſay, is an Animate, Sen ſitive Subſtance, therefore each of its *Species* is ſaid t be both a Subſtance, and Animate, and Senſitive So if *Genus* be both Body, and Incorporeal, an Falſe and True, and Black and White, and Littl and Great, and all the reſt, each of its *Species* an Particulars will alſo be all; which we do not find t be ſo; therefore this alſo is falſe. But if it be onl ſome, then that which is the *Genus* of thoſe, wil not be the *Genus* of the reſt; as if *Thing* be Body, i will not be the *Genus* of Incorporeals; and if livin Creature be Rational, not of Irrationals; ſo tha neither will an Incorporeal be a Thing, nor Irrati onal a Creature. Therefore *Genus* is neither ſuch and ſuch, nor ſuch and not ſuch, nor neither ſuch nor ſuch: And if ſo, neither is *Genus* any thing a all.

If any ſhall ſay, that *Genus* is all Potentially; w anſwer, that what is any thing Potentially, muſ be ſomething Actually alſo; as none can be a *Gram marian* Potentially, if he exiſt not Actually; now i *Genus* be all things Potentially, we demand of them what it is Actually; and thereupon occur the ſame inextricable Difficulties, for it cannot be all Contra ries Actually. Again, neither can it be ſome Actu ally, others Potentially, only as a Body Actually Incorporeal Potentially; for a thing is Potentially ſuch as it may be Actually, but what is Actually a Body cannot be Actually Incorporeal; ſo as, fo Example, If it be a Body Actually, it is Incorporea Potentially, and on the contrary. Wherefore w cannot ſay that *Genus* is ſome things Actually, other Potentially, only. Now if Actually it be nothin at all, it exiſts not; and therefore the *Genus*, whic they affirm to be divided into its *Species*, is no thing.

This likewiſe is worthy Conſideration, That a becauſe *Alexander* and *Paris* are the ſame, therefor it is impoſſible, if it be true that *Alexander* walks, i ſhould be falſe that *Paris* walks. In like manner If to be Man, be the ſame thing in *Theon*, and i

Dion

Dion, this Appellation, *Man*, alledged in the framing of any Axiom will make the Axiom either true or false in both; but this we find not to be so; for when *Dion* sitteth, and *Theon* walketh, this Axiom, *a Man sitteth*, spoken of one, is true; of the other, false; wherefore this Appellation, *Man*, is not common to both, not one and the same in both, but proper to each.

CHAP. XXI.

Of Common Accidents.

THE like may be said of *Common Accidents*. For if one and the same Accident belong to *Dion* and *Theon*, for Example, *Seeing*; if *Dion* die, and *Theon* survive and see, either they must say, that the Sight of *Dion* is not subject to perish, which is absurd, or that the same Sight is perished, and not perished, which is irrational also: Therefore the Sight of *Theon* is not the same with the Sight of *Dion*, therefore proper to each. For if the same Respiration happen to *Dion* and *Theon*, it cannot be that it should be in *Theon*, and not in *Dion*; but one may die and the other survive, therefore it is not the same. But of these, let what we have briefly said suffice.

CHAP. XXII.

Of Sophisms.

IT will not haply be absurd to insist a little upon *Sophisms*, in regard that they who cry up *Dialectick* so much, say, it is necessary for the Solution of them. For, say they, *If it discern Speeches, true and false; and Sophisms be false Speeches; it is dijudicative of these, which corrupt Truth with an apparent Likelihood.* Wherefore the *Dialecticks*, as assisting and underpropping the failing course of Life, with much Labour, teach the Inferences, and Solutions of Sophisms, saying, *A Sophism is a Reason probable and deceitful; so as it receives an Inference, either false, or like to false, or uncertain, or otherwise not to be received. False, as in this Sophism,*

No Man giveth a Categorem to be drunk;
But this, to drink Wormwood, is a Categorem;
Therefore, No Man giveth Wormwood to be drunk.

Like to False, as in this;
That which could not be, nor cannot be, is not absurd;
But this, a Physician, as a Physician, kills; neither could, nor can be;
Therefore this [Proposition] a Physician, as a Physician, kills, is not absurd.

Uncertain, as this;
I did not ask thee something first, and the Stars are not even in Number;
But I did ask thee something first;
Therefore, the Stars are not even in Number.

Not otherwise to be received; as those Speeches which are called Solœcisms, as,
That which thou seest, is;
But thou seest him mad,
Therefore he is mad.

Again,
That which thou seest, is;
But thou seest many Houses burning,
Therefore many Houses are burning.

Then they endeavour to shew their Solutions, saying, That "in the first Sophism, one thing is granted by the Sumptions, another inferred; it is granted that a Categorem is not drunk, and that to drink Wormwood is a Categorem, but not the Wormwood itself. So that, whereas the Inference ought to be, Therefore no Man drinks this [Categorem,] To drink Wormwood; which is true; it inferreth, Therefore no Man drinketh Wormwood; which is false, and is not collected from the granted Premises.

"As to the Second, It seems to lead to False, (insomuch as they who mind it not well, doubt whether they ought to assent to it or not,) but it collects Truth, therefore this is not absurd. A Physician, as a Physician, killeth; for no Proposition is absurd; but this, A Physician, as a Physician, killeth, is a Proposition; therefore it is not absurd.

"That which leadeth to Uncertainty, is, they say, of the Nature of reciprocal Reasons; for if nothing were asked before, then the Negative of the Connex were true, the Connex itself being false, *because this*, [I asked thee something first] which is false, is inserted into it; but after asking, (the Assumption being true, [I asked thee first] by reason the asking was before the Assumption) the Negative of the Connex is false; so that a Conclusion cannot any way be gather'd, the Negative of the Connex being inconsistent with the Assumption.

"The last Kind being by Solœcism, (some say) infers absurdly, and contrary to common Use.

Thus some *Dialecticks* discourse of *Sophisms*, (others otherwise) which may perhaps tickle the Ears of the lighter sort of Persons, but are indeed superfluous, and forged by themselves to no purpose. This perhaps may be observed, from what was said formerly; for we shewed, that neither True nor False can be comprehended, according to the *Dialecticks*, as many other ways, so particularly, by overthrowing Demonstration, and indemonstrable Rea-

Reasons, the Props of their Syllogistick Faculty. Many other things might be alledg'd against the Subject in hand, of which we shall only say briefly thus.

Of all those *Sophisms*, which *Dialectick* seems properly to confute, the Solution is unprofitable; but those, the Solution whereof is profitable, it is not within the Power of a *Dialectick* to solve, but of those who are conversant in the particular Arts of each several thing. As for Instance; If this *Sophism* were propounded to a Physician, "In "the Remission of a Disease, there ought to be Va- "riety of Diet, and Wine allowed; but on the "third Day, there usually happens a Remission; "therefore before the third Day, there ought to be "Variety of Diet, and Allowance of Wine." A *Dialectick* can say nothing to all this; but the Physician can solve the *Sophism*, knowing that Remission is taken two ways, either of the whole Disease, or for any particular Inclination towards Amendment. Before the first third Day it happens for the most part, that there is a Remission of some particular Intenseness; now we approve not Variety of Diet in this Remission, but in the Remission of the whole Disease. Whereupon he will say, That one of the Sumptions of the Argument is disjoined from the other, *viz.* that which concerns the whole Disease, from the other which concerns part: Again, to this Argument concerning an intense Fever, "Contra- "ries are the Remedies of Contraries; but Cold "is contrary to the Heat of the Fever, therefore "cold things are convenient for the Cure of it;" a *Dialectick* will not know what to say. But the Physician, knowing that some are Affections adherent to the Disease, others Symptoms of those Affections, will answer, That the Question is not to be understood of the Symptoms, (for it usually happens that Heat is increased by pouring on cold things,) but of the adherent Affectedness; and that Constipation is an adherent Affection, which requires not Condensation, but rather Opening; but the Heat which follows upon it, is not primarily adherent, wherefore that which is Cold is not convenient to be applied. Thus to Sophisms, whose Solution is profitable, the *Dialectick* will not know what to say; but to such as these, "If thou hast not large Horns, and hast "Horns, thou hast not Horns; but thou hast not "large Horns, and hast Horns; therefore thou "hast not Horns. *And*, If a thing be moved, ei- "ther it is moved in the place wherein it is, or in "that wherein it is not; but neither in that where- "in it is, (for there it rests;) nor in that wherein "it is not, (for it cannot act, where it is not;) "therefore nothing is moved: *And*, Either that "which is generated, or that which is not, but "that which is not generated (for it is already) not "that which it is not; for that which is gene- "rated suffers something, that which is not, suffers "not; *Again*, Snow is Water congeal'd; but Wate "is black, therefore Snow is black. And a grea many such Fooleries gathering together, he knit his Brows, and produceth his *Dialectick*, and wit a great deal of Gravity, endeavours to shew us b Syllogistick Demonstrations, that something is gene rated, and that something is moved, and that Snov is white, and that we have not Horns; when per haps, if he did only oppose the Evidence of the con trary to them, it would suffice to overthrow thei *Theses* by the Testimony of their Contraries, whic are manifest. Whence a Philosopher, to whom th Argument against Motion was objected, said no thing, but walked. And Men, in the ordinary Course of Life, travel by Sea and Land, build Ship and Houses, and beget Children, never minding th Arguments against Motion and Generation. Ther is also a facete Apothegm of *Erophilus* the Physician (contemporary with *Diodorus*, who introduc'd int his foolish Logick many sophistical Arguments, a about other things, so particularly concerning Mo tion,) *Diodorus* having put his Shoulder out of joint *Erophilus* coming to set it, derided him, saying 'Either the Bone slipt out of the Place in which i 'was, or out of that in which it was not; but nei 'ther out of that in which it was, nor out of tha 'in which it was not, therefore it is not slipt, S as the *Sophist* was fain to intreat him to let his Argu ments alone, and to betake himself to the Cure For it is sufficient (I conceive) to live experimentally and inopiniatively, according to common Observa tions and Assumptions, suspending our Assent in al dogmatical Superfluities, and especially those, which are besides the Use of Life. If therefore *Dialectic* cannot solve those *Sophisms*, whose Solution is use ful; and of those which some think it doth solve the Solution is unuseful, *Dialectick* is of no Benefi in solving *Sophisms*.

Moreover, even from what the *Dialecticks* them selves say, it may be proved, that their Art concern ing *Sophisms* is superfluous. They say, That they ap plied themselves to *Dialectick*, not only to learn wha may be gathered from it, but proposing to themselve chiefly, to know how to judge true and false by de monstrative Reasons. Whence they affirm *Diale tick* to be the Science of True, and False, an Neuters. When therefore they assert that to be true Reason, which by true Sumptions collects a tru Conclusion, as soon as any Reason, which hath false Conclusion, is brought against us, we shal know it is false, and therefore will not assent to it for of necessity, the Reason must either be not con clusive, or not have true Sumption, which is mani fest from hence. The false Conclusion which is i the Reason, is either Consequent to the Connexio made by its Sumption, or not Consequent; if no Consequent, the Reason is not Conclusive; for the say, a conclusive Reason is that which followeth th

Con

Connexion made by its Sumptions; if Conſequent, the Connexion which is made by its Sumptions muſt neceſſarily be falſe, by their own Rules; for they ſay, Falſe is conſequent to Falſe, but not True. Now that a Reaſon which is neither concluſive nor true, is, according to them, not demonſtrable, is manifeſt from what was formerly ſaid. If therefore a Reaſon being propounded, in which there is a falſe Concluſion, we know even by itſelf, that it is neither True nor Concluſive; foraſmuch as it hath a falſe Concluſion, we will not aſſent to it, though we do not know where the Falacy lies. For, as we believe not the Tricks of Jugglers to be true, but know that they deceive, though we know not which way they do it; ſo neither do we credit falſe Reaſons, which ſeem true, though we know not which way they are fallacious.

Or becauſe *Sophiſms* lead us not only to one Falſity, but to many Abſurdities beſides, we may argue more generally thus: The Reaſon propoſed either leadeth us to ſomething unexpected, or to ſomething that we muſt have expected; if to the latter, we ſhall not do abſurdly in aſſenting to it; if to ſomething beyond our expectation, we ought not to aſſent to an Abſurdity raſhly, upon a Probability; but they rather ought to withdraw their Reaſon, which compelleth Aſſent to an Abſurdity, if they intend not to trifle childiſhly, but to make a ſerious Enquiry into the Truth, as they profeſs. For if there be a Way leads to ſome Precipice, we will not run upon the Precipice, becauſe there is a Way that leads to it, but rather go out of the Way, becauſe of the Precipice. In like manner, if there be a Reaſon which bringeth us to ſomething, acknowledged to be abſurd, we muſt not aſſent to the Abſurdity becauſe of the Reaſon, but reject the Reaſon becauſe of the Abſurdity. When therefore a Reaſon is objected to us, we will ſuſpend to every Propoſition; and then, when the whole Reaſon is laid down, we will bring in that which appeareth to us. For if the Followers of *Chryſippus*, being *Dogmatiſts*, upon a *Sorites* propoſed, ſay, They muſt put a ſtop to the Progreſs of the Reaſon, and ſuſpend their Aſſent, leſt they fall into an Abſurdity; certainly we, who are *Scepticks*, and jealous of Abſurdities, ought much more to take heed, leſt we be betray'd by Sumptions, and therefore ſuſpend upon every one, until we hear the whole Argument. Beſides, we, without Opinion, being only informed by the common Obſervations of Life, thus avoid fallacious Reaſons: But the *Dogmatiſts* cannot diſcern a *Sophiſm* from a true Reaſon, ſeeing they are conſtrained to judge dogmatically, whether the Form of the Reaſon be concluſive, and whether the Sumptions be true or not; but we have formerly ſhewn, that they cannot comprehend what Reaſons are Concluſive, nor judge Truth in any thing, as having neither a Criterie nor Demonſtration, which we proved from their own Words. Hence it appears, that the artificial Forms of *Sophiſms*, ſo much cry'd up by the *Dialecticks*, are ſuperfluous.

CHAP. XXIII.

Of Amphibolies.

WE ſay the ſame concerning Diſtinction of *Amphibolies*. For, if *Amphiboly* be a Word which ſignifies two or more things, and Words ſignify by Impoſition, it is fit they be diſtinguiſhed by thoſe who are of the ſeveral Arts to which they belong; they having had experience of the poſitive Uſe of the Words, which they applied to the things that they ſignified; but a *Dialectick* hath not, as in this *Amphiboly*; *In the Remiſſion of Diſeaſes, Variety of Diet, and Wine is allowed.*

Moreover, we ſee, that in common Life, even Children diſtinguiſh thoſe *Amphibolies*, the Diſtinction whereof ſeemeth uſeful to them. For if a Man, having two Servants of the ſame Name, ſhall bid a Child call *Manes* to him, (let us ſuppoſe that to be the Name of both) the Child would ask, Which? And if one having ſeveral Sorts of Wine, ſhall bid a Child fill him ſome Wine, the Child will ask, Of which ſort? Thus in all things, Experience of that which is uſeful introduceth Diſtinction; but thoſe *Amphibolies* which come not within the Experience of Life, and are perhaps only in the Sayings of the *Dogmatiſts*, and nothing uſeful to living without Opinion, the *Dialectick* being particularly employed in theſe, will be neceſſitated even in them to ſuſpend after the *Sceptical* way, according as they are annexed to things uncertain, or incomprehenſible, or inexiſtent. But of theſe we ſhall diſcourſe again. Now if any *Dogmatiſt* attempt to ſay any thing againſt this, he confirms the *Sceptick* Reaſon, and by the Allegation of Arguments on both Sides, and their indeterminable Difference, will ſettle *Suſpenſion* as to the thing controverted. Having ſpoken thus much concerning *Amphibolies*, we cloſe our Second Book of *Hypotypoſes*.

Of *PHYSICK.*

The THIRD BOOK.

HItherto, by way of Summary, we have ſpoken of the *Logical* Part of Philoſophy; we ſhall obſerve the ſame Courſe in examining the *Phyſical* Part; not confuting every Particular, but endeavouring to overthrow the more general, wherein the others are comprehended. We will begin with the *Principles*. And foraſmuch as the greateſt part hold, that ſome of them are Material, others Efficient; we will firſt ſpeak of the Efficient, thoſe being ſaid to be Principles more properly than the Material.

CHAP. I.

Of GOD.

NOW ſeeing that moſt of the Dogmatiſts hold *God* to be the moſt efficient Cauſe, let us firſt enquire concerning *God*; profeſſing, that, following the Courſe of Life, we ſay, (without engaging our Judgment) that there are Gods, and we worſhip the Gods, and we ſay, that they have Providence. Only to confute the Temerity of the Dogmatiſts, we ſay as followeth.

Of the things which we underſtand, we ought to conſider the Subſtances, as, whether they are Bodies, or Incorporeal; likewiſe their Forms. For none can underſtand a Horſe, if he hath not firſt learnt what the Form of a Horſe is. Likewiſe, that which is underſtood, muſt be underſtood as being ſomewhere. Now foraſmuch as, of the Dogmatiſts, ſome ſay, That God is a Body; others Incorporeal; ſome, that he hath a human Form; others, not; ſome, that he is in Place; others, that he is not in Place: And of thoſe who ſay, he is in Place; ſome, that he is in the World; others, that he is beyond it: How can we have a Notion of God, not having an indubitate Knowledge of his Subſtance, nor of his Form, nor of the Place wherein he is. Let them firſt agree amongſt themſelves, What God is; and then they may repreſent him to us, and require, that we receive ſuch a Notion of God; for, while they diſagree irreconcileably amongſt themſelves, we cannot receive any thing from them as undoubtedly true. But, ſay they, conceive with yourſelf ſomething incorruptible and bleſſed, and think God to be ſuch. This is fooliſh. For, as he who knoweth not *Dion*, cannot know the Accidents that are competent to him, as *Dion*; ſo, not knowing the Subſtance of God, neither can we know his Accidents.

Moreover, let them tell us what is bleſſed: Whether that which acts according to Virtue, and hath Providence over the Things ſubordinate to it; or that which is unactive, and neither hath any Buſineſs itſelf, nor affords Buſineſs to any other. For, differing irreconcileably even about this, they ſhew, that what they call bleſſed is not to be found out, and conſequently not God himſelf.

But though we ſhould admit the Notion of God, yet is it neceſſary we ſuſpend, whether he is, or he is not, even from what the Dogmatiſts ſay; becauſe it is not manifeſt that there is a God; for, if that were ſelf-evident, the Dogmatiſts would have agreed Who, and What, and Where he is; whereas on the contrary there is an undeterminable Controverſy amongſt them, whereby we ſee, that his Being is unmaniſeſt to us, and requireth Demonſtration. Now he who ſaith, that there is a God, muſt either demonſtrate it by a thing maniſeſt, or by an unmaniſeſt; not by a thing maniſeſt, for if that were maniſeſt which demonſtrates there is a God, foraſmuch as that which demonſtrateth is relative to that which is demonſtrated, and conſequently is comprehended together with it, (as we have formerly proved) that there is a God will be maniſeſt alſo, as being comprehended together with the maniſeſt thing that demonſtrates it. But this is not maniſeſt, therefore neither can it be demonſtrated by a maniſeſt thing.

But neither by an unmaniſeſt, for the unmaniſeſt that ſhould demonſtrate there is a God will require a Demonſtration. If demonſtrated by a maniſeſt, it will no longer be unmaniſeſt, but maniſeſt, that there is a God. Therefore the unmaniſeſt demonſtrative cannot be demonſtrated by a maniſeſt. But neither by an unmaniſeſt; for he who ſaith ſo, will be driven into *infinite*, we continually requiring a Demonſtration of the unmaniſeſt, that is alledged for Demonſtration of the thing propoſed. Therefore it cannot be demonſtrated from any other, that there is a God; and if it neither be maniſeſt in itſelf, nor demonſtrable from any other, it will be incomprehenſible whether there be a God.

Moreover, he who ſaith there is a God, holds either, that he is provident over the things in the World, or not provident. If provident; either over all,

ill, or over ſome. If over all, there would be no Ill or Wickedneſs in the World; but all things (as they confeſs) are full of ill; therefore God cannot be ſaid to be provident over all. If over ſome only, Why is he provident over theſe and not over thoſe? For either he both will, and can be provident over all; or he will, but cannot; or he can, but will not; or he neither will nor can. If he both will and can, then he would be provident over all; but he is not, as is manifeſt from what we laſt alledged; therefore that he both will and can provide over all, is not ſo. If he will, but cannot, his Power is exceeded by that Cauſe, which hinders him from being provident over the things over which he is not provident; but it is abſurd to imagine God to be weaker than ſome other. If he can be provident over all, and will not, he may be thought envious: If he neither will nor can, both envious and infirm; which to affirm of God, were impious. Therefore God is not provident over the things of the World; and if he is not provident over them, neither performeth any Work or Effect, none can ſay by what means he comprehends there is a God, ſeeing that it neither is manifeſt in itſelf, nor comprehended by any Effects. For theſe Reaſons therefore it is incomprehenſible, Whether there be a God or No.

Hence we alſo argue, That perhaps they who ſay there is a God, cannot be excuſed from Impiety; for in affirming, That he is provident over all Things, they ſay, that God is the Author of Evil; and in ſaying, that he is provident over ſome, and not over all, they will be forced to confeſs, That God is either envious or infirm; which cannot be ſaid without manifeſt Impiety.

CHAP. II.

Of Cauſe.

BUT that the *Dogmatiſts*, not being able to extricate themſelves out of theſe Difficulties, may not charge us with Blaſphemy; we will in general examine *Efficient Cauſe*, firſt, endeavouring to lay down the Notion thereof.

From what the *Dogmatiſts* ſay, none can underſtand what *Cauſe* is. Some hold it to be a Body; others, Incorporeal. It ſeems to be, according to their moſt general Opinion, *That by which the Effect is operated*; as the Sun, or the Sun's Heat is Cauſe that the Wax is melted, or Cauſe of the Liquefaction of the Wax; for even here they differ. Some will have the Cauſe to be of the Abſtract, as Liquefaction; others of the Concrete, as to be liquified. Thus, as I ſaid, according to the moſt general and received Opinion, a Cauſe is that by which the Effect is operated.

Of theſe Cauſes, they hold ſome to be Continent (or Solitary;) others, Con-cauſal; others, Co-operative. Solitary are thoſe, which being preſent, the Effect is preſent; and being taken away, the Effect is taken away; and being diminiſhed, the Effect is diminiſhed. Thus, the knitting a Halter about the Neck is the Cauſe of Suffocation. Con-cauſal is that which joineth with another Con-cauſal, towards Production of the ſame Effect; thus, Every one of the Oxen that draw the Plough, is cauſe of the drawing thereof. Co-operative is that which affords Aſſiſtance, but very little to the Effect; as when two Men carry a Burthen, and a third helps them a little.

Some ſay, That things preſent are impulſive Cauſes of the future, as the vehement Heat of the Sun is of a Fever; but ſome will not admit theſe; for that a Cauſe, being relative to its Effect, cannot, as Cauſe, precede it.

CHAP. III.

Whether there be any Cauſe of a Thing.

IT is probable, there is ſuch a thing as Cauſe: For how can Augmentation, Diminution, Generation, Corruption, Motion of natural and ſpiritual Agents; in a word, the ordering of the whole World be, if not from ſome Cauſe: For, if none of theſe be really ſuch in their own Nature, we muſt ſay, That they ſeem to us, by reaſon of ſome Cauſe, to be ſuch as indeed they are not. Again, All Generations would be promiſcuous if there were no Cauſe; Horſes, of Mice; Elephants, of Piſmires. At *Thebes* in *Egypt*, there would be great Showers of Rain and Snow; in the Southern Parts none, unleſs there were ſome Cauſe that produced extraordinary cold in the Southern Parts, and made the Eaſtern dry and hot.

Again, he who ſaith there is no Cauſe, is confuted either way: If he ſay it ſimply, without a Cauſe, (or Reaſon) he is not worthy credit; if upon any Cauſe, let him ſhew a Cauſe where there is no Cauſe, and by that very reaſon he will prove that there is a Cauſe.

That they likewiſe ſpeak probably who deny Cauſe, we ſhall ſhew, by alledging ſome Reaſons out of many. As thus: It is impoſſible to underſtand the Cauſe, before we comprehend the Effect as its Effect; but neither can we comprehend the Effect of the Cauſe as its Effect, if we comprehend not the Cauſe of the Effect as its Cauſe; for then we ſeem to know that it is its Effect, when we comprehend the Cauſe as its Cauſe. Now if to underſtand the Cauſe, it be neceſſary that we firſt know the Effect; and to know the Effect (as I ſaid) it be neceſſary that we firſt know the Cauſe, the *alternate Common-place* comes in, to ſhew, that neither of them can be known; not the Cauſe as Cauſe, nor the Effect as Effect; for each of them requiring the other to its credit, we ſhall not know upon which to ground our

Knowledge firſt. Wherefore we are not able to aſſert, that there is any Cauſe of a Thing.

But though we ſhould grant there is a Cauſe, yet will it appear to be incomprehenſible, from the Controverſies about it. For he who ſaith, That there is Something Cauſe of Something, either ſaith it ſimply, not moved by any Cauſe or Reaſon, or elſe is moved to this Aſſent by ſome Cauſe. If ſimply, he will be nothing the more creditable, than he who ſaith, There is no Cauſe of any thing. If he alledge any Cauſe, why he thinks there is a Cauſe, he endeavoureth to prove that which is in queſtion by that which is in queſtion. For the Queſtion being, Whether there be any Cauſe of a Thing, he takes it for granted that there is a Cauſe, when he alledgeth a Cauſe, why there is a Cauſe. Moreover, the Queſtion being concerning the Exiſtence of Cauſe, if we prove it by any Cauſe, it will be requiſite to alledge another Cauſe to prove that, and ſo to infinite; but to alledge infinite Cauſes, is impoſſible. It is therefore impoſſible to aſſert, That there is ſomething Cauſe of another.

Moreover, a Cauſe produceth the Effect, either when it already is, and exiſts as Cauſe, or when it is not a Cauſe. Not the latter. And if when it already is, it muſt firſt exiſt, and be a Cauſe, and then produce the Effect, which is ſaid to be the Effect thereof, the Cauſe already exiſting: But Cauſe being relative to the Effect, it is manifeſt, that, as Cauſe, it cannot exiſt before it. Therefore a Cauſe, even when it is already a Cauſe, cannot produce that whereof it is Cauſe. And if it produceth not any thing, neither when it is not a Cauſe, nor when it is a Cauſe, then there is no Cauſe at all; for a Cauſe cannot be underſtood as Cauſe, unleſs it produce ſomething.

Whence ſome argue alſo thus: A Cauſe muſt exiſt either together with the Effect, or before it, or after it. Now to ſay, that the Cauſe begins to exiſt after the Production of the Effect, were ridiculous. Neither can it exiſt before it, as being underſtood in relation to it; but Relatives, as Relatives, coexiſt, and are underſtood together; but neither can it coexiſt with the Effect, for if it be its Efficient, and that whatſoever is effected, muſt be effected by ſome other that hath a Being, it is neceſſary, that a Cauſe firſt be a Cauſe before it produce the Effect. Therefore if a Cauſe exiſt not either together with, or before, or after the Effect, it exiſts not at all.

Moreover, the Notion of a Cauſe may haply be overthrown thus. For if we cannot underſtand a Cauſe (foraſmuch as it is relative) before its Effect; and to underſtand it, as Cauſe of the Effect, it be neceſſary to underſtand it, as being before the Effect: But it be impoſſible to underſtand any thing to be before that, before which we cannot underſtand any thing to be, then it is impoſſible to underſtand that there is Cauſe.

Hence we argue thus: Foraſmuch as the Reaſons by which we proved that there muſt be a Cauſe, are probable; and thoſe alſo are probable on the other ſide, which prove there is no Cauſe; and of theſe Reaſons we cannot poſſibly know which ought to be preferred, ſince we neither have a Sign, nor Critery, nor Demonſtration, acknowledged indubitate, (as we ſhewed formerly:) Therefore we muſt neceſſarily ſuſpend, as to the Exiſtence of Cauſe, ſaying, That from what the *Dogmatiſts* affirm of it, it appears *nothing rather* to be, than not to be.

CHAP. IV.

Of material Principles.

HItherto of the *Efficient*; we ſhall next ſpeak briefly of thoſe which are called *material Principles*. That theſe are incomprehenſible, is manifeſt from the Diſagreement of the *Dogmatiſts* about them. *Pherecydes* the *Syrian* aſſerted Earth to be the Principle of all things; *Thales* the *Mileſian*, Water; *Anaximander*, his Diſciple, Infinite; *Anaximenes* and *Diogenes Appollionates*, Air; *Hippaſus* the *Metapontine*, Fire; *Xenophanes* the *Colophonian*, Earth and Water; *Enopides* the *Chian*, Fire and Air; *Hippo* of *Rhegium*, Fire and Water; *Onomacritus*, in his Orphicks, Fire, Water, and Earth; not to ſpeak of Matter void of Quality, (which ſome have prodigiouſly fancied, but not underſtood;) the Followers of *Ariſtotle* (the *Peripateticks)* a circular moving Body, conſiſting of Fire, Air, Water, and Earth; *Democritus* and *Epicurus*, Atoms; *Anaxagoras* the *Clazomenian*, Homoiomeria's; *Diodorus Cronus*, leaſt and indiviſible Bodies; *Heraclides* of *Pontus*, and *Aſclepiades* of *Bithynia*, uncompounded Bulks (or little Bodies;) the *Pythagoreans*, Numbers; the *Mathematicians*, the Terms of Bodies; *Strato* the Naturaliſt, Qualities.

Such (or, yet greater) being the Controverſy amongſt them concerning the material Principles, we muſt either aſſent to all their Opinions, or to ſome. To all is impoſſible; for we cannot hold with *Aſclepiades*, that they are tangible and qualited; and with *Democritus*, that they are Atoms, and void of Quality; and with *Anaxagoras*, who aſcribes all ſenſible Qualities to his *Homoiomeria's*. But if we muſt of our own Judgments make choice of ſome of theſe Opinions, we muſt do it either without Demonſtration, or with Demonſtration. If without Demonſtration, it will not be credited; if with Demonſtration, that Demonſtration muſt be true: But it will not be granted to be true, unleſs it be judged and determined by a true Critery; but the Critery muſt be proved to be true by an adjudged Demonſtration. If therefore, to prove that which preferreth one Opinion before the reſt to be true, it be requiſite that its Critery be demonſtrated; and to demonſtrate that the

the Critery is true, it be requiſite that its Demonſtration be firſt adjudged; it runs into the *alternate Common-place*, which will ſuffer the Argument to proceed no further, the Demonſtration continually requiring a Critery; and the Critery, adjudged Demonſtration: But to judge a Critery by a Critery, and a Demonſtration by a Demonſtration, were to run into infinite. Now if we cannot aſſent to all Opinions concerning the Elements, nor to ſome of them, we muſt neceſſarily ſuſpend.

This perhaps is ſufficient to ſhew the Incomprehenſibility of the Elements and material Principles. But to refute the *Dogmatiſts* more fully, we will inſiſt longer hereupon. Their Opinions concerning Elements are ſo many, that to examine every one in particular is more than our Deſign will allow, but what we ſhall alledge may ſerve to confute all: For ſeeing that in all Controverſies concerning the Elements they are held either to be Bodies or Incorporeal, we conceive it ſufficient to prove that both Bodies and Incorporeals are incomprehenſible; for thence it will follow, that the Elements muſt be incomprehenſible.

CHAP. V.

Whether Bodies be incomprehenſible.

A *Body* (ſome of them ſay) *is that which* (they think) *doth, or ſuffereth:* But according to this Notion it is incomprehenſible, as we have ſhewn. For not being able to ſay whether there be a Cauſe, we cannot ſay whether there be a Patient, for the Patient ſuffers from the Cauſe: Thus both the Cauſe and the Patient being incomprehenſible, a Body alſo muſt be incomprehenſible.

Some ſay, A Body is that which hath a triple Dimenſion and Reſiſtance: For a Point (they ſay) is that which hath no Part, a Line is a Length without Breadth: Now when theſe have received Depth alſo, and Reſiſtance, it then becomes the Body we ſpeak of, conſiſting of Length, Breadth, Depth, and Reſiſtance. But theſe are eaſily diſproved; for either they muſt ſay, that a Body is nothing but theſe, or that it is ſomething elſe different from theſe. * That it is ſomething elſe different from theſe, we cannot conceive; for we cannot conceive that there is a Body, where there is not Length, Breadth, Depth, and Reſiſtance. But if a Body be theſe, and we prove that theſe are not exiſtent, we take away Body; for the Whole, if you take away all its Parts, is taken away alſo. Theſe may be confuted ſeveral ways, of which we ſhall only alledge this: If there are Terms, either they are Lines, or Superficies, or Bodies. If they ſhall ſay that there is Line or Superficies, they muſt grant that each of them can exiſt by itſelf, or is conſidered only in the Bodies. That a Line or Superficies exiſts by itſelf, none perhaps is ſo fooliſh as to imagine. If they ſay that they exiſt not by themſelves, but in the Body: Firſt, They muſt grant that Bodies are made of them; for then they muſt firſt have had a Subſiſtance by themſelves, and afterwards concur to the making of a Body. Again, neither do they exiſt in the things which are called Bodies, as (to omit other Inſtances) we ſhall ſhew from Contact only: For if the Bodies which are clapp'd together touch one another mutually, they muſt touch mutually by their Terms, that is, by their Superficies; but the Superficies touch not each other in whole, for then they would be united one to the other by the Act of touching, the Touch would confound the Subſtances; ſo as to divide two things that touch one another, would be a Diviſion. Neither doth a Superficies by ſome Parts touch the Superficies of the Body which is applied to it, and by others is united to the Body, whoſe Term it is; certainly no Man can conſider this to be without Depth, and conſequently not a Superficies, but a Body. In like manner, if we ſuppoſe two Superficies, laid one upon the other, according to their Terms or Bounds; it follows, that, according to that which is called their Length, (that is, according to their Lines) thoſe Lines, by which the Superficies are ſaid to touch one another, ſhall not touch one another totally, for then they would be confounded: Neither doth any one Line of them touch, by ſome Parts, the Line to which it is applied, and by others is united to the Superficies, whoſe Bound it is; for then it would not be without Breadth, and conſequently no Line. Now if in a Body there is neither Line nor Superficies, there is neither Length, Breadth, nor Depth in a Body.

If any ſhall ſay theſe Terms are Bodies, they may be confuted briefly thus: If Length be a Body, it is divided into its three Dimenſions; and each of thoſe being a Body, is again divided into its three Dimenſions, and ſo into infinite. Thus a Body will be of infinite Magnitude, being divided into infinite; but that is abſurd: therefore the foreſaid Dimenſions are not Bodies: And if neither Bodies, nor Lines, nor Superficies, it may well be conceived that they are not at all.

Reſiſtance likewiſe is not to be comprehended or underſtood; for if it might be comprehended, it would be comprehended from the Touch. Now if we ſhew that the Touch itſelf is incomprehenſible, it will appear that it is impoſſible to comprehend Reſiſtance: That Touch is incomprehenſible, we collect thus; Whatſoever things touch one another, either touch one another mutually by their Parts; or the Whole, the Whole. Not the Whole, the Whole; for that were not to touch, but to be made one; neither

* The Text ſeems defective, and to be thus ſupplied out of his Chapter concerning Body, *adverſus Mathematicos*, p. 368.

neither the Parts, the Parts; for those Parts, though in respect of their Wholes they are Parts, yet in respect of their own Parts are Wholes, for they have Parts within themselves. But Wholes touch not Wholes, for the Reason alledged; and consequently neither do Parts touch Parts; these Parts, in respect of their own Parts, being Wholes. Now if we cannot comprehend, that Touch may be made either by Whole, or by Parts, Touch must be incomprehensible, and consequently so must a Body; for if it be nothing more than these three Dimensions and Resistance, and we have shewn that each of these is incomprehensible, Body also is incomprehensible. Thus therefore, as to the Notion of Body itself, it is incomprehensible, whether there is a Body.

Moreover, of Bodies, say they, some are sensible, others intelligible; these are comprehended by Intellect, those by the Senses. The Senses are simply passible, but the Intellect cometh to the Comprehension of intelligible things through Comprehension of Sensibles. If therefore a Body be something, it must either be sensible or intelligible: Sensible it is not; for it seemeth to be comprehended by Collection of Length, and Breadth, and Depth, and Resistance, and Colour, and such like, together with which it is considered; but the Senses they hold to be simply *passive*. If they say, a Body is intelligible, there must be something in the Nature of sensible Things, by which Bodies, being intelligible, may be understood: But there is nothing besides Body and Incorporeal, whereof the Incorporeal is itself intelligible; the Body therefore is not sensible, as we proved; and there not being in the Nature of things any Sensible, by which Body might be understood, neither will Body be intelligible; and if neither sensible nor intelligible, and there be nothing besides these, we may say, a Body is nothing. Wherefore opposing these Reasons, which prove there is no Body, to those which prove that there is a Body, we suspend.

Now, from the Incomprehensibility of Body, will be inferred also that Incorporeal is incomprehensible; for Privations are understood to be the Privations of Habits, as, of Sight, Blindness; of Hearing, Deafness, and the like. Wherefore to comprehend the Privation, we must first comprehend the Habit, whereof it is a Privation; for he who understands not what Sight is, cannot say, This Man hath not Sight, that is, he is blind. If therefore the Privation of a Body be incorporeal, and the Habits being incomprehensible, it be impossible to comprehend their Privations; but Body, as we have shewn, is incomprehensible; Incorporeals also will be incomprehensible. For either it is sensible, or intelligible; if sensible, it is incomprehensible, by reason of the Difference of living Creatures, and of Men, and of Senses, and of Circumstances, and by reason of Commixion, and the like, mentioned in the ten Common-places of Suspension; if intelligible, there not being granted a Comprehension of sensible things by which we may be carried to Intelligibles; neither will there be granted a Comprehension of things intelligible, and consequently not of an Incorporeal. Besides, he who saith that he comprehends an Incorporeal, must say, that he comprehends it either by Sense or by Reason; not by Sense, for the Sense seemeth to perceive sensible things by Intromission and Insinuation; as the Sight, (whether it be made by a conick Impression, or by Emission, or Immission of Species, or by Effusion of Rays and Colours) and the Hearing (whether it be that the Air is struck, or that the parts of the Voice are carried to the Ear, and strike the Sense, so as to cause a preception of the Voice;) likewise Odours to the Nostrils, and Sapours to the Tongue, and tangible things are derived to the Touch in the same manner. But Incorporeals are not capable of receiving such Impressions, therefore they cannot be comprehended by Sense. But neither by Discourse (or Reason;) for if Discourse be a Dicible and Incorporeal, (as the Stoicks hold) he who saith Incorporeals are understood by Discourse, begs the Question: For when we demand, Whether an Incorporeal can be comprehended, he, taking Incorporeal simply, would thereby shew the Comprehension of Incorporeals; whereas Discourse itself, if it be incorporeal, is a Part of the thing controverted. How then can any shew that this Incorporeal (Discourse) is comprehended first? If by any Incorporeal, we shall require a Demonstration of its Comprehension, and so to infinite. If by a Body, the Comprehension of Bodies is the thing in question. By what then shall we demonstrate, that a Body is comprehended, which is assumed to demonstrate the Comprehension of Discourse and Incorporeal? If by a Body, we run into *Infinite*; if by an Incorporeal, we run into the *Alternate Common-place*. Thus Discourse being, if Incorporeal, comprehensible; none can say, that an Incorporeal may be comprehended by it. But if Discourse be a Body, forasmuch as there is Controversy concerning Bodies, whether they are comprehended or not, because of the continual Effluxion (as they call it) of them; in respect whereof, they neither can admit Demonstration, nor are conceived to be; insomuch as *Plato* termeth Bodies, γινόμενα, ὄντα δ' οὐδέποτε, *Generated, Not being*. Hereupon I doubt which way the Controversy concerning Body determineth, since neither by a Body, nor by an Incorporeal, for the Inconveniences alledged. Therefore neither is it possible to comprehend Incorporeals by Discourse; but if they neither incur to Sense, nor are comprehended by Discourse, they cannot be comprehended at all. Now if we can neither assert the Existence of a Body, nor of an Incorporeal, we must suspend as to the Elements; and perhaps we must suspend also concerning those things, which are after the Elements; if, of them some

ſome are corporeal; others, incorporeal, and both theſe are controverted. Moreover, ſeeing we ought to ſuſpend concerning efficient and material Principles, for the precedent Reaſons, the whole Diſcourſe concerning Principles will be inextricable.

CHAP. VI.

Of Temperament.

BUT, ſetting this aſide, how can they ſay that Temperaments are made of the firſt Elements, when as there is not any Touch, nor Contact, nor Temperament, nor Mixture at all? That Touch is nothing, we ſhewed lately, in diſcourſing concerning the Exiſtence of Bodies. And that Temperament alſo, from what they ſay, is not poſſible, we ſhall briefly declare. They ſpeak much concerning it, and almoſt innumerable are the Controverſies of the Dogmatiſts about it, ſo as from the Indijudicableneſs of the Controverſy may be argued the Incomprehenſibility of the Subject. To confute them all in particular, would be beyond our Deſign; this which we ſhall ſay, we conceive, may ſuffice.

All contemperated things conſiſt, as they ſay, of Subſtance and Qualities. They muſt therefore either hold, that either the Subſtances are mingled, and not the Qualities; or the Qualities, but not the Subſtances; or neither with the other; or both with one another. But if neither Subſtance nor Qualities are mingled one with the other, Temperament will be unintelligible; for how can one Senſe be made of the things tempered, if the things tempered be not mingled together by any of the foreſaid ways? If they ſay, that the Qualities are ſimply adjacent one to another, but the Subſtance is mingled, this alſo is abſurd; for we comprehend not Qualities in Temperaments, as ſeparate, but we feel them as made one by the things tempered. If they ſay, that the Qualities are mingled, but not the Subſtances, it is impoſſible; for the Subſiſtence of the Qualities is in the Subſtance. Wherefore it is ridiculous to ſay, that the Qualities are ſeparated from their Subſtances, and ſo mingled with one another, and the Subſtances left deprived of their Qualities. It remains to ſay, that the Qualities and Subſtances of things tempered paſs through one another, and being mingled, make the Temperament; which is more abſurd than the former; for ſuch a Temperament is impoſſible. For example; If with ten Pints of Water there be mixed one Pint of Hemlock, the Hemlock will be ſaid to be commixed with all the Water; for if a Man take never ſo little of this Mixture, he will find it full of the Power of the Hemlock. Now if the Hemlock be mixed with every Part of the Water, and co-extended with it, the whole with the whole, by mutual Permeation of the Subſtances and Qualities one through another, that ſo the Temperament may be made; and things, co-extended with one another in every Part, take up equal Place, and conſequently are equal to one another, the Pint of Hemlock ſhall be equal to the ten Pints of Water; ſo that the Mixtion muſt either be twenty Pints or two Pints, according to this Hypotheſis of the manner of Temperament. And again, one Pint of Water being put to twenty Pints of Water, according to this Hypotheſis, muſt make the Meaſure either of forty Pints, or of two only; becauſe we may either conceive the Pint to be twenty Pints, as being co-extended with ſo many; or the twenty Pints to be that one, with which they are co-equaliz'd. In like manner a Man, adding but one Pint, may argue, that the twenty Pints, which we ſee, ought to be twenty thouſand, or more, according to this Hypotheſis of Temperament, and that the ſame are but two only; than which, nothing is more abſurd: Therefore this Hypotheſis of Temperament is abſurd. Now if Temperament neither be by mixing the Subſtances only, nor Qualities only, nor both, nor either; and beſides theſe, nothing can be imagined; the manner of Temperament, and of all Mixtures, is not to be underſtood. Wherefore if thoſe things which are call'd Elements, are not capable of making Contemperations, neither by touching one another, nor by being blended or mingled, the Phyſiology of the Dogmatiſts, as to this thing, is unintelligible.

CHAP. VII.

Of Motion.

BEſides what hath been ſaid, the Phyſiology of the Dogmatiſts may be conceived to be impoſſible by diſcourſing upon Motions; for all Commixtions muſt be made by ſome Motion of the Elements, and the efficient Principle. If therefore we prove, that there is no generally acknowledged Species of Motion, it will be manifeſt, that though all which we formerly oppoſed ſhould, by way of ſuppoſition, be granted; yet that, which the Dogmatiſts call Phyſick, ſerves to no purpoſe.

CHAP. VIII.

Of Local Motion.

THEY who ſeem to have diſcourſed moſt exactly of Motion, ſay there are ſix kinds thereof, Local Motion, Alteration, Augmentation, Diminution, Generation, and Corruption. We ſhall examine each of theſe particularly, beginning with Local Motion. This according to the Dogmatiſts, is that, by which that which moveth, paſſeth from Place to Place, either according to its Whole, or according to Part; according to its Whole, as in them who walk; according to Part, as in a Sphere that moves

moves about its Center; for the Whole remaineth in the ſame Place, the Parts only change Place.

Three, as I conceive, are the principal Controverſies concerning Motion. *Bias*, and ſome other Philoſophers, hold that there is Motion; *Parmenides*, *Meliſſus*, and others, that there is not Motion; the Scepticks *nothing rather* that it is, than that it is not. For as to the Phænomena's, it appeareth that there is Motion; but as to philoſophical Diſcourſe, that there is not. If therefore, upon Examination of the Arguments on both ſides, we ſhall find them to be of equal weight, we ſhall not aſſent to either. Let us begin with thoſe who hold that it is.

Theſe inſiſt moſt upon Evidence: For if, they ſay, there is no Motion, How doth the Sun appear now in the Eaſt, anon in the Weſt? or, How doth he make the Seaſons of the Year, which are according as he is nearer to, or further from us? Or, How do Ships put off from one Port, and reach another far diſtant? Or, how does he, who denies Motion, go abroad and come home? Theſe they conceive cannot be anſwered, and therefore one of the Cynicks, an Argument being propounded to him to take away Motion, made no Anſwer, but roſe up and walk'd, ſhewing by Action and Evidence, that there is Motion. Thus they endeavour to ſilence the contrary Party.

But they who take away the Exiſtence of Motion, argue thus. If a thing be moved; it muſt be moved either by itſelf, or by ſome other; but neither by itſelf, nor by any other. For that which is ſaid to be moved not by itſelf, muſt be moved either by ſome Cauſe, or by none: by no Cauſe, they ſay, nothing is done; if by ſome Cauſe, the Cauſe by which it is moved will be its Mover, and ſo they will run into infinite, according to our uſual way of Argument. Again, if that which moveth, effects, and that which effects, is moved, that will alſo require another to move it, and this a Third, and ſo to infinite; ſo that Motion ſhall be without any Principle of firſt Beginning, which is abſurd. Therefore every thing that moveth, is not moved by another. But neither by itſelf; for every thing that moveth either impelleth forward, or draweth backward; or upward, or downward; therefore whatſoever moveth itſelf, muſt do it after one of theſe ways. If by impelling forward, it muſt be behind itſelf; if by drawing back, before itſelf; if upwards, below itſelf; if downwards, above itſelf. But for a thing to be either above, or before, or below, or behind itſelf, is impoſſible; it is therefore impoſſible for any thing to be moved by itſelf. But if neither by itſelf, nor by any other, then nothing at all is moved. If any recur to Appetite and Election, we muſt let him know, that the Queſtion is concerning *that which is in our power*, and that this Queſtion is indeterminable, foraſmuch as we have not yet found a Critery of Truth.

Again, if a thing be moved, it is either moved in the Place in which it is, or in which it is not. But not in the Place wherein it is; for if it be in it, it continues in it. Nor in the Place in which it is not; for where a thing is not, there it can neither act nor ſuffer. This was the Argument of *Diodorus Cronus*. But it is anſwered ſeveral ways, of which we ſhall only alledge thoſe which we conceive to be of greateſt Force, together with the Judgment which appeareth for the preſent to us. Some ſay that a thing may be moved in the Place where it is, for the Spheres which roll about their Centers are moved, and yet continue in their Place. In anſwer to whom, the Argument ſhould be transferred to the ſeveral Parts of the Sphere, and we muſt ſhew by this Argument, it is not moved as to its Parts, if we will prove that nothing is moved in the Place wherein it is.

The ſame Anſwer may be made to thoſe, who ſay that a thing moved muſt touch two Places, that wherein it is, and that to which it goes. We ſhall ask them, ſeeing that what is moved is carried from the Place wherein it is to another, Whether this be when it is in the firſt Place, or when it is in the ſecond? But whilſt it is in the firſt, it paſſeth not to another, for it is yet in the firſt; and when it is not in this, it paſſeth not out of it. Beſides this, the Queſtion is begged. For in the Place wherein it is not, it cannot act; for no Man will grant ſimply, that it is carried to any Place, who grants not that it is moved.

Some there are who diſtinguiſh thus: Place is taken two ways, largely, as my Houſe; ſtrictly, as the Air, which encloſeth the Superficies of a Body. Now when a thing that is moved, is ſaid to be moved in Place, we mean not Place in the large Senſe, but in the ſtrict. To theſe may be anſwered, by ſubdividing Place largely taken; that in one Part thereof the Body is ſaid to be moved properly, as being its exact Place; in the other, not ſo, this being the reſt of the Parts of Place largely taken. Then inferring that nothing can be moved, neither in the Place wherein it is, nor in the Place wherein it is not, conclude, that neither in Place at large, improperly taken, can any thing be moved. For it conſiſts of two Parts, of that wherein the thing exactly is, and of that in which exactly it is not; in neither of which can any thing be moved, as was proved.

It may be argued alſo thus: If any thing be moved, either it is moved from ſome Part of the Space and then another; or it is moved all at once, over the whole diviſible Interval: But neither can any thing be moved from ſome firſt Part of the Space and then another, not all at once, over the whole diviſible Interval, therefore nothing is moved. That nothing is moved from ſome firſt Part of the Space, is manifeſt from hence; for that if the Bodies, and the Places, and the Times, in which

which thoſe Bodies are ſaid to be moved, be divided into Infinite, there will be no Motion, it being impoſſible to find in Infinites a Firſt, from which Firſt (Part) that with is ſaid to be moved ſhall be moved. But if the things aforeſaid end in an Indiviſible, and every thing that is moved paſs the firſt diviſible Part of its Place, in like manner as the firſt indiviſible Part of its Time, all things will be of equal Celerity; as the fleeteſt Horſe, and a Tortoiſe which is abſurder than the former. Therefore Motion is not made from ſome firſt Part of the Space. But neither all at once over the whole diviſible Interval: For if apparent things muſt, as they ſay, clear things unapparent; when a Man ſhould go the Space of a Stadium, it is requiſite that he firſt perform the firſt Part of the Stadium, and then the ſecond, and ſo the other Parts in order. So every thing that is moved according to the Firſt, muſt firſt be moved; for if that which is moved be ſaid to paſs at once over all the Parts of the Place in which it is moved, it will be in all its Parts at once; and if one Part of the Place be cold, another hot; or one black, another white, ſo much as to qualify the things that are in it; that which moveth will be at once hot and cold, and black and white. Beſides, let them ſay, how much of the Place at once that which is moved paſſeth. If they ſay it is indefinite, they grant, that ſomething may be moved over the Face of the whole Earth at once; if they deny that, let them define the Quantity of the Place; for to endeavour exactly to define ſuch a Place, than which the thing moved cannot paſs, at once, any (though never ſo little) greater Diſtance, beſides that it is abſurd and ridiculous, will perhaps incur the former Inconveniences; for all things will be ſwift alike, ſeeing that every thing paſſeth alike through determinate Places. But if they ſhall ſay, that what is moved all at once, is moved through a little, but not exactly determinate, Place, we ſhall confound them by a Sorites, continually adding to the ſuppoſed Magnitude, another very little Magnitude of Place. For if at any time they make a Stand, then they fall into their former Determination of the Place, and ſtrange Conceits: But if they admit an Increaſe, we ſhall force them to grant that a thing may be moved all at once over the whole Earth. Wherefore neither are thoſe things which are ſaid to be moved, moved at once over the whole diviſible Interval; and if neither all at once, nor from ſome Part, then nothing is moved. This and much more is alledged by thoſe who take away local Motion: But we (not being able to diſprove either theſe Arguments, or the Phænomena which they follow, who ſay there is no Motion, as to the Oppoſition betwixt the Phænomena's and the Arguments) ſuſpend, Whether there be Motion or not.

CHAP. IX.

Of Augmentation and Diminution.

UPon the ſame Ground we ſuſpend as to *Augmentation* and *Diminution*: For Evidence ſeems to prove that they are, but Diſcourſe (or Reaſon) to overthrow them; as thus: That which is augmented, being already an *Ens* and Subſiſtent, muſt be moved further as to Quantity (for if any ſhall ſay that by Appoſition of one thing another is augmented, he ſpeaketh falſely:) Since therefore Subſtance never is at a Stand, but always in Fluxion, and ſome are inſinuated into others, that which is augmented hath not its firſt Subſtance with the addition of ſome other, but a Subſtance wholly new. As therefore (for Inſtance) If there being a Piece of Wood three Foot long, ſome Man putting to it a Piece ten Foot long, ſhould ſay he hath augmented the Piece of three Foot, he ſhall ſay falſly, (foraſmuch as this is wholly another thing from the other:) So in every thing that is ſaid to be augmented, the former Matter flowing out, and new Matter flowing in, if that be added which is ſaid to be added, none will ſay, that this is Augmentation, but Alteration of the Whole.

The ſame may be ſaid of Diminution; for how can that which ſubſiſts not, be ſaid to be diminiſhed? Beſides if Diminution be made by Detraction, Augmentation by Addition; but neither Detraction nor Addition be any thing, neither is Diminution nor Augmentation any thing.

CHAP. X.

Of Detraction and Addition.

THat Detraction is Nothing, they argue thus: If Something be detracted from another, either an Equal is detracted from an Equal, or a Greater from a Leſſer, or a Leſſer from a Greater: But none of theſe; therefore Detraction is not poſſible. That Detraction is not made by any of theſe ways, is manifeſt: That which is detracted from another, before it is detracted, muſt be contained in that from which it is detracted; but an Equal is not contained in a Equal, as Six in Six; for that which containeth, ought to be greater than that which is contained; and that from which ſomething is detracted, ought to be greater than that which is detracted, that after the Detraction there may be ſomething remaining; for herein Detraction ſeems to differ from quite taking away. Neither is the Greater contained in the Leſſer, as Six and Five; that were abſurd. Neither is the Leſſer contained in the Greater; for if Five were contained in Six, as the fewer in the more, by the ſame Reaſon, in Five will be contained Four, and in Four Three, and in Three Two, and in

Two One; thus Six ſhall contain Five, Four, Three, Two, One, which being put together, make Fifteen, which muſt be contained in Six, if it be granted that the Leſſer is contained in the Greater. In like manner, in the Fifteen which is contained in Six, will be contained Thirty five; and ſo, by Progreſſion, infinite Numbers: But it is abſurd to ſay, that infinite Numbers are contained in the Number Six, therefore it is abſurd to ſay, that the Leſſer is contained in the Greater. If therefore it be requiſite, that what is detracted from another, by contained in the thing from which it is detracted, but neither Equal is contained in Equal, nor the Greater in the Leſſer, nor the Leſſer in the Greater; Nothing certainly is Detracted from any Thing.

Again, if Something be detracted from Something, either the Whole is detracted from the Whole, or Part from Part, or the Whole from the Part, or Part from the Whole. But to ſay, that the Whole is detracted from the Whole, or from Part, is abſurd; it remains therefore to ſay, That the Part is detracted from the Whole, or from Part, which is abſurd alſo. We will inſtance (not to change our Example in Numbers, as being moſt perſpicuous,) in the Number Ten, and let us ſuppoſe One to be ſubſtracted from it. This One cannot be ſubſtracted from the whole Ten, nor from the remaining part of it Nine, as I ſhall prove; therefore is it not ſubſtracted. For if One be ſubſtracted from the whole Ten, foraſmuch as Ten is nothing elſe but Ten Unites, not any one of the Unites, but a Combination of all, this Unity to be ſubſtracted out of the whole Ten, muſt be ſubſtracted out of every Unite: But firſt, from a Unite nothing can be ſubſtracted, for Unites are indiviſible, and therefore One cannot be ſubſtracted from Ten in this manner. But if we grant an Unite may be taken from every Unite, an Unite will have Ten Parts, and having Ten Parts, will be an Unite; now there being Ten other Parts remaining from which were ſubſtracted the Ten Parts of that which is called an Unite, thoſe Ten will be Twenty: But it is abſurd to ſay, that One is Ten, and that Ten is Twenty, and that what is indiviſible (according to them) is divided; therefore it is abſurd to ſay, That an Unite is ſubſtracted from the whole Number Ten. But neither is the Unite ſubſtracted from the remaining Number Nine; for that from which a Thing is ſubſtracted remaineth not entire, but the Nine remaineth entire after the Subſtraction of the Unite. Beſides, the Nine being nothing elſe but nine Unites, if the Unite be ſaid to be taken away from the Whole, the Nine itſelf will be taken away; if from a Part of the Nine, as from Eight, the ſame Abſurdities will follow. If from an Unite, which is the laſt, they muſt ſay that an Unite is diviſible, which is abſurd; therefore the Unite is not ſubſtracted out of the Nine. Now if it neither be ſubſtracted from the whole Ten, nor from a Part thereof, neither can a Part be ſubſtracted from the Whole, nor from a Part: If therefore neither Whole can be ſubſtracted from Whole, nor Part from Whole, nor Whole from Part, nor Part from Part, Nothing is ſubſtracted from another.

Likewiſe Addition is reckoned by them amongſt Things impoſſible: For ſay they, That which is added, is either added to itſelf, or to ſome Subject præ-exiſtent, or to that which conſiſts of both; but none of theſe is true, therefore nothing is added to another. For Inſtance; Suppoſe the Quantity of four Pints, and thereto let be added one Pint, I demand, To what it is added? To itſelf it cannot; for that which is added, is diverſe from that to which it is added, but nothing is diverſe from itſelf. But neither is it added to that which conſiſts of both, the meaſure of four Pints and one Pint; for how can any thing be added to that which is not yet? Beſides, if to the four Pints, and to the one Pint, be added a Pint, it will make up Six Pints, from the Quantity of four Pints, and the one Pint, and the additional Pint. Now if to the four Pints only, be added one Pint; foraſmuch as that which is co-extended with another, muſt be equal with that to which it is co-extended; if one Pint be co-extended with four Pints, it will double the Quantity of the four Pints, ſo as the whole Meaſure will be eight Pints, which we ſee to be otherwiſe. If therefore that which is ſaid to be added, be neither added to itſelf, nor to ſome other Subject, nor to that which conſiſts of both theſe, and beſides theſe, there be nothing; certainly there is no Addition of one thing to another.

CHAP. XI.

Of Tranſpoſition.

TRanſpoſition comes within the Compaſs of Addition, and Detraction, and Local Motion; for it is Detraction from one thing, and Addition to another, tranſiently.

CHAP. XII.

Of Whole and Part.

THE like may be ſaid of Whole and Part; for the Whole ſeemeth to be made by Convention, and Addition of the Parts; but by Detraction of any one, or more of them, it leaveth to be Whole.

Beſides, If there be a Whole, either it is a thing diverſe from its Parts, or its Parts are the Whole; but it ſeems not to be diverſe from its Parts: For the Parts being taken away, nothing remaineth whereby we may think that the Whole is any thing beſides them. Now if the Parts are the Whole, the Whole is only a Word, and an empty Name, but hath no

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proper Subſiſtence; as Diſtance is nothing more than things diſtant, and Contiguity nothing but things contiguous; therefore the Whole is not any thing. But neither the Parts alſo; for if there are Parts, either they are Parts of the Whole, or Parts of one another, or each is Part of itſelf. Not of the Whole, for that is nothing more than the Parts themſelves. Beſides, the Parts would then be Parts of themſelves, becauſe every Part is completive of the Whole. Neither of one another, for a Part ſeemeth to be contained in that whereof it is a Part; and it were abſurd to ſay, that the Hand (for example) is contained in the Foot. Neither is each of them a Part of itſelf; for then, as containing, and contained by itſelf, a thing will be greater, and leſſer than itſelf. Now if thoſe which we call Parts, neither be Parts of the Whole, nor of themſelves, nor of one another, they are not Parts of any thing; and if Parts of nothing, neither are they Parts, for Relatives are taken away together. This, by way of Digreſſion; for we treated of Whole and Part once before.

CHAP. XIII.

Of Alteration.

SOme alſo deny that there is any Alteration or natural Mutation, (as they term it) arguing thus: If Something be changed, either that which is changed is a Body, or Incorporeal; but neither of theſe is determinable, therefore Alteration itſelf is indeterminable. If any thing alter by operating as a Cauſe, it alters as being the Patient; and the Subſiſtance of it, as Cauſe, is ſubverted, together with which the Patient alſo is ſubverted, not having a thing from which to ſuffer, therefore nothing is altered.

Moreover, if there be Alteration, it is either of a Being, or of a Not-Being; but a Not-Being is inſubſiſtent, and can neither ſuffer nor act, therefore it is not capable of Alteration. If that which is changed be a Being, it is either changed as a Being, or as a Not-Being. As a Not-Being it is not changed, for Not-Beings are not. If it be changed as a Being, it becomes different from a Being, that is, it will not be a Being: But to ſay that a Being is a Not-Being, is abſurd. Therefore a Being is not changed. Now if neither a Being be changed, nor a Not-Being, and beſides theſe there is nothing, it remains to ſay, that nothing is changed.

Some argue thus: That which is changed, muſt be changed in ſome Time; but neither is any thing changed in the time paſt, nor in the future, nor in the preſent, (as we ſhall ſhew;) therefore nothing is changed. In Time paſt or future, nothing is changed; for neither of theſe is preſent; but it is impoſſible for any thing to act or ſuffer in a non-exiſtent and not-preſent Time. But neither in the preſent, for perhaps the preſent alſo is inexiſtent. This τὸ νῦν, *Now*, is indiviſible: But it is impoſſible to imagine that Iron (for Example) can be changed from hard to ſoft, or that any other Alteration can be made in indiviſible Time, for they ſeem to require Succeſſion. Now if nothing be changed either in the Time paſt, nor in the preſent, nor in the future, nothing at all is changed.

Moreover, If there be Alteration, [a] either it is ſubject to Senſe, or to Intellect; not to the Senſes, for they receive only ſingle Notions; but Alteration hath a twofold Reſpect, both to that out of which the Alteration is, and to that into which it is. If they ſay, It is intelligible, foraſmuch as there is an indeterminable Controverſy concerning Intelligibles, as we have already ſaid, we cannot aſſert the Being of Alteration.

CHAP. XIV.

Of Generation, and Corruption.

GEneration and Corruption are ſubverted together with Addition, and Detraction, and Alteration; for without theſe, nothing can be generated nor corrupted. As for Example: Of the Corruption of the Number Ten, ſay they, is generated the Number Nine, by Subſtraction of One; and of Nine corrupted is generated Ten, by Addition of One; and Canker (by Alteration) of Braſs corrupted; therefore the forenamed Motions being taken away, perhaps it neceſſarily followeth, that Generation and Corruption are alſo taken away.

Moreover ſome argue thus: If *Socrates* were generated, he was generated either when he was not *Socrates*, or when he was *Socrates*: If when he was, he muſt have been generated twice; if when he was not, he was, and was not, at the ſame time. He was, as being generated; he was not, according to the *Hypotheſis*. Again, If *Socrates* died, either he died when he lived, or when he was dead; not when he lived, for ſo the ſame Perſon ſhould be both dead and alive; neither when he was dead, for ſo he ſhould die twice. Therefore *Socrates* died not. By this Argument, upon every thing that is ſaid to be generated or corrupted, Generation and Corruption may be ſubverted.

Some argue thus: If there be Generation, that which is generated is either a Being, or a Not-Being; not a Not-Being, for to that which *is not*, nothing can happen, not ſo much as *to be*. Neither a Being; for if a Being be generated, it is generated either as it is a Being, or as it is a Not-Being. As it is a Not-Being, it is not generated; and if it be generated as a Being, foraſmuch as a thing is generated

[a] The Text requires to be ſupplied to this effect.

ted of something different from it, that which is generated must be different from a Being, that is, a Not-Being. Therefore that which is generated shall be a Not-Being, which is absurd. Now if neither a Being, nor a Not-Being be generated, nothing at all is generated.

Upon the same Grounds also nothing is corrupted. For if something be corrupted, it is either a Being, or a Not-Being; not a Not-Being, for that which is corrupted must suffer Something; not a Being, for either it is corrupted, as continuing in the State of a Being, or as not continuing. If as continuing in the State of a Being, the same will be at once a Being and a Not-Being; because it is not corrupted as a Not-Being, but as it is a Being; and as it is corrupted, it is different from a Being, and consequently a Not-Being. But it is absurd to say, the same thing is a Being and a Not-Being; therefore a Being is not corrupted whilst it continueth in the State of a Being. But if a Being be corrupted, not whilst it is in the State of a Being, but first reduced to a Not-Being, and afterwards corrupted; it is not a Being, but a Not-Being, that is corrupted; which (as we said before) is impossible. If therefore neither a Being is corrupted, nor a Not-Being, and besides these there is Nothing, Nothing is corrupted. This may serve, by way of Summary, to say of Motions; whence it followeth, that the Physiology of the *Dogmatists* is inexistent, and unintelligible.

CHAP. XV.

Of Rest.

IN like manner some doubt as to the Nature of Rest, saying, That whatsoever moves, rests not; but every Body continually moveth, according to the Opinions of the *Dogmatists*, who say, That Substance is fluid, and hath continual Evacuations and Recruits: (Whence the *Platonicks* chuse rather to call Bodies, Things generated, than Beings; and *Heraclitus* compared the Mobility of our Matter to the rapid Course of a River:) Therefore no Body rests.

Again, That which is said to rest, seemeth to be contained by the things that are about it; that which is contained suffers, but there is no Patient; for, as we proved before, there is no Cause, therefore nothing rests. Some argue thus: That which rests, suffers; that which suffers is moved; therefore that which is said to rest, is moved; and if moved, it rests not. Hence also it is manifest, that an Incorporeal rests not; for if that which rests suffers, and to suffer be proper to Bodies, and not to Incorporeals, no Incorporeal either suffers or rests; therefore nothing rests.

Now forasmuch as none of the fore-named are understood without *Place* or *Time*, we must proceed to Disquisition of these; and if we prove that these exist not, the others will appear to be inexistent upon that Account also. Let us begin with *Place*.

CHAP. XVI.

Of Place.

PLace is taken two ways, Properly and Improperly; Improperly, for Place at large, as a City; Properly, for that in which we are exactly contained. We enquire of Place in the proper exact Sense; some have asserted it, others deny'd it, others suspended. Of these, they who assert it, recur to Evidence: For who is there, say they, who will affirm there is not Place, when they behold the Parts of Place, as Right, Left; Upwards, Downwards; Before, Behind? and that the same Person is at several times in several Places? and that where my Master taught, there do I now teach? They argue also, That there is Place, because things are naturally light or heavy; and for that the Antients said, *Chaos was first*; for they hold, That Chaos is Place, because it contained all things that were made in it. And if a Body be any thing, say they, so is Place also; for without this, there will be no Body: And if there be a *from which*, there is also an *of which*, and an *in which*, that is, Place. The first is in either, the second therefore in both.

But neither do they who take away Place grant, that the Parts of Place are; for Place is nothing else but its Parts: And he who asserts that Place is, if he takes for granted that its Parts are, endeavours to make good the thing in question by itself. In like manner they do foolishly, who say, That something is in a Place, whenas Place itself is absolutely deny'd to be: They take away together with it the Existence of Place, which of itself is not granted, and the *of which*, and the *from which*, are proved to be inexistent, as well as Place; and disallow *Hesiod*, as not a competent Judge in Philosophy. And thus overthrowing the Arguments alledged for the Existence of Place, they, with greater Subtilty, prove it to be inexistent, converting to their own Use those Opinions of the *Dogmatists* concerning Place, which seem of greatest Weight; as that of the *Stoicks*, and that of the *Peripateticks*, in this manner: The *Stoicks* say, *Vacuum is that which is capable of being contained by a Being, but is not contained; or a Distance void of Body; or a Distance not contained by a Body: But Place is a Distance which is contained by a Being, and is adequate to that which containeth it; they call a Body a Being; the Distance, which is partly contained by the Body, partly not contained, Region.* Whereas others by Region understand the Place of a great Body, so as *Place* and *Region* differ in Magnitude. Now it's objected, when they say, *Place is the Distance contained by a Body*; how do they mean it to be

be a Diſtance, (or Dimenſion) whether the Length of a Body, or the Breadth, or the Depth only, or whether all three together? If they mean but one of theſe, the Place will not be adequate to that whoſe Place it is. Beſides, that which containeth will be Part of that which is contained, which were abſurd. If all the three Diſtances, foraſmuch as in that which is called Place there is not *Vacuum*, nor any other Body that hath Dimenſions; but that Body which is ſaid to be in the Place, conſiſts not of Diſtance, (for that is Length, and Breadth, and Depth, Reſiſtance alſo comes within theſe) the Body itſelf will be its own Place; and that which containeth will be the ſame with that which is contained, which were abſurd. There is not therefore any Diſtance of the Place, and conſequently Place is nothing.

There is alſo an Argument to this Effect: Foraſmuch as in a thing that is ſaid to be in Place, there are not ſeen double Dimenſions, but one Length, and one Breadth, and one Depth; Whether are theſe Dimenſions of the Body only, or of Place, or of both? If of Place only, then the Body will have no proper Length, Breadth, or Depth, and conſequently it will not be a Body, which is abſurd. If of both, foraſmuch as *Vacuum* hath no Subſiſtance beſides the Dimenſions, and thoſe of the *Vacuum* ſubjected to the Body; of whatſoever Dimenſions the Body conſiſts, of the ſame will the *Vacuum* conſiſt alſo. For of the Exiſtence of Reſiſtance, nothing can be poſitively aſſerted, as we formerly ſhewed. Now ſeeing that the Dimenſions which belong to the *Vacuum*, and are the ſame with the *Vacuum*, appear only in the Body, which is viſible, the Body will be *Vacuum*; which is abſurd. If the Dimenſions are of the Body only, then there will be no Dimenſion of Place, and conſequently no Place; if therefore the Dimenſion of Place be not found by any of the foreſaid ways, there is no Place.

This is likewiſe alledged: When a Body enters into a *Vacuum*, which thereby becomes a Place, either the *Vacuum* ſuffers, or yields, or is deſtroyed; but if it ſuffers, the ſame will be full and vacuous; if it either yields, being * moved locally, or is deſtroy'd by Motion, *Vacuum* will be a Body, for theſe are proper Affections of a Body. But it is abſurd to ſay, the ſame is vacuous and full, or that *Vacuum* is a Body; therefore it is abſurd to ſay, that a *Vacuum* may be occupated by a Body, and become Place. Whence it is alſo found, that *Vacuum* is abſolutely inexiſtent, if it cannot be occupated by a Body, ſo as to become Place; for *Vacuum* was ſaid to be that which may be occupated by a Body.

Hereby alſo is ſubverted *Region*; for either it is a great Place, or is circumſcribed with the Place; but if it be partly occupated by Body, and partly a vacuous Diſtance or Dimenſion, it is taken away with both. This, and much more, is alledged againſt the Opinion of the *Stoicks* concerning Place, wherein they diſſent from others.

But the *Peripateticks* ſay, That *Place is the Term (or inmoſt Superficies) of that which containeth, inaſmuch as it containeth*; ſo that my Place is the *Superficies* of the Air which incloſeth my Body. But if this be Place, the ſame will be and not be; for when a Body is about to go into ſome Place, foraſmuch as nothing can be in that which is not, it is neceſſary that Place firſt exiſt, and then that Body be in it; ſo that there muſt be Place, before there can be a Body that is ſaid to be in Place. But inaſmuch as Place is made, by accommodating of the *Superficies* of the thing containing, to the thing contained, Place cannot exiſt before there be a Body in it, and therefore will not have been before. But it is abſurd to ſay, that the ſame is Something, and is not; therefore Place is not the Term of a Thing continent, inaſmuch as it containeth.

Moreover, if Place be Something, it is either Generate or Ingenerate; not Ingenerate, for they ſay it is made, whilſt it is conformed to the Body which is in it: But neither is it Generate; for either when the Body is in Place, then is made the Place, in which that which is in Place is now ſaid to be, or when it is not in it. But neither when it is in it, (for it is already the Place of the Body that is in it) ſeeing that which containeth is adapted, as they ſay, to that which is contained, and ſo becometh Place. But nothing can be adapted round about that which is not in it. Now if Place be neither made when the Body is in it, nor when it is not in it; and beſides theſe, we know not any way, then Place is not generated; but if it be neither Generated nor Ingenerated, it is not at all.

More generally may be argued thus: If there be Place, it is either a Body, or Incorporeal; but both theſe are doubtful, as we diſcourſed formerly, therefore Place itſelf is doubtful. Place is underſtood with reference to the Body whereof it is Place; but that which is alledged concerning the Exiſtence of a Body is uncertain, therefore that which is ſaid of Place. The Place of every particular thing is not eternal; but if it be ſaid to be generated, it will be found to be inexiſtent, foraſmuch as Generation itſelf is not. Much more might be ſaid; but not to inſiſt longer hereon, we ſhall, from what hath been ſaid, infer, That the *Scepticks* ought not to aſſent to any thing that is ſaid by the *Dogmatiſts* concerning Place, but to ſuſpend.

CHAP. XVII.

Of Time.

THE ſame we do in the Queſtion concerning *Time:* For by *Phænomena's*, Time ſeemeth to be Something; but by that which is ſaid of it, it ſeems

* Reading κινούμενον.

ſeems to have no Being; for ſome affirm, That Time is the Interval of the Motion of Time, (by Time underſtanding the World;) others, That it is the Motion of the World. *Ariſtotle*, or, as ſome, *Plato*, That it is the Number of *Prius & Poſterius* in Motion. *Strato*, or, as ſome, *Ariſtotle*, That it is *the Meaſure of Motion and Reſt*. *Epicurus*, (as *Demetrius* the *Lacedemonian* ſaith) That it is an Accident of Accidents, accompanying Days, and Nights, and Hours, and Affections, and Apathies, and Motions, and Reſts. As to its Eſſence, ſome affirm it is a Body, as the Followers of *Æneſidemus*; for they hold, it differs nothing from Being, and from the firſt Body; others, that it is Incorporeal. Now therefore, either all theſe diſſonant Opinions are true, or all are falſe; or ſome are true, ſome falſe. But all cannot be true, for moſt of them are repugnant to one another; neither will the *Dogmatiſts* yield that all are falſe. Beſides, if we ſhould grant it to be falſe, that Time is a Body; and falſe likewiſe, that it is Incorporeal; it muſt immediately be granted, that Time is not at all; for beſides theſe, there can be nothing. Neither is it poſſible to comprehend which are true, which falſe, by reaſon of the Equivalence of the Arguments on both Sides, and the Uncertainty of the Critery and the Demonſtration. For theſe Reaſons therefore we cannot aſſert any thing concerning Time. Moreover, ſeeing that Time exiſts not without Motion or Reſt; if Motion and Reſt be taken away, Time alſo is taken away. Nevertheleſs, ſome bring theſe Arguments againſt Time:

If Time be, either it is determinate, or infinite; if determinate, it began from ſome Time, and will end in ſome Time; and conſequently there was once a Time, when Time was not, that is, before it began to be; and there will be a Time when Time ſhall not be, that is, when it ſhall have ceas'd to be, which is abſurd; therefore Time is not determinate. Now if it be infinite, foraſmuch as one is ſaid to be Paſt, another Preſent, another Future; the Future and Preſent either are or are not; but if they are not, ſeeing there only remains the preſent, than which nothing can be ſhorter, Time will be determinate, and conſequently there will ariſe the ſame Difficulties as at firſt. But if the Paſt exiſt, and the Future exiſt, they muſt both be Preſent; but it is abſurd to ſay, That that which is Paſt and Future is Preſent, therefore Time is not infinite. Now if it be neither infinite nor determinate, it is not at all.

Moreover, if Time be, 'tis either diviſible or indiviſible; indiviſible it is not, for it is divided, as they ſay, into Preſent, Paſt, and Future; but neither is it diviſible, for every Diviſible is meaſured by ſome Part of itſelf, that which meaſureth being applied to every Part of the Thing meaſured, as when we meaſure a Cubit with a Digit. But Time cannot be meaſured by any part of itſelf; for if the Preſent (for Example) meaſureth the Paſt, it muſt be in the Paſt, and conſequently Paſt; and, if the Future, it muſt be in the Future, and conſequently Future. In like manner the Future, if it meaſure the others, muſt be Preſent and Paſt, and the Paſt muſt be Future and Preſent, which is a Contradiction; therefore it is not diviſible. Now, if it be neither diviſible nor indiviſible, it is not at all.

Again, Time is ſaid to have three Parts, the Paſt, the Preſent, and the Future; of which, the Paſt and Future are not, (for if the Paſt and Future were now, each of them would be the Preſent); neither is the Preſent alſo. For if the preſent Time be, it is either indiviſible or diviſible; indiviſible it is not, for things that are changed, are ſaid to be changed in preſent Time; but nothing is changed in indiviſible Time, as, I am ſoftned, or the like; therefore the preſent Time is not indiviſible. But neither is it diviſible; it cannot be divided into Preſents; for, by reaſon of the ſwift Fluxion of Things in the World, the Preſent is imperceptibly changed into the Paſt. Neither is it divided into Paſt and Future, for then it were inexiſtent, as having one Part no longer exiſtent, the other not yet exiſtent. Whence neither can the Preſent be the End of the Paſt, and Beginning of the Future, for ſo it will be, and not be; it will be, as it is Preſent; and not be, becauſe its Parts are not; therefore it is not diviſible. Now if the Preſent be neither diviſible nor indiviſible, it is not at all. But if there be neither Preſent, nor Paſt, nor Future, Time is not; for that which conſiſts of what is not, itſelf is not.

Againſt Time is alſo brought this Argument: If Time is, it is either generate and corruptible, or ingenerate and incorruptible. Ingenerate and incorruptible it is not, for Part is paſt, and hath no longe Being; Part is Future, and hath no Being yet. But neither is it generate and corruptible; for things that are generated, are generated of ſome Being, and Things that are corrupted, are corrupted into ſome Being, according to the Tenet of the *Dogmatiſts*. If therefore it be corrupted into the Paſt, it is corrupted into a Not-being; and if it be generated of the Future, it is generated of a Not-being, for neither of theſe is. But it is abſurd to ſay, that a Thing is generated of a Not-being, or corrupted into a Not-being; therefore Time is not generate and corruptible. Now if Time be neither ingenerate and incorruptible, nor generate and corruptible, it is not at all.

Moreover, foraſmuch as every thing that is generated, ſeems to be generated in Time; if Time be generated, it is generated in Time; it is therefore either generated in itſelf, or one time in another: But if in itſelf, the ſame will be and not be; for ſince that in which any thing is generated, muſt be preexiſtent to that which is generated in it; Time generated

rated in itſelf, if it be generated, is not yet; and if it be generated in itſelf, it is already; wherefore Time is not generated in itſelf. But neither is one Time generated in another; for if the Preſent be generated in the Future, the Future muſt be Preſent; and if in the Paſt, the Paſt. The ſame may be ſaid of other Times; therefore one Time is not generated in another. Now if Time be neither generated in itſelf, nor one Time in another, it is not generate at all. But that it is not ingenerate, we ſhewed alſo. Therefore ſeeing it is neither generate nor ingenerate, it is not at all; for every Being muſt either be generate or ingenerate.

CHAP. XVIII.

Of Number.

FOraſmuch as Time ſeemeth not to be conſidered without *Number*, it will not be from the Purpoſe, to ſpeak ſomething briefly concerning Number. As to common Converſation, we ſay, without Opinion, that we number ſomething; and allow it to be ſaid, that Number is ſomething: But the ſuperfluous Curioſity of the *Dogmatiſts* urgeth us to diſpute againſt it. The *Pythagoreans* aſſert Numbers to be the Elements of the World, for they ſay, that *Phænomena*'s muſt conſiſt of ſomething, but the Elements muſt be ſimple, therefore the Elements are unapparent. Now of things unapparent, ſome are Bodies, as Vapours, and little Bulks; others incorporeal, as Figures, and Idea's, and Numbers, of which Bodies are compounded, conſiſting of Length, Breadth, Depth, Reſiſtance, and Gravity. The Elements therefore are not only unapparent, but incorporeal. Moreover, Number is conſidered in every Incorporeal, for it is either one, or two, or more; whence it is gathered that the Elements of all things are Numbers, which are unapparent and incorporeal, and conſider'd in all things; and this not ſimply, but by the *Monad*, and the [a] indefinite *Duad*, made by Compoſition of the *Monad*, by Participation whereof, all particular *Duads* are *Duads*. Of theſe are made the other Numbers, which are conſidered in things enumerate, and, they ſay, frame the World. For the Point is correſpondent to the *Monad*, the Line to the *Duad*, (for it is conſidered, as lying betwixt two Points) the *Superficies* to the *Triad*, (for they ſay, it is the Fluxion of a Line into breadth to another Point over againſt it.) The Body of the *Tetrad* to the *Tetrad*, for it is made by elevating the *Superficies* to a Point over it. Theſe Fictions they make of Bodies, and of the whole World, which they affirm to be governed according to the harmonical Propoſitions; the *Diateſſaron*, which is *Seſquitertia*, as 8 to 6; the *Diapente*, which is *Seſquialtera*, as 9 to 6; and the *Diapaſon*, which is duple, as 12 to 6. Theſe things they dream, aſſerting Number to be ſomething diſtinct from the Things numbred, arguing thus; If an Animal be in its own proper reſpect One, a Plant, not being an Animal, will not be One; but a Plant is One, therefore an Animal is not One, [b] in its own proper reſpect, but according to ſomething extrinſical that is conſidered in it, whereof every thing partakes, and is made One by it. And if Number be the Things numbred, foraſmuch as the things numbred are (for Example) Men, and Oxen, and Horſes, Number muſt be Men, Horſes, and Oxen; and Number muſt be white, and black, and bearded, if the things numbred happen to be ſuch; but this is abſurd: Therefore Number is not the things which are numbred, but hath a peculiar Exiſtence diſtinct from them, according to which it is conſider'd in the things numbred, and is alſo an Element.

The *Pythagoreans* having thus collected, that Number is not the things numbred, there comes in the inſoluble doubt concerning Number; for Number is ſaid to be Number, therefore is either the things numbred, or ſome extrinſical thing diſtinct from them; but neither is Number the things numbred, as the *Pythagoreans* have demonſtrated; nor is it any thing diſtinct from them, as we [c] ſhall declare; therefore Number is nothing. That Number is nothing extrinſical, diſtinct from the Things numbred, we ſhall prove, inſtancing in the *Monad*, for the better Explication hereof. For if the *Monad* be ſomething in itſelf, by Participation whereof, every thing that participates of it becomes One, either the *Monad* itſelf is but One, or it is as many as there are things which participate of it: But if it is One, Whether doth each of thoſe Things which are ſaid to participate of it, participate of the Whole, or of Part thereof? For if one Man (for Example) hath the whole *Monad*, there will be no more *Monad*, whereof one Horſe, or one Dog, or any of thoſe things which we affirm to be one, can communicate. For, ſuppoſing one Garment to be amongſt many naked Men, if one of them put it on, the reſt muſt remain naked, and without any Garment; now if every one participates of part thereof, firſt, a *Monad* will have a Part, and conſequently infinite Parts into which it is divided, which were abſurd. Again, as a Part of the *Decad* (as a *Duad*) is not a *Decad*, ſo neither will a part of the *Monad* be a *Monad*, and therefore nothing participates of the *Monad:* Therefore there is not one *Monad*, of whoſe Parts all Singulars participate. Now if the *Monads* are equal in Number to all numerate Things, of which the Word *One* is predicated, by Participation of which *Monads* every Particular is ſaid to be One, there will be infinite *Monads* thus participated. And theſe either participate

[a] Read ἀόριστον. [b] Inſerting κατὰ τ ἑαυτου λόγον. [c] Reading ὡς ὑπομνήσομεν.

pate of a tranſcendent *Monad*, or of *Monads* which are of equal Number with them, and are for that reaſon *Monads*; or they participate not, but are *Monads*, without any Participation. If theſe can be *Monads* without Participation, every ſenſible Thing may in like manner be one without Participation; and then the *Monad*, which is conſidered in itſelf, is overthrown. But if theſe *Monads* alſo are by Participation, either they all participate of one, or there is one peculiar to each; if all participate of one, each participates of Part thereof, or of the Whole; whereupon follow the former Abſurdities: But if each hath a peculiar to itſelf, we muſt conſider over each of theſe another Monad, and over each of thoſe another, and ſo to infinite. If therefore to comprehend, that there are ſome Monads in themſelves, by participation whereof every thing that is is one, it be requiſite to comprehend infinitely infinite intelligible Monads; but it is impoſſible to comprehend infinitely infinite intelligible Monads; by conſequence it is impoſſible to aſſert, that there are certain intelligible Monads, and that every Being is one, being made one by Participation of its proper Monad. Therefore it is abſurd alſo to ſay, there are as many Monads as there are things participant of them. Now if that which is ſaid to be Monad in itſelf, neither is one, nor ſo many as are the things which participate of it, there is no ſuch thing as a Monad in itſelf. In like manner, neither will there be any of the other Numbers in itſelf; for the ſame Argument which we have brought againſt the Monad, will hold againſt them all. But if Number be neither in itſelf, as we have ſhewn; nor Number be the things numbred, as the *Pythagoreans* approved; and beſides theſe there is nothing; we muſt ſay, that Number is not.

Moreover, how do they, who conceive Number to be ſomething extrinſical, diſtinct from the things numbred, affirm, That the Duad is generated of the Monad? For when we add a Monad to another Monad, either ſomething extrinſical is added to the Monads, or is ſubſtracted from them, or is neither added nor ſubſtracted; but if nothing be added or ſubſtracted, there will be no Duad. For neither will the Monads, being ſeparate from one another, have a Monad conſidered as above them, according to their peculiar Reſpects; neither is any thing added to them from without, (nor taken away, according to the *Hypotheſis.*) So that the Addition of a Monad to a Monad, there being no Addition nor Subſtraction from without, will not make a Duad; but if there be Subſtraction, there will not only be no Duad, but the Monads themſelves will be diminiſhed; and if from without a Duad be added to them, that of the two Monads there may be made a Duad, ſeeming to be two they will be four; for there is firſt laid down one Monad, and another Monad, to which a Duad from without being added, the Number four is made. It is the ſame as to all other Numbers, which are ſaid to be made by Compoſition. If therefore thoſe Numbers which are ſaid to be compounded of tranſcendent Numbers, are made neither by Subſtraction nor Addition, nor without Subſtraction and Addition, the Generation of that Number, which is ſaid to be by itſelf, and about numerate things, will be inſubſiſtent. But that the Numbers which are by Compoſition, are not ingenerate, they themſelves declare, affirming, That they are compounded, and made of thoſe which are tranſcendent, as of the Monad and indefinite Duad; therefore Number hath not a Subſiſtence of itſelf. And if Number hath not a Subſiſtence, neither conſidered in itſelf nor in things numbered, Number is not any thing, according to the ſuperfluous Curioſity of the *Dogmatiſts*. Thus much may ſerve for a brief Account as to that which is called the *Phyſical* Part of Philoſophy.

CHAP. XIX.

Of the Ethical Part of Philoſophy.

THere remains the *Ethical* Part, which ſeemeth converſant about *Goods*, and *Ills*, and *Indifferents*. That therefore we may treat of this alſo, by way of Summary, we will enquire into the Exiſtence of Goods, Ills, and Indifferents, having firſt explained their Notions.

CHAP. XX.

Of Goods, Ills, and Indifferents.

THE *Stoicks* ſay, that *Good is Profit, or, that which differeth not from Profit*, calling *Profit*, Virtue; and virtuous Action, *that which is not different from Profit*, a virtuous Man, and a Friend; for Virtue being the *Hegemonick* Part of the Soul, conſiſtent after ſuch a manner; and virtuous Action, being an Operation according to Virtue, is plainly Profit; and a virtuous Man and a Friend, is not different from Profit. For Profit is a Part of virtuous, as being the *Hegemonick* thereof; now the Wholes, they ſay, are neither the ſame with their Parts, (for a Man is not a Hand;) nor different from their Parts, for they ſubſiſt not without their Parts: Wherefore they ſay, the Whole is not different from its Parts, conſequently, a virtuous Man being the Whole, in reſpect of its *Hegemonick*, (which the ſay is Profit) is not different from Profit.

CHAP. XXI.

That Good is taken three Ways.

HENCE, *Good*, they ſay, is taken three Ways: *One Way, Good is ſaid to be that from which Profit cometh; this is the moſt principal, and the Virtues:*

tues: The Second, is that by which Profit cometh, as Virtue and virtuous Actions. The Third, is that which is able to profit, as Virtue, and virtuous Actions, and a virtuous Man, and a Friend, and the Gods, and good Dæmons: Thus the Second Signification includes the first; and the Third, both First and Second.

Some say, Good is that which is expetible for itself; Others, that which assisteth to Felicity, or compleateth it. Felicity, according to the Stoicks, *is* Εὐροια βίε, *a good Current of Life.*

These Things are said to explain the Notion of Good; but whether a Man saith, Good is that which profiteth, or that which is expetible in itself, or that which co-operates towards Felicity, he declareth not what Good is, but something accident to it, which is frivolous. For the foresaid are either accident to Good only, or to other things also. If to other things also, they are not Characteristicks of Good, forasmuch as they are made common. If to Good only, we cannot by these understand Good; for as he who understands not what a Horse is, knoweth not what Neighing is, nor can by that come to the Notion of a Horse, if he first light not upon a Horse neighing: So he who enquireth what is good, forasmuch as he knoweth not what Good is, he cannot know what properly and solely belongs to it, that thereby he might come to understand Good itself. For first he must learn the Nature of Good itself, and then understand, that it profiteth, and that it is expetible for itself, and that it is effective of Felicity. But that the aforesaid Accidents are not sufficient to declare the Notion and Nature of Good, the Dogmatists manifest in effect: For, that Good profiteth, and that it is expetible (whence called ἀγαθὸν qu. ἀγωγὸν) and effective of Felicity, all perhaps grant: But being demanded, What that is to which these are accident? they run into an incredible Contest; some saying that it is Virtue, others Pleasure, others Indolence, others something else: whereas, if by the aforesaid Definitions it were determined what Good is, they would not fall out among themselves, as ignorant of its Nature. Thus the most eminent among the Dogmatists differ concerning the Notion of Good. They likewise differ about Ill, saying, that Ill is Hurt, or not different from Hurt; others, that which is avoidable for itself; others, that which is effective of Infelicity; whereby perhaps declaring not the Essence of Ill, but some of the Things accident to it, they fall into the aforesaid Inextricability.

CHAP. XXII.

Of Indifferent.

INdifferent is taken three Ways: First, for that which moveth neither Appetite nor Aversion; as, that the Stars or the Hairs of our Head are of even Number. Secondly, for that which moves the Appetite or Aversion not one more than the other, as in two Tetradrachms nothing different, when one of them is to be chosen: There is an Appetite to chuse one of them, but not this more than that. The third Kind of Indifferent is, that which conduceth neither to Felicity nor Infelicity; as Health, Wealth: for that which sometimes may be used well, and sometimes ill, this, they say, is indifferent. Concerning this last chiefly they discourse in Ethicks.

What to conceive of this Notion, is manifest from what we said before from Goods and Ills. They bring us not to the Notion of each of these Things; but it is not strange, that they fail in Things inexistent. That nothing by Nature is good, ill, or indifferent, some argue thus.

CHAP. XXIII.

Whether there is any thing naturally good, ill, or indifferent.

FIre being hot by Nature, appeareth to all to be heating; Snow being cold by Nature, appeareth to all to be cooling; all Things which affect by their Nature, affect all that are according to Nature, or well, after the same Manner; but none of those which are called Good, affect all Men as good (as we shall shew) therefore there is nothing good by Nature. That none of those which are called Goods, affect all Men alike, is manifest; for (to pass by the ordinary People, whereof some think a good Habit of Body to be Good; others, venereal Pleasures; others, Eating; others, Drinking; others, Dicing; others, Riches; others, something worse than these:) some Philosophers, as the *Peripateticks*, say, There are three Kinds of Goods, *some in the Soul, as the Virtues; some in the Body, as Health, and the like; others, external, as Friends, Wealth, and the like.* The *Stoicks* also affect three kinds of Goods, *some in the Soul, as the Virtues; some external, as a virtuous Man, and a Friend; some, neither in, nor without the Soul, as a virtuous Man as to himself.* But those which are in the Body or external, which the *Peripateticks* account Goods, they deny to be Goods. Some there are who hold Pleasure to be a Good; others on the contrary say, it is an Ill; whence one of the Philosophers cried out, *I had rather be mad than be pleased.* Now if all things, which move (or affect) by Nature, move all Men alike, but by those which are called Goods, all Men are not affected alike, nothing is good by Nature. For neither can we believe all the foresaid Opinions, by reason of their Repugnance, nor some one of them; for he who saith we must believe this Sect, and not that, seeing he is opposed by the Reasons of the other side, becomes a Party in the Controversy, and will him-

ſelf need a Judge, but ſhall not judge others. Now there neither being an acknowledged Criterie, nor a Demonſtration, by reaſon of the indijudicable Controverſy concerning theſe, he muſt come to Suſpenſion, and hereupon will not be able to aſſert what is good by Nature.

Moreover ſome argue thus: Good is either the Deſire itſelf, or that which we deſire: The Deſire itſelf is not good, in itſelf; for then we would not endeavour to obtain that which we deſire, leſt having obtained it we loſe the Deſire. For Example; if to deſire Drink were good, we would not endeavour to get Drink; for, as ſoon as ever we have obtained it, we leave to deſire it. 'Tis the ſame in Hunger, Love, and the like; therefore the Deſire is not a thing expetible in itſelf; rather on the contrary, perhaps troubleſome. For he who is hungry, endeavours to obtain Meat, that he may be freed from the Trouble of Hunger; the like doth he who loves and he who thirſts. Neither is that which is deſired, the Good itſelf; for either it is without us, or above us. If it is without us, either it cauſeth in us ſome pleaſing Motion, and ſuch a Conſtitution as we willingly embrace, and conſequently is a delightful Affection, or it affects us not at all; but if it be not delightful it is not good, nor can incite us to its Appetition, nor can be any way expetible. If there be ingenerate about us extrinſically ſome delightful Conſtitution and Affection, which we willingly embrace, that which is without us, ſhall not be expetible in itſelf, but for the Affection which is raiſed in us thro' it. But neither about us, for then it muſt either be about the Body, or about the Soul, or about both. If about the Body only, we cannot know it, for all Knowledge they attribute to the Soul, the Body they ſay in itſelf is irrational. Now if it be ſaid to proceed as far as the Soul, it will ſeem to be expetible to the Comprehenſion of the Soul, and to its delightful Affection: For that which is judged to be expetible, is judged (according to them) by the Intellect, not by the irrational Body. It remains therefore to ſay, that Good is about the Soul only: But even this, according to the Grounds of the *Dogmatiſts*, is impoſſible; for perhaps the Soul itſelf is not exiſtent, or if it exiſt, it is not (from what they themſelves ſay) comprehended, as we have proved in the Diſcourſe concerning the Criterie. But how will any venture to ſay, that ſomething is produced in a thing, which comprehends it not?

Beſides all this, How do they ſay that Good is in the Soul? If *Epicurus* ſay, That Pleaſure is the End, and that the Soul (for ſo do all things,) conſiſts of Atoms, how Pleaſure, and an Aſſent or Judgment, that this is expetible and good, that avoidable and ill, can be in a Heap of Atoms, is not poſſible to be reſolved?

CHAP. XXIV.

What that is which is called Art about Life.

AGAIN, the *Stoicks* ſay, *That the Goods in the Soul are certain Arts, the Virtues. Art, they ſay, is a Syſtem of coexerciſed Comprehenſions; Comprehenſions are made in the Hegemonick.* Now how in the Hegemonick, which, according to them, is a Spirit, there is a ſtoring up of Comprehenſions, and a Coacervation of them, ſo as to make an Art, is not poſſible to be underſtood; foraſmuch as the later Impreſſion ſtill defaceth the foregoing, ſince they ſay it is a Spirit, and moved totally, according to every Impreſſion. For to ſay that *Plato's* ἀνειδεωλοποίησις can demonſtrate Good, I mean that Temperament of diviſible and indiviſible Subſtance, and of the Nature of Alterity and Identity, or Numbers, is meerly to trifle; whence neither can Good be in the Soul. Now if neither the Deſire be the Good, nor the extrinſical Subject which is expetible for itſelf, nor in the Body, nor in the Soul, as I have proved, there is nothing naturally Good; and for the ſame Reaſons, neither is there any thing naturally Ill: For thoſe things which to ſome ſeem ill, are purſued by others for good; as Laſciviouſneſs, Injuſtice, Covetouſneſs, Intemperance, and the like. Whence if thoſe which are naturally good, affect all Men alike; and thoſe which are ſaid to be ill, affect not all alike, there is nothing ill naturally.

Neither is there any thing naturally indifferent, by reaſon of the Controverſy about Indifferents; as for Example: The *Stoicks*, of Indifferents, ſay, That *ſome are preferred, others rejected; others neither preferred, nor rejected. Preferred are thoſe, which have a ſufficient Dignity, as Health, Riches; rejected, thoſe which have not a ſufficient Dignity, as Poverty, Sickneſs. Neither preferred, nor rejected; as to ſtretch, or bend the Finger. But ſome hold, that, of Indifferents none is abſolutely preferred or rejected; for every Indifferent ſeemeth ſometimes preferred, ſometimes rejected, according to various Circumſtances.* For if (ſay they) a Tyrant plots againſt the rich, whilſt the poor are ſuffered to live quietly, there is none but had rather be poor than rich; ſo as Riches in this Caſe will be in the Number of the rejected. Thus each of theſe which are called Indifferents, is by ſome held to be good, by others to be ill; but if it were indifferent by Nature, all Men would alike conceive it to be indifferent. Therefore there is nothing indifferent by Nature. Again, if ſome ſhall argue, that Courage is expetible by Nature, becauſe Lions, and Bulls, Cocks, and ſome Men are naturally inclined to it, we reply, that, for the ſame Reaſon, Timidity ought to be reckoned amongſt things expetible in their own Nature; for Harts and Hares, and many other Creatures, are addicted to it by Nature. Even a great

Part

Part of Mankind are such. For it seldom happens, that a Man gives up himself to dye for his Country, or, couragiously attempts some bold Action, as being with-held by effeminate Timidity; the greater part of Men decline all these. Whence the *Epicureans* conceive it to be proved, that Pleasure is expetible in its own Nature; for living Creatures, say they, as soon as they are born, being yet unperverted, desire Pleasure and decline Pain. To these may be objected, That whatsoever causeth ill, cannot be good by Nature; but Pleasure causeth ill, for to all Pleasure is annexed Pain, which, according to them, is ill in its own Nature: For Example; A Drunkard hath Pleasure in drinking, a Glutton in eating, a luxurious Person in wantoning; but these cause Poverty and Sickness, which are painful and ill, as they conceive; therefore Pleasure is not good in its own Nature. Besides, that which causeth good, cannot be naturally ill; but Pains cause Pleasures; by Labour we attain Science and Riches; by Labour a Man obtains the Enjoyment of his Love; by Pain is acquired Health; therefore Labour is not ill naturally. For if Pleasure were good in its own Nature, and Labour or Pain ill in its own Nature, all Men would be alike affected with them: But we see many Philosophers embrace Labour and Pain, and contemn Pleasure.

In the same manner may they be overthrown, who say, That a Life conjoined with Virtue is good by Nature, because some Philosophers have made choice of a voluptuous Life; so as by the Disagreement amongst them is subverted, that a thing is such or such in its own Nature.

It will not perhaps be from our Purpose, to propose briefly some more particular Opinions of things honest and dishonest, of the lawful and unlawful, Laws and Customs, and Devotion to the Gods, and Piety to the Dead, and the like; for by this means we shall find a great Difference amongst things to be done, and not to be done. With us ἀρρηνομιξία is held dishonest and unlawful; with the *Germans*, not dishonest, but an allowed Custom. Neither did the *Thebans* of old esteem it dishonest; and *Merione* the *Cretan*, they say, was so called, by Emphasis of the *Cretan* Nation. Some also refer to this *Achilles*'s fervent Friendship to *Patroclus*. And no wonder, when the *Cynicks*, and *Zeno* the *Cittiean*, and *Cleanthes*, and *Chrysippus* say, It is an Indifferent. Again, for a Man to lie with his Wife in publick, though we esteem it unseemly, yet some in the *Indies* do not so, for they make no Distinction of Places therein; as *Crates* the Philosopher is also said to have done. For Women to prostitute themselves, with us, is dishonest and shameful, but with many of the *Egyptians* honourable; for it is said, that those who have lain with many Men, used to wear a Bracelet about their Ancles as a Mark of Honour. Moreover, amongst them, Virgins before Marriage gain'd a Dowry by prostituting themselves. The *Stoicks* say, That it is no Shame to cohabit with a common Woman, or to be maintained by what she gets. To be stigmatiz'd, with us, is shameful and dishonourable; but many of the *Egyptians* and *Sarmatians* stigmatiz'd their Children. For Men to wear Earrings is, with us, accounted shameful; but with some *Barbarians*, as with the *Syrians*, it is a Mark of Nobility; insomuch as some extending this Mark of Nobility, bore Holes in the Nostrils of their Children, in which they hang Rings of Silver or Gold, which none amongst us do. As neither to wear a Mantle stain'd and dy'd with Flowers; for though the *Persians* esteem this an Ornament, we think it undecent. When at a Feast made by *Dionysius* Tyrant of *Sicily*, such a kind of Robe was offered to *Plato*, and to *Aristippus* the Philosophers, *Plato* refus'd, saying,

I will not with a Female Robe myself disgrace,
Who am a Man, and of a manly Race.

But *Aristippus* took it, with these Words;

If she come pure, a Bacchanalian *Feast*
Never corrupts a modest Woman's Breast.

Thus even of the wise Men, to some it seemed decent, to others indecent. With us it is unlawful to marry our Mother or Sister; but the *Persians* (and of them the *Magi*, who make greatest Profession of Wisdom) marry their Mothers, and the *Egyptians* their Sisters, and all; as the Poet,

Jove *to his Wife and Sister* Juno, *said.*

Zeno the *Cittiean* saith, That it is not dishonest, τὸ μορίου τ μητρὸς τ ἑαυτῆς μορίου τρίψαι, no more than if it were to rub any other Part of the Body. *Chrysippus*, in his Treatise of Policy, asserts, That the Father may lie with the Daughter, and the Mother with the Son, and the Brother with the Sister. But *Plato* more universally saith, That all Wives ought to be in common. With us it is detestable, [b] ἀλλοφαγεῖν, *Zeno* approves it; and are informed that some there are, who use this Evil as a Good. To eat Man's Flesh with us is unlawful; whereas amongst the *Barbarians* there are whole Nations which use it as a thing indifferent. What need we instance *Barbarians*, when *Tydeus* himself is said to have eaten the Brains of his Enemy? And the *Stoicks* say, it is not unfitting to eat not only the Flesh of other Men, but our own. Moreover, to defile the Altar of God with Blood, with most People, as with us, is held

[b] With *Laertius*, χειροβρῳγεῖν. See the Life of *Diogenes*.

held impious; but the *Lacedæmonians*, at the Altar of *Orthosia* and *Diana*, whipp'd themselves cruelly, so as much Blood run down upon the Altar of the Goddess. Besides, some sacrifice a Man to *Saturn*, as the *Scythians* do Strangers to *Diana*; but we, on the contrary, think the Temples are defiled with human Blood. With us there is a Law for Punishment of Adulterers; but some hold, that to lie with other Mens Wives, is a thing indifferent: Even some Philosophers say, that to lie with other Mens Wives is indifferent. With us, Children are bound by Law to take care for their Parents; the *Scythians*, when they exceed threescore Years, cut their Throats. And what wonder, when *Saturn* himself with a Sickle emasculated his Father; *Jupiter* threw down *Saturn* into *Tartarus*; *Minerva* joined with *Jupiter* and *Neptune* to fetter her Father; *Saturn* devoured his own Children. Moreover, *Solon* the *Athenian* made a Law concerning indemnate Persons, whereby any Man was permitted to kill his Son; but with us, the Laws forbid to kill our Sons. The *Roman* Lawgivers order the Children to be under the Power of the Parents, and to be their Servants; and the Children not to be Masters of their own Estates, but the Parents, until they are manumitted after the same manner as purchased Slaves. Others reject this Custom as tyrannical. There is a Law to punish Homicides; but *Gladiators*, when they kill a Man, are many times honoured for it. The Laws forbid to strike a free Person; but Wrestlers, beating Freemen, sometimes killing them, are rewarded with Honours and Garlands. The Law commands every Man to have but one Wife; but amongst the *Thracians* and *Getulians*, a People of *Lybia*, every one hath many. To rob is with us held unlawful and unjust; but with many of the *Barbarians*, not so: On the contrary, the *Cilicians* esteem it honourable; whereupon such as die in Robbing, they judge worthy of Honour. *Nestor* in the Poet, after he had kindly received those who were with *Telemachus*, says,

> ——*Do you uncertain stray*
> *As Thieves?*

But if to rob had been dishonourable, he would not have entertained Persons that might be suspected for Thieves, with so much Humanity. Besides, to steal, is, with us, unjust and unlawful; but those who say *Mercury* is a thievish God, do not conceive it unjust; for how can a God be wicked? Some also say, That the *Lacedæmonians* punish'd Thieves, not for Stealing, but for being Taken. A Coward that throws away his Shield is in many Countries punished by Law; (whence the *Lacedæmonian* Woman, giving her Son a Shield, said to him, [a] *Thou Son, or this, or upon this*;) but *Archilochus* brags, that he had thrown away his Shield, and run away, writing of himself in his Poems thus:

> *Some* Sajan *doth perhaps himself adorn*
> *Now with the Shield which once by me was born,*
> *And left behind (though sore against my Will)*
> *To save my Life* ——

The *Amazons* maim their Male-Children, that they might not be fit for War, and they themselves underwent all military Business; whereas we think the contrary to be the best Order. The Mother of the Gods admits Eunuchs, which a God would never do, if it were ill by Nature not to be perfectly virile. Thus concerning things Just and Unjust, and Virility, there is great Disagreement.

Likewise, concerning Devotion, and the Gods, there is much Controversy: The greater Part hold, that there are Gods; but some, that there are none, as the Followers of *Diagoras* the *Melian*, and *Theodorus*, and *Critias* the *Athenian*. Of those who affirm there are Gods, some worship the Gods of their Country, others those which the Sect of *Dogmatists* have framed; as, *Aristotle* held God to be incorporeal, the Boundure of Heaven; the *Stoicks*, a Spirit, penetrating even through things horrible to behold; *Epicurus*, of human Form; *Xenophanes*, an impassible Sphere: Some, that he is provident over our Affairs; others, that he is not provident over them: For that which is blessed and incorruptible, saith *Epicurus*, neither hath any Trouble itself, nor causeth any to others. Whence also, of those according to Life, some say that there is one God; others, that there are many, and of different Forms; so as they run into the Opinions of the *Egyptians*, who conceived the Gods to be faced like Dogs, and formed like Hawks, and Oxen, and Crocodiles, and what not. Whence also there happen'd a great Difference as to Sacrifices, and the Worship of the Gods. Things that are sacred in some Temples, are profane in others; whereas this could not be, if there were any thing sacred or prophane in its own Nature. For Example: None sacrifice a Swine to *Serapis*, but to *Hercules* and *Æsculapius* they sacrifice them. 'Tis unlawful to sacrifice a Sheep to *Isis*; but to her who is called the Mother of the Gods, and to other Gods, they are sacrificed. To *Saturn* they sacrifice a Man, which to most is impious. In *Alexandria* they sacrifice a Cat to *Hero*, a Moth to *Thetis*, which amongst us none do. To *Neptune* a Horse is sacrificed, but to *Apollo* the *Didymean* especially, this Creature is abominable. To sacrifice Goats to *Diana* is pious, but not to *Æsculapius*. Many others might be alledged, which, for brevity, I omit. Now if there were any Sacrifice pious or impious in its own Nature, all Persons would have the same Opinion of it.

Like

[a] Either bring it home, or, Be brought home dead upon it.

Like to these we shall find the things that concern the Diet of Men, as to Worship of the Gods. A *Jew*, or an *Egyptian* Priest, will die, rather than eat Swine's Flesh; a *Lybian* thinks it most unlawful to eat the Flesh of Sheep; some of the *Syrians*, that of a Pigeon; others, of Victims; in some Temples, it is lawful to eat Fish; in others, unlawful. Of those who amongst the *Egyptians* were thought to be wise, some conceived it abominable to eat the Head of a Creature; others, the Shoulder; others, the Foot; others, other Parts. None eat *Onions*, who are initiated in the Rites of *Cacian Jupiter* at *Pelluſium*. The Priest of *Lybian Venus* never eats Garlick. In some Temples they abstain from Mint; in others, from Marjoram; in others, from Smallage. Some affirm it better to eat the Heads of our own Parents than Beans; others hold the eating of these indifferent. We think it abominable to eat the Flesh of Dogs; but some among the *Thracians* are reported to feed thereon. Perhaps also it was in Use amongst the *Grecians*; whence *Diocles*, following the *Æsculapians*, prescribed to some sick Persons the Flesh of Puppies. There are, who, as I said, eat Man's Flesh indifferently, which we think unlawful. Now if these Rules of Worship, and things unlawful, were by Nature, all Men would have the like Opinion of them.

The same may be said concerning Piety towards the Dead. Some cover the Bodies of the Dead with Earth, thinking it impious to shew them to the Sun: The *Egyptians*, drawing out the Entrails, embalm them, and keep them amongst them above Ground. Amongst the *Æthiopians*, the *Ichthyophagi* throw them into Ponds to be eaten by the Fishes; the *Hircanians* give them to be devoured by Dogs; some of the *Indians* to Vultures. It is reported, that the *Troglodytes* bring the dead Body to a Hillock, tye it Head and Heels together, and throw Stones at it, laughing, with which when they have covered it, they depart. There are some *Barbarians*, who sacrifice and eat those who out-live threescore Years; but such as die young, they bury in the Ground. There are who burn their Dead; of whom, some gathering their Bones, preserve them, others cast them away. The *Persians*, it is reported, hang up their Dead, and embalm them with Nitre, and then wrap Cloaths about them. We see with what Mourning some follow the Dead: Some esteem Death horrible, and to be shunned; others, nothing such. *Euripides:*

If Life be Death who know,
And Death a Life below?

And *Epicurus* saith, *Death concerns us not. For what is dissolved is insensible; but what wants Sense concerns us not. They say moreover, If we consist of Soul and Body, and Death be a Dissolution of the Soul and Body, then when we are, Death is not, for we are not dissolved; and when Death is, we are not; for this Composition of Soul and Body consisting no longer, neither are we. Heraclitus* saith, *That to Live is to Die, and that whilst we Live we are Dead; for whilst we Live, our Souls are Dead, buried in us; but when we die, our Souls revive and live.* There are who conceive, that to die is better than to live; whence *Euripides*,

We New-born Infants rather should lament,
Pitying the Miseries to which they're sent:
But him who Dies, set from all Labours free,
Bear to the Grave with Joy triumphantly.

To the same Effect is also this;

Of wretched Mankind, the most happy State
Were never to be born, nor see the Day:
Next which, as soon as born to pass the Gate
Of Pluto, *and their Bones in Dust to lay.*

We know the Story of *Cleobis* and *Biton*, related by *Herodotus*, concerning the *Argive* Priestess. It is said, amongst the *Thracians* there are some that mourn over a Child as soon as it is born. Therefore ought not Death to be reckoned amongst things horrible in their own Nature, nor Life amongst things good in their own Nature? Nor is there any of the forementioned things such or such in their own Nature, but all are such by Opinion and Reference. The same kind of Argument we might deduce from many other things, which, for brevity, we omit. And if we cannot immediately instance a Contrariety to something, we may say, It is possible, that in some Nations which we know not, there may be a different Opinion. For if we did not (for Example) know, that the Custom of the *Egyptians* is to marry their Sisters, we might falsly affirm, that it is a thing acknowledged by all, that we ought not to marry our Sisters. In like manner, in such things as have not a Difference known to us, it is not fit to affirm, that there is no Controversy concerning them; it being, as I said, possible, that some other Nations which we know not, may hold the contrary.

Hereupon the *Sceptick* observing so great Difference of things, suspends as to what is good or bad in its own Nature, or what is absolutely to be done, or not to be done: herein declining the Temerity of the *Dogmatists*; but he follows the common Course of Life without being positive; whence it comes, that in things Opinionative, he remains void of Passion; in things Compulsive, he is moderately affected: As being a Man, sensible, he suffers; but not taking the Opinion, that which he suffers is ill in its own Nature, he is moderately affected: for to have such an Opinion is worse than the suffering itself; insomuch as they who suffer the Amputation of some Limb, or the like, many times bear it well, whilst the

the Standers-by, out of an Opinion that it is ill, faint. For, doubtleſs, he who propoſeth to himſelf that ſomething is good or ill in its own Nature, and to be done or not to be done, is troubled many ways. When the things are preſent, which he conceives ill by Nature, he ſeems to be tormented; and when he poſſeſſeth thoſe which ſeem to him good, through his being exalted in Mind for it, and his Fear of loſing it, and Care leſt he ſhould fall again into thoſe things which he conceives ill by Nature, he is involv'd in no ſmall Trouble. For thoſe who ſay that Goods cannot be loſt, are to be ſilenced by the Inſolubility of the Queſtion. Hence we argue, If what cauſeth ill be ill, and to be avoided; but the Perſuaſion that ſome things are ill, ſome good, in their own Nature, cauſeth Troubles; then that Perſuaſion is ill, and to be avoided. Thus much of Goods, Ills, and Indifferents.

CHAP. XXV.

Whether there be an Art about Life.

FRom what hath been ſaid it is manifeſt, That there is not an Art about Life; for if there be ſuch an Art, it is converſant in the Contemplation of Goods, Ills, and Indifferents; but theſe being inexiſtent, the Art about Life will be inexiſtent alſo. Beſides, the *Dogmatiſts* not agreeing concerning this Art about Life, ſeveral of them being of ſeveral Opinions, they are ſubject to the Controverſy and Argument from *Diſagreement*, which we alledged in the Diſcourſe concerning Good.

But though we ſhould ſuppoſe all to agree in one Art about Life; as for Example, That celebrated Prudence which the *Stoicks* dream of, and ſeem to preſs more than the reſt, many Abſurdities will nevertheleſs follow. For ſeeing that Prudence is a Virtue, and *a wiſe Man only hath Virtue*, the *Stoicks* not being wiſe, will not have the Art about Life. And ſeeing, according to them, the Art cannot ſubſiſt, there will be no Art about Life, if we follow what they ſay. For they affirm, *Art to be a Syſtem of Comprehenſions*, *Comprehenſion to be an Aſſent to comprehenſive Phantaſy*. But comprehenſive Phantaſy cannot be found; for neither is all Phantaſy comprehenſive, nor can it be known what Phantaſies are comprehenſive, and what not: but needing comprehenſive Phantaſy to diſcern what Phantaſy is comprehenſive, we run into *infinite*; another comprehenſive Phantaſy being required, for the diſcerning of the comprehenſive Phantaſy which we aſſumed. The *Stoicks* give ſuch a Notion of comprehenſive Phantaſy as is not right; for ſaying, *comprehenſive Phantaſy is that which ariſeth from a Being, and a Being is that which is able to move comprehenſive Phantaſy*, they run into the *Alternate Common-place*. If therefore that there be an Art about Life, it is firſt requiſite that there be an Art; and that there be an Art, it is firſt requiſite that there be Comprehenſion; and that there be Comprehenſion, it is firſt requiſite that there be an Aſſent to comprehenſive Phantaſy; but comprehenſive Phantaſy cannot be found, therefore the Art about Life cannot be found.

Again, every Art ſeems to be comprehended from thoſe things which it properly delivers; but there is no Work proper to that Art which is about Life; for whatſoever Work ſhall be inſtanced, it will be found common with the Vulgar, as, to honour Parents, to reſtore a *Depoſitum*, and the like; therefore there is no Art about Life. Neither, as ſome maintain, from that which ſeemeth to be ſaid or done through a prudent Habit of Mind, can we know what is the Work of Wiſdom; for a prudent Habit of Mind itſelf is incomprehenſible, it neither being manifeſt in and by itſelf ſimply, nor by its Words, for thoſe are common with the Vulgar. And to ſay, that we comprehend him who hath the Art about Life, by the Equability of his Actions, is to ſpeak above human Nature, rather to be wiſhed than aſſerted:

For every Man's endu'd with ſuch a Mind,
As ſeveral Days are by the Gods aſſign'd.

It remaineth to ſay, That this Art about Life is comprehended from their Writings; which being many, and all of one kind, we ſhall inſtance only ſome few. The Prince of their Sect, *Zeno*, in his *Exercitations concerning the Inſtitution of Children*, amongſt other things, ſaith thus, "To diſtinguiſh "nothing more or leſs, Childiſh or not Childiſh, "Maſculine or Feminine; for there is no Difference "between *(Manners)* Childiſh and not Childiſh, "Maſculine and Feminine, the ſame become both. "*Alſo*, of Piety towards Parents, *he ſaith*, *ſpeaking* "*of* Jocaſta *and* Oedipus, That it was not abomi- "nable, &c. *With this agrees* Chryſippus, *in his* "*Treatiſe of* Policy, *ſaying*, Theſe things in my "Judgment ought ſo to be ordered as they are uſed "not amiſs with ſome, that the Mother ſhould "have Children by the Son, and the Father by the "Daughter, and the Brother by the Siſter. *In the* "*ſame Book he alloweth* to eat Man's Fleſh; *for he* "*ſaith*, If any Part be cut off from a Body living, "which is fit for Food, we ſhould not bury it, nor "careleſly throw it away, but ſo conſume it, that "it may become another Part of us. *In his Books* "*of* Office, *treating of the Burial of Parents, he ex-* "*preſly ſaith*, When our Parents are dead, we muſt "provide for them the moſt ſimple Tombs; for "the Body (no more than Nails, or Teeth, or "Hair) pertaining nothing to us, we need not to "have any Reſpect or Care of it. If the Fleſh be "ſound, it may be converted into Aliment, (in "like manner, as if ſome Limb of our own Body "were cut off, as the Foot) but if unſound, it is to "be

" be buried, or burnt, or thrown away without any " regard, as our Nails and Hair." Much more of this kind is said by Philosophers, which they could not have the Heart to do, unless they had been brought up among the *Cyclopes*, and the *Lestrigones*. Now if they do none of these, but their Actions are common with the Vulgar, there is no particular Work proper to them, who are thought to have the Art about Life. If therefore it be absolutely necessary, that Arts be comprehended from their proper Works; but there is no Work proper to the Art about Life, it is not comprehended. Wherefore none can say, that it is existent.

CHAP. XXVI.

Whether there is in Men an Art about Life.

NOW if there be in Men an Art about Life, either it is ingenerate in them by Nature, or acquired by Discipline and Doctrine. If by Nature, either it is ingenerate in them as they are Men, or as they are not Men. Not as they are not Men, for they are Men; If as they are Men, this Wisdom would be in all Men, insomuch that all Men would be prudent, virtuous, and wise: But the greater Part of Men, they say, are evil; therefore the Art which is according to Life is not in them, as they are Men, and therefore not by Nature. Besides, forasmuch as they hold an Art to be a System of unexercised Comprehensions, they seem rather to conceive both this and other Arts to be comprehended by Experience and Discipline.

CHAP. XXVII.

Whether the Art about Life can be taught.

NEither is it understood by Doctrine and Discipline; for before these are, there must be three things acknowledged; the Thing taught, the Teacher, and He who learneth the manner of Discipline; but none of these are, therefore not the Doctrine.

CHAP. XXVIII.

Whether there be any thing taught.

FOR what is *taught*, is either true or false. If it be false, it cannot be taught, for that which is false, is not; that which is not, cannot be taught. But neither, if it be said to be true; for that true is inexistent, we proved in our Discourse concerning the Critery. If therefore neither false nor true is taught, and besides these there is nothing docible, (for these not being docible, no Man will say that things indeterminable are docible) nothing is taught.

Again, that which is taught is either manifest or unmanifest; if manifest, it needs not be taught, for things manifest are alike manifest to all. If unmanifest, forasmuch as things unmanifest, by reason of the indijudicable Controversy concerning them, are incomprehensible, they cannot be taught; for how can any Man learn, or teach, that which he comprehends not. Now if neither that which is manifest, nor that which is unmanifest is taught, nothing at all is taught.

Besides, that which is taught is either a Body or Incorporeal; but neither of these, whether manifest or unmanifest, can be taught, for the foresaid Reason; therefore nothing can be taught.

Moreover, either that which is, is taught, or that which is not. If that which is not be taught, forasmuch as Doctrines are conceived to be of things true, that which is not, will be true; and if true, it will be existent; for Truth, they say, is that which exists, and is opposed to something. But it is absurd to say, that which is not, exists; therefore that which exists not, cannot be taught. Neither can a Being be taught. For if a Being be taught, it must either be taught as a Being, or according to some other thing. If, as it is a Being, it is docible, it is a Being, and consequently not docible; for Doctrines must be made of things indubitate and indocible, therefore a Being, as a Being, is not docible. But neither according to some other thing, for a Being hath nothing accident to it, which is not a Being. Therefore if a Being be not taught, as it is a Being, neither can it be taught according to any other thing; for whatsoever is accident to it, is a Being. Besides, whether the Being which they say is taught, be manifest or unmanifest, it appears by the foresaid Difficulties to be indocible. Now if neither that which is, nor that which is not, be taught, nothing is taught.

CHAP. XXIX.

Whether there be a Teacher and a Learner.

BY the foresaid Difficulties are also subverted the *Teacher* and the *Learner*; nevertheless, we will question them more particularly. Either the Artist teacheth the Artist; or the Ignorant, the Ignorant; or the Ignorant, the Artist; or the Artist, the Ignorant. The Artist teacheth not the Artist, for, both being Artists, neither needs teaching. The Ignorant cannot teach the Ignorant, no more than the blind can lead the blind. The Ignorant cannot teach the Artist, that were ridiculous. It remains to say, that the Artist teaches the Ignorant, which likewise is impossible. For there can be no such thing as an Artist, seeing that no Man is an Artist naturally, and born such, neither is an Artist made of one that is not an Artist: For either one Theorem, and one Comprehension is sufficient to make an Artist of him that

that was not an Artiſt, or not; but if one Comprehenſion can make an Artiſt of him that was not an Artiſt, Firſt, we may ſay, that Art is not a Syſtem of Comprehenſions; for he that before knew nothing at all, if he have learnt one Theorem of Art, may thus be ſaid to be an Artiſt. Next, if any ſhall ſay, that he who hath attained ſome Theorems of Art, but as yet wanteth one, and therefore being not an Artiſt, ſhall, as ſoon as he hath attained that one, be made an Artiſt of a Not-Artiſt, he holds that it is compleated by one Comprehenſion. But if he come to Particulars, he cannot ſhew a Man that is yet no Artiſt, but ſhall be an Artiſt as ſoon as he hath attained one Theorem more; for no Man can number the Theorems of every Art, ſo as having numbred the Theorems known, he ſhall be able to ſay, how many there are behind to compleat the Number of the Theorems of the Art; therefore the Knowledge of the Theorem maketh not a Man an Artiſt who was not an Artiſt before. But if this be true, Foraſmuch as a Man comprehends not all the Theorems of Arts together, but one by one, (as muſt be granted) he who attaineth every Theorem of Art diſtinctly by itſelf, cannot become an Artiſt; for we have ſhewed, that the Knowledge of one Theorem cannot make him an Artiſt who was not an Artiſt; therefore he, who is not an Artiſt, cannot be made an Artiſt. So as from hence it appeareth, that there is no Artiſt at all, and conſequently no Teacher.

But neither can he who is ſaid to learn, not being an Artiſt, learn and comprehend the Theorems of Art, whereof he is ignorant: For as he who is blind from his Birth, as being blind, cannot comprehend Colours; nor he who is deaf from his Birth, Sounds; ſo neither can he who is not an Artiſt, comprehend the Theorems of Art whereof he is ignorant. Otherwiſe, the ſame Perſon might be both an Artiſt, and ignorant of Art; ignorant of the Art, for he is ſuppoſed to be ſuch; An Artiſt, for he comprehends the Theorems of the Art. Wherefore neither doth an Artiſt teach him who is not an Artiſt. Now if neither the Artiſt teacheth the Artiſt; nor the Ignorant, the Ignorant; nor the Ignorant, the Artiſt; nor the Artiſt, the Ignorant; (and beſides theſe there is nothing) neither is there a Teacher, nor a Learner; and there being neither a Teacher nor a Learner, the way of learning likewiſe is ſuperfluous.

CHAP. XXX.

Whether there is a Way of Learning.

NEvertheleſs, againſt this alſo are raiſed Doubts; for the Way of teaching is either by Evidence or by Diſcourſe; but neither by Evidence, nor by Diſcourſe, as we ſhall prove; therefore the Way of teaching is inextricable. Learning is not acquired by Evidence; for Evidence is of things ſhewn, but that which is ſhewn is apparent to all; that which is apparent, inaſmuch as it is apparent, is perceptible by all; that which is commonly perceptible by all, is not to be learned; therefore nothing is to be learned by Evidence.

But neither is there any thing learnt by Diſcourſe; for Diſcourſe either ſignifies ſomething, or ſignifies nothing; but if it ſignify nothing, it teacheth nothing. If it ſignifies ſomething, it ſignifies it either by Nature, or Impoſition; by Nature it ſignifies not, for all Men underſtand not all Men, as *Greeks Barbarians*, and *Barbarians Greeks*. If it ſignifieth by Impoſition, it is manifeſt, that the Makers of theſe Words, firſt comprehending the things to which they accommodated them, underſtand them, not as being taught by theſe Words the Things which they knew not, but as being put in mind of the things which they knew. Now they who have need to learn that which they know not, not knowing to what things the Words are accommodated, will underſtand nothing at all; wherefore there can be no way of Learning, For the Teacher ought to inſinuate into the Learner, an Underſtanding of the Theorems of the Art which is to be learnt, that ſo he, comprehending the Collection of them all, may be made an Artiſt. But Comprehenſion, as we ſhewed already, is nothing, therefore there cannot be a way of teaching. Now if there be nothing taught, nor a Teacher, nor a Learner, nor a Way of Teaching, there will neither be any Diſcipline nor Doctrine. Theſe Arguments are in general alledged againſt Diſcipline and Doctrine.

Another Difficulty may be raiſed againſt that which is called, The Art concerning Life. Thus: The thing taught, that is, Wiſdom, we have formerly proved inſubſiſtent; the Teacher likewiſe, and Learner are inſubſiſtent: For either the wiſe teacheth the wiſe the Art concerning Life; or the fooliſh the fooliſh; or the fooliſh the wiſe; or the wiſe the fooliſh; but none of theſe teacheth another; therefore the Art concerning Life is not taught. To ſpeak of the reſt were ſuperfluous. But if the wiſe teach the fooliſh Wiſdom, and Wiſdom be the Science of Good, and Ill, and Indifferent; the fooliſh, not having Wiſdom, will be ignorant of the things Good, and Ill, and Indifferent; and, being ignorant of them, whilſt the wiſe teacheth him things Good, Ill, and Indifferent, he can only hear the Things he ſaith, but not know them. For if he did underſtand them whilſt he is in his Folly, Folly alſo might contemplate things Good, Bad, and Indifferent: But according to them, Folly contemplates not theſe, (otherwiſe a fooliſh Perſon were wiſe) therefore the fooliſh underſtand not by learning the things ſaid or done by the wiſe; but if he underſtands not, he cannot be taught by him any way, but by Evidence and Diſcourſe, as we ſaid before. Now if that which

which is called the Art concerning Life, is neither communicated by Learning and Diſcipline, nor by Nature, it is not to be found out by the Philoſophers, who cry it up ſo much.

CHAP. XXXI.

Whether the Art concerning Life be profitable to him who hath it.

MOreover, though we ſhould grant, that the Art which they dream of concerning Life, may be communicated, yet it will rather appear hurtful and troubleſome to thoſe that have it, than beneficial. We will take but one Inſtance for brevity. The Art concerning Life may be profitable to a wiſe Man in giving him Continence in Appetition of Good, and Averſion from Ill. For he, whom they call continent, is ſaid to be ſuch, either for that he hath no Appetition to Ill, nor Averſion from Good; or for that he hath ill Appetitions and Averſions, but maſters them by Reaſon: But as far as he is not in ill Judgments, he is not continent; for he is not continent in that which he hath not. And as no Man ſaith, an Eunuch is continent in venereal Pleaſures; or, he who hath no Appetite, continent in eating, (for they have not thoſe things that by Continence might be ſubdued) in like manner, a wiſe Man cannot be ſaid to be continent, becauſe he hath not in himſelf the Paſſion whereof he ſhould be continent. But if they will ſay, he is continent, for that he is in ill Judgments, but overmaſters them by Reaſon: Firſt, they muſt grant, that Wiſdom hath profited him nothing; foraſmuch as he is ſtill in Trouble, and needeth Help: Next he will be found to be more unfortunate than thoſe who are ſaid to be bad. For if he hath an Appetite towards any thing, he is wholly diſturbed; if he overmaſters it with Reaſon, he containeth the Ill within himſelf, and thereupon is more troubled than the ill Perſon, who ſuffereth not this; for if he hath an Appetite to any thing, he is troubled; but if he obtain his Deſire, the Trouble ceaſeth. A wiſe Man therefore, either is not continent as to Wiſdom; or if he be, he is of all Men the moſt unhappy; ſo that the Art concerning Life affords him not Benefit, but extraordinary Trouble. Now that he, who conceiveth that he hath the Art concerning Life, and thereby knoweth what things are good and ill in their own Nature, is exceedingly troubled, as well when the good are preſent as when the ill, we ſhewed heretofore. We muſt therefore ſay, If the Subſiſtence of things Good, Ill, and Indifferent, be not undoubtedly a Knowledge, and the Art concerning Life be perhaps inſubſiſtent alſo; and though it were granted by Suppoſition to ſubſiſt, yet would it bring no Profit to thoſe who have it, but on the contrary, great Trouble; the Dogmatiſts look ſupercilioufly, and take pride in vain, in the Ethical Part of that which they call Philoſophy. And with this Diſputation (not to exceed the Limits of a Summary) we ſhall cloſe our third Book of *Pyrrhonian Hypotypoſes*, adding only this.

CHAP. XXXII.

Why the Sceptick, ſometimes on ſet purpoſe, alledgeth weak Arguments.

THE *Sceptick*, by reaſon of his great Humanity, endeavours with Diſcourſe to remedy, as far as in him lies, the Arrogance and raſh Inſolence of the Dogmatiſts. As therefore Phyſicians, in corporeal Diſeaſes, have Remedies of different ſorts, applying violent to thoſe who are violently ſick, but gentle to thoſe whoſe Diſeaſe is more gentle: In like manner, the Arguments propoſed by the *Sceptick* are not all of equal Force; but the more ſolid, which are beſt able to overthrow the Affection of the Dogmatiſts, he uſeth againſt thoſe who are moſt violently affected therewith; the lighter againſt thoſe who have it more lightly and ſuperficially; ſo as that they may be overthrown by lighter Probabilities. Whence it happens that the *Sceptick*, ſometimes, alledgeth ſtronger Probabilities and Arguments; ſometimes, on ſet purpoſe, weaker, as often perceiving them ſufficient to compaſs his Deſign.

THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY.

THE THIRTEENTH PART,

Containing the *EPICUREAN* Sect.

EPICURUS.

CHAP. I.

His Country, Parents, Brethren.

EPICURUS is by ſome conceived to have been a *Samian*, for *Timon* (in [a] *Laertius*) ſaith, he was the laſt of the Natural Philoſophers that came out of *Samus*. And [b] *Conſtantinus Porphyrogeneta* conceives, that he derived his Original from *Samus*, as well as *Pythagoras*. But the Occaſion of this was, for that he paſſed the firſt Part of his younger Years at *Samus*, with his Father and Brethren; for thither came his Father, *Agripeta*, as [c] *Cicero* terms him, (that is, one who claimeth a Portion in the Diviſion of Lands.) Upon the like ground [d] *Strabo* conceives him a *Lampſacene*, for he lived at *Lampſacum*, and converſed with the chief Perſonages there. But *Epicurus* indeed was by Country an *Athenian*, as [e] *Laertius*, [f] *Suidas*, and infinite other Writers affirm; whence [g] *Laertius*, about to praiſe him, begins thus:

Firſt Ceres *Gifts to human Indigence,*
Renowned Athens *did long ſince diſpenſe:*
And Mens diſordered Ways by Laws redreſt,
And firſt our Life with greateſt Comfort bleſt;
When it produc'd a Perſon of ſuch worth,
Whoſe Breaſt contain'd, whoſe Lips all Truth brought forth.

Now foraſmuch as the *Athenian* People, being diſtinguiſhed by Tribes, were diſperſed into τῶν δήμων, the adjacent Towns, which were made free Corporations, even from the time of *Theſeus*; *Epicurus* was born at *Gargettus*, a Town (as *Heſychius* [h] and *Favorinus* deſcribe it) belonging to the *Ægean* Tribe, where (ſaith [i] *Plutarch*) *Theſeus* overcame the *Pallantidæ*, who conſpired againſt him and *Ægeus*; and where *Euryſtheus* (as [k] *Stephanus* relates) was buried. For this reaſon, he is ſaid, by [l] *Laertius*, to have been

[a] Lib. 10. 3. [b] Lib. 1. de Themat. [c] De Nat. Deor. l. 1. 26. [d] Lib. 14. [e] Loc. Cit. [f] In voce *Epicurus*.
[g] Lib. 6. [h] In Lexicis. [i] In Theſeo. [k] De Urb. [l] Loc. Cit.

been δῆμον Γαργηττίων; by [m] *Statius* termed, the *Gargettick Author*, and the *Gargettick old Man*; by [n] *Cicero*, [o] *Ælian*, and others, simply the *Gargettian*.

Laertius [p] (out of *Metrodorus*, in his Treatise of *Nobility*) writes, that *Epicurus* was, *of the Family of the Philaidæ*; the *Philaidæ* were denominated from *Philæus*, the second Son of *Ajax*, who dwelt in *Melite*, and is mentioned by [q] *Plutarch*, who adds, that *Pisistratus* also was of the *Philaidæ*. Of this Family was the Father of *Epicurus*, (according to *Laertius* [r] and others) named *Neocles*, his Mother *Chærestrata*. He is also frequently cited, after the Greek Fashion, *Epicurus Neoclis*, sometimes simply termed *Neoclides*, as when compared by [s] *Menander* with *Themistocles*, whose Father was named *Neocles* also. I omit, that his Father was (according to [t] *Strabo*) one of the two thousand Citizens, whom the *Athenians* sent to *Samus* to share the Land by Lots, whither they had before sent *Pericles* and *Sophocles*, who strictly besieged the revolted *Samians*. I omit also, that he was a Schoolmaster, which (besides *Strabo*) [u] *Cicero* observes, when proceeding to reproach him, *But his little Farm*, saith he, *not being sufficient to maintain him, as I conceive, he became a Schoolmaster*.

[w] *Suidas* mentions only two Brethren of *Epicurus*, *Neocles* and *Chæredemus*; but [x] *Laertius* (out of *Philodemus* the *Epicurean*) adds a third, *Aristobulus*, whom [y] *Plutarch* sometimes seems to call *Agathobulus*. By what Care and Benevolence *Epicurus* gained their Reverence and Affection, is excellently declared by [z] *Plutarch*, who conceives it worthy Admiration, how he came so to win them, and they to be won. That all these died before *Epicurus*, may be inferred from his Will, wherein he ordereth nothing, either to them, or of them, as alive; but only appointed a Day to be celebrated for his Brethren in the Month *Posidæon*. And though of *Chæredemus* there is no further Testimony, yet of *Aristobulus* it is more apparent from [a] *Plutarch* who writes, that *Epicurus* was wholly taken up about *Metrodorus*, *Polyæmus*, and *Aristobulus*, tending them in their Sickness, and mourning for them when they died. But of *Neocles* it is most manifest, from the same [b] *Plutarch*, relating, that *Epicurus* broke forth into a kind of Joy, mixt with Tears, upon the Remembrance of the last Words of *Neocles*. Of how great and painful Sicknesses they died, is sufficiently aggravated by [c] *Plutarch* and [d] *Suidas*.

CHAP. II.

The Time of his Birth.

EPICURUS was born (as [e] *Laertius* relates out of the Chronology of *Apollodorus*) in the 3*d* Year of the 109*th* Olympiad, the 7*th* Day of the Month *Gamelion*; at whose Birth, *Pliny* [f] saith, the Moon was twenty Days old. *Hecatombæon* (the first Month) this Year falling in the Summer of the Year 4372. of the *Julian* Period, (now used by Chronologers) it is manifest, that *Gamelion* the same Year, being the 7*th* Month from *Hecatombæon*, fell upon the Beginning of the Year 4373. which was before the ordinary Computation from Christ, 341 compleat Years. Now forasmuch as in *January*, in which Month the Beginning of *Gamelion* is observed to have fallen, there happen'd a New Moon in the Attick Horizon, by the Tables of Celestial Motions, the fourth Day, in the Morning, (or the third Day, according to the *Athenians*, who, as [g] *Censorinus* saith, reckon their Day from Sun-set to Sun-set) and therefore the twentieth Day of the Moon, is coincident with the three and twentieth of *January*; it will follow, that *Epicurus* was born on the 23*d* Day of *January*, if we suppose the same Form of the Year extended from the Time of *Cæsar*, upwards. And this in the old Style, according to which the Cycle of the Sun, or of the Dominical Letters for that Year, (it being Bissextile) was *B. A.* whence the 23*d* Day of *January* must have been *Sunday*. But if we suit it with the *Gregorian* Account, which is ten Days earlier, (now in use with us) we shall find that *Epicurus* was born on the 2*d* of *February*, which was *Sunday*, (for the Dominical Letters must have been *E. D.*) in the Year before Christ, or the Christian Computation, 341, and consequently in the 1974*th* Year, compleat, before the Beginning of *February* this Year, which is from Christ 1634. Some things here must not be passed by.

First, That [h] *Laertius* observes *Sosigenes* to have been Archon the same Year, wherein *Epicurus* was born, and that it was the 7*th* Year from the Death of *Plato*. Moreover, it was the 16*th* of *Alexander*; for it was, as the same [i] *Laertius* affirms, the Year immediately following that in which *Aristotle* was sent for to come to him, then 15 Years old.

Secondly, That [k] *Eusebius* can hardly be excused from a Mistake, making *Epicurus* to flourish in the 112*th* Olympiad; for at that time, *Epicurus* scarce had pass'd his Childhood, and *Aristotle* began but to flourish in the *Lycæum*, being returned the foregoing Olympiad out of *Macedonia*, as appears from [l] *Laertius*.

[m] Silv. l. 1 and 2. [n] Lib. 15. Ep. 16. [o] Var. Hist. 4. 13. [p] Lib. 10. [q] In Solone. [r] Loc. Cit. [s] In Anthol. l. 3. [t] Lib. 14. [u] De Nat. Deor. l. 1. 26. [w] In voc Epicur. [x] Loc. Cit. [y] Adv. Colot. l. 2. [z] De Amor. Fratr. Adv. Col. 2. [a] Ibid. [b] Ibid. [c] Ibid. [d] Loc. Cit. [e] Lib. 10. l. 4. [f] Lib. 35. c. 2. [g] De Die Nat. c. 1. [h] Lib. 10. ib. [i] Lib. 5. 10. [k] In Chron. [l] Loc. Cit.

Thirdly, That the Error which is crept into [m] *Suidas*, and hath deceived his Interpreter, is not to be allowed, who reports *Epicurus* born in the 79*th* Olympiad. I need not take notice, how much this is inconsistent, not only with other Relations, but even with that which followeth in *Suidas*, where he extends his Life to *Antigonus Gonotas*; I shall only observe, that, for the Number of Olympiads, *Suidas* having doubtless set down ϱ θ, which denote the 109*th* Olympiad, the end of the ϱ was easily defaced in the Manuscript, so as there remained only θ, by which means of ο θ, was made the 79*th* Olympiad.

Fourthly, That it matters not that the *Chronicon Alexandrinum*, *Georgius Sincellus*, and others, speak too largely of the time wherein *Epicurus* flourished, and that we heed not the Errors of some Persons, otherwise very learned, who make *Aristippus* later than *Epicurus*, and something of the like kind. Let us only observe what St. *Hierom* [n] cites out of *Cicero*, *pro Gallio*; A Poet is there mentioned, making *Epicurus* and *Socrates* discoursing together, *Whose Times*, saith *Cicero*, *we know were disjoined, not by Years, but Ages.*

Fifthly, That the Birth-day of *Epicurus*, taken from *Laertius* and *Pliny*, seems to argue, That amongst the *Athenians* of old, the Civil Months and the Lunary had different Beginnings. This indeed will seem strange, unless we should imagine it may be collected that the Month *Gamelion* began only from the Full Moon that went before it: For, if we account the 14*th* Day of the Moon to be the 1*st* of the Month, the 1*st* of the Moon will fall upon the 7*th* of the Month. Not to mention that *Epicurus* seems in his Will to appoint his Birth-day to be celebrated on the first Decad of the Days of the Month *Gamelion*, because he was born in one of them; and then ordaineth something more particularly concerning the 20*th* of the Moon, for that it was his Birth-day, as we shall relate hereafter. Unless you think it fit to follow the [o] anonymous Writer, who affirms, *Epicurus* was born on the 20*th* Day of *Gamelion*; but I know not whether his Authority should outweigh *Laertius*. Certainly, many Errors, and those very great, have been observed in him, particularly by *Meursius*. I shall not take notice, that the ὄπισθεν of *Gamelion* might perhaps be understood of the 20*th* of the Moon, happening within the Month *Gamelion*, from *Cicero*, whose Words we shall cite hereafter. But this by the way.

CHAP. III.

Where he lived in his younger time.

LAERTIUS, [p] out of *Heraclides*, in his Epitome of *Sotion* relates, that a Colony being sent by the *Athenians* to *Samus*, *Epicurus* was bred up there till the 18*th* Year of his Age, in which he went to *Athens*; *Xenocrates* living in the Academy, *Aristotle* at *Chalcis*. [q] *Strabo* adds, that being first brought up, partly at *Samus*, partly at *Teos*, he spent the first part of his Youth at *Athens*, growing up together with *Menander*, the comick Poet. [r] *Laertius* further relates, That *Alexander* dying, and the *Athenians* being oppressed by *Perdiccas*, he went to *Colophon* to his Father, (about the 23*d* Year of his Age) and that he lived a-while there. And adds afterwards, out of *Apollodorus*, that from the 32d Year of his Age to the 37*th* he lived partly at *Mitylene*, partly at *Lampsacum*, (whither he made a dangerous Voyage, as [s] *Plutarch* observes.) *Suidas* [t] sets down how much time he bestowed in each of these Places, one Year at *Mitylene*, four at *Lampsacum*. *Laertius* adds, that he returned to *Athens*, when *Anaxicrates* was Archon. Now forasmuch as *Anaxicrates* (who succeeded *Charinus*, in the Year of whose Magistracy, as *Seneca* notes, [u] *Epicurus* writ to *Polyænus*) was Archon in the 2*d* Year of the 118*th* Olympiad, and consequently the 36*th* of *Epicurus*'s Age, there must necessarily be here a Metachronism of one Year.

Hitherto of the Places where *Epicurus* lived in his younger Times, partly learning, partly teaching, before he settled at *Athens*, where he instituted a Sect.

CHAP. IV.

His Masters.

AS for the Masters which he had, we read, in [w] *Laertius*, that some relate, *Epicurus* was Auditor of *Pamphilus* the *Platonick*; [x] *Suidas* saith the same; [y] *Cicero* also mentions *Epicurus*, himself acknowledging, that he heard him at *Samus*, but exceedingly slighted his Doctrine. Others also report the same.

Moreover, [z] *Clemens Alexandrinus* and others, report *Nausiphanes* the *Pythagorean*, Disciple of *Pyrrho*, to have been his Master; though [a] *Sextus Empiricus* writes, That he himself deny'd he had been Disciple to *Nausiphanes*. *Apollodorus*, in his Chronology, reports, That *Epicurus* heard *Lysiphanes* and *Praxiphanes*; but this, saith [b] *Laertius*, he doth not himself acknowledge, in his Epistle to *Euridicus*.

He might indeed have heard *Xenocrates*, and *some there are* (saith [c] *Cicero*) *who think he did hear him*, (as *Demetrius* the *Magnesian* in *Laertius*) but *Epicurus* himself will not allow it.

I would mention *Democrates*, with whom, [d] *Plutarch* saith, *Epicurus* contested *about Syllables and Accents*; but that I suspect *Democrates* to be falsly read instead

[m] In voc. Epic. [n] De Vit. Cler. [o] This anonymous Writer is no other than *Scaliger*, whose Mistakes for the most Part, *Meursius* hath unhappily followed, and taken Pains to confute the rest, conceiving him some antient Author. [p] Lib. 10. 1. [q] Lib. 14. [r] Loc. Cit. [s] Adv. Col. l. 2. [t] In Epic. [u] Epist. 18. [w] Lib. 10. 13. [x] In Epic. [y] De Nat. Deor. 1. 26. [z] Strom. l. 1. [a] Adv. Mat. 1. [b] Loc. Cit. [c] De Nat. Deor. l. 1. 26. [d] Adv. Col. 2.

instead of *Democritus*, even from this, that *Plutarch* adds, That *Epicurus* stole all his Opinions from him; which was the common Objection concerning *Democritus*, as shall be shewn hereafter.

I should mention also *Metrodorus*, whom [e] *Stobæus* calls, καταγνήτην, his Interpreter; *Doctorem, the Master* of *Epicurus*; and should suspect he were the same with him, whom [f] *Solinus* makes Contemporary with *Diogenes* the Cynick; did not the Opinion, attributed to him of the Infinity of Worlds, and of Atoms, argue, that this was *Metrodorus* the *Chian*, Disciple of *Democritus*, whom *Epicurus* might have, not as *Doctorem*, a Teacher by Word of Mouth; but as *Ductorem*, a *Leader* by Writing.

Thus also is *Lucian* to be taken, when he saith sportingly, that *Epicurus* was Disciple to *Democritus*, making him to be Disciple of *Aristippus* also, by reason of his Opinion of Pleasure, wherein yet there was a great Difference between them, as we shall shew in its due Place. But notwithstanding all we have alledged, [g] *Cicero*, *Plutarch*, *Empiricus*, and others, write, that *Epicurus* used to boast, That he never had any Master, but was αὐτοδίδακτος, his own Teacher, and attained Philosophy by his own Wit and Industry. And though they seem to mention this, not without some Disparagement of him, yet it will easily be granted, that he found out many things of himself, since this was that wherein he took most Delight at his last End; and withal, seeing he writ so many Books, filled only with his own Sayings, as we shall shew hereafter. And indeed [h] *Athenæus*, delivering in an Epigram an excellent Sentence of his, concludes, as if *Epicurus* learnt it not from any other, than from the Muses and *Apollo*. Hither also conduce these Commendations of *Laertius*:

Dispensing Gifts acquir'd by his own Breast;
And,
He rous'd his Soul to break the narrow Bonds
Which fetter Nature ———

And others of the same kind.

As for those whom *Epicurus* particularly esteemed, [i] *Laertius* (citing *Diocles*) affirms, he was chiefly addicted to *Anaxagoras*, (though in some things he contradicted him) and *Archelaus*, who was Master to *Socrates*. Of *Democritus* we shall speak hereafter. I only add, that *Epicurus* much admiring the Conversation of *Pyrrho*, continually question'd his Disciple *Nausiphanes* concerning him; as [k] *Laertius* saith in the Life of *Pyrrho*.

CHAP. V.

When, and upon what Occasion, he addicted himself to Philosophy, and instituted a Sect.

SUIDAS [l] saith, That he began to apply himself to Philosophy in the *12th* Year of his Age, which is confirmed by others, who wrote his Life, as [m] *Laertius* relates. But *Epicurus* himself (alledged by the same [n] *Laertius*) attesteth, That he did not addict himself to Philosophy till he was fourteen Years old. *Hermippus* (in [o] *Laertius*) saith, that, lighting accidentally upon the Books of *Democritus*, he betook himself to Philosophy. But *Apollodorus* the *Epicurean*, in the First Book of the Life of *Epicurus*, affirms, he applied himself to Philosophy, upon Dislike of the Sophists and Grammarians, for that they could not explain what *Hesiod* meant by *Chaos*. *Sextus* [p] *Empiricus* having related this more fully, it will not be amiss to transcribe his Words. Having proposed some Doubts concerning these Verses of *Hesiod*,

First, Chaos, *next broad-breasted Earth was made,*
The Seat of all ——— ———

He adds, And some affirm, That this was the Occasion of *Epicurus*'s sudden applying himself to Philosophy; for being yet very young, he asked a Grammarian who read to him [*Chaos* was first made:] Of what was *Chaos* made, if it was first made? The other answering, That it did not belong to him to teach such things, but to those who were called Philosophers. Then, saith *Epicurus*, I must go to those, for they are the Persons that know the Truth of Beings.

To omit, what some affirm, that he was, as *Hermippus* (in [q] *Laertius*) relates, before he addicted himself to Philosophy, a Schoolmaster: And though the [r] *Stoicks*, who were much his Enemies, reproached him, that with his Father he taught Boys for a small Stipend, and that with his Mother he went from House to House reading expiatory Prayers; I observe, that after he had applied himself to Philosophy, he instituted a School, being thirty-two Years old, as [s] *Laertius* relates, and this first at *Mitylene*, afterwards at *Lampsacum*, as may be collected from the Relation of *Suidas*, but had Disciples also from *Colophon*, as [t] *Laertius* relates.

Returning to *Athens* in the *36th* or *37th* Year of his Age, *He a-while discoursed* (saith [u] *Laertius*) *of Philosophy in publick with others, but afterwards instituted a Sect in private, denominated from him.* At first indeed, admiring the Doctrine of *Democritus*, he

[e] Eccl. Phys. 1. [f] Cap. 1. [g] Locis citatis. [h] Apud Laert. l. 10. [i] Loc. Cit. [k] Lib. 9. 64. [l] In Epic.
[m] Lib. 10. 14. [n] Ibid. [o] Ibid. [p] Adv. Phys. l. 2. [q] Loc. Cit. [r] Ibid. [s] Ibid. [t] Ibid. [u] Lib. 1.

he profeſſed himſelf a *Democritian*, as *Plutarch* [w] relates; but afterwards, for that he changed or added many things, his Followers were from him called *Epicureans*.

CHAP. VI.

His School.

WHereas other Profeſſors of Sects made choice of particular Places in *Athens*, as the *Academy*, the *Lycæum*, and the like, he purchaſed a very pleaſant Garden, for fourſcore *Minæ*, where he lived with his Friends and Diſciples, and taught Philoſophy. Thus, amongſt others, [x] *Laertius*, citing *Apollodorus*. *Pliny* [y] writes, that *Epicurus* firſt brought into *Athens*, the Cuſtom of having under the Name of *Hortus*, a Garden, the Delights of Fields and Country Manſions within the City itſelf; whereas, until his Time, 'twas not the Faſhion to have thoſe Kinds of Manſions *(Rura)* in Towns.

Hence we may conjecture, that this was the Place which [z] *Pauſanias* reports to have been called, even in his time, *the Gardens*; adding, That there was in it a Statue of *Venus*, made by *Alcamenes*, one of the moſt eminent things in *Athens*, (as may be gather'd alſo from [a] *Lucian*) and that the Temple of *Venus*, with the Statue of celeſtial *Venus*, did join to it. This Garden is often mention'd in the plural Number by [b] *Cicero*, [c] *Juvenal*, and others, and ſometimes diminutively, *Hortulus*, as *Virgil*; but howſoever it be us'd, it is commonly taken for the Sect or Doctrine deliver'd in that Place by *Epicurus* and his Scholars. When *Sextus Empiricus* calls the *Epicureans* the *Philoſophers of the Garden*, (as the *Stoicks*, the Philoſophers of the *Stoa* or *Cloiſter*) and *Apollodorus* being in his Time the Maſter of the Garden, was, as *Laertius* affirms, called κηπότυραννος, *the Garden King*.

Beſides this Garden, which, with Houſes belonging to it, joined upon the City, *Epicurus* had a Houſe in *Melite*, which was a Town of the *Cecropian* Tribe, as [d] *Suidas* affirms, inhabited by *Philæus*, one of the Anceſtors of *Epicurus*, as was formerly ſaid, having (according to [e] *Phavorinus*) a famous Temple dedicated to *Hercules*. Hither *Epicurus* ſometimes retir'd with his Diſciples, and at laſt bequeathed it to his Succeſſors, as we ſhall declare hereafter.

CHAP. VII.

How he lived with his Friends.

Epicurus after his Return to *Athens*, at what Time *Anaxicrates* was Archon, went only twice or thrice to *Ionia* to viſit his Friends, but lived all the reſt of his time at *Athens*, unmarried; nor would ever forſake his Country, though at that time reduc'd to great Extremities, as [f] *Laertius* obſerves. The worſt of which was when *Demetrius* beſieged *Athens*, about the 44th Year of *Epicurus*'s Age. How great a Famine at that time oppreſs'd the City, is deſcrib'd by [g] *Plutarch*. But it is obſervable, that having related a Story of the Conteſt between a Father and his Son, about a dead Mouſe which had fallen from the Top of a Houſe; he adds, *They ſay that* Epicurus *the Philoſopher ſuſtain'd his Friends with Beans, which he ſhared equally amongſt them.*

Epicurus therefore lived all the reſt of his Time at *Athens*, together with ſo many Friends and Diſciples, whom he converſed with, and inſtructed, as that whole Cities were not ſufficient to contain them (they are the Words of [h] *Laertius*) who reſorted to him, not only from *Greece*, but all other Parts, and lived with him in his Gardens, as he cites out of *Apollodorus*; but eſpecially from *Aſia*, and particularly from *Lampſacrum* and from *Egypt*, as may be collected out of [i] *Plutarch*. Of the Temperance and Frugality of his Diet we ſhall ſpeak hereafter. As to his living with his Friends, it is remarkable what *Diocles* in *Laertius*, and others, relate, That *Epicurus* did not, as *Pythagoras*, who ſaid the Goods of Friends ought to be in common, appoint them to put their Eſtates into one joint Stock, (for that imply'd a Diſtruſt, not a Friendſhip) but that any one upon occaſion ſhould be freely ſupply'd by the reſt. This will appear more manifeſt hereafter. In the mean time, we muſt not omit an eminent Place of [k] *Cicero*: "Neither *(ſaith he)* did *Epicurus* approve "Friendſhip in Diſcourſe only, but much more by "Life, Actions, and Manners, which how great a "thing it is, the Fables of the Ancients declare. "For amongſt the many various Stories repeated "from utmoſt Antiquity, there are hardly found "three Pair of Friends from *Theſeus* his Time down "to *Oreſtes*. But how many great Companies of "Friends, and how unanimouſly loving did *Epicurus* keep in one Houſe, and that very little? "Which is done even unto this Day by the *Epicureans*." *Thus* Cicero.

Amongſt the reſt of his Friends, [l] *Laertius* mentions *Polyſtratus*, who ſeems to be the ſame; of whom, together with *Hippoclides* another *Epicurean*, [m] *Valerius Maximus* gives a ſtrange Account. I ſhall inſert the Words of *Valerius*, the rather becauſe they will ſerve to illuſtrate Part of *Epicurus*'s Will hereafter, concerning Communication of the Goods of his Diſciple. They are theſe: "Hither may aptly "be referred *Polyſtratus* and *Hippoclides*, Philoſo-"phers,

[w] Ad. Col. 1. [x] Loc. cit. [y] Lib. 19. 4. [z] In Attic. [a] In Imag. T. 2. [b] Ad Attic. Eph. 2. 24.
[c] Sat. 14. [d] In Lexic. [e] Ibid. [f] Lib. 10. 10. [g] In Demetr. [h] Loc. cit. [i] De coc. viv. [k] P. de
ſin. lib. 1. c. 20. [l] Cap. iv. 25. [m] Lib. 1. c. 8.

" phers, who, born the ſame Day, Followers of " the Sect of the ſame Maſter, *Epicurus*, joined to- " gether in the common Poſſeſſion of Eſtate and " Maintenance of that School, died very old, in the " ſame Moment of time. So equal a Society of " Fortune and Friendſhip, who thinks not to have " been begotten, bred, and ended, in the Boſom of " celeſtial Concord?" *Thus he.*

CHAP. VIII.

His Friends and Diſciples.

BEing now to give a Catalogue of the chiefeſt of his Friends and Diſciples, we muſt not, in the firſt place, paſs by the three Brethren of *Epicurus*, mention'd in the Beginning; for they by his Advice ſtudied Philoſophy with him, as *Philodemus* (in [n] *Laertius*) affirms. [o] *Plutarch* adds, That they took in the Philoſophy of their Brother, as greedily as if they had been divinely inſpir'd, believing and profeſſing from their firſt Youth, That there was not any Man wiſer than *Epicurus*. The moſt eminent of the Three was *Neocles:* He declaring from a Boy, That his Brother was the wiſeſt of Mortals; added, as a Wonder, That his Mother could contain ſo many and ſo great Atoms, as, by their Convention, made up ſuch a wiſe Man, as [p] *Plutarch* relates. Hence it appearing that *Neocles* followed not any Philoſophy of his own, but that of his Brother, I know not why [q] ſome affirm, that he introduced a Sect like that of his Brother, unleſs perhaps they ground it upon that Place of [r] *Suidas*, where he ſaith that *Neocles* writ concerning his Sect. But who ſees not it may be underſtood, that he writ concerning the Sect which he himſelf profeſſed, but was inſtituted by another, eſpecially for that there is nothing ſaid any where of the Sect of the *Neoclidæ*.

Obſerve by the way, that this Saying (λάθε βιώσας, *Live cloſely*) which [s] *Plutarch* oppugns, and is brought in [t] amongſt the proverbial Speeches) did belong to this *Neocles*, as the ſame [u] *Suidas* affirmeth.

To his Three Brethren may be added thoſe Three Friends, who (as we read in [x] *Seneca*) became great Perſons through the Converſation of *Epicurus*.

Metrodorus is to be firſt nam'd; for he was, as [y] *Cicero* ſaith, almoſt another *Epicurus*. [z] *Strabo* plainly declareth he was of *Lampſacrum*. For whereas *Laertius* ſeems to ſay he was an *Athenian*, the Place is very corrupt; eſpecially ſeeing it is manifeſt he was not an *Athenian*, from this Antitheſis of [a] *Cicero: How much was* Epicurus *happier for being in his Country, than* Metrodorus *for being at* Athens; becauſe *Athens* was not the Country of *Metrodorus*. The Text of [b] *Laertius* is this: " He had many " Diſciples; but the moſt eminent were *Metrodorus*, " Ἀθηναῖον, and *Timocrates*, and *Sandes* a *Lampſa-* " *cene*, who from his firſt Acquaintance with the " Man, never left him," *&c.* For my part I am of Opinion, that theſe Words Ἀθηναῖον, καὶ Τιμοκράτην, καὶ Σάνδην ſhould be quite expunged; for if you take them away, the reſt joins together very well; if you admit them, they will not hang together: for it was *Metrodorus* that was indeed a *Lampſacene*, and with whom all the reſt that follows agreeth; not *Sandes*, whom, beſides other things, it is falſe, that *Epicurus* ſhould mention in his Will. And though [c] *Caſaubon* conceives, that Ἀθηναῖον may be the proper Name of a Man, yet is it ſtrange that we hear nothing elſewhere, as well of *Athenæus* as of *Sandes*, as *Epicureans*, ſince *Laertius* in this Place reckons up his moſt eminent Diſciples; but taking theſe away, the Three, *viz. Metrodorus*, *Polyænus*, and *Hermachus*, are deſcribed in a continued Series; who, as we ſaid, are put together by *Seneca* as moſt eminent. As for *Timocrates*, he is mentioned afterwards by the way, when he comes to name *Metrodorus* as his Brother, and ſeems here to be inſerted amiſs. The Occaſion upon which theſe Names crept into the Text I ſuſpect to be, that, perhaps, ſome Tranſcriber had noted in the Margin, that what was deliver'd in the Text was confirmed alſo by *Athenæus* (Author of the *Deipnoſophiſtæ*; for in him there is ſomething concerning the *Epicureans*) and by *Timocrates* (for he is alſo cited by *Laertius*) and by one *Sandes* (perhaps *Suidas*, or ſome other.) That many things have heretofore been inſerted out of the Margins into the Texts themſelves by Careleſneſs of the Tranſcribers, is moſt manifeſt.

Metrodorus therefore was by Country a *Lampſacene* (not the ſame with that Friend of *Anaxagoras*, whom [d] *Laertius* mentions of the ſame Name) born in the 12th Year of *Epicurus*'s Age; for dying in the 53d Year of his Age, (the Coherence of the Words and Senſe makes me think it ſhould be read Μητροδώρῳ ἄρχοντα) and that being the 7th before the Death of *Epicurus*, who lived to the 72d Year, it is evident, that the Year of his Birth muſt fall upon the 12th of *Epicurus*'s. From the firſt time that *Metrodorus* became acquainted with *Epicurus*, (which might happen in the 22d Year of his Age, at what time *Epicurus* lived at *Lampſacum*) he never (as we began to ſay out of *Laertius*) parted from him but one ſix Months, in which time he was abſent at home, and thence returned to *Epicurus*. He had a Siſter, *Batis*, whom he married to *Idomeneus*, and a Concubine named *Leontium*. He had Children, whom *Epicurus* recommended in his Will, and in the Epiſtle which

[n] Lib. 10, 3. [o] De Amor. Fra. [p] Adv. Col. 2. [q] *As* Genebr. Lib. 2. Chronol. [r] In Epic. [s] Lib. de Cō. [t] Eraſm. Chil. 2. Centu. 10. [u] In Neocl. [x] Epiſt. 6. [y] De fin. lib. 2. 28. [z] Lib. 13. [a] Loc. cit. [b] Lib. 10. [c] In Not. ad Laert. [d] Lib. 11. 11.

which he writ dying; and particularly a Son, named *Epicurus*. He was a very good Man, undaunted with Troubles, or Death itself, as *Epicurus* himself in *Laertius* attests. He had the Dropsy; [e] for *Cornelius Celsus* writes, That whilst he was sick of that Disease, and could no longer abstain, as was convenient, from drinking; he used, after he had forborn a great while, to drink, and cast it up again. But whether it was of this Disease, or of some other, that he died, is not certain. The Books which he writ are, by *Laertius*, reckoned to be these: *Against Physicians* III. *Of the Senses*, *to* Timocrates. *Of Magnanimity*. *Of the Infirmity of* Epicurus. *Against the* Dialecticks. *Against the* Sophists IX. *Of the Way to Wisdom*. *Of Alteration*. *Of Riches*. *Against* Democritus. *Of Nobility*. Besides which, [f] *Plutarch* cites his Books, *Of Philosophy*, *Of the Poets*, *Against* Timarchus. Likewise [g] *Clemens Alexandrinus* cites a Treatise, *That the Cause of Felicity, which comes from ourselves, is greater than that which comes from other things*. But of *Metrodorus* enough.

Polynæus was Son of *Athenodorus*, a *Lampsacene* also. He was *a great Mathematician*, to use the Words of [h] *Cicero*, and to comprise much in little: Modest and amiable, as *Philodemus* in [i] *Laertius* saith.

Hermachus was Son of *Agemorchus*, a *Mitylenean*, his Father of mean Quality. At first he studied Rhetorick; but afterwards became so knowing in Philosophy, that *Epicurus* dying, committed the Government of the School to him. He died at *Lysias*. There is a great Mention of him in *Epicurus*'s Will. His Writings, which *Laertius* commends for excellent, these. *Epistolicks concerning* Empedocles, XXII. *Of Disciplines*, (for *Casaubon* well reads, not Μαθητῶν, but Μαθημάτων) *Two Books*. *Against* Plato. *Against* Aristotle.

To these must be added *Leontius*, a *Lampsacene*, whom [k] *Plutarch* calleth one of the most eminent Disciples of *Epicurus*; adding, That this was he who writ to *Lycophron*, that *Epicurus* honoured *Democritus*.

Moreover, *Colotes* and *Idomeneus*, *Lampsacenes* also. Of the former we shall have Occasion to speak oftner, especially because of the two Books which *Plutarch* writ against him. [l] *Laertius* elsewhere writes, that *Menedemus* the Cynick was his Disciple, (unless perhaps there were some other *Colotes* of *Lampsacum*.) The same *Colotes* it is, who, cited by [m] *Macrobius*, argues, that *Plato* ought not to have invented the Fable of *Erus*, because no kind of Fiction agreeth with the Professors of Truth. The later, *Idomeneus*, *Epicurus* design'd to make famous by his Letters; as indeed he did, which appears from [n] *Seneca*: "I will alledge, *saith he*, *Epicurus* for an Example, who writing to *Idomeneus* (then a Minister of State employ'd in great Affairs) to persuade him, from a specious kind of Life, to true settled Glory. If, saith he, you affect Glory, my Epistles will make you more famous, than all those things which you esteem, and for which you are esteemed. Who would have known *Idomeneus*, if *Epicurus* had not graved his Name in his Letters? All those Magistrates and Princes, even the King himself, from whom *Idomeneus* derived his Title, are now suppressed by a deep Oblivion." *Thus he*. "And these (saith *Laertius*) were the more eminent Disciples."

But to these may be added two out of *Valerius*, already mentioned, *Polystratus* and *Hippoclides*; especially seeing *Laertius* reckons *Polystratus* as Successor to *Hermachus*; unless the *Polystratus* who is joined to *Hippoclides*, were not the same with him that succeeded *Hermachus*.

We might add *Timocrates* of *Lapsacum*, Brother of *Metrodorus*; but he seems to have fallen off, not brooking the Reprehensions of his Brother. We shall therefore rather join to these *Mus*, the Servant of *Epicurus*, who, as *Laertius* affirms, became an eminent Philosopher; not omitted by [o] *Agellius* and [p] *Macrobius*, in reckoning up those, who, of Servants, became famous for Philosophy.

To omit *Apelles*, somewhere derided by *Plutarch*, we must here mention three Women, who, together with others of the same Sex, learnt Philosophy of *Epicurus*. One *Leontium*, who studied Philosophy under *Epicurus*, as [q] *Athenæus* recites; and may also be collected from [r] *Cicero*, who saith she wrote a Book against *Theophrastus*, in an elegant Style, and in the *Attick* Dialect. The second, *Themista*, Daughter of *Zoilus* a *Lampsacene*, Wife of the forementioned *Leontius*. Of her, besides the Testimonies which we shall hereafter alledge, [s] *Clemens Alexandrinus* taketh express Notice. The third, *Philenis*, whom [t] *Athenæus* affirms to have written many things; adding, that the obscene Books ascribed to her, were put forth under her Name by *Rolycrates* the Sophist, to discredit the Woman.

To these may be added *Herodotus*, to whom [u] *Epicurus* writ a little Epitome of Physick, extant in *Laertius*; and who, amongst other things, according to the same *Laertius*, writ a Book, *Of the Youth of* Epicurus.

Pithocles, to whom *Epicurus* writ of superior Things; extant in *Laertius*, and who affirmed, that when he was but 18 Years old, he had not his Equal for Ingenuity in all *Greece*, as *Plutarch* relates.

Menæceus,

[e] Lib. 3. c. 21. [f] Adv. Col. [g] Strom. 2. [h] Acad. 3. [i] Lib. 10. 24. [k] Adv. Col. l. 1. [l] Lib. 6. 102. [m] In Somn. Scip. lib. 1. [n] Epist. 11. [o] Lib. 1. c. 12. [p] Saturn. 1, 11. [q] Lib. 15. [r] De Nat. Deor. 1. 33. [s] Strom. l. 4. [t] Lib. 8, & 10. [u] Laert. 10, 35.

(*Menæceus*, to whom *Epicurus* writ that Epistle concerning *Morality*, which is extant in *Laertius*; its Beginning recited also by *Clemens Alexandrinus*.

Timocrates, Son of *Demetrius*, a *Potamian*; and *Amynomachus*, Son of *Philocrates* of *Bate*, whom *Epicurus* made the Executors of his Will.

Nicanor, whom *Epicurus* recommended to the Care of the said Executors.

Eurydicus, one of those to whom, as *Laertius* saith, he writ Epistles.

Dositheus, and his Sons *Pyrrho* and *Hegesinax*, to whom *Epicurus* wrote a consolatory Letter upon the Death of their Father, as we find in *Plutarch*.

I omit *Polymedes*, *Antidorus*, and others, to be mentioned hereafter in treating of his Books.

CHAP. IX.

How much he wrote.

NEither did *Epicurus* spend the Time in giving his Disciples only Oral Instructions, but bestowed much Pains in composing several Books. But to understand how much he labour'd herein, by Comparison with other Philosophers, hear but *Laertius* in his [w] Preface: *Many things*, saith he, *Zeno writ*; *more*, Xenophanes; *more*, Democritus; *more*, Aristotle; *more*, Epicurus; *more*, Chrysippus. Where we see that *Epicurus*, as to Multitude of Writings, came short only of *Chrysippus*. But observe, that elsewhere [x] *Laertius*, to shew he may be thought to have exceeded *Chrysippus* herein, cites *Apollodorus* the *Athenian*; *who*, saith he, *to shew that what* Epicurus *writ of himself, not borrowed from any other, did far exceed the Books of* Chrysippus, *saith expresly thus*; *If a Man should take out of the Books of* Chrysippus *the things which he hath borrowed of others, the Paper will be left blank*. But that this may not seem strange, the same [y] *Laertius* elsewhere relates, that *Chrysippus*, for his Emulation of *Epicurus* in writing much, was called by *Carneades* the *Parasite of his Books*; because, *if* Epicurus *writ any thing*, (read γράψαι, not γράφαι) *he would affect to write as much. Whence it came to pass, that he often wrote the same things over again, and whatsoever came next to hand, and presently thrust it in for haste without Correction*; *and brought in so many Testimonies of other Writers, that his Books were filled up only with them, as may be found in* Zeno *also, and* Aristotle. Thus *Laertius* of *Chrysippus*: but of *Epicurus* not so; for [z] he relates, that his Volumes amounted to three hundred, *in which*, saith he, *there is no Testimony of any other Author, but they are all the very Words of* Epicurus. Which I observe, to shew (seeing *Epicurus* wrote so many things, [a] *a great Writer*, as he terms him, and exceeding for multitude of Books; so as [b] *Origen* charging *Celsus* with Temerity, objects as a thing he conceives impossible, *There is not any of us, who*, saith he, *knows all that* Epicurus *writ*) his fluent Vein, and how he was chiefly employ'd.

CHAP. X.

What Writings of his are particularly mentioned by Authors.

HERE it is fit we give a kind of Catalogue of his Books, not of all he wrote, but of those whose Titles are extant in other Authors. I say, their Titles; for the Books themselves have so miscarried by the Injury of Time, that besides some few Compendiums preserv'd by *Laertius*, and some Fragments scatter'd up and down amongst several Writers, there is not any thing of them remaining, at least, as yet known to us.

To begin with those which [c] *Laertius* accounts the best, they are ranked thus:

Of Nature, XXXVII. They are sometimes cited simply, *Of Nature*; sometimes with the Number of the Books, as when *Laertius* hereafter in his Life cites the Ist, the XIth, XIIth, XIVth, XVth. [d] *Galen* also mentions the Title and Number of the Books.

Of Atoms and Vacuum, so usually cited. [e] *Cleomedes* seemeth to mean the same under another Name, *Of the Principles of all things*.

Of Love.

An Epitome of things appertaining to natural Philosophers. This Epitome was twofold, Great and Little; both are cited by [f] *Laertius*: the Lesser, that which is written to *Herodotus*.

Against the Megarick (or Dialectick) *Philosophers Doubts*. These *Doubts* seem chiefly to have concerned certain moral Arguments, as concerning Justice, Marriage, and Dower: For this seems to be the same which *Laertius* and [g] *Plutarch* cite under the Name of *Doubts*, without adding, *To the Megaricks*.

Κύριαι δόξαι, *Maxims*; or, as [h] *Cicero* interprets, *Maximæ ratæ Sententiæ*; *because*, saith he, *they are Sentences briefly expres'd, which conduce exceedingly to living happily. He* [i] *elsewhere calls them select and short Sentences.* [k] Sextus *seems to call them Memorable Sayings. Laertius* hath put them at the End, and [l] *Lucian* somewhere commends them, as [m] *Cicero* the Book of *Crantor*; *which is*, saith he, *not Great indeed, but Golden, and, as* Panætius *advised* Tubero, *to be gotten by heart*. He was in Opinion different from *Suidas*, who calls them *wicked Notions*.

[w] Lib. 1. 16. [x] Lib. 7. 182. [y] Lib. 10. 26. [z] Ibid. [a] Ibid. [b] Adv. Celf. l. 1. [c] Laert. 10. 27. [d] Comment. in 1. lib. Hipp. de nat. hum. [e] Lib. 2. c. 1. [f] Laert. 10. 27. [g] Adv. col. l. 1. [h] De fin. l. 2. [i] De Nat. Deor. 2. [k] Adv. Phyf. l. 2. [l] In Pfeuden. [m] Lib. 4. Acad. 44.

Περὶ αἱρέσεων, *Of Elections*; ſo I conceive it ought rather to be render'd than of Sects; becauſe in this Book *Epicurus* ſeems not to deſign a Hiſtory of Sects, but moral Inſtitution, which is converſant about the Choice of things, as [n] *Laertius* declares at the End of *Epicurus*'s Epiſtle to *Menœceus*. Not to mention that he teacheth the Ethick Kind to conſiſt only of Election and Avoidance. For which reaſon the Book, which is ordinarily and next to this cited, Περὶ φυτῶν, *Of Plants*, ought rather to be entitul'd, Περὶ φευκτ[ῶν], *Of things to be avoided*; as well for Coherence of the Title, as for that *Epicurus*, almoſt wholly taken up with moral Philoſophy, ſcarce treated of any particular Subject in Phyſick, unleſs they were ſuch as conduced to take away vain Terrors from the Minds of Men; of which Kind, this of *Plants* could not be. Moreover, becauſe in Manuſcripts this Title is connected to the former by the Conjunction καὶ, we may conjecture that the Inſcription was, Περὶ αἱρέσεων καὶ περὶ φυγῶν; or under a ſingle Title, Περὶ αἱρέσεων, καὶ φυγῶν; *Of Election and Avoidance*. Yet might the Inſcription have been in the plural Number, foraſmuch as it is afterwards ſaid, *Elections and Avoidances are dijudicated from Pleaſure and Grief*.

Of the End; ſo this Book is generally cited, as amongſt others, by [o] *Plutarch*. Neither doth *Cicero* ſeem to mean any other, though he cite a Book, *Of the Ends of Good and Evil*.

Of the Critery, or the Canon; or, as [p] *Cicero* tranſlates it, *Of the Rule, and of Judgment*. But if inſtead of Judgment we render it Judicatory, the Force of the Word will be more fully expreſs'd.

Chæredemus; or, *Of the Gods*. This is one of thoſe Books which *Epicurus* entituled by the Names of his Brethren and Friends, that, being dead, their Names might not be forgotten, as [q] *Plutarch* obſerves.

Of Sanctity, or *Hegeſianax*. This perhaps is he, whom [r] *Plutarch* terms *Hegetoanax*; concerning whoſe Death, *Epicurus* wrote to his Parents; unleſs perhaps it were he who wrote Hiſtories, and *Troica*, cited by [s] *Athenæus*; for he was of *Alexandria*, and *Epicurus* had Friends out of *Egypt*.

Of Lives, IV. Which is all one as if the Inſcription had been, *Of Life and Manners*. Neither doth *Epicurus* ſeem in theſe Books to relate the Story of ſome eminent Perſons, as *Plutarch* and *Laertius* have done in their Books of Lives, but to give Rules whereby to lead a quiet Life; as may plainly enough be collected from the Catalogue of the moral Treatiſes, and the Places cited out of this by *Laertius*. The word *Lives* ſeems here to be taken in the ſame Senſe as with [t] *Plutarch*, when he ſpeaketh of *the Difference of Lives and Politicks*, which the Interpreter well renders, *Of Manners and publick Inſtitutes*. Of theſe Books are hereafter cited by *Laertius* the firſt and ſecond.

Of Juſt Action.

Neocles to *Themiſta*. This ſeems to have been that *Neocles* who was Brother to *Epicurus*, not his Father; for in like manner he called other of his Books after the Names of his Brothers.

The Banquet, cited by [u] *Plutarch*, [w] *Athenæus*, and others. [x] *Plutarch* mentions Queſtions handled in it, concerning the Heat of Wine, the Time of Coition. *Laertius*, concerning Troubles about Marriage, *&c.*

Eurylochus to *Metrodorus*. I gueſs that this *Eurylochus* was the ſame with that *Eurydicus*, to whom, as we ſaid formerly, *Epicurus* writ; but the thing is uncertain.

Of Seeing.

Of the Angle, which is in the Atom.

Of Touching; or perhaps, *Of the Tangibility of Atoms:* for [y] *Epicurus* called *Vacuum* τὸ ἀναφὲς, *that which cannot be touched.*

Of Fate.

Of Paſſions. Sentences to Timocrates.

Προγνωστικὸν, *Præcognitorium*; ſo I render it, becauſe he ſeemeth in this to have diſcourſed of the Precognitive Faculty.

Protreptick (Exhortatory) that is, *Diſcourſe*; for ſo *Iſocrates* and *Clemens* expreſsly.

Of Images, εἴδωλα, *Simulacra*, *Imaginei*, *Species*, *Formæ*, *Spectra*; ſo ſeveral Perſons variouſly interpret them, which are now commonly termed *Intentional Species*.

Of Phantaſy, or the Impreſſion thereof, which appeareth in the knowing Faculty; for neither did *Epicurus*, nor moſt of the ancient Philoſophers, underſtand by this Word, as we now for the moſt part do, the Faculty itſelf.

Ariſtobulus; this Book bears the Name of *Epicurus*'s third Brother.

Of Muſick, *viz.* as it conduceth to Manners; for this may be collected from [z] *Plutarch* and [a] *Empiricus*.

Of Gifts and Gratitude, mentioned by [b] *Empiricus*, who cites ſomething grammatical out of it.

Polymedes. He ſeems to have been ſome Friend or Diſciple of *Epicurus*.

Timocrates, III. Whether meaning the Brother of *Metrodorus*, or the Executor of his Will, or ſome other. Hence I ſhould believe, that by *Laertius* was cited the third Book of *Timocrates*, or written by *Timocrates*; but that inſtead of Τιμοκράτης, I ſuſpect it ſhould be written Τιμοκρατεῖ, relating to the third

[n] Laert. ibid. [o] Adv. col. 2. [p] De Nat. Deor. 1. c. 16. [q] De occ. viv. [r] Adv. col. 2. [s] Lib. 3, & 9.
[t] In Lycurgo. [u] Symp. quæſt. 1, 1. [w] Deipn. 5. [x] Adv. col. 1, Symp. quæſt. 3. 3. [y] Apud Laert. 10. 28.
[z] Adv. col. 2. [a] Adv. Math. [b] Adv. Gram.

third Book, which, by *Epicurus*, was ſo entitled. This the Text ſeems to confirm.

Metrodorus, V. That this was the ſame *Metrodorus*, of whom we have ſpoken formerly, cannot be doubted. From the firſt Book, cited by *Laertius*, may be collected, that *Epicurus* related the Story of *Metrodorus*'s Life.

Antidorus, II. This *Antidorus* is mention'd by [c] *Plutarch*, and perhaps by [d] *Laertius* alſo, in the Life of *Heraclides*, if we there read *Antidorus* for *Autodorus*.

Περὶ νόσων δόξαι πρὸς Μίθρην, *Of the South Winds, Sentencees to* Mithres. But perhaps the Title ought rather to be read, περὶ νόσων, *Of Diſeaſes*, as well for the Reaſons alledged about the Title περὶ φυτῶν, as for that theſe Sentences ſeem not to have been ſeveral Opinions concerning ſome particular Winds, as moral Sentences to moderate the Pain of Diſeaſes. This ſeems to be the ſame *Mithres*, a *Syrian*, whom *Metrodorus* relieved, as [e] *Plutarch* hath ſeveral times deliver'd; and the ſame whom [f] *Laertius* relates to have been the Steward of *Lyſimachus*'s Houſe; adding, that *Mithres* ſaying to *Theodorus*, Thou ſeemeſt not only not to acknowledge Gods, but Kings alſo: *Theodorus* reply'd, How can I but acknowledge Gods, who think thee an Enemy to the Gods?

Calliſtolas; who, it may be preſumed, was ſome Friend of *Epicurus*'s.

Of a Kingdom, mention'd by [g] *Plutarch*.

Anexímenes; perhaps the ſame *Lampſacene* who is mention'd by [h] *Strabo*, and whom both [i] *Plutarch* and [k] *Laertius* ſeem to mean; for though he were one of *Alexander*'s Maſters, yet did he ſurvive him, (for he wrote his Actions) and was, according to *Suidas*, Diſciple to *Diogenes* the *Cynick*, and conſequently younger than he; whereas *Diogenes* died in the eighteenth Year of *Epicurus*'s Age, *viz.* in the Beginning of the 114th Olympiad.

Epiſtles. Of theſe, four are extant in *Laertius*; one to *Herodotus*, which was, as we ſaid, the leſſer Epitome, and under that Name cited by [l] *Achilles Tatius*, *Of natural things*. The ſecond to *Pythocles*, *Of Meteors*, or ſuperior things, as well celeſtial, as all others above the Earth. The third to *Menæceus*, *Of Manners*. The laſt is very ſhort, which he writ, dying, to *Idomeneus*. That, beſides theſe, he writ innumerable others, may be collected from [m] *Plutarch*, [n] *Laertius*, and others. For *Plutarch*, for Example, cites an Epiſtle of his, *To Anaxarchus*; [o] *Laertius* his Epiſtle, *To Ariſtobulus*; alſo an Epiſtle, *To his Friends at* Mytilene. This ſeems to be the ſame with that which [p] *Sextus Empiricus* cites thus, *To the Philoſophers at* Mytilene. But *Laertius* implieth, there were more which bore that Inſcription, Ἐν τῇ πρὸς τοὺς ἐν Μιτυλήνῃ φιλοσόφους; ſo as there might be one of them ſuppoſititious. In the ſame Rank may be reckon'd his Epiſtles concerning ſeveral Inſtitutions of Life, hinted by [q] *Laertius*, cited by [r] *Athenæus* and [s] *Euſebius*. I omit that the ſame [t] *Athenæus* mentions his Epiſtles to *Hermachus*; and not to enquire after any more, the higheſt in Repute were thoſe written to *Idomeneus*, as we may underſtand from [u] *Seneca*, who alſo citeth ſomething excellent out of his Epiſtles to *Polyænus*. Amongſt thoſe to *Idomeneus* was that, out of which [x] *Michael Apoſtolius* cites a Fragment, containing the Original of the Proverb, *Theſe ſhall be to thee both* Pythian *and* Delian, apply'd to thoſe that ſhall die within a ſhort time; though *Eraſmus* affirms the Proverb itſelf to be cited out of *Menander*.

As to the Epiſtles, we ſhall by the way obſerve, that *Epicurus* uſed to write, by way of Salutation in the Beginning of his Epiſtles, ſometimes χαίρειν, *Joy*; ſometimes εὖ πράττειν, *well to do*; ſometimes εὖ διάγειν; ſometimes ἀβλαβῶς ζῆν, *well to live*; ὑγιαίνειν, *Health*. For that which we read in [y] *Laertius*, ἢ ἐν τῇ ὀπιστολαῖς ἀντὶ τοῦ χαίρειν, εὖ πράττειν ἢ ἀβλαβῶς ζῆν ἄειτον, is defective; there ſeems ſome Word wanting to the Sentence; neither doth the word ἄειτον ſeem to belong to the Form of Salutation. And beſides, theſe Words, ἀντὶ τοῦ, exclude χαίρειν from the *Epicurean* Form of Salutation; whereas this Word is not only put before his Epiſtles, extant in *Laertius*, but it is render'd by [z] *Cicero* alſo, when he alledgeth that which he wrote at his Death. For this Reaſon, when heretofore I would, in the room of theſe two Words, have put ἐπῆν, (as a leſs Alteration than if I ſhould have ſubſtituted πρὸ ἔπηκε, or the like) the learned *Puteanus* approved it; but withal conceived ἄειτον ought to be retained: But the excellent *Menagius* was of Opinion, that ſince a Word is wanting, for ἄειτον ſhould be read ἔγραφεν, uſed on the like Occaſion by *Laertius*; but that ἀντὶ τοῦ ought to be retained, foraſmuch as *Epicurus* ſeemeth not to have uſed the Word χαίρειν, it being mentioned as proper to *Cleon*, both by [a] *Lucian* and *Laertius* himſelf. Or whether inſtead of ἄειτον might we not put ἀφέκται, or, with the leaſt Alteration, ἄρεσον; ſignifying, that for Salutation, he was beſt pleaſed with thoſe Words, εὖ πράττειν, and ἀβλαβῶς ζῆν; or might not ἀντὶ τοῦ be retained, implying, that he did not quite caſt aſide the word χαίρειν, but inſtead of it ſometimes uſed the other two, as if πάντα were either wanting or imply'd. Indeed [b] *Lucian* ſeems not obſcurely to hint as much, when relating that *Epicurus* was extremely delighted with the

4 I 2 word

[c] Adv. col. 1. [d] Lib. 5. 22. [e] Adv. col. 28. [f] Lib. 10. [g] Adv. col. 2. [h] Lib. 14. [i] In Politic. [k] Lib. 2, 3. [l] In Phæn. Arat. [m] Adv. col. 1. [n] Lib. 7. 9. [o] Lib. 10. 7. [p] Adv. Matth. 1. [q] In Protag. lib. 9. [r] Deipn. 8. [s] De Præpar. lib. 15. [t] Deipn. 13. [u] Epiſt. 18. [x] Cent. 16. Parœm. 95. [y] Lib. 10. 14. [z] De fin. 2. 30. [a] De lapſ. in Salut. [b] Lib. 3. 61. [c] Ibid.

word χαίρειν, he adds, that ſometimes he uſed other Words, and that ſometimes in his more accurate and profound Epiſtles, (which yet, he ſaith, were not many) or when he writ to his moſt intimate Friends, he chiefly uſed ὑγιαίνειν. *Laertius* therefore attributing the word εὐπράττειν to him, may as well be thought to have intended χαίρειν as uſed by him; ſince attributing εὖ διάγειν to him alſo, he makes εὖ πεφράδειν as peculiar to *Plato*, as χαίρειν to *Cleon*.

This Catalogue of his Books is compiled by *Laertius*: But beſides theſe, there are others, cited both by *Laertius* himſelf, and other Writers. *Laertius* formerly cited his Book, *Of Rhetorick*, mentioned alſo by the Scholiaſt of *Hermogenes*. But that which is cited, *Of Perſpicuity requiſite to Diſcourſe*, belongs to *Canonick*, which he ſubſtituted in the room of *Dialectick*.

He likewiſe ſeems to cite his Προηγούμενα, *Antecedentia*, or *Præcipua*; things precedent or preferred, in the Senſe of the *Stoicks*. I ſhould think it meant of ſome of the Books before cited, if amongſt them there were any, wherein that which is alledged were written by *Epicurus*.

There are cited alſo *Stœcheioſes*, *Inſtitutions* or *Elements*, XII.

There ſeems alſo to be cited, *Of Worlds*, XII. For, deſcribing ſeveral Worlds, he is ſaid to have done it in the XIIth περὶ τούτου, or, as the Manuſcripts, περὶ αὐτοῦ, upon this very Subject; the rather, becauſe it ſeems not meant of thoſe XXXVII which are conſtantly cited, *Of Nature*.

I ſhould add his *Phyſical Problems* and *Ethical Doctrines*; but that under theſe Names may be compriſed, all that *Epicurus* wrote concerning *Nature* and *Morality*.

Moreover, [d] *Cicero* cites his Book, *Of the chief Good*; unleſs it be the ſame with that, *Of the End*, already mentioned.

By the [e] ſame alſo is cited his Book, *Of Pleaſure*: This perhaps *Laertius* meant, when he ſaid, It was objected by ſome againſt *Epicurus*, that he uſurped the Treatiſe of *Ariſtippus* concerning Pleaſure, as if it had been his own.

Beſides theſe, [f] *Cicero* cites his Book, *Of Piety towards the Gods*, diſtinct, as it ſeems, from that *Of Sanctity* reckon'd by *Laertius*. *Of Sanctity*, ſaith he, *Of Piety towards the Gods*, he wrote Books.

Again, *Plutarch* declares that he wrote Books againſt *Theophraſtus*; for the ſecond of them, he ſaith, contained a Diſcourſe concerning Colours. Hitherto of his Books.

CHAP. XI.

His Will.

EPICURUS having employed his Life in teaching and writing, and being now grown old, made, as the Cuſtom was, his Will; which being preſerv'd entire by [g] *Laertius*, we ſhall not need to have Recourſe to thoſe Fragments of it, which lie diſperſedly in *Cicero*, and other Writers. It was in this Form.

"Thus I bequeath; I give all my Eſtate to *Amynomachus*, Son of *Philocrates*, of *Batis*, (a Town of the *Ægean* Tribe, as [h] *Heſychius* deſcribes it) and to *Timocrates* Son of *Demetrius*, a *Potamian*, (of *Potamus*, a Town belonging to the *Leontian* Tribe, [i] *Phavorin.*) according to the Donation which hath already been made, and is recorded among the Deeds in the *Metroum*, (a Temple of the great Goddeſs at *Athens*, ſeated upon the Haven, in which the Laws, Judgments, and other Acts were preſerved, as *Athenæus*, *Suidas*, and others affirm) with this Condition, that they beſtow the Garden, and all that belongs to it, on *Hermachus*, Son of *Agemarchus*, a *Mitylenian*, and thoſe that ſhall ſtudy Philoſophy with him; and on thoſe whom *Hermachus* ſhall leave his Succeſſors in Philoſophy, and to thoſe who ſhall ſucceed us in the Profeſſion of Philoſophy, for ever. And that it may be preſerved with all poſſible Care, I aſſign the School to *Amynomachus* and *Timocrates*, and to their Heirs, according to the ſureſt Form of Law, that they may keep the Garden, and deliver it to thoſe who ſhall profeſs Philoſophy after us. The Houſe which is at *Melite*, let *Amynomachus* and *Timocrates* deliver to *Hermachus*, and to thoſe that ſtudy Philoſophy with him, to dwell in it as long as he ſhall live. Of the Revenues made over by us to *Amynomachus* and *Timocrates*, let them ſet apart as much as ſhall be ſufficient (adviſing with *Hermachus*) to celebrate the Exequies of my Father, Mother, and Brethren; and to keep, as they have done hitherto, my Birth-day, in the firſt Decad of the Month *Gamelion*; as alſo to provide a Feaſt for Entertainment of all thoſe who ſtudy Philoſophy with us, every Month on the twentieth Day of the Moon, in Commemoration of us, and of *Metrodorus*. Let them alſo keep a Day in Memory of my Brethren in the Month *Poſideon*, as we uſed to do; and another to *Polyænus*, in the Month *Metagitnion*. Let *Amynomachus* and *Timocrates* take care of *Epicurus*, Son of *Metrodorus*, and of the Son of *Polynæus*; and let them ſtudy Philoſophy,

[d] Tuſc. 3. 18. [e] De divin. 2. 27. [f] De nat. deor. 1. 41. [g] Lib. 10. 16. [h] In Lex. [i] Ibid.

" Philosophy, and live with *Hermachus*. In like " manner, let them take care of the Daughter of " *Metrodorus*; and so soon as she shall be marri- " ageable, bestow her upon him of the Students of " Philosophy, whom *Hermachus* shall chuse, provi- " ded she be modest, and obedient to *Hermachus*. " Let *Amynomachus* and *Timocrates*, out of our Re- " venues, bestow yearly so much as shall be suffici- " ent for their Maintenance, with the Consent of " *Hermachus*. For let them so esteem *Hermachus*, " having an equal Share in our Revenues, and grown " old in studying Philosophy under us, and left by " us Guide of those that studied Philosophy under us, " that all things be done by his Advice. As for her " Portion, when she shall come to be marriageable, " let *Amynomachus* and *Timocrates* take as much as " they shall think convenient, with the Consent of " *Hermachus*. Likewise, let them take the same " Care of *Nicanor* as we did, that all they who, " studying Philosophy with us, have communicated " the Use of their Estates, and expressing all Friend- " ship, have chosen to grow old with us in Philoso- " phy, want not any Necessaries to the utmost of " our Power. All my Books I bequeath to *Her-* " *machus*; but if any thing of Mortality happen to " *Hermachus*, before the Children of *Metrodorus* ar- " rive at full Age, let *Amynomachus* and *Timocrates* " take care, that all Necessaries be decently provided " for them, as much as shall be necessary, out of the " Revenues left by us. Let all the rest be order'd as " we have appointed, as much as is possible. I " manumit of my Servants, *Mus*, *Licias*, *Lycon*: " *Phædria* also I set free."

CHAP. XII.

The Manner of his Death.

AS concerning his last Sickness and Death, we must know that *Epicurus* was of a Constitution not very strong. This is implied even by the Title of the Book written by [a] *Metrodorus*, *Of the Infirmity* (or Unhealthfulness) *of* Epicurus. It is implied also by the envious Exaggeration of [b] *Suidas*, that *Epicurus* could not endure to put on his Cloaths, nor to rise out of Bed, nor to look upon the Sun, and the Fire, and the like. These may at least persuade, that *Epicurus* was of a Complexion not strong; and as in the whole Course of his Life, he had not a constant Health, so at last he died of a painful Disease, the Stone, whereof it is probable he had many Fits. [c] *Laertius*, out of *Hermachus*, in his Epistles, relates that he died of the Stone, stopping his Urine, having lain sick 14 Days.

It is memorable, that being near Death, he writ that Epistle which *Laertius* mentions, as written to *Idomeneus*; [d] *Cicero*, to *Hermachus*; perhaps it was sent to both, because of the τὸ νμῖν; or to *Idomeneus*, rather than to *Hermachus*, because the Children of *Metrodorus* were sufficiently recommended to *Hermachus*, by his Will. Moreover, it is not likely that *Hermachus*, his next Successor, was absent at that time, especially seeing he sent a Relation of *Epicurus*'s Death in Letters; not to press, that he from his Youth was more addicted to Rhetorick than Philosophy, as appeareth from *Laertius*. The Epistle is this.

" Leading a most happy Life, and withal dying, " we writ this to you, seized by the Strangury, and " Dysentery, beyond Expression; but all these were " counterpoised by the Joy of Mind, which I con- " ceive in remembring our Discourses and Inventi- " ons. But thou, as becomes the Good-will which " thou hast had from thy Youth to me and Philoso- " phy, take care of the Children of *Metrodorus*."

[e] *Laertius* adds, (out of *Hermippus*) that *Epicurus* went into a Bath of warm Water, called for Wine, drank it off, and exhorting his Friends to be mindful of his Doctrine, whilst he was discourfing, died. Upon which *Laertius* hath this Epigram:

Farewel, and bear my Doctrine in your Minds,
Said dying Epicurus *to his Friends:*
Into a warm Bath going, Wine he quaft,
And then from Pluto *took a colder Draught.*

CHAP. XIII.

The Time of his Death.

EPICURUS died in the 2*d* Year of the 127*th* Olympiad, *Pytharatus* being *Archon*. After δεύτερον ἔτος, which [f] *Laertius* cites out of *Apollodorus*'s Chronology, *Casaubon* rightly reads τὸ εἰκοστὸν ἐβδόμης καὶ ἑκατοστῆς Ὀλυμπιάδος; for in the ordinary reading εἰκοστῆς being wanting, who could imagine that *Epicurus*, born in the 109*th* Olympiad, could die in the 107*th*? And indeed, the 72*d* Year of *Epicurus*, in which he is said to have died, falls upon the 127*th* Olympiad.

The Month and Day of the Year, in which *Epicurus* died, is told by [g] *Clemens Alexandrinus*, who saith, that *Antilochus*, from the Time of *Pythagoras* to the Death of *Epicurus*, reckoned 312 Years, adding, that the Death of *Epicurus* happened on the 10*th* Day of the Month *Gamelion*. Where observe, if the Time of *Pythagoras* be reckoned from the 60*th* Olympiad, in which *Laertius* saith he flourished; there will be found to be but 270 Years from thence to the Death of *Epicurus*, and consequently the Account

[a] Laert. l. 10. 24. [b] In Lex. [c] 10. 15. [d] De fin. l. 2. 30. [e] Loc. Cit. [f] Lib. 10. 15. [g] Strom. l. 1.

count of *Antilochus* will fall short 42 Years. Wherefore this ἡλικία must be taken from the Birth of *Pythagoras*, who began to flourish in the 40*th* Year of his Age.

Now whereas *Apollodorus* saith, that *Epicurus* lived 72 Years, which is confirmed also by [h] *Cicero*, saying, *It always was true, that* Epicurus *shall dye, having lived 72 Years*; *Pytharatus* being *Archon*; (whence some conjecture, *Epicurus* died in his Climacterical Year, which is commensurated by 9.) the last, or 72*d* Year, is not to be understood as compleat, for *Epicurus* had but newly enter'd into it, there being but three Days over and above the 71 Years; for he was born on the 7*th*, and dy'd on the 10*th*, of the Month *Gamelion*, there being, between the Time of his Birth and his Death, 18 compleat Olympiads, except one Year. Wherefore, this is in the same manner, as when [i] *Pliny*, [k] *Lucian*, and [l] *Censorinus* affirm the *Sicilian* (or *Leontine*) *Gorgias* did live 108 Years; whereas [m] *Cicero*, and *Valerius Maximus** say, he compleated but 107. Here is observable, the Comparison which [n] *Plutarch* makes between *Epicurus* and *Gorgias*; for after he had said that *Alexis*, the Comick Poet, (Son of *Menander*, and Father of *Stephanus* the Comick Poet, as [o] *Suidas* relates) lived double the Time of *Metrodorus*, that is 106 Years, *Metrodorus* living, according to [p] *Laertius*, 53. he adds, that *Gorgias* the Sophist outlived *Epicurus*, πλέον ἢ ὄγδοηκοντα, more than one third; for if we take the Number 36, it will be the same which *Epicurus* lived double, *Gorgias* treble; and whereas *Plutarch* says *more*, perhaps he reflected upon the Opinion which [q] *Quintilian* and [r] *Suidas* afterwards followed, that *Gorgias* lived 109 Years.

I see not why the [s] Interpreter of *Clemens Alexandrinus* should render Gamelion *October*; for though there be some Controversy about the Order of the *Greek* Months, yet shall we not find any but make *Gamelion* the 6*th*, 7*th*, or 8*th*, from *Hecatombæon*; which seeing it cannot begin higher than *June*, certainly *Gamelion* will be far distant from *October*. But since by many Arguments it is evinced, that *Gamelion* is the 7*th* from *Hecatombæon*, it ought rather to be reduced to *January*. Now because the 2*d* Year of the 127*th* Olympiad began in Summer, in the 4443*d* Year of the *Julian* Period, the *Gamelion* of that Year must fall upon *January*, in the Beginning of the 4444*th* Year of the *Julian* Period. Upon what Day of *January* the 10*th* of *Gamelion* might fall, it is not easy to determine. But if we may make *Gamelion* commence (as is done in the time of the Nativity,) from the 14*th* Moon, or from the 7*th* Full Moon, after the Summer Solstice, forasmuch as the New Moon happened upon the 30*th* of *December*, and consequently the 14*th* Moon upon the 12*th* of *January*; hereupon, if we make that the 1*st* of *Gamelion*, the 10*th* will fall upon the 21*st* of *January*, upon which the Death of *Epicurus* might fall. Where we must further observe, that whereas *Epicurus* is said to have lived 72 Years, it must be understood of the *Grecian* Years, not *Julian*, for so it would fall short two Days, it being already proved, he was born the 23*d* of *January*. Now to reduce the Death of *Epicurus* to our Account is easy: For if we substract ten Days, and for the Cycle of the Sun that Year which is 20, and, for the Dominical Letter D, according to the Old Style, put G, according to our own, it will appear that *Epicurus* died the 31*st* of *January*, it being the 4*th* Day of the Week, or *Wednesday*, before the Computation of Christ 270 Years.

CHAP. XIV.

How dear his Memory was to his Followers.

IT remains that we briefly tell how the Memory of *Epicurus*, after his Death, was respected by his Followers. For to omit that his Country honoured him with brazen Statues, as [t] *Laertius* writes, I observe, that the Set-Days and Ceremonies appointed in his Will were punctually kept by his Followers. [u] *Pliny*, (writing 350 Years after upon this thing) *On his Birth-day*, saith he, *the twentieth Moon, they sacrifice, and keep Feasts every Month, which they call Icades*; whence it may be conceived, that the *Epicureans* were by *Greek* Writers, as [w] *Athenæus*, termed εἰκαδίσαι, from observing εἰκάδας, as *Rhodiginus* also takes notice. Although some there are who [x] think they were called *Icadistæ*, from εἰκὼν, an Image, because there was not one of them but had the Picture of *Epicurus*. And of these Images, [y] *Pliny* also thus; *They keep* (saith he) *the Countenance of* Epicurus *in their Chambers, and carry it up and down with them:* And [z] *Cicero*, in the Person of *Atticus*, "Neither, *saith he*, can we forget *Epicurus* of any "Man; whose Representation we have not only in "Pictures, but in Cups, and Rings also." There are [a] who add, that "some took great care to have "Pictures of *Epicurus*, not only in Rings, but in "Cups, as conceiving it a fortunate Omen to the "Nation, and their own Name." As for the Affection which they bare to him, hear *Parro*, *Honour*, saith [b] *Cicero*, "Office, Right of Wills, the Autho-"rity of *Epicurus*, the Attestation of *Phædrus*, the "Seat, House, Footsteps of excellent Persons, he saith, "that he must preserve; *But especially* [c] Torquatus. "Owe we not much to him, *saith he*, who, as if "he

[h] De Fato. [i] Lib. 7. cap. 48. [k] In Macrob. [l] De Die Nat. [m] In Cat. Majore. * Lib. 8. cap. 13. [n] De Orat. Def. [o] In Lex. [p] Lib. 10. 15. [q] Lib. 3. cap. 1. [r] In Lex. [s] Hervetus. [t] Lib 10. 9. [u] Lib. 35. cap. 2. [w] Lib. 7. 13. [x] Rivier. [y] Loc. Citat. [z] De fin. 2. 7. [a] Alex. ab Alex. 2. 19. [b] Epist. 15. 1. [c] De fin. 1.

" he had heard the Voice of Nature herſelf, did ſo " firmly and ſoundly comprehend her, as that he " brought all ingenious Perſons into the way of a " peaceful, calm, quiet, happy Life?" And [d] again, " Who, ſaith he, I think only ſaw Truth, and " freed the Minds of Men from the greateſt Errors, " and delivered all things pertaining to well and happy " living."

And becauſe *Epicurus* dying, adviſed his Friends to be mindful of his Doctrines, [e] *Cicero* ſaith, that all of them got by heart his *Maxims*; and ſome there were who learned without Book all his Doctrines, as particularly *Scyro*, mention'd in his Academicks. But let it ſuffice, to alledge ſome few Verſes of [f] *Lucretius*, by which we may perceive how affectionate they were to the Memory and Doctrines of their Maſter. He begins his third Book thus:

Who firſt from Darkneſs could'ſt a Light ſo clear
Strike forth, and make Life's Benefits appear;
Great Ornament of Græcia, *I am led*
By thee, and in thy ſacred Footſteps tread:
Not to contend, but kindly imitate.
For how can chatt'ring Swallows emulate
The Swans? Or tender Kids keep equal Pace
With the ſtout well-breath'd Steed's impetuous Race?
From thee, O Father, every thing receives
Invention; thou giv'ſt Precepts from thy Leaves.
As Bees skip up and down and ſweetly ſuck
In flow'ry Groves, we golden Sayings pluck:
Golden, deſerving an eternal Life.

And again,

By theſe a Pleaſure I receiv'd from thee
Divine; withal, a Reverence, to ſee
That Nature every way thou hadſt unveil'd.

And afterwards,

Great Epicurus *died, his Life's Race run,*
Whoſe Wit Mankind exceeded, as the Sun
Eclipſeth by his riſing all the Stars.

CHAP. XV.

With what Conſtancy and Unanimity the Succeſſion of his School flouriſhed.

IT deſerves to be taken notice of, not only that the Succeſſion of his School was conſtant, but that his Succeſſors and Followers did always ſo agree, as was indeed wonderful. As concerning the Conſtancy, it is known that the Preſidents of the Gardens, or Maſters of the School, from the Death of *Epicurus* to the Times of *Julius Cæſar*, and *Auguſtus*, ſucceeding one another in a continued Series, were, according to [g] *Suidas*, XIV. and that for 237 Years: In which later times, How many *Epicureans* there were, eminent Perſons, and of great Account in the State, appears from *Cicero*. [h] *Lucian* alſo writes, that in his time there was a Stipend allowed to the *Epicureans*, by the Emperor, no leſs than to other Philoſophers; adding, that when any one of them died, he, whom they moſt approved of was ſubſtituted in his room. [i] *Laertius* who lived after *Lucian*, declares, that whereas the Succeſſions of the other Philoſophers did almoſt quite fail; yet the Succeſſion of *Epicurus* did conſtantly perſevere; ſo many ſucceeding one another in Government of the Diſciples, as could not be reckoned up. *Numenius* (cited by [k] *Euſebius*) adds, that this Succeſſion laſted till his time, and that ſo perfectly, as it was likely to endure a great while after. After theſe [l] *Lactantius*; *The Diſcipline of* Epicurus, ſaith he, *was much more celebrious.* In a word, as long as Learning flouriſhed in *Greece*, and *Rome* was preſerved from the *Barbarians*, the School and Diſcipline of *Epicurus* continued eminent.

As for their Unanimity, to omit that of *Cicero*, " *I will maintain the* Epicureans *who are ſo many my* " *Friends, Men that are ſo loving to one another*," and the like Places; and ſhall rather obſerve, that whereas other Sects almoſt at their very Beginning were diſtracted with inteſtine Diſſentions; the *Epicurean* was far from ſuffering any ſuch thing. For *Themiſtius* [m] writes, that *the Opinions of* Epicurus *were kept by all the* Epicureans, *as Laws of* Solon *or* Lycurgus. And, as if they had all one Soul amongſt them, ſaith [n] *Seneca*, *Whatſoever* Hermachus *affirmed, whatſoever* Menodorus, *is referred to one. All things that any Man delivers in that Society, go under one Man's Name:* This will appear more plainly, if we alledge the Words of *Numenius*, the *Pythagorean*, in [o] *Euſebius*; who after he hath complain'd, that the Succeſſors of *Plato* did not preſerve that Unanimity for which the *Pythagoreans* were eſteemed, adds, " After this manner the *Epicureans* being inſtituted " (though unworthy,) ſeeming not in any thing to " diſſent from *Epicurus*, and profeſſing to have the " ſame Tenets with their wiſe Maſter, have not un- " juſtly attained their Scope. Hence it hath happen- " ed to the *Epicureans* for a long time, that they ne- " ver, in any thing worth notice, contradicted either " one another, or *Epicurus*. Amongſt them it is an " Offence, or rather Impiety, and Sin, to bring in " any Innovation; wherefore none dares attempt it. " Hence, by reaſon of their conſtant Agreement a- " mong themſelves, they enjoy their Doctrines " peaceably and quietly: And this Inſtitution of *Epi-* " *curus* reſembles the true State of a perfect Com- " monwealth, which being far from Sedition, is " governed by one joint Mind and Opinion. For " which Reaſon, there have not, nor are not, nor, in

[d] De fin. 1. [e] De fin. 2. [f] Lib. 3. [g] In Epic. [h] In Eub. [i] Lib. 10. 9. [k] Præp. l. 14. [l] Lib. 3. cap. 17. [m] Orat. 4. [n] Epiſt. 35. [o] Præp. l. 14.

" in likelyhood, will be wanting, thoſe that ſhall " willingly follow it, but amongſt the Stoical Facti- " on, &c." One would think there were nothing wanting to this Teſtimony, but to ſay of all the *Epicureans*, as [q] *Valerius* (before cited) did of two of them, that " Such a Society might be thought to " have been begotten, nouriſh'd, and terminated in " the Boſom of Celeſtial Concord."

CHAP. XVI.

The Succeſſors and Followers of Epicurus.

IT remains, that we give a Catalogue of thoſe who were eminent in that Sect, after the Death of *Epicurus*. We have already ſaid, that *Hermachus* ſucceeded *Epicurus*, and *Polyſtratus Hermachus*. [r] It alſo is manifeſt from *Laertius*, that *Dionyſius* ſucceeded *Polyſtratus*; and *Baſilides*, *Dionyſius*. But who thoſe ten Succeſſors were from *Baſilides*, to him who govern'd the School in the Time of *Auguſtus*, we cannot eaſily ſay. Perhaps after *Baſilides*, ſucceeded *Protarchus Bargyleites*, whom [s] *Strabo* terms an illuſtrious Perſon. The ſame *Strabo* ſaith, that Diſciple to *Protarchus* was *Demetrius*, ſirnamed *Lacon*, who is mentioned alſo by [t] *Laertius*, and was, as [v] *Sextus Empiricus* ſaith, eminent amongſt the Followers of *Epicurus*. Perhaps after him ſucceeded *Diogenes* of *Tarſus*, Author of the *Select Schools*, whereof *Laertius* mentions XX Books. He alſo cites an Epitome of Moral Doctrine, written by the ſame Perſon. *Laertius* mentions alſo, (but whether they belong to this Series of Succeſſors, is uncertain) two *Ptolomies* of *Alexandria*; whether from Differences of Complexion, or ſome other reſpect, one ſirnamed black, the other white. He mentions alſo *Orion*, and ſeems to mention one *Democritus*, who, in his *Timocrates* takes notice of Pleaſure after *Epicurus*'s Doctrine.

There follow two out of this Rank, named [x] *Athenæus*; the firſt, *Diogenes* of *Seleucia* near *Babylon*, whom he deſcribes to have been eloquent, but of an ill Life; the other, *Lyſias*, who, as he ſaith, (governed at *Tarſus*; and being choſen by the Country, *Stephanoforus* (Prieſt of *Hercules*) he enjoy'd the ſupream Government, and wore regal Ornaments. This is he, who diſtributed the Eſtates of the Rich amongſt the Poor, and put many of them to Death for refuſing to part with them. At what Time he lived, we cannot certainly determine; but *Diogenes* being contemporary with *Alexander* King of *Syria*, and *Antiochus* his Succeſſor, may be referred to the 155th Olympiad.

About the ſame Time ſeemeth to have flouriſhed *Eucratidas*, to whom belongs this Inſcription, recited by *Janus Gruterus*; *At* Brunduſium, *before the Gate of* Diomedes Athenæus, *a Phyſician, on the Baſis of*; EUCRATIDAS *Son* OF PISADAMUS A RHODIAN, AN EPICUREAN PHILOSOPHER. THIS PLACE APPOINTED FOR BURIAL BY THE SENATE OF BRUNDUSIUM.

Not long after ſeems to have flouriſhed in the School that *Apollodorus*, whom *Laertius* termeth *eminent*, κυπαιῤῥαννον, for that (as I conceive) he bore ſuch ſway in the Garden, as *Demoſthenes* is ſaid to have done in Courts of Judicature. He wrote about 300 Books, amongſt which were ſome concerning the Life of *Epicurus*, cited by *Laertius*. It may be conjectured, that he was the ſame, whoſe Chronology is cited by *Laertius*, and others.

Auditor of *Apollodorus* was *Zeno* the *Sidonian*, according to [y] *Laertius*, who adds, that he wrote much, and that he was famous both for Philoſophy and Rhetorick; whence I conjecture, it is the ſame *Zeno* of whom [z] *Cicero* ſaith, he ſpoke diſtinctly, gravely, and neatly; and that he was chief of the *Epicureans*; unleſs both he and *Apollodorus* lived earlier; which if it were ſo, this other belongs to the Times of the Emperors, for [a] *Cicero* heard him, and writing concerning him to [b] *Atticus*; *Zeno*, ſaith he, *I love as well as thou doſt*.

CHAP. XVII.

Laertius, *his Vindication of* Epicurus.

Iotymus the Stoick, much maligning *Epicurus*, traduced him exceedingly, " producing fifty E- " piſtles, very laſcivious, as written by *Epicurus*; " to which he added, as *Epicurus*'s alſo, the ſhort " Epiſtles, commonly aſcribed to *Chryſippus*. No " leſs diſaffected to him were *Poſidonius* the Stoick, " and *Nicolaus*, and *Socion*, in the 12th of his Dio- " clean Confutations, (which are in all XXIV) " and *Dionyſius Halicarnaſſæus*. For they ſay " he went from Houſe to Houſe with his Mother " reading expiatory Prayers; and that with his Fa- " ther he taught Children for a ſmall Stipend; that " one of his Brothers was a Pandor; that he him- " ſelf uſed the Company of *Leontium*, a Courtezan; " that he aſcribed to himſelf the Books of *Democritus* " concerning Atoms, and of *Ariſtippus* concerning " Pleaſure; that he was not a true Native of the " City, as *Timocrates* acknowledgeth, and *Herodo- " tus*, in his Book of the Youth of *Epicurus*; that " he baſely flattered *Mithres*, Steward of *Lyſimachus*, " calling him in his Epiſtles, *Apollo* and *King*; that " *Idomeneus*, *Herodotus*, and *Timocrates*, who pub- " liſhed ſome obſcure Pieces of his, did commend " an

[q] Lib. 1. c. 8. [r] Laert. 10. 25. [s] Lib. 14. [t] Lib. 10. 26. [v] Adv. Log. 2. [x] Deipn. 3. [y] Lib. 7. 35.
[z] De Nat. Deor. 1. 21. [a] Ibid. [b] Lib. 5. Epiſt. 11.

" and flatter him for the ſame: that in his Epiſtles, " he writes to *Leontium*, thus; O King *Apollo*, my " dear little *Leontium*; how were we tranſported " and filled with Joy at the reading of thy Letter! " To *Themiſta*, Wife of *Leontius*, thus; If you " come not to me, I ſhall roll to you whitherſoever " you call me. And to *Pithocles*, a handſome " Youth; I conſume in Expectation of your ami- " able and divine Company. And again, writing " to *Themiſta*, he thinks to perſuade her: as *Theodo-* " *rus* affirms, in his fourth Book againſt *Epicurus*. " That he wrote to many other Courtezans, eſpe- " cially to *Leontium*, with whom *Metrodorus* alſo " was in Love. That in his Book concerning the " *End*, he writes thus; Neither know I what is this " Good, if we take away the Pleaſures of the " Taſte; if we take away thoſe of Coition; if we " take away thoſe of Hearing; if we take away " thoſe of the Sight. That in his Epiſtle to *Pitho-* " *cles* he writes; Happy Youth, fly as faſt as thou " canſt from all Diſcipline. *Epicurus* calls him, " *Cinnædologum*, and rails at him exceedingly. *Ti-* " *mocrates*, Brother of *Metrodorus*, who was a while " a Diſciple of *Epicurus*, but at laſt forſook the " School, ſaith, that he vomited twice a day, upon " overcharging his Stomach; and that he himſelf had " much ado to get away from their nocturnal Philo- " ſophy, and Converſation in ſecret. That *Epicu-* " *rus* was ignorant of many things belonging to " Diſcourſe, but much more of thoſe which belong- " ed to Life. That he was of ſuch a miſerable " Conſtitution, that he was not able of himſelf for " many Years, to get out of Bed, or riſe out of the " Chair in which he was carried. That he ſpent " every Day a Mina at his Table, as he himſelf " writeth in his Epiſtle to *Leontium*, and in his Epi- " ſtles to the Philoſophers at *Mitylene*. That he " and *Metrodorus* alſo uſed the Company of Courte- " zans; amongſt others, *Marmarium*, *Hedia*, *Ero-* " *tium*, *Nicidium*. That in the thirty Books which " he writ concerning Nature, he ſaith moſt of the " ſame things over and over; and that in them he " writes againſt many Perſons, and, amongſt the " reſt, againſt *Nauſiphanes*, and that in theſe very " Words: But this Man, if ever any, had a way " of teeming, a ſophiſtick Brag, like many other " Slaves. And that in his Epiſtles he writes thus " concerning *Nauſiphanes*: This ſo far tranſported " him, that he railed at me, and called himſelf my " Maſter. Likewiſe that he called himſelf *Nauſi-* " *phanes*, Lungs (as ſenſleſs) and unlearned, and de- " ceitful, and laſcivious: The Diſciples of *Plato*, " *Dionyſius*'s Paraſites; *Plato* himſelf, Golden; *A-* " *riſtotle*, a Prodigal, that, having waſted his Patri- " mony, was fain to turn Soldier and Apothecary; " *Pretagoras*, a Basket carrier, an *Amanuenſis* to " *Democritus*, and a Highway Schoolmaſter; *He-* " *raclitus*, κυκήτην, a Cauſer of Confuſion; *Demo-* " *critus*, Λημάκτον, Purblind; *Antidorus*, Σανιδοφάγον, " a Fawner upon Gifts; the *Cyrenaicks*, Enemies " to *Greece*; the *Dialecticks*, Envious; *Pyrrho*, " Unlearn'd and Unmanner'd.

" But theſe Men are mad; for of the excellent " Candor of *Epicurus* towards all Men, there are " many Witneſſes; his Country, which honour'd " him with Statues of Braſs; his Friends, who were " ſo many, that whole Cities could not contain " them; his Diſciples, who were alſo taken with " his Sirenical Doctrine, except *Metrodorus* the " *Stratonicean*, who, perhaps over-burthen'd with " his exceſſive Goodneſs, revolted to *Carneades*; " the Succeſſion of his School, which, when all the " reſt were almoſt quite worn out, remained con- " ſtant, and ordained ſo many Maſters one after " another, as cannot be number'd; his Piety to- " wards his Parents, his Kindneſs towards his Bre- " thren, his Meekneſs towards his Servants, (as " may appear by his Will, and their ſtudying Philo- " ſophy with him, amongſt whom *Mus* formerly " mention'd was moſt eminent;) and, in general, " his Humanity towards all, his Devotion to the " Gods, and Love to his Country, was beyond Ex- " preſſion. He would not accept of any publick " Office, out of an exceſſive Modeſty; and, in the " moſt difficult troubleſome Times, continued in " *Greece*, where he lived conſtantly; except that " twice or thrice he made a Journey to his Friends " on the Borders of *Ionia*. But to him they reſort- " ed from all Parts, and lived with him (as *Apollo-* " *dorus* relates) in the Garden which he purchaſed " with 80 Minæ. *Diocles* in his third Book, *De* " *Incurſione*, ſaith, They uſed a moſt frugal ſpare " Diet; for they were contented with a Pint of " ſmall Wine, and for the moſt part they drunk " nothing but Water. And that *Epicurus* would " not have them to put their Eſtates into one com- " mon Stock, as *Pythagoras* ordained, ſaying, The " Goods of Friends are common; for this argued " Diſtruſt, and where there is Diſtruſt, there is no " Friendſhip. As for himſelf, in his Epiſtles, that " he was contented with Water only, and coarſe " Bread: And ſend me, ſaith he, a little Cyther- " dian Cheeſe, that I may feaſt myſelf when I have " a mind. Such was he, who profeſſed that Plea- " ſure is the End, or chief Good; for which, *A-* " *thenæus* in an Epigram thus commends him:

Man's moſt unhappy Race for worſt things toils,
For Wealth (unſatiate) raiſeth Wars and Broils.
Nature to Wealth a narrow Bound aſſign'd,
But vain Opinions Ways unbounded find.
Thus Neoclides, *whom the ſacred Choir*
Of Muſes, or Apollo, *did inſpire.*

But this we ſhall underſtand better from his own Doctrine and Words. Hitherto *Laertius* in Vindica-

tion of *Epicurus*; which Subject is more fully and rhetorically handled by the learned *Gaſſendus*, *De Vita & Moribus Epicuri*, in the ſix laſt Books.

The Doctrine of *EPICURUS*.

Of PHILOSOPHY in general.

"PHiloſophy [a] (or the Love of Wiſdom) is an "exerciſing of the Reaſon; by which, in "meditating and diſcourſing, it acquireth "happy Life, and enjoyeth it. For [b] Philoſophy "hath this Propriety above other Arts, that its End "is the End alſo of Reaſon, which ſo tends to it, "that it may reſt in the Enjoyment of it."

Now happy Life conſiſting in the Tranquility of the Mind, and Indolency of the Body, but eſpecially in the former, (in regard the Goods of the Mind are better than thoſe of the Body, and the Ills thereof worſe;) it comes to paſs, that Philoſophy is chiefly the Medicine of the Mind, in regard it both makes and preſerves it ſound; its Soundneſs or Health being nothing elſe but its Tranquility.

Hence it followeth, That [c] "neither ought a young "Man to delay Philoſophizing, nor an old Man to "be wearied therewith: for to rectify and cure his "Mind, no Man is too young; and he who pre-"tends, that the time of Philoſophizing either is not "yet, or is paſt, doth, as he who ſaith the time to "live well and happily either is not yet come, or is "quite gone.

"Both young and old therefore muſt Philoſo-"phize; the one, that whilſt he is growing old, he "may perſevere to advance himſelf in good things, "to continue the Excellence of his former Actions; "the other, that, though aged in Years, he may "yet be youthful in Mind, remaining ſecure from "future eminent Harms."

For it is Philoſophy alone, which breeds in its Followers an Aſſuredneſs and an Immunity from all vain Fears; whence we ought to devote ourſelves to it, that we may be truly free.

Happy they, who are of ſuch a Diſpoſition of Body or Mind, or born in ſuch a Country, as they can either of themſelves, or by the Inſtigations of others, addict themſelves to Philoſophy, and purſue Truth; by Attainment whereof, a Man is made truly free or wiſe, and abſolute Maſter of himſelf.

They who apply their Minds hereto, are of three ſorts: Some addreſs themſelves to enquire after Truth without the Aſſiſtance of any; ſome require Help, and would not go, if none had gone before, but follow well; ſome may be compelled to the Right, who need not ſo much a Leader, as an Aſſiſtant; and, as I may call it, a Driver.

The firſt are moſt to be commended; yet the Ingenuity of the ſecond is excellent likewiſe; and the third not to be contemned. Of the ſecond was *Metrodorus*; of the third, *Hermachus*. As I highly praiſe the Fortune of the former, ſo I no leſs admire and value the latter; but although both of them arriv'd at the ſame End, yet he deſerv'd the greater Praiſe, who, their Performances being equal, broke through the greater Difficulties.

Now whereas to a Philoſopher nothing ought to be more valuable than Truth, let him proceed to it in a direct Way, [d] and neither feign any thing, nor admit any thing that is feign'd by another; for no kind of Fiction beſeemeth Profeſſors of Truth. Neither is that perpetual Irony of [e] *Socrates* to be approved, whereby he extolled to the Skies *Protagoras*, *Hippias*, *Prodicus*, *Gorgias*, and the reſt, but pretended himſelf rude and ignorant of all things.

[f] How much leſs was it becoming a [g] Philoſopher to have feign'd that Fable concerning *Erus Armenius?* For why (if he had an Intent to teach us the Knowledge of celeſtial things, and the Diſpoſition of Souls) did he not perform this by naked plain Inſtruction, but rather choſe to introduce a Perſon; by which Carriage the Newneſs of the Invention, and the formal Scene of a Fiction, repreſented on the Stage, contaminated the very way of ſeeking Truth with a Falſhood?

For this reaſon [h] a wiſe Man will neither hearken to the Fables of Poets, nor will himſelf labour in compoſing fabulous Poems; nay rather, [i] he will have an Averſion from the juggling Tricks and Sophiſtications of Orators: And as he exacts no more from Grammar than Congruity, ſo neither will he exact more from Rhetorick than Perſpicuity of Speech,

[a] Sext. Emp. adv. Eth. [b] Sext. Emp. adv. Math. 1. [c] Laert. 10. 122. [d] Ibid. [e] Cic. in Bruto. [f] Macrob. in Somn. l. 1. c. 2. [g] Viz. Plato in Rep. l. 10. [h] Plut. de audiend. Poet. [i] Laert. 10. 13.

Speech, but will uſe a plain familiar Style; whether he profeſs to Teach, or write Books, or explicate to the Multitude any thing already written, he will be wary that he do it not panegyrically and hyperbolically.

But ſeeing that of Philoſophers there are ſome, who aſſert nothing of Truth, but doubt of all things; others, who imagine they know all things, and aſſert without any Diſtinction: A wiſe Man ought not to behave himſelf ſo, as that he aſſent not at all, but [k] only maintain ſome poſitive Maxims which are indiſputable.

For when there are divers ways whereby ſome things may be performed, as the Eclipſes of the Stars, their Riſing, Setting, and other ſuperior things, ſo to approve one way as to diſapprove the reſt, is certainly ridiculous. But when we ſpeak of things that cannot be any way but one, (ſuch as are theſe Maxims:) *Of nothing is made nothing*; *the Univerſe conſiſts of Body and Vacuum*; *the Principles of things are indiviſible*, and the like; then it is very abſurd not to adhere firmly to them.

Hence it is proper for a wiſe Man to maintain both the manifold Ways in thoſe, and the one ſingle Way in theſe, and not to ſtagger nor recede from Science once obtained. Not like thoſe, who, as if preſcribed by a Law, philoſophize concerning Nature, not in ſuch manner as the things themſelves require, but go out of the right way, and run into Fables; never conſidering that to vent, or vainly boaſt our own Opinions, conduceth nothing to happy Life, but diſturbeth the Mind.

Now whereas [l] the principal Parts of Philoſophy are held to be two; one *Phyſick*, conſiſting in Contemplation of Nature; the other *Ethick*, which treats of directing of Manners in order to happy Life, it is manifeſt, either that *Ethick* comprehends all Philoſophy, or that *Phyſick* comes to be a Part thereof, only inaſmuch as it conduceth to happy Life.

"For [m] if thoſe things which we ſuſpect and "dread from the ſuperior Bodies, and even from "Death itſelf, breed no Diſturbance in us, as things "unconcerning our Condition; if alſo we could "ſufficiently comprehend what are the juſt Bounds "of our Deſires, and to what Degree the Grief "which ſprings from them is to be aſſuaged, there "were no need of Phyſiology, or the Explication "of Nature."

But becauſe [n] it is not poſſible we ſhould arrive at ſo great a Good, without having firſt ſurveyed the Nature of things: but, as Children in the Dark tremble, and are afraid of every thing; ſo we, miſerably groping in the Darkneſs of Ignorance, fear things that are fabulous, and no more to be dreaded than thoſe which Children fear in the Datk, and fancy to themſelves will happen. It is therefore neceſſary, that this Terror and Darkneſs of the Mind be diſpelled, not by the Beams of the Sun, but by Impreſſions from Nature and Reaſon, that is, by Phyſiology. Whence all Phyſick is to be eſteemed a Part of Philoſophy.

Dialectick, which ſome add as a third Part, is to be rejected; becauſe, as ordinarily taught, it doth nothing but beget thorny Queſtions, being an empty Bubbling and Forge of Cavils. Moreover, becauſe it is ſuperfluous to that End which they propoſe, that is, to the Perception and Dijudication of the Reaſons of Naturaliſts: for there needs no more thereto, than, like the natural Philoſophers themſelves, to uſe Terms ordinary and perſpicuous.

If, beſides this, there may ſeem any thing of Uſe, it can be nothing but a Collection of ſome few *Canons* or *Rules*, *both concerning Terms*, and the Criteries whereby we uſe to dijudicate.

Thus may this ſhort Canonick, or Treatiſe of Rules, ſerve inſtead of a laborious and prolix Dialectick, and be reputed either a diſtinct Part of Philoſophy (though leaſt conſiderable) or, [o] *An Addition to Phyſick*, by way of Introduction.

[k] Laert. 10. 13. [l] Senec. Epiſt. 89. [m] Laert. 1. 63. [n] Laert. ibid. [o] Senec. Ep. 89.

The Firſt Part of PHILOSOPHY.

CANONICK of the CRITERIES.

FOraſmuch as [p] every Queſtion in Philoſophy is either of the Thing, or of the Word, to Solution whereof many Canons may be given; hence the firſt Part of Philoſophy which compriſeth them, may be termed *Canonick*.

But becauſe of the [q] Word, nothing more is ſought than the Uſe or *Signification*; but of the Thing, the Truth, which is of an abſtruſe Nature: therefore we will, in the ſecond Place, comprehend in a few

[p] Laert. 10. 121. [q] Ibid

Canons all that belongs to the Uſe of the Words: But in the firſt place lay down thoſe of Truth, and its Criteries (which in Number exceed the other,) premiſing ſome few Notes concerning them.

CHAP. I.

Of Truth and its Criteries.

FIRST then, Truth is twofold, one of *Exiſtence*, the other of *Enunciation* or Judgment.

Truth of *Exiſtence* is that, whereby every thing which exiſts in the Nature of things, is that very thing which it is, and no other. Whence it comes to paſs, that there is no Falſity oppoſite to this Truth, (for *Orichalcum*, for Example, is not falſe Gold, but true *Orichalcum*,) and therefore *it is all one, whether we ſay a thing is Exiſtent or True.*

Truth of *Enunciation*, or Judgment, is nothing elſe but a Conformity of an Enunciation pronounced by the Mouth, or a Judgment made in the Mind, with the thing enunciated or judged.

This is that Truth to which Falſhood is oppoſite; for as [r] *it is true that the thing is ſo as it is ſaid to be*, ſo *is it falſe that it is not ſo as it is ſaid to be.*

As for that which they call a future Contingent, *thoſe* [s] *Disjunctions which are made of Contraries* (or rather thoſe Complexions which are made by disjunctive Particles, *are true*; as if we ſhould ſay, [t] either *Hermachus* will live To-morrow, or will not live; but [u] *neither of the Parts in this disjunctive Propoſition, taken ſingly, is true*; for neither is there any Neceſſity in Nature, that *Hermachus* ſhall live To-morrow; nor, on the contrary, that he ſhall not live.

Moreover, becauſe as the thing whoſe Truth is ſought, belongs either to Speculation only, or to Action, (the firſt of which appertains to Phyſick, the latter to Ethick;) we muſt for this Reaſon have a Critery, or Inſtrument of judging, whereby it may be examined, judged, and diſcerned, in order to both theſe.

But foraſmuch as natural things affect the *Senſe* or *Intellect*, and moral things the *Appetite* or *Will*; for this reaſon, Criteries are to be taken from both theſe.

From the *Senſe*, nothing can be taken more than its Function, Senſation, which likewiſe is called Senſe.

From the *Intellect*, foraſmuch as beſides the Function which it hath, whilſt like the Senſe it contemplateth the thing, as if it were preſent and apparent, (whence the Perception of a thing's appearing, which appeareth to be as well to the Intellect as to the Senſe, is called a Phantaſy, or Appearance;) foraſmuch, I ſay, as beſides this Function, it is proper to the Intellect to ratiocinate or diſcourſe; there is therefore required a Prænotion or Anticipation, by looking upon which, ſomething may be inferred.

Laſtly, From the *Will* or *Appetite*, whoſe Property it is to purſue or ſhun ſomething, nothing elſe can be taken, but the Affection or Paſſion itſelf; and that either *Allective*, as Pleaſure; or *Averſive*, as Pain or Grief.

[w] There are therefore in all three Criteries; Senſe, or Senſation; Prænotion, or Anticipation; and Affection, or Paſſion. Concerning each of theſe, ſome Canons are to be preſcribed.

CHAP. II.

[x] *Canons of Senſe, the Firſt Critery.*

TO begin with the Canons which concern Senſe; of theſe there may be laid down four.

CANON I.

Senſe [y] *is never deceived; and therefore every Senſation, and every Perception, of an Appearance is true.*

This is proved, Firſt, becauſe [z] "All Senſe is "void of Ratiocination, and wholly incapable of Re- "miniſcence. For neither being moved by itſelf, "nor by any other, is it able to add or detract any "thing; or to join or disjoin by enunciating or con- "cluding, ſo as thereby it might think any thing, "and be miſtaken in that Thought. The Intellect indeed can do this, but the Senſe cannot, [a] *whoſe Property it is only to apprehend that which is preſent, and moveth it; as the Sight, Colour preſented to it; but not to diſcern, that what is here preſented is one thing, what there, another.* Now where there is a bare Apprehenſion, not pronouncing any thing, there is no Error or Falſhood.

Next, becauſe [b] "there is nothing that can refel or "convince the Senſes of Falſhood, (for neither can "Senſe of a like kind refel Senſe of a like kind; as, "the Sight of the Right Eye the Sight of the Left, "or the Sight of *Plato* the Sight of *Socrates*; and "this, by reaſon of the Equality of their Credits) "or that there is the ſame Reaſon for both:" For a pur-blind Man doth not leſs ſee that which he ſees, than *Lyncæus* ſeeth that which he ſeeth. "Neither "can that which is of an unlike kind refel that which is

[r] Emp. loc. cit. [s] Cic. de Fato. [t] Cic. Acad. 4. 5. [u] Cic. de Fato. Loc. cit. [w] Laert. 10. 31. Cic. Acad. 4. 5.
[x] Quales *Epicurus* videtur poſſe inſtituiſſe; *collected by* Gaſſendus, ne Canonica cenſeatur id nomen haud jure adepta, *p.* 157. [y] From *Laertius*, 10. 31. and *Plutarch adv. Col.* [z] Laert. ibid. [a] Sext. Emp. ad Laert. 10. 126. [b] Lucret. l. 4. v. 482.

" is of an unlike kind, as the Sight the Hearing, and " the Taſte the Smelling; becauſe they have diffe- " rent Objects, and ſerve not to give Judgment of " the ſame things. Neither can one Senſation of the " ſame Senſe refel another, becauſe there is not any " Senſation wherewith we are not affected; and to " which, whilſt we are affected with it, we do not " adhere and aſſent; as whilſt we ſee a Staff one " while ſtrait, out of the Water; another time, part " under the Water, crooked; for we cannot by any " means ſee it crooked in the former Condition, or " ſtrait in the latter. Laſtly, " neither can Reaſon " or Ratiocination refel the Senſes; becauſe all Ra- " tiocination depends upon previous Senſes, and it is " neceſſary the Senſes firſt be true, before the Reaſon " which is founded on them can be true."

This is confirmed; foaſmuch as Senſe is the firſt of the Criteries, to which we may appeal from the reſt, but itſelf is ſelf-evident, and of manifeſt Truth. For [c] if we ſay every Senſe is deceived, you will want a Critery to determine and make good even that very Saying upon any particular Senſe; or, [d] if ſome one only, you will entangle yourſelf in an intricate Diſpute, when you ſhall be demanded, Which Senſe, how, and when it is deceived, or not deceived? So as the Controverſy not being determinable, you muſt neceſſarily be deprived of all Critery. Whence may be inferred, that, if any Appearance to Senſe be falſe, nothing can be perceived, or, (to expreſs it in other terms) unleſs all Appearances and bare Perceptions of a thing be true, there were no Credit, Conſtancy, and Judgment of Truth. For, " They [e] who alledge the Contradiction of Appear- " ances one with another, can never prove even this " Contradiction of them, or, that ſome are true, " others falſe; they cannot prove it by any thing " that is apparent, for the Queſtion is of things ap- " parent; nor by any thing unapparent, for that " which is unapparent is to be demonſtrated by ſome- " thing elſe that is apparent."

Again, this is confirmed; becauſe, taking away the Certainty of the Senſes, and by that means the genuine Knowledge of things, we take away all Rule of Life and Action. For [f] as in a Building, if the firſt Rule be amiſs, the Square untrue, the Plummet faulty, all things muſt neceſſarily be defective, and awry, and diſproportioned; ſo muſt all things in Life be prepoſterous, and full of Trouble and Confuſion, if that which is to be eſteemed, as it were, the firſt Rule, Square, and Plummet, for diſcerning things good and bad, done or not to be done, be unſincere or perverſe, that is, if it want the Certainty which is, as it were, its Rectitude. Whence it cometh to paſs, that though Reaſon (for Example) cannot explain the Cauſe why things near at hand are ſquare, but ſeem round afar off; yet is it better to heſitate and alledge ſome wrong Cauſe, rather than to overthrow the firſt Faith and Foundations whereon the Conſtancy and Security of Life is ſo grounded, that unleſs you dare credit Senſe, you will not have any way to ſhun Precipitation and Deſtruction.

Thirdly, " Becauſe [g] the Truth of the Senſes is " manifeſt even from this, in that their Functions " exiſt in Nature, or really and truly are. For " that we ſee and hear, is as truly ſomething indeed " exiſting, as our very feeling Pain; and there is no " Difference (as even now we ſaid,) between ſaying " a thing is exiſtent and true.

To ſpeak more fully, " As [h] the firſt Affections, " Pleaſure and Pain, depend upon ſome Cauſes " which produce them, and are, by reaſon of thoſe " Cauſes, exiſtent in Nature, (that is, Pleaſure de- " pends on pleaſant things, Pain on painful; and it " neither cometh to paſs, that what produceth Plea- " ſure is not pleaſant, nor that what cauſeth Pain is " not painful; but that which produceth Pleaſure, " muſt neceſſarily be pleaſant; that which Pain, pain- " ful and offenſive to Nature,) in like manner, as " to the Affections of the Appearances produced in " us, whatſoever is the efficient Cauſe of them, is " undoubtedly ſuch as makes this Appearance; " and being ſuch, it cannot come to paſs, that it " can be any other than ſuch as that is conceived to " be which makes this Appearance. The ſame is to " be conceived of all the reſt in particular; for that " which is viſible not only ſeems viſible, but is ſuch " as it ſeems; and that which is audible, not only " ſeems audible, but is indeed ſuch, and ſo of the " reſt: Wherefore all Appearances are true, and con- " formable to Reaſon.

" Hence [i] it is manifeſt, that the Phantaſies even " of thoſe who doat and dream, are, for this Reaſon, " conceived to be true, for that they truly and really " exiſt, ſeeing that they move the Faculty; whereas, " that which is not cannot move any thing." So that there is a Neceſſity in Nature, that the *Species* of things which are received in the Intellect, or Imagination, being in this manner moved, mingled, and diſturbed, that ſuch Phantaſies cannot but be, whatſoever Opinion follows them, whereby things are judged to be ſuch in themſelves; of which we are to ſpeak next.

CANON II.

Opinion [k] follows upon Senſe, and is ſuperadded to Senſation, and capable of Truth or Falſhood.

This is proved, becauſe when a Tower (for Example) appeareth round to the Eye, the Senſe indeed is

[c] Laert. ibid. [d] Laert. ibid. [e] Sext. adv. Log. 2. [f] Lucret l. 4. 510. [g] Laert. 10. 32. [h] Sext. Emp. adv. Log. [i] Laert. ibid. [k] From *Laertius*, 10. 33. &c.

is true, for that it is really affected with the *Species* of Roundneſs; which *Species* is truly ſuch, and hath a neceſſary Cauſe for which it is ſuch, at ſuch a diſtance; and withal it is not deceived, for it does not affirm that the Tower is ſuch, but only behaves itſelf paſſively, receiving the *Species*, and barely reporting that which appeareth to it. But Opinion, or the Mind, whoſe Office it is to conceive or judge, inaſmuch as it adds, as it were from itſelf, that what appeareth to the Senſe is a Tower, or that the Tower really and in itſelf, is round; Opinion, I ſay is that which may be true or falſe.

Whence may be inferred, that [l] "all Phantaſies "(or Senſations,) whereby *Phænomena*'s (things ap- "parent,) are perceived, are true, but Opinions ad- "mit a Difference; for ſome are true, others falſe, "inaſmuch as they are our own Judgments ſuperad- "ded to the Appearances; and we judge ſome things "aright, others amiſs, by reaſon that ſomething is "added, and imputed to the Appearances, or ſome- "thing detracted from them: And generally Senſe "which is incapable of Ratiocination charged with "Falſhood.

"But ſome are deceived by the Diverſity of thoſe "Appearances, which are derived from the ſame "ſenſible Object, as in a thing viſible, (for Exam- "ple) according as the Object ſeemeth to be either "of another Colour, or of another Figure, or ſome "other way changed; for they conceive, that of "contrary Appearances, one muſt neceſſarily be "true, and the other which is oppoſite thereto falſe. "Which certainly is very fooliſh, and proper to ſuch "Men as conſider not the Nature of Things: For "(to continue our Inſtance of Things viſible) it is "not the whole Solid, or the whole Solidity of the "Body which we ſee, but the Colour of the ſolid "Body. Now of the Colour, that which is in a "ſolid Body, and appeareth in thoſe things which "are ſeen nigh at hand, is one; that which is with- "out the ſolid Body, as a *Species*, or Image flow- "ing from it, and is received into Places ſituate "one beyond another, ſuch as appeareth in thoſe "things which are beheld at a great Diſtance, is ano- "ther. This latter being changed in the interme- "diate Space, and aſſuming a peculiar Figure, exhi- "bits ſuch an Appearance as itſelf indeed is.

"Whence, neither the Sound which is in the "Braſs that is ſtruck, nor the Voice which is "in the Mouth of him who crieth a-loud, is "heard, but that Sound of Voice which lights "upon our Senſe; for the ſame thing cannot be "in two diſtant Subjects. And as no Man ſaith, "that he hears falſly, who perceiveth the Sound to "be but ſmall at diſtance, becauſe coming nigher, "he perceiveth it as if it were greater; ſo neither can "we ſay, that the Sight is deceived, for that afar off "it ſeeth a Tower, little and round; near, great "and ſquare; but rather that it is true. For when "the ſenſible Object appeareth to it little, and of "ſuch a Figure, it is in that Place little indeed, and "of ſuch a Figure, the Extremities of thoſe Images "being broke off, whilſt they are conveyed thro' "the Air, and thereupon coming into the Eye in a "leſſer Angle. And again, when it appeareth great "and of another Figure, it not being the ſame in "both Places; for here the Extremities of the Ima- "ges are more entire, and come into the Eye in a "greater Angle; but it is a great Miſtake to think, "that it is the ſame thing which appeareth to Sight, "and affecteth the Eye near and afar off."

[m] Neither can we ſay, that the Sight is deceived, when we ſee a Shadow in the Sunſhine to move, to follow our Footſteps, and imitate our Geſtures. For Shadow being but Air deprived of Light, and the Earth, as we go, being now here, now there, ſucceſſively deprived of the Sun's Light, and ſucceſſively recovering that whereof it was deprived, it comes to paſs that the Shadow ſeems to change place, and to follow us; but the Eyes are not therefore deceived, it being only their Office to ſee the Light, and to ſee the Shadow in whatſoever Place it is. But to affirm, that the very Light or Shadow which is here, is the ſame, or diſtinct from that which even now was there, this belongs not to them, but to the Mind, whoſe Office it is to determine and judge. So that whatſoever of Falſity happens to be here, it is to be attributed to Opinion, not to Senſe.

[n] The ſame Anſwer may be given to a thouſand other Objections; as of a Ship which ſeems to ſtand ſtill, and the Land to move; of the Stars, which ſeem to reſt; of Mountains far aſunder, which yet ſeem to be nigh; of Boys, who having made themſelves giddy by turning, think the Roof itſelf runs round; of the Sun appearing to be near the Mountains, when as ſo great Spaces divide them; of the Appearance of a Space under Water, as large as from above it to the Sky; of a River, which to thoſe who paſs over it, ſeemeth to flow back towards the Spring; of a Gallery, which ſeems narrow at the further End; of the Sun, who ſeems to riſe out of the Water, and to go down into the Water; of Oars, which ſeem crooked or broken; of Stars in the Night, which ſeem to glide over the Clouds; of Things, which, by drawing the Eye on one Side, double.

CANON III.

All [o] Opinion atteſted, or not contradicted by the Evidence of Senſe, is true.

Evidence of Senſe, I here call that kind of Senſation or Appearance, which, all things obſtructive to Judgment

[l] Sext. Emp. adv. Log. 1. [m] Lucret. l. 4. v. 365. [n] Lucret. loc. cit. v. 388. [o] Laert. 10. 34.

Judgment being removed, as Diſtance, Motion, Indiſpoſition of the Medium, and the like, cannot be contradicted. Whence to the Queſtion, Whether a thing be ſuch as it appears? We ought not to give a ſudden Anſwer, but to obſerve [p] that which I call προσμενόμενον, *expectable*, in regard that we muſt ſtay, until the thing be fully examined and ſifted out, according to all the Ways that it can poſſibly happen.

" Atteſtation [q] I call Comprehenſion, made by " Evidence, that the thing conceivable is ſuch as we " before conceived it; as *Plato* coming towards me " from afar off; I conjecture, and think, as far as " I can gueſs at ſuch a Diſtance, that it is *Plato*; " but when he draws nigher, and the Diſtance is ta- " ken away, by the Evidence of the Thing, then is " there made an Atteſtation that it is *Plato*.

" Not-Contradiction is ſaid to be the finding out " of a thing not manifeſt, which we ſuppoſe and " conceive by reflecting on ſomething manifeſt or " evident; as when I ſay, there is *Vacuum*, which " indeed is unmanifeſt, I am induced thereto by " ſomething manifeſt, that is, by Motion; for if " there were no *Vacuum*, there would be no Mo- " tion, ſeeing the Body that ſhould be moved, " would not have any Place to go into, all things be- " ing full, and cloſe pack'd together. Whence that " which is apparent or manifeſt doth not contradict " that which is unmanifeſt, ſince indeed there is " Motion."

The Atteſtation and Not-contradiction are the Criteries whereby a thing is proved to be true.

CANON IV.

An [r] Opinion, contradicted or not atteſted by Evidence of Senſe, is falſe.

In which Words, " Contradiction is ſomething " oppoſite to Not-atteſtation, it being the joint De- " ſtruction of a manifeſt thing together with another " ſuppoſed unmanifeſt; as for inſtance, ſome affirm, " there is not *Vacuum*; but together with this Sup- " poſition muſt be ſubverted a thing manifeſt, *viz.* " Motion. For if there be no *Vacuum*, Motion " likewiſe cannot be, as we have already ſhewed.

" In like manner, Contradiction is oppoſed to At- " teſtation; for it is a Subverſion, whereby it ap- " peareth that the thing conceivable is not ſuch as it " was conceived in the Opinion; as a Man coming " towards us from afar off, we at that Diſtance gueſs " he is *Plato*, but the Diſtance being taken away, " it appeareth to us by Evidence that he is not *Plato*. " This is Contradiction, for the thing manifeſt con- " tradicts the pre-conceived Opinion. Thus as At- " teſtation and Not-contradiction are the Critery by " which a thing is proved to be true; ſo Contradi- " ction and Not-atteſtation are the Critery by which " a thing is evinced to be falſe:" Evidence being the Baſis and Foundation upon which all right Opinion of True and Falſe is grounded.

To omit, that Evidence is ſometimes had by one Senſe, and about ſome proper Senſible; ſometimes by many, as when the Senſible is common, as Magnitude and Figure, Diſtance and Poſition, Reſt and Motion, and ſuch like, which may be perceived both by the Sight and Touch, and become manifeſt, if not to one Senſe, at leaſt to the other. Whereupon it ſometimes happens, that by reaſon of ſeveral Qualities, ſeveral Senſes may be ſummoned, that the Evidence which cannot be got by one, may be obtained by the other; as when we cannot diſcern by Sight, whether the Bread that is offer'd to us be true or counterfeit, we may ſummon our Taſte, whereby it will evidently appear, which of the two it is.

But this I adviſe, that, after we have exactly conſidered all, we adhere to thoſe things which are obvious to us; uſing our Senſes, either the common about common Senſibles, or the proper about the proper. Since we muſt hold generally to all Evidence which is freely preſented to us by every Critery, but eſpecially by this; " and tenaciouſly ſtick to it, as to " an infallible Principle, leſt either the Criteries " which are eſtabliſhed by Evidence be overthrown, " or Error, being eſtabliſhed as ſtrong as Truth, " turn all things upſide down."

I need not repeat or give particular Advice what is to be done about the Inſtance alledged of a Tower, which at diſtance ſeems round, but nearer, ſquare: For, from what is deduced it is manifeſt, that before we aſſert any thing, we muſt expect or pauſe, and approach nearer, and examine and learn whether the Tower be ſuch when we come at it as it appeared far off.

I ſhall only give this general Rule. That unleſs (the Truth of the Senſes being preſerved after the manner aforeſaid,) you diſtinguiſh that which is opinable or conceivable into that which is expectable or requireth time, before it be aſſerted what it is, as being not yet duly perceived, and into that which is preſent and propoſed to us, and throughly examined, it will come to paſs, that you will perpetually be diſquieted with deceitful or vain Opinions. But if, when the things opinable are agitated in your Mind, you firmly eſteem all that is here called expectable as ſuch indeed, and paſs not lightly by it, as if that which is falſe, not having the Atteſtation of any Evidence, were firm and allowable; in this Caſe you will behave yourſelf as one that is cautious of all Ambiguity, and ſollicitouſly takes heed to every Judgment, which is rightly or falſly paſſed of an opinable thing.

CHAP.

[p] Laert. ibid. [q] Sext. Emp. adv. Mathem. [r] Out of *Sext. Empir. adv. Mathem.* [s] Sext. ibid.

CHAP. III.

Canons of Prænotion or Anticipation; the second Critery.

OF Prænotion or Anticipation may be given four Canons;

CANON I.

All [s] Anticipation or Prænotion, which is in the Mind, depends on the Senses, either by Incursion, or Proportion, or Similitude, or Composition.

I mean, that the Notion (or Idea, and Form as it were, which being anticipated is called Prænotion) is begotten in the Mind by *Incursion* (or Incidence,) when the thing incurreth into the Sense directly and by itself, as a Man just before our Eyes. By *Proportion*, when the Prænotion is amplified or extenuated, but the Number, Situation, and Figure of the Parts, with a convenient Bigness of each, is retain'd; as when having seen a Man of due Magnitude, we from thence form in our Mind the *Species* of a Giant, by Amplification; or of a Pigmy, by Extenuation. By *Similitude*, when according to a thing first perceived by the Sense, we fancy another like it; as when we imagine a City unseen, like to some that we have seen. Lastly, by *Composition*, when we put as it were into one the distinct Notions which we have of two or more things; as when we so unite the Notions of a Horse and a Man, as that the Notion of a Centaur ariseth out of them, but [t] *not without some Assistance of Ratiocination.*

CANON II.

Anticipation is the very Notion, and (as it were) Definition of the Thing; without which, we cannot enquire, doubt, think, nor so much as name any thing.

For [u] *by the Word Anticipation*, or Prænotion, *I understand a Comprehension of the Mind, or a suitable Opinion or Understanding fixed in the Mind, and, as it were, a certain Memory or Monument of that thing which hath often appeared from without*, (which the Mind hath represented in itself after some one of the forementioned manners:) *Such for Example is the Idea, or Form and Species, reflecting upon which we say to ourselves that thing is Man. For as soon as ever we hear this Word* Man *pronounced, immediately the Image of a Man is understood, according to the Anticipation formed in the Mind by the foregoing Sensations.*

"Wherefore that thing which is primarily and "chiefly meant by and coucht under every Word, "and so apprehended by the Mind is something per-"spicuous and manifest: For when we enquire "after any thing, or doubt of it, or think some-"thing; we should not do it, unless we already "had a Prænotion of that thing; as when we en-"quire, whether that which appeareth afar off, be "an Horse or an Ox, it is requisite that we should "first have seen and known by Anticipation the Fi-"gure of an Horse and Ox. Indeed we could not "so much as name any thing, unless we first had some "Image thereof known by Anticipation."

Hence it comes to pass, that, if it be demanded what any thing is, we define or describe it in such manner as it is, according to the Anticipation thereof we have in our Mind. Neither do we thus only, being demanded what some singular thing is, as what *Plato* is, but also what an Universal is, as Man, not this or that, but considered in general; this is brought to pass according as the Mind, having seen many Singulars, and set apart their several Differences, formeth and imprinteth in herself the Anticipation of that which is common to them all, as an universal Notion; reflecting upon which, we say, Man (for Example) is something animate, and endued with such a Form.

CANON III.

Anticipation is the Principle in all Discourse, as being that to which we have regard, when we infer that one is the same or divers, conjoined with or disjoined from another.

For [w] *whilst we conceive any thing*, either by Enunciation or Ratiocination, *it depends upon something first evident, unto which thing we having regard, and referring our thought, infer that thing of which the Question is, to be such, or not to be such*; that is, the same, or another; coherent, or not coherent with it. Thus, if we are to prove that this thing which we behold is a Man, we so look back upon the Prænotion which we have of Man, as that without any stop we say, Man is something animate and endued with such a Form; this that I see, is animate and endued with such a Form, therefore this that I see is Man; or it is not animate, nor endued with such a Form, therefore it is not Man.

But it is not necessary to confirm all things with exquisite Reasons or Arguments, and scrupulous Forms of Reasoning, which are cried up by the Dialecticks: For there is this Difference betwixt an Argument and the Conclusion of the Reason, and between a slender Animadversion and an Admonition; that in one, some occult, and (as it were) involved things

[s] Out of *Laert.* 10. 32. [t] Laert. ibid. [u] Laert. 10. 33. [w] Ibid.

things are unfolded and opened; in the other, things ready and open are judged. But where there are such Anticipations as ought to be, then what will follow or not follow from them, or what agrees or disagrees with them, is perspicuously discerned, and naturally inferred, without any Artifice, or Dialectick Construction; wherefore we need only take care, that the Anticipation which we have of things be clear and distinct.

CANON IV.

That which is unmanifest ought to be demonstrated out of the Anticipation of a thing manifest.

This is the same we said even now,[x] That the Anticipations of Things from which we infer something, and thinking upon which we make Sumptions or Propositions, which are Maxims or Principles, by which that which is inferred or concluded is conceived to be demonstrated, be perspicuous and manifest. For, *Demonstration*[y] *is a Speech, which collecting by granted Sumptions (or Propositions,) brings to light a Truth not manifest before.* Thus, to demonstrate that there is *Vacuum*, which is not manifest. supposing the Anticipation of *Vacuum*, and the Anticipation of a manifest thing (Motion) these Sumptions are premised, If there is Motion, there is *Vacuum*, but there is Motion, and then is inferred, therefore there is also *Vacuum*.

In this place, Motion is taken for the Argument, *Medium*, or Sign, which properly ought to be a sensible thing: For the Sense is that, according to which it is necessary to make a Conjecture by Ratiocination, ultimately to that which is unmanifest, altho' such a Sign or *Medium* hath not always a necessary Connexion with that which is inferred, but is sometimes only contingent, or probable, and might be otherwise.

Of this kind are many, from which we argue chiefly in superior things, those being such as may be brought to pass, not one way only, but many, as was hinted formerly.

Hither also may be[z] referred that which I use to term ἰσονομίαν, Equivalence, by which it is inferred, that one of the Contraries being, the other also must be: And when I argue thus, if the Multitudes of Mortals be so great, that of Immortals is no less; and if those things which destroy be innumerable, those which preserve ought also to be innumerable.

Against those who deny there is any Demonstration, may be brought this Argument; [a] Either you understand what Demonstration is, or you understand it not? If you understand and have the Notion thereof, then there is Demonstration; but if you understand it not, Why do you talk of that, whereof you have not any Knowledge?

[b] They who take away the Credit of the Senses, and profess that nothing can be known, being in the same Ranks, do they not, when they confess that they know nothing, imply they know not this very thing, Whether any thing can be known? We should not therefore contend against them, that they walk backwards upon their Head: Yet if they affirm they do, and I thereupon grant, that this is known by them, I have a fair Occasion to ask them, how, since before they saw nothing true in the things themselves, they came to understand what it was to know, and what to be ignorant?

CHAP. IV.

Canons of Affection or Passion; the third Critery.

LAstly, concerning Affection (or Passion) which is, as I said, Pleasure and Pain, there may be Four[c] Canons.

CANON I.

All Pleasure, which hath no Pain joined with it, is to be embraced.

CANON II.

All Pain, which hath no Pleasure joined with it, is to be shunned.

CANON III.

All Pleasure, which either hindreth a greater Pleasure, or procureth a greater Pain is to be shunned.

CANON IV.

All Pain, which either putteth away a greater Pain, or procureth a greater Pleasure, is to be embraced.

Of these we shall speak more largely in the *Ethicks*. In the mean time, I shall give this general Advertisement concerning Pleasure: Pleasure is desirable of itself, because it is Pleasure; Grief or Pain is always abhorred and avoidable, because it is Pain; whence, I conceive, a wise Man will have an Eye to this Exchange or Recompence, that he shun Pleasure, if it procure a Pain greater than itself; and undergo Pain, if it produce a greater Pleasure. As for my own Part, I should forsake Pleasure, and covet Pain, either if Remorse were annexed to the Plea-

[x] Sext. Empir. & adv Mathem. [y] Ibid. [z] Cic. de Nat. 1. 19. [a] Sext. Emp. adv. Log. [b] Lucret. l. 4. v. 471, &c.
[c] Out of *Laertius*, 10. 118.

ſure, or a leſſer Pain might be taken inſtead of a greater.

CHAP. V.

Canons concerning the Uſe of Words.

I Shall add ſomething concerning the Uſe of Words, (which I deſign'd to ſpeak of laſt) and [d] eſpecially that which concerns Diſcourſe; for which, two Canons may ſeem ſufficient, one for the Speaker, the other for the Hearer: They are theſe;

CANON I.

When thou ſpeakeſt, make uſe of Words common and perſpicuous, leſt either thy Meaning be not known, or thou neceſſarily waſte the time in Explication.

CANON II.

When thou hearеſt, endeavour to comprehend the Power and Meaning of the Words, leſt either their Obſcurity keep thee in Ignorance, or their Ambiguity lead thee into Error.

Above all, "we [e] muſt know what things the "Words ſignify; that we may have ſomething, re- "flecting upon which, we may ſafely diſcern what- "ſoever we either conceive, or ſeek, or doubt; "otherwiſe, if all things ſhould eſcape us undetermi- "ned, they who would demonſtrate any thing to us, "will proceed to infinite, and we ourſelves gain no- "thing by our Diſcourſe, but Words and empty "Sounds. For it is neceſſary, we have regard to "the Notion and primary Signification of every "Word, and that we need not any Demonſtration "to underſtand that thing, in caſe we can pitch up- "on any thing, to which we may refer that Point, "about which our Enquiry, Doubt, or Opinion are "buſied."

Hence it is, that the Method of enquiring after Truth, which is performed by a certain orderly Procedure, ought firſt to preſcribe certain Rules, by which that Affair may be performed, that ſo the Diſcourſers may agree, what it is concerning which they diſcourſe. So that if any Man ſhall not firſt agree to this, but hath a Mind rather to cavil and trifle in wordiſh Equivocation, he is not to be diſcourſed with, or ſtill to be preſt to explain himſelf, what 'tis he would be at; for by this means his juggling will be diſcovered, and his Cavils will ſolve themſelves: Nor will he be able to intangle his Adverſary, but rather diſcover himſelf a ridiculous Sophiſter.

[d] Laert. 10. 34. [e] Laert. 10. 37.

The Second Part of PHILOSOPHY.

PHYSICK; or of NATURE.

WE now come to *Phyſick*; which I uſually term *Phyſiology*, for that it is a Diſcourſe and Ratiocination about the Nature of things, in the Contemplation whereof it is wholly employ'd.

We have already ſaid our Scope to be, that thro' Perſpection of the Nature of things, nothing of Diſturbance, either from Meteors, or from Death, or from the unknown Ends of Deſires, or any other way, may ariſe unto us. Now the things which this Contemplation fathoms being ſo many, and ſo various, it ſeems very profitable, that (ſome being engaged in the more profound Study of the liberal Diſciplines, or, through ſome other Buſineſs, not having Leiſure to know every thing particularly and exactly,) we have ready at leaſt [a] "ſome proper "Compendium of the whole Science of Nature, that "whenſoever they will apply their Minds to the "chief Arguments of things, they may be aſſiſtant "to themſelves, according to the Meaſure of their "Knowledge, in Contemplation of Nature.

"Beſides, to thoſe who have made a greater Pro- "greſs in the Speculation of all things, whereof Phy- "ſiology treateth, it is very uſeful, by ſome com- "pendious Idea, to preſerve the Memory of the "things themſelves digeſted under Heads: For it of- "ten happens, that we need a general Inſpection of "things, but not a particular Diſquiſition. This "Way therefore is to be obſerved, and this Kind of "Study continually uſed in exerciſing the Memory, "that our Attention to things may be conſtant and "ready; and in the Forms of things or Notions, ge- "nerally

[a] Laert. 10. 35.

" nerally comprehended and imprinted in the Mind, " and elſewhere thoroughly examined, according to " the firſt Principles, and the Terms whereby they " are explained. If any thing be particularly inqui- " red, it may be found; for where ſuch a Conſtancy " and Readineſs is gotten, and the Mind is endu'd " with a general and exquiſite Information, we are " able to underſtand of a ſudden whatſoever we " pleaſe. I add, *according to the Words*; Foraſ- " much as it is not poſſible, that a coherent Sum of " general Heads can be frequently repeated by Heart, " unleſs it ſo contain every thing, as that it may be " explicated in few Words, even if any thing come " to be examined particularly.

" Hence it is, this Courſe being moſt profitable " to thoſe who are inclin'd and addicted to Phyſio- " logy, that I would adviſe them therein, (eſpeci- " ally if they enjoy a happy Life) that they frame " to themſelves ſome ſuch Epitome and Information " by general Heads." But if they are not able of themſelves, that they get one elſewhere; of which kind we have freely compoſed, for the Benefit of the Studious; hoping, that if what we have laid down be exactly remember'd as much as poſſible, although a Man runs not out into all particular Arguments that may be diſcuſſed, yet ſhall he obtain a copious Knowledge of Phyſiology, incomparably beyond other Men; for he will of himſelf underſtand many things in the more general Work, and, committing thoſe to Memory, will help himſelf, and continually profit.

For theſe are of ſuch a Kind, that ſuch as have made no little Diſcuſſion of Particulars, and addicted themſelves perfectly to theſe Contemplations, may thereby be enabled to raiſe and compleat more Diſſertations of all Nature; and whoſoever of them are throughly vers'd in theſe, revolving them tacitly within themſelves, may be able in a moment, and quietly, to over-run whatſoever is moſt conſiderable in Phyſiology.

But not to ſtay longer in the Entry, there being ſo many (as I ſay) and various things contained in Phyſiology, it will be convenient to divide them into ſome principal *Sections*, which may afterwards be purſued particularly; and every thing which eſpecially belongs to any one of them, may be referred to it.

Theſe Sections may be Four. The Firſt, Of the *Univerſe*, or the Nature of Things, which compriſeth this World, and all other things that are beyond it. The Second, Of the *World*, this wherein we are, and by which we may conjecture of the innumerable others. The Third, Of *inferior Things*, the Earth, to which we adhere, and of the things in it. The Fourth, Of *ſublime Things*, which are ſeen and produced above the Earth, and upwards from it.

SECT. I.

Of the Univerſe, or the Nature of Things.

TO begin then with the *Univerſe*: It is manifeſt, that it is ſo named, foraſmuch as it containeth all things, even others beſides this World. Whence it is alſo termed *the Whole*, and *the All*; and we uſually call it, *the Sum of Things*, and *the Nature of Things*.

We muſt firſt ſpeak generally, Of *the things whereof the Univerſe conſiſts*; Next, Of what *the ſo many Things in the Univerſe are made*; Thirdly, *By what they are made*; Fourthly, *What Kind they are of when made*; Fifthly, *How they are made*; Laſtly, *How they periſh*.

CHAP. I.

That the Univerſe conſiſts of Body, and Vacuum, *or Place.*

FIRST therefore, [a] *the Univerſe conſiſts of Body and* Vacuum [b]; neither can there be conceived any third Nature beſides theſe.

Now [c] *Body is underſtood by conceiting a certain vaſt Heap (as it were) of Magnitude* (or Bigneſs) *likewiſe of Figure, Reſiſtance*, (that is, Solidity, and Impenetrability) *and Gravity*; withal, to be ſuch, as it only can touch and be touched.

[d] *Emptineſs, or* Vacuum, which is oppoſed to Body, and *only* or properly, and in itſelf, *is incorporeal*, is underſtood by Negation of theſe; and chiefly from being of an intactile Nature, and void of all Solidity, and *can ſuffer nor act any thing, but only afford a moſt free Motion to Bodies paſſing through it.*

For this is [e] *that Nature, which being deſtitute of Body, is called* Vacuum; *taken up by a Body, Place; paſſed through by a Body, Region*; conſider'd as diffuſed, Interval or Space.

[f] *That there are Bodies in the Univerſe, Senſe atteſts; whence it is neceſſary to deduce Conjecture from other Principles, to that which is unmanifeſt, as I formerly touched.* Certainly, all theſe things which we behold, which we touch, which we turn up and down, which we ourſelves are, are nothing but Bodies.

But that there is Vacuum *alſo, is hence manifeſt, that if it were not in Nature, Bodies would neither have where to be, nor any way to perform their Motions; whereas that they are moved, is evident.*

[g] Doubtleſs if all were full, and the Matter of things crouded, as it were, together, it could not be, but that all things muſt be immoveable; for neither would any thing be moved, but it muſt thruſt for-

[a] Laert. 10. 30. [b] Ibid. [c] Sext. Emp. [d] Laert. 10. 40. [e] Plut. Plac. 1, 20. [f] Laert. 10. 39.
[g] Lucret. lib. 1. v. 423.

ward all things; nor would there be Place left, whereinto any things might be thruſt. For whereas ſome anſwer, That Fiſhes therefore can move, becauſe they can leave a Place behind them, into which the Water, being thruſt forward, and giving place, are received; they obſerve not, that the firſt Impulſion forward could never begin, becauſe there is not yet any Place, neither behind, nor beſide, whereinto the Water may be received. So as it is neceſſary, there ſhould be little empty Intervals of Space within things, eſpecially the fluid, into which the little Particles being driven may be ſo received, that, by the Compreſſion, Place may be made; towards which, the impelling Body may be moved forward, and, in the Interim, leave Place behind, into which the compreſſed Fluid may dilate itſelf, and, as it were, flow back.

[h] I paſs by other Arguments, as, That Thunder or Sound were not able to paſs through Walls, nor Fire to penetrate into Iron, Gold, and the reſt of Metals, unleſs in theſe there were ſome vacuous little Spaces intermingled. Beſides, foraſmuch as Gravity is proper to Bodies, the Weight of things could not be made greater or leſſer, if it were not according to their having more or leſs Vacuity intermixed.

Now *Vacuum* being incorporeal, is ſo penetrated by Bodies, whether exiſting in it, or gliding by it, that it remains unchang'd, and preſerves the ſame Dimenſions to which it is adequate. Whence a ſtraight Line, taken in *Vacuum*, is indeed ſtraight; but not ſo, that it becomes crooked with the Body which fills it, becauſe *Vacuum* is neither moveable in whole nor in part.

Whence it comes, that whereas the Notion of Place is, to receive the things placed to be co-extended with it; not to be moved with it, nor to forſake it; leſt either the Body be moved, yet not change Place; or change Place, yet not be moved: It therefore is only compatible to *Vacuum* to have the Nature of Place, foraſmuch as it only, both by its corporeal Dimenſions, Length, Breadth, and Depth, is co-extended with the thing placed in Length, Breadth, and Depth, and exactly adjuſted to it. Beſides, it is ſo immoveable, that whether the Body come to it, or go from it, or ſtay in it, it continueth the ſame, and invariable.

That I ſaid, [i] *No third Nature beſide can be conceived*, it is for this Reaſon, that whether we take to be conceived *comprehenſively*, (in which manner the things, which by themſelves, and directly fall into our Knowledge, are perceived) *or comparatively to thoſe things which are conceived*, (after which manner thoſe things are underſtood, which are known only by Proportion, as was ſaid about Anticipation) whatſoever it be that is conceived, either it hath ſome Bulk and Solidity, and ſo is a Body; or it is void of all Bulk and Solidity, and ſo it is *Vacuum*; which is to be underſtood, *in caſe you conceive it as certain by its ſelf-exiſtent, ſubſiſtent, coherent Nature, and not as ſome Adjunct or Accident thereof.*

For ſince [k] an Adjunct is a Property, which cannot be taken from the thing to which it belongs, without Deſtruction of the thing; as Tactility from Body, Intactility from *Vacuum*; and in a more familiar Example, as Weight from a Stone, Heat from Fire, Moiſture from Water: But an Accident is that, whoſe Preſence or Abſence violates not the Integrity of the Nature, as Liberty and Servitude, Poverty and Riches, War and Peace, *&c.* Therefore they conſtitute not ſome third Nature, diſtinct from corporeal and incorporeal, but only are as ſomething appertaining to one of theſe.

CHAP. II.

That the Univerſe is Infinite, Immoveable, and Immutable.

NOW [l] *the Univerſe*, conſiſting of *Vacuum* and Body, *is Infinite*; *for that which is Finite hath a Bound*; *that which hath a Bound, is ſeen from ſome other thing*; or may be ſeen from out of an Interval beyond, or without it. *But the Univerſe is not ſeen out of any other things beyond it*; for there is no Interval, or Space, which it containeth not within itſelf, otherwiſe it could not be an Univerſe, if it did not contain all Space; *therefore neither hath it any Extremity. Now that which hath no Extremity hath no End, and that which hath no End doubtleſs is not Finite, but Infinite.*

This is confirmed; [m] for if you imagine an Extremity, and ſuppoſe ſome Man placed in it, who with great Force throws a Dart towards its utmoſt Surface, the Dart will either go forward, or not, but be forced to ſtay. If it go forward, there is Place beyond; wherefore the Extremity was not there where we deſin'd it: If not, therefore there is ſomething beyond which hinders the Motion, and ſo again the Extremity was not in the fore-deſigned Place.

Moreover, [n] *this Infinity belonging to the Univerſe is ſuch, both in the Multitude of Bodies, and the Magnitude of* Vacuum; nay, in Infinites thruſting themſelves forward mutually, alternately, or in order. " For if *Vacuum* were Infinite, and Bodies Finite, " then Bodies, *which are in perpetual Motion, (as " we ſhall anon declare)* would reſt no where, but " be diſperſedly carried through the infinite *Vacuum*, " as having nothing to ſtop them, and reſtrain " them, by various Repercuſſions. But if the *Va- " cuum* were finite, the Bodies infinite, then there " would not be Place large enough for the infinite " Bodies to exiſt in.

" *Hence*

[h] Lucret. loc. cit. [i] Laert. x. 431. [k] Lucret. l. 5. v. 456. [l] Laert. 10. 41. [m] Lucret. 1. v. 967. [n] Laert. 10. 42.

" *Hence* [o] we ought not ſo to attribute to the *U-*
" *niverſe*, or infinite Space, the being above or be-
" low, as if there were any thing in the Univerſe
" higheſt, or any thing loweſt; the former, by
" conceiving the Space over our Head not to be ex-
" tended to infinite; the latter, by imagining that
" which is under our Feet not to be of infinite Ex-
" tent; as if both that which is above, and that
" which is below, were terminated with ſome one
" and the ſame Point; as it happens with us, or the
" Middle of this World, one of its extreme Parts
" being imagin'd higheſt, the other loweſt; for in
" Infinite, which hath neither Extremes nor Mid-
" dle, this cannot be imagin'd.

" Wherefore it is better to aſſume ſome one Mo-
" tion, which may be underſtood to proceed upwards
" into Infinite, and in like manner another which
" downwards; although that Moveable, which
" from us is carried up towards the Places over our
" Heads, meet a thouſand times the Feet of thoſe
" who are above, *and (conceiting other Worlds) think*
" *it comes from below*; or which from us is carried
" towards that Quarter, which is under our Feet,
" to the Heads of thoſe who are below us, *and who*
" *are thence apt to imagine, that it comes from above:*
" Notwithſtanding which Imagination of theirs, ei-
" ther of theſe oppoſite Motions, taken entirely, is
" rightly conceived to be of infinite Extent.

" To theſe is conſentaneous, That [p] the Univerſe
" was ever ſuch as it now is, and ſuch as it now is
" ſhall ever be; for there is nothing into which,
" *loſing the Nature of the Univerſe*, it may be chang-
" ed; and beſides the Univerſe, *which containeth all*
" *things*, there is nothing, which by aſſaulting it,
" can cauſe an Alteration in it."

Rightly therefore is the Univerſe eſteemed as *im-moveable, there being no Place beyond it, into which it may be moved.* So alſo immutable, foraſmuch as it admits neither Decreaſe nor Increaſe, and is void of Generation and Corruption; and therefore is eternal, not having Beginning, nor End of Duration.

And indeed many things in it are moved and changed; but whatſoever Motions and Mutations you conceive, they bear no Proportion, if compar'd with the Immenſity of the Univerſe itſelf. Nor is therefore the whole Univerſe either moved into any other Place, or changed into any other thing; does it therefore not perſevere to be ever the ſame which it ever was? For the Motions and Mutations in it were always alike; ſo as it may be ſaid, *That there is nothing new done in the Univerſe, more than what was already done in the Infinity of Time.*

CHAP. III.

Of the Divine Nature in the Univerſe.

BUT before we ſpeak of things in the Univerſe which are generated and corrupted, and of the Principles whereof they are made, it is fit to premiſe, and put, as a By-diſcourſe, a Treatiſe concerning Divine Nature; as well for the Excellency of that Nature, as for that, although it be of the ſame with corporeal Nature, yet is it not ſo much a Body, as a certain thing like a Body, as having nothing common to it with other Bodies, that is, with tranſitory, or generated, and periſhable things. Now it firſt being uſually queſtion'd concerning the Divine Nature, whether there be any in the Univerſe; yet the thing ſeems as if it ought not at all to be called in queſtion, foraſmuch as Nature herſelf hath imprinted a Notion of the Gods in our Minds: For what Nation is there, or what Kind of Men, which without Learning have not ſome Prænotion of the Gods?

Wherefore, ſeeing it is an Opinion not taken up by any Inſtitution, Cuſtom, or Law, but the firm Conſent of all Men, none excepted, we muſt neceſſarily underſtand that there are Gods, becauſe we have the Knowledge of them ingrafted, or rather innate in us. But that, concerning which the Nature of all Men agreeth, muſt neceſſarily be true; therefore it is to be acknowledged, that there are Gods.

[q] Indeed Men may ſeem, when they beheld the Courſe of the Heavens, and the various Seaſons of the Year, to wheel about, and return in certain Order, and were not able to know by what Cauſes it were performed, to have recurr'd to this Refuge, to attribute all things to the Gods, and make them obey their Beck, placing them withal in Heaven, for that they beheld in Heaven the Revolution of Sun, Moon, and Stars; but how could they attribute theſe to the Gods, unleſs they had firſt known that there were Gods?

" [r] Did they not rather derive a Knowledge of the
" Gods from the Apparitions of Dreams? Certain-
" ly they might by ſome great Images incurring to
" them under human Forms, by Dreams, conceive
" that there are indeed ſome Gods endued with ſuch
" a human Form;" they might, I ſay, not ſo much in Sleep, as when awake they called to mind, that thoſe excellent Images had appeared to them in Sleep ſo majeſtick, of ſo ſubtle a Compoſure, and ſo well proportion'd in Shape, conceive that there is no Repugnance, nay, that there was a Neceſſity, that ſomewhere there ſhould be things of like Nature with theſe, capable alſo of Senſe or Underſtanding, [s] becauſe they fancied them moving their Limbs, and ſpeaking.

[o] Laert. ibid. [p] Laert. 10. 41. [q] Lucret. l. 5. v. 1182. [r] Sext. Emp. adv. Math. [s] Lucret. 5. v. 1168.

ſpeaking. And thoſe alſo Immortal, becauſe their Shape was always preſent to their Apprehenſions, becauſe their Form remain'd ſtill the ſame, and was of ſuch Grandeur, that they ſeem'd not eaſy convincible but there were ſuch; moreover, Bleſſed, forasmuch as they neither fear Death, nor take any pains in effecting their Works.

[t] They might alſo by Diſcourſe uſe that *Ισονομία*, or *Equivalence*, by which when we treated of the Criteries, we affirmed it was concluded, that *if the multitude of Mortals were ſo great, that of Immortals was not leſs; and if thoſe things which deſtroy be innumerable, thoſe which preſerve ought alſo to be innumerable.*

[u] Which way ſoever it came, we have this certainly by Prænotion, That we think the Gods are bleſſed and immortal: "For the ſame Nature which "gave us Information of the Gods themſelves, im- "printed alſo in our Minds, that we eſteem them "Bleſſed and Eternal." Which if it be ſo, our Opinion is truly laid down, "[w] What is Eternal and "Bleſſed, neither is troubled with any Buſineſs it- "ſelf, nor troubles any other; therefore not poſſeſ- "ſed with Favour or Anger: for all ſuch are weak."

And if we ſought no further than to worſhip the Gods piouſly, and to be free from Superſtition, what we have ſaid were ſufficient; for the excellent Nature of the Gods is worſhipped by the Piety of Men, as being Eternal and moſt Bleſſed. For to whatever is excellent, Veneration is due; and all Fear, proceeding from the Power and Anger of the Gods, would be expelled; for it is underſtood, that Anger and Favour are far ſeparate from a bleſſed immortal Nature; which being removed, no Fears hang over us as to the Gods. But for Confirmation of this Opinion, the Soul enquires after the Form and the Life, and the Action of Mind, and Agitation in God.

"[x] As to the Form, Nature partly inſtructs us, "partly Reaſon; for by Nature, all of us, of all "Nations, have no other Form but human of the "Gods. For what other Forms ever occur to any "Man, waking or ſleeping? But not to reduce all "things to their firſt Notions, Reaſon itſelf declares "the ſame. For ſeeing it is proper to the moſt ex- "cellent Nature, either becauſe it is bleſſed, or be- "cauſe it is ſempiternal, that it be moſt beautiful, "what Compoſition of Limbs, what Conformity "of Lineaments, what Figure, what Form can be "more beautiful than the human?

"Now if the Figure of Men excelleth the Form "of all things animate, and God is animate, cer- "tainly he is of that Figure which is the moſt beau- "tiful of all. And forasmuch as it is manifeſt, that "the Gods are moſt bleſſed; and none can be bleſ- "ſed without Virtue, nor Virtue conſiſt without "Reaſon, nor Reaſon conſiſt in any Figure but tha "of Man, we muſt acknowledge, that the God "are of human Form."

But when I ſay, that the Gods are of the Form of a Man, and of an animate Being, Do I therefor attribute ſuch a Body to them, as ordinarily Me and animate Beings have? By no means: "Fo "God is not a thing, as *Plato* ſays, merely incor- "poreal; becauſe what kind of thing that is, can- "not be underſtood; for then he muſt neceſſarily "want Senſe, he muſt want Prudence, he muſ "want Pleaſure; all which we comprehend togethe "with the Notion of the Gods:" But neither is he therefore a groſs Body, no not the moſt ſubtle tha can be coagmentated of Atoms; but he is altogethe a Body of his own Kind, which indeed is not ſeen by Senſe, but by the Mind; nor is he of a certain Solidity, nor compoſed of Number, but conſiſts of Images perceived by Compariſon; and which, compar'd with thoſe that ordinarily occur, and are called Bodies, may be ſaid "to be (not Body, but) as before I "ſaid, Reſemblance of Body; and (for Example) "not to have Blood, but a certain Reſemblance of "Blood."

In the mean time, I muſt intimate by the way, that [y] he is not ſuch a Kind of Body as is coagmentated of Atoms; for then he could not be ſempiternal, and upon his Generation would follow Corruption; upon his Concretion, Diſſipation; and ſo he could not be ſempiternal. Thus there are four things to be eſteemed *Eternal* and *Incorruptible*; the *Univerſe*, which hath no Place into which it can fall; *Vacuum*, which cannot be touch'd, nor receive any Blow; the *Matter* of things, which unleſs it did ſubſiſt unchanged, thoſe things which are diſſolved would go away into nothing; and the *Divine Nature*, which is inconcrete, and, by reaſon of its Tenuity, cannot be touched nor ſtruck.

Hence one of the Natural Philoſophers was in a great Error, when he ſaid, That the Nature of the Gods is ſuch, as to diffuſe, and ſend forth Images out of itſelf; for in this manner, ſomewhat might be ſo taken out of it, as that it might be admitted diſſolvable. But [z] ſome have miſinterpreted our Meaning, when, upon our admitting many Worlds, and ſaying, that there are *Intermundia*, that is, Intervals between the Worlds, they affirm we place the Gods in the *Intermundia*, leſt they ſhould receive any Injury by the World's Ruin. For as *Vacuum*, ſo is the Nature of the Gods more ſubtle, than to fear any harm from Bodies; which if it did fear, in no Place were it more to be feared than in the *Intermundia*, when the World ſhould come to be diſſolved.

Neither can we deſign in what Places the Gods live, ſeeing that this our World is not a Seat worthy of

[t] Cic. de Nat. Deor. 1. 19. [u] Ibid. 1. 17. [w] Laert. ibid. [x] Cic. de Nat. Deor. 1. 18. [y] Lactant. de gra. Dei. c. 10. [z] Seneca de Benef. 4. 19.

of them: But we can only say in general, such as the Poets describe *Olympus*; such are, wheresoever they be, the blessed and quiet Seats of the Gods.

[a] *Where Showers not fall, nor Winds unruly blow,*
Where neither blasting Frost, nor hoary Snow
Rifle the Place; but Heaven is ever bright,
Spreading his glorious Smiles with chearful Light.

[b] "Hereupon it being further demanded, what "kind of Life that of the Gods is, and what State "of Age they enjoy, it may be answered, That "certainly, than which nothing can be more hap- "py, nothing more abundant in all Goods, can be "imagined. For God doth nothing, he is not en- "tangled in any Employments, he undertakes no "Works, but joyeth in his own Wisdom and Vir- "tue. He knows for certain that he shall ever be "in Pleasures, both greatest and eternal. This "God we justly stile Blessed, who ourselves place a "blessed Life in Serenity of Mind, and in Disen- "gagement from all Business; but not, such as others "do describe him, Laborious, involved in great and "troublesome Employments."

CHAP. IV.

Of First Matter, or of the Principles of Compound Things in the Universe.

NOW to resume and pursue our Discourse: Forasmuch as in the first place 'tis manifest by Sense, that in Nature many things are generated, and many corrupted; therefore we must conclude, that hereto is requir'd Matter, of which things may be generated, and into which they may be resolved: for [c] *of nothing, nothing is made; and into nothing, nothing goes away. For if something were made of nothing, every thing might be produced from any thing, as not requiring Seeds; and if that which perisheth did go into nothing, all things would perish absolutely, there not remaining those things into which they were dissolved.*

Besides, forasmuch as we affect to know the Nature of any thing generated or made, it is first demanded, whether it be some thing one and simple, or compounded of some things which themselves are simple and precedent. It is manifest, that nothing generated or made can be one and simple, seeing that it hath Parts of which it was made up, and into which again it may be dissolved, which therefore are precedent and more simple; and if they still be compounded, they may be conceived to consist of those, which at length are the first and most simple.

Thus again it appears, *that* [d] *of Bodies, some are Concretions*, or (if you like it better) concrete or compounded Bodies; *others, of which Concretions*, or compounded Bodies, *are made*. These, if first and simple, are the first Matter of Things, and are termed Principles, and, by the later Authors, Elements also.

These *Principles*, or first Things of all, must be simple uncompounded Bodies, (or rather Atoms) and *indivisible*, or not resolvable by any Force, and consequently *immutable*, or in themselves void of all Mutation. I mean, *if it shall so come to pass*, as that in the Dissolution of Compounds, *all things go not into nothing, but that there consist and persevere a certain Nature, full, or void of Vacuity*, and therefore solid; *which* being such, *it cannot in any part, or by any means, admit a Diversion, and so be dissolved.*

Wherefore it is necessary, that those which are called the Principles of compounded *Bodies, be*, as *of a Nature*, full, solid, and *immutable*, so wholly *indivisible*; whence we use to call them *Atoms*. We term it an Atom, not as being the least, that is, as it were a Point, (for it hath a Magnitude) but for that it cannot be divided, it being incapable of suffering, and void of Vacuity. So that he who saith, *Atom*, names that which is free from a Blow, and can suffer nothing; and which is invisible indeed by reason of its Littleness, but indivisible by reason of its Solidity.

CHAP. V.

That there are Atoms in Nature, which are the Principles of Compound Bodies.

THAT [e] there are Atoms, the Reason alledged sufficiently convinceth: for, seeing that Nature makes nothing of nothing, and reduceth nothing to nothing, there must remain in the Dissolution of compound Bodies something that is incapable of further Dissolution. Certainly, if you say that it is still dissolvable, or divisible, it will be necessary, by subdividing, to come at last to something that is solid, and incapable of Division; since that neither Nature itself doth dissolve things infinitely, but stays in some last things; nor can Body admit of an infinite Division.

[f] "In a finite Body, doubtless there cannot be "Parts of infinite, either Multitude or Magnitude; "wherefore there cannot be understood to be per- "formed in it, not only that Division into infinite, "which is made into less, or by Parts always lesser, "and proceeds, ever observing the same Proportion of "Division; but also that Progression into infinite, "which is made by proceeding not always by lesser, "but by equal, or those which are called determinate "Parts." For since infinite Parts must needs be admitted to serve for an infinite Division, how can there be infinite of them in a finite Body?

"He

[a] Lucret. 3. v. 29. [b] Cic. loc. cit. [c] Laert. 10. 38. [d] Ibid. 10. 40. [e] Ibid. 10. 38. [f] Ibid. 10. 56.

" He certainly who once hath said, that in every " thing there are Parts infinite in Number, is not " able further to understand and declare how that " Magnitude, whereof he speaks, comes to be finite. " For whether the Parts that a Division or Progres- " sion may be made into infinite be determinate, " (that is, equal among themselves) or indeterminate, " (that is, always lesser) it is manifest that the Mag- " nitude, whose Parts they are, and which consists, " and is compounded of them, must indeed be infi- " nite.

" And since on the other side, a finite Magnitude ma- " nifestly hath an Extreme *or last* Part, *easy to be per- " ceived and shewn*, unless this Part may be seen by it- " self, and as the last, we cannot, *although we should " subdivide it*, understand any other Part, which should " be thought the last *rather than this*; *for that with " as much Reason will be divisible.* Whence *it will " come, that* by proceeding *further*, and consequent- " ly towards an extreme Part into infinite, we can " never arrive, not even by thought, to that part " which is the last, *nor be able to over-run, by Pro- " gression, even the least Space.*"

Add [g] to this, That unless in Dissolutions there did remain little Bodies, so solid as that they cannot be dissolved by any Force, the Difference between Body and *Vacuum* could not be sufficiently understood, inasmuch as nothing of Body, by infinite Attenuation, would be capable to resist; by which means too all things would become weak or soft, and nothing could be made hard, seeing that Solidity only is the Foundation of Hardness. Neither need we scruple, as if because Atoms are solid, soft things cannot be made of them, for they may be made soft by Intermistion only of *Vacuum*, into which the compressed Parts retire, and yield to the Touch.

Add [h] also the diverse Sorts of Constancy in Nature, as in carrying on Animals always to certain Bounds of Strength, Augmentation and Life; in imprinting always the same Distinctions and Marks of every particular kind; which she could not do, if she did not use Principles certain and constant, and therefore not obnoxious to Dissolution and Mutation.

CHAP. VI.

Of the Properties of Atoms; and first, of their Magnitudes.

ALthough all Atoms, by reason of this Solidity, may seem to be of one and the same Nature, yet have they some Adjuncts or Properties, and certain [i] *Qualities*, by which they may differ among themselves; such only are *Magnitude*, *Figure*, *and Weight*; *and if there be any beside which are necessarily ally'd to Figure*, as roughness and smoothness; for *Colour*, *Heat*, *Cold*, and the rest of the Qualities, *are not such as are proper to Atoms*, but to Compounds, and arising partly out of the Adjuncts, partly the Accidents of Atoms, of which we shall speak hereafter.

This in brief, at present: If [k] Colour (for Example) were in the Atoms themselves, it would be as intransmutable as they are; and so the things consisting of Atoms, that are of one Colour could not change that, and appear under another; whereas we observe the contrary happens; for the Sea foaming looks white, it being otherwise of a green Colour; which doubtless if it were in it by reason of green Atoms, could not be changed into a white Colour. For whereas some say, That Contraries are made of Contraries, it is so far from being so, that White will sooner be produced out of no Colour at all, than out of Black. Better they, who conceive the Matter of Things, that it may undergo Variety of Colours and other Qualities, ought to be void of them; as we chuse that Oil which is most free from any Scent to make Perfumes of.

But to touch a little every Property of the Atoms: Whereas in the first place I attribute Magnitude to them, I mean not any Magnitude; for the largest Atom is not so great as to be perceptible by Sight; but that Magnitude which, altho' it be below the Reach of Sense, yet is of some Bigness, (for if Atoms were Points void of all Magnitude, no Body of any Magnitude could be made up of them.) Whence I use to say of an Atom, that it is some small thing, thereby, as it were, not excluding all Magnitude from it, but the larger Size only.

Neither [l] can it be objected, That the Magnitude of Atoms is not perceived by the Senses, since we must necessarily confess, there are innumerable things invisible; for can we see the Wind, Heat, Cold, Odour, Sound, or the little Bodies, by whose Arrival to the Sense these are perceived? Can we see the little Bodies of Moisture, by which Garments hung by the Water-side are moistened, yet being spread abroad are dried? Can we see those which are rubb'd off from a Long Ring-worm, from a Wheel that turns round, from a Plough-share in ploughing, from a Stone which a Drop hollows, which a Tread diminisheth, or those by which a Plant or Animal grows in its Youth, decays in its old Age, and the like?

" Yet [m] we must not think that all Atoms are of " the same Magnitude; it is more consonant to Rea- " son, that amongst them there be some greater, " others lesser; and, this admitted, a Reason may be " given of most things that happen about the Pas- " sions of the Mind, and about the Senses."

That

[g] Lucret. l. 1. v. 548. [h] Ibid. v. 578. [i] Laert. 1. 44. 54. [k] Lucret. 2. v. 729. [l] Ibid. l. 1. v. 268. [m] Laert. 10. 55.

That [n] there may be an incomprehenſible Variety of Magnitudes beyond the Reach of Senſe, may alſo be underſtood even from this, foraſmuch as there are ſome little Animals, whoſe third part, if we imagine them divided, would be inviſible; nevertheleſs, to the Compoſition of them an incomprehenſible Number of Parts is neceſſary. For how many muſt there be to make the Entrails, the Eyes, the Joints, the Soul; to conſtitute all Parts, without which we cannot underſtand there ſhould be any living, ſenſitive, moving Animal?

Whether may not (to uſe a groſs Example,) this Variety be comprehended from thoſe duſty Motes which the Beams of the Sun, coming in at a Window, diſcover? For whereas without ſuch Beams all things are alike dark, yet they coming in, there appeareth an innumerable Company of little Bodies, in ſuch manner, as that there is an evident difference between the greater and the leſſer; nevertheleſs, I ſay not, (as ſome conceive) that theſe Kinds of little Bodies are Atoms, for in the leaſt of them are contained many Myriads of Atoms; I only uſe them by way of Compariſon, that whereas the whole Nation (as it were) of Atoms is impervious, and dark, even to the ſharpeſt Sight, yet we may underſtand it to be ſo illuſtrated by the Beams of Reaſon, that the Atoms may be perfectly ſeen by the Mind, and that we may conceive there are ſeveral Degrees of Magnitudes in them.

Hence [o] it happens, that as in a great and meaſurable Magnitude we take ſomething, which, that it may be the common Meaſure, muſt have the Proportion of the leaſt, as a Foot, a Digit, a Barly-corn; and in ſenſible Magnitude, we take alſo ſomething which is accounted the leaſt as to Senſe, as the little Creature called *Acaris*; ſo in intelligible Magnitude, ſuch as is that of the Atom, we may take ſomething which in it is eſteemed (as it were) the leaſt; ſuch as in an Atom may be conceived the very Point in which a ſharp Angle is terminated.

But [p] this Difference there is between the leaſt, under the Notion of Meaſure, and the leaſt of thoſe which are ſenſible and intelligible, that the former, by its Repetition, may be underſtood to be adequated to the whole Magnitude; but theſe latter are conceiv'd as certain individual Points, which either are Bounds of Magnitudes, or certain Connexures (as it were) ſo interpos'd between the Parts, as that they have only certain Reſpects to the Parts connected on each Side, though they are ſuch, that a Beginning of Menſuration cannot be made from them. For nothing hinders but that we may, by the Mind, frame ſome Dimenſions in an Atom.

Although, when as we ſay, there are Parts or Connexures in an Atom, it is not ſo to be underſtood, as if at any time they were disjoined, and afterwards united; but we do it, to declare that in an Atom there is a true Magnitude conſiſting of Parts, though withal they have that Difference from compound things, that their Parts can only be diſtinguiſhed by Deſignation, not by Separation; foraſmuch as they cohere by a natural, indiviſible, and perpetual Connexion.

CHAP. VII.

Of the Figure of Atoms.

As [q] concerning *Figure*, which is the Bound of Magnitude, it is firſt neceſſary, that in Atoms it be manifold; or, that Atoms amongſt themſelves be variouſly figured. This is proved, foraſmuch as all natural things framed of them, Men, Beaſts, Birds, Fiſhes, Plants, *&c.* are variouſly figured, not only in reſpect of their *Genus*, but of every particular *Species* or *Individuum*; for there are not any two ſo like one another, but that if you mind them exactly, you will find ſome Differences by which they are diſtinguiſhed.

Again, *Foraſmuch* [r] *as the Kinds of Figures in Atoms are incomprehenſible for Number*, for they are round, oval, lenticular, flat, gibbous, oblong, conical, hooked, ſmooth, rough, briſtly, quadrilateral, *&c.* as well regular as irregular, without any Determination poſſible to the Intellect, yet they are not to be eſteemed ſimply infinite in Number: *For there would not be ſo many and ſo great Differences in concrete things, if in the Atoms, of which they are compounded, there were ſuch a Diverſity of Figure as could be comprehended by the Mind. Yet the Diverſities of Atoms cannot be abſolutely infinite, unleſs a Man conceive in Atoms a Magnitude*, which is not only ſo ſmall as to eſcape Senſe, but it is in reality infinitely little: *For in Magnitude*, or the *Superficies* of Magnitude, *which is finite, cannot be underſtood Diverſities, which are infinite.*

But thirdly, although the Kinds of Figure be not infinite, *yet are there in every Figuration, or Kind of Figure, Atoms ſimply infinite in Number*; that is, there are infinite round Atoms, infinite oval, infinite pyramidal; *for otherwiſe the Univerſe would not be infinite in Multitude of Atoms*, as was already declared, *unleſs the Atoms which are like to one another in Figure, were abſolutely infinite in Number.*

But [s] take notice, That though there are Atoms corner'd and hooked, yet can they not be conceiv'd to be worn away or broken, becauſe both the Corners and Hooks, as alſo the middle little Bodies themſelves are of one Nature, and kept together with equal Solidity and Neceſſity, inſomuch as no Force

[n] Lucret. 4. v. 115. [o] Laert. 10. 58, *&c.* [p] Ibid. [q] Lucret. l. 2. v. 333. [r] Laert. 10. 42. [s] Plut. plac. 1. 4. Lactant. Inſtit. 3. 17.

whatsoever can compress an Atom, either as to the whole, or as to its Parts, even to its very Points.

CHAP. VIII.

Of the Gravity (or Weight) and manifold Motions of Atoms.

LAstly, I attribute to Atoms *Gravity*, or Weight; for, whereas they are perpetually in Motion, or striving to move, it is necessary that they be mov'd by that internal Impulse which is called Gravity, or Weight.

There [t] first presents itself to us in the Atoms a twofold Motion, one of the Gravity or Weight itself, whereby the Atom is carried after its own way; the other, by Percussion or Reflection, whereby one Atom, being driven upon another, is beaten back again. And as for the Motion of Gravity or Weight, that Motion is first conceived, whereby the Atom is carried on in a *straight* or perpendicular Line. By this Motion are all heavy things moved. But because if all Atoms should be moved in a straight Line, or downwards, and, as it were, straight on, it should come to pass, that one could never overtake the other; it is therefore necessary, that Atoms should go a little *aside*, the least that may be, that so may be produced the Complications, and Adhesions, and Copulations of Atoms to one another, of which may be made the World, and all the Parts of the World, and all things in it.

When [u] I say, That otherwise the Atoms would not overtake one another, and consequently not meet, the Reason is, That the Universe, being infinite, hath no middle or centre towards which they may tend, and so meet; but only there may be conceived, according to what hath been said, some Region above, out of which, without any Beginning, all Atoms, by their Gravity, would descend like Drops of Rain, that is, by Motions in themselves parallel; the other below, into which all, without any Bound, would be carried by the same Motions.

Motion [w] from Reflection may be understood to be made, as well when the Atom rebounds by great Leaps, as when being impell'd and repell'd within short Spaces, it doth, as it were, quake and tremble. Whence also [x] *it comes to pass, that while it happeneth that the Atoms run into certain Meetings and Complications* of many obviating to, and entangling one another, (which is chiefly done in those Compounds where they seem to rest,) yet then they are still unquiet, and, as much as they can, *and according as they are further from, or nearer to one another, they get an Agitation, or kind of Palpitation, being bent down, or repressed by the rest, which make up that Association.*

The Cause of this not only longer rebounding, but also shorter Agitation, or, as it were, inward Palpitation, continuing still in those Compounds, is partly the Nature of *Vacuum*, which, being intercepted even within the most compact Bodies plucks all the Atoms asunder from one another, either in whole or in part, not having Power to stay or fix them; partly the Solidity connatural to the Atoms, which by Collision and Repercussion cause a trembling, as much as that Complication will suffer that Motion to be kept still continued by the Stroke of the descending Atoms. Now since Weight or Gravity is a certain Vigour, or Energy, as it were ingenerate in Atoms; and, as I said, an Impulsion, whereby they are fitted for Motion, we must therefore take it for certain, *that* [y] *Atoms are moved* (even with both kinds of Motion, of Weight, and Reflection,) *continually, and through all Eternity*, because there is no first instant, since which they began to be made; not only Atoms, but also *Vacuum*, which serves for both Motions, being eternal.

We must also take it for certain, "that [z] that "Motion of Atoms, to which nothing occurs, "which may divert it by beating against it, is of so "great Swiftness as it over-runs any imagi- "nable Space *in a Moment, that is*, in time un- "imaginably short; *for they ought in Velocity to "out-run those Beams of the Sun, which make not "their Course thro' pure Vacuum; I say, to which no- "thing occurs that beats it back*; for otherwise, this fre- "quent Reverberation makes a kind of Slowness, "as want of Reverberation makes a kind of Swift- "ness.

"Yet doth not hereupon the Atom, which suf- "fers several Repulsions, arrive at divers Places in "such times as may be discerned by the Mind, for to "discern those Times is not within the Power of the "Mind. Besides, it may so happen, that the same "Atom, though diverted by several Repulses, may "be so carried, as that from whencesoever it comes, "out of that Immensity of Space, we shall not be "able to assign any Place or Term, which in that "time it hath not over-passed. For the Repercussi- "on may be such, *(that is, so little frequent, and so "little diverting,)* that it may in some measure equal "the Swiftness of that Motion which is free from "Repercussion.

"We must lastly take it for certain, That Atoms "are equally swift, forasmuch as they are carried "through *Vacuum*, neither is there any thing that "resists their Progress: For neither are the heavy "carried on more swiftly than those which are con- "ceived light, seeing nothing occurs that may hin- "der either; nor the lesser more than the greater, "forasmuch as the Passage is equally free to all, ac- "cording to their several Magnitudes. Neither do the

[t] Lucret. l. 2. 217. [u] Ibid. 1. 1069. [w] Plut plac. 1. 12. [x] Laert. 10. 43. [y] Ibid. [z] Ibid. 10. 46. [a] Ibid. [b] Ibid. 10. 43. 61.

" the Motions which are made, either upwards, or " obliquely by Colliſions, or downwards by their na- " tural Gravity, differ in Swiftneſs; ſince an Atom " as long as it is not thruſt on either ſide, ſo long " keeps on its way, and that by a Swiftneſs equal to " Thought, until being driven on, either extrinſical- " ly, or by its own Gravity, it meets with the Re- " ſiſtance or Aſſault of the Atom that ſtrikes it.

" Moreover [c], as concerning compound Bodies, " foraſmuch as Atoms are in their own Nature equal- " ly ſwift, therefore one cannot be ſaid to be ſwifter " than another; as if the Atoms that are in Com- " pounds, and hurried away by the common Moti- " on of them, were carried away, ſometimes into " one Place by a ſenſible Motion, and that continu- " ous, and in ſucceſſive Time, as whilſt ſuch Mo- " tion is ſlow; ſometimes whether into one or more " Places, they ſhould be carried in times ſo ſhort, as " can only be conceived by Reaſon, as when the " Motion is moſt rapid. But we ſhall only ſay, " that which way ſoever the Atoms are carried with " the Compounds, they are all the while exagitated " with inteſtine, moſt frequent, or rather innume- " rable, and therefore not ſenſible, Repercuſſions; " until the Perpetuity or Succeſſion of the Motion of " the whole Body come to be ſuch, as that it may " fall under the reach of Senſe.

" [d] For what we fancy concerning the imperceptible Motion of Atoms, as if Times conceived by " Reaſon might reach the moſt ſwift Succeſſion of " their Parts, is no way true; but rather, whatſo- " ever our Mind, attending to the very Nature of " the thing, apprehends, that is to be eſteemed true.

CHAP. IX.

That Atoms (not the vulgar Elements or Homoiomera's) are the firſt Principles of Things.

THIS premiſed concerning Atoms, we now muſt ſhew how they are the Principles, or firſt Matter of Things: But becauſe that cannot be done without treating at the ſame time of Generation and Corruption; and that cannot be performed, unleſs we firſt ſpeak of the Qualities of Things, and even before that, of the firſt Cauſes which produce theſe; it is ſufficient in this place to take notice, that Atoms are the Principles and firſt Matter of Things, becauſe they are that firſt and moſt ſimple, of which all generated Things are compounded; as alſo the laſt and moſt ſimple, into which all corruptible Things are reſolved.

I ſay, the firſt and the laſt; for beſides other greater Bulks, of which that which is generated may more nearly be compacted, and into which that which is corrupted may be reſolved, there are little Lumps, or certain ſmall thin Compounds, which being made by ſome more perfect and indiſſoluble Coalitions, are, as it were, long durable Seeds of things; ſo that Things may alſo be ſaid to be generated of Seeds, not as of firſt Principles, becauſe even theſe Seeds are generated of Things precedent, that is, of Atoms. And likewiſe Things may be ſaid to be reſolved into Seeds, but not ultimately, becauſe even theſe may ſtill further be diſſolved into Atoms.

In like manner, the four vulgar [e] Elements commonly admitted, Fire, Air, Water, Earth, may be called Principles, but not the firſt. They may alſo be called Matter, but not the firſt Matter; foraſmuch as they have Atoms precedent to them, of which even they themſelves are compounded.

And they who aſſign one [f] Element only for Principle, will, that of it, by Rarefaction and Condenſation, the three other be made, and of theſe afterwards the reſt of things. But how if it be one, and nothing mix'd with it, can any thing be generated? For of Fire (for Inſtance) rarefied, nothing elſe will be produced, but a more languid, or a ſtronger Fire.

And beſides, that they who teach this [g] admit not *Vacuum*, without which, neither Rarefaction nor Condenſation can be made. They ſeem not to obſerve, that Fire cannot be ſaid to be changed by Extinction into ſome other thing; becauſe that which is ſimple cannot be changed, unleſs by going away into nothing. Or at leaſt, if they admit that Something common remains, which is firſt Fire, afterwards Air; ſince this Something is the firſt and common Matter, the firſt Matter is not of itſelf either Fire or Air, but rather thoſe Atoms, which being put together on one Faſhion, may make Fire; being put together after another Faſhion, may make Air.

They who admit [h] many, or all things, to be equally firſt, run moreover into this Inconvenience, that making them contrary to one another, they by conſequence make them ſuch, as either can never join to make one Compound; or, if they do, muſt deſtroy one another.

There was a natural [i] Philoſopher, who conceived that all things are generated of tenuious little Bodies, which he called *Homoiomera's*, *ſimilar*, or *like Parts*, as it were, *viz.* to the things generated; ſo as thoſe (for Example) of which hot things are made, are hot; thoſe of which fleſhy things, fleſhy; thoſe of which bloody things, bloody; and ſo of the reſt. But if Principles were of the ſame Nature with the things generated, they might, as well as they, be altered and loſe their Qualities, and ſo be changed, and being of a ſimple Nature go into nothing.

Not to preſs, that if the [k] things, whereby ſomething is made hot, muſt be hot; as if things alike be

[c] Laert. 62. [d] Ibid. [e] Lucret. l. 1. v. 636. [f] Ibid. 656. [g] Ibid. [h] Ibid. 713. [i] Ibid. 830. [k] Ibid.

not generated but of their like; there must also be things laughing, that a laughing Animal may be made of them; and things weeping, that a weeping Animal; and the like.

CHAP. X.

Of the first and radical Cause of Compounds, that is, of the Agent or Efficient.

IT followeth, that we speak of *Causes*, since to the making of any thing, is necessary, not only Matter, *of which*, but a Cause, *by which*, it may be made: wherefore to say a Cause, is no other, than to say, that which in the Production of a thing is the Agent, or Efficient.

Now of the things that are made, no other first and radical Cause is to be requir'd, than the same Atoms themselves, as they are endued with that Vigour, by which they are moved, or continually tending to Motion. Neither is it absurd to make Matter active: it is rather absurd to make it unactive; because they who make it such, and yet will have all things to be made out of it, cannot say, from whence the things that are made have their efficient Power, since they cannot have it elsewhere than from Matter.

Therefore, as the first little Compounds made up of Atoms have in themselves a certain Energy or Power to move themselves, and to act, consisting of the Vigors of each several Atom, but variously modify'd; as some of them, mutually entangling one another, are carried hither, others thither; so the greater Compounds, made up of the lesser, have some Power also, and that modify'd according to their Variety; and every natural Body, consisting of those greater and lesser Compounds and Atoms, have a particular Energy, or Power of moving themselves and acting, modify'd by a certain Reason. Thus, Motion or Action ascends to, and proceeds from its very Principles.

Yet we must observe, That though all Atoms are moved alike swiftly, yet within the Compounds themselves, those which are more corner'd and hooked, are entangled and hinder'd, and so made as it were more sluggish and dull, than the smoother and rounder. Wherefore the Energy, or Power of acting, which is in compound Bodies, chiefly comes of these. And because those, of which Fire, the Soul, and those which are more generally termed Spirits, consist, are of this Nature; hence it comes, that the chiefest Energy in Bodies is from those very Spirits; which, as they have Liberty of running up and down, so they have also Dominion within those Bodies.

But forasmuch as all [l] Effection, or Action, whereby Something is made, is either from an internal, or external Principle, it is manifest, that artificial Things, whose Nature is sluggish, and merely passive, own all their Production to the efficient or external Agent. But natural Things, although they borrow some Part of themselves, or some Principle of acting, from an extrinsecal Cause; yet they owe their Production to the Principles contained within themselves, as from which intrinsecally, according to all their Parts, they are ordered and co-apted.

Moreover, the very Action of the external Agent is from its own internal Principles, which always so turn and direct the Action, as that it may with greater Strength sustain the Violence of most things. For even in sensitive Creatures, where there is a kind of voluntary Action, it is therefore such, and carried rather this way than that way, because there occurs to the Mind a *Species* inviting it, rather this way than that way; and the Mind, through the Dominion whereby it ruleth the Spirit contained in the Body, leads them this way, and not that way; and together with them, the Members in which they are.

CHAP. XI.

Of Motion, which is the same with Action, or Effection; and of Fortune, Fate, End, and sympathetical and antipathetical Causes.

IN the mean time, I shall not need to make any Excuse, for that I confound the Action or Effection of a Cause with Motion; since it is known, that both of these are one with Motion, and only add the Connotation; and for that it must be terminated to the thing done or effected.

I understand here no other Motion, than that which is Migration from Place to Place, which for the most part is called Lation, and transient Motion, and local Motion. For thus they name it in Distinction from that Motion, which some use to call Mutation and Alteration; that whereby a thing remaining unmoved, according to its internal Nature, is, as they conceive, changed or altered through Acquisition, or Loss of some Quality, as Heat or Cold.

This Mutation or Alteration is not a *Species* of Motion, distinct from that which is called local Motion or Transition. Local Motion or Transition is the *Genus*, this Mutation or Alteration is nothing but a *Species* thereof, to wit, that whereby Moveables are carried through short and undiscernible Intervals. [m] *For whatsoever compound Body is changed according to Quality, is changed altogether by the local and transitive Motion of the Atoms and little Bodies, creating a Quality*; whether they be transposed in Place and Situation in the Body itself, or come into it, or pass out of it.

For

[l] Lucret. 2. 133.

[m] Sext. Emp. adv. Phys. 2.

I

For Example: [n] *That of sweet, something bitter be made; or of white, black; it is requisite, the little Bodies which constitute it be transposed, and one come into the Rank of another. But this could not happen, unless those little Bodies themselves were moved by transient Motion. Again, That of hard, something soft be made; and of soft, hard; it is requisite, those Particles whereof it consists be moved locally, forasmuch as by Extension of them it is soften'd, and by Condensation harden'd; whence the Motion of Mutation is not generically different from the Motion of Transition.*

But to return to that Motion which is proper to the Cause or Efficient, we may observe, that to some Things the Name of Cause is attributed, for that they excite Motion. For *Fortune*, which is a Cause of some Things, can no other way be admitted, than as it is the same with the self-moving and agent Cause, and only denotes Ignorance of the Effect connected with it, and intended by it. Otherwise, so far is it from being fit to make it a Goddess, as the ordinary Sort of Men do, (for by God nothing is done disorderly) that it is not to be esteemed so much as an unstable Cause.

Even *Fate* also is no other than the self-moving Causes that act by themselves, as they are connected among themselves, and the latter depend on the former; albeit this Connection and Dependance be not of that Dependance and Necessity which some natural Philosophers would persuade; for there is no such Necessity in Nature, since the Motion of the Declination of Atoms, of which we already spoke, breaks it off, so as it intercurs neither in a certain Line, nor in a certain Region of Place.

Likewise an *End* is said to be a Cause, forasmuch as it produceth something, or not produceth it, no otherwise than because it moveth. It moveth, I say, by sending a *Species* into the Soul, which draws and allures it by invisible, yet physical little Hooks and Chains, as it were; by which, for the most part, together with the Soul, the Body also is attracted. Certainly no such Attraction can be understood to be made, unless by some Reboundings and Intanglings of Atoms.

Insomuch as even all those things which are said to be done by Sympathy or Antipathy, are perform'd by physical Causes, that is, by some (unseen indeed, but) very small Organs, which intervening, some things are as truly attracted to, or repelled from one another, as those things which are wrought upon by sensible and grosser Organs are attracted and repelled.

For to explain this by an [o] Example: How think we comes it to pass, that a Lion is not able to endure the Sight of a Cock, but as soon as he sees him runs away? unless there are some little Bodies in the Body of the Cock, which being, as in Looking-glasses, immitted into the Eyes of the Lion, so pierce his Eye-balls, and cause so sharp Pain, that he is not able to withstand or endure it, how fierce and furious soever he be. But in our Eyes, those Bodies produce nothing like this, being they are of a different Contexture, as shall be shewed when we come to discourse of the Senses.

CHAP. XII.

Of the Qualities of Compound Things in general.

AS concerning the Qualities belonging to compound Things, it is known, that under this Term are comprehended all, as well Adjuncts as Accidents of Things; but chiefly the Adjuncts, whether they be properly Adjuncts, that is, constantly abiding in a compound Body, as long as it perseveres, and not separable from it without destroying: Or more properly and largely taken, that is, as a Mean between Adjuncts, properly so termed, and Accidents, forasmuch as, like these, they exist in them; but in those they come and go, may be with or from a Body, without the Corruption thereof.

The most obvious Question concerning them, is, How it comes to pass that they are in compound Things, when, as we said before, they are not in Atoms, of which compound Things consist? That they are not in Atoms, is already shewn; forasmuch as every Quality that exists in Atoms, as Magnitude, Figure, and Weight, is so natural to them, that it can no more be changed than the very Substance of the Atoms; and this, because in the Dissolution of compound Things, there must needs remain something solid and undissolved; whence it comes, that all Motions which are made, are neither into nothing, nor out of nothing.

We answer, That Qualities arise in compound Things, as well from the Transposition that is made of the Atoms, now fewer, now more; which in one Position afford one Quality; in another, another; as from the Accession that is made of some Atoms wholly new, and the Discession of some pre-existent. Whence these Qualities again are varied, or seem different from what they were at first.

For as Letters give a divers Representation of themselves, not only those which are of different Figure and Form, as *A* and *N*, but even the same Letters, if their Position or Order be changed; Position, as in *N* and Z; Order, as in *AN*, and *NA*: So, not only Atoms, which are of divers Figures, (as also of different Bulk and Motion) are naturally apt to affect divers Senses; and, in one, to exhibit Colour; in another, Odour; in a third, Sapor; in a fourth, another: But also those which are of the same, if they change the Position or Order among them, affect the Senses in such manner, that those (for

[n] Sext. Emp. adv. Phys. 2.

[o] Lucret. l. 4. v. 714.

(for Example) which now exhibit one Colour, presently exhibit another; as we before inſtanc'd in the Water of the Sea, which, being ſtill, ſeemeth green; troubled, white; and, as is ordinarily inſtanc'd, the Neck of a Pigeon, which, according as it is variouſly placed towards the Light, receiveth a great Variety of Colours.

And as there is made a Diverſity, not only when the ſame Letters which compoſe one Word are ſo tranſpoſed, as that they exhibit divers Forms, but much more, when ſome are added to them, and ſome taken away from them; in like manner it is neceſſary, that Colours, Odours, and other Qualities, be changed, not only when the ſame Atoms change their Poſition and Order, but likewiſe when ſome come to them, ſome depart from them; as is manifeſt from the ſoftning, hardning, crudefaction, ripening of things, and the like.

Briefly, as it is of great Concernment amongſt Letters, with what other Letters they are joined, and in what Poſition and Order they are among themſelves; ſince, by ſo ſmall a Number of Letters, we ſignify the Heaven, the Earth, the Sun, the Sea, Rivers, Fruits, Shrubs, living Creatures, and innumerable ſuch like: So is it of great Concernment amongſt Atoms, with what others they are joined, and in what other Poſition, and in what Intervals and Connections, what Motions amongſt one another they give or receive; foraſmuch as by this means they are able to exhibit the Variety, as of all things, ſo of all Qualities in them.

To ſpeak more particularly: Some Qualities firſt ſeem to ariſe out of Atoms, as conſider'd according to Subſtance; and being in ſuch Poſition amongſt themſelves, as that they have a greater or leſſer *Vacuum* intercepted or excluded. Other Qualities are made of them, as they are endued with their three Properties, ſome from a ſingle Property, others from a Conjuncture of more.

CHAP. XIII.

Qualities from Atoms conſider'd, according to their Subſtance, and Interception of Vacuum.

AND after the firſt manner ariſe *Rarity* and *Denſity*; for it is manifeſt, that no Denſe thing can be made Rare, unleſs the Atoms thereof, or the Parts of which it is compounded, (they themſelves being compounded of Atoms) be ſo put aſunder from one another, that, being diffuſed into a larger Place, they intercept within it more and larger Vacuities. Neither can any thing Rare be made Denſe, unleſs its Atoms or Parts be ſo thruſt up together, as that, being reduced into a narrower Place, they comprehend it in fewer, or more contracted Vacuities. Moreover it is manifeſt, that, according to the more or leſſer Vacuity which is intercepted, the Air (for Example) or Light is ſaid to be Rare; but a Stone, Iron, and the like, ſaid to be Denſe.

Together with theſe ſeem to ariſe *Perſpicuity* and *Opacity*; for every thing is ſo much more perſpicuous (other Reſpects being equal) by how more it is too Rare; ſo much more opacous, by how much it is more Denſe: Becauſe the more Rare is the more patent to lucid and viſible Beams; the more Denſe, the more obſtructive of them. But I ſay, (other Reſpects being equal) a more thick Body, as Glaſs, may have little vacuous Paſſages placed in ſo ſtraight a Line, that the Beams may paſs more eaſily thro' it, than through a rarer Body; as a Leaf of Colewort, whoſe ſmall Pores are peſter'd with little Bodies variouſly permix'd; even the Beams themſelves are cut off, unleſs they paſs through ſtraight Holes, ſuch as are in Glaſs.

Again, there ariſeth alſo *Fluidity*, *Liquidity*, and *Firmneſs*: For a Body ſeemeth to be fluid for no other Reaſon, than becauſe the Atoms, or Parts whereof it conſiſts, have little Vacuities lodg'd within them, and are withal ſo diſſociated from one another, as that they are eaſily moveable, one in order to another, through the Non-reſiſtance of the little Vacuities. Neither doth any thing ſeem to be firm from any other Cauſe than the contrary hereof; that is, the Atoms and Parts touch one another ſo cloſely, and are ſo coherent to one another, that for the ſame Reaſon they cannot be moved out of their Situation; for ſuch Atoms there may be, as, being more hooked, and as it were more branching, may hold the Body more cloſely compacted. How Water, in particular, being liquid, becomes harden'd into Ice, ſhall be ſaid hereafter.

Likewiſe thoſe Qualities which depend of theſe, *Humidity* and *Siccity*. *Humidity* is a kind of Fluidneſs; only it ſuperadds this, That the Parts of a humid Thing, touching ſome Body, or penetrating into it, are apt to ſtick to it, thereby rendring it moiſt. *Siccity* is a kind of Firmneſs, adding only this, That a dry Body is void of Humidity.

Moreover, *Softneſs* and *Hardneſs*, which cohere with theſe, and, upon another Account, agree alſo with Rarity and Denſity; inaſmuch as (other Reſpects being equal) every Body is ſo much the more ſoft, by how much the more rare; and ſo much the more hard, by how much the more compact; I ſay (other Reſpects being equal) becauſe Dirt is ſoft, and a Pumice hard, by reaſon of the greater Coheſion of the Parts, which peſter the Cavities, and reſiſt the Touch, and cannot retire into the hindermoſt Cavities, as otherwiſe they would.

There are others which depend upon theſe; as, *Flexility*, *Tactility*, *Ductility*, and others, from Softneſs; their Oppoſites, from Hardneſs: but 'tis enough to have hinted them.

CHAP.

CHAP. XIV.

Qualities ſpringing from Atoms, conſidered according to the Properties peculiar to each.

IN the ſecond Manner, and as far as the Properties of Atoms are conſidered particularly: In the firſt place, the Magnitude, Quantity, or Bulk of every Thing ariſeth no other way than from the coacervate Magnitude of the Atoms of which it is compounded. Whence it is manifeſt, that *Augmentation* and *Diminution* of Bodies is therefore made, becauſe Atoms, whereſoever they arrive, give to the Things an Increaſe; whereſoever they go away, they diminiſh them.

Not to mention, that according as the Atoms are greater or leſſer, may be made that which we call *Bluntneſs* or *Acuteneſs*. And thence a Reaſon may be given, why the Fire of Lightning is more penetrative than that of a Taper: Or how it comes, that Light paſſeth through Horn, which reſiſts Rain, and the like.

Beſides, the very Figure of Things, though it did not depend upon the Figure of Atoms, (whereas it ſeems to depend upon them, in all Things which are conſtantly produced in the ſame Figure) yet it is generally at leaſt true, that every Body is therefore figured, becauſe it conſiſts of Parts terminate and figurate; for Figure is a Term, or Bound.

Thus, though out of Smoothneſs, and Roughneſs, (which, as I ſaid, are allied to the Figure of Atoms) it doth not neceſſarily follow, that Things ſmooth are made of ſmooth, rough Things of rough: Yet in general, nothing can be conceived to to be ſmooth, but whoſe Parts to the leaſt of them are ſmooth; nor rough, but whoſe Parts are rough.

Here obſerve, that as well from the Figure, as from the Magnitude, the Reaſon may be given, why Wine floweth eaſily through a Strainer; but Oil more ſlowly, which is, that the Oil may conſiſt not of greater Atoms only, but alſo of more hooked and much intangled among themſelves.

Laſtly, *Weight*, or the Motive Faculty which is in every Thing, can riſe no other Way than from the Weight or Mobility of Atoms. But that being declared formerly, we ſhall here only obſerve, that all Atoms are heavy, and none light; wherefore every compound Body is heavy, there is none that is light; or that is not of itſelf ready to tend downwards. Here preſently comes in Fire for an Objection; but although it foregoeth not its Propenſion downwards, yet it therefore tendeth upwards; foraſmuch as it is driven that way by the ambient Air: After the ſame manner as we ſee with great Force the Water reſiſt Logs and Beams, Things otherwiſe heavy; and the deeper we plunge them, the more eagerly it caſts them up, and ſends them back. Whence it comes that thoſe Things, which we call light, are not abſolutely light; as if, of their own accord, they did tend upwards, but only comparatively, that is, as they are leſs heavy, and extruded by the more heavy, which preſs themſelves down before them. So as Earth being the moſt heavy, Water leſs heavy, Air yet leſs heavy than that, and Fire leaſt of all; the Earth drives the Water upwards, and far from the Middle; Water the Air; Air the Fire: But if we ſuppoſe the Earth to be taken away, the Water will come to the Middle; if the Water, the Air; if the Air, the Fire.

CHAP. XV.

Qualities from Atoms, conſidered according to their Properties taken together.

BUT Properties of Atoms being taken together, and thoſe things eſpecially of which we have hitherto ſpoken, Rarity, Denſity, and the reſt, being commixt and varied, there ariſe Faculties of Things, which being active and motive, have it from the Weight and Mobility of the Atoms: And whereas ſome act one way, ſome another, they muſt of neceſſity have it, as well from the peculiar Magnitude and Figure of the Atoms, as from their various Order and Poſition amongſt themſelves, as from their Looſeneſs, Compactedneſs, Connection, Sejunction, *&c.*

Of this kind, are not only in Animals, the Faculties of Senſe, Sight, Hearing, Smelling, Taſting, Touching, wherewith they can perceive ſenſible things; but alſo, in the things themſelves thoſe very Qualities which are called ſenſible. Theſe are, in Things, the Faculties of ſtriking, and affecting the Senſes, after a certain manner, to the end they may be perceived by them; as Colour and Light, the Sight; Sound, the Hearing; Odor, the Smell; Sapor, the Taſte; Heat and Cold (above the reſt) the Touch. Whence it comes, that being to ſpeak of thoſe hereafter, we ought not here to omit theſe: To treat of which will be worth our Pains.

To begin from Heat: We cannot treat of it, without joining Light to it, for without Light there are no Colours, the Variety of Colours being taken away by Night; whence in the Infernal Region, all things are ſaid to be black. But though in Darkneſs, all things are alike diſcolour'd, nevertheleſs, in themſelves, or in their Superficies, there are Diſpoſitions of extreme Particles, by reaſon of which the affuſed Light is ſo variouſly modify'd, that, together with this Modification reflected on the Eye, it exhibits various Colours in the Eye; as white, for Example, when the Ball receiveth into itſelf one kind of Blow or Stroke; black, when another, *&c.*

For though Colours are not coherent to Bodies, but generated according to ſome reſpective Sites, Orders, and Poſitions, yet are they not generated, unleſs

leſs Light alſo be adjoined to the Diſpoſure of their Superficies, to compleat or make up the perfect Nature of Colour. Neither, ſetting this aſide, do I ſee how it can be ſaid, that Bodies which are in the dark inviſible, have Colour.

And indeed, ſince not only a Pigeon's Neck, a Peacock's Train, and the like, exhibit ſeveral Colours, according to their ſeveral Poſitions to the Light; but alſo even all other things appear ſometimes in ſome Colours, ſometimes in others, according as they are placed in ſeveral Degrees of Light, what elſe ſhould we conceive, but that generally it is Light, by whoſe coming things put on Colours, and by its Departure loſe them.

In the mean time, Light itſelf, being nothing elſe but a ſubſtantial Effluxion from a lucid Body, is not viſible of itſelf, but only in Colour, as that is a Part of it; for neither is it ſeen through a pure or liquid Medium; neither when we imagine that we ſee it, either in a lucid or an illuminate Body, is it beheld as a thing diſtinct from the Colour of the thing lucid or illuminate. In fine, neither is Shadow (the Privation thereof) in any other manner, than as becauſe it is withal the Privation of Colour in a thing ſhadowed, which loſeth Colour always by the ſame Proportion as it loſeth the Light. How it comes to paſs, that Shadow, though it be a mere Privation, yet ſeems to be moved, was declared in the Canonick.

[p] *Sound* is nothing but an Effluxion of tenuious little Bodies, ſent out from the Thing ſpeaking, ſounding, or what way ſoever making a Noiſe, and apt, by entring into the Ear, to affect the Hearing.

That it is a corporeal Effluxion, is proved, in that it moveth the Senſe, and that either by touching it ſmoothly and delightfully, or roughly and unpleaſantly, according to the Smoothneſs or Roughneſs of the little Bodies. Alſo in that it is moved through the Air, and being driven againſt ſolid Bodies, leaps back, whence Eccho is made, *viz.* by Reaſon of the Solidity of the little Bodies. Alſo in that it is diminiſhed, and becomes confuſed, in regard of the long Train of little Bodies, when it goes forward, or their ſwerving while they go overthwart, through ſome thicker Partition, and the like.

If you demand, why Sound can paſs, where Light and the Species of Colour cannot, as when we ſpeak, the Doors being ſhut; the Reaſon is, becauſe Light, or the Images of Colour, cannot paſs but in a direct Line; but Sound can inſinuate itſelf thro' oblique Tracks. For being excited, it leaps forward in little Bodies which turn upwards, downwards, forwards, backwards, on the right Side, and every Way; in like manner as a Spark of Fire ſometimes ſcatters itſelf into little Sparkles, which take a direct Courſe towards all ſides.

The ſame may be ſaid of *Odor*. For this alſo is an Effluxion, which going out of the odorous thing, is diffuſed every way, and, arriving at the Noſtrils, moveth the Senſe of Smelling, either by ſtroking, or pricking it. This is corporeal alſo, even more than Sound, in that it paſſeth more ſlowly through Space, and cometh not from ſo great a Diſtance, and penetrates not through thoſe Partitions, through which Sound doth penetrate.

As concerning *Sapor*, there is this Difference, that tho' it conſiſt in little Bodies, contained in the thing ſtil'd ſapid; yet they iſſue not forth into the Tongue and Palate at a Diſtance; but then only, when the thing ſapid is applied to the Tongue, they ſo inſinuate themſelves into it, that they affect the Contexture of it, either mildly, and then make a ſweet Taſte; or roughly, and ſo they make a ſowre Taſte.

As for *Heat* and *Cold*, that Senſation which they cauſe, is to be referred to the *Touch*. But though many of the foreſaid Qualities properly appertain to the Touch, as Hardneſs, Softneſs, Humidity, Siccity, and the reſt, which require Application of the Thing touched to the Hand, or to ſome other part of the Body; yet, theſe too may be felt, not only when the hot or cold thing is applied to the Hand, or ſome other part; but alſo when it is remote, and at ſuch a Diſtance as it can tranſmit ſome little Bodies out of itſelf into it.

Heat indeed is chiefly an Effluxion of little Bodies or Atoms, in Bulk ſlender, in Figure round, in Motion ſwift. For as they are ſlender, there is no Body compacted, that they find not little Pores, through which they inſinuate into it; as they are round, they are eaſily moved, and inſinuate themſelves every where; as they are ſwift, they rapidly are impelled, and enter into the Body, and more and more ſtill ſucceeding one another, they are ſo preſſed, as that they penetrate thro' the whole; and if they proceed in acting, they ſever and diſlocate the parts thereof, and at laſt diſſolve the whole. Such the Effects of Heat, and chiefly the fiery, (for Fire is nothing but intenſe Heat) towards all Bodies, and in a living Creature is only added the Senſe of Heat, which is from the plucking aſunder, and looſening what before was continued.

Cold is an Effluxion alſo, but of Atoms, whoſe Bulk is greater, their Figure more corner'd, their Motion ſlower; for, the Effects being contrary, the Principles muſt alſo be contrary. So that whereas Heat diſgregates and diſperſes, Cold compreſſeth and conſtipates: And in a ſenſitive Creature, it doth this with a particular kind of Senſation; for, entring into the Pores of the Skin, it keeps back, and drives in again the little Bodies of Heat, by oppoſing the Bodies of Cold, and with its little ſharp Corners, it tears and twingeth all things whereſoever it paſſes.

CHAP.

[p] Lucret. lib. 4. 527.

CHAP. XVI.

Of those Qualities which are esteemed the Accidents of Things; and particularly of Time.

IT remains, that we a little touch those Qualities which are not so much Adjuncts as Accidents, and therefore affect not the thing internally, but externally only, and qualify them with a certain kind of respect to some extrinsecal thing. Not but that within the things themselves also there are some Accidents (such are Position, Order, Intervals of Parts or Particles, and the like) but that being such, they are Accidents of the Parts themselves, not of the whole, which consists of them.

Accidents of this kind, are all those generally out of which ariseth some Relation, for which every thing is said to be such or such, in order to another; as like, unlike; greater, lesser; many, few; superior, inferior; right, left; cause, effect; giving, receiving, and innumerable of the same kind.

But it is known, that Relation is a Work of the Mind, referring and comparing one to another; so that, setting aside the Mind, every thing is that only which it is in itself, but not that which it is in respect of another. Whence, to Accidents we formerly referred Liberty and Health, Riches and Poverty, *&c.* because, setting the Mind aside, a Man is nothing but a Man; not free or subject, rich or poor, *&c.*

Now of all Accidents, there is one which may be termed the *Accident of Accidents*, that is *Time*, from which all things are denominated, either present or past or future, lasting or little, durable or momentary, sometimes also swift or slow.

For first, that Time is an Accident, is manifest in that it is not any thing by itself, but only attributed to things by Cogitation, or the Mind, as they are conceived to persevere in the State in which they are, or to cease to be, and to have a longer or shorter Existence, and to have it, or to have had it, or be to have it. Whence it comes, that [q] *Time is not to be enquired after the same manner as we enquire after other things, which are in some Subject, setting aside the Mind; and therefore, neither to understand what it is, must it be referred to the Prænotions of Things which occur to our Sight; but we ought to discourse of it according to Evidence, using familiar Speech:* And not entangling ourselves in Circumlocutions, we say, Time is long or short.

Moreover, we call it the *Accident of Accidents*; because, whereas some things cohere by themselves as a Body, and as a *Vacuum* or Space; others happen, or are accident to the Coherent, as Days, Nights, Hours; as also Passions and Exemptions from them, as Motion, Rest, *&c.* Time, by the Assistance of the Mind, presupposeth all these Accidents, and supervenes to them.

For Day and Night are Accidents of the ambient Air; Day happens by the Sun's Illumination; Night by Privation of the solar Illumination. Hour being a part of Night or Day, is an Accident of the Air also, as likewise are Night and Day; but Time is co-extended with every Day, and Night, and Hour; and for this Reason a Day or Night is said to be long or short, whilst we are carried by Thought to Time that supervenes to them according to the former Notions.

In the same manner happen Passions, and Indolencies, and Griefs, and Pleasures to us; and therefore they are not Substances, but Accidents of those things which are affected by them; to wit, by Sense of Delectation, or of Trouble. But these Accidents happen not without Time.

Moreover, the Motion and Rest, as we have always declared, are Accidents of Bodies, neither are they without Time; wherefore we measure the Swiftness and Slowness of Motion by Time, as also much or little Rest. And forasmuch as none understand Time by itself, or separate from the Motion and Rest of things; therefore by understanding things done, as the *Trojan* War, and the like, which are done with Motion, and are Accidents partly of the Men acting, partly of the Places in which they are acted; together with them is understood their Time, as they are compared to our Affairs, and the Existence of the things intervening betwixt those and us.

CHAP. XVII.

Of the Generation and Corruption of Compounds.

IT remains that we add, how things are *generated* and *corrupted*; either of which is some kind of Mutation or Alteration. But whereas by other Mutations, a Body is not made and exists new; but only that which now is, acquires a new Quality, and a new Denomination from it; *Generation* is a Mutation, whereby every Body is first produced, and begins in Nature to be, and to be denominated such. *Corruption* is a Mutation, whereby it is at last dissolved, and ceases to be in Nature, and to be denominated such; for thus Fire, a Plant, an Animal, and whatsoever is in a determinate *Genus* of Bodies, when it first ariseth into the Light, and beginneth to be denominated such, is said to be *generated*; when it goeth out of the Light, and can no longer be denominated such, to be *corrupted*.

When I say, that a Body is first produced, or beginneth to be, I mean not, but that whatsoever is in it of Substance, Body, or corporeal, was before; for all the Atoms, and little Bulks or Seeds, of which it is compounded, were before. As when a House is said to be made, the Stones, Wood, and the

[q] Laert.

reſt whereof it is ſaid to be built, are underſtood to be pre-exiſtent. But I only mean, that the Atoms and Seeds thereof are ſo commixt, and ſo united, as that they are in a new Manner, or in a new Form, wherein they were not before; and therefore a Body reſulting thence, then firſt begins to be, and be denominated ſuch.

Hence, becauſe there ariſeth not ſo much a new Subſtance, as a new Quality in Compounds, it cometh to paſs, that Generation is a *Species* of Mutation or Alteration; and ſo is Corruption likewiſe, but in a contrary manner. Wherefore alſo it comes to paſs, that Generation and Corruption are performed only by conjoining and disjoining thoſe Principles, and not by changing them, becauſe the Atoms, as we ſaid, are incapable of Change.

"And indeed,* ſeeing all change, (as we have al-
"ready ſaid, and ſhall ſhortly ſay again,) is per-
"form'd either by Tranſpoſition, adding, or taking
"away of Parts; it followeth, that Atoms, being ſo
"compact and ſolid, as that none of their Particles
"can be tranſpoſed, added, or taken away, are im-
"mutable and incorruptible, and ſuch alſo are their
"Properties; of which ſort are thoſe little Mag-
"nitudes, and little Figures peculiar to them; for it
"is neceſſary that theſe alſo remain with the Sub-
"ſtance of the Atoms when the Compounds are diſ-
"ſolved; and with good reaſon, ſeeing that alſo in
"things which we transform at our Pleaſure, as when
"a Man, of ſtanding or upright, becomes ſitting,
"or bowed, (or, if you will, is made black or hot,)
"it is ever underſtood, that the ſame Magnitude,
"Figure, and Order of Parts are in them.

"But the Qualities that are not in them, or pro-
"per to them, as ſtanding, ſtraightneſs, white,
"cold, *&c.* remain not in the Subject, after its
"Tranſmutation, as the others do, but periſh, or
"are loſt to the whole Body, or to the part wherein
"they were."

Since therefore Principles are intranſmutable, and, in Generation are no other than mingled and put together, it follows that no ſuch Mixture can be made, as is a perfect Confuſion by Coalition, but only that which is a compounding by Appoſition; and this, whether thoſe little Bulks made up of Atoms are only mingled, or whether alſo the Atoms themſelves be mingled with thoſe little Bulks reſolved into their Atoms, or firſt Principles; whence it follows that the Deſtruction of thoſe little Bulks, and of the Bodies conſiſting of them, as Wine, and Water, Honey, and the like, goeth accompanied with the Generation of the mixt Body, and of the other little Bulks, which are proper to it; not as if Water and Wine, (for Example) but as if aquifying and vinifying Atoms (as I may ſay) were mingled together.

And to the Generation, which is made in an infinite *Vacuum*, we muſt conceive, that the Atoms ſevered from one another, and differing amongſt themſelves in Figure, Magnitude, Poſition and Order, are carried thro' the *Vacuum*, and, where they concur, being mutually entangled, are condens'd; whence it happens, that a different Temperature of the thing reſults; for they are conjoined according to Proportion of Magnitude, Figures, Poſitions, Order, and by this means the Generation of compound things comes to be perfected.

But where the Generation of one is made out of the Corruption of another, that uſually happens after a threefold manner, which we touched, ſpeaking of Alteration; either only by *Tranſpoſition* of the Parts or Atoms, as when a Frog is generated of Dirt, a Mite of Cheeſe; or by *Addition* of Things acceſſory, as when, by Acceſſion of the Seed to a greater Maſs, (as of Rennet into Milk, or of Leaven into Dough) there is begotten a Plant or Animal; after which manner alſo Augmentation is made, by which the generated thing becomes bigger: Or laſtly, by *taking away* ſomething pre-exiſtent, as when Fire is generated by the ſevering of watery, aſhy, or other Parts which were in Wood; Wax, by the ſevering of Honey which was in the Comb; and ſo of the reſt.

Here the former Compariſon of Letters will ſerve to make us underſtand two things. One, that the particular Manners of Generation, and their oppoſite Corruptions, which may be comprehended under any of theſe three manners, are (if not infinite, at leaſt) innumerable, inexpreſſible, and incomprehenſible, ſince of four and twenty Letters only, which are in the Alphabet, there may be produced a Multitude of Words almoſt incomprehenſible.

The other is, that as Words, accommodated to Pronunciation and Reaſon, are not made of every Combination of Letters; ſo in natural things, all things are not made of all things; nor are all Atoms fit, by being joined together, to conſtitute any *Species* of compound things. For every thing requires ſuch a Diſpoſition, as that the Atoms conſtituting it match, and, as it were, aſſociate themſelves with thoſe which are agreeable to them, but paſs by, and, as it were reject others. Whence again it comes to paſs, that when a thing is diſſolved, all the agreeing Atoms draw from one another mutually, and diſengage themſelves from thoſe which are diſagreeing. This is manifeſtly ſeen in Nutrition, which is Aggeneration, and is evident even from this, that otherwiſe Monſters would be ordinarily generated, as half Men, half Beaſts; Chimera's, and Zoophyts.

In a word, certainly he never had the leaſt Taſte of Phyſiology, who conceiveth, that any thing which is generated can be eternal; for what Compoſition is there which is not diſſolvable? Or what is there that hath a Beginning and no End? Though there were no external Cauſes to deſtroy its Frame,

yet

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* Laert. 10. 54.

yet wants there not an inteſtine Motion, and, even within the moſt compact and durable Bodies, an unvanquiſhable Inclination of Atoms downwards, whence their Diſſolution muſt neceſſarily follow.

Yet, this Diſſolution is not always immediately made into Atoms, but, for the moſt part, into little Bulks, or parts compounded of them; which are certain kinds of compound Bodies, as when there is a Diſſolution of Wood, partly into Fire, partly into Smoke, partly into ſome wateriſh Moiſture, partly into Aſhes. But what way ſoever it be done, we muſt always hold, that in Generation there is no new Subſtance made, but præ-exiſtent Subſtances are made up into one; ſo in Corruption, no Subſtance abſolutely ceaſeth to be, but is diſſipated into more Subſtances, which remain after the Deſtruction of the former.

CHAP. XVIII.

Whence it comes, that a generated Body is in a certain kind of things, and diſtinguiſhed from other things.

MOreover, ſeeing that every Body is generated only of the Aggregation of Matter, or of material and ſubſtantial Principles, knitting together in a certain Order and Poſition; therefore, that which is concrete or generated, is underſtood to be nothing elſe but the Principles themſelves, as they are knit together in ſuch an Order or Poſition, and thereupon are exhibited in ſuch a Form or Quality.

This Form or Quality, whereby a thing generate is eſtabliſhed in ſuch a certain kind of things, as of Metal, or of Stone, or of Plant, or of Animal, and is diſtinguiſhed from all the *Species* and *Individuums* of the *Genus* wherein it is; this Form, I ſay, is not one and ſimple, but rather, as it were, an Aggregation and Collection of many, which Collection cannot be found in any thing but in this.

"Wherefore [a] we muſt here obſerve, that the Figures of things, their Colours, Magnitude, Gravity, and (in a word) all other Qualities which are uſually predicated of a compound Body, as its Accidents, whether perceived by Sight, or by other (Senſes) are ſo to be underſtood; not as if they were certain Natures or Subſtances, exiſtent by themſelves, (for our Underſtanding cannot reach this;) nor, on the other ſide, as if truly they did not exiſt, or were abſolutely nothing; neither again, as if they were ſuch, as are thoſe other incorporeal things which are accident to it; nor, laſtly, as if they were Parts of the Body. But they are thus to be eſteemed, that whereas a Body may be diſpoſed after ſeveral manners, the whole Complex gains, by the Aggregation of them, a certain Nature proper and peculiar to its kind.

"Not that a Body comes to be ſuch, as is a greater Bulk made up out of a leſſer, whether thoſe be the firſt, leaſt, greateſt, or in general made up of others more minute; but only, as I ſaid, that of all theſe joined together, and by this Conjunction differencing it from others, it poſſeſſes a Nature proper to itſelf, and diſtinct from any other.

"All theſe are comprehended by certain ſpecial Notions and Conceptions, but ſo, that ſtill the Body which reſults out of them as a certain Whole, and is not divided in itſelf, but conceived as one undivided thing, obtains the Denomination of a Body, which is reckon'd up in ſuch a certain kind of things."

The ſame may, in a manner, be conceived to happen, by the Concurrence of certain Accidents, which are found the ſame in no other Body; that is, the things indeed to which thoſe Accidents agree, may be diſtinguiſhed and denominated from the Notions of them, but yet only then, when each of thoſe Accidents is conceived to be there: For theſe are not of that kind of Accidents, which, exiſting in the thing, become therefore neceſſarily and perpetually conjoin'd to it, and conſequently beſtow on it a perpetual Denomination.

Here it may be demanded, Whether, if we were diſſolved by Death, it might happen, in Proceſs of Time, that the very ſame Principles, of which we conſiſt, might, by ſome odd Chance, be ranged and ordered again in the ſame manner as they are now; and ſo we come to be denominated the ſame which we are at this preſent? To which we anſwer, That it is doubtleſly true, but ſtill ſo, that to have been formerly would nothing appertain to us, becauſe in our very Diſſolution, every Diſpoſition which we had, and all Memory of thoſe things which compounded us, and which we were, would utterly be loſt; by which means, all our Remembrance too would ſo have been totally decay'd, that it were impoſſible it ſhould come into our Minds that we had ever had a Being. Thus much concerning the Univerſe.

SECT. II.

Of the World.

IT followeth, that we ſpeak of the World, which is a Portion of the Univerſe, or Infinity of things, and may not unfitly be deſcribed, *The whole Circumference of Heaven, containing the Stars the Earth, and all things viſible.*

When I ſay, the *Circumference of Heaven*, I imply, that Heaven is the outmoſt Part of the World, which may alſo be called *Æther*, and the Region of Fire, from the Stars which it containeth, and are, as it were, Fires lighted there.

[a] Laert. 10. 55.

When I say the *Earth*, I mean the lowest, or, as it were, the middle Part of the World, in which also there is the Water, and next over it the Air, immediate to the Region of Fire. And because the things which we see created of these, and in these, are various, therefore we comprehend them under the Name of *things visible*.

But seeing it may, and useth to be demanded concerning the World, What Form it hath within, what Figure without? Whether it be Eternal, or had a Beginning? Whether it require any other Author than Nature or Fortune? In what manner was the Production of the Whole, and of its Parts? Whether it require any Ruler, or perform its Vicissitudes by itself? Whether, How, and When it shall perish? Whether it be One, or, besides it, there be Innumerable? We must therefore speak a little of each.

CHAP. I.

Of the Form and Figure of the World.

AND, as to the first Head, the World, by its internal Form or Constitution, is not animate, much less a God, as some think; but whereas what is conceived to be one in its Form or Constitution, is such, either for that its Parts are contained under one Disposition, as a Plant or Animal; or, that they are artificially joined one to another, without mingling their Tempers, as a House, or Ship; or, that they are discretely distinguish'd from one another, yet have some mutual Relation to each other, as an Army and a Commonwealth; the World is only to be conceived one, partly the second way, partly the third.

The second way it may be esteemed one, in regard between the Sun, the Moon, and the rest of the more solid and compacted Parts of the World, there is intercepted either Air or *Æther* diffusive, whereby a kind of Coherence is made. It may also be esteemed one the third way, in regard the Sun, Moon, Earth, and other compacted Bodies, are so separated from one another, that, after a determinate Order, they possess the Situations or Seats of Superiors and Inferiors, Antecedents and Consequents, Things Illustrating and Things Illustrated.

But to say, that the World is one the first way also, How can it be made good? Since that if it were so, that the World, as some will, were animate, nothing could be thought inanimate; not a Stone, not a Carcass, not any thing whatsoever; that same Disposition, called Soul, being diffused through all things.

Neither do they, who assert the World to be animate and wise, sufficiently mind and understand, what kind of Nature that must be to which such Expressions are proper, since as a Tree is not produced in the Air, nor a Fish on dry Ground, nor Blood in Wood, nor Moisture in a Pumice; so neither can the Mind or the Soul be produced, or be, indifferently, in any kind of Body. But seeing it must be determinately ordered where every thing shall grow and inexist, the Nature of the Soul must be looked for about the Nerves and Blood, not in putrid Globes of Earth, in Water, in the Sun, in the Sky, &c.

Now whereas some hold, That the World is not only endued with Mind and Senses, but that also it is a round burning God, and ever moving with restless Circumvolutions; these are Prodigies and Monsters, not of Philosophers discoursing, but dreaming. For who can understand, what this ever-moving and round God is, and what Life is ascribed to him, to be turned about with so great Swiftness, as is unimaginable to be equall'd? With which I see not how a constant Mind and a happy Life can consist.

But granting the World to be a God, not only the Sun, Moon, and the rest, are Parts of God, but even the Earth itself, as being a part of the World, must be also a Part of God. Now we see, there are very great Regions of the Earth uninhabitable, and uncultivated, part of them being burnt up by the Approach of the Sun, part being oppressed with Snow and Ice through his Distance from it. If then the World be God, these, being the Parts of the World, are to be termed, some, the burning; some, the frozen Members of God.

As to its external Form or Figure, it seems, in the first Place, certain, that there is some Extremity of the World, because the World is a kind of Segment of the infinite Universe; but what that is, who is able to tell, unless he came thence?

For whereas it seems to be Heaven, there is nothing in all apparent things hinders, but that it may be Rare, nor nothing hinders but that it may be Dense; Rare, forasmuch as the Stars which are in it, and appear to be moved, perform their Motions through it; Dense, forasmuch as itself is able to move the Stars fixed in it.

Again, nothing hinders but that it may be either quiescent, if the Stars are moved through it; or circularly moved, if the Stars are carried round about with it.

Besides, nothing hinders but that it may be round, oval, or lenticular, especially if it be moved. Again, nothing hinders but that it may be triangular, pyramidal, square, hexædrical, or of any other plain Figure, especially if it be unmoved.

As for them, who, being persuaded by some Arguments, assert the World so to have one determinate Figure, as that it can have no other, we cannot but wonder at their Stupidity. For most maintain the World to be, as immortal and blessed, so also round, because *Plato* denieth any Figure to be more beautiful than that. But, to me, that of the Cylinder, or the Square, or the Cone, or the Pyramid,

ramid, ſeem, by reaſon of the Variety, more beautiful.

CHAP. II.

Of the late Beginning of the World.

AS for the ſecond Head. The World is not Eternal, but began to be at ſome time.

For firſt, ſeeing that the Nature of the Whole and of the Parts is the ſame; and we obſerve that the Parts of the World are obnoxious both to Generation and Corruption, it follows, That the whole World muſt be ſubject to Generation and Corruption. That the Parts of the World are generated and corrupted, is demonſtrated even by the Senſe, and ſhall be proved hereafter.

Neither let any ſay, that the Mutations which are made in the Parts of the World are not of the more principal Parts, as of the Sun, the Moon, the Earth, and the reſt; but of the leſſer only which are but Particles, whereof the Principal conſiſt; for he ought to conceive, that if the principal Parts conſiſt of Parts ſubject to Mutation, thoſe whole Parts themſelves are ſubject to Mutation; and though ordinarily there occur not Cauſes ſo powerful as to change them, nevertheleſs nothing hinders, but that ſuch may ſometimes occur; as even among the leſſer Parts, ſome continue ſafe a great while, which, at laſt, in Progreſs of Time, find Cauſes of Mutation.

Beſides, ſeeing that the moſt antient Hiſtories of all Things exceed not the *Theban* and *Trojan* Wars, what is the Reaſon of this, but becauſe the World is not old, ſo far is it from being eternal? For if eternal, why did not other Poets celebrate other things? How came the memorable Acts of ſo many eminent Perſons to periſh? Why are the Records of eternal Fame no where extant?

In like manner, ſeeing that we have all Arts newly invented, and their Inventors are not unknown, (for, that daily many Arts are advanced and receive Increaſe, is very manifeſt,) how comes this to paſs, but becauſe the World had not its Beginning long ago? For the World could not be ſo long without Arts, which are of ſo great Importance to Life.

If you believe that in Times paſt there were ſuch Records and Arts as now, which periſhed by ſome great Conflagrations, Deluges, Earthquakes, being ſubverted, together with the Cities and Nations themſelves, do you not acknowledge it neceſſary, that there muſt be at ſome time to come a Deſtruction of Earth and Heaven, as it had happen'd, if in thoſe Caſes ſome greater Cauſes had lighted? For we ourſelves think ourſelves mortal, for no other Reaſon, but for that we perceive ourſelves to fall into the ſame Diſeaſes as they whom we ſee die.

The World therefore had a Beginning; nor was, as may appear by what we ſaid, of very great Antiquity. But whenſoever it begun, it is moſt probable it begun in the Spring, becauſe then all things ſprout, flouriſh, and bring forth; and the Newneſs of the World required a temperate Heat and Cold for the cheriſhing of its young Brood, before it ſhould paſs to either of the Extremes.

CHAP. III.

Of the Cauſe of the World.

AS to the next Head, we muſt firſt acquit the divine Power from the Solicitude and Labour of framing the World, for it could not be a Cauſe bleſſed and immortal that made it.

With what Eyes could *Plato* look upon the Fabrick of ſo great a Work, as to conceive the World made and built by God? What Deſigns, What Tools, What Beams, What Engines, What Miniſters, in ſo great a Task? How could Air, Fire, Water, Earth, obey and ſerve the Will of the Architect? Whence ſprung thoſe five Forms, of which the reſt alſo are framed, lighting aptly to make up Mind and Senſes? It were too long to repeat all, which are rather in our Wiſh, than in our Power to find out.

Again, this God, of whom he ſpeaks, either was not in the former Age, wherein Bodies were either immoveable, or moved without any Order; or he then ſlept or wak'd; or did neither. The firſt cannot be admitted, for God is Eternal; nor the ſecond, for if he ſlept from Eternity he was dead, Death being an eternal Sleep. But neither is God capable of Sleep, for the Immortality of God, and a thing near Death, are far aſunder. Now if he were awake, either ſomething was wanting to his Felicity, or he was perfectly happy. But the firſt would not allow him to be happy; for he is not happy who wants any thing to make up his Felicity: The latter is abſurd, for 'twere a vain Action for him who wants nothing, to trouble himſelf with making any thing.

To what End then, ſhould God deſire to adorn the World with fair Figures and Luminaries, as one that dreſſeth and ſets out a Temple? If, to the End that he might better his Habitation, it ſeems then, that for an infinite time before, he lived in Darkneſs as in a Dungeon. Again, can we think, that afterwards he was delighted with the Variety wherewith we ſee the Heaven and the Earth adorned? What Delight can that be to God, which, were it ſuch, he could not ſo long have wanted it?

But ſome will ſay, That theſe were ordained by God for the ſake of Men. Do they mean of the Wiſe? Then this great Fabrick of Things was made for a very few Perſons. Or of the Fooliſh? There was no Reaſon he ſhould do ſuch a Favour to the Wicked. Again, What hath he got by doing

ſo,

ſo, ſince all Fools are even in that regard moſt miſerable; for what more miſerable than Folly? Beſides, there being many Inconveniences in Life, which the Wiſe ſweeten by Compenſation of the Conveniences; Fools can neither prevent the future, nor ſuſtain the preſent.

Or, Did he make the World, and, in the World, Men, that he might be worſhipped by Men? But what doth the Worſhip of Men advantage God, who is happy and needeth nothing? Or, if he reſpect Man ſo much, as that he made the World for his ſake, that he would inſtruct him in Wiſdom, that he would make him Lord over all living Creatures, that he would love him as his Son; Why did he make him mortal and frail? Why did he ſubject him, whom he loveth, to all Evils? Seeing rather a Man ought to be happy, as conjoined with, and next unto God, and immortal, as he himſelf is, whom he is made to worſhip and contemplate.

For theſe Reaſons ought we to ſay, that the World rather was made by Nature; or, as one of the natural Philoſophers ſaid, by Chance.

By Nature; for ſuch is the Nature of the Atoms, running through the Immenſity of the Univerſe, that in great abundance running againſt one another, they can lay hold of, entangle, and engage one another; and variouſly commixing themſelves, firſt roll up a great kind of Chaos, in manner of a great Vortex, (Clue or Bottom) and then after many Convolutions, Evolutions, and making ſeveral Efforts, and as it were Attempts, trying all kinds of Motions and Conjunctions, they came at laſt into that Form which this World bears.

By Chance; for the Atoms concur, cohere, and are co-apted, not by any Deſign, but as Chance led them. Wherefore, as I ſaid, Chance is not ſuch a Cauſe, as directly, and of itſelf, tends to mingle the Atoms, and diſpoſe them to ſuch Effect; but the very Atoms themſelves are called Chance, inaſmuch as meeting one another, without any Premeditation, they faſten'd on one another, and make up ſuch a Compound, as chanceth thence to reſult.

CHAP. IV.

Of the Generation of the World.

BUT to diſcuſs this Matter more narrowly, and to come to another Head; the World ſeemeth to have been elaborated and molded into this round Figure, by a certain kind of Reaſon, without Bellows, Anvil, or other Inſtruments.

Firſt, Whereas the Atoms, by an inconſiderate and caſual Motion, were continually and ſwiftly carried on, when they began to run in multitudes into this immenſe Place, in which the World now is, and to faſten upon one another, they preſently became heaped into one rude and indigeſted Maſs, in which great things were mingled with ſmall, round with corner'd, ſmooth with hooked, others with others.

Then, in this confuſed Croud, thoſe which were the greateſt and moſt heavy began by degrees to ſettle down; and ſuch as were thin, round, ſmall, ſlippery, theſe, in the Concurrence of the others, began to be extruded and carried upwards; as in troubled Water, until it reſts and groweth clear, the earthy Parts ſettle downwards, the watry are as it were thruſt upwards; but after the impulſive Force which drove them upward, grew languid, nor was there any other Stroke which might toſs them that way, the Atoms themſelves, endeavouring to go down again, met with Obſtacles from others; whereupon they flew about with greater Activity to the utmoſt Bounds; as alſo did others, which were reverberated by them, and repreſſed by others that cloſely followed them; whence was made a mutual Implication, which did generate Heaven.

But thoſe Atoms, which were of the ſame Nature, (there being, as we ſaid, many Kinds of them) and carry'd round about in Heaps, whilſt they were thruſt upwards, made the Sun, and Moon, and other Stars. Theſe were chiefly called Signifying Atoms; thoſe which they left, as not able to riſe ſo high, produced the Air.

At length, of thoſe which ſettled down the Earth was generated; and ſeeing there yet remained much Matter in Earth, and that condenſed by the Beatings of the Winds and Gales from the Stars, that Figuration of it which conſiſted of leaſt Particles, was ſqueezed forth and produced Moiſture. This being fluid, either run down into hollow Places, fit to receive and contain it, or, ſtanding ſtill, made hollow Receptacles for itſelf. And after this manner were the principal Parts of the World generated.

To ſay ſomething of the leſs principal, the Particles as it were of the former Part; there ſeems in that firſt Commiſtion to have been made the divers Seeds of generable and corruptible Things, of which Compounds of divers Natures were firſt framed, and afterwards in a great degree propagated.

Stones, Metals, and all other Minerals, were therefore generated within the Body of the Earth at the ſame time it was formed, becauſe that Maſs was heterogeneous, or conſiſting of Atoms and Seeds of different Natures; and in that the Bulks of Stones did diverſly ſwell out to the very Superficies. Whereupon Mountains came to be made, and conſequently Vallies and Plains muſt needs have been between them.

Soon after, about the Mountains and the Hills, and in the Valleys, and in the Fields, grew up Herbs, Shrubs, Trees, almoſt in the ſame manner as Feathers, Hair, Briſtles, about the Bodies and Members of Birds and Beaſts.

But

But as concerning Animals themſelves, it is likely that the Earth, retaining this new genital Seed, brought out of itſelf ſome little Bubbles, in the Likeneſs of little Wombs; and theſe when they grew nature (Nature ſo compelling) broke, and put forth young little Creatures. Then the Earth itſelf did abound in a kind of Humour, like to Milk, with which Aliment living Creatures were nouriſhed.

Which Creatures were ſo framed, that they had all Parts neceſſary for Nutrition, and all other Uſes. For as when *Nilus* forſakes the Fields, and the Earth beginneth to grow dry through Heat of the Sun, the Husbandman turning up the Glebe finds ſeveral living Creatures, Part begun, Part imperfect and maimed; ſo that in the ſame Creature one Part liveth, the other is mere Earth. In like manner, amongſt thoſe firſt Efforts of the Earth, beſides the living Creatures perfectly formed, there were ſome produced wanting Hands, Feet, Mouth, and other Parts; without which, there is no way to take Nouriſhment, or to live long, or to propagate their Kind.

What I ſay of other living Creatures, I hold alſo in Man, that ſome little Bubbles and Wombs ſticking to the Roots of the Earth, and warmed by the Sun, firſt grew bigger, and by the Aſſiſtance of Nature afforded to Infants ſprung from it a connatural Moiſture, called Milk; and that thoſe thus brought up, and ripen'd to Perfection, propagated Mankind.

Two things I add; One, That it is by no means to be allowed, what ſome affirm, that at that time were produced *Centaur's*, *Scylla's*, *Chimæra's*, and other Monſters, conſiſting of Parts of different Kinds. For how in a *Centaur* (for Example) could the Limbs of a Man and of a Horſe be joined together, when at the third Year of his Age, at what time a Child is hardly weaned, a Horſe is in full Vigor? And at what time a Horſe languiſheth with Age, a Man flouriſheth in the Prime of his Youth.

The other, That in the Earth there were created new living Creatures, and more and greater than now, by more and more vigorous Seeds, and amongſt thoſe, Men too; ſo as that Race of Men was more hardy, as conſiſting of greater and more ſolid Bones and Nerves: And ſo at laſt the Earth, her Seeds being exhauſted, like a Woman too old to bear Children, left off to produce voluntarily ſuch living Creatures. Whence it comes to paſs, that now Men are no where generated on this faſhion; but both they, and other more great and perfect Animals, ſpring up only by way of Propagation.

CHAP. V.

Of the Viciſſitudes in the World.

THERE followeth a Queſtion, Whether the World be governed by itſelf, or by the Providence of any Deity?

Firſt therefore, we ought not to think that the Motion of Heaven, or the Summer and Winter, Courſe of the Sun, or the Eclipſe of the Sun and Moon, or the Riſing and Setting of the Stars, or the like, happen, becauſe there is ſome Ruler over them, who diſpoſeth, and hath diſpoſed of them; and withal poſſeſſeth Beatitude and Immortality: for with Felicity agree not Buſineſs, Solicitude, Anger and Favour; theſe happen through Imbecility, Fear, and want of external Help.

Neither ought we (it being a troubleſome Employment, and wholly averſe from a happy State) to think, that the Nature which poſſeſſeth Felicity is ſuch, as that (knowing and willing) it undergoes theſe Commotions or Perturbations of Mind; but rather to obſerve, out of reſpect to it, all Veneration, and to uſe ſome kind of Addreſs to it, ſuggeſting ſuch Thoughts, as out of which ariſe no Opinions contrary to Veneration.

We ſhould rather think, that, when the World was produced, there were made thoſe Circumplexions of Atoms, involving themſelves about one another, that from thence the celeſtial Bodies being framed, there was produced in them this Neceſſity, whereby they are moved in ſuch a manner, and perform ſuch Periods: and after the ſame manner all the reſt perform their Tasks, in order to the Courſe of things once begun.

And why ſhould we not rather think thus? For whether the World itſelf is a God, as ſome conceive, What can be leſs quiet, than unceſſantly to roll about the Axis with admirable Swiftneſs? But unleſs it be quiet, nothing is happy. Or whether there be ſome God in the World, who rules, governs, conſerves the Courſes of the Stars, the Mutations of Seaſons, the Viciſſitude and Order of Things, who is preſent in all Places, and at all Times; and, how great ſoever is the Variety, or rather Innumerability of all particular Things, is diſtracted by ſo many Cares, by taking Order that they be done this way, and no other: Indeed he is, as I before objected, involved in Buſineſſes troubleſome and laborious.

Beſides, though it were but only ſuppoſed, that God doth not take care of things, Shall we not find, that all things happen no otherwiſe than as if there were no Providence? For ſome fall out well, but the moſt ill, and otherwiſe than they ought. To omit the reſt; if *Jupiter* himſelf did thunder, or guide the Thunder, he ought at leaſt to ſpare Temples, though it were only not to give occaſion of doubting, whether it proceed from Fortune, or divine Counſel; that is, all things, in a manner, holding on their Courſe as it was at firſt begun.

This alſo is of no little Weight, that they aſſert a ſpecial Providence in reſpect of Men. For (not to repeat what I even now ſaid, That a happy and immortal Nature cannot be poſſeſs'd with Anger or Favour) put caſe, that God takes no Care of the Affairs

fairs of Men, How can they come to be otherwiſe than they are? In them there is an equal, or rather greater Imbecility than in other Creatures, equal Inconveniences, equal Ills. Some of them making Vows are preſerved from Shipwreck; How many have mane Vows, and yet periſh'd? Many pray for Children, and obtain them; How many pray for Children in vain?

But to be brief; Why, if God takes care of the Affairs of Men, is it ill with the Good, well with the Bad? Truly it is an Argument with me, when I ſee Croſſes always happen to the Good, Poverty, Labours, Exile, Loſs of Friends; on the other ſide, wicked Perſons to be happy, to increaſe in Power, to be honoured with Titles; that Innocence is unſafe, wicked Actions go unpuniſhed; that Death exerciſes his Cruelty without obſerving Manners, without Order and Diſtinction of Years; ſome arrive at old Age, others are ſnatch'd away in their Infancy, others in their full Strength; others in the Flower of their Youth are immaturely cut off; in War, rather the beſt are vanquiſhed and periſh. But that which prevails moſt with me, is, that the moſt religious Perſons are afflicted with the greateſt Ills; but to them, who either wholly neglect the Gods, or worſhip them not religiouſly, happen either the leaſt Misfortunes, or none at all.

Moreover, I think it may not be ill argued thus: Either God would take away Ills and cannot, or he can and will not, or he neither will nor can, or he both will and can. If he would and cannot, he is impotent, and conſequently not God; if he can and will not, envious, which is equally contrary to God's Nature; if he neither will nor can, he is both envious and impotent, and conſequently not God; if he both will and can, which only agrees with God, Whence then are the Ills? Or, why doer he not take them away?

CHAP. VI.

A Digreſſion, concerning Genii *or* Dæmons.

IT is all one, whether God takes care of things by himſelf, as ſome will have it, or (as others hold) by Miniſters, whom they generally call *Genii* or *Dæmons*; for things happen no otherwiſe, than as if we ſhould ſuppoſe no ſuch Miniſters; and tho' it were granted, that there are ſome, yet can they not be ſuch as they feign them, that is, of a human Form, and having a Voice that can reach to us: To omit, ſince for the moſt part they are ſaid to be ill and vicious, they cannot be happy and long-liv'd, ſince both much Blindneſs and a Proneneſs to Deſtruction perpetually attends Wickedneſs.

How much were it to be wiſhed, that there were ſome who might take care of us, and ſupply what is wanting to our Prudence, and to our Strength? Eſpecially how much were it to be wiſhed, by ſuch as are Leaders in War, of moſt pious and honeſt Attempts, that they might not confide not only in Arms, Horſes, Ships, but alſo in the Aſſiſtance of the Gods themſelves?

Add indeed, ſome are ſaid to appear ſometimes to ſome Perſons; and why may it not be, that they who affirm *Dæmons* to have appeared to them, either lye and feign, or are melancholy, and ſuch, that their diſtemper'd Body either ſtrangely raiſeth, or diverts their Imagination to extraordinary Conceits. It is well known, that nothing is more apt to be moved and transformed into any Species (altho' there be no real Ground) than Imagination. For the Impreſſion made upon the Mind is like that in Wax, and the Mind of Man having within itſelf that which repreſents, and that which is repreſented, there is ſuch a Power in it, that, taking even the very leaſt of things ſeen or heard upon ſome occaſion, it can of itſelf eaſily vary and transfigure the Species, as is manifeſted by the Communications of Dreams which are made in Sleep, from which we perceive, that the imaginative Faculty puts on all Variety of Affections and Phantaſies; ſo that it is no wonder, if, where the Faculty is unſound, they ſeem to ſee *Dæmons*, or other things, of which they have had any foretaken Conceit.

Moreover, they uſe to alledge Divination as an Argument to prove both Providence and the Exiſtence of the *Dæmons*; but I am aſhamed at Human Imbecility, when it fetcheth Divinations even out of Dreams, as if God walking from Bed to Bed did admoniſh ſupine Perſons, by indirect Viſions, what ſhall come to paſs; and out of all kinds of Portents and Prodigies; as if Chance were not a ſufficient Agent for theſe Effects; but we muſt mix God, not only with the Sun and the Moon, and ſeveral other living Creatures, but alſo with all Braſs and Stone.

But to inſtance in Oracles only: Many ways may it be evinced, that they are mere Impoſtures of Prieſts, as may particularly be diſcover'd; for that the Verſes which proceed from them are bad, being, for the moſt part maimed in the Beginning, imperfect in the Middle, lame in the Cloſe; which could not be, if they came from Divine Inſpiration, ſince from God nothing can proceed but what is well and decent.

And I remember, that, when in my younger Days I lived at *Samus*, that Oracle was much cried up, by which (as they reported) *Polycrates*, King of that Iſland, celebrating the *Pythian* and *Delian* Games, ſent at the ſame time to *Delus*, demanding of *Apollo*, Whether he ſhould offer Sacrifice at the appointed time? *Pythius* anſwered, *Theſe to thee are the Pythian and the Delian*; whereby, ſaid they, it was ſignify'd, that thoſe ſhould be his laſt, for ſoon after he happened to be ſlain. But how could it be ſignify'd by that Anſwer, That theſe Sacrifices

ſhould

ſhould be the laſt rather than the middle? But that the vulgar ſort of Men are moſt commonly led by Hearſay, and are greedy of ſtrange Stories.

CHAP. VII.

Of the End, or Corruption of the World.

THAT the World ſhall periſh, and have an End, is conſequent, foraſmuch as it was generated, and had Beginning; for it is neceſſary, that all compounded Things be alſo diſſipated and reſolved into thoſe things of which they are compounded; ſome by ſome Cauſes, others by others; but ſtill all from ſome Cauſe, and at ſome time or other. Whence it is the more to be admired, that there ſhould be ſome, who, not only broaching the Opinion, that the World was generated, but even in a manner made by Hands, thence define, that it ſhall be ever. For as I argued before, What Coagmentation can there be indiſſoluble? Or, What is there that hath a Beginning, but no End?

Certainly, the World ſeems like an Animal, or Plant, as generated ſo ſubject to Corruption, as well becauſe, no otherwiſe than they, it conſiſts of Atoms, which, by Reaſon of the inteſtine Motion, wherewith they are inceſſantly moved, at length muſt cauſe a Diſſolution; as alſo becauſe there may happen both to them and the World, ſome extrinſecal Cauſe, which may put them to Deſtruction: Eſpecially it being known that every thing is produced but one way, but may be deſtroyed by many; as alſo, becauſe, there are three Ages in them, Youth, Middle State, and Old Age; ſo the World firſt began to grow up; (as alſo after the Time of its Generation, there came extrinſecally from the Univerſe, Atoms which inſinuated into the Pores, as it were, of the World; and by which, Heaven, the Stars, the Air, the Sea, the Earth, and other Things were augmented, the congruous Atoms accommodating themſelves to thoſe that were congruous to them;) then, becauſe there ought to have been ſome End of growing, it reſted in a kind of perfect State; and at laſt began ſo to decay, as plainly ſhews, that it declines towards its laſt Age.

This is firſt proved, becauſe, as we ſee, in Progreſs of Time, Towers fall, Stones moulder, Temples and Images decay, whereby at laſt they come to be diſſolved: So we may perceive the Parts of the World ſenſibly to moulder, and wear away; a great Part of the Earth goes away into Air, (not to ſay any thing of thoſe greater Concuſſions, which makes us fear ſometimes, leſt the whole ſhould fall, and ſinking from under our Feet, ſink, as it were, into an Abyſs) the Water alſo is partly exhaled into Air, partly ſo diſtributed through the Earth, that it will not at all flow back again: The Air is continually changed, many Things going forth into it, and many produced again out of it. Laſtly, the Fire, (not only ours, but the ſtarry Fire alſo, as that which is in the Sun) ſenſibly decays by the Emanation, and caſting forth of Light. Wherefore, neither is there any Reaſon to think, that theſe Bodies of the World will continue ever.

Again, becauſe we ſee there is a continual Fight amongſt the Bodies of the World themſelves, thro' which ſometimes happen Conflagrations, ſometimes Deluges, as it were, with equal Strength: But, as in Wreſtling, ſo is it neceſſary, that in the World one of the Contraries prevail at laſt, and deſtroy all Things. If any ſhall demand, which of the two is the more likely to prevail, it may be anſwer'd, The Fire, as being the more active, and receiving particular Recruits from the Sun and Heaven; ſo as, at laſt, it will come to get the upper hand, and the World thereupon, periſh by Conflagration.

Laſtly, becauſe there is nothing indiſſolvable, but either as it is ſolid, as an Atom; or intactile, as Vacuum; or hath nothing beyond it, whence either a diſſolving Cauſe may come, or whither itſelf may go forth, as the Univerſe. But the World neither is ſolid, by Reaſon of Vacuum intermix'd; nor intactile, by Reaſon of corporeal Nature; nor hath nothing without it, by Reaſon of its Extremity: Whence it follows, that a Deſtruction may happen extrinſecally, by Bodies incurring to it, and breaking it, but, both extrinſecally and intrinſecally, it is capable of being diſſolved.

This I add, becauſe the World may periſh, not only by Conflagration, or, if you will, by Inundation alſo, but by many other Ways; amongſt which the chief is, that, as a living Creature (to which I already compar'd it) the Frame of the Soul being unty'd, is diſſolved into ſeveral Parts, and theſe at length are quite diſſolved alſo, either by being diſſipated, and turning into the Air, and the moſt minute Duſt, or ſerving again for the Production of ſome other living Creatures: So the Walls, as it were, of the World decaying and falling, the ſeveral Pieces of it are diſſolved, and go at length into Atoms; which having gotten into the free Space of *Vacuum*, ruſh downwards in a Tumult, and recommence their firſt Motions; or run forward, far and long; or ſoon fall upon other Worlds; or meeting with other Atoms, join with them to the Production of new Worlds.

And though indeed, as a living Creature may be ſooner or later diſſolved by Departure of the Soul, ſo may either of theſe happen to the World: Yet it is more probable, that it will ſo come to paſs, as that in a Moment of Time, nothing thereof ſhall remain except Atoms, and a deſolate Space; for which way ſoever the Gate of Death, as it were, ſhall be firſt opened, thither will all the Crowd of Matter throng to get out.

That the World, as I said, is declining towards its last Age is probable; for that the teeming Earth, as I lately touched, scarce bringeth forth even little Animals, when as formerly she produced large; and that she, not without extream Labour, brings forth Corn and Fruits, whereas at first she brought them forth of her own accord, in great Plenty. Whence it comes, that there are frequent Complaints, praising the former Ages, and accusing the present; for that they perceive not that it is the Course of Things that all Things should decay by little and little, and, weary'd with long space of Age, tend as it were to Destruction. I wish Reason, rather than the Thing itself did perswade, that within a short time, we shall see all things shatter'd in pieces.

CHAP. VIII.

Of Infinite Worlds.

MOreover, as to demand, Whether there are, besides this, not only other Worlds, but many, even infinite: This seems to be the Answer, That there are infinite Worlds. For [a] *the Atoms being infinite, as we formerly shewed, are carried through infinite Spaces; and that several Ways in far Distances from this World, and there meeting one another in Multitudes, may join to the Production of infinite Worlds. Since the Atoms, being of this Nature, that a World may be made up, and consist of them, cannot, by Reason of their Infinity, be consumed or exhausted by one, nor any determinate Number of Worlds; whether these Worlds be supposed framed after one Fashion, or after divers. It is not impossible therefore, but that there may be infinite Worlds* [b].

And indeed it is as absurd for a single World to be made in an infinite Universe, as for one Ear of Corn to sprout up in the vast Field, sowed with many Grains; for as in the Field there are many Causes, to wit, many Seeds apt to grow up, and Places to produce them; so in the Universe, besides Places, there are Causes, not many, but infinite, namely Atoms, as capable of joining as those of which this World was made up.

[c] Besides, we see not any generable thing, so one, as that it hath not many like itself, in the same kind, (for so Men, so Birds, so Beasts, so Fishes, are multiplied each under their particular Species.) Wherefore, seeing that not only the Sun, the Moon, the Earth, the Sea, and the rest of the Parts of the World were generated; but even the whole World itself, which consists of them; we must acknowledge, that not only the Parts, but the World itself, are not single, but many, as to Number, and (for the Reasons alledged) infinite.

Now there being nothing to hinder, but that some Worlds may be like this of ours, others unlike it; for there may be equal, there may be greater, there may be lesser; there may be, that have the same Parts, disposed in the same Order; there may be, that have different Parts, or disposed in a different Order; there may be, that have the same Figure; there may be, that have a different, (for though Atoms cannot have an infinite Variety of Figures, having a determinate Space in their Superficies, yet may they be of more Figures than we can number, as round, oval, pyramidal, *&c.* altho', I say, there be no Repugnance in this, yet all these Diversities are only certain kinds of Conditions, which vary the common Quality and Nature of the World.

But it seems, that each of the other Worlds, as this of ours, and every Compound which is made in that vast Vacuity, and hath any Resemblance with those things which fall under our Observation, is generated apart, and after a fashion peculiar to itself, *by certain Convolutions, and Intextures of Atoms proper to it*; [d] and this, whether it be generated in the *Intermundia*, (so we term the Interval, included betwixt two or more Worlds, not far distant from one another) or in a multivacuous Place, (that is, in which, though there be great and little Bodies, yet Vacuities take up the greater Share of it) or lastly, in a great unmixt and pure *Vacuum*, though not as some (who assert such a *Vacuum*) describe it.

For we are to understand, contrary to them, that [e] *there floweth together, if not from infinite, at least from one, or more Worlds, or* Intermundia, *some apt Seeds, that is, a congruous Heap of Atoms, or little Bodies, which are by degrees mutually adjoined here and there, and variously formed, and change Place diversly, according as it happens, and withal receive from without some irriguous, as it were, Accretions; until a Bulk, consisting of the whole Assembly of all these, be made up, and gain a Consistency, as much as the Principles, of which it was made, can well bear.*

[f] *For it is not sufficient, for the Generation of a World, that a great Heap of Atoms be thrown together in a* Vacuum, *and by the Accession of others, grow bigger, till it roll into another* Vacuum, *in the same manner, as a Heap of Snow, being tumbled upon Snow, gathers still more, and grows bigger, as was the Opinion of a certain Philosopher, holding the Necessity of such a Method: Since this is repugnant to our daily Experience.* For a Heap, whose innermost Kernel, as it were, is solid, and its outermost Shell solid also, can neither be rolled up and down, nor increased, if the Part intercepted betwixt the Kernel and the Shell be fluid, as in the World it is.

Finally, That the other Worlds also are, because generated, subject to Corruption, is too manifest to be mentioned; that some may be dissolved sooner, others later; some by some Causes, others by others, is

[a] Laert. 10. 45. [b] Lucret. 2. v. 1047. [c] Lucret. loc. cit. [d] Laert. ibid. [e] Laert. 10. 89. [f] Ibid.

is a thing neceſſarily conſequent to the peculiar Diverſity of every one.

CHAP. IX.

Of inferior Terreſtrial Things.

BUT that (omitting the reſt) we may ſpeak more particularly of this our World, ſince all things in it are either contained within the Compaſs of the Earth, or exceed not the Height of the Ground, or are placed on high, that is, raiſed above the Earth's Superficies, and therefore may generically be divided into the low or terreſtrial ſort of Things, and thoſe which are ſublime, celeſtial, or ærial: Let us then ſo order our Diſcourſe, as to ſpeak firſt of the former; in regard, that as they are nearer, and more familiar to us, ſo we may thence aſcend by orderly Degrees to diſcourſe and define what we ſhould moſt rationally conjecture of the latter, which are more remote from us, and leſs viſible to us.

In the firſt place, we are to take a general View of the Body of the Earth, next of the Water, a conſiderable part of this Maſs, and mingled diverſly with the Earth, partly in its Superficies, partly in its very Bowels; afterwards of theſe leſſer Bodies, with which we ſee that whole Maſs repleniſhed, whether inanimate, as Minerals, Stones, and Plants; or animate, uſually called Animals.

CHAP. I.

Of the Earth ſituate in the Middle of the World.

FIRST then, as to the Earth, we have already ſaid, how it was framed together with the other parts of the World; for it had been to no purpoſe to form it firſt, beyond the utmoſt Surface of the World, and then convey it into the World already framed, ſince it was ſufficient for that Effect, that there were ſuch Seeds found in the univerſal Maſs, of which it, with the other parts of the World, might be generated; in the ſame manner as it would be unneceſſary that living Creatures ſhould firſt be ſeparated from, and carried beyond this Infinity of things, and be formed there, that, being now perfected, they might be brought thence into this our Region. Nor was it needful, that they ſhould firſt be exactly wrought in Heaven, and thence tranſmitted to our Earth; ſeeing no Man can ſhew, why there muſt needs be found ſuch Seeds there, of which Animals, Plants, and other viſible Compounds are made up, and could as well be found here; or, whence Heaven hath this Privilege, of having ſufficient Conveniencies for their Generation and Nutrition, more than our Earth.

It is already ſaid, That the Earth, when the Heaven, and other higher Bodies, did fly, as it were, upwards, ſettled into the Middle of the World, and there reſted as in the loweſt Place. We add now, That as it is the middle Part of the World, towards which all heavy things falls; it follows not, that there is alſo a middle Part of it, called the Center, towards which, all things that ponderate are directed in a ſtrait Line; for all heavy things fall in parallel Motions, without any Endeavour to meet in any Angle; there being, as in the Univerſe, ſo alſo in our World, one Region above, from which all heavy things come, and only one below, towards which they tend.

Whence, as they are nor to be approved of, who ſay, there are Antipodes, or Men ſo ſituated in a ſtrange Region of the Earth, that they walk with their Feet diametrically oppoſite to ours, in like manner as we ſee the Images of Men, or other things, either ſtand or go with their Heads downwards under the Water; for theſe Philoſophers endeavour to maintain, contrary to the Laws of Nature and of heavy Things, that Men, and other terreſtrial Bodies placed there, tend upwards, or towards the Earth; and that it is equally impoſſible they ſhould fall down from the Earth to the inferior Places of the Sky; as that Bodies amongſt us here ſhould unimpell'd mount up to Heaven. However, upon another Account they ſpeak conſequently to their Hypotheſis, that it is Day with the Antipodes when it it is Night with us, and Night with them when it is our Day.

The Earth then is framed indeed after a circular Figure, but yet as a Diſh or a Drum is, not like a Sphere or Bowl; for this Surface of it which we inhabit, and which indeed is only habitable, is flat or plain, and not globous, and ſuch as all heavy things are carried to it in a ſtrait Line, or perpendicularly, as was formerly declared.

This being ſo, here ariſeth a great Difficulty, How can it then be, that it ſhould ſtand ſteady, and not fall downwards into that Region, into which the Antipodes would ſlide? But, *the Reaſon why the Earth falls not, is, becauſe it reſts upon the Air, as ally'd to it in Nature; nor doth it any more burthen the Air than Animals, which are of like Nature with the Earth, burthen the Earth.*

Nor is it hard to conceive, that in the Air beneath there is a Power to ſuſtain the Earth, becauſe the Air and the Earth, by the general Contexture of the World, are things not of different Extraction, but ally'd to one another by a certain Affinity. Whence, as being Parts of the ſame Whole, one cannot be burthenſome to the other, but are held by a mutual Embrace, as if they had no Gravity at all; eſpecially ſince this Earth, however in this upper Part of it more compacted and heavy, may, deſcending lower, be, by degrees, leſs ſolid, and ſo leſs weighty; till at length, in its loweſt Part of all, it apprroach

very near the Nature of the Air which ſupports it.

And for this Reaſon I ſaid, that the Earth was not made in ſome Place out of the World, and thence brought into it, becauſe then it would have preſſed the Air with its Weight, as our Bodies are ſenſible of the leaſt Weight, if impoſed from without; whereas, neither the Head, nor other Parts are heavy to one another, by Reaſon that they are agreeable to one another in Nature, and knit to one another by the common Law of the ſame Whole.

And that it ſeem not incredible, a thing ſo tenuious as is Air ſhould be able to uphold ſo groſs a Bulk; do but conſider how ſubtle a thing the Soul or Animal Spirit is, and yet how groſs and weighty a Bulk of the Body it upholds and governs; and that only by this means, becauſe it is a thing joined to it, and aptly united to it, as the Air is to the Earth.

But we muſt not therefore conceive the Earth to be Animate, much leſs a Goddeſs; for we have formerly proved the contrary: The Earth indeed many times brings forth ſeveral living Creatures, yet not as being herſelf Animate; but becauſe, containing various Atoms and divers Seeds of Things, ſhe produces many Things many Ways; of which, Animate Beings are formed. Some there are, who call the Earth, The *Great Mother of the Gods*, and *Berecynthia*. That to the Earth theſe Names be attributed, if it be lawful to make uſe of divine things thereby to ſignify natural things, may perhaps ſeem tolerable; but to believe, that there is a Divinity in the Earth, is no way allowable.

CHAP. II.

Of Earthquakes, and the Flames of Ætna.

IT ſeems wonderful, how it come to paſs, that the Earth is ſometimes ſhaken, and trembles; but this is an Effect which may happen from divers Cauſes: Suppoſing that the Earth, as I ſee no Reaſon to doubt, is in all Parts alike, and that below as well as above, it hath Caverns, Breaches, and Rivers, rolling great Billows, vaſt Stones, &c.

For the Water may move the Earth, if it hath waſh'd or worn ſome Parts, which being made hollow, it can no longer be held up, as it was whilſt they were entire; or if ſome Wind drive upon Channels and Lakes, or ſtanding Waters within the Earth, and the [Blow] Impulſion either ſhake the Earth from thence, or the Agitation of the Wind increaſing with its own Motion, and ſtirring up itſelf, be carried from the Bottom to the Top; as a Veſſel cannot ſtand ſtedfaſt, until the Water which hath been troubled in it give over moving.

Likewiſe the Earth may receive a Shock, by ſome Part thereof ſuddenly falling down, and thereby be moved; ſeeing that ſome of its Parts are upheld, as it were, with Columns and Pillars, which decaying and ſinking, the Weight that is laid on them quakes: For we ſee whole Houſes ſhake, by Reaſon of the jumbling, and Succuſſion of Carts and Chariots.

Alſo the very Wind itſelf may move the Earth, either if the Earth (its interior and lower Parts being full of Crannies and Chinks) be ſhaken by ſome Wind variouſly diſpers'd, and falling into thoſe hollow Caverns, and ſo tremble in ſuch manner as our Limbs, by Inſinuation of Cold, tremble and are moved, whether we will or no; or, if the Wind, getting in at the Top, and driving downwards, the Earth is driven upwards by the Air under it, which is ſomewhat groſs and watery, (for it ſuſtains the Earth) and ſhaken as it were from beneath, leaps up, which happens to all things; not only to thoſe which are forced againſt any thing, hard or firm; or ſo ſtretched or bent, that being preſt upon it, recoils; but alſo againſt a fluid thing, if it be able to ſtrike it back, as when Wood is plung'd into Water.

The Force of this Wind, if we conceive it turn'd into Fire, and reſembling Thunder, may be carried on with a great Deſtruction of all Things that oppoſe its Paſſage. For as Lightning, engender'd in a Cloud, breaks thorow it, and ſhakes the Air with wonderful Violence; in like manner, may the Fire, generated within the Caverns of the Earth of a coacervate and exagitated Wind, break thorow it, and make it tremble.

Now as there appears not any Cauſe more likely than that which is taken from the Wind, and chiefly in this laſt manner; either by diſtributing itſelf into many ſeveral Cavities of the Earth; it cauſeth a trembling only, and (as if there were a Tranſpiration through the looſer Earth) the Earth is not ſo broken thorow as that there is a Breach made, or ſomething overthrown, or turn'd awry; or elſe by its being heaped up together in greater Caverns, there may follow ſuch a Succuſſion and Impulſion, as may heave up, and cleave aſunder the Earth, and make Gaps big enough to entomb whole Cities, as in divers Places it hath often happened.

What I ſay concerning the Force of the Wind, which being turned into Fire, breaks thorow, and ſhakes the Earth, may ſerve to make us underſtand, that the Eruptions of Fire which often happen in the ſame Places, as at *Ætna*, proceed from the ſame Cauſe.

For this Mountain is all hollow within, and ſo underpropped with Vaults of Flint, that the Wind ſhut up in them, groweth hot, and being enkindled, forceth its Way through the Breaches which it finds above, and eats into the Sides of theſe Caverns; whence (together with Flame and Smoke) it caſts up Sparkles and Pumices.

And the better to bring this to paſs, the Sea lies at the Foot of the Mountain, which rolling its Waves to and from the Shore, unto which the Caverns of the Hill extend, thruſts in, and drives forward the Air, whereby

whereby the Fire is augmented and cheriſh'd, as with the blowing of Bellows.

CHAP. III.

Of the Sea, Rivers, Fountains, and the overflowing of Nilus.

AS for thoſe Waters which are on the Earth, (for of thoſe which are generated on high, and thence fall down in Rain, we ſhall ſpeak more opportunely hereafter;) Firſt, there is a vaſt Body of them, which we call the Sea: For beſides thoſe Inland Seas which waſh our Shores, there is alſo an extern Sea, or Ocean, which flowing about all the habitable Earth, is believed by ſome to be ſo immediately placed under the Arch of Heaven, that the Sun and other Stars riſe from it, and ſet in it, as we ſhall have occaſion to ſhew elſewhere.

And indeed, the Vaſtneſs of the Sea being ſuch, it may be eſteemed not the moſt inconſiderable Reaſon, why the Sea ſeems not to be increaſed by the flowing of ſo many Rivers into it; for all the Rivers are hardly like a Drop, compared to ſo immenſe a Body. And withal, the Sun, who with his Beams ſo ſoon dries wet Garments; although he ſuck not up much Moiſture from every Place, yet from ſo large a Compaſs cannot but take away a great deal. Not to mention how much the Winds, which in one Night many times dry up the Ways, and harden the Dirt, may in ſweeping along the Sea, conſume of it.

But, the chiefeſt Reaſon ſeems to be this. The Earth being a rare Body, and eaſily penetrated, and withal, waſhed on all Sides by the Sea, the Waters, as well as they are poured from the Earth into the Sea, ſo muſt they alſo ſoak down from the Sea into the Earth, that they may riſe up in Springs and flow again.

Neither need it trouble us, that the Water of the Sea is ſalt, and the Waters of Springs and Rivers freſh; becauſe the Water, paſſing out of the Sea into the Earth, is ſtrained in ſuch manner, that it puts off the little Bodies of Salt, and returns quite ſtripp'd of them. For the Body of the Sea being commix'd of Salt and of Water; foraſmuch as the Seeds of Salt are more hooked, and thoſe of Water more ſmooth, therefore theſe glide eaſily away, whilſt the others cannot but be entangled, and are all along left behind.

Hence appeareth the Cauſe (which ſeemeth the principal) of the perpetual flowing of Springs: Where they riſe up, there may indeed be ſome great Quantity of Water gathered together, which may ſerve for Supply: But upon another Account, they may be ſupplied, foraſmuch as there is ſomething continually flowing from beneath into them. And tho' theſe ſubterraneous Rivulets (as it were,) might be made up of the ſeveral Seeds, which are diſperſed thro' the Earth, yet muſt theſe Seeds be ſupplied by the Sea, which ſoaks into the Earth.

Whence it comes to paſs, as was ſaid, that thoſe Rivulets, diſperſing themſelves into leſſer Streams, and running down into lower hollow Receptacles, and meeting there, at laſt join together in great Channels, and make large Rivers, which continually renew and ſupply the immenſe Sea.

But ſince there is not any River more wonderful than *Nilus*, for that every Summer it overfloweth and watereth *Egypt*, we muſt not therefore omit to ſay, that this may happen by reaſon of the *Eteſian* Winds which at that Seaſon blowing towards *Egypt*, raiſe up the Sea to the Mouths of *Nilus*, and drive up Sands thither, ſo as *Nilus* cannot but ſtop and ſwell, and riſing above its Channel, overflow the Plain which lies beneath.

Perhaps alſo it happens, for that the *Eteſian* Winds blowing from the North carry the Clouds into the South beyond *Egypt*, which, meeting at ſome very high Mountains, are there crouded together, and ſqueeze forth Rain, by which *Nilus* is increaſed.

It may happen alſo, that the exceeding high Mountains of *Ethiopia*, may be cover'd with Snow, which being diſſolved by the Sun's exceſſive Heat, fills the Channel of *Nilus*.

CHAP. IV.

Of the Properties of ſome Waters, and of Ice.

BUT that we may ſelect beſides ſome Properties of Water, which ſeem wonderful to the Vulgar, I omit, at preſent, that Property which is of kin to thoſe we laſt mentioned; That although the Water ſo eaſily diſſolves Salt, and admits to be imbued by it; yet there are ſome ſweet Fountains which ſpring out of the midſt of the Sea. For this plainly happens hence, That the Water burſting forth from the Bottom of the Sea, riſeth up with ſo great Vehemency, that it drives away on all Sides the Sea-water, and neither ſuffers it nor its Salt to be mingled with it.

Wonderful is that Fountain in *Epirus*, over which Flax or a Taper is no ſooner put, but it is preſently ſet on Fire and flames. It ſeems, that from the Earth which is beneath it, ſo many Seeds of Heat are breathed forth, as that, though they are not able to heat the Water in their Paſſage through it, yet as ſoon as ever they get out of it into the open Air, running into the Flax and Tapers, they aſſociate themſelves with the fiery Seeds wherewith ſuch things abound, and break forth into Flame; in the ſame manner, as when putting Flame to a Candle newly extinguiſh'd, you may ſee it light before the Flame touches it.

But what ſhall we ſay of that Fountain which is reported to be at the Temple of *Jupiter Hammon*, cold in the Day-time, and hot in the Night? Certainly the Earth about this Fountain, tho' it be looſer than other Earth, yet being compreſs'd by the cold of Night, it ſtrikes out, or ſqueezeth forth, and tranſmits into the Water many Seeds of Fire which it contains, whereby the Water groweth hot; but being looſened by the Heat of Day, it ſucks back again, as it were the ſame Seeds, whereby the Water becometh cold.

It may likewiſe come to paſs, that the Water which is made hot through the ſame Seeds, which are repreſſed in the Night-time, by reaſon of the cold Air, may become cold in the Day-time, the Beams of the Sun paſſing ſo through the Water, that they afford to thoſe Seeds a free Vent into the Air. juſt as Ice is diſſolved by the ſame piercing and rarifying Beams; and though the Effects are contrary, yet may they proceed from the ſame Cauſe, as the melting of Wax, and hardening of Clay.

'Tis from the ſame Cauſe, that Water in Wells is hot in the Winter, cold in the Summer. For in Summer, the Earth is rarify'd by Heat, and exhaleth the Seeds of Heat which are in her; by which means the Water, which is kept cloſe within her, becomes colder. But in Winter the Earth is compreſs'd and condens'd with Cold; whence, if ſhe hath any Heat, ſhe ſqueezeth it forth into the Wells.

Theſe put me in mind to ſpeak of Ice, by which the Water, forgetting, as it were, its natural Fluidity, grows ſolid and hard. Here we muſt conceive, that thoſe Bodies only are capable of being made ſolid, which are made up of Parts of little Bodies, that have plain Surfaces; becauſe, by Excluſion of Vacuity, the Parts cohere beſt with one another; whereas if thoſe little Bodies be round, or joined to round, or intermingled with plain, there is a *Vacuum* contained round about them, into which the round may roll, and the plain bend; whence followeth Softneſs, and (unleſs there be ſome Hooks that ſtay it,) Fluxibility.

Ice therefore is made, either when the round little Bodies, which cauſe Heat, are thruſt out of the Water, and the plain which are in the ſame Water (part whereof are acute-angled, part obtuſe-angled) are thruſt up cloſe together: Or, when thoſe little Bodies are brought thither from without, (and that for the moſt part from the Air, when it is made cold by them,) which being cloſely preſſed, and thruſting out all the round that they meet, bring Solidity into the Water.

CHAP. V.

Of Things Terreſtrial Inanimate.

OUR Method leading us to ſpeak of thoſe things which are generated of Earth and Water; it is in the firſt place manifeſt, that thoſe things are either Animate or Inanimate. Animate things are thoſe which have Senſe, and are vulgarly called Animals; Inanimate things are thoſe which want Senſe, whence, under this Name are comprehended all thoſe, to which the Name of Animal is not applied.

Of this ſort are, firſt, certain moiſt things which are grown conſiſtent, as we ſee Salt, Sulphur, and ill-ſcented Bitumen generated in the Earth. Now theſe are the chief Cauſe, not only of ſubterraneous Heat, and ignivomous Eruptions, as that of *Ætna*, already ſpoken of; but alſo of peſtiferous Exhalations, which, being carried on high, cauſe avernous Lakes and Diſeaſes. Wherefore we will ſpeak more amply of theſe when we treat of Meteors. Concerning Amber, which attracteth Straws, we ſhall ſay ſomething hereafter.

Of this ſort alſo are Metals, which were firſt found out upon occaſion of ſome Woods being burnt by Lightning, or ſome other Fire, which being quite burnt up, the Metals were melted and ſtuck to the Roots, and thereupon dazzled the Eye with their Splendour, and were obſerved to retain the ſame Figure with the things in which they flowed. Whence Men conjectured, That the ſame Metals, being melted by the Force of Fire, might be formed into any Figure, even, acute, or pointed; and by reaſon of the Solidity they had acquired, might be made fit to malleate, or to ſtrike, or for other Uſes.

Moreover, not only Lead, but alſo Gold and Silver lay neglected, as being found leſs commodious for thoſe Uſes, and Braſs only was in eſteem, of which were made Darts, Swords, Axes, Ploughſhares, and the like, until Iron came to be found out; of which then, they choſe rather to make theſe things, by reaſon it was of greater Hardneſs.

Of this ſort alſo are Stones, whereof many are daily generated, many broke off from Rocks; but the main Bodies of Rocks and Stones were made from the Beginning; for by this means, as we ſaid formerly, Mountains were firſt occaſion'd; and ſometimes we find, that the Earth encloſeth in her Bowels, Caverns, Rocks, and broken Stones, as well as Rivers, Channels, and Winds.

Now as Stones are ordinarily diſcerned by their Hardneſs and Solidity, ſo in the firſt Rank, as it were, may be reckoned Adamants, not damnify'd by Blows, (for a Trial of them being made upon Anvils,

Anvils, they ſplit the Iron,) and huge Flints, out of which, by the Stroke of Iron, Fire flieth; for they contain Seeds of Fire cloſe hidden in their Veins; neither doth the cold Force of the Iron hinder, but that being ſtirred up by its Stroke, they meet together in one Body or Spark.

Laſtly, of the inanimate kind are Plants, that is, Herbs and Trees; for the Soul is not without Senſe. And we ſee, that of animate Beings, which from thence are called Animals and living Creatures, ſome have a moving and deſiderative Soul; others a diſcurſive; but Plants neither have Senſe, nor either of thoſe Souls, and therefore cannot be called animate things.

Something indeed they have common with living Creatures, that is Nutrition, Augmentation, Generation; but they perform theſe things by the Impulſe of Nature, not by the Direction of a Soul, and therefore are only Analogically, or for Reſemblance-ſake, ſaid to live and die as Animals. Whence alſo whatſoever may be ſaid of them, may be underſtood by Parity, and in ſome Proportion, by thoſe things which ſhall be ſaid of living Creatures.

I would add, that the original of ſowing and grafting was upon the Obſervation Men took, that Berries and Acorns ſhedding, and falling to the Ground, ſprung up again, and begot new Plants, like thoſe of which ſort they themſelves were. But it is enough to have hinted this.

CHAP. VI.

Of the Loadſtone in particular.

BUT we muſt inſiſt a little longer upon a thing inanimate indeed, yet very admirable; I mean the *Herculean* Stone, which we call alſo Magnet, for that it was firſt found in *Magneſia*. It is much wondred at, by reaſon of its ſingular Power (or Virtue) in attracting Iron.

To explicate this Power, we muſt ſuppoſe three or four Principles; One is, That there is a continual Effluxion of little Bodies out of all things; as, out of coloured and lucid Bodies, flow ſuch as belong to Colour and Light; from hot and cold Bodies, ſuch as belong to Heat and cold Bodies; from odorous Bodies, ſuch as belong to Smell; and ſo of the reſt.

A ſecond is, That there is no Body ſo ſolid but hath little Vacuities contained within it, as is manifeſt by all Bodies through which paſſeth Moiſture, (or Sweat) Light, Sound, Heat, or Cold.

The third, That theſe effluent little Bodies are not alike adaptable to all things. The Sun, by Emiſſion of his Beams, hardens Clay, melts Snow; Fire reſolves Metal, contracts Leather; Water makes hot Iron harder, Leather ſofter; the Olive-tree is bitter to the Taſte of Man, pleaſing to Goats; Marjoram is ſweet to the Smell of Man, hateful to Swine, *&c.*

The fourth, That the little Vacuities are not of the ſame Compaſs in all things, wherefore neither can the ſame be accommodated to all little Bodies. This is manifeſt from the Contextures of the Senſe; for the little Bodies which affect theſe, move not thoſe; or thoſe which affect ſome one way, affect others another; as alſo from the Contextures of all things elſe, for what will penetrate one, will not penetrate another.

From theſe it is underſtood, that the Loadſtone may attract Iron (and Amber, Straw) upon a double Account. For firſt, We may imagine the Atoms that flow out of the Stone, ſo to ſuit with thoſe which flow out of the Iron, that they eaſily knit together; wherefore being daſhed on both Sides on the Bodies of the Iron and the Stone, and bounding back into the middle, they intangle with one another, and draw the Iron along with them.

But foraſmuch as we ſee, that the Iron, which is attracted by the Stone, is itſelf able to attract other Iron; Whether ſhall we ſay, that ſome of the Particles flowing out of the Stone, hitting againſt the Iron, bound back, and theſe are they which catch hold of the Iron; others, inſinuating into it, paſs with Swiftneſs through the empty Pores, and being daſhed againſt the Iron that is next, into which they could not all enter, although they had penetrated it; from thence leaping back to the firſt Iron, they made other Complications like the former; and if any happen'd to penetrate farther, they likewiſe might attract another Iron, and that another, upon the ſame ground.

Moreover, it may be conceived in this manner, that there flow certain little Bodies, as well out of the Magnet, as out of Iron, but more and ſtronger out of the Magnet; whereby it comes to paſs, that the Air is driven away much farther from about the Magnet, than from about the Iron; whereupon there are many more little Vacuities made about it than about the Iron. And becauſe the Iron is placed within the Compaſs of the diſpelled Air, there is much *Vacuum* taken up betwixt it and the Magnet. Whence it happens, that the little Bodies leap forward more freely to be carried into that Place, and thereupon run towards the Magnet; but they cannot go thither in a great and extraordinary Company, without enticing along the things that cohere with them; and ſo the whole Maſs, conſiſting of ſuch coherent things, goes along with them.

It may alſo be ſaid, that the Motion of the Iron is aſſiſted by the Air, through its continual Motion and Agitation. And that firſt from the outward Air, which continually preſſing, and preſſing more vehemently where it moſt abounds, cannot but drive the Iron into that part where there is leſs, or which is more

more vacuous, as towards the Magnet. Next from the inward, which in the ſame manner continually agitating, moving, and deriving, cannot but give it a Motion into that part where there is greateſt Vacuity.

CHAP. VII.

Of the Generation of Animals.

WE come now to ſpeak of Animals, which are of ſo different Natures, ſome walking, others flying, others ſwimming, others creeping; ſome being greater, ſome leſſer; ſome more perfect, ſome leſs perfect, (even we ourſelves alſo being Animals) and yet withal ſtill of one Nature; that Nature diſcovers an admirable Power in the Compoſure of them.

For ſince Nature is, as it were, inſtructed by the things themſelves, and from their orderly Procedure, and compelled by a kind of Neceſſity, or by the Concatenation of Motions, to perform theſe ſo many and ſo different Effects, which we call the Works of Nature; this eſpecially appears in Animals, becauſe the Concatenation of Motions ſhews itſelf to be artificial, chiefly in them, although proceeding from a Subſtance utterly void of Reaſon.

And although the Atoms themſelves be not endued with Reaſon, nor their Motion govern'd by a rational Conduct; yet the Nature of every living Creature in the Beginning of the World grew to be ſuch, that, according to the Temperature of thoſe Motions which the Atoms then had, other Motions ſtill, and others followed; which being cauſed after the ſame manner, ſtill produced their Like. By which means thoſe Motions, which in the Beginning were merely caſual, in proceſs of time became artificial, and ſucceeded after a conſtant and determinate Order.

But to diſcourſe more fully hereupon: Divers Kinds of Animals being produced in the Beginning of the World, it came to paſs, firſt, by their receiving congruous Aliment, that thoſe Atoms, which are adaptable to one another, were attracted and entangled by their Fellow-Atoms, which were already in the Animal, (thoſe which were not adaptable being cut off) ſo that a peculiar Nature to every one of them, *viz.* ſuch a Compound of ſuch Atoms grows up firſt, and at length becomes confirmed.

Next, That by the perpetual Motion of Atoms, and their intrinſecal Ebullition, ſome of them being ſtill thruſt out of their Place, and running into the genital Parts, meet there from all Places; and, there being a Diſtinction of Sexes, after mutual Appetition and Coition, are received in the Womb.

After this, that the Atoms, or ſeminal Bodies compounded of them, and flowing from all Parts, (whence therefore [a] *the Seed may be conceived as ſomething incorporeal*; not in Rigor indeed, becauſe only *Vacuum* is truly ſuch, but *in the moſt familiar Senſe of the Word, by which we term any thing incorporeal, which eaſily penetrates through the moſt ſolid Bodies*;) that the Atoms, I ſay, are thoſe ſeminal little Bodies, which thus flowed from all Parts, did therefore (this Motion continuing) withdraw themſelves from the Tumult of others, and, like Atoms, drawing their Like; therefore thoſe that come from the Head would betake themſelves to one place, thoſe from the Breaſt into the next place, and thoſe which come from every other Part, each rank themſelves in their diſtinct Situation; and ſo at length a little Animal is formed like that whence the Seed was taken.

Moreover, That this little Animal is nouriſhed and increaſeth by the Attraction of like Atoms, or little Bodies meeting together in the Womb; until the Womb being wearied, and no longer fit to nouriſh them, ſlackens its Motions, or rather opens the Door, and gives them leave to go out.

Further, That this Animal being after the ſame manner fully grown up, and the continual Agitation of the Atoms purſuing one another, not ceaſing, it begetteth another like thing, and that other conſequently another.

At length, That Nature being by little and little accuſtomed hereunto, learneth, as it were, ſo to propagate Animals like in their Kinds, as that from the Motion and perpetual Series of Atoms, it derives a Neceſſity of operating continually in this manner.

Thus much for the Generation of thoſe Animals which are made by Propagation; as for thoſe which we ſometimes ſee produced otherwiſe, they may be generated after the ſame manner, as all things at firſt were; whether ſome Seeds of them were remaining, formed from the very Beginning; or whether daily formed, either within or without the Animals themſelves; and if within, then thruſt out, (as in the Generation of Worms and Flies, leaving behind them ſome Remainders, either in the Earth, or elſewhere; of which, other Animals, of the ſame Kinds, are begotten.)

What I ſaid of the Defluxion of Seed, I mean not only on the Parts of the Male, but of the Female alſo, ſeeing that ſhe likewiſe emitteth, having *Paraſtatæ*, or Teſticles, though placed in a contrary way, and therefore is ſhe deſirous of Coition.

And this indeed ſeems neceſſary to be granted towards giving the Reaſon, why a Male or Female is formed; for nothing can be alledged more proper than this, that whereas the young one conſiſts of the Seeds both of its Sire and Dam, if that of the Sire predominate, it proves Male; if that of the Dam, Female.

Hence alſo may be given a Cauſe of the Reſemblance which it hath to either, or both its Parents; for

[a] Laert. 10. 75.

for if the Female with a ſudden Force attracts, and ſnatcheth away the Seed of the Male, then the young one becometh like the Dam; if both alike, it becometh like both, but mixtly.

If you demand, Why Children are ſometimes like their Grandfathers, or Great Grandfathers? the Reaſon ſeems to be this; the Seed is made up of many little Bulks, which are not always all of them diſſolved into Atoms, or neareſt to Atoms, in the firſt or next Generations; but at length, in ſome one of the following Generations, they unfold themſelves in ſuch manner, as that, what they might have done in the Immediate, they exhibit only in the Remote.

But whence comes Barrenneſs? From the Seed's being either thinner than it ought, ſo as it cannot faſten on the Place; or thicker, ſo as it cannot eaſily be commixed: For there is requiſite a due Proportion betwixt the Seeds of the Male, and of the Female; whence it happens, that many times the ſame Man or Woman, who are incapable of having Children by one, may yet have them by another. I omit other Reaſons, as from the Aliment, ſince it is manifeſt, that Aliment, by which Seed is increaſed, differs from that whereby it is attenuated and waſted.

CHAP. VIII.

Of the Uſe of Parts in Animals.

HENCE follows, That the Parts of Animals were not from the very Beginning of Things framed, after the Faſhion they have now, for thoſe Ends and Uſes whereto we ſee them now ſerve, (for there was no Cauſe to foreſee this End, nor any things precedent to which that Cauſe attending, and thence taking a conjectural Aim, might deſign any ſuch Faſhion;) but becauſe it happen'd that the Parts were made, and did exiſt as we now ſee them, therefore they came to be applied to theſe Uſes rather than to others, and being firſt made, themſelves became afterwards the Occaſion of their own Uſefulneſs, and inſinuated the Knowledge of it into the Minds of the Uſers.

The Eyes therefore were not made to ſee, nor the Ears to hear, nor the Tongue to ſpeak, nor the Hands to work, nor the Feet to go; for all theſe Members were made before there was Seeing, Hearing, Speaking, Working, Going: but theſe became their Functions after they had been made.

For the Soul being formed together with and within the Body, and moreover being capable of Senſe, the Eye happen'd to be made of ſuch a Contexture, that the Soul, being applied unto it, could not but produce the ſenſitive Act of Seeing; and the Ear of ſuch, as that being joined to it, it could not but produce Hearing; and there being within the Body, made together with it, an animal Spirit capable to impel and move; the Tongue happen'd to be framed after ſuch a Contexture, as that this Spirit coming to it, could not but move it, and break the Air (which at the ſame time it breathed forth) into Words. In like manner, the Hands, the Feet, and the reſt of the Limbs were ſo faſhion'd, as that this Spirit ruſhing into them could not but give this Motion to one, and that to the other.

As for the Tendons, which are plainly the Organs by which the Parts are ſtirred, it is evident that the Actions are not ſtrong, becauſe theſe are big; nor remiſs, becauſe they are ſmall; but the Actions are ſuch or ſuch, according to the Occaſions of frequent or ſeldom uſing them: But the Bigneſs of the Tendons follows the Quantity of the Motion, ſo that thoſe which are exerciſed are in good plight, and grow conveniently bigger; thoſe which lie idle thrive not, but waſte away.

Wherefore the Tendons were not ſo formed by Nature, as if it were better that they ſhould be ſtrong and big for the Diſcharge of vehement Functions; weak and ſlender for the weaker, (for we ſee even Apes have Fingers faſhion'd like ours;) but, as was ſaid before, thoſe which are exerciſed muſt of neceſſity be big, becauſe they are well nouriſh'd; and thoſe which are not exerciſed, ſmall, becauſe they are leſs nouriſhed.

For Confirmation hereof may be alledged, that moſt Parts are ſometimes directed to thoſe Uſes for which no Man will ſay they were deſign'd; and this, when either Neceſſity, or Occaſion, or ſome Conjecture taken elſewhere, lays them open to us. Men would not ſo much as dream of fighting with Weapons, if they had not firſt fought with their Hands; nor of holding Shields before them, if they had not firſt felt Wounds that were to be avoided; nor of making ſoft Beds, if they had not firſt ſlept on the Ground; nor of making Cups, if they had not drunk Water firſt out of their Hands; nor of making Houſes, if they had not been acquainted with the Uſe of Caves; and ſo of the reſt.

CHAP. IX.

Of the Soul, the intrinſecal Form of Animals.

LET us now come to the Soul, by which Animals are, and from it have their Denomination. In the firſt place we muſt conceive it to be corporeal, [b] *ſome moſt tenuious or ſubtle Body, made up of moſt ſubtle Particles.* Doubtleſs *they who affirm it is incorporeal, beſides that they abuſe the Word, play the Fools exceedingly:* for except it were ſuch, it could neither act nor ſuffer; it could not act, for it could not touch any thing; it could not ſuffer, for it could not be touch'd by any thing, but *would be as a mere Vacuity, which, as I ſaid before, is ſuch that it can neither*

[b] Laert. 10. 63.

ther act nor suffer any thing, but only affords a free Motion to Bodies passing through it.

[c] *Now that the Soul acts and suffers something, is manifestly declared by those things which happen about its Senses and Affections*; as also by the Motions wherewith it impels the Members, and, from within, governeth the whole Animal, turneth it about, transports it with Dreams; and, in general, by its Union and Consent, to mix in one Compound with this grosser Matter, which usually, upon this Occasion, is more particularly termed the Body.

I say it is a most tenuious and subtle Body, for that [d] *it is made up of most tenuious, or most subtle little Bodies; which, as they are for the most part exceeding smooth, so are they very round*; otherwise they could not permeate and cohere intrinsecally with the whole Body, and with its Parts, as with Veins, Nerves, Entrails, and the rest. Which is manifest even from hence; for that when the Soul goeth out of the Body, we find not that any thing is taken off from the Whole, neither as to its Figure nor Weight; but like Wine, when its Flower or Spirit is gone; or Unguent, that hath lost its Scent; for the Wine and Unguent retain the same Quantity, as if nothing of them were perished. So that the Soul, if you should imagine her to be rolled up together, might be contained almost in a Point, or the very least of Places.

Nevertheless, though it be of such a subtle Contexture, yet is it mixed and compounded of four several Natures: for we are to conceive it a thing made up and contemperated of something fiery, something aerial, something flatuous, and a fourth which hath no Name; by means whereof, it is endued with a sensitive Faculty.

The Reason is this, because when a thin Breath departs out of the Body of a dying Person, this Breath is mixed with Heat, and Heat attracts Air, there being no Heat without Air. Thus we have three of those things which make up the Soul; and because there is none of these three from which the sensitive Motions can be derived, we must therefore admit a fourth, though without a Name, whereunto the sensitive Faculty may be attributed.

This may be confirmed from hence; for that there is a certain Breath or Gale, as it were, and Wind, which is Cause of the Body's Motion; Air, of its Rest; something hot, Cause of the Heat that is in it; there must likewise be some fourth thing, the Cause of its Sense.

Now the Necessity of this fourth being manifest, upon another Account, Anger, by which the Heart boils, and Fervor sparkles in the Eyes, convinceth that there is Heat in it; Fear, exciting Horror throughout the Limbs, argues a cold or copious Breath or Wind; and the calm State of the Breast, and Serenity of the Countenance, demonstrates there is Air.

[c] Lucret. 3. v. 169.

Whence it comes to pass, that those Animals in which Heat is predominant are angry, as Lions; those in which a cold Breath, are timorous, as Harts; those in which an aerial Portion, are more quiet, and, as it were, of a middle Condition between Lions and Harts, as Oxen. The same Difference is also to be observ'd amongst Men.

Lastly, Although the Soul be a mix'd and compounded thing, and this fourth nameless thing, or sensitive Faculty, be the chief of its Parts, (it being, in a manner, the Soul of the Soul; for from it the Soul hath that it is a Soul, and it distinguishes Animals from other things, as their intrinsecal Form and essential Difference) nevertheless these Parts are so perfectly contemperated, as that of them is made one Substance, and that most subtle and most coherent; neither, as long as the Soul is in the Body, can these four be separated from one another, any more than Odor, Heat, or Sapor, which are natural to any inward Part of the Body, can be separated from it.

Now this Substance being contained in the Body, and coherent, as it were, with it, is in a manner upheld by it; and is likewise the Cause of all the Faculties, Passions and Motions in the Body, and mutually containeth the Body, and governeth it; and is moreover the Cause of its Health and Preservation, and can no more be sever'd from the Body without the Dissolution thereof, than Scent can be divided from Frankincense without Destruction of its Nature.

I shall not need to take notice, that one of the natural Philosophers seems, without any Reason, to conceive, that there are as many Parts of the Soul as of the Body, which are mutually applied to one another. For the Substance of the Soul being so subtle, and the Bulk of the Body so gross, doubtless its Principles must be more subtle and fewer than those of the Body; so that every one of these coheres, not with another, but each of them to little Bulks and Heaps, as it were, that consist of a greater Number. Whence it comes to pass, that sometimes we feel not when Dust, or a Gnat lights upon the Body, nor a Mist in the Night, nor the Spider's Thread, nor Feathers, nor Thistle-down, or the like, when we meet with them; it being requisite, that more of the little Bodies which are mingled with the Parts of the Soul be stirred up, before they can feel any thing that toucheth or striketh them.

We must further observe, that there is some internal Part of the Body of such a Temperature, as that where the Soul adheres to it, it receives an extraordinary Perfection. This Perfection is the Mind, the Intellect, or that which we call the rational Part of the Soul; because (the other Part diffused through the whole Body being irrational) this only discourseth.

Now forasmuch as the irrational Part is twofold, Sense, and Affection or Appetite; and the Intellect is between

[d] Ibid. 3. v. 206.

between both; for it hath the Senſe going before it to judge of things, and the Appetite coming after it, that by its own Judgment it may direct it; we ſhall therefore, being to ſpeak of each, begin with the Senſe.

CHAP. X.

Of Senſe in general, which is the Soul (as it were) of of the Soul.

TO ſpeak therefore firſt of Senſe in general; we muſt obſerve, that the Soul poſſeſſeth it after ſuch a manner, as that both to have it, and to uſe it, it requireth the Body, as being the Thing wherein it is contained, and with which it operates. *Now the* [e] *Body affording this to the Soul*, viz. *That it hath a Principle of Senſation, and is able to uſe it, becometh itſelf alſo participant of this Effect, which dependeth upon that Principle*, (that is to ſay, it feeleth or perceiveth) *but not of all things that belong thereto*, as of Tenuity, and the like.

Wherefore it is not to be wonder'd at, that *the Body, when the Soul is departed, remaineth void of Senſe; for it did not of itſelf poſſeſs this Faculty, but only made it ready for the Soul, which was congenious with it; which Soul, by means of the Faculty co-effected in the Body, exerciſing, by a peculiar Motion of hers, the Act of Senſation, giveth Senſe, not only to itſelf, but to the Body alſo, by reaſon of their Neighbourhood, Coheſion, or Union with one another.*

[f] Thus it comes to paſs, that not the Soul alone, nor the Body alone, perceive or feel, but rather both together. And though the Principle of Senſation be in the Soul, yet whoever holds, that the Body doth not perceive or feel together with the Soul; and believeth that the Soul, intermingled with the whole Body, is able of herſelf to perform this Motion of Senſation, he oppugns a thing moſt manifeſt.

[g] And they who ſay, (as ſome do) that the Eyes ſee not any thing, but it is the Soul only that ſeeth through them, as thro' open Doors, obſerve not, that if the Eyes were like Doors, we might ſee things much better if our Eyes were out, as if the Doors were taken away.

Now, that which here ſeems the greateſt Difficulty being this, How it comes to paſs that a thing Senſitive, or capable of Senſe, may be generated of Principles that are wholly inſenſitive, or void of Senſe, we are to take Notice, that this is to be aſcribed to ſome neceſſary and peculiar Magnitude, Figure, Motion, Poſition, and Order of thoſe Principles, as was before declared when we treated of Qualities; for the Faculty of Senſe is one of the Qualities, which, that it appear where it was not, requireth that there be ſome Addition, Detraction, Tranſpoſition, and, in a word, a new Contexture, able to do that which the former could not.

Yet we muſt not therefore believe, that Stones, Wood, Clods of Earth, and ſuch like Compounds, perceive or feel; for, as other Qualities, ſo this alſo is not begotten of every Mixtion, or of the Mixtion of any kind of things, but it is wholly requiſite, that the Principles be endued with ſuch a Bigneſs, ſuch Figures, Motions, Orders, and the like Accidents; whence it comes to paſs, that even Clods of Earth, Wood, and the like, when putrified by Rain, and heated by the Sun, the Poſition and Order of their Parts being changed, turn into Worms, and other ſenſitive things: This may be underſtood from the ſeveral Aliments, which being applied to the Bodies of living Creatures, and variouſly altered, do, in like manner, of inſenſitive become ſenſitive; as Wood applied to Fire, of not-burning becometh burning.

And that it may appear, how much ſome are miſtaken, who aſſert, that the Principles whereof Senſe and ſenſitive things conſiſt, muſt be ſenſitive; conſider, that if they were ſuch, they muſt be ſoft; foraſmuch as no hard, or ſolid thing is capable of Senſe, and conſequently, as we argued before, they muſt be corruptible; becauſe, unleſs they are ſolid, they may be diminiſhed, and ſo loſe their Nature, whereas the Principles of things, as we have often heretofore alledged, muſt be incorruptible and permanent.

It may otherwiſe be proved thus: If we allow the Principles to be incorruptible, we cannot conceive them to be ſenſitive; neither as Parts, for Parts ſevered from the Whole, feel not; neither as Wholes, for then they would be Animals, and conſequently mortal, or corruptible, which is contrary to the *Hypotheſis*. Moreover, if we ſhould admit, that they are both Animals, and immortal, it would follow, that no ſuch Animals as we now behold (that is, of a peculiar kind, and agreeing in one *Species*) could be generated, but only a Heap of ſeveral little Animals.

Furthermore, if ſenſitive things muſt be generated of ſenſitive, that is, like of like, it will be neceſſary, as we ſaid before, that a Man (for Example) conſiſt of Principles that laugh, weep, ratiocinate, diſcourſe of the Mixture of Things, and of themſelves, enquiring of what Things they conſiſt, and theſe being like to corruptible Things, muſt conſiſt of others, and thoſe likewiſe of others, into infinite.

Now it being well known, that in the Bodies of Animals there are five diſtinct Organs of Senſe, by which the Soul (or the ſenſitive Faculty in her) apprehends, and perceives ſenſible Objects ſeveral ways, that is, by Seeing, Hearing, Smelling, Taſting, Touching; nothing hinders, but that we allow five Senſes, the Sight, the Hearing, the Smell, the Taſte, and the Touch.

All this Diverſity ariſeth from hence, that on one ſide the *Species* of Colours, and viſible Things, as alſo Sounds, Odors, Sapors, and other Qualities;

[e] Lucr. 10. 64. [f] Ibid. [g] Lucret. 3. v. 351.

are made up of little Bodies, endued with particular Magnitudes, Figures, Positions, Orders, and Motions. On the other side, the Organs of Sight, Hearing, and the rest of the Senses, are of such Contextures as contain little Vacuities or Pores, which have likewise peculiar Magnitudes, Positions, and Orders; and these Organs being various, have several Aptnesses and Proportions, to which the several little Bodies of the Qualities are commensurated, so as some can receive into themselves these, others those; whence it happens, that only these little Bodies, of which the Species of Colour consist, are capable of penetrating into the Organ of Sight, and to move and affect it after thar manner; but so are not the little Bodies, which are only capable of piercing, moving, and affecting the Organ of Hearing, or those which can only affect that of the Touch; and so of the rest.

Hence also, when we observe, that not only Animals of different kinds, but even amongst Men themselves, some are not affected with the same sensible Objects, we may understand that there is not in them the same kind of Contexture. And since in all little Bodies blended and mingled together, some will naturally agree with others, some not; therefore, neither can the Impression and Apprehensions, or Sensation of the same Quality be made in all Animals; neither can a sensible Object affect all Animals alike with all its Parts, but each one with those Qualities only which are suitable to their Senses, and convenient to affect them.

I shall add nothing concerning the common Objects of Sense, as Magnitude, Figure, Motion, and the like, which are perceptible by more Senses than one; for what we said of them in the Canonick, is sufficient.

CHAP. XI.

Of Sight, and of the Images which glide into it.

BEING to speak something of every Sense, we must begin with Sight, whose Organ manifestly is the Eye; nor is it less evident, that *the external Appearances and Forms of Things, are therefore seen by us*[h]; *because something glides from without, or from the Objects into us, that is, into our Eye.* But before we undertake to shew, that this is far more probable than what others assert, we must declare, whether there be any thing which comes from the things themselves into our Eye, and of what Nature it is.

[i] First then we affirm, that nothing hinders, but that certain "Effluxions of Atoms, perpetually flying in an uninterrupted Course, are sent from the "Surfaces of Bodies, in which also the same Position and same Order may be preserved, which "was found in the Superficies and Solids of the very "Bodies themselves; whence such Effluxions are as it "were Forms, Figures, or Images of these Bodies "from which they are derived, and resembling them "in all their Lineaments; and, moreover, are far "more subtle than any of the things themselves, "which by them are made visible to us. This then "is the Nature of those Forms or Figures which we "use to call Idols or Images.

"[k] Nor is it difficult, that such kind of Contextures "should be found in the middle Air, or ambiently "diffused Space; nor, that there should be in the "things themselves, and especially in the Atoms, "certain Dispositions, rendring them apt to make "Representations, which are only meer empty Ca"vities, and superficial Tenuities of no determinable "Depth." [l] But in this Place, we speak of those Effluviums, which are as it were thin Films, or Skins stript from the remaining Bodies.

Nor yet is it difficult, that Images of this Nature should flow from the outsides of Bodies, as is hence proved, that [m] there flowing ever something from the inner Parts of Bodies, as Smell, Heat, Cold, (as we hinted formerly) it is far more easy, that something should flow, or be carried away from their outmost Parts; since the Atoms, as well in one as the other, are in a perpetual Endeavour of disentangling themselves to get away: But in the former Case, being covered with other Atoms, they find Resistance; whereas, in the latter, being placed in the Fore-front of the Body, they find none. Add, that hence also they gain the Advantage of flying out from the Superficies in the same Order and Rank which they held there; whereas, those which come from within, cannot but change their Postures, being often disturbed in the way, by their anfractuous Passages.

[n] Now, that there are indeed such Effluviums, may hence be proved, that if the Sun-beams pass thorough Curtains, red, (for Example,) or if any other Colour, drawn before the Theatres, such subtle Emissions are sent from them, as make all things behind them appear so colour'd. But the Experiment from Looking-glasses is more than sufficient; for these clearly shew, that there are indeed such Effluviums emitted from Bodies, in regard, the Bodies being present, they light upon the Glass; if any thing intervene, they are hindred from coming thither; if the Bodies be moved, they move also; if inverted, they also are inverted; if the Bodies retire, they also go back; if they are taken away, they wholly disappear.

[o] But "forasmuch as there is no Point of Time, "in which these Images flow not into the Medium, "doubtless their Production must be made in a "Point of Time, and be perpetually flowing out at "the Superficies in a continued Stream. For the "Reason why they cannot be discerned apart, is, be"cause, when one Image goes away, another cohe"rently

[h] Laert. 10. 49. [i] Laert. 4. 46. [k] Ibid. [l] Lucret. 4. v. 35. [m] Lucret. loc. cit. [n] Ibid. [o] Laert. 10. 48.

" rently ſucceeds, and ſupplies its room; and inſtant-
" ly preſerves the ſame Order and Poſition of Atoms,
" which is in the Superficies of the ſolid Body, and
" that for a long time, and at a great diſtance,
" (although at laſt they are confounded.)" Whence it comes to paſs, that the Body always appeareth with the ſame Accidents, and in the ſame Form.

I mean here, that Form which is proper to the Body, [p] and is conceived to be a Collection (as it were) of Parts, diſpoſed in a certain Order, or, (as it were) the Superficies left behind by the Image, which flies away from it.

It may here ſeem ſtrange, that the Body ſeemeth no more to be diminiſhed, than as if nothing at all were taken off from it; but this is by reaſon of their extraordinary Tenuity, which cannot be underſtood, without firſt conceiving the Tenuity of the Atoms. Concerning this, we inſtanc'd formerly, in an Animal ſo ſmall, as if we ſuppoſed it divided into three Parts, each of them will be indiſcernible; and yet for Performance of thoſe animal Functions which it diſchargeth, it muſt neceſſarily be made up of ſuch Parts and Particles as can hardly be form'd without innumerable Myriads of Atoms.

Not to mention, in Confirmation of the Probability hereof, that there are many odorous things, out of which, though ſomething inceſſantly flows, yet for a long time nothing appeareth to be diminiſhed, either as to their Figure or Weight, notwithſtanding that the Effluviums out of them are far groſſer, and more numerous than theſe Images which flow out along with them; yet are ſo inconſiderable a Part of the Things that flow out as no Man can expreſs.

Wonderful alſo may ſeem their Celerity in flying out; but this muſt be underſtood by the Celerity of the Atoms, formerly declared; for theſe Images, by reaſon of the Tenuity we ſpoke of, being nothing elſe but certain Contextures of ſimple Atoms, [q] " have
" a Celerity beyond all Imagination, and their Paſ-
" ſage through the tranſparent Place, which is round
" about them, is like that which is through the infinite
" Spaces, there being not much Difference; becauſe
" they meet few or no Obſtacles in the Space which
" ſurrounds them." Certainly, if the Light of the Sun and other Stars can come ſo ſwiftly (as we obſerve) from Heaven, the Celerity of theſe Images ought to be, if not greater, yet not leſs, by reaſon of the Atoms which ſtand in the Surface of the Body, ready for Motion, and have nothing to retard them.

CHAP. XII.

That Seeing is performed by means of thoſe Images.

THESE [r] things preſuppoſed, ſome conceive, that " external and diſtinct things are therefore ſeen
" by us, becauſe they imprint in our Eye the Image
" of their Colour or Figure; the Air intervening be-
" tween them and us, performing the Office of a
" Seal, by means of which this Impreſſion is made.
" Others think, that this is effected by the Rays or
" Effluviums ſent from us or our Eyes to the Object;
" it is far more probable, that it is performed by theſe
" Images we ſpoke of, which coming from the
" things, or their Colour and Figure, flow into us,
" and preſerving a congruous Magnitude, enter into
" our Eyes, and ſtrike our Sight with a very ſwift
" Motion."

This Sigillation (or Impreſſion) indeed is a thing extream hard, and perhaps impoſſible to be explicated; and as for the Emiſſion of Rays out of our Eyes, it is unimaginable what the Looking-glaſſes ſend out of them, that they alſo ſhould have Images painted in them; or what that is, which in a Moment is ſent from the Eye into the whole vaſt Circumference of the Heavens.

To omit, that ſince in Hearing, Smelling, Taſting, Touching, we ſend nothing out of ourſelves, but receive ſomething from without, which cauſeth a Senſation of itſelf, (for of itſelf a Voice comes into the Ears, Odors into the Noſtrils, Sapors into the Palate, and things which may be touched, are applied to the Body) it is obvious to be conceived, that neither is any thing ſent out from our Eyes, but that ſomething (*viz.* thoſe Images) comes into our Eyes from the things themſelves.

But the Soul, inaſmuch as it is in the Eye, cannot but ſee, that is, apprehend the Colour and outward Form of that thing which is preſented to it: For by reaſon of the polite and perſpicuous Contexture of the Organ, it receiveth the Image of the thing, and is ſtruck by it according to all the preſented Parts.

[s] And foraſmuch as thoſe things are beautiful which delight the Sight, thoſe deformed which offend it; how ſhould we imagine this to be, but that the Images which come from the one conſiſt of Bodies, which, by their Smoothneſs, are gently accommodated to the Contexture of the Eye; but thoſe which come from the other, conſiſt of ſuch, as by their ugly Figure, rend the Contexture?

[t] And when the Eye is troubled with the Jaundice, how comes it, that all things ſeem yellow? but that the Images, in their Application to the Eye, receive a Tincture; or they may be ſtain'd alſo without the Eye, coming amongſt the yellow little Bodies or Images, which proceed in like manner from the Eye.

[u] But how happens it, that we ſee not only the Colour and Form of a Body, but we diſcern its Diſtance alſo? This proceeds from the Air, which the Image drives on before it; for though it comes to the Eye exceeding ſwiftly, and in imperceptible time; yet it comes thither, and touches upon it orderly; and

[p] Laert. 10. 50. [q] Laert. 10. 47. [r] Laert. 10. 49. [s] Lucret. lib. 4. v. 333. [t] Ibid. [u] Ibid. 270.

and by how much the longer it is in doing so, so much the more distant the thing appears to be; by how much the sooner, so much the nearer.

Hence also may be given a Reason, [w] why an Image seems to be beyond the Looking-glass; for as when a Man, from any Place within a House, looks upon a thing that is without Doors, the Air cometh to him imprinted, as well that without to the Door, as that within from the Door: So to him who looketh in a Glass, cometh successively as well that Air which is from the Glass to the Eye, as that which is from the Object to the Glass.

Hence also may be given a Reason, why, [x] being in the dark, we can see the things that are in the Light; but being in the Light, cannot see those that are in the dark. For the enlightened Air succeeding the dark, the Eye informed by it is enabled to see; but not when the dark succeedeth the enlightned.

How comes it, [y] that the Images in a Glass seem to walk as we do? This happens, by reason of the varied Parts of the Glass, from which several Parts there must necessarily be made a Reflection upon the Eye, and thereupon the Images seem to walk as we.

If you ask, [z] why the Image which goeth from us to the Glass represents not the Back-side, but the Fore-side, and that so, as that the right Part is on the left Side, and the Left on the Right; take notice, that this happens on the very same Fashion as if the Image of a Man, made of Chalk or Clay, not quite dried, should be clapt to a Ball or Pillar.

But if the Image be reflected [a] from one Glass to another, and thence to the Eye, the Situation of the Parts is restored, so as the right Parts appear on the right Side, and the Left on the Left, (and by this means it may be brought to pass, especially if there be many Glasses, that such things as are hidden behind something, and out of Sight, may be brought to View) which may also happen even in one Glass, if it hath little Sides, whereof one reflects the Image to the other.

Thus much concerning the Sight; to which also some things, formerly hinted in our Discourse of the Criteries and of Qualities, have Reference.

CHAP. XIII.

Of Hearing.

CONcerning Hearing, we must repeat what we have touched formerly, that, it being confess'd, the Ear is the Organ of the Hearing, as Seeing is perform'd by the coming of something into the Eye; "so *Hearing* also is [b] perform'd in the Ear by an E-"mission of something convey'd thither from the "thing that speaks, sounds, makes a Noise, or is "some other way disposed to stir up the Sense of "Hearing." This kind of Effluvium, as it affects this Sense, is called Sound.

Moreover, this [c] *Effluvium*, either in the Mouth of the Speaker, or generally in the thing struck upon and making a Noise, *is shatter'd there by Motion into innumerable little Pieces of the same Figure*, ([d] round, if the whole Effluvium were round; inequilateral and triangular, if the first Effluvium were such,) in like manner as we observe, that little Drops are made when we pour any thing out of Bottles, or when Cloath-workers spirt Water upon their Cloaths.

"These little Pieces, [e] or small Bulks, are there-"upon dispersed in such manner, as that they pre-"serve a certain mutual Conformity to one ano-"ther, (and strike the hearing of several Persons a-"like, so as they all seem to hear one and the same "Sound, though it be not the same, but like only,) "and keep fast also within themselves, each by a "particular Coherence, whereby it comes to pass "that they are known to have reference to that "thing from which they were sent forth; and, for "the most part, make such a Sensation as was first "made by that which sent forth the Sound, (as when "the Sound comes not from far into the Ear, and "passeth through a free Space.) But otherwise, (as "by reason of a great Distance, or some Partition,) "something from without bringeth in the Sound "confusedly only. For without a kind of Confor-"mity and Coherence, deduced and preserv'd from the "very thing sounding, there could never be any di-"stinct hearing.

"Yet [f] must we not imagine, that when the "Voice *(for Example,)* is once sent forth into the "Air, the Air is presently imprinted or formed, "either by that Voice, or by some others made by "it, into like Voices; which (as one [g] expresseth it, "fly away together, as one Jay with another, as "saith the Proverb.) It were too great a Task, that "the Air should be designed for any such Employ-"ment; but as soon as ever the Blow is made with-"in us when we speak, the Voice being articulated "out of certain little Pieces, of a most spiritual and "nimble Effluxion, fit for the Office, and arriving "at the Ear, causeth hearing in us."

That these little [h] Pieces which insinuate into the Ear have a Figure, may be argued, by reason that Sound could not affect the hearing pleasantly and unpleasantly, if it had not such a Smoothness as suits with the Contexture of the Organ, nor such a Roughness as rends the Organ. This may better be understood, by comparing the grating of a Saw with the Sweetness of a Lute, or the hoarse cawing of a Crow with the sweet Melody of a dying Swan.

Not to repeat some things spoken [i] heretofore, which seem to conduce hereunto, I shall only touch this Difficulty, How it comes to pass, that Sounds in the Night-time are both louder and clearer than in the Day? To solve this, we must assume what is

[w] Ibid. Plut. Plac. Phil. [x] Ibid. [y] Ibid. [z] Ibid. [a] Ibid. [b] Laert. 10. 52. [c] Laert. loc. cit. [d] Lucret. ib. [e] Laert. ib. [f] Ibid. [g] Democr. [h] Lucret. ib. [i] Plut. Symp. quæst. 8. 37.

is manifeſt from our Diſcourſe formerly, That Motion is made through Vacuum, and that there is much of Vacuum ſcattered up and down through the little Bodies, or Bulks of Air, which are made up of Atoms; and that in the Day-time it being hot, and theſe little Bodies rarify'd, and the Atoms diffuſed, the little Vacuities contained in them muſt neceſſarily become narrower and ſtraiter; but in the Night, it being cold, and theſe little Bodies preſt up cloſe, and the Atoms crouded together, the Vacuities become larger. This is evident from all things, which in a Veſſel are boiled, ſoftned, and melted; but if they take up a larger Place, they cool, return to their Temper, and become contracted.

Hence therefore it happens, that [k] the Sound in the Day-time paſſing thorough the dilated Air, and lighting upon many Bodies in its way, is either quite ſtopp'd, or torn, and much knock'd and worn away. But when in the Night it paſſeth through a Space free from Bodies, it arrives at the hearing by a full, ready, and uninterrupted Career, and with that Swiftneſs preſerves its Clearneſs and Diſtinction.

From the [l] ſame Ground it ſprings, that empty Veſſels, being ſtruck, ſound; the full ſound not; and that the more ſmall Bodies, as Gold, make a low dull Noiſe; the leſs compact, as Braſs, a greater and clearer.

CHAP. XIV.
Of Smelling.

AS concerning *Smelling*, we muſt underſtand, that *Odor (as was in* [m] *Proportion declared concerning Sound or Voice, when we treated of hearing) would not make any Impreſſion or Stamp of itſelf, unleſs from the odorous thing there were deduced ſome little Bodies or Bulks, ſo commenſurated to the Organ of Smelling, (the Noſtrils) as to be able to move and affect it.*

That Odors flow and come out of things, is manifeſt, foraſmuch as all things eſteemed odorous have a ſtronger Scent,, being broken, pounded, or diſſolved by Fire, than whilſt they are whole. For the Stock of theſe little Bodies, which are fit to move the Smell, is pent up, as it were, within the odorous Body, and bound; but the Body being broken, pounded, or burnt, it leaps forth, and ſpreads itſelf like a Vapour or Cloud, and affects the Smelling, if it can light upon it.

It uſeth to affect the Smell two [n] ways, either *unquietly and unſuitably*, whence proceed unpleaſant Odors; or *ſmoothly and aptly*, whence pleaſant Odors. For ſome of the little Bodies of Odor having a ſmooth and even Surface; others, more or greater Angles than is fit; thence it happens, that ſome Odors affect the Organ with Delight, as touching it ſmoothly; others, with a kind of Pain, as if they tore it.

There [o] muſt needs be a Difference betwixt the Penetrations of theſe little Bodies into the Noſtrils, when Carcaſes are burnt, and when the Theatre is newly ſtrew'd with Saffron. And it may be conceived after this manner. As the Hand, if we put Down to it, preſſeth upon it; but if a Nettle, ſnatcheth itſelf back; (for the Smoothneſs of the one, and the Roughneſs of the other, by its Prickles, affect two different Ways,) in like manner the little Bodies which proceed out of the Saffron, are ſmooth; thoſe which out of the Carcaſs, prickly; ſo as the firſt gently ſtroke and delight the Noſtrils, the other prick them, and make them draw back.

Moreover,[p] there being ſo great Variety of Tempers amongſt Animals, (even amongſt Men, one in reſpect of another) and the Contexture of the Organ of Smelling being different in ſeveral Perſons, it ought not to ſeem ſtrange, that ſome Scents pleaſe ſome; others, others; by reaſon of the Diſſimilitudes of the Figures of the little Bodies of which they conſiſt; nor that Bees delight in Flowers, Vultures in Carrion; or that Dogs find out by the Scent which way Beaſts have gone, which we cannot perceive; as if in paſſing they left a Steam which cannot ſtrike our Smell.

CHAP. XV.
Of Taſting.

WE come next to ſpeak of *Taſting:* Whereas it it is manifeſt, that the Organ thereof is the Tongue and Palate; and that [q] we then taſte and perceive the Sapor in our Mouth, when chewing the Meat, we ſqueeze out the Juice, (as when we preſs with the Hand a Sponge full of Water) and thereupon the Juice which is ſqueezed forth, is diſtributed through the Pores, or complicated Holes of the Tongue and Palate; we may in general aſſert the Sapor to be ſweet, the little Bodies whereof are accommodated to the Organ, gently and ſmoothly; on the contrary, that to be bitter, ſalt, ſharp, acid, ſowre, hot, *&c.* which roughly and unſuitably. For neither could Honey or Milk affect the Tongue pleaſantly, nor Wormwood or Centory unpleaſantly, if it were not that thoſe conſiſt of ſmoother and rounder little Bodies, theſe of more harſh and hooked; ſo as thoſe touch it gently, theſe prick and rend it.

He therefore [r] not defines the thing amiſs, who ſaith, That the Atoms, which make a ſweet Sapor, are round, and of a convenient Size; thoſe which a ſowre, large, thoſe which a harſh, multangular, and nothing round; thoſe which a ſharp, acute, conical, crooked, not ſlender, nor round; thoſe which an acid, round, ſlender, corner'd, crooked; thoſe which a ſalt, corner'd, diſtorted, æquicrural; thoſe

[k] Ibid. [l] Ibid. [m] Laert. 10. 53. [n] Lucret. lib. 4. v. 680. [o] Lucret. lib. 2. v. 414. [p] Lucret. lib. 4. v. 682. [q] Lucret. lib. 4. v. 621. [r] Theophraſt. lib. 4. de Senſ. & Senſ.

those which a bitter, round, smooth, distorted, little; those which a fat, slender, round, little.

But, more [s] particularly, seeing that the Tempers, not only of Animals, but even of Men among themselves, are so various, and that as they differ in the outward Lineaments of their Bodies, so they cannot but differ also in their inward Contextures; hence we may say, that the Sapors that are pleasing to some Animals or Men, are displeasing to others, by reason that the little Bodies, of which they consist, are suitable, and accommodated to the Contexture of the Organs of those, but unsuitable and unaccommodate to the Contexture of the Organs of these; since the round Pores, that in the Organ can receive the round Atoms smoothly, but the triangular difficultly; and the triangular Pores can receive the triangular smoothly, but the round difficultly.

Hereby also [t] is understood, how it comes to pass, that the things which were formerly pleasant to us, are in a Fever distasteful; for the Texture is so disordered, and the Figures of the Pores so alter'd, that the Figures of the little Bodies which insinuate into them, though formerly they were adaptable, now become unsuitable and incongruous.

From the same Reason it is, that the Meat which agreeth with one Animal, is [u] Poison to another; as Hemlock or Hellebore is destructive to a Man, yet it fattens Goats and Quails. This happens, by reason of the interior Contextures, which differing from one another, that which is accommodate and adaptable to one, is inadaptable to another.

CHAP. XVI.

Of Touching.

LAstly, concerning the [w] *Touch*, I mean not that which is common to all Bodies, as they are said to touch one another by their *Superficies*, (contrary to the Nature of *Vacuum*, which can neither touch, nor be touched) but that which is proper to Animals, not performed without Perception of the Soul; and hath not one, but all Parts of the Body for its Organ. Concerning this *Touch*, I shall only declare, that what is perceived by it is perceived three ways.

For first, A thing [x] is perceived by the *Touch*, when it is extrinsically applied, or, from without insinuates itself; applied, as when the Hand feels a Stone clapp'd to it; insinuated, as when a hot thing emitting Heat, or a cold thing Cold, certain little Bodies get into the Pores, which, according to the State wherein the Body is, either refresh or disturb it.

Secondly, When a thing [y] which is within is driven out, which sometimes happens with Pleasure, especially when the thing itself was burthensome and incommodious, *ut dum semen excernitur*; sometimes with Pain, as when by reason of the Angles of the little Bodies, it excoriates the Passage, as by the Strangury, or Difficulty of Urine.

Lastly, [z] When some things within the Body take some of these Motions, as by Impulsion, Diduction, Distraction, Convulsion, Compunction, Rasure, Excoriation, Inflation, Tension, Breaking, and innumerable other Ways, it disturbs the natural Constitution, and confounds and troubles the Senses. Thus all Aches and Pains of the Head, and other Parts within, are caused; and the Animal doth in such manner affect itself, as if a Man should with his own Hand strike a Part of his Body.

CHAP. XVII.

Of the Intellect, Mind, or Reason, and its Seat.

HItherto of the [a] *Sense*. We must now speak of the *Intellect*, which is also usually called, *Mind*, *Reason*. The rational and hexegemonick Part; sometimes Cogitation, Imagination, Opinion, Counsel: Its Property is, when the Sense strikes it, to think, apprehend, understand, revolve, meditate, discourse, or deliberate something.

The Contexture of the *Intellect* consists of little Bodies, the most subtle, smooth and round of all, forasmuch as nothing can be more subtle, nor of quicker Motion. Neither is there any thing that can stir up itself sooner, or perform any thing quicker than the Intellect, which if it design or begin any thing, brings it to pass in a Moment; whence all acknowledge, that nothing can be swifter than (her Action) Thought.

And certainly, as Water is much apter to move, and more fluent than Honey, by reason that it is made up of little Bodies, which are smoother, lesser, rounder; nothing consequently can consist of rounder, lesser, and smoother, than the Mind, for nothing can be readier for Motion, quicker, or more pliant.

And in whatsoever Part of the Body the Intellect inheres, it so cohereth to the Soul, or to that Portion of the Soul which coexists with it in that Part, as that it is indivisibly conjoined to it, and constitutes one Nature with it; yet it always so preserves and retains its own Nature, as that it is the Property of the Intellect, to think; of the Soul, to undergo Affections; though, by reason of their Cohesion, it be conceived, that the Soul thinks, and the Intellect is affected.

Indeed, the Intellect is void of Affection or Passion; but (because, as the Passions depending on Sense, are stirred up in the Soul about those Parts wherein the Sense is seated; so those which depend on Cogitation

[s] Lucret. 4. 662. [t] Ibid. 667. [u] Ibid. 637. [w] Lucret. 2. 434. [x] Ibid. [y] Ibid. [z] Ibid. [a] Lucret. 9. lib. 3. v. 94.

Cogitation, are ſtirred up in the Soul about that Part where Cogitation is, and in which Part the Soul is one thing with the Intellect thinking:) Hence it cometh to paſs, that as if the Aggregate or Compound of the Intellect and the Soul reſiding in that Part made up only Intellect, the Paſſions come to be attributed to the Intellect itſelf.

Thus, whether the Intellect be taken diſtinctly or jointly, it hath this Property beyond the other Part of the Soul, that, as when the Head or Eye acheth, we are not thereupon pain'd all over the Body; ſo ſometimes the Intellect is affected with Grief or Joy, when the other Part of the Soul, which is diffuſed through the Body, is free from this Affection. I ſay *ſometimes*, becauſe it may happen that the Intellect be ſeiz'd with a Fear ſo vehement, as that the reſt of the Soul may be ſtruck together with it, and thereby may be cauſed Sweating, Paleneſs, ſtopping of the Speech, the Eyes grow dim, the Ears poſſeſſed with a humming, the Joints grow faint, and, in a word, the Man may fall into a Swoon.

Moreover, the Intellect may be conceived to partake of Life more perfectly than the Soul, or the other Part of the Soul, foraſmuch as the Soul cannot ſubſiſt never ſo little in the Limbs without the Intellect; but the Intellect, though the Limbs round about it were cut off, and thereby a great Part of the Soul taken away, would nevertheleſs ſubſiſt and preſerve Life: Like the Ball, which conduceth more to Sight than all the reſt of the Eye; becauſe the Ball being hurt, though the reſt of the Parts be ſound, the Sight is deſtroy'd; but as long as the Ball is ſound, though the other Parts be deſtroy'd, the Sight continueth.

[b] It ſeemeth not, that there can be any other Seat aſſign'd for the Intellect, or rational Part of the Soul, than the middle Part of the Breaſt, and conſequently the Entrails, or the Heart, which is in the midſt of the Breaſt. This is manifeſt from the Affections of Fear and Joy proceeding from Cogitation, (or the Intellect thinking) which we perceive to be in the Breaſt.

CHAP. XVIII.

That the Soul thinketh by Images, which glide into it.

THERE is only this Difficulty, [c] How the Intellect can be ſtirred up to think ſomething? But it being manifeſt, that things are thought by the Intellect, in the ſame manner as they are ſeen by the Eye; it is alſo evident, that as Sight, ſo Thinking or Cogitation is made by Images which glide into it.

[d] For beſides thoſe Images which glide into the Eye, and being of ſomething a groſſer Bulk, are accommodated to the Contexture of the Eye, and produce in it the Act of Seeing, there muſt neceſſarily wander through the Air an innumerable Company of others, far more ſubtle; and thoſe either peel'd off from Bodies, or form'd in the Air itſelf, as was formerly ſaid; which penetrating through the Body, and being adaptable to the Contexture of the Intellect, as ſoon as they arrive at it, move it to Think.

[e] Whence it comes to paſs, that as we ſee (for Example) a Lion, becauſe the Image thereof glides into our Eyes; ſo we think a Lion, becauſe the Image of a Lion glides into our Mind. That we think or imagine Centaurs, Scylla's and the like, which neither are, nor ever were; this may happen, not ſo much by Images framed on purpoſe, as for that when the Images (for Example) of a Man and of a Horſe are preſented to us, they, by reaſon of their Tenuity or Subtlety, like a Cobweb, or a Leaf of Gold, are joined together, and made one, ſuch as is attributed to a Centaur.

[f] But take notice, that when ſometimes we perſevere in the ſame Thought, whether waking or ſleeping; this happens not, for that we uſe ſome one Image of the ſame thing, but that we uſe many Images ſucceeding in a continual Fluxion; which if they come to us in the ſame Poſture, the thing thought or imagin'd ſeemeth unmoved; if in a varied, it ſeems moved. Which is the Reaſon why, in Dreams eſpecially, Images ſeem to us to be moved, and to ſtir their Arms and other Limbs one after another.

[g] But how comes it to paſs, that whatſoever any Man would, his Mind or Intellect thinks that very thing? Becauſe, though there are every where Images of all ſorts, yet the greateſt Part paſſeth by unthought of; and thoſe only move the Mind which ſhe herſelf takes notice of, or would obſerve, or frames herſelf to think of. And obſerve we not, that the Eyes, when they begin to have a Sight of ſomething very little, bend and fix themſelves upon it; and till they ſee ſomething plainly, all other things are as if they were not, although they receive their Images alſo?

Now as there is ſome Intentiveneſs requiſite to the Mind, that it may apprehend things diſtinctly; ſo much more that it may ſimply think, or give ſome Judgment, by affirming or denying; but moſt of all, that it may diſcourſe of them, as if its greateſt Care were not to be deceived.

But this we declared formerly, in treating of the Criteries. It will be ſufficient, as to the Speculation of natural things, here to obſerve, that *human Diſcourſe firſt admireth the things that are produced by Nature, and next enquires into them, and finds out their Cauſes; but in ſome ſooner, in others later; and ſometimes evinceth this, or arrives at the full Knowledge in a longer time, ſometimes in a ſhorter.*

[b] Lucret. l. 3. v. 441. [c] Lucret. l. 4. v. 728. [d] Ibid. 756. [e] Ibid. 772. [f] Ibid. 780. [g] Ibid. 801.

CHAP. XIX.

Of the Affections or Paſſions of the Soul.

THERE [h] is beſides Senſe another Part of the irrational Soul, which may be called Affectuous, or Paſſionate, from the Affections or Paſſions raiſed in it. It is alſo termed the Appetite or Deſire, from the chief Affection which it hath, called Appetite or Deſire; ſome diſtinguiſh it into Concupiſcible and Iraſcible.

Now whereas it was already ſaid, that the Affections which follow Senſe are produced in the Organs of Senſe, thoſe which follow Opinion, in the Breaſt: Hereupon there being two principal Affections, Pleaſure and Pain; the firſt, familiar, and ſuitable to the Soul; the other, incommodious, and unſuitable to Nature; it is manifeſt, that both theſe are excited, not in the Breaſt only, where Pleaſure, for the moſt part, comes under the Name of Joy, Gladneſs, Exultation, Mirth; and Pain, under that of Grief, Sorrow, Anguiſh, *&c.* but alſo in the other Parts, in which, when they are removed from their natural State, there is raiſed Pain or Grief; when they are reſtored to that State, Pleaſure.

If all the Parts could continue in their natural State, either there would be no Affection, or if there were any, it muſt be called Pleaſure, from the Quiet and Calmneſs of that State. But becauſe either by reaſon of the continual Motion of Principles in the Body of an Animal, ſome things depart from it, others come to it; ſome are taken aſunder, others put together, *&c.* or by reaſon of the Motion which is in the things round about, ſome things are brought which inſinuate into them, change, invert, disjoin, *&c.* Pain is cauſed (from the firſt Occaſion, as by Hunger, Thirſt, Sickneſs; from the ſecond, as by Burning, Bruiſing, Wreſting, Wounding) therefore the Affection of Pain ſeems to be firſt produced: and withal, becauſe it is of an oppoſite Nature, that of Averſation or Avoidance of it, and of the thing that bringeth it; to which, for that reaſon, is attributed the Name of Ill.

Hereupon followeth a Deſire of Exemption from Pain, or of that State which is void of Pain, and conſequently of the thing by which it may be expelled, and to which, for that reaſon, is given the Name of Good; and then the Pain being taken away, and the thing reduced into a better, that is, into its natural State, Pleaſure is excited, and goeth along with it; ſo as there would not be Pleaſure, if ſome kind of Pain did not go before, as is eaſily obſervable even from Hunger and Thirſt, and the Pleaſure that is taken in eating and drinking.

For this Pleaſure is only made, becauſe (moſt of the Parts being diſſipated by the Action of the intrinſecal Heat, by which means the Body itſelf becomes rarify'd, all Nature deſtroy'd, and the Stomach eſpecially grip'd; or otherwiſe ſome little Bodies of Heat rolling about it, make it glow, whereby is cauſed Pain;) becauſe, I ſay, Meat cometh, and ſupplieth the Defect, ſupports the Limbs, ſtoppeth the Deſire of eating, which gapeth throughout the Members and the Veins; Drink comes and extinguiſhes the Heat, moiſtneth the Parts which before were dry, and reduceth them to their firſt State. And beſides, both are made with a ſmooth and pleaſing Senſe of Nature, which it is manifeſt is then abſent, when a Man eats, not being hungry; or drinks, not being athirſt.

Thus the general Affections of the Soul ſeem to be theſe four, Pain and Pleaſure, the Extreme; Averſion and Deſire, the Intermediate. I ſay, General; becauſe the reſt are Kinds of theſe, and made by Opinion intervening, and may be reduced principally to Deſire and Avoidance.

For Deſire is particularly called Will, when the Mind wills that which it thinks, and conceiveth it to be good; and Avoidance is called Averſion, when it turneth away from that which it thinketh, or conceiveth to be ill. Hereupon, Love (for Example) is a Will, whereby we are carried to the Enjoyment of ſomething. Hate is an Averſion, whereby we withdraw ourſelves from converſing with ſomething. Again, Anger is nothing but Deſire, whereby we are carry'd on to Vengeance. Fear is an Avoidance, by which we ſhrink at ſome future Ill, and retire, as it were, within ourſelves; and ſo of the reſt.

But foraſmuch as Deſire (as alſo in proportion Avoidance too) is partly excited by Nature, and by reaſon of ſome Indigence, which muſt neceſſarily be ſupplied, that Nature may be preſerved; partly is begotten by Opinion, which is ſometimes conformable to the Deſign of Nature, and ſo tends to remove her Indigence, as that yet it is not neceſſary it ſhould be quite taken away. Laſtly, it ſometimes conduces nothing either to Nature, or to the taking away of its Indigence. Hence it comes to paſs, that of Deſires, ſome are Natural and Neceſſary; others Natural, but not Neceſſary; others, neither Natural nor Neceſſary, but Vain.

Natural and Neceſſary are thoſe, which take away both the Indigence, and the Pain proceeding from the Indigence; ſuch is that of Meat, of Drink, of Cloathing, to expel the Cold. Natural, but not Neceſſary, are thoſe which only vary the Pleaſure, but are not abſolutely Neceſſary to the taking away of the Pain; as thoſe which are of delicate Meats, even that which is of venereal Delights, to which Nature gives a Beginning, but from which a Man may abſtain without Inconvenience. Laſtly, neither Natural nor Neceſſary are thoſe, which contribute nothing to the taking away of any Pain, cauſed by ſome Indigence

[h] Lucret. l. 3. 142.

Indigence of Nature, but are begot only by Opinion; such are, for Instance, those of Crowns, Statues, Ornaments, rich Cloathing, Gold, Silver, Ivory, and the like.

Moreover it is to be observed, That whereas Pleasure consists in the Fruition of Good, Pain in suffering Ill; for this reason, the first is produced with a kind of Dilatation and Exaltation of the Soul, the other with a Contraction and Depression thereof; and therefore it is not to be wonder'd at, if the Soul dilates herself as much as she can, to make way for the Good to come into her, and contracts herself to prevent the Ill.

There is a Diffusion, or Dilatation; for as soon as ever the Form of a good and pleasing thing strikes the Sense, or moveth the Mind, the little Bodies, of which it consists, so insinuate into the Organs of Sense, or into the Heart itself, as that being accommodated as well to the Soul as to the Body, they, in a more particular manner, gently stroke and delight the Soul, and, like little Chains, allure and draw it towards that thing out of which they were sent: Whereupon the Soul being turned towards, and intent upon that thing, gives a great Leap, as it were, towards it, with all the Strength it hath, that it may enjoy it.

On the other side there is Contraction; because as soon as ever the Form of a painful thing strikes the Sense, or the Mind, the little Bodies of which it consists, as so many little Darts or Needles, prick the very Soul together with the Organ, in such manner, that they loosen its Contexture; while she, to prevent them as much as she can, shuts herself up, and retires to her very Centre or Root, where the Heart or Intellect is placed.

It will not be necessary to repeat what we formerly said, that it depends upon the Contexture of the Soul, why one Animal is more inclined to Anger, another to Fear, a third to calm smooth Motions; nor to add, that this Difference is found in Men also, according as their Souls participate more of a fiery, or a flatuous, or of an aerial Principle. Or we may observe even in Men that are polish'd by Learning, these Seeds cannot be so rooted out, but that one is more propense to Anger, another more subject to Fear, a third more prone to Clemency than he ought. Moreover, the Difference of Manners, which is observed to be so great, not amongst Animals only, but in Men from one another, is plainly enough derived from the various Commistion of these Seeds.

CHAP. XX.

Of voluntary Motion, and particularly of Speaking, and Imposition of Names.

NOW the Soul being naturally stirring, and ready for Motion, and able to move the Body wherein it exists, and the Members thereof; it is well known, that whensoever she moveth the Body, or its Members, with any Motion whatsoever, she therefore doth it, because she hath a Will to move them, and that this Will is stirr'd up by the Intellect imagining; and that this Imagination is caused by the Image that strikes it: for the Intellect, or Mind, never doth any thing, but first she foreseeth it; nor foreseeth it, unless she first have the Image of that Thing.

[j] Thus, when we move (for Example) the Thighs, and walk, this is therefore done, because first the Images of walking coming to the Mind strike it, thence proceeds a Will to walk; then when the Mind hath so mov'd itself, as that it wills to walk, it instantly strikes the Soul in that Part whereto it is joined; that Part strikes the rest of the Soul, which is diffused through the whole Body, and especially through the Thighs and Feet. Thus the whole Frame is by degrees thrust forwards, and moved: Not to mention that the Air conduceth something thereto, by reason that as the whole Body becomes rarify'd, the Air insinuates into its Parts. The Body therefore is moved from two Causes, like a Ship, which is driven on by Oars and Wind.

[k] That the Beginning of Motion proceeds from the Heart, where the Mind is seated, is manifest; for that we see sometimes Horses (for Example) cannot, as soon as ever the Barrier is let down, break forth, nor start away so suddenly, as their Will prompts them; because the whole Substance of the Soul diffused through all the Limbs must first be summoned, that, being stirr'd up, it may follow the Design of the Mind. Thus it proceeds first from the Will of the Mind, and then through the Body and Limbs.

[l] It may perhaps seem strange, that so little Bodies as those, whereof the Mind consists, should be able to move, wrest, and turn about so great a Weight, as is that of the Body. But what wonder, when the Wind, a thing so subtle, can with so great a Force drive forward a vast Ship; and one Hand, one Rudder, turn it about and guide it, though under full Sail? And are there not Engines, which by Pullies and Screws move and draw up huge Weights, and that with no great Force?

But forasmuch as of the Motions with which we move the Parts of the Body as we will ourselves, that of the Tongue is most considerable, which is called Speaking, it seems requisite to say something of this in particular.

[m] The Tongue being framed in breathing Animals after such a manner, as that it can break, and, as it were, mould the Air, which is vehemently breathed forth, and thereupon causeth a Sound: Hence it happeneth, that, as because every Animal perceiveth its own Power, by which it can do something, and

[j] Lucret. 4. 879. [k] Ibid. l. 4. v. 884. [l] Ibid. 4. 896. [m] Ibid. 5. 1027.

[h]hereupon the Bull butts with his Horns, the Horse strikes with his Heels, the Lion teareth with his Teeth and Claws, the Bird trusts to her Wings; hence it happeneth, I say, that Animals, and chiefly Men, perceiving the Ability of their Tongue to express the Affections of the Mind (even when they would signify something that is without them) they send out a Sound which is called Voice, and by the Interposition of the Tongue, and other Parts serving for that Variation, bend and mould it in several Fashions.

I instance [n] Animals also, because we see that they likewise send forth several Voices, according as they are joy'd or griev'd, or fear, or pursue any thing. Dogs, for Example, make several Noises, when they assault furiously, when they bark, when they play with their Whelps, when they fawn, when they are hurt, and cry or howl; a Horse neigheth after a different manner, when he rouzeth himself, when he followeth a Mare, and when he is spurr'd by his Rider. And Birds make different Cries when they strive about their Prey, and when they perceive Change of Weather, and when they sit idly, still.

Now [o] Man, above the rest, perceiving the great Power of his Tongue, and how he can bend it various ways, so as to make divers articulate Sounds, which may be accommodated to signify several things, hence proceeds Speech, by which Men ordinarily discourse with one another, expressing the Passions of the Mind, and other things, no otherwise than as by nodding the Head, or pointing with the Finger.

Here, because it is usually demanded, How Men came at first to impose Names on Things? We must know, that [p] *Names were not imposed merely by Invention of Man*, nor by some Law; *but the very Nature, or natural Dispositions of Men, which were in several Nations, being, upon the Presentment of Things to them, affected with particular Motions of the Mind, and compelled by Images proper to the Things, sent forth the Air out of their Mouths, after a peculiar Fashion, and broke and articulated it, according to the Impulsion of the several Affections or Phantasies, and sometimes according to the Difference of Places*, as the Heaven and the Earth is various in different Countries; the Words which were thus pronounced, and particularly with a Will of denoting things to others, became the Names of things.

[q] *Some also desiring to mention some things to others, which were out of their Sight, pronounced certain Sounds or Words, and then were constrained to repeat the same Words; whereupon the Hearers finding out the thing by some Discourse and Conjecture, at last, with much Use, understood what the others meant.*

And because several Men used several Names, to signify the same things to others, and thereupon there was a Variety of Names; for this Reason, [r] *Names proper to signify things, were in every Nation by degrees and, as it were, with common Consent chosen and appointed, so as their mutual Significations might be less ambiguous, and things might be explicated by a more compendious way of speaking.*

For this Reason I conclude, [s] that the first Man imposed Names on things, not out of certain Science, or by the Command or Dictate of any one Man; for how should he come by that Science, or have Power to compel many Men to use the Words which he dictated? But rather, that they imposed them, being moved by a certain natural Impulsion, like those who cough, sneeze, bellow, bark, sigh. And therefore we may say, that Names are not by Institution, but by Nature, seeing they are Effects and Works, as it were, of Nature; for to see and hear things (which are certain Effects and Works of Nature) are of the same kind, as the giving of Names to things.

CHAP. XXI.

Of Sleep and Dreams.

IT rests, that we add something concerning *Sleep*, and the *Death of Animals*, two things near of kin; for one is an Intermission, the other the Extinction of Sense, and Death is ordinarily termed an Everlasting Sleep.

[t] *Sleep is caused, when the Parts of the Soul, which are diffused through the whole Composition of the Body, are either repressed or segregated; or else some little Bodies, either from the Air or from Food, light upon the dispersed Parts, which partly drive them away from the Body, partly crowd them into the Body, and discompose them* [u]. For hereupon the Body, as destitute of its ordinary Support and Government, becometh weak, and all the Limbs grow feeble, the Arms and Eye-lids hang down, the Knees sink, and, in a word, there is no more Sense.

For it being certain, that [w] Sense proceeds from the Soul, it is no less evident, that when Sleep hindereth the Sense, the Soul is disturbed, and thrown out of Doors; not the whole Soul, for then it were not Sleep, but Death; but a Part only, and yet so, as that which is left behind is oppressed within, and buried like Fire rak'd up in Ashes. And as, if we stir up the Fire, it wakes, as it were, and a Flame arises from it, in appearance extinguished; so the Senses are restored throughout the Members, and raised again out of a thing in appearance dead.

When I say, that [x] little Bodies coming from the Air cause this Disturbance, I mean, partly the exterior Air, which never ceaseth to beat and drive against the Body, (whereby it comes to pass, that the outward

[n] Lucret. ibid. 1055. [o] Lucret. ibid. 1086. [p] Laert. 10. 75. [q] Laert. 10. 76. [r] Laert. ibid. [s] Lucret. 5. 1040.
[t] Laert. [u] Lucret. 4. 914. [w] Lucret. 4. 918. [x] Lucret. 4. 930.

outward Part of every Animal becomes ſolid and hard) partly the interior, or that which is drawn in at the Mouth, and blown out again. For the Stroke of each of theſe paſſing through the little Vacuities to the Principles and firſt Elements of the Body, their Poſitions are ſo diſordered, that part are caſt out, part thruſt in, and the reſt, which is diffuſed through the Limbs, are not able to diſcharge their Office, by reaſon that they are intercepted, and not joined one to another.

I add, that [y] this happens from the Food alſo, becauſe the Food being conveyed inwardly by the Veins, performs the ſame thing as the Air, and that with more abundant and greater Force. Whence it comes to paſs, that the Sleep which is cauſed by Meat, by reaſon of the greater Diſturbance of thoſe Particles, is more ſound than ordinary, as is that alſo which proceeds from exceſſive Wearineſs, by reaſon of their greater Diſſipation.

Now, foraſmuch as it may ſeem ſtrange, [z] that Dreams ſhould come to us in Sleep, we muſt obſerve what was ſaid not long ſince, that every where there are Images of innumerable things, continually roving up and down, which, by reaſon of their Subtlety, are able to penetrate into the Body, and able to ſtrike and affect the Mind, which is ſeated in the midſt of the Breaſt, ſo as it is ſtirred up to think of thoſe things whereof they are the Images. Hereupon, foraſmuch as theſe penetrate and ſtrike the Mind no leſs in Sleep, than in waking, it comes to paſs that we ſeem to behold things as well in Sleep as awake.

But it happens, that [a] we receive the things which appear to us in this manner as true, becauſe our Senſes being ſtupified, nothing can occur to us, that may give us Notice of the Error, and convince the Falſity by true things; and beſides, our Memory being laid aſleep, we eſteem (for Example) thoſe Men to be alive who are dead, becauſe their Images are preſent to us, and we remember not their Death.

If you demand, why [b] we dream moſt of thoſe things in which we chiefly delight, or to which we are moſt particularly addicted when awake (for Orators plead, Soldiers fight, Mariners conteſt with the Winds, Gameſters play, and ſo of others; neither is it thus with Men only, but amongſt other Animals alſo; Horſes ſweat and blow, as if they were running a Race; Hounds ſtretch their Legs, cry, and ſnuff up the Air; and ſo of the reſt,) we muſt ſay, that this happens; foraſmuch as by Reaſon of the Impreſſion lately made in the Mind, the Paſſages are left open, into which the ſame Images inſinuate, and above the reſt, move the Soul again.

From the ſame [c] Ground it ſeems to proceed, that he who is thirſty, dreams of a Fountain, and that he is drinking; he that hath need to Urine, dreams of a Chamber-pot, and that he is uſing it. For the intrinſical Motions open as it were, the Ways into which the Images of things of the ſame Nature inſinuating, ſtrike the Mind. Hence alſo it comes to paſs, that many Images of the ſame thing meeting together, there are produced certain great Motions in the Mind; and then he who dreameth, imagines that he poſſeſſeth great Knowledge, performeth great Actions, ſpeaketh excellent Things, and ſometimes crieth out as if his Throat were about to be cut, or himſelf to be devoured by a Lion or Panther, and is no leſs affrighted, than if he had caſt himſelf down from a high Mountain, ſo as when he awakes, he has ſcarce the Uſe of his Reaſon.

CHAP. XXII.

Of Death.

AS for Death, it is nothing but a Privation of Senſe, by reaſon of the Departure of the Soul. By Senſe here, I underſtand not only the Action, of which Sleep alſo is the Privation; but the Faculty likewiſe of feeling or perceiving, which periſheth with the Soul, and together with theſe, the Mind alſo; ſo that the Soul going forth, the Mind, which is joined with it, goeth forth alſo.

For, "as long as the [d] Soul exiſts in the Body, "although ſome other Part fail, yet there is not a "Privation of Senſe; but Senſe periſhes together "with the Soul, as ſoon as ever that wherein it is "contained, whether it be the whole Body, or ſome "Part in which it is ſeated, happens to be diſſolved. "Neither can it be objected, that the Body remaineth "a while undiſſolved, either in whole or in part: "For it is nevertheleſs void of Senſe, as ſoon as ſuch "a Company of Atoms as is neceſſary to conſtitute "the Nature of the Soul goeth out of it.

"Moreover, the [e] Body being diſſolved, the Soul "itſelf is diſſipated, and hath no longer the ſame Fa"culties, nor any longer is moved, nor any longer "hath Senſe; for we cannot imagine, that the ſame "thing doth any longer feel or perceive, when it no "longer uſeth the ſame Motions, when it no longer "is in the ſame Compound, when thoſe things no "longer are by which it was cheriſh'd and preſerv'd, "and in which exiſting it performed ſuch kind of "Motions. Is is the ſame with the Soul as with the "Eye; which being out, and divided from the Body "in which it was, cannot ſee any thing."

When I ſay, The Soul is diſſipated, I imply the Mind alſo; ſince the Mind is indiviſibly joined with it, neither can it ſubſiſt if the Soul periſh. So that here it is all one to ſay, the Mind and the Soul, for the ſame Diſſipation happens to both. Now this Diſſolution is made, not into nothing, (as they muſt neceſſarily

[y] Lucret. ibid. 957. [z] Lucret. ibid. 761. [a] Lucret. ibid. 766. [b] Lucret. ibid. 659. [c] Lucret. ibid. 1013. [d] Laert. 10. 65. [e] Ibid.

neceſſarily affirm, who hold the Soul to be Harmony, or ſuch a Contemperation as Health) but into the Principles and little Bodies, of which its Contexture is made; and this not ſo much like Water which runneth about when the Veſſel is broken, as like Smoke, or a Miſt, which goes away into the Air, but much more eaſily; its Contexture being more ſubtle, ſince it is capable of receiving Impreſſions from the Images of Smoke and Miſt.

That the Soul is diſſipated and periſheth, is manifeſt; for that it is compounded and hath a Beginning. Some indeed there are, who conceive it to be Eternal, denying it to have a Beginning, to avoid its Diſſolution; and aſſuming for granted, that it was before the Body, and came from without into it, that they may maintain, that it ſurvives after the Body, out of which it goes entire. I ſhall omit, that they ſeem not obſerve, that nothing can be durable for ever, unleſs it be ſuch, either by reaſon of its Solidity as an Atom; or for that it is uncapable of being ſtruck as Vacuum; or for that it wants Place whereinto it might remove, as the Univerſe. Neither do they reflect how great a Madneſs it is to conceive, that things ſo different as immortal and mortal, may be joined together.

I omit this, I ſay, and demand only, How it is poſſible the Soul can, from without, be inſinuated into the Body, and diffuſed through its Parts, and yet not be divided and diſſolved, as Meat diſtributed through the Limbs; and muſt it not dwell in the Body, as a Bird in a Cage, rather than be thought to grow, and be co-extended with the Body? And how then arrives it together with the Body, at the Flower of Age? And why it is, that in old Age it fears, not rejoiceth, to go out of the Body as out of her Priſon, and like the Serpent, to caſt her decayed Skin? And if forſaking the Body, it leaves ſome Relicts of itſelf behind, is it not diſſolvable? But if it leaves none, how comes it, that ſo many Worms are generated in a Carcaſs?

For to ſay, that ſo many Souls flow thither from without, and fly up and down like Shadows, and chuſe their own Matter, and frame their own Bodies, and the like, How abſurd is it? Neither is it leſs ridiculous, that there ſhould be a Swarm, as it were, of Souls, hovering round about at the Coition and Birth of Animals, conteſting with one another which ſhall enter into the Body.

And if Souls did ſo often ſhift Bodies, would not their Natures, by degrees, become changed, and ſo the Lion in time not be fierce, the Hart not timorous, the Fox not crafty, the Dog afraid of the Hare, the Hawk of the Dove? And if any ſhall ſay, that human Souls only paſs into human Bodies, he cannot give a Reaſon, Why the Soul, of wiſe, becomes fooliſh? Why no Children are wiſe? Why we, as the firſt Authors of theſe Opinions feigned of themſelves, never remember our paſt Life, and the Actions performed in it.

The Soul therefore hath a Beginning, from which, as it groweth up and flouriſheth with the Body, ſo muſt it neceſſarily tend to an End, growing old, and decaying by Degrees, together with it.

This I ſay likewiſe of the Mind, which by degrees is perfected, and decays; ſeeing that it not only bears a Share in the Diſeaſes, and Pains of the Body, but ſuffers Diſeaſes, and Pains of her own, and is cured by Medicine; which could not be, if ſomething were not added to, or taken from, or tranſpoſed in her Contexture. We need not inſtance what happens to her by Drunkenneſs, the Falling Sickneſs, or Dotage.

We muſt obſerve, that ſhe is affixed to ſome certain Part of the Body, no otherwiſe than the Ear or the Eye; ſo that accordingly ſhe begins and ends with the whole; and this is manifeſt, foraſmuch as every thing (Trees, Fiſhes, *&c.*) hath a certain determinate Place in which it is produced, liveth, and at laſt ceaſeth to be, and cannot exiſt out of it.

And foraſmuch as a Man dieth Limb by Limb, and expireth by Degrees, the Soul being as it were diviſible; who can ſay, that the Mind (or Intellect) doth not evaporate out of the midſt of the Breaſt, but goeth entire out at the Throat and Mouth? For that the Soul herſelf goeth out, ſifted as it were, and ſever'd thorough the whole Body, is argued, even for that the Stench which after her Departure is in the dead Carcaſs, procedeth from no other Cauſe than that its ſeveral Parts are got into that Place, which was taken up by the ſeveral Parts of the Soul. Not to mention, that, otherwiſe, when the Body is ſuddenly cut aſunder, into two or more Pieces, the Soul could not be cut into two or more Pieces as the Body.

As therefore, the Soul was not before the Generation, ſo neither will it be after the Diſſolution, or Death; and as, before that, we did not feel any Pain; ſo neither ſhall we know any after this; as well, for that there will be no longer Touch, or any other Senſe, which cannot exiſt in a ſeparate Soul; as for that, it is now without thoſe Organs, in which only the Senſes reſide, and with which only they can act and ſuffer.

Hence it is manifeſt, that all Fears of the Inferi are vain; *Ixion* is not roll'd upon a Wheel; *Siſiphus* does not thruſt a Stone up Hill continually; *Prometheus*'s Liver cannot be devoured and renewed every Day. Theſe are but Fables, as are alſo thoſe which are reported of *Tantalus*, of *Cerberus*, of the *Danaides*, of the Furies, and the like; which if they are made good any where, it is in this Life, through the depraved Manners of Men.

SECT.

SECT. IV.

Of Superior Things, as well Cæleſtial, as Aerial.

HItherto of *inferior* things; we come now to the *ſuperior*, which appear in the Region above the Earth; ſuch are the Sun, the Moon, and other Stars, and all that belongs to them, as Riſings, Settings, Tropicks, Eclipſes, and the like. Moreover Clouds, Rain, Wind, Lightning, Thunder, Thunder-bolts, and the like. For tho' ſome make a diſtinction, and call theſe latter only Μετέωρα, *ſuperior things*, yet is it convenient to call the former alſo Meteors, and to include both within Meteorology, that is, a Treatiſe of ſuperior things.

Here we muſt repeat what was ſaid at firſt, that "we muſt not propoſe any other [f] End of the Know-"ledge of ſuperior things, whether they be treated of "jointly with others, as here, or ſeparately, and by "themſelves, as elſewhere we do, than an undiſturb-"ed State of Mind, and unwavering Judgment; as "alſo in the reſt of the things, of which we uſe to "diſcourſe.

"For ſuperior [g] things being ſuch, as that they "either have, or may have a manifold Cauſe of Ge-"neration, and Declaration of their Being, con-"formable to that which we perceive by the Senſe; "we ought not to adhere to one particular way, as "we do in moral Maxims, or ſome in Phyſick, "ſuch as are, The Univerſe is Body and Vacuum; "the Principles of things are indiviſible, and the "like, which agree only one way with the Phæno-"mena's: But firmly hold, that theſe things are in-"deed explicable, not one, but many ways; neither "ought we to attempt any thing above the Reach of "human Power, by defining one certain way, af-"ter which only the thing may be performed.

"This, I [h] ſay, we muſt repeat; foraſmuch as it "is requiſite to conceive, that it is the Office of Phy-"ſiology, accurately to examine the Cauſes of the "chief things which are in Nature, and that from "hence proceedeth all the Felicity which conſiſteth "in knowledge of ſuperior things, and in that eſpeci-"ally, that we examine what kind of things thoſe "are which are diſcovered in thoſe ſuperior ones, "and whatever has Affinity with them. And with-"al, inviolably to obſerve this Rule, that it is com-"petent to thoſe things, to be done many ways, *and* "not *neceſſarily* one way only: *but*, that they may "be brought ſome other way alſo."

This, I ſo expreſly inculcate; leſt, if we adhere only to one way, and that happen to diſpleaſe us, we preſently recur, not to ſome other natural Cauſe, but to the divine; for this were to acknowledge a manifold manner, where there is but one. Thus, to the divine Nature we ſhould attribute Trouble and Buſineſs, whereas "it is ſimply and abſolutely neceſ-"ſary, that in an immortal and bleſſed Nature, there "be none of thoſe things which cauſe Diſſolution "and Trouble; for the Mind immediately appre-"hends, and concludes from the Conſideration of an "immortal and bleſſed Condition, that it is abſo-"lutely impoſſible, any ſuch thing ſhould happen "to it."

And doubtleſs, for want of this Conſideration, it comes to paſs, that "the Contemplation and Obſer-"vation of Riſing, Setting, Solſtices, Eclipſes, and "the like, make our Knowledge nothing the hap-"pier; but they who have conſidered theſe things "(yet know not what are the Nature of thoſe Bo-"dies, and what are their chief Cauſes,) fear as "much, and perhaps more, than as if they had not "contemplated them at all; by reaſon that the Ad-"miration which ariſeth from their Conſideration, "cannot be ſatisfied, as to the Diſpoſition and Man-"ner whereby they are performed. For this Rea-"ſon we endeavour to find out, and alledge many "ſeveral Cauſes of Solſtices, Settings, Riſings, E-"clipſes, and the like, conformable to things of "the like kind, which happen amongſt us on the "Earth.

"Beſides [i] we muſt not think, that an accurate "Enquiry after theſe things, conduceth to Acquiſi-"tion of Tranquility and Felicity. In ſuperior "things, and others that are obſcure, we ought to "ſeek out Cauſes, according to the ſeveral Ways by "which the like things happen amongſt us; deſpiſing "thoſe who neither know one certain way by which "a thing is effected, nor a manifold way, but con-"tent themſelves only with the Appearance of things "as preſented at that Diſtance, and yet are ignorant "in what conſiſts or not conſiſts Imperturbation. "Truly, if we conceive it may fall out, that a thing "may be done one certain way, and thereupon we "are not troubled; truly I ſay, knowing on the "other ſide, that the ſame thing may be effected "many ſeveral ways, we ſhall be no leſs undiſturbed, "than if we knew it could be done by a certain "way.

"But whenſoever one has [k] a mind to adhere to, "or defend any thing that is likely in itſelf, that Ex-"plication is ſufficient in this preſent Subject which "runs congruouſly, according to the manifold ways "the Phænomena's afford us. Yet is it neceſſary to "derive our Conjectures concerning ſuperior things, "from thoſe which are done amongſt us; from thoſe, "I ſay, which are obſerved to reſemble thoſe in thoſe "which are ſeen above: For thoſe things are effected "ſeveral ways; wherefore alſo that which appeareth "in every ſuperior thing, is to be conſider'd by thoſe "things which agree with it, and which may be ef-"fected ſeveral Ways amongſt us, as ſeveral things "may happen."

But

[f] Laert. 10. 85. [g] Ibid. 86. [h] Laert. 10. 78. [i] Ibid. 80. [k] Ibid. 87.

But I insist too much hereupon. To come therefore to the Business. Although the whole Region above Earth is sometimes called Heaven, for even the nearer Part of it, the Air, is sometimes called so too; yet, by the word Heaven and Æther, we will understand the superior Part of the Region, which containeth the Stars; and, by Air, the inferior, in which Clouds, Lightning, and the like are generated. We shall begin with the celestial superior things, and speak afterwards of the aerial.

CHAP. I.

Of the Substance and Variety of the Stars.

WE [l] must first lay down what was formerly touched, that *the Sun, Moon, and other Stars, were not made apart, and afterwards brought into the World, but received their Figure, Augmentation, and Magnitude, immediately, and together with the World, (as the Earth, the Sea, and whatsoever is in the World,) by the Coagmentations and Convolutions made within it, of some more tenuious Natures, and those either aerial, or fiery, or both; for this our Sense suggests to us.*

Hence some Stars seem to be of more fiery Substance, especially the Sun, whose Heat is so manifest to Sense; but withal, they seem not so much to be pure Fires, as some mixed Concretions, to which Fire is annex'd.

Or, it may be, they are, as it were, certain glassy smooth Dishes, capable to receive the bright, fiery little Bodies, which coming from the ætherial Region through which they run, light upon them, and so reflect them, and shew them to us in that Form wherein they appear: For the like is done amongst us. Or that they may be Clouds enlighten'd, and, as it were, enkindled; for those Meteors, called the Parhelii, are caused no other way.

Or, it may be, they are, as it were, deep Vessels, containing Fire in their hollow part, like a Lanthorn, or a Chasing-dish, which holdeth Coals, or melted Metals. Or, they may be, as it were, glowing Plates, or, as it were, Stones burning in a Furnace; for there is nothing in all these that implies a Contradiction.

In like manner, the Sun in particular may be nothing else but a thick kind of Clod, which being like a Pumice, or a Spunge full of Pores, and little Holes, may, containing Fire, dart Light out of them.

Only the most impossible thing seems to be what some assert, that the Stars are animate, or so many Animals, and moreover, so many Gods. For tho' we should grant, that each of them is a kind of World, or rather, as it were, an Earth, which hath not only an Air, but an Æther peculiar to itself; Nevertheless, as this our Earth, though it produceth Animals, is not therefore itself an Animal; so neither would the Stars be, although we should grant that some Animals may be generated in them.

But if we should admit this, yet what they further press, that there are such a kind of round and rolling Gods, needs to be repeated only; for we formerly proved that these are prodigious Fancies, not of discoursing but dreaming Philosophers, when expressing immortal Beings by the Language proper to mortal, they pronounce things so contrary to the Felicity of the Gods, and which seem so far beneath their excellent Nature.

The Stars have been already distinguished into two kinds; some are fixed, which observe the same Position from one another, and keep the same Course from East to West, never altering it. Others are wandring, whence called Planets or erratick Stars, because they never observe the same Position, either towards one another, nor to the rest; and sometimes perform their Courses nigher the North, sometimes nigher the South.

If you demand [m] from whence this Diversity proceeds, I shall say, that *it may be the Stars were from the Beginning moved round, with such a Necessity, that some took a circular Motion uniform and even; others, an irregular and unequal one.*

It may also be, that in the Places through which they move, there may be some even Diffusion of Spaces, which may carry them on the same way one after another, whereby they may move evenly; but that elsewhere they may be uneven for the same Reason; Varieties which we observe in their Motions proceeding from hence.

To alledge one only Cause for these, seeing that the Phænomena's argue that the Causes may be many, is Madness, and not rightly considered by those who dote on vain Astrology, and trivially explain the Cause of some things, and in the mean time will not allow the divine Nature (to which they ascribe most of these) *to be free from the Task of several troublesome Offices.*

CHAP. II.

Of the Magnitude and Figure of the Stars.

AS concerning the Magnitude of the Sun, and of the rest of the Stars, it may be considered either as to us, or in itself. *As* [n] *to us, it is so much as it appeareth to be,* for the Sense is not deceived; and whatsoever Magnitude the Eye seeth in them, is such in them, for they have not any other thing immediately encompassing them without, which is visible; nor

[l] Laert. 10. 90. [m] Ibid. 10. 113. [n] Ibid. 10. 91.

nor any thing of their own, which falls not within View of the Eye.

But this Magnitude considered in itself, or *as to the thing itself, may be either somewhat greater, or somewhat lesser, or exactly so much as it appears to be. For with such Variety are Fires presented to our Senses; seen at a Distance, in the Day-time, or by Night.* For either they are just so big as they seem, as the Light of a Candle if we look near it; or lesser, as when we see the same Light in the Day-time at distance; or greater than indeed they are, as when the same Light is seen in the Night-time afar off.

I say, somewhat greater or lesser, in regard this Diversity betwixt the Appearance and the true Compass cannot be very great, as may be evinced from our ordinary Fires; for, from what Distance soever we perceive the Heat of any Fire, from the same its just Form appeareth to us. In like manner, since we perceive the Heat of the Sun here from the Place where he seemeth to us to be, his just Magnitude cannot be sensibly different.

That nothing perceivable is taken off from the Stars by this Distance, is confirmed, because those things which we behold at a great Distance, and much Air mediating between, are presented to us with a confused Circumference; but the Sun, to those who can look upon him, appears to be of an exact Compass; nor can any thing be seen more distinctly than the Circumference of the Moon. There are indeed some Stars which twinkle, and seem to shoot forth trembling Beams; but upon another account, this argues they are so near as to be seen exactly. For Fires amongst us seem, in like manner, to wave and tremble, when we behold them at a Distance, which, near at hand, seem fixed and constant.

Again, this is confirmed, because, if the Stars did lose their due Magnitude by reason of distance, they would much more lose their Colour; for we know, that a thing at distance ceaseth to be seen in its native Colour, sooner than by reason of its littleness it totally disappears, or comes not to be seen at all. But though there be no distance more capable to effect this, (for there is not any length greater,) yet the Stars do not therefore lose their true Colour.

Many [o] *things may be objected against this, but they are easily solv'd, if a Man stick close to those things which are manifest to us, as we have shewed in our Books concerning Nature*; where we bring in this Distinction of Magnitude, considered in itself, and, according to us, we declared, that neither he did absurdly, who said, The Sun is a Foot broad; nor he that said, It was many times bigger than *Peloponnesus*; nor he who said, It is of equal Bigness with the Earth; forasmuch as of things, which in themselves are greater and lesser, there may be, as to us, one Magnitude, according as they are nearer and farther off.

As for the Figure, I shall only say, that since it appeareth round to us, it is globous and plain like a Plate; and therefore the Stars are either as Dishes, or as Cylinders, or as Cones and Tops, or as certain Nails fixed in the Sky. For none of these hath any thing that implyeth a Contradiction, nor Dissonancy from the Phænomena.

CHAP. III.

How the Stars move, out-run one another, and are turned round.

HAving said, not long since, that, of the Stars, some are fixed, others erratick, and that this Difference proceeds from their having different Motions; we must [p] now say, in general, that the Motions of both may be made *either by the turning about of the whole Heaven*, in which one or more of them are, supposing it to be solid, and carrying them about with it, like Nails fastned into it; or else, the Heaven standing still, as a fluid or pervious thing, by their being whirled about, and moved through it.

Now forasmuch as whether it be the Motion of the Heaven, or of the Stars, it may have begun from a Necessity made at the very time that the World was generated, and impress'd eastwardly; it might in the first Case, (that is, if it be in the whole Heaven,) both have begun, and be continued by the Hurry of some Air. For there may be a twofold extrinsical Air; one, pressing from above, and driving the Heaven towards the West; the other lifting it up, as it were, and carrying it on, and that otherwise than the former, which on all sides presses and fixes the Poles. In the second Case, (that is, if the Motion be in the Stars themselves,) it may have been, either by Hurry of Air, or by the Course of the Fire.

For it may have been from the very Beginning, that a great Company of little Bodies, evaporating, and diffusing themselves, might break the Air, and force their Passage through it; and the Air, receiving this Motion of the Wind, and hurrying the Stars along with it, might carry them about, and cause that continual circular Motion, which is still seen above in them. It might also be, that the proper Fire of every Star, either being shut up close and seeking a Vent, might begin to turn about, and continue still as it began; or, being at greater Liberty, might move in this Fashion that way, unto which the Food or Aliment of each invites them, and so go on, *through its Heat and Desire of Aliment to the next Bodies, which were Fuel* convenient to nourish it.

[o] Laert. 10. 91.

[p] Ibid. 10. 92.

None of all these is repugnant to the Phænomena's; but otherwise we cannot easily determine from what Cause the Motion of the Stars should proceed.

But how comes it to pass, that some Stars anticipate, or get before others, so as that we see the others left behind them? This may happen, either because the others performing the same diurnal Revolution with them are moved more slowly, as the Moon, which moving more slowly than the rest towards the West, is left as it were behind them Eastward. Or because, being carried about by the diurnal Motion towards the West, they are in the mean time slowly carried on, by a contrary Motion, towards the East, whereby the Moon may not have been left by the rest Eastward, but rather have left them Westward. Or because all things being carry'd about only with a diurnal Revolution and equal Motion, yet some perform a longer, others a shorter Course; and so the Moon, if she be above the fixed Stars, as some conceive, will perform its Revolution more slowly, and be observed to be left behind.

Certainly to assert any thing absolutely in these Matters, becomes those who affect to make Ostentation of something magnificent and prodigious before the Multitude.

Again, How comes it to pass that the Sun, Moon and Planets, when they come to the Tropicks or Solstices, turn about and go back again? This may happen, either because such a kind of circular Motion was at the Beginning impress'd upon these Stars, as that they should be carry'd round about after a spiral manner, limited on each Side at the Solstices. Or that they go according to the Obliquity of Heaven, which in process of Time acquir'd a Necessity of that indirect Position. *Or because they are repell'd by the Air, which driveth them back* on, now to this side, now to that, by reason of its Coldness, Density, or some other Quality. *Or because their Aliment is conveniently disposed all along that way, kindling backward,* and failing forwards.

And these, and those which are like these, have in them nothing repugnant to the Evidence of Things; if a Man, adhering only to the Possibility that is in these things, can reduce each of them to that which agreeth with the Phænomena's, not fearing the groundless Contrivements of Astrologers, who forbear not to build upon and in them a vast Company of concentrick Orbs.

CHAP. IV.

Of the Rising and Setting of the Stars, and of the alternate Length of Days and Nights.

THE Rising and Setting of the Sun, Moon, and the rest of the Stars, may happen three ways.

First, [q] *By Appearance above, and Occultation beneath:* For that the Stars being always bright and never extinguish'd, are so carry'd about, above, and below the Earth, that sometimes they rise, sometimes they go down, or set; and the Sun, in particular, when he goeth down causeth Darkness with us; but returning, he enkindleth as it were the Heaven with his Morning-Beams. There is not any thing amongst the Phænomena's which contradicts this.

Again, [r] *By being enkindled* in the East-Quarter, *and extinguished* in the West: For *there may be such a Disposition of the Medium in both these Places, as that,* whilst the Stars pass through it, *what I affirm may be effected, there being nothing in the Phænomena's that contradicts it*; seeing there are not only Fountains that extinguish, but such also as enkindle Tapers, as that at *Epirus*, formerly mention'd. So that the Ocean compassing the Earth, the Sun may be extinguished by it in the West-Quarter, and return all along it, passing along the North into the East-Quarter, and from thence arise re-enkindled.

Thirdly, By a new Production every Day; for nothing hindreth, but that there may every Day arise new Suns. For Example: there flowing together to the East several Fires, or Seeds of Fire, which join in one round Body, and shine, and are carry'd on impetuously towards the West. For it is reported that the like happens in the Mountains of *Ida*, and chiefly about the Rising of the Dog-Star; and that Fires may meet in great Bodies together at certain Seasons, may be understood from what is observed to be done at some determinate Time in all other Bodies. For from the Confluxion and Defluxion of Seed, Trees at a certain Time bring forth Leaves and Fruits, at a certain Time shed them; at a certain Time Teeth are bred, at a certain Time cast; and so in other things, which it were too long to instance.

Now the Sun's Continuance above the Earth making Day, and his Absence Night; How comes it to pass that all Days are not equal, and all Nights equal; but that in Summer the Days are longer, the Nights shorter; in Winter alternately, the Nights longer and the Days shorter? This also may happen three Ways.

First, [s] *For that the Revolutions of the Sun above and beneath the Earth are sometimes performed faster, sometimes slower, according to the alternate Lengths of the Paces,* or Ways in which the Sun passeth: [t] And this by reason of the Position of the Orb called the *Zodiack*, through which the Sun passeth obliquely, and in two Signs of it makes the Nights and the Days equal. But when from thence he declineth to the North or South, as much of his Journey as he taketh off from one Part, either above or below the Earth, so much he adds to the other.

Secondly, *Because there may be certain Places in the Æther, which, by reason of their Grossness, and the Resistance which happens thereupon, cannot be passed*

[q] Laert. 10. 92. [r] Ibid. [s] Ibid. [t] Lucret. 5. v. 679.

fed through ſo ſwiftly as others. Such are thoſe which make the Sun ſtay long beneath the Earth in the Winter, whereby they make the Night longer and the Day ſhorter than in Summer. *Some things of the ſame kind may be obſerved amongſt us, according to which it is convenient to explicate ſuperior Bodies.*

Thirdly, That in the alternate Parts of the Year, the Fires, or Seeds of Fire aforeſaid, flow together in ſuch manner, as that they make a Sun ſooner or later; and the Sun riſes out of that Part from which he begins a longer or ſhorter Courſe above the Earth.

They who inſiſt and fix upon but ſome one particular Way to explicate theſe Effects, both contradict things apparent, and deviate from that which falls under human Contemplation.

CHAP. V.

Of the Light of the Stars, and of the Changes and Spots in the Moon.

LET us now ſay ſomething of the Light, not only of the Sun, but of the reſt of the Stars, and particularly of the Moon. Firſt, Men admire that the Sun, being ſo little, ſhould pour forth ſo much Light out of himſelf, as ſufficeth to enlighten and warm the Heaven, the Earth, the Sea, and yet not be itſelf exhauſted. But the Sun is a kind of Fountain, into which there flow together from beneath on every Side perpetual Rivulets; for the Seeds of Heat throughout the whole World flow ſo into the Sun, as that immediately from him, as from one Fountain or Head, both Heat and Light overfloweth every way.

Moreover, the Subſtance of the Sun may be of ſuch Thickneſs, and the Light and Heat which floweth from him of ſuch Thinneſs, that as a little Current or a Rivulet, ſtreaming from a Spring, watereth the Meadows and Fields round about it, without any loſs to itſelf; ſo that of the Sun may be ſufficient to irrigate, as it were, the whole World, without any ſenſible Diminution of the Sun.

Moreover, the Air may be of ſuch a Nature, as that it may be kindled, as it were, by a little Light diffuſed from the Sun; as a whole Field of Corn may be ſet on fire by one Spark.

Likewiſe the Sun may have his Aliment round about him, which may ſupply what he loſeth, as the Flame of a Lamp is fed by the Oil which is put to it. It may happen alſo many other ways.

[u] As to the reſt of the Stars, eſpecially the Moon, it may be that they have their Light from themſelves, *it may be they borrow it from the Sun; for amongſt us we ſee, that there are many things which ſhine of themſelves, many things which borrow Light from others; and there is nothing appearing in the ſuperior things themſelves, which hinders but that either of thoſe Opinions may be true.*

If a Man perſevere ſtedfaſt in his Mind the manifold Ways, and the Suppoſitions conformable to it, and conſider the Cauſes together with it; leſt minding things that are incoherent, he grow vainly proud, and ſometimes fall into one particular way, ſometimes into another.

As for the Moon, it is in the firſt place wonderful, how ſhe comes to have ſo many Changes, or Increaſe or Decreaſe of Light. It may be, that being round, and receiving Light from the Sun, ſhe is ſucceſſively ſo figur'd, (after the ſame manner as the Air, when the Sun riſeth, is enlighten'd, and when he ſetteth is darken'd ſucceſſively) as that going away from the Sun, ſhe ſeemeth every Day to increaſe, becauſe ſhe ſheweth more and more of her enlighten'd Face to us, until ſhe preſents it at full; and then going towards the Sun, decreaſeth every Day, becauſe ſhe ſheweth leſs and leſs of it, until at laſt ſhe turneth no Part of it towards us, but is quite unſeen.

Moreover, it may be that the Moon being round, one Part of her may be bright, another dark, and as ſhe turneth her Body about, may diſcover to us, alternately, more or leſs of each Part.

It may alſo be, that being bright of itſelf, ſhe may be obſcured by an Interpoſition of ſome opacous Body coming under her, which is hemiſpherical and hollow, and, moved along with her, is continually rolled about her.

Neither doth any thing hinder, but that there may every Day (according to what we formerly ſaid) be made a new Moon of a ſeveral Form and Figure; as in like manner the Seaſons of the Spring, Summer, Autumn, and Winter; and many things in them come and go, are produced and periſh, at ſet Times.

In fine, it may be any way wherein thoſe things which appear to us may be applied to Explication of that Manner; unleſs ſome Man, being much in Love with one ſinguiar Way, ſhall vainly reject the reſt; not conſidering what things it is poſſible for a Man to know, and thereupon aims at the Knowledge of thoſe things which Man cannot attain.

[w] Moreover, they admire in the Moon that there appear Spots in her Face; but *her Face may appear ſo, either from the various and different Nature of the Parts of the Moon, or from the Interpoſition of ſome Body,* not ſo much opacous as dusky; not rolling about her, but perpetually adhering to her; and not ſolid all over, but full of Holes like a Racquet.

[x] *Or it may be any other way of all thoſe which are obſerved to be conformable to things apparent. This is the Courſe to which we muſt adhere, concerning ſuperior things; for no Man, if he conteſt againſt apparent things, can ever partake of true Tranquility.*

[u] Laert. 10. 94. [w] Ibid. 10. 95. [x] Ibid. 10. 96.

CHAP. VI.

Of the Eclipses of the Stars, and their set Periods.

BUT there is nothing which useth to strike a greater Terror into Men, than that sometimes they observe Eclipses, and Defects of Light in the Sun and Moon, to happen on a sudden. Yet why may not this also happen many several ways?

For first, the Sun may be eclipsed; for that the Moon being interposed, puts her dark Orb or opacous Body before him, and keeping away his Light from the Earth, causeth Darkness in her, until by her Removal the Light is restor'd. The Moon may be eclipsed, for that the Earth being interposed betwixt her and the Sun, takes the Sun off from her, and darkens her, while she comes within the Cone of the Shadow, until, passing from out of it, she recovereth Light.

Again, the Sun may be eclipsed, for that some Part of Heaven, or some other opacous Body, such as is the Earth, may move along with the Sun, and at certain Times come underneath him, and intercept his Light. And the Moon in like manner; for that some other opacous Body passing betwixt her and the Sun, keeps off the Beams of the Sun from her; or moving together with her, doth not only perform its Phases slowly, but sometimes overcasts her with a sudden Darkness. Not to mention, that if she be dark on one Side, and bright on the other, it may happen that she may sometimes on a sudden turn her dark Side towards us.

Moreover, both the Sun and Moon may suffer Eclipse; for that they may pass through Places pernicious to Fire, and thereby their Light become extinguished, until going beyond them they renew and recover it.

Thus ought the several ordinary Ways to be heeded, and some of them also put together, it being possible that many Causes may concur.

[1] *The periodical Order*, by which Eclipses happen at certain Times, *is conceived to be kept in like manner as amongst us in some things, as in the Vicissitude of Seasons. There is no need of recurring to the divine Nature for the bringing of these to pass; let us allow that to be free from all Business, and exquisitely happy.*

Unless this be done, all Discourse of Causes in superior things will be vain; as hath already happen'd to some, who taking an impossible Course became frivolous, for that they approved only one, and rejected all the rest, though they were possible; and were transported to dream of that which exceeds the Capacity of the Intellect, and were neither able to admit, as they ought, apparent Signs; nor understand, as they say, how to rejoice with God.

[1] Laert. 10. 97.

CHAP. VII.

Of the Præsignifications of the Stars.

IT remains we speak of the Præsignifications of the Changes of the Air attributed to the Stars, as Rain, Wind, Drought, Heat, and the like, which happen according to the Time of the rising or setting of certain Stars, as of the Dog, Orion, the Pleiades.

[2] * *These Præsignifications may be made either according to the Condition of the Seasons, as it happens in those living Creatures, which being seen at one time with us, at another with others, passing hither and thither, are Signs, not Causes, of the Seasons: for the rising and setting Stars may be not Causes, but Signs of those Mutations; or as it happens not certainly, but casually, at what time the Stars rise or set, there are Causes of some Mutation in the Air.*

For neither of those is repugnant with things apparent; and what Cause there may be, besides these, agreeable with things apparent, we cannot perceive.

It is not without some Reason what I hinted of Præsignifications, which are observed in some Animals to be made according to the Condition of the Season which at that time comes in; so as the Motions observed in Animals only declare Tempests, but make them not. As those, for Example, which depart from us in Autumn induce not any Necessity of the Winter's being at that time; neither is there any divine Nature which sits and marks the Departure of living Creatures, that it may make good what is foretold by them.

This is a kind of Folly that cannot fall upon any Animal, in which there were the least Grain of Wit; so far is it from being in that Nature which possesseth all Felicity.

CHAP. VIII.

Of Comets, and those which are called Falling Stars.

WHAT hath been hitherto spoken of the Stars, belongs to the Sun and Moon, and Stars, which having been made from the Beginning of the World constantly inhere and appear in Heaven. But besides these there are other Stars, which sometimes are generated or newly appear, and after some few Days or Months either perish or lie hid. They are called Comets, *quasi Comatæ Stellæ*, hairy Stars, for that they have a long Train like Hair.

Some also there are that last but for a Moment, vanishing almost as soon as they appear; and seeming in some kind of Excursion to fall down, they are ordinarily termed Falling-Stars.

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[2] * Ibid. 10. 98.

As for the Comets, [z] "they may be generated; "either for that some Fire is sometimes kindled in "some of those superior Places, and being kindled "is for a time nourish'd and moved, according to "the Abundance and Disposition of the Matter. "Or else they appear; for that Heaven, as to that "Part which is over our Heads, hath some peculiar "Motion according to several Vicissitudes, so as "these Stars are driven to be made manifest. Or "else they come forth by reason of a certain Dispo- "sition at some times; and as soon as they come "lower towards us they become manifest.

"Comets disappear to our Sight through the Cau- "ses contrary to these: Either the Matter conve- "nient for them is not placed all along, as it is in "that Place where they are observed to inhere; so "as by degrees, through want of Aliment, they con- "sume as it were and go out, or that something "opposeth their Motion. And that may happen, "not only for that this Part of the World, round "about which the rest is turned, remaineth unmo- "ved, as some affirm; but also, for that there may "be in the Air some impetuous Gyration, which "may hinder their moving round, and drive it ano- "ther way; as may also happen to the other Stars, "which are called Planets, at the Tropicks.

"Moreover this may happen many other ways, "if we discourse upon that which is conformable to "things apparent.

"As for those which are called Falling-Stars, "they may be made either by Pieces broken off "from the true Stars, or from the falling down of "that Matter whereof there is a kind of Diffiation, "as may happen also in Lightning: Or from a "Company of ignifying Atoms meeting and joining "together to effect it, the Motion being made ac- "cording as the Force of meeting together was from "the Beginning: Or from the driving of Wind up "together within certain cloudy Bottoms or Wind- "ings, and setting it a-fire whilst it is rolled up and "down, and breaking through the Bottoms which "restrain them, and moving to that Part towards "which that Impulsion carries them.

"There are other Ways not fictitious, by which "this may be done. But of celestial Meteors "enough."

CHAP. IX.

Of Clouds.

NEXT these are the aerial Meteors, which are made nearer us in the Air. We shall begin with the Clouds; than which nothing is generated above in the Air, or seen more frequently.

[a] *A Cloud therefore may be generated and have its Being by some Accumulation as it were of the Air, the Winds driving it, so as that a Cloud is nothing but a thickning of the Air. Again, by Implication of some Atoms cohering mutually to one another, and fit to produce such a Compound*; and this when they first come together into little Bodies of Clouds, and those are gathered together into greater Bulks, so as at last they become greatest of all.

They most commonly seem to rise at the Tops of Hills; for that the first little Compounds are so subtle as that they escape the Sight, and are carry'd on by the Wind, until being by little and little condensed, they appear on the Tops of the Hills, which by reason thereof seem to smoke.

If any shall doubt, from whence there can come so great a Conflux of Atoms as is sufficient to make such great Bulks of Clouds, let him consider, that if no other way, yet they may at least come from without, out of the Immensity of the Universe, where there is an infinite Multitude of them. And this because there is allowed to the Principles a free Passage in and out, through the Vents of the World, as was formerly declared.

Moreover, a Cloud may be generated *by the gathering together of Effluxions and Exhalations out of the Earth and Water*, and carried upwards. For that there are many little Bodies drawn out of the whole Sea, appeareth by Garments which being hung upon the Shoar grow moist. Besides, we see that every-where out of Rivers arise Mists, and Exhalations, and Vapours, in such abundance, as that being carried upwards they darken the Sky, and by little and little meeting together turn into Clouds.

Neither doth any thing hinder, but that these Coagmentations may be made many other ways.

CHAP. X.

Of the Winds, and of Presters.

WIND may be generated, first, [b] *when the Atoms, or little Bodies, leap out of some convenient Places, and fly through the Air; there being a more vehement Effusion made from some Heaps, which are proper for such kind of Emissions:* [c] When in a narrow Vacuum there are many little Bodies, there followeth Wind; and contrary, the Air is quiet and calm, when in a great Vacuum there are but a few little Bodies.

For, as in a Market-place or Street, as long as the People are but few, they walk without any trouble; but when they run into some narrow Place, they justle and [d] quarrel with one another: so in this Space which encompasseth us, when many Bodies crowd into one little Place, they must necessarily justle one another, and be thrust forward, and driven back, and entangled, and squeezed; of which is made the Wind,

[z] Lucret. lo. 111. [a] Ibid. l. 6. v. 450. [b] Laert. lo. 100. [c] Senec. nat. quæst. 5. 2. [d] Senec. ibid.

Wind, when they which conteſted yield, and having been long toſs'd up and down uncertainly, ſhrink: But when a few Bodies ſtir up and down in a large Space, they can neither drive nor be driven impetuouſly.

Again, Wind may be cauſed when the [e] Air is driven on and agitated, either by Exhalations coming from the Earth and Water, or by the Sun's preſſing upon it from above; for it is manifeſt, that where the Air is agitated and ſtirred, there is cauſed Wind, ſo as Wind ſeems to be nothing elſe but the Waves of the Air. Whence we may conceive, that the Wind ſomewhat reſembles Water troubled, and that the more violent Winds come from being ſtirred by ſome more vehement Cauſe, after the ſame manner as Torrents rage and make waſte, when there happens a vaſt Defluxion of Waters by great Showers falling upon the Mountains.

[f] *Preſters* are windy Whirlings (for the fiery, and thoſe which burn, from which the Name is taken, are a kind of Thunder.) They "may be generated "either from the Depreſſion of a Cloud after various "Faſhions towards inferior Places, whilſt it is car-"ried down and driven on by Abundance of Wind, "which rolls itſelf about, and tears away the Sides "of the Clouds; the Wind alſo driveth on the "Cloud immediately from without, or from the "Wind ſtanding round about; whereas the Air "preſſing upon it from above, and withal the Air "which is driven on and diffuſed round about, hin-"dring, by reaſon of its Denſity, the great Abun-"dance of Wind knoweth not which way it may "ſpread itſelf," and being driven back, as well by the Sides as from above, it neceſſarily thruſts the Cloud downwards.

When this Preſter is thruſt down upon the Land, it cauſeth Whirlwinds; when upon the Sea, Whirlpools. Whirlwinds are leſs frequently ſeen, becauſe the Mountains ſnatch them away before they come within our Sight; Whirlpools more frequently, by reaſon of the wide Smoothneſs of the Sea, into which we may behold a Cloud like a Pillar deſcend from Heaven, and puſh it down, as it were, with the Force of an Arm or Fiſt, until the Violence of the Wind breaking thorough it, the Sea works and boils, and the Ships incur a Danger almoſt inevitable.

CHAP. XI.

Of Thunder.

IT was not without Reaſon that I ſaid, there are alſo fiery Preſters, which are not different from Thunder. For *Thunder ſeems to be cauſed by the manifold Conglomeration* of Blaſts, ſwelling with fiery little Bodies, "within the Bulks of the Cloud;" *and by the Evolution and ſtrong enkindling of them, and breaking of the Clouds by the Fire, which is ſo forcibly darted to inferior Places, according as that breaking forth is ſometimes directed towards a high Mountain (which kind of Places are oftneſt ſtruck with Thunder) ſometimes towards other Things.*

For that the [g] Nature of Thunder is fiery is manifeſt, even becauſe it often burneth the Houſes upon which it is darted, and for that it leaveth behind it a Stench like Brimſtone. That it is generated within the Clouds, is evident, for that it never thunders when the Sky is clear; but the Clouds firſt gather together all along the Air, and darken the Sky, and there ariſeth a foul Night, as it were of Showers. Laſtly, that many little Bodies or Seeds, as it were, of Fire, are contained within a Cloud, may be argued as well from the Effect, as for that amongſt the little Bodies of a Cloud riſing up from beneath, are intermingled, not only watery, but fiery alſo, and of other ſorts. Withal, it cannot be but that the Cloud muſt receive many things from the Beams of the Sun.

When therefore the Blaſt or Wind, which drove the Clouds together, hath intermingled itſelf with the Seeds of Fire, that are in the Boſom, as it were, and Cavity of the Clouds, there is cauſed a whirling or Vortex within it, which being carried about very rapidly, groweth hot by Motion; and either by Intenſion of this Heat, or the Contagion of ſome other Fire, breaketh out into perfect Thunder, and tearing the Cloud, is darted forth. Now the Cloud is cleft and broken, by reaſon that the Places round about the whirling or Vortex are taken up, and ſtuffed thicker with the Part of the Cloud; neither, by reaſon of their being ſqueezed up ſo cloſe together, is there any Chink open, whereby whilſt it is ſpread with the Wind may inſinuate itſelf, and retire by penetrating into it by degrees. Whereupon it is neceſſary, that the Fire lately made, being dilated by the Wind, breaks thorough the Cloud with Violence, which makes the Noiſe of Thunder; and coming forth, ſhineth and filleth all Parts with a glittering Light.

It may alſo be, that the Force of the Wind may light from without upon the Cloud, at ſuch time as the Thunder is mature and perfect, and rending the Cloud, make way for the fiery Vortex to break thorough.

It may alſo be, that the fiery Vortex, tho' not ſet on Fire when it breaks forth, may be kindled afterwards in its Paſſage thorough the Air; after the ſame manner as a leaden Slug paſſing thorough the Air, grows hot, and takes Fire. It may alſo be, that the Fire is made in the very daſhing againſt the thing which it hits, the Seeds of Fire being ſtruck out of both in the ſame manner as they are ſtruck by a Flint out of Steel.

"There

[e] Plin. 2. 33. [f] Laert. 10. 104. [g] Laert. 6. 218.

" There are many [h] other Ways by which this " Fire may be kindled, or Thunder made; only let " us caſt away all Fiction, and caſt away it will be, " if we take our Conjecture of things unſeen, from " that which is conformable to things apparent."

Hence may be given the Reaſon, why it comes to paſs, that it thunders oftner in the Spring and Autumn than in other Seaſons. In Winter, there wants the Seeds of Fire; in Summer, the Blaſts and Heaps of Clouds; in the Spring and in Autumn, all things convenient are ready.

But how comes it to paſs, that the Motion of Thunder is ſo ſwift, and its Stroke ſo violent? This proceeds from the great Violence of the Eruption, and the Tenuity; by reaſon of which, nothing in the way reſiſts them; and Force, which is, as it were, doubled by Gravity, and increaſeth by Motion.

How comes it to penetrate thorough the Walls of Houſes, to melt Metals in a Moment, to draw out all the Wine out of full Veſſels? This proceeds from the Tenuity, and quick Motion, and violent Force of the little Bodies, whereby it can in a Moment diſſipate and diſperſe thoſe things which the ordinary Fire of the Sun cannot under a long time.

CHAP. XII.

Of Lightning and Thunder-claps.

ALtho' I hinted by the way how Lightning and how Thunder are generated; yet nothing hinders, but that they may be generated many ways beſides.

For " Lightning [i] may be made either by the " rubbing or ſtriking of the Clouds againſt one ano- " ther, ſuch a kind of Figure iſſuing from them;" or by ſuch a Diſpoſure and Conformation of Atoms heaped up together, as cauſeth Fire, and generates Lightning; after the ſame manner as we obſerve it to be done, when Iron and a Stone are hit againſt one another.

Or by the Winds ſtirring up out of the Clouds thoſe Bodies, or little Bodies, that is, Atoms, *which cauſe this glittering Brightneſs*; for that the Wind (and eſpecially if it grow hot like a leaden Slug) ſtrikes off the ſame little Bodies, which are ſtruck by the mutual Attrition of the Clouds.

" Or by ſqueezing forth; there being made a " Compreſſion either by the Clouds one with ano- " ther, or by the Winds driving them, which is " cauſed over and above the Force of Colliſion.

" Or by Interception of the Light which is diffu- " ſed by the Stars, which thereupon is driven by the " Motion of the Clouds and Winds, and falleth out " of the Clouds.

" Or by the falling down of ſome moſt tenuious " Light out of the Clouds, whilſt the Clouds are intrin- " ſecally gathered together by the Fire; and withal, " Thunder is cauſed like a kind of Bounce by their " Motion.

" Or by the enkindling of a Wind, which is " cauſed as well by a vehement Intenſeneſs, as Con- " volution of Motion.

" Or by a breaking of the Clouds by the Winds, " and falling down of fiery Atoms, which cauſe " Lightning to ſhine."

That Lightning may be generated many other ways, he will eaſily perceive, who adheres to things " apparent, and is able to underſtand what ſuits with " them."

Thunder-claps may be made thus, " Either by " the Rolling of a Wind within the Cavities of the " Clouds, as in ordinary Veſſels, when ſomething " is rolled in them.

" Or making a Crack by the very Diffiation and " Ebullition, as it were, of the Fire within the ſame " Clouds.

" Or by the breaking and tearing of the ſame " Clouds, as when a ſwollen Bladder cracks, Paper " is torn, or a Shrowd rent.

" Or by the ſame Clouds, rubbing and driving " againſt one another, having acquired an icy kind " of Concretion, [k] and this, by reaſon of the Winds " driving them;" as tall Woods crackle at the blowing of the Eaſt Wind, Waves unbroken murmur, Garments hung up, and Papers carried away and beaten, as it were by the Winds, make a clattering Noiſe.

Or by Extinction of the Fire of Thunder, breaking out of one Cloud and lighting upon another which is wateriſh, whereupon it hiſſes like red-hot Iron taken out of the Fire, and caſt into the Water.

Or by the burning of ſome dry Cloud, which crackles like a Branch in the Fire.

" In a word, that this alſo may be explained ſe- " veral Ways, the things which appear evince and " teach us;" that we think not, with ignorant and ſuperſtitious Perſons, that the Noiſe of Thunder denotes the Appearance of ſome God, ſince other Bodies, being ſtruck againſt one another, make a Sound alſo, as Mill-Stones in grinding, or the Hands clapped together.

Leſt any Wonder how it comes to paſs, that Lightning is ſeen before the Thunder is heard, this may happen, " either for that in ſome certain Diſpoſition " of the Clouds, as ſoon as the Wind lights upon " them, there leaps forth ſuch a Configuration of " little Bodies, as cauſeth Lightning;" and thereupon the Wind, by rolling up and down, maketh this Sound.

" Or

[h] Laert. [i] Laert. 10. 101. [k] Lucret. lib. 6. v. 163.

" Or for that they being both generated together, " the Lightning is brought to us with a quicker " Nimbleneſs; the Thunder cometh later, as hap- " peneth in ſome things which are ſeen at a diſtance, " and make a Sound by Blows;" for it is manifeſt, that the Stroke is ſeen before the Sound is heard.

CHAP. XIII.

Of Rain and Dew.

WE muſt now ſpeak of watery Concretions, whereof ſome continue fluid, others acquire ſome Solidity by the Impreſſion of Cold; thoſe which continue fluid are Rain and Dew, whereof one is made, the Heaven being cloudy; the other, when it is clear.

Rain may be made of the Clouds [l], either when being thinner than ordinary, the Wind driving them, or they preſſing upon one another, are ſqueezed together, and knit into Drops; or when being thicker than ordinary, they are rarified and changed by Heat or by the Wind; or, like Wax, melt ſo, that they fall down in Drops.

That there are Seeds of Water contained in the Clouds, is ſo well known, that we need not ſpeak of it. They aſcend together with Clouds, they increaſe together with them, and are diſperſed thorough them, as Blood through the Parts of our Body. Neither doth there aſcend Moiſture into the Clouds from all Rivers only, but the Clouds alſo which hang over the Sea receive Moiſture like a Fleece of Wool.

Wherefore [m] Rain may flow from the Clouds, either when the Force of the Wind thruſteth the Clouds up together, and great Stores of Showers being raiſed above them, preſſeth and thruſts them; or when the Clouds, by the Power of the Winds are rarified, and ſuffer their Moiſture to flow abroad, or by the Heat of the Sun are ſo diſſolved, that they fall down in Drops, and, as I ſaid, like melting Wax.

It may happen, that Rains ſometimes laſt a long while, becauſe it then happeneth, that many Seeds of Waters, riſing up to ſeveral Clouds, and diſperſed every way, may ſupply the Rain. Sometimes alſo the Earth reeking, exhales back again all the Moiſture which ſhe receiveth.

Dew is made, either by the meeting together of the little Bodies in the Air, which are of ſuch a Nature, as to be fit to generate this kind of Moiſture; or by the bringing forth of little Bodies, which chiefly generate Dew above, when they ſo meet together as to make that Moiſture, and flow down into the Places beneath. Many things of this kind are done amongſt us, eſpecially in Stoves.

CHAP. XIV.

Of Hail, Snow, and Froſt.

OF watery [n] Concretions, which, by Impreſſion of Cold are congealed into ſome Solidity, there are two things which are made when the Heaven is cloudy, Hail and Snow; one, when it is clear, Froſt.

Hail is generated, either when the Congelation is ſtronger, by reaſon of the ſettling of a cold Wind which is on every ſide, and preſſeth the Drippings or Drops of the Clouds, which otherwiſe would go away into Rain; or when the congealed Bulk cleaveth aſunder in many Places, and by a moderate Liquefaction, watery Drops inſinuating into the Chinks by Compreſſion of the Parts, and breaking the whole Frame into Pieces, they cauſe that the Parts exiſt compacted ſeverally by themſelves, and make a Heap of Fragments which are thereupon diſperſed.

That theſe Fragments be in a manner round, nothing hindreth, either for that the outmoſt Corners are cut off on every ſide, by reaſon of their long falling; or, for that in their very forming, ſomething either watery or windy ſurrounds all the Parts evenly, as we ſaid, ſo that their Surface is round, and not uneven.

Snow happeneth to be made either by thin Water poured out of the Clouds, ſo that it froths, (ſome Clouds fit for that Purpoſe preſſing, and the Winds blowing them abroad) and is afterwards congealed in the very Motion, by reaſon of ſome more vehement Cold in the lower Places of the Clouds.

Or by ſome ſmooth congealing, cauſed in the Clouds, unto which, whilſt the little watery Bodies, compreſſed by, and neighbouring to one another, arrive, there is cauſed an Aggeneration of ſuch Looſeneſs as the Flocks of Snow have; whereas, the ſame driving one another cauſe Hail, which two things chiefly are made in the Air.

It may alſo be, that a kind of Ejaculation of the Snow, which falleth down in Heaps, may be made, the Clouds, which were firſt congealed, breaking in aſunder.

Laſtly, Froſt is made of the ſame little Bodies as Dew; whenas, the little Drops of Dew made either way, are by the cold Temperament of the Air congealed, and in congealing, receive a light Compactedneſs.

CHAP.

[l] Laert. 10. 99. [m] Lucret. lib. 6. v. 496. [n] Laert. 10. 106.

CHAP. XV.

Of the Rainbow, and Halos.

WE muſt not here paſs by two remarkable things [o], which appear in the Clouds or above; the Rainbow, an Arch of various Colours, over-againſt the Sun; and Halos, which ſometimes like a white Crown compaſſeth the Moon.

The Rainbow is made either for that the moiſt Air ſhineth by the oppoſite Splendor of the Sun, or for that it is the particular Nature of Light, and of the Air, to preſent ſuch kind of Colours, either all of them, or one only, from which (ſhining forward) the neighbouring Parts of the Air are ſo coloured; in like manner, as we obſerve to be done when the Parts of any thing which is enlightened make the Parts of other things next to it ſhine alſo.

As to the Roundneſs of its Figure, this is cauſed by reaſon that it is only conveyed to the Beholders Eye, from a Diſtance every way equal; or, for that the Atoms, which are carried out of the Air into the Cloud, are ſo compelled, that every Concretion made of them is formed into this Roundneſs.

A Halo is made about the Moon, either by the carrying up of a ſomewhat groſs or lightly-cloudy Air towards the Moon, whilſt in the mean time, ſome Effluxions derived from her, do as it were ſift it (for they do not abſolutely diſperſe it) in ſuch manner, that they are formed into a Circle about her in this cloudy Figure.

Or by the Air, compelled about the Moon, after ſuch a manner as to make this round and groſſer Figure about her; which ſome conceive to happen according to ſome of her Parts, or by ſome Effluxion driving together from without, or, by Inſinuation of Heat from beneath, fit to effect this.

CHAP. XVI.

Of Avernal Places.

IT reſts, that we ſpeak [p] ſome things of Avernal Places; ſo termed, for that they are pernicious to Birds; for when Birds attempt to fly over them, they inſtantly fall down and die: As alſo concerning the Cauſes of Peſtilence, as far as they depend on the Air.

I muſt here only repeat, that the Earth containeth all kinds of little Bodies ſo diverſly figured, that ſome are ſuitable to the Natures of Animals, others hurtful; and by reaſon that the Contextures of Animals are ſo unlike to one another, ſome of theſe are convenient and wholſome to ſome Animals, which to others are inconvenient and pernicious. And why not? when the Contexture and Temper of the ſame Perſon being changed by a Fever, the ſame Wine, which before did him much good, is now as deadly to him as to be ſtabb'd to the Heart.

It is manifeſt, that many things unpleaſant, troubleſome, and pernicious, ordinarily come into the Taſte, the Smell, the Touch, and all the Senſes; not to mention ſome Trees which either cauſe a Heavineſs to thoſe who ſleep in their Shade, or by an ill Scent kill them; nor ſtrong Wine, or the Fume of Coals and the like. How many Places are there, which exhale ſtrong and hurtful Scents of Brimſtone and Sulphur? They who dig in Mines, who look ſo wan, and die ſo ſoon, how many noiſome Vapours do they find to breathe out of the inmoſt Parts of the Earth?

Thus there are ſome Places out of which theſe Vapours breathe, which being carried up into the Air, diffuſed round over it in ſome manner poiſon it, and infect it with a deadly Quality; ſo as that, when Birds come to paſs over it, *Veluti ſi Mulier Menſium Tempore Caſtoreum olfaciat*, they become ſtupified, and immediately fall down dead.

It may alſo be, that the Air which lies between the Birds and the Earth, being cleft aſunder by the Force of a Vapour breaking forth, and the Place becoming almoſt vacuous; the Birds may not have a Support upon which to reſt their ſpreading Wings, and continue their Flight, ſo that they ſink and fall, over-burden'd by the Weight of their own Body. Thus much for Avernal Places.

CHAP. XVII.

Of Peſtilence.

THough Peſtilence, [q] or a mortal Affection of the Air may come from above, like a Cloud or Dew, yet it is moſt commonly cauſed, when the Earth is putrify'd by unſeaſonable Rains and Heats, and ſuch a Vapour ariſeth out of it as infects the Air, and killeth far and near, not only Men, but other living Creatures.

That the Air eaſily entertains the Affection, or Quality of the Vapour breathed immediately out of the Earth into it, is manifeſt, from the Diſeaſes that are particular to Countries; as here with us the Gout is frequent; among the *Achæans*, Soreneſs of Eyes; among the *Ægyptians*, the Leproſy; as alſo for that Travellers find it by Experience, acknowledging that the Air in ſeveral Places is very different.

That this Affection is ſometimes propagated by the Air, the Nature of the Peſtilence declareth, as that eſpecially, which, in the Memory of our An-

[o] Laert. 10. 109. [p] Lucret. l. 6. 740. [q] Laert. 6. 1091, &c.

ceſtors beginning in *Æthiopia*, ran on into *Lybia* and *Egypt*, and almoſt over all the Dominions of the King of *Perſia*, ſo as it came into our City and Country alſo, and quite laid it waſte.

This Propagation is made, when the poiſonous Vapour intermingling its little Bodies with the Air, doth ſo diſorder, and pervert the Situation of the little Bodies thereof, that whatſoever of them are like its own, it formeth into the ſame Contexture: As when Fire inſinuating with its little Bodies into Wood, ſo altereth its Compoſition, that it ſtrikes forth all the fiery little Bodies that are in it; and, out of it, maketh a new Fire like to itſelf. Moreover, as Fire running along in its ſwift Motion, is able to ſpread itſelf through a whole Wood; ſo this peſtilent Affection, by reaſon of the little Bodies of which it conſiſts, creepeth forward by Degrees, and changeth the Air a great way, until it be repreſs'd by an Affection quite different; in like manner, as when a Cloud or Miſt creeps through the Air, and by little and little, changeth and diſturbeth it all along as it goeth.

Not to mention, that when Men by breathing, draw the Air into their Bodies, they ſuck in at the ſame time, the little Bodies of this Affection; wherewith thoſe which are like them in the Body are tranſpoſed, and perverted in the ſame manner, as we ſaid of the Air; and by contagious Afflation, they are tranſmitted on to others, which cauſe the ſame Perverſion, whereby the Diſeaſe ſpreads every where.

Thus much concerning not Meteorology only, but all Phyſiology: Of which the few things that we have ſaid are ſuch, as that by contemplating them, we may throughly underſtand the things that are done; whereby the things that are of Affinity with them, may be comprehended; and the Cauſes of particular Effects in Nature, known. For they, who purſue not theſe with all poſſible Diligence, are far from underſtanding them as they ought, and from obtaining the End for which thoſe are to be underſtood.

And never muſt we caſt out of Mind the Criteries, (nor the Evidence that belongs to every one of them,) becauſe, if we forſake not theſe, we ſhall with right Reaſon find out from whence Perturbation ariſeth, and what it is that cauſeth Fear, and ſhall quit ourſelves from it, underſtanding the Cauſe of ſuperior things, and of all others which ordinarily happen, and ſtrike great Fear into others.

But, preſuppoſing the Criteries, it avails moſt to apply ourſelves to Speculation of the Principles of which all things conſiſt, and of the Infinity of Nature, and other things coherent with theſe, and with conſtant Remembrance to preſerve the chiefeſt and moſt general Maxims concerning them. For by this means, we ſhall be fartheſt off from Fables, and obtain that undiſturbed State of Mind, which is the true and only Mark, at which, in all this Diſcourſe, we have aimed.

The Third Part of PHILOSOPHY.

ETHICK, or *MORALS*.

IT reſteth that we ſpeak of *Ethick*, or the Philoſophy of *Manners*; neither is it without Cauſe that we ſaid at firſt, that this is to be eſteemed the principal Part of Philoſophy, becauſe that which is of Nature would be uſeleſs, unleſs it conferr'd to the End of Life with an Ethical Conſideration. Even Prudence itſelf, which belongs to this Part, therefore excels natural Philoſophy, becauſe it rules it, and uſeth it as a Means to moral Philoſophy.

In ſaying this Part concerns the *End of Life*, I ſhew why it is commonly called the Philoſophy *concerning Life and Manners*, or concerning the Inſtitution of the Actions of Life, (for Manners are no other than the cuſtomary Actions of human Life;) likewiſe concerning the *End*, that is, the extreme or greateſt of the Goods which we purſue; and concerning things eligible and avoidable, inaſmuch as it preſcribeth the Election of ſuch things as conduce to that End, and the Avoidance of ſuch as divert from it.

For the *End* of Life, by the tacit Conſent of all Men, is *Felicity*; and ſince almoſt all miſs of that End, muſt it not happen either for that they propoſe not to themſelves that Felicity which they ought, or for that they uſe not the right Means to attain it?

When we behold ſo many, who, abounding in all things neceſſary to the Uſe of Life, (ſwimming in Wealth, adorn'd with Titles, flouriſhing in a hope-

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[a] Laert. 10. 132.

ful Iſſue; in fine, poſſeſs'd of all things commonly eſteem'd deſirable,) are notwithſtanding anxious and querulous, full of Cares and Solicitudes, diſtracted with Terrors, in a word, leading a miſerable Life; thence we may infer, that they know not wherein true Felicity conſiſts, and by what Means it may be attained: Their Hearts reſembling a Veſſel, which either being leaky and full of Holes, can never be filled; or being tainted with ill Liquor, corrupts and ſpoils whatſoever it receives.

It is therefore worth our Pains, by the Benefit of this Philoſophy, (which [b] treats of the *End* and of *Felicity*,) to cleanſe and mend our Heart, that it may be ſatisfy'd with a little, and be pleaſed in the enjoying of any thing; *we muſt philoſophiſe not for Shew, but ſeriouſly; for it is requiſite, not that we ſeem ſound, but that we be ſound:* We muſt philoſophiſe [c] forthwith, and not defer it to the Morrow; for even to Day it concerns us to live happily, and *it is a Miſchief of Folly that it always begins to live*, or defers to begin, but in the mean time liveth never.

A ſtrange thing it is! *We* [d] *have been born once, we cannot be born twice, and Age muſt have an End: Yet thou, O Man, though the Morrow be not in thy Power, in Confidence of living to-morrow, putt'ſt thyſelf off to the future, and loſeſt the preſent: So Mens Lives waſte with Delay, and hence it is that ſome of us die in the midſt of Buſineſs:* Every Man leaves the World as if he had but newly enter'd it; and therefore old Men are upbraided with Infancy, becauſe, as if employ'd in Buſineſs that concerns them not, they do not take notice that they live, and ſo their whole Life paſſeth away without the Benefit of Life.

Let us therefore endeavour ſo to live, that we may not repent of the time paſt; and ſo enjoy the preſent, as if the Morrow nothing concerned us. He moſt ſweetly attains the Morrow, who leaſt needs or deſires the Morrow; and that Hour overtakes a Man moſt welcome, whereof he had framed to himſelf the leaſt Hope. And ſince [e] *it is troubleſome always to begin Life*, let Life be always to us as it were perfect and abſolute, and as if there wanted nothing to its meaſure. *The Life of a* [f] *Fool is unpleaſant, it is timorous, it is wholly carried on to the future*; let us endeavour that ours be pleaſant, ſecure, not only preſent, but even now ſettled in Safety.

Doubtleſs the way to fly Folly, is to aſcend that Watch-tower (as it were) of wiſe Men, from whence we may behold the reſt wandring, and, in Life, vainly ſeeking Life. If you think it pleaſant, from Land to behold Mariners ſtriving with Storms; or, without endangering yourſelf, ſee Armies joining Battle; certainly nothing can be more delightful, than from the calm Throne of Wiſdom, to view the Tumults and Contentions of Fools. Not that it is pleaſant that others be afflicted, but it pleaſeth that we are not involved in the ſame Evils.

But that we may in ſome meaſure, to our Ability, help thoſe who deſire to attain this Height of Wiſdom, we will collect our Meditations upon theſe things; treating firſt of *Felicity*, which is Man's greateſt good, and then of thoſe things which conduce to the making and preſerving it, which are nothing elſe but the *Virtues* themſelves.

CHAP. I.

Of Felicity, or the End of Good, as far as Man is capable of it.

OF *Felicity* we muſt firſt take notice, it is termed the *End*, that is, the laſt, the extreme, and greateſt of Goods; becauſe ſince thoſe things are called good which allure the Appetite to purſue them, and of theſe goods ſome are deſired for themſelves, ſome for other things, Felicity is ſuch a Good as all Goods ought to be referred unto, itſelf to none.

And though *Felicity*, or *Beatitude*, and *Happy Life* be the ſame thing, yet that doth not hinder us, but that we ſometimes mention the End of happy Life, which we do, according to the vulgar Phraſe, taking the End of happy Life, and happy Life, for the ſame thing; but not implying any further End, to which happy Life may be thought to be referred.

This premiſed, we muſt firſt diſtinguiſh Felicity into two kinds; one ſupreme, incapable of Intenſion and Remiſſion; the other ſubalternate, in which there may be Addition and Detraction of Pleaſure.

The firſt is conceived to be a State, than which none can be imagined better, ſweeter, more deſirable, in which there is no Ill to be feared, no Good wanting: There is nothing that would and may not be done; and which is ſo ſure, that it can at no time be loſt.

By the other we underſtand a State, in which it is as well as may be, or in which there are very many neceſſary Goods, very few Ills, and in which it is permitted to lead a Life ſo ſweetly, ſo quietly, and conſtantly, as the Company, Courſe of Life, Conſtitution of Body, Age, and other Circumſtances will allow.

Nor without Reaſon is it I make this Diſtinction and Definition. For, though it ſeem manifeſt, that the firſt kind is proper only to Good; yet there are, who, having a high Opinion of themſelves, and of their own Wiſdom, dare promiſe and arrogate it to themſelves, and therefore affirm, that they are equal to God; and modeſt amongſt them are they, who repute themſelves inferior to none but *Jupiter*.

[b] Stob. l. 134. [c] Senec. Ep. 13. [d] Plut. adv. Colot. Stob. Serm. 16. [e] Senec. Ep. 23. [f] Ibid.

But these truly seem forgetful of their own Mortality and Weakness; when as all, who are conscious thereof, cannot but acknowledge, that Men are capable only of the latter, and that Wisdom doth much, if, all Men being in some manner miserable, it place thee in a State, wherein thou shalt be the least miserable of all Men. Or, if among the several Degrees of Miseries, to which thou art obnoxious by Birth, it place thee in that wherein thou shalt be least miserable. For that is to be happy, to be free from those Ills wherewith thou mightest be afflicted; and in the mean time to enjoy such Goods, than which, greater cannot be had in the Condition wherein thou art.

This indeed is the Reason, why I conceive a Man, tho' deprived of Sight and Hearing, may nevertheless partake of happy Life, because he will yet persevere in as many Goods as he can, and be free from those Ills, if not of Body, at least of Mind, which otherwise might have afflicted him.

I further declare, that a wise Man, tho' he should be cruelly tormented, will yet be happy, by Felicity not divine but human; which in a wise Man is always as great as can be for the Condition of the time.

For in Torments he feels the Pain indeed, sometimes groans and cries out; but because there is a Necessity of suffering them, he exasperates not or makes them greater, by Impatience or Despair, but rather, with as great Constancy of Mind as is possible, mitigates and renders them somewhat more easy. Herein certainly he is more happy than if he sunk under them, like those, who, being under the same Torment, bear them not with equal Courage and Constancy, nor have the like Assistance from Wisdom (which confers at least Innocence of Life, and Security of Conscience,) to lighten them.

Therefore neither is there any Reason to cavil, that the Bull of *Phalaris*, and a Bed of Roses, are all one to us; and the wise Man, burning in that Bull, must cry out, *How pleasant is this! How unconcern'd am I! How little care I!* Since there are some things which a wise Man had rather should happen to him, as Rest of Body, free from all Disturbance, and Leisure of Mind, rejoicing in Contemplation of its own good: There are other things, which though he would not have them, yet when they do come, he bears them constantly, even commends and approves them, inasmuch as they give him Occasion to please himself in his own Constancy, and to say, I burn, but yield not. Why may it not be wished, not indeed to be burnt, but to be vanquished?

This I say, in regard a wise Man is obnoxious both to the Pains of Sickness, and the Tortures of Tyrants, although he neither invites those, nor provokes these, so far as decently he may. Besides, the Times are not such always to all Men, as that they may by Indolence live happy.

CHAP. II.

That Pleasure, without which there is no Notion of Felicity, is in its own Nature good.

SEeing that to live without Pain is sweet or pleasant, and to enjoy good things, and be recreated by them; it follows that Felicity cannot consist without both, or at least one of these; (by Pleasure, Suavity, Jucundity, and the like Terms, I understand the same thing:) Yet some there are, who, with great Flourishes, have so discoursed against Pleasure itself, as if it were something ill in its own Nature, and consequently not appertaining to Wisdom and Felicity.

Therefore, before we enquire whether Felicity really consists in Pleasure, we must shew, that Pleasure is in its own Nature good, as its contrary, Pain, is in its own Nature ill.

Certainly since that is good which delighteth, pleaseth, is amiable, and allures the Appetite; that, consequently, ill which harmeth, is unpleasant, and therefore excites Hate and Aversion: That is, nothing pleaseth more than Pleasure, delighteth more, is lov'd more, is desired more; as on the contrary, nothing incommodes more than Pain, displeaseth, is abhorred, and shunned. So as Pleasure seems not only to be a good, but the very Essence of good, it being that by which any thing is good or desirable: Pain not only an ill, but the very Essence of ill, as being that by which any thing is ill or hateful.

For though we sometimes shun Pleasure, yet it is not the Pleasure itself which we shun, but some Pain annexed accidentally to it; as, if at any time we pursue Pain, it is not the Pain itself that we pursue, but some Pleasure accidentally joined to it.

For, (to express this more plainly,) no Man slights, hates, or shuns Pleasure as Pleasure, but because great Pains overtake those who know not how to follow Pleasure with Reason. Nor is there any who loves, pursues, would incur Pain simply as Pain, but because sometimes it so happens, as that with Labour and Pain he must pursue some great Pleasure.

For to instance in the least things; Who amongst us undertakes any laborious Exercise of Body, unless that some Commodity arise by it? Who can justly blame him, who desires to be in that Pleasure which hath no Trouble? Or him, who shuns that Pain which procures no Pleasure? But we accuse and esteem those worthy of Contempt, who, blinded and corrupted with the Blandishments of present Pleasures, foresee not the Troubles that must ensue. Alike faulty are they, who desert their Duties out of Softness

neſs of Mind, that is, the Avoidance of Labour and Pains.

Of theſe things, the Diſtinction is eaſy and ready. For at a free time, when our Election is at Liberty, and nothing hinders, but that we may do what pleaſeth us moſt, all Pleaſure is to be embraced, all Pain to be expelled. But at ſome times it often falleth out, that Pleaſures are to be rejected, and Troubles not to be declined.

Thus, altho' we eſteem all Pleaſures a good, and all Pain an ill, yet we affirm not, that we ought at all times to purſue that, or to avoid this; but that we ought to have regard as to their Quantity, ſo alſo to their Quality; ſince it is better for us to undergo ſome Pains, that we may thereby enjoy the more abundant Pleaſures; and it is expedient to abſtain from ſome Pleaſures, leſt they prove the Occaſion of our incurring more grievous Pains.

Hereupon this was, as it were, the Fountain, from which, in treating of Criteries, we deduced ſeveral Canons concerning Affection or Paſſion, eſteeming Pleaſure or Pain the Critery of Election and Avoidance: And not without Reaſon, foraſmuch as we ought to judge of all theſe things, by the Commenſuration and Choice of things profiting or hurting, ſince we ſometimes uſe a good as an ill; and, on the contrary, ſometimes an ill as a good.

Hence therefore, to preſs this further, I ſay, that no Pleaſure is ill in itſelf, but ſome things there are which procure ſome Pleaſures, but withal bring Pains far greater than the Pleaſures themſelves. Whereupon I add, that if every Pleaſure might be ſo reduced within itſelf, as that it neither ſhould compriſe within it, nor leave behind it any Pain; every Pleaſure, by this Reduction, would be no leſs perfect and abſolute than the principal Works of Nature, and conſequently there would be no Difference amongſt Pleaſures, but all would be expetible alike.

Moreover, if thoſe very things which afford Pleaſure to luxurious Perſons, could free them from the Fear of Meteors, and of Death, and Pain, and could inſtruct them what are the Bounds of Deſires, I could not find any fault, foraſmuch as they would be every way replete with Pleaſures, and have nothing grievous or painful that is ill.

CHAP. III.

That Felicity conſiſts generally in Pleaſure.

NOW to come to what was propoſed, Felicity ſeems plainly to conſiſt in Pleaſure. This is firſt to be proved in general, then we muſt ſhew, in what Pleaſure particularly it conſiſts.

In general, Pleaſure ſeems to be, as the Beginning, ſo the End alſo of happy Life, ſince we find it to be the firſt Good, and convenient to our, and all animal, Nature; and is that from which we begin all Election and Avoidance, and in which at laſt we terminate them, uſing this Affection as a Rule to judge every Good.

That Pleaſure is the firſt and connatural Good, or (as they term it,) the firſt thing ſuitable and convenient to Nature, appeareth; for that *every Animal, as ſoon as born,*[g] *deſireth Pleaſure, and rejoiceth in it, as the chief Good; ſhunneth Pain as its greateſt Ill, and to its utmoſt Ability, repels it.* We ſee that even [h] *Hercules* himſelf, tormented by a poiſonous Shirt, could not with-hold from Tears;

> Crying and howling, whilſt the *Locrian* Stones,
> And high *Eubœan* Hills, retort his Groans.

Thus[i] *doth every undepraved Animal, its own Nature judging incorruptly and entirely.*

There[k] *needs not therefore any reaſoning to prove, that Pleaſure is be deſired, Pain to be ſhunned; for this is manifeſt to our Senſe, as that Fire is hot, Snow white, Honey ſweet. We need no Arguments to prove this, it is enough that we give notice of it. For ſince that if we take away from Man all his Senſes, there is nothing remaining, it is neceſſary, that what is convenient or contrary to Nature, be judged by Nature herſelf, and that Pleaſure be expetible in itſelf, and Pain in itſelf to be avoided: For what perceives, or what judgeth, either to purſue or avoid any thing, except Pleaſure and Pain.*

That Pleaſure, as being the firſt thing convenient to Nature, is alſo the laſt of Expetibles, or the End of good things, may be underſtood even from this, Becauſe it is Pleaſure only for whoſe ſake we ſo deſire the reſt, that itſelf is not deſired for the ſake of any other, but only for itſelf; for we may deſire other things to delight or pleaſe ourſelves, but no Man ever demanded a Reaſon, why we would be delighted and pleaſed? Certainly no more, than for what Cauſe we deſire to be happy; ſince Pleaſure and Felicity ought to be reputed, not only in the ſame degree, but to be the very ſame thing, and, conſequently the End, or ultimate and greateſt Good, on which the reſt depend, but itſelf depends on none.

This is further proved, for that *Felicity* is, as we hinted formerly, no otherwiſe, than becauſe it is that State in which we may live moſt ſweetly and moſt pleaſantly, that is, with the greateſt Pleaſure that may be. For, take from Life this Sweetneſs, Jucundity, Pleaſure; and where, I pray, will be your Notion of *Felicity*; not of that *Felicity* only which I termed divine, but even of the other, eſteemed human; which is no otherwiſe capable to receive degrees of more and leſs, or Intenſion and Remiſſion, than

[g] Cic. de fin. 1. 9. [h] Laert. 10. 137. [i] Cic. ibid. [k] Ibid.

than becauſe Addition or Detraction of Pleaſure may befal it?

To underſtand this better, by comparing Pleaſure with Pain, "let [1] us ſuppoſe a Man enjoying many "great inceſſant Pleaſures, both in Mind and Body, "no Pain hindring them, nor likely to diſturb them; "What State, can we ſay, is more excellent, or "more deſirable than this? For in him who is thus "affected, there muſt neceſſarily be a Conſtancy of "Mind, fearing neither Death nor Pain, becauſe "Death is void of Senſe; Pain, if long, uſeth to be "light; if great, ſhort; ſo as the ſhortneſs makes a-"mends for its greatneſs, the lightneſs for its length. "When he arrives at ſuch a Condition, as he trem-"bles not with Horror of the Deity, nor ſuffereth "the preſent Pleaſures to paſs away, whilſt his "Mind is buſied with the Remembrance of paſt, or "Expectation of future good things, but is daily "joyed with the reflecting upon them; What can "be added to better the Condition of this Per-"ſon?

"Suppoſe, on the other ſide, a Man afflicted with "as great Pains of Body, and Griefs of Mind, "as Man's Nature is capable of, no hope that they "ſhall ever be eaſed, no Pleaſure paſt, preſent, or "expected; What can be ſaid or imagined more mi-"ſerable than he?

"If therefore a Life full of Pains be of all things "moſt to be avoided, doubtleſs the greateſt ill is to "live in Pain; whence it followeth, that the great-"eſt good is to live in Pleaſure. Neither indeed "hath our Mind any thing elſe, wherein, as its "Centre, it may reſt; all Sickneſſes and Troubles "are reduced to Pain, nor is there any thing elſe which "can remove Nature out of her Place, or diſſolve "her."

CHAP. IV.

That the Pleaſure, wherein conſiſts Felicity, is Indolence of Body, and Tranquility of Mind.

THere being (as before is intimated) two kinds of Pleaſures; one in Station or Reſt, which is a Placability, Calmneſs, and Vacuity, or Immunity from Trouble and Grief; the other in Motion, which conſiſts in a ſweet Movement, as in Gladneſs, Mirth, and whatſoever moveth the Senſe delightfully, with a kind of Sweetneſs and Titillation, "as to eat and "drink out of Hunger and Thirſt: It may be de-manded, Whether in both, or in either, and in which, conſiſts Felicity?

We ſay, that Pleaſure, wherein Felicity conſiſts, is of the firſt kind, the ſtable, or that which is in Station; and ſo can be no other than Indolence of Body, and Tranquility of Mind.

When therefore we ſay in general Terms, Pleaſure is the End of happy Life, we are far from meaning the Pleaſures of luxurious Perſons, or of others, as conſidered in the Motion or Act of Fruition, by which the Senſe is pleaſantly and ſweetly affected; as ſome, either through Ignorance, Diſſent, or Ill-will, interpret. We mean no more but this, (to repeat it once more) *Not pained in Body, nor troubled in Mind.*

For it is not perpetual Feaſting and Drinking; not the Converſation of beautiful Women; not Ra-rities of Fiſh, nor any other Dainties of a profuſe Table, that make a happy Life; but Reaſon, with Sobriety, and a ſerene Mind, ſearching the Cauſes, why this Object is to be preferred, that to be rejected; and expelling Opinions which occaſion much Trouble to the Mind.

The better to underſtand why this Pleaſure only is the End, we may obſerve, that Nature tends to no other Pleaſure primarily, as to her End, but to the ſtable, which followeth upon the Removal of Pain and Trouble. The moveable ſhe propoſes not as the End, but provides only as a Means conducing to the ſtable, to ſweeten (as it were) that Operation of hers which is requiſite to the Extirpation of Pain and Trouble. For Example, Hunger and Thirſt being Things troubleſome and incommodious to an Ani-mal, the primary End of Nature is to conſtitute the Animal in ſuch a State, as that it may be free from that Trouble and Inconvenience; and becauſe this cannot be done but by eating and drinking, ſhe there-fore ſeaſons with a ſweet Reliſh the Action of eating and drinking, that the Animal may apply himſelf more readily thereto.

Moſt Men, indeed, live prepoſterouſly; tranſ-ported inconſiderately and intemperately, they pro-poſe for their End the Pleaſure which conſiſts in Mo-tion; but Wiſdom ſummon'd to our Relief reduceth all Pleaſures into decent Order; and teacheth, that Pleaſure is to be propoſed as the End; but that which is the End according to Nature, is no other than that which we have ſpoken of: For while Nature is our Guide, whatſoever we do tends to this, that we nei-ther be pained in Body, nor troubled in Mind. And as ſoon as we have attained this, all Diſturbances of the Mind are quieted, and there is nothing beyond it that we can aim at to compleat the good both of our Soul and Body. For we then want Pleaſure when its Abſence excites Pain in us; but as long as we are not pained, we want not Pleaſure.

Hence comes it, that a Motion of Pain, or the State which follows upon that one Word, is the furtheſt Bound or Height of Pleaſures; for, where-ever Pleaſure is, as long as it is there, there is nothing painful or grievous, or both together. Hence alſo it comes, that the higheſt Pleaſure terminated in Priva-tion of Pain may be varied and diſtinguiſhed, but not increaſed and amplified: For Nature, until ſhe hath quite taken away the Pain, increaſeth the Plea-ſure;

[1] Cic. de fin. 1. 12.

ſure; but when the Pain is quite remov'd, ſhe permits not the Pleaſure to increaſe in greatneſs, but only admits ſome Varieties which are not neceſſary, as not conducing to our not being pained.

Moreover, hence it appears, that they inſult without Cauſe, who accuſe us, that we mean not by want of Pain, ſome middle thing betwixt Pain and Pleaſure, but ſo confound it with the other Part (in the Diviſion) as to make it not only a Pleaſure, but the very higheſt of Pleaſures. For, becauſe when we are delivered out of Pain, we rejoice at that very Freedom and Exemption from all Trouble; but every thing whereat we rejoice is Pleaſure, as every thing whereat we are offended, Pain; the Privation of all Pain is rightly named Pleaſure. For, when Hunger and Thirſt are expelled by eating and drinking, the very Detraction of the Trouble brings Pleaſure; ſo in every thing elſe, the Removal of Pain cauſeth Succeſſion of Pleaſure.

Hence alſo may be ſhewn the Difference, when they object, that there is no Reaſon why this middle State ſhould rather be eſteemed a Pleaſure than a Pain. For Diſcontent enſues not immediately upon Detraction of Pleaſure, unleſs ſome Pain chance to ſucceed in the room of the Pleaſure: But on the contrary, we rejoice at the Loſs of Pain, though none of thoſe Pleaſures which move the Senſe ſucceed. By this we may underſtand, how great a Pleaſure it is, not to be pained; which if any doubt, let them ask thoſe who are oppreſſed with ſharp Sickneſſes.

Some laugh hereat; they object that this Pleaſure is like the Condition of one that ſleeps, and accuſe us of Sloth; never conſidering that this Conſtitution of ours is not mere Stupidity, but rather a State wherein all Actions of Life are performed pleaſantly and ſweetly. For, as we would not have the Life of a wiſe Man to be like a Torrent or rapid Stream, ſo we would not it ſhould be like a ſtanding dead Pool; but rather like a River gliding on ſilently and quietly. We therefore hold his Pleaſure is not unactive, but that which Reaſon makes firm to him.

But to omit theſe, and return to our Subject, there are two good things of which our chiefeſt Felicity conſiſts; That the Mind be free from Trouble, the Body from Pain; and ſo as that theſe Goods be ſo full, and all Trouble taken away, that they admit not Increaſe. For how can that increaſe which is full? If the Body be free from all Pain, what can be added to this Indolence? If the Mind from Perturbation, what can be added to this Tranquility? As the Serenity of Heaven being refined to the ſincereſt Splendor, admits no greater Splendor; ſo the State of a Man who takes care of his Body and Soul, and connects his good out of both, is perfect, and he hath attained the End of his Deſires, if his Body be neither ſubject to Pain, nor his Mind to Diſturbance. If any external Blandiſhments happen, they increaſe not the chief good, but, as I may ſay, ſeaſon and ſweeten it; for that abſolute good of human Nature is contained in the Peace of the Soul and the Body.

CHAP. V.

Of the Means to procure this Felicity; and of Virtues, the chief.

NOW ſeeing this Peace of Body and Mind, Tranquility in one, Indolency in the other, is the compleat Felicity of Man; nothing more concerns us than to conſider what things will procure and preſerve it; for when we have it, we want nothing; while we want it, all we do is to obtain it, and yet (as we ſaid) for the moſt part we fail of it.

Firſt, therefore, we muſt conſider of Felicity no otherwiſe than as of Health; it being manifeſt, that the State in which the Mind is free from Perturbation, the Body from Pain, is no other than the perfect Health of the whole Man. Whence it comes, that as in the Body, ſo in the Mind alſo, thoſe things which produce and conſerve Health are the ſame with thoſe which either prevent Diſeaſes, or cure and expel them.

Now ſeeing that to provide againſt the Diſeaſes of the Body belongs to the Art of Medicine, as well for the Prevention as Cure of them, we ſhall not need to ſay much hereupon, but only give two Cautions which may be ſufficient.

One, that for the driving away all Diſeaſes, or at leaſt making them lighter and eaſier to be cured, we uſe Temperance and a ſober continent Life.

The other, that when there is a Neceſſity of our ſuffering them, we betake ourſelves to Fortitude, and undergo them with a conſtant Mind; not exaſperating them by Impatience, but comforting ourſelves with conſidering, that, if great, they muſt be ſhort; if long, light.

Againſt the Diſeaſes of the Mind, Philoſophy provides, when we juſtly eſteem it the Medicine of the Mind: But it is not with equal Facility conſulted, nor applied, by thoſe who are ſick in Mind. For we judge of the Diſeaſes of the Body by the Mind; but the Diſeaſes of the Mind, we neither feel in the Body, nor know or judge as we ought by the Mind, becauſe that whereby we ſhould judge is diſtempered. Whence we may underſtand that the Diſeaſes of the Mind are more pernicious than thoſe of the Body; as amongſt thoſe of the Body, the worſt and moſt dangerous are ſuch as make the Patient inſenſible of them; as the Apoplexy, or a violent Fever.

Moreover, that the Diſeaſes of the Mind are worſe than thoſe of the Body, is evident from the ſame Reaſon which demonſtrates that the Pleaſures of the Mind are better than thoſe of the Body; *viz.*

becauſe

becauſe in the Body we feel nothing but what is preſent, but in the Mind we are ſenſible alſo of the paſt and future. For, as the Anxiety of the Mind which ariſeth from Pain of the Body may be highly aggravated, if we conceit (for Inſtance) that ſome eternal and infinite Evil is ready to fall on us; ſo (to transfer the Inſtance) Pleaſure is the greater, if we fear no ſuch thing; it being manifeſt, that the greateſt Pleaſure or Trouble of Mind doth more conduce to a miſerable or happy Life than either of the other two, though they ſhould be equally laſting in the Body.

Now foraſmuch as there are two principal Diſeaſes of the Mind, *Deſire* and *Fear*, with their ſeveral Off-ſprings, and accompany'd with Diſcontent and Trouble, in the ſame manner as Pain is joined to the Diſeaſes of the Body; it is therefore the Office of Philoſophy to apply ſuch Remedies as may prevent them from invading the Mind; or, if they have invaded it, expel them. Such briefly are the vain Deſires of Health, of Honours, Fear of the Gods, of Death, and the like, which having but once taken Poſſeſſion of the Mind, they leave no Part thereof ſound.

The Remedies which Philoſophy applieth are the *Virtues*, which being deriv'd from Reaſon, or the more general Prudence, eaſily drive away and expel the Affections. I ſay, from Reaſon, or the more general Prudence; becauſe, as there is a more particular Prudence, ſerving for the Directions of all the particular Actions of our Life; ſo is there a more general Prudence, which is no other than Reaſon itſelf, or the Dictate of Reaſon, and is by moſt eſteemed the ſame with Wiſdom; whereas Virtue is only a perfect Diſpoſition of the Mind, which Reaſon or Prudence doth create and oppoſe to the Diſeaſes of the Mind, the *Vices*.

CHAP. VI.

Of Right-reaſon and Free-will, from which the Virtues have all their Praiſe.

BEing therefore to proceed in our Diſcourſe to Virtue, and its ſeveral Kinds, we muſt premiſe ſomething concerning Reaſon itſelf, and likewiſe concerning the Free-will which is in it: for thence is derived all the Praiſe belonging to Virtue; as alſo its Oppoſite, the Reproach due to Vice.

Foraſmuch as Reaſon generally is nothing but the Faculty of ratiocinating, or judging and inferring one thing from another, we here take it particularly for that which judgeth, inferreth, and ratiocinates in things of Action, ſubject to Election or Avoidance.

But whereas Judgment or Reaſoning may be either right or wrong, that Reaſon, whoſe Judgment is falſe, is not properly Reaſon, and therefore we term it *Opinion*; yet in reſpect it is the common Phraſe, you may call it alſo Reaſon if you pleaſe, meaning *wrong Reaſon*; as right Reaſon may be termed *Opinion*, meaning *ſound Opinion*.

Right Reaſon ariſeth either from Ingenuity, or Experience, and ſedulous Obſervation. Being grounded upon firm and correct Principles, our Ratiocination becomes ſolid; and juſtly do we appeal to the Judgment of him, who is expert and knowing in things. But of this already in the canonick Part concerning the Criteries, which need not Repetition.

When I ſay things ſubject to Election and Avoidance, I take for granted that there is in us a free or arbitrary Power or Reaſon, that is, a Faculty elective and proſecutive of that which Reaſon hath judged good, and of avoiding and ſhunning what it hath judged ill.

That it really is in us, is proved even by Experience, and by common Senſe, which manifeſts that nothing is worthy of Praiſe or Diſpraiſe, but what is done freely, voluntarily, deliberately, and by Election; and therefore muſt depend on ſomething within us which is beyond Compulſion, and in reſpect whereunto all Rewards and Puniſhments are rightly ordained by the Laws: Than which nothing were more unjuſt, if the Actions of Men were to be imputed to that rigid Neceſſity, which ſome aſſert, derived from Fate, as the ſole Commandreſs of all things, declaring, that whatſoever comes to paſs floweth from an eternal Truth, and Continuation of Cauſes.

Truly it is much better to be addicted to the fabulous (that is, the common) Opinion of the Gods, than to be Slaves to the Belief of Fate, according as ſome Naturaliſts hold it, impoſing it upon our Necks as an everlaſting Lord or Tyrant, whom we are to ſtand in awe of Night and Day. For the other Opinion hath ſome Comfort in it, that the Gods will be moved with our Prayers; but this imports an inexorable Neceſſity.

True indeed it is, that in things void of Reaſon ſome Effects are neceſſary; (yet not ſo neceſſary but that they might have been prevented, as we declared in the Canonick, and where we treated of Cauſes;) but in Man endu'd with Reaſon, and as far as he makes uſe of that Reaſon, there can be no Neceſſity. Hence it was we endeavour'd to aſſert the Declination of Motions in Atoms, that we might from thence deduce, how Fortune might ſometimes intervene, and put in for a Share amongſt human Affairs, yet that which is in us, our Will, not be deſtroy'd.

It behoves us to employ all our Wit and Endeavours to maintain our own Free-will againſt that ſempiternal Motion, and not to ſuffer Wickedneſs to eſcape unculpable.

But what I ſay of Fortune, implies not that we aſcribe any Divinity to it, not only as the Vulgar, but even as thoſe Philoſophers, who eſteeming her an unſtable Cauſe; though they conceive not that ſhe beſtows on Men any thing of Good or Ill that may conduce to happy Life, yet think that ſhe gives Occaſion

casion of very considerable Goods and Ills. We imply not this, I say, but only mean, that as many things are affected by Necessity and Counsel, so also by Fortune; and therefore it is the Duty of a wise Man to arm himself against Fortune.

Now seeing whatever Good or Ill there is in human Actions depends only upon this, that a Man doth it knowingly, and willingly, or freely; therefore the Mind must be accustomed to know truly, that is, to use right Reason; and to will truly, that is, to bend the Free-will to that which is truly good, from that which is truly ill. Forasmuch as this accustoming begets that Disposition in the Mind, which we described to be Virtue; as the accustoming of it to the contrary begets that Disposition which we may justly define Vice.

Not to mention that what produceth Pleasure, sincere, without any Pain, Trouble or Repentance attending or ensuing thereupon, is truly good; that which produceth Pain, sincere, without any Pleasure, or Joy succeeding upon it, is truly ill. I only give this Hint of both, to distinguish each of them from what is only apparent and dissembled: Such as that Good which begets present Pleasure, and afterwards introduceth Pain and Trouble; and that Ill which procures Pain or Trouble, but afterwards Pleasure and Chearfulness.

CHAP. VII.

Of the Virtues in general.

FOrasmuch as all *Virtue* is either *Prudence*, or the Dictate of *right Reason*, as we accustom ourselves to it, or is directed by, and dependent on Prudence, and the Dictate of right Reason; it is manifest, that to this latter Kind belongs, as well that whereby a Man is affected toward himself, as that whereby he is affected towards another: for by Prudence a Man is made capable to govern not only himself, but others.

The Virtue which relates to others, is generally called *Justice*; that which concerns ourself, is ordinarily distinguished into *Temperance* and *Fortitude*. But we use to comprise both under the Term *Honesty*; as when we say to act Virtuously, is no other than to act Prudently, Honestly, Justly; they who live Soberly and Continently, are said to live Honestly or Decently; they who do Valiantly, are thought to behave themselves Honestly or Decently.

Hereupon we (as others) distinguish Virtue into four Kinds, *Prudence*, *Temperance*, *Fortitude*, and *Justice*; but so, as that we oppose not *Prudence* to any Affection so much as to *Incogitance*, *Ignorance*, *Folly*, (except by Accident, inasmuch as Perturbation blinds Reason, and causeth a Man to act imprudently;) nor *Justice* to any Affection so much as to *Malice*, whereby a Man is prone to Deceits, (unless by Accident, in as much as Anger, Hatred, Covetousness, or some other Passion may cause a Man to do unjustly;) *Temperance* we oppose to *Desire*; *Fortitude* to *Fear*.

Hence is manifest, when I formerly said, A sober or well-order'd Reason procures a pleasant or happy Life; we are to understand, that it procures it by means of the Virtues which it ingenerates and preserves. And whereas I added, that it searched out the Causes why things are to be embraced or avoided, and chaseth away Opinions which occasion great Trouble in the Mind; we are to understand that is all one with general Prudence, the Principle of all things expetible and avoidable, and consequently the greatest; because the Virtues which arise from it appease Perturbations, teaching, that we cannot live pleasantly, unless prudently, honestly, and justly; not prudently, honestly, and justly, unless pleasantly.

By this you find why I conceive that the Virtues are connatural to a happy Life, and that it is impossible to separate a happy Life from them. All other things, as being frail and mortal, are transitory, separable from true and constant Pleasure; only Virtue, as being a perpetual and immortal Good, is inseparable from it.

By this also you may understand, that all the Virtues are connected within one another; and that by one; because to the principal Prudence all the rest are conjoined, as the Members to the Head, or as Rivers to the Spring from which they flow: the other, because as well Prudence, as all the rest, cohere with happy Life; there cannot be a happy Life where the Virtues are not; neither can the Virtues be there, where the Life is not happy.

Notwithstanding that the Virtues are all connected within one another, yet are they not therefore all equal, as some conceive, who hold that all Vices and Faults are also equal. For a Man may be more inclin'd to Justice than to Temperance; and Temperance may be more perfect in one than in another. As for Instance, (without Envy be it spoken) myself, by Length of Time, have made so great a Progress in Sobriety, as less than an *Obolus* serves me for a Meal; *Metrodorus*, who hath not yet made so great Progress, a whole *Obolus*. And it is evident, that of Men one is wiser than another; and of them who do rightly according to Virtue, equal Rewards are not allotted to all, as neither equal Punishments to all Offenders. Even Sense and Manners confute them, who make all equal, and hold that they offend alike; he who beats his Servant wrongfully, and he who his Parent; seeing some there are who make no Difference betwixt eating a Bean, and the Head of our Father.

Others condemn and exclaim on us for affirming, that the Virtues are of such a Nature, as that they conduce to Pleasure or Felicity; as if we meant that

Pleaſure which is obſcene and infamous; but let them rail as they pleaſe. For as they make Virtue the chief Good, ſo do we: If the Diſcourſe be of the Means conducing to a happy Life, neither is there any of ſo great Power as Virtue, therefore not more excellent, (not Wealth, not Honour, not Friends, not Children, &c.) But if the Diſcourſe be of living happily, or Felicity, why ſhould not this be a Good ſuperior to Virtue, to the Attainment whereof Virtue itſelf is but ſubſervient.

They exclaim again, that we enervate Virtue, in not allowing her ſo much Power, as to render a wiſe Man free from all Paſſion or Affection, but to permit him to be moved therewith, as (for Inſtance) to grieve, weep, and ſigh at the Death of Friends: But as we ſet a high Value upon Virtue, as being able to deliver us from vain Terrors and ſuperfluous Deſires, the chief Heads of all grievous Perturbations; ſo likewiſe not a little eſteem it, for that it reduceth the reſt of the Affections to ſuch a Mediocrity, in which there remains ſome Senſe as it were of Humanity.

Certainly that total Exemption from Grief which theſe Men boaſt of, proceeds from ſome greater Ill, Cruelty, and immoderate Ambition of Vain-glory, and a kind of Madneſs. So that it ſeems much better to feel ſome Paſſion, to be affected with ſome Grief, to ſhed ſome Tears, ſuch as proceed from Perſons touched with Love and Tenderneſs, than to be wiſe as theſe would have us, and grin like brute Beaſts.

CHAP. VIII.

Of Prudence *in general.*

WE muſt now ſay ſomething of every Virtue in particular; beginning with *Prudence*, whoſe Office being to govern the Life, and ſo to provide for every Occurrence in Life, as to direct it to Happineſs, it ſeems alone to compriſe the Offices of all Virtues.

That the Property of Prudence, is to diſpoſe all Accidents and Actions of Life to Felicity or Pleaſure, is moſt manifeſt. As we value Medicine, not for the Science itſelf, but for Health; and the Art of Steering, not for its Ingenuity, but Uſe in Navigation; ſo Prudence, the Art of living, would never be deſired, if it were nothing efficacious in Life; but being ſo, it is deſired, as the Art by which Pleaſure is ſought and obtained.

For Prudence, or (if you like the Word better) Wiſdom, alone it is, which not only provides that nothing happen which may afflict the Body, but likewiſe above all, expels Sadneſs from the Mind, not permitting us to be daunted with Fear: Under which Governeſs we may live in Tranquility, extinguiſhing the Ardor of all Deſires. For Deſires are inſatiable, they ſubvert not only ſingle Perſons, but Families, many times a whole Commonwealth. From Deſires ariſe Hatreds, Diſſentions, Diſcords, Seditions, Wars; neither do theſe only revel abroad, or with blind Fury aſſault others only, but likewiſe ſhut up in the Breaſt, they diſagree and quarrel with one another, which muſt neceſſarily make Life exceeding bitter. Only the prudent and wiſe Perſon, cutting off all Vanity and Error, content with the Limits of Nature, can live without Diſcontent and without Fear.

Now, ſeeing Life is diſturbed by Error and Ignorance, and that it is Prudence alone which reſcues us from the Violence of Luſts and Fears, teacheth us temperately to ſuſtain the Injuries of Fortune, and ſheweth us all the Ways that lead to Quiet and Tranquility, why ſhould we ſtick to affirm, that Prudence is expetible in order to Pleaſure, and Imprudence to be ſhunned for Trouble's ſake?

That we ſay, a prudent Perſon temperately ſuſtains the Injuries of Fortune, the Reaſon is, that he foreſees them, if not in particular, at leaſt in the general; neither, if any thing happen contrary to his Expectations or Deſigns, is he troubled, for that he knoweth it not to be within the Reach of human Induſtry, Sagacity, or Power, either to foreſee, or to prevent, that nothing adverſe or troubleſome happen. He judgeth it better to be, with well ordered Reaſon (as far as human Frailty will admit) unfortunate, than with Inconſideration fortunate; and thinks nothing more handſome, than if Fortune bring about a thing fairly and proſperouſly, that was not undertaken without Judgment and Deliberation.

But indeed, a wiſe Man orders ſo himſelf, that cutting off vain Deſires, he contracts himſelf within Neceſſaries, which are ſo few and ſmall, as hardly any Fortune can ſnatch them from him. Thus, ſince none, or very little Fortune can intervene to a wiſe Man, he may ſay to her, I have ſeized on thee, (Fortune) and intercepted thee, ſo as thou canſt not come at me.

Concerning the cutting off all Deſires, we ſhall ſpeak hereafter. Now, foraſmuch as Prudence may be conſidered, either as it governs ourſelves, or a Houſe, or a Family, or a City, or a Commonwealth, and ſo is diſtinguiſhed into private, domeſtick, civil, let us ſay ſomething upon each.

CHAP. IX.

Private Prudence.

PRivate Prudence conſiſteth almoſt wholly in this, that a Man underſtand his own *Genius*, and undertake nothing whereto his Nature is averſe; that he deliberately pre-examine the State in which he is to ſpend his whole Life, and to which he muſt ſo accommodate all the Actions of Life, as that, as much as poſſible, he may live in Indolence and Tranquility.

For

For he ought to have the End or Scope of Life fixed, and conſtantly ſet before his Eyes, and conſult with right Reaſon, according to all Evidence, whereby we uſe to weigh whatſoever we think or determine. For unleſs this be done, all will be full of indiſcreet Temerity and Confuſion, and our Deſigns and Enterprizes will be overtaken by too late Repentance.

Beſides, if upon every emergent Occaſion, you refer not each of your Actions both to this kind of Scope, and to that End of Nature which you propoſed to yourſelf in deſigning it, but turn aſide to purſue or fly ſome other thing, the Actions of your Life will not correſpond to your own Words. For Example, you extol Tranquility in Words, but in Actions diſcover yourſelf buſy and obnoxious to Trouble.

He underſtands the Bounds preſcribed by Nature to thoſe who enter the Courſe of Life, who diſcerns how eaſily procurable that is which is neceſſary to Life, or what is ſufficient to remove any thing that afflicts the Body with Indigence. Thereby he knows ſo well to order the whole Series of Life, as never to need ſuch things or Buſineſs as are contentious, and conſequently full of Hazard and Danger.

Hence it is, that a wiſe Man is not much afraid of Poverty, it happening ſeldom, that any Man wants the things neceſſary to Life. Yet if thoſe ſhould chance to be wanting, and he not have Money to procure them, he will not betake himſelf to beg, as the *Cynick*, but rather apply himſelf to inſtruct ſome Perſons in Learning: Thus taking an Employment not misbecoming Wiſdom, and at the ſame time ſupplying himſelf with Neceſſaries from thoſe who have full Eſtates.

Whilſt we are obliged to this or the like Employment; " If Neceſſaries fail us, and our Buſineſs be " to entertain daily * Occurrences with a ſettled " Courage, we muſt have Recourſe to Wiſdom or " Philoſophy for Relief. To an ill Counſellor we " reſign the ordering of the things that concern us, " if, what is neceſſary to Nature, we meaſure and " provide without Philoſophy.

" It therefore imports a Philoſopher to beſtow " Time in looking after theſe things, until by dili- " gent Care he hath furniſhed himſelf with them. " But as long as he hath ſo much of theſe, as that he " can ſpend of them, yet retain perfect Confidence, " he is not to apply himſelf to Acquiſition of " Wealth and Proviſions.

" Thus is Philoſophy to be our Guide in theſe " things, by which we ſhall ſoon perceive, what a " Virtue, and how great a Good it is, to require " only what is ſimple, light, and very ſmall; be- " cauſe what is moſt ſweet and free from Trouble " in all a Man's Life, depends upon our being con- " tented with the leaſt. But, by thoſe Impedi- " ments which a ſolicitous Acquiſition of things " draws upon us, being quickly diſcover'd, either by " the Pains and Toil of the Body, or by the Diffi- " culty of their Procurement, or by their drawing " the Mind away from the moſt advantageous Spe- " culations, (which we ought evermore highly to " eſteem) or by ſome other Cauſe; we ſhall clearly " find, that it is altogether fruitleſs, and not of Coun- " tervalue with the Troubles which follow it."

I adviſe, that every Man ſhould examine his own Genius, and adviſe with himſelf, that he may apply himſelf to that which is proper for him, becauſe otherwiſe, nothing can be more miſerable, and more at a diſtance with Tranquility, than to be engaged in a Courſe of Life, for which Nature hath rendered thee unfit.

For neither is an active Life to be undertaken by an unactive Perſon, nor an unactive Life by an active Perſon. To one, Reſt is Quiet, and Action Labour; to the other, Reſt is Labour, and Action Quiet. A timorous and ſoft Perſon muſt avoid the military Life; a bold and impatient, the eaſy; for one cannot brook War, nor the other Peace. The ſame it is in all the reſt. So that nothing can be more ſafe, than to undertake that Courſe only which thou canſt run through, without any Reluctance or Repugnance of Nature.

I ſhall only add this, That every Man, as far as lies in his Power, to the end the State of Life, which he chuſeth, may be more ſecure and quiet, ought to chuſe it mean, neither very eminent, nor very abject. For it behoves him to live in a civil Society, neither as a Lion, nor as a Gnat; leſt, reſembling the one, he be caſt out; the other caught in a Snare.

CHAP. X.

Domeſtick Prudence.

DOmeſtick Prudence being either conjugal and paternal, or dominative and poſſeſſory; we ſhall, in the firſt, only conſider that which ariſeth from what hath been ſaid, concerning the Inſtitution of Life.

If you find, that you cannot, without much Trouble, live ſingle; that you can patiently bear with a croſs Wife, and diſobedient Children; that you will not ſo much as vex, to behold your Children crying before you; that you ſhall not be perplexed and diſtracted with various Sollicitudes, how to provide all things requiſite to a married Life, how to prevent all Inconveniencies, and the like: In this Caſe, to marry a Wife, and to beget Children, for whom you may provide with a conjugal and fatherly Prudence, is lawful. But unleſs you know yourſelf to be ſuch, you ſee, by Marriage and Iſſue, how much you hinder the Happineſs of your Life, true Tranquility.

* Porp. de nat. eſu carn.

Presume you may, of having a loving Wife, dutiful Children, Cares neither great nor many; but you can only presume it, there is not any God will warrant the Success of your Presumption. Since therefore the Case is hazardous, it is no Wisdom voluntarily to undergo the Venture, and throw yourself into a Condition, out of which, should you afterwards repent, you can never retire.

I say, voluntarily; for some Circumstance of Life may exact, that though unwilling, you marry and beget Children; as if your Condition be such, as that it requires you to serve your Country herein. For whereas some pretend Propagation of the Species, to which we are in a manner obliged, certainly there is no Danger, that there should be wanting such as will marry and procreate; so that some few wise Men may be allowed to abstain from this Employment.

But if some Case, or certain Counsel, or Necessity, enforce you to marry, you must so dispose your Wife, as that she may be loving to you, and a Partner in your Cares. You must take such Care for your Children, as is partly prescribed by Nature, which instigates us to love them as soon as born, (common also to Sheep, Wolves, and other living Creatures) partly by Prudence, which adviseth so to bring them up, as they may be obedient to the Laws of their Country, and desirous themselves they may become wise.

Neither is this Care to be taken for our own Children only, but likewise for the Children of our Friends, especially if they are our Pupils; there being nothing more beseeming Friendship, than to be a Guardian in the room of a Parent to those whom our deceased Friend entirely loved, and hath left Orphans needing Protection.

For the other kind, as having Slaves and Servants under us, (a Possession, tho' necessary, yet for the most part not very pleasant) a wise Man must take Order they grow not insolent and froward, that he may behave himself mildly (as far as is fitting) towards them, and chastise the Disobedient, remembring they are Men, with a kind of Unwillingness, being ever ready to forgive, especially if they are diligent, not of an ill Disposition. And not only this, but if he find any inclined to Learning, (such as we had, particularly *Mus*) let him delight to further them, call them Friends, and study Philosophy with them.

As to his Estate, he must take Care of it, and provide for the future, but so, as without Coveteousness, and the Desire of growing rich; of which hereafter. A wise Man must not neglect his Estate, because it is his Livelihood; lest, if that be consumed, and he want the Necessaries of Life, his Study of Philosophy be hindred, whilst he either gains by Labour what might with little or no Pains have been preserved; or begs, and by Importunity extorts from another, what every one with little Endeavour might provide for himself; or, growing old, fall sick, and die in want, which not a little hinders the Tranquility of the Mind.

Besides the things necessary to the Uses of Life, there may be others, which, according to the Condition of the Person, Place, Time, must be esteemed necessary, and therefore not to be neglected. But our chiefest Care must be for things requisite to the Prevention of natural Indigence, without which, Nature herself would suffer; such is the Provision of Corn. Those who store their Houses with Corn, are to be commended above those, who adorn them with rich Furniture. I rejoice exceedingly, that lately in a strict Siege, when many perished in our City by Famine, we were able to sustain so many good Friends with Food (no Delicacies, but a provident Quantity of Beans) which we distributed daily to every one by Tale.

CHAP. XI.

Civil Prudence.

LASTLY, as to civil Prudence we must likewise repeat what we insinuated concerning the Choice of a Course of Life.

They who are naturally ambitious, desirous of Honour, active withal, and fit to manage publick Affairs; as also they, whom the Quality of their Birth, or Fortune, and Opportunity invite, by an easy Accession to publick Government, those Men may decline Quiet, and comply with their own Nature, by addicting themselves to publick Government and an active Life. For their Disposition is such, that a quiet Life gives them Trouble and Molestation, whilst they obtain not what they desire.

But they who either are naturally inclined to Quiet, or have suppress'd Ambition and Vanity by the Power of Reason; or, having made Trial hereof, have escaped, as out of a Storm, or took Warning by many eminent Precedents; these will justly conceive, that Quiet is much the best for them, and that it is not convenient to exchange it for an active Life, unless by chance some Accident intervene in the Commonwealth, requiring their Industry. Whence we conclude, that a wise Man must not involve himself in publick Affairs, unless from some intervening Necessity.

What else? Since he in pursuing Quiet, may far more easily and safely attain to that End, which the Ambitious aim at by Dangers and by Labours.

For to speak of their Scope, there never wanted some, who, to procure Security of Men (according to the Condition of Sovereignty and Rule, by which they commonly think it gained) have affected to excel in Honour, and to become illustrious, thinking, that by this means, to attain a secure and quiet Estate.

But

But if their Life be ſecure and quiet, they have acquired the chief Good of Nature; if not ſecure and quiet, (as indeed it can hardly be) then have they loſt it, becauſe they ſought that which is convenient to Nature in Dominion.

But the wiſe Man's Scope being the ſame, Security and Tranquility of Life, by how much nearer a Way doth he arrive at that End, when flying the Troubles of civil Life, he directly and immediately ſettles himſelf in a moſt profound Quiet, as in a ſtill calm Haven? Happy indeed, who knows, The chief Good and a Bleſſed Life conſiſts not in Sovereignty or Power, not in numerous Wealth or Plenty, but in Indolence, Compoſure of Affection, and ſuch a Diſpoſition of Mind, as circumſcribing all things by the Boundaries of Nature, makes him, in being content with little, obtain that which they, who rule over many, and poſſeſs great Treaſures, deſpair ever to arrive at.

Truly, if it be fit to ſpeak of myſelf, I eſteem it a great Happineſs that I was never engaged in the Factions of our City, and never ſtudied to flatter and pleaſe the People. To what end ſhould I, whenas, what I know, the People approve not; what the People approve, I know not? That *Metrodorus* and I lived private, How far was it from doing us Harm, when among the large Goods enjoyed in narrow Gardens, and in obſcure *Melite*, *Greece* was ſo far from knowing us, that ſhe had ſcarce ever heard of us?

I ſaid, unleſs ſomething intervene as to the Commonwealth: Becauſe, if the Commonwealth ſhou'd ſummon and really need our Aſſiſtance, we ſhou'd be inhuman, where we might benefit many, not to do it: Injurious alſo to ourſelves; for unleſs the Commonwealth be ſafe, we cannot be what we moſt deſire, quiet.

A wiſe Man therefore doth not, like ſome, who profeſſing Wiſdom, have, through exceſſive Pride, ſo great an Opinion of their own Judgment in civil Goverment, that they think they could equalize *Lycurgus* and *Solon*.

But if he be deſired to make Laws, and to preſcribe a Form of Government, and the Offices of Magiſtrates, he will not refuſe it; knowing that they who firſt made Laws and Ordinances, and conſtituted Government and Magiſtracy in Cities, ſettled Life in a ſecure and quiet Condition: For if that be taken away, we ſhall live like Beaſts, and every Man devour the next he meets with.

And if he be called to the Supreme Power, to govern the Commonwealth according to the Laws and Form of Government already eſtabliſhed, he ſhall not refuſe; knowing that tho' the thing itſelf is for the moſt part full of Hazard, yet a wiſe Man may have ſuch Regard to all things, and ſuch a provident Care of all, as that little of Fortune, as I ſaid before, ſhall intervene to him; but the greateſt things, and ſuch as are of the moſt Concernment be managed by his Advice and Conduct. He will firſt take Care, that the weaker ſort of Men, diſcharging their Duty towards the more powerful, be neither oppreſſed by them, nor permitted to want thoſe Neceſſaries of Life wherewith the others abound; it being the End of every Society and Commonwealth, that by mutual Aſſiſtance the Lives of all be ſafe, and as happy as is poſſible.

Laſtly, if he be ſummoned by his Prince, and ſome Occaſion require, that he ſerve him either with his Advice or Help, neither ſhall he refuſe this; knowing that as it is, not only more honourable, but more pleaſant to give than to receive a Benefit; it is as the moſt honourable, ſo the moſt pleaſant thing to oblige a Prince who confers ſo many Obligations on others. Hitherto of Prudence.

CHAP. XII.

Of Temperance in general.

NEXT follows Temperance, the firſt Part, as we ſaid, of Honeſty, and which ſeems to contain the greateſt Share of what is honeſt and decent. For it being the Office of Temperance to ſuppreſs the Mind when it deſires, as of Fortitude to exalt it when it fears; it is eſteemed leſs undecent to be dejected by Puſilanimity, than exalted by Deſire; and therefore to reſiſt Deſire, is more decent than to oppoſe Fear.

Concerning Temperance, we muſt firſt obſerve, that it is deſired not for its own ſake, but for that it procureth Pleaſure, that is, brings Peace to the Minds of Men, pleaſing and ſoothing them with a kind of Concord. For it being employed in moderating Deſires, and conſequently in adviſing, that in things to be purſued or avoided, we follow Reaſon, it is not enough that we judge what is to be done or not to be done, but we muſt fix upon that which is judged.

But moſt Men, not able to hold and keep what they have reſolved on, being vanquiſhed and debilitated by the Appearance of a preſent Pleaſure, reſign themſelves to the Fetters of Luſt, not foreſeeing what will follow; and hereupon for a ſmall unneceſſary Pleaſure, which might otherwiſe have been procured, or wholly wanted without incurring Pain, they fall into great Sickneſſes, Loſſes, and Infamy, and many times into the Penalties of Law.

But they who ſo enjoy Pleaſures as that no Pain ſhall enſue, and who preſerve their Judgment conſtant, nor are overcome by Pleaſure, to the doing of what they know ought not to be done; theſe Men obtain the greateſt Pleaſure, by pretermitting Pleaſure: They alſo many times ſuffer ſome Pain to prevent falling into greater.

Hence it is underſtood, that Temperance is to be deſired, not for that it avoids ſome Pleaſures, but becauſe

becauſe he who refrains from them declines Troubles; which being avoided, he obtains greater Pleaſures. Which it ſo doth, as that the Action becomes honeſt and decent; and we may clearly underſtand, that the ſame Men may be Lovers both of Pleaſure and of Decency, and that ſuch as eſteem and practiſe all Virtues, perform for the moſt part thoſe Actions, and attain thoſe Ends, as that by them it is manifeſt, how odious to all Men Cruelty is, and how amiable Goodneſs and Clemency; and that thoſe very things which ill Men moſt deſire and aim at, happen alſo to the Good.

Now, foraſmuch as of the Deſires about which Temperance is employed, ſome are natural, others vain; and of the natural, ſome neceſſary, others not neceſſary (to omit, that, of the neceſſary) ſome pertain ſimply to Life, as that of Meat and Drink, and the Pleaſure which conſiſts in Motion; others to Felicity itſelf (as that of Indolence and Tranquility, or ſtable Pleaſure:) It is manifeſt, that not without good Cauſe, we in our Phyſiology, diſtinguiſhed Deſires into three kinds, ſome both natural and neceſſary; others natural but not neceſſary; others neither natural nor neceſſary, but vain, or ariſing from vain Opinion.

And foraſmuch as we ſaid, that thoſe are natural and neceſſary, which unleſs they be ſatisfied, cauſe Damage and Pain in the Body; it is evident that thoſe which infer no Damage nor Pain, tho' not ſatisfied, yet are accompanied with earneſt and vehement Inſtigations, are ſuch not by Neceſſity, but vain Opinions; and tho' they have ſome Beginning from Nature, yet their Diffuſion and Exceſs they have not from Nature, but from the Vanity of Opinions, which render Men worſe than Beaſts, that are not obnoxious to ſuch Diffuſion or Exceſs. Likewiſe, that ſuch Deſires are not only not neceſſary, but not natural, may be proved; for that they have a Diffluent, exceſſive Appetition, very hardly or never to be ſatisfied; and are, for the moſt part, juſtly eſteemed Cauſes of Harm.

But to diſcourſe of ſome chief kinds of Temperance, according to ſome chief kinds of Deſires, we may make Choice of Sobriety oppoſed to Gluttony, or the exceſſive Deſire of Meat and Drink; Continence to Luſt, or the unbridled Deſire of Coition; Mildneſs, to Anger or Deſire of Revenge; Modeſty, to Ambition or Deſire of Honour; Moderation, to Avarice or Deſire of Riches; and laſtly, in reſpect of the Affinity betwixt Deſire and Hope, Mediocrity, which conſiſts betwixt Hope and Deſperation of the future.

CHAP. XIII.

Of Sobriety oppoſite to Gluttony.

IT can hardly be expreſſed, how great a good Sobriety is, which reduceth us to a thin, ſimple, and ſpare Diet, teaching how little that is which Nature requires, and clearly ſhewing, that the Neceſſities ſhe lies under may be abundantly ſatisfied with things light, and eaſily provided, as Barley Cakes, Fruits, Herbs, and Water.

For theſe [b] *things being every where to be had, and having the ſimple Nature of moiſt and dry, moiſt Aliments ſufficiently remove the Trouble of the Body ariſing from want of Suſtenance. Whatever is more than this amounts to Luxury, and concerns only the Satisfaction of a Deſire, which neither is neceſſary, nor occaſioned by any thing, the Want whereof doth neceſſarily infer any Offence to Nature; but partly for that the Want of ſomewhat is born with Impatience; partly, for that there is Preſumption of an abſolute Delight without Mixture of any Trouble; partly, (to ſpeak in ſhort,) for that there are vain and falſe Opinions inherent in the Mind, which ſerve neither for the ſupplying of any natural Defect, nor tend to the Acquiſition of any thing, by the Want of which, the Frame of the Body would be diſſolved.*

Thoſe very things which are ready at hand, abundantly ſuffice to ſupply all Nature's Wants, and they are ſuch as partly for their Simplicity, partly for their Slightneſs, are eaſily made ready. He, for Example, who feeds on Fleſh, needs other things inanimate to eat with it; whereas he, who is content with inanimate, needs but half ſo much as the other, and ſuſtains himſelf with what is eaſily got, and cheaply dreſs'd.

There are four Benefits ariſing from Sobriety [c]; the firſt, that to accuſtom ourſelves to a ſimple Diet *brings and preſerves Health:* For it is ſumptuous Feaſting and Variety of Meats, which begets, exaſperates, and continues Crudities, Head-aches, Rheums, Gouts, Fevers, and other Diſeaſes; not plain and ſimple Food, which Nature makes both neceſſary and wholſome, and not only to other Animals, but even to Man himſelf, who yet depraves them by his Exorbitancy, and corrupts them by ſuch Delicates, as which while he affects he affects only his own Deſtruction.

Therefore if we are wiſe, [d] *Let us beware of that Meat which we muſt deſire and long for; but as ſoon as we have had it, find it was pleaſant to us, only to our Harm: Such are all coſtly and luſcious Meats;* whence the eating Fleſh is leſs to be approved, as being rather prejudicial to Health than wholſome; as may be argued; becauſe [e] *Health is preſerved by the ſame Means whereby it is recovered; but it is manifeſt that it is recovered by a thin Diet and Abſtinence from Fleſh.*

Neither is it any wonder, that the ordinary ſort of Men conceive the eating of Fleſh to conduce much to Health; [f] *for they, in like manner think, that the Way to preſerve Health is to wallow in Pleaſures, even the Venereal; whereof nevertheleſs there is none benefits any Man, and it is well if it hurt not.*

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[b] Porph. de non eſu carn. [c] Laert. [d] Porph. loc. cit. [e] Porph. loc. cit. [f] Porph.

The second is, that it *makes a Man ready and quick in the Offices necessary to Life.* For if you look upon the Functions of the Mind, it preserves her Serenity, Acuteness, Vigor; if upon the Functions of the Body, it keeps it sound, active, and hardy: But Repletion, Over-satiety, Surfeiting and Drunkenness, cloud the Mind, make it blunt and languid; the Body diseased, unactive, and burthensome. What, I pray, can you expect extraordinary from that Man, whose Limbs are unweildy, his Knees feeble, his Tongue faltring, his Head swimming, his Eyes full of Rheum, his Mouth of the Hic-up, Brawling, and Clamour; and all this, through Excess of Wine.

Certainly a wise Man, who ought to content himself with a *Hemina* of small Wine, or to esteem the next Water he comes at to be the most pleasant of all Drinks, will be far from spending the Night in Drunkenness; and as far from stuffing himself with Meats that are high, or burthening his Stomach with such as are luscious and gross, who ought to be content with the most simple, even the very free, Gifts of Nature.

" Indeed such simple and slender Diet will not " make a Man as strong as *Milo*, nor conduceth " absolutely to an intense Corroboration of the Body; " but neither doth a wise Man need such intense " Strength, seeing his Employment consists in Contemplation, not in an active and petulant kind of " Life."

The third Benefit is, that " if sometimes the Ta- " ble happen to be more plenteously furnish'd, we " shall come much better prepar'd to taste what it " yields. Not but that homely Fare affords as much Delight as sumptuous Feasts, when Hunger, which in want of Food troubleth us, is satisfy'd, (for Barley-cakes and Water are highly pleasant, if taken only when we hunger and thirst;) but because they who are daily accustom'd to more costly Viands are not so sensible of their Sweetness, by reason of their being almost continually cloy'd with them; as a wise Man is, who the better to relish them brings along with him a Taste prepar'd by mean Diet. In like manner it comes to pass, that he, if at any time he chance to be present at publick Spectacles, is taken with them more sensibly than are others.

What I affirm concerning the coarsest Meat and Drink, that it affords no less Pleasure than the greatest Delicates, cannot be deny'd by any but by him who deceiveth himself with vain Opinions. Who observes not, that they only enjoy Magnificence with greatest Pleasure, who least need it; who never hath tasted coarse Bread and Water, prest with Hunger and Thirst? For my own part, when I eat coarse Bread and drink Water, or sometimes augment my Commons with a little *Cytheridian Cheese*, (when I have a mind to feast extraordinarily) I take great Delight in it, and bid defiance to those Pleasures which accompany the usual Magnificence of Feasts; so that if I have but Bread, or Barley-Cakes and Water, I am furnish'd to contend even with *Jove* himself in Point of Felicity.

Shall I add, that " Magnificence of Feasts, and " Variety of Dishes, not only not free the Mind " from Perturbation, but not so much as augment " the Pleasure of the Body; forasmuch as this also, " when that Trouble is removed, hath found its " End. For Example; the eating of Flesh (which " we lately instanc'd) neither takes away any thing " particularly that is a Trouble to Nature, nor per- " forms any thing which would occasion Trouble, " if not fulfilled. But it hath a forc'd Delight, and " perhaps mingled with that which is contrary to " these; for it conduceth little to long Life, and " serveth only to Variation of Pleasures; like vene- " real Pleasures, and the drinking of foreign Wines, " without which Nature or Life may well subsist: " For those things, without which it cannot subsist, " are most compendious, and may be obtained easi- " ly without Breach of Justice, Liberality and Tran- " quility.

" Neither is it any matter whether the ordinary " sort of Men be of this Belief, or not, since Petu- " lancy and Intemperance abound in such Persons, " so that we need not fear, but there will be those " who will feed on Flesh. For though all Men " had the best and right Judgment of things, yet " would there be no need of Fowling or Fowlers, " or Fishers, or Swine-herds; these Animals, liv- " ing by themselves, free and without a Keeper, " would in a short time be destroyed by others prey- " ing upon them, and suppressing the Vastness of " their Increase, as happens to infinite others which " Men eat not. But since there reigneth always a " multiplicious, or rather universal Folly amongst " Men, there will never be wanting an innume- " rable Company of Gluttons to feed on these."

Lastly, the fourth Benefit, is, that " it renders " us fearless of Fortune." For they only must stand in awe of Fortune, who being accustom'd to live sumptuously, conceive their Lives cannot be otherwise than most miserable, unless they are able to spend Pounds, and Talents every Day. Whence it happens, that such Men are for the most Part subject to a troublesome Life, and often commit Rapines, Murders, and the like Villainies. But he who is content with coarse Food, as Fruits and Sallads, who is satisfied with Bread and Water, who hath confin'd his Desire within these, what can he fear from Fortune? For who so distress'd, that he cannot easily meet with Beans, Pulse, Herbs, Fruits? As for Water, what need I mention it?

For my own part truly (that I may with Modesty instance myself) I am content, and highly pleas'd with the Plants and Fruits of my own little Gardens; and will that this Inscription be set over the Gate, *Stranger, here you may stay; here the Supreme*

preme Good is Pleasure; the Master of this little House is hospitable, friendly, and will entertain you with Polenta, *and afford you Water plentifully, and will ask you, How you like your Entertainment? These little Gardens invite not Hunger, but satisfy it; nor increase Thirst with Drinks, but extinguish it with the natural and pleasant Remedy.*

In this Pleasure I have grown old, finding by Account that my Diet amounts not fully to an *Obolus* a Day; and yet some Days there are, in which I abate somewhat even of that, to make trial whether I want any thing of full and perfect Pleasure, or how much, and whether it be worth great Labour.

CHAP. XIV.

Of Continence, opposite to Lust.

MOreover, Continence or Abstinence from venereal Pleasures is a great Virtue; for the Use of them, as I said formerly, doth never benefit, and it is well if it hurts not.

Certainly to use them intemperately, is to make a Man destitute of Vigor, anxious with Cares, painful with Diseases, and of short Continuance. Wherefore a wise Man must stand upon his Guard, and not suffer himself to be caught with Love; far from conceiving Love to be something sent from the Gods above, and therefore to be cherished.

And that a Man may be least subject thereto, and want the chief Excitements to venereal Delights, nothing more avails than spare Diet, of which we lately treated: for Excess in eating causeth abundance of that Humour, which is the Food and Fuel of Love's Fire. The next Antidotes are, an honest Employment, (especially the Study of Wisdom) and Meditation upon the Inconveniences to which they, who suffer themselves to be transported with Love, are liable.

The general Inconveniences which attend Love of Women and Boys, are Consumption of Strength, Decay of Industry, Ruin of Estate, Mortgages and Forfeitures, Loss of Reputation. And while the Feet wear *Sicyonian* Buskins, the Fingers Emeralds, the Body other Ornaments, the Mind, in the mean time conscious to itself, is full of Remorse, for that she lives idly, and suffers good Years to be lost, and the like, which it were easy to instance.

But as to Particulars, What Ill doth it not draw upon a Man to desire the Company of a Woman prohibited to him by the Laws? Doubtless, a wise Man will be very far from thinking of such a thing; it being enough to deter him from it, to reflect upon the vast Solicitude which is necessary to Precaution of those many and great Dangers which intervene; it happening, for the most part, that they who attempt such things are wounded, murther'd, imprison'd, banish'd, or suffer some great Punishments. Whence it comes, that (as we said before) for a Pleasure, which is but short, little, and not necessary, and which might either have been obtained otherwise, or quite let alone, Men expose themselves to great Pain, and sad Repentance.

Besides, to be incontinent, to resign up ourselves to this one kind of Pleasure, were to defraud ourselves in the mean time of other Pleasures, many and great; which he enjoys, who lives continently according to the Laws. He so applies himself to Wisdom, as that he neither blunts his Mind, nor excruciates it with Cares, nor disturbs it with other Affections; and for his Body, he neither enervates it, nor vexeth it with Diseases, nor torments it with Pains. And thus he attains the chief Good, which (as I said) is not gotten by keeping Company with Boys or Women, not having a Table plenteously furnished with Choice of Fish or Fowl.

Yet there is no reason any one, from this Commendation of general Abstinence from venereal Delights, should infer, that therefore a Man ought to abstain even from lawful Marriage. What our Judgment is of that Particular, we have formerly declar'd. I shall only add, that whereas I said, Love is not sent from the Gods, it gives us to understand, that if a Man hath no Children by his Wife, he must not attribute it to the Anger of *Cupid* or *Venus*, or hope to become a Father by Vows, Prayers, and Sacrifices, rather than by natural Remedies.

I shall add, that a wise Man ought not to live after the manner of the *Cynicks*, or to behave himself with such Immodesty as they shew in publick. For whilst they plead they follow Nature, and reprehend and deride us, for esteeming it obscene and dishonest to call things which are not dishonest by their Names, but things which are indeed dishonest we call by their proper Names; as to rob, to cozen, to commit Adultery, are dishonest indeed, but not obscene in Name; whereas to perform the Act of Generation is honest in Deed, but obscene in Name; and alledge divers other Arguments against Modesty: They seem not sufficiently to consider, that they live in a civil Society, not in the Fields like wild Beasts, and therefore ought not to follow Nature exactly.

For, from the Time that we enroll'd our Names in a Society, Nature commands that we observe the Laws and Customs of that Society; to the end, that participating of the common Goods, we draw no Evil upon ourselves: Such as is (besides all other Punishments) the very Infamy or Ignominy which attends Impudence, or the want of such Modesty as is prescribed by the Customs and Manners of the Society wherein we live; and from which, in the Voice, the Countenance, and Behaviour, that modest Respect, which is deservedly commended by all, is denominated.

Lastly,

Laſtly, I add, that it not a little conduceth as to Modeſty in particular, ſo to all kinds of Continency, to abſtain from Muſick and Poetry, for that their pleaſing Songs and Airs are no other than Incentives to Luſt.

Hence is our Maxim, That a wiſe Man only can treat of Muſick and Poetry aright, and according to Virtue. For others, eaſily taken with the Allurements of both, indulge to both; only the wiſe Man, duly foreſeeing the Harm that would enſue, caſts them away; declaring that Muſick is, amongſt other things, an Allurement to drink, an Exhauſter of Money, a Friend to Idleneſs, conducing nothing to good, honeſt, and generous Works; that Poetry hath always made Men prone to all ſorts of Vices, eſpecially to Luſt, even by the Examples of the Gods themſelves, whom it introduceth inflamed with Anger, and raging with Luſt; and repreſents not only their Wars, Conflicts, Wounds, Hatred, Diſcords, Diſſentions, Births, Deaths; but alſo their Complaints, Lamentations, Impriſonments, Coition with mortal Children of immortal Parents, and the like; which certainly ſober Men would abhor.

CHAP. XV.

Of Meekneſs oppoſite to Anger.

MOreover, Lenity or Meekneſs, whereunto are reduced Clemency and Pity, is ſo excellent an Antidote againſt Anger, or Deſire of Revenge, that it is eſteemed a moſt eminent Virtue; inaſmuch as Anger, eſpecially if exceſſive, cauſeth Madneſs for the time. For by Anger the Mind is heated and darken'd, the Eyes ſparkling with Fire, the Breaſt ready to burſt with Rage, the Teeth gnaſhing, the Voice choaked, the Hairs ſtanding an End, the Face glowing, and diſtorted with menacing Looks, horrid and ugly to behold, ſo that the Mind ſeems to have loſt the Command of herſelf, and to have forgotten all Decency. But Lenity cures the Mind, or rather preſerves it ſound; ſo that it is neither moved in itſelf, nor is there any Eruption of Paſſion into the Body, that may cauſe the leaſt Undecency.

Now Anger being commonly kindled, and ſet on fire, by Opinion of ſome Injury receiv'd; but Men are injur'd through Hatred, Envy, or Contempt; how can a wiſe Man ſo bear an Injury, as to behave himſelf with Lenity and Sweetneſs towards thoſe who did it? By ſubmitting himſelf to the Government of right Reaſon; whereby (as I formerly ſaid) he muſt fortify himſelf againſt Fortune. For he accounts an Injury among things of Chance, and diſcreetly conſiders it is not in his Power to make other Men juſt, and free from Paſſion; and therefore is as little moved at Injuries done to him by Men, as at the Incommodities or Loſſes which happen by Accidents of Fortune, or by any other Cauſe above, beyond his own Power.

He is not, for Example, troubled at the great Heats or Colds of the Seaſons of the Year, becauſe it is the Nature of the Seaſons in their Viciſſitudes, which he cannot alter. In like manner, neither is he troubled at the Injuries which diſhoneſt and malicious Men do to him; becauſe in doing ſo, they act according to their own Natures; and to make them do otherwiſe, and to change their Natures, is not in his Power. Beſides, he conceives it not agreeable to Reaſon and Wiſdom to add Ill to Ill, (to add unto the Harm which happens to him from without, Perturbation within by Opinion) or becauſe another Man would afflict his Mind with Vexation, he ſhould be ſo fooliſh as to admit that Vexation, and further the ill Deſigns of his Enemy upon him.

Yet is it fit that a wiſe Man take ſuch Care of his Reputation, as not to become contemptible; ſince there are ſome Pleaſures that ariſe from a good Name, ſome Troubles from an ill, and the Contempt that follows it: But he muſt take care of his Reputation, not ſo much by revenging Injuries, or being offended at thoſe that do them, as by living well and innocently, giving no Man a juſt Cauſe of Contumely or Malediction. To do thus, is in our Power; not, to hinder another from exerciſing his own Malice.

Whence, if one that bears you Ill-will, and is your profeſs'd Enemy, ſhall demand any thing of you, you muſt not deny him, provided what he demand be lawful, and you are nothing the leſs ſecure from him: he differs not from the Dog, and therefore muſt be appeaſed with a Morſel. Nevertheleſs, nothing is better or ſafer than to confront his Malice with Innocence of Life, and the Security of your own Conſcience, and withal to ſhew that you are above Injury.

Eſpecially ſeeing it may ſo happen, that a wiſe Man (as I ſaid before) may be arraign'd, and ſuffer not only Injury, but Calumny, Accuſation, Condemnation: Even then he conſiders, that to live well and virtuouſly is in his Power, but not to fall into the Hands of envious, unjuſt Perſons; not to be unjuſtly accuſed by them; not to be ſentenced by unrighteous Judges, is not in his Power. He therefore is not angry, either with the Accuſers, Witneſſes, or Judges; but confiding in a good Conſcience, loſeth nothing of his Lenity and Tranquility; and eſteeming himſelf to be above this Chance, he looks upon it undaunted, and behaves himſelf in his Trial boldly, and with Courage.

Let not any object, that what I here adviſe concerning Lenity, is repugnant to what I formerly ſaid of the chaſtiſing of Servants; for I limited Caſtigation only to the Refractory and Perverſe. It is manifeſt, that Puniſhment ought to be inflicted on Offenders, as well in a private Family, as in a Commonwealth; and that as a Prince or Magiſtrate puniſheth the Offences of his Subjects without Anger,

ſo the Father of a Family may without Anger, puniſh the Faults of his Servants.

Moreover, a wiſe Man muſt not only bear Injuries, nor only pardon them mildly, but even kindly encourage and congratulate him, who betakes himſelf to a better Courſe. For ſince the Beginning of Reformation is to know our Fault, therefore muſt this Gratulation and Encouragement be given to the penitent Offender, that, as he is affected with Horror at this Knowledge of his Crime, ſo the Excellence and Beauty of that which he ought to have done, and thenceforward muſt do, may be fully repreſented to him, and the Love of it increaſe daily in him.

CHAP. XVI.

Of Modeſty, oppoſite to Ambition.

AS concerning *Modeſty*, there needs little more to be ſaid, than what we formerly declared, when we ſhew'd it was not the part of a wiſe Man to affect high Offices, or Honours in a Common-wealth, but rather ſo to contain himſelf, as to live in ſome private Corner: Wherefore, here I ſhall once more give the ſame Counſel, which I give to all my Friends. Live cloſe, or private, (provided no Neceſſities of the Common-wealth require otherwiſe) for even Experience teacheth, that he hath lived well, who hath well concealed himſelf.

It is but too frequently ſeen, that they who climb up to the Top of Honour, are caſt down by Envy, as with a Thunder-bolt, and then too late acknowledge that it is much better, quietly to obey, than by laborious climbing up the narrow Path of Ambition, to aim at Command and Sovereignty, and to arrive there, where nothing can be expected, but a great and dangerous Precipitation. Beſides, are not they, whom the common People gaze upon with Admiration, glittering with Titles and Honours, the moſt unhappy of all Men, for that their Breaſts are gnawn with weighty and troubleſome Cares? You muſt not imagine that ſuch Perſons live quiet and ſecure in mind; for it is impoſſible, but that they who are feared by many, ſhould themſelves fear many.

And though you ſee them ſend out great Navies, command Legions, compaſſed with Guards, yet you muſt not think they live all quiet, or indeed do at all partake of any true Pleaſure, for all theſe things are ridiculous Pageantry and Dreams. Fears and Cares are not afraid of the Noiſe of Arms, nor ſtand in awe of the Brightneſs of Gold, or Splendor of Purple, but boldly intrude amongſt Princes and Potentates, and, like the Vulture, which the Poets talk of, gnaw and prey on their Hearts.

Neither muſt you think, that the Body is any thing the better for this, ſince you ſee that Fevers go away nothing the ſooner, if you lye in a Bed of Tyrian Purple, in a Chamber furniſhed with rich Tapeſtry, than under a plain homely Coverlet; and that we take no harm by the want of purple Robes, embroidered with Gold and Pearl, as long as we have a coarſe plain Garment ſufficient to keep away the Cold. And what, if, being chearful and contented with Rags and a Bed of Straw, you ſhould inſtruct Men how vain thoſe are, who with aſtoniſh'd and turbulent Minds gape and thirſt after the Trifles of Magnificence, not underſtanding how few and ſmall thoſe things are which make a happy Life? Believe me, that which you ſhall ſay will appear far more magnificent and high, being delivered from a Matraſs covered with coarſe Cloth; for it is not only ſpoken but practiſed.

Though your Houſe ſhine not with Silver and Gold, reſound not with Muſick, hath not any golden Images of Boys holding Tapers to light you at your nightly Revels and Banquets; truly, it is not a whit leſs pleaſant to repoſe yourſelf on the ſoft Graſs by a purling Stream, underneath a ſpreading Tree, and eſpecially in the Spring, at what time the Fields are beſprinkled with Flowers, the Birds entertain you with their Muſick, the Weſt Wind fans you, and Nature herſelf ſmiles on you.

Why therefore ſhould any Man, that may live thus in his own Fields and Garden, purſue Honour; and not rather modeſtly reſtrain his Deſires within this Compaſs: For to aim at Glory by Oſtentation of Virtue, Science, Eloquence, Nobility, Wealth, Attendants, Attire, Beauty, Mein, and the like, is a ridiculous Vanity: In all theſe, Modeſty requires no more than that we tranſgreſs not Decency through Ruſticity, Stupidity, or Negligence. It is (as I ſaid) equally baſe and abject, to grow inſolent, upon Poſſeſſion of theſe, as to be caſt down at their Loſs.

Hereupon a wiſe Man, if he happen to have the Images or Statues of his Anceſtors, or other Perſons, will be far from taking Pride in them, or ſhewing them as Badges of Honour; yet on the other ſide, he will not neglect them, but place and keep them carefully in his Gallery.

In like manner, neither will he be ſolicitous about his own Funeral, or give order that it be performed magnificently. He will only conſider what may be beneficial and pleaſant to his Succeſſors, knowing, that as for himſelf or his dead Body, it is all one what becomes of it. For to propagate Vanity even beyond Death is Madneſs; and ſuch alſo is the Fancy of thoſe who would not that their dead Bodies ſhould be devoured by wild Beaſts. For, if that be an ill, muſt it not be very bad to have them burnt, embalmed, and immerſed in Honey, to grow cold and ſtiff under a Marble-ſtone, to be preſſed and conſumed with Earth?

CHAP. XVII.

Of Moderation, oppoſite to Avarice.

THE next is Moderation, or that Diſpoſition of Mind by which a Man is contented with little, and than which he cannot have a greater Good. To be content with little is the greateſt Wealth in the World, foraſmuch as a mean Eſtate proportion'd to the Law of Nature is great Riches. To have wherewithal to prevent Hunger, Thirſt, and Cold, is a Felicity equal to that of the Divinity; and who poſſeſſes ſo much, and deſires no more, however the World may eſteem him poor, is the richeſt Man.

How ſweet a thing is this Poverty, chearful and contented with what is enough, that is, with thoſe Riches of Nature which ſuffice to preſerve from Hunger, Thirſt, and Cold? Truly, ſeeing the Riches of Nature are finite and eaſy to be had, but thoſe that are coveted out of vain Opinions, are without meaſure and infinite, we ought to be thankful to kind Nature, for making thoſe things neceſſary that are eaſy to be had, and thoſe that are hard to be got, unneceſſary.

"And ſince it behoves a wiſe Man to hope he ſhall "never, as long as he lives, want Neceſſaries, doth "not the eaſy Acquiſition of theſe cheap and com-"mon things abundantly cheriſh that Hope? Where-"as, on the contrary, things of Magnificence afford "him not the like Hope. And this is the Reaſon "why ordinary Men, though they have great Poſ-"ſeſſions, yet as if they feared thoſe might fail them, "labour ſtill to heap up more, never thinking their "Store compleat.

"This may teach us to content ourſelves with "the moſt ſimple things, and ſuch as are eaſily got-"ten; remembring that not all the Wealth in the "World put together is able in the leaſt meaſure to "allay the Perturbation of the Mind; whereas things "that are mean, ordinary, and eaſy to be had, re-"move that Indigence which is incommodious to "the Body, and beſides are ſuch that the thought of "parting with them is nothing grievous to him who "reflects upon Death."

Miſerable indeed are the Minds of Men, and their Hearts blind, inaſmuch as they will not ſee that Nature dictates nothing more to them than this, that they ſupply the Wants of the Body, and withal enjoy a well pleaſed Mind, without Fear or Trouble; not that they ſhould employ their whole Life in ſcraping together that which is neceſſary to Life, and that with ſuch Greedineſs as if they were to outlive Death, never thinking how deadly a Cup, from our very Birth, we are deſign'd to pledge.

What though thoſe things which are purely neceſſary, and in reſpect whereunto no Man is poor, yield not the Delights which vulgar Minds dote on? Nature wants them not, and yet ſhe ceaſeth not to afford real and ſincere Pleaſures, in the Fruition of thoſe mean and ſimple things, as we already have declared. Whence a wiſe Man is ſo indifferently affected towards thoſe things, for whoſe ſake Money is coveted, (to ſupply the daily Expences of Love and Ambition) as that being at a great diſtance from them all, he hath no reaſon either to deſire or care for Money.

Whereas I ſaid, that the Riches which are coveted through Opinions, have not any Meaſure or Bound, the Reaſon is, that though Nature is ſatisfied with little, yet vain Opinion, uſhering in Deſire, always thinks of ſomething which we have not, and, as if it were really needful, directs the Deſire to that thing. Whence it happens, that he who is not ſatisfied with a little, can never have enough; but the more Wealth he hath, the more he conceives himſelf to be in want.

Wherefore ſeeing there can never be want of a little, a wiſe Man, poſſeſſing that little, ought to eſteem it great Riches, becauſe therein is no Want; whereas other Riches, how great ſoever in eſteem, are indeed ſmall, becauſe they want Multiplication to Infinity. Whence it follows, that he who thinks not what he poſſeſſeth is ſufficient and plenteous, though he were Maſter of the whole World, would yet be miſerable. For Miſery is the Companion of Want, and the ſame vain Opinion which firſt perſuaded him, that his own Eſtate was not ſufficient, will continue to perſuade him, that one World is not ſufficient, but that he wants more and more to Infinity.

Would you then make a Man rich? Know, that it muſt be done, not by adding to his Riches, but by detracting from his Deſires. For when, having cut off all vain and ſuperfluous Deſires, he ſhall compoſe himſelf to the Rules of Nature, and covet no more than ſhe requires, then ſhall he find himſelf to be rich indeed, becauſe he ſhall then find that he wants nothing. Whence alſo this ſhould be inculcated to him, If you live according to Nature, you ſhall never be poor; but if according to Opinion, never rich. Nature deſires little, Opinion infinite.

Certainly this Diſpoſition or Faculty of the Mind, whereby a Man, moderating himſelf, cuts off from his Deſires whatſoever is not neceſſary to Nature, and contents himſelf with ſuch things as are moſt ſimple and eaſy to be got; this Diſpoſition, I ſay, begets that Security which is found in a quiet Retirement, and Avoidance of the Multitude: moreover, by it, even he who lives with much Company wants no more, than he who lives alone.

Hence alſo it proceeds, that whoſoever endeavours to beget a Confidence and Security to himſelf out of external things, the beſt way that may be, ſeeks after things poſſible to be got, as being not unſuitable to him: but the impoſſible he eſteems unſuitable.

Beſides, even of the poſſible, there are many which he attains not; and all thoſe which it is not neceſſary for him to attain, he renounceth.

Now for want of this Renouncing or Detraction, how great Miſery is it for a Man to be continually pouring into a bored Veſſel, never able to fill his Mind? For not to mention that many, who have heaped up Wealth, have therein found only a Change, not an End, of their Miſery; either becauſe they run themſelves into new Cares, to which they were not ſubject before; or becauſe they made way for Snares, in which they were entangled and taken: Not to mention this, I ſay, the greateſt Miſery is, that the more thou feedeſt, the more thou art tormented with Hunger.

CHAP. XVIII.

Of Mediocrity, betwixt Hope and Deſpair of the future.

LAſtly, ſeeing that all Deſire whatſoever is carry'd to that which is not poſſeſſed, but propoſed as poſſible to be attained, and accompany'd with ſome Hope of obtaining it; which Hope, cheriſhing the Deſire, is accompany'd with a certain Pleaſure; as its contrary, Deſpair, fomenting a Fear that what is deſir'd cannot be obtained, is not without Trouble: Something therefore muſt be added concerning *Mediocrity*, which is of great Uſe, as well in the general, concerning things hoped or deſpaired, as in the particular, concerning the Duration, or rather Perpetuity of Life; whereof, as there is a Deſire kindled in the Breaſts of Men, ſo the Deſpair of it torments them.

[a] *In the firſt place therefore, we muſt look upon this as a general Rule: In contingent things, that which is to come is neither abſolutely ours, nor abſolutely not ours; ſo that we are neither to hope for it, as if it muſt certainly come to paſs*, becauſe it may be diverted by ſome Accident intervening; *nor to deſpair of it, as if it muſt certainly not come to paſs*, becauſe it may fall out, that no Accident may intervene to divert it. Thus, not being deſtitute of all Hope, we ſhall not be without ſome Pleaſure; nor being quite fruſtrated of our Hope, we ſhall not receive any Trouble.

This Difference there is betwixt a wiſe Man and a Fool; the wiſe Man expects future things, but depends not on them, and in the mean time enjoys the preſent, (by conſidering how great and pleaſant they are) and remembers the paſt with Delight. But the Life of a Fool (as I ſaid before) is unpleaſant and timorous, for that it is wholly carried on to the future.

How many may we ſee, who neither remember the paſt Good, nor enjoy the preſent? They are wholly taken up with Expectation of future things, and thoſe being uncertain, they are perpetually afflicted with Anguiſh and Fear, and are exceedingly grieved when they too late perceive, that they have in vain addicted themſelves to the getting of Riches, or Honours, or Power, or Glory; for they fail of obtaining thoſe Pleaſures, with the Hopes whereof being enflamed, they had undergone many and great Labours. Not to ſay any thing of thoſe others, who being abject and narrow-hearted deſpair of all things, and are, for the moſt part, malevolent, envious, moroſe, Shunners of the Light, Evil-ſpeakers, monſtrous.

I ſay, a wiſe Man remembers the paſt Goods with Delight and Gratitude: But indeed it cannot ſufficiently be lamented, that we are too ungrateful towards the paſt, in not calling to mind, nor accounting amongſt Pleaſures, all the good things we have received; foraſmuch as no Pleaſure is more certain, than that which cannot now be taken from us. The preſent Goods are not yet conſummate and wholly ſolid, ſome Chance or other may intervene, and cut them off in half; the future are dependent and uncertain; what is already paſt is only ſafe, and out of all Danger to be loſt.

Among the paſt Goods, I reckon not only ſuch as we have enjoyed, but even the Avoidance of the Ills that might have befallen us; as alſo our Deliverance out of ſuch Ills as did fall on us, and might have laſted longer; likewiſe the Remembrance and Delight that we ſuſtained them conſtantly and bravely.

As to the Deſire of prolonging Life to a vaſt Extent, I already hinted that a wiſe Man muſt cut off that Deſire, becauſe there would immediately upon it follow Deſperation, which is never without Trouble and Anguiſh. Hither it conduceth to conſider, that no greater Pleaſure can be received from an Age of infinite Duration, than may be received from this which we know to be finite, provided a Man meaſure the Bounds of it by right Reaſon.

For ſeeing that to meaſure the Bounds of Nature by right Reaſon, is nothing elſe but to conſider, (as I ſaid before) that the ſupreme Pleaſure is no other, than an Exemption from Pain and Trouble, it is manifeſt, that it can neither be made greater by Length, nor leſſer, or more remiſs, by Shortneſs of Time.

And though the Hopes of a more prolonged Pleaſure, or of a longer Age, ſeem to render the preſent Pleaſure more intenſe; yet it is only ſo with thoſe, who meaſure the Bound of Pleaſure, not by right Reaſon, but by vain Deſire; and who look upon themſelves ſo, as if, when they die and ceaſe to be, they ſhould yet be troubled at the Privation of Pleaſure, as if they had been alive. Whence it happens, that, as I hinted formerly, to underſtand fully that Death nothing concerns us, much conduceth to our Enjoy-

[a] Laert.

Enjoyment of this mortal Life, not by adding any thing of uncertain Time, but by caſting away the Deſire of Immortality.

Wherefore ſeeing that ſince Nature hath preſcribed Bounds to corporeal Pleaſures, and the Deſire of eternal Duration takes them away, it is neceſſary that the Mind or Reaſon interpoſe, that by diſcourſing upon thoſe Bounds, and extirpating the Deſire of Sempiternity, it may make Life every way perfect; ſo that we being content therewith, ſhall not want a longer Duration.

Moreover, neither ſhall we be deprived of Pleaſure, even then when Death ſhall ſummon us, foraſmuch as we have attained the perfect and delightful End of the beſt Life, departing like Gueſts full and well ſatisfied with Life, and having duly diſcharged that Office, to acquit ourſelves of which we received Life.

CHAP. XIX.

Of Fortitude in general.

WE come next to *Fortitude*, which I affirmed to be the other Part of *Honeſty*, becauſe it withſtands Fear, and all things that uſe to cauſe Fear; whereby they who behave themſelves not timorous and cowardly, but valiantly and ſtoutly, are ſaid to behave themſelves honeſtly and beſeemingly. This may be manifeſted many ways, eſpecially from War, wherein they who behave themſelves with Courage and Honeſty, get Honour above the reſt. Whence Honeſt is almoſt the very ſame with that which in the common Eſteem is Honourable.

That this Virtue conduceth alſo to Pleaſure, may be inferred from hence; for that neither the undergoing of Labours, nor the ſuffering of Pains, are things in themſelves allective, nor Patience, nor Aſſiduity, nor Watching, nor Induſtry, though ſo highly commended, nor Fortitude itſelf; but we purſue theſe, to the end we may live without Care and Fear, and ſo (as much as poſſible) free both the Body and Mind from Moleſtation.

For as by the Fear of Death (for Example) all the Quiet of Life is diſturbed; and as to ſink under Pains, and to bear them with a dejected and weak Mind, is a great Miſery, and by ſuch Lowneſs of Spirit many have quite undone their Parents, Friends, Country, and even themſelves: ſo on the other ſide, a ſtrong and gallant Mind is free from all Care and Anguiſh; for it contemns Death, becauſe they who ſuffer it are in the ſame Caſe as before they were born; and is ſo fortify'd againſt all Pains, as to remember, that the greateſt are determined by Death, the leaſt have many Intervals of Eaſe, the middle Sort we ourſelves can maſter; if they are tolerable we can endure them, we can contentedly quit this Life, when it no longer pleaſeth us, as if we went off from a Stage.

Hence is it manifeſt, that Timidity and Cowardlineſs are not diſpraiſed, nor Fortitude and Patience praiſed, for their own ſakes; but thoſe are rejected, for that they cauſe Pain; and theſe deſired, for that they produce Pleaſure.

Whereas I ſaid, that Fortitude withſtands Fear, and all things that uſe to cauſe Fear, it tends to let us underſtand, that they are the very ſame Ills, which torment when they are preſent, and are feared when expected as future; and therefore we muſt learn not to fear thoſe Ills, which we either fancy to ourſelves, or any ways apprehend as future, but to bear thoſe which are preſent with Conſtancy and Patience.

Of the Ills which we fancy to ourſelves, but are not really future, the chieſeſt are thoſe which we fear either from the Gods, as if they were ill to us; or from Death, as if that brought along with it, or after it, ſome ſempiternal Ill. Of the Ills which we fear, for that they may happen, and yet in the mean time are ſo preſent, that they afflict and trouble us, are, thoſe which either cauſe Pain in the Body, or Diſcontent in the Mind.

Thoſe which cauſe Pain are, Sickneſſes, Stripes, Fire, Sword, and the like. Thoſe which cauſe Diſcontent, are ſuch as are termed external Ills; and of theſe ſome are publick, as Tyranny, War, Deſtruction of our Country, Peſtilence, Famine, *&c.* Others private; of which ſort are Servitude, Baniſhment, Impriſonment, Infamy, Loſs of Friends, and the like.

The Difference betwixt all theſe things on one Part, and Pain and Diſcontent on the other, is this, that Pain and Diſcontent are abſolute Ills in themſelves, the others are not ſo, but only inaſmuch as they relate to Pain and Diſcontent, as Cauſes; for if they did not cauſe Pain and Diſcontent, there were no Reaſon why we ſhould ſhun them.

We ſhall ſay ſomething in Order upon theſe: But firſt take notice, that Fortitude is not to be looked upon as if ingenerate in us by Nature, but acquired by Reaſon. Fortitude is different from Audacity, Ferocity, inconſiderate Temerity, for thoſe are found even in brute Animals alſo; but this is proper to Man, and to ſuch Men only as act adviſedly and prudently; and therefore it is to be meaſured not by the Strength and violent Carriage of the Body, but by the Firmneſs of the Mind, conſtantly adhering to an honeſt Intention or Purpoſe.

CHAP. XX.

Of Fortitude, as to Fear of the Gods.

WE muſt firſt treat of twofold Fear, far tranſcending the reſt. For if any thing ever produced the ultimate Good, and chief Pleaſure, proper to the Mind, it was the Expunction of thoſe Opinions (and all allied to them) which have impreſſed the

the greateſt Fear upon the Mind. Such is the Condition of miſerable Mortals, that they are not led by ſound Opinions, but by ſome Affection void of Reaſon; ſo that not diſcerning what is ill indeed, by reaſon they ſuffer an equal and no leſs intenſe Perturbation, than as if theſe things for which they are troubled, were indeed ſuch.

That, which in the firſt Place, uſeth to poſſeſs Men with greateſt Fear, and, conſequently cauſes in them the greateſt Perturbation, is this, That conceiving there are certain bleſſed and immortal Natures, they do yet think them to have Wills, Paſſions, and Operations, plainly repugnant to thoſe Attributes, (of Beatitude and Immortality) as perpetual Solicitude, Buſineſs, Anger, Favour; whereby it comes to paſs, that ill Men receive great Harms by way of Puniſhment; the Good, Protection and Benefits from theſe Natures, that is, from the Gods. Thus Men being nurſed up in their own, that is, in human Affections, fancy and admit Gods like to themſelves; and whatſoever ſuits not with their own Diſpoſitions, that they conceive incompetent to them.

Hereupon, it cannot be expreſs'd, how great Unhappineſs Mankind hath drawn upon itſelf, by attributing ſuch things to the Gods, eſpecially Anger and Severity, by reaſon whereof Mens Minds being dejected, every one trembles with Fear, when the Heaven thunders, or the Earth quakes, or the Sea is tempeſtuous, or any other thing happens, whereby he is perſuaded, that the Gods intend to puniſh him, miſerable Man.

But it is not ſo with thoſe, who, inſtructed by Reaſon, have learned, that the Gods live in perpetual Security and Tranquility, and that their Nature is too far remov'd from us and our Affairs for them to be either pleaſed or diſpleaſed with us. Truly if they were, and did hear the Prayers of Men, how ſoon would all Men be deſtroyed, who continually imprecate Miſchief on one another?

Therefore, when you conceive God to be an immortal and bleſſed Animal, (as the common Notion concerning God ſuggeſts) take heed of attributing any thing to him, which is either incompetent with Immortality, or repugnant to Beatitude; but let all your Conceptions be ſuch, as may conſiſt with Immortality and Beatitude.

Gods indeed there are, for the Knowledge of them is evident, as we formerly proved; but ſuch as Men commonly conceive them, they are not. For firſt, they deſcribe them by ſome Adjuncts or Properties, as when they ſay, they are immortal and bleſſed; and then overthrow what they have aſſerted, by applying other Attributes to them, repugnant to the former; as when they ſay, that they have Buſineſs, or create Buſineſs for others; that they are affected with Anger or Favour, which, as I hinted formerly, imply Imbecility, Fear, and Want of external Aſſiſtance.

Neither need you fear, that this will make you eſteemed impious; for he is impious indeed, not, who denies the vulgar Gods of the Multitude, but he who aſcribes to the Gods the Opinions of the Multitude. For thoſe things which are commonly delivered concerning the Gods, are not genuine Prænotions, but falſe Opinions.

By the ſame Reaſon likewiſe, he is not pious, who out of Fear of the Gods, addreſſeth himſelf to every Stone, to every Altar, he beſprinkles every Temple with the Blood of Victims: But he, who contemplating all things with a ſerene and quiet Soul, conceiveth aright of the Gods, and worſhipping them in his Mind, not induced thereto by Hope or Reward, but for their excellent Majeſty and ſupreme Nature, obſerves all kind of Veneration towards them, and uſeth Expreſſions ſuggeſting ſuch Thoughts as out of them ariſe no Opinions repugnant to Veneration; and conſequently, ſuffereth not that which others ſuffer, in whoſe Minds this Contrariety cauſeth an extraordinary Perturbation.

CHAP. XXI.

Of Fortitude, as to Fear of Death.

THAT which next ſtriketh greateſt Terror into the Minds of Men is *Death*, for that they expect, and fear, I know not what everlaſting Ill, as Fables tell them, (and which is ſtrange, in the very Privation of Senſe which then happens, as if they ſhould ſtill have Being); not knowing that all Stories concerning the Infernal Places, (which we ſpoke of formerly) are mere Fictions of Poets; or if they contain any thing of Truth, it is made good in this Life, by vain Fears, ſuperfluous Cares, inſatiable Deſires, and other violent Paſſions, which torture unhappy Men in ſuch manner, that their Life is worſe than helliſh.

That you may exempt yourſelf, therefore, from theſe Terrors, accuſtom [b] *yourſelf to this Thought, That Death nothing concerns us*; and to this Argument, That *all Good or Ill that happen to us is with Senſe*; *but Death is a Privation of Senſe*, for Death is a Diſſolution, and what is diſſolved remains without Senſe: So that Death ſeems eaſy to be contemn'd, becauſe it is an ineffectual Agent, and in vain threatens Pain, when the Patient is not.

Indeed the ordinary ſort of Men abhor Death [c], *becauſe they look upon it ſometimes as the greateſt of Pains, ſometimes becauſe they apprehend it as the Ceſſation of all things that we enjoy in Life; but without Cauſe is it, that not to live, or not to be, is fear'd; for when it*

[b] Laert. 10. 1295.

[c] Laert. ibid.

t comes to that, we shall not have any Faculty left whereby to know, that not to live, is ill.

Hence we may conclude, that they are very foolish who abhor, amongst other things, to think, hat after Death their Bodies should be torn by wild Beasts, burnt by Fire, devoured by Worms; for hey do not consider, that then they shall not be, and o not feel nor complain, that they are torn, burnt, evoured, turned into Corruption. As also, those who are troubled to think, that they shall no longer njoy the Conversation of their Wives, Children, Friends; no longer do them good Offices, nor assist hem; for these consider not, that they shall have no Desire of such things.

[d] *Death therefore, which is esteemed the most horrid f Ills, doth (as I said) nothing concern us, because while we are, Death is not; and when Death is, we re not: So that it concerns neither the Living nor the Dead; the Living it toucheth not, the Dead are not.*

Now the assured Knowledge that Death nothing conerns us, makes us enjoy this mortal Life, not adding uncertain Time to it, but casting away the Desire of Immortality. For, in Life, there can be nothing of Ill o him, who perfectly understands, that there can be othing of Ill in the Privation of Life. Whence, as ve make Choice not of the most Meat, but of the best; o should we covet, not the longest, but most pleasant Life.

Neither can he be acquitted of Folly, who says, he ears Death, for that, when it comes, it brings not ny Trouble, but because it afflicts the Mind with Grief before it comes: For, that which brings no Trouble with it when it comes, ought not to make us ad with Expectation. Certainly, if there be any hing of Inconvenience or Fear in this Business, it s the Fault of him that is dying, not of Death: Nor is there any Trouble in Death, more than there s after it; and it is no less Folly to fear Death, than o fear Old Age, since as Old Age follows Youth, so Death follows Old Age.

Moreover, we are to hope at least, that either we shall feel no Pain at the Point of Death, or if any, so short, as the very Consideration of that may comfort us; for no great Pain lasts long, and every Man ought to believe, that tho' the Dissolution of his Soul and Body be accompanied with some Torment, yet that being past he shall feel no more Pain.

[e] *He also who advised young Men to live well, and old to die well, was very ridiculous, for these are not to be parted; the Meditation of living well and of dying well is one and the same,* seeing that a young Man may die suddenly, and an old Man hath something more of Life behind: Besides, the last Act is a Part, even the Crown of Life.

Both young and old ought to consider, that tho' Men may provide for their Security in other things; yet as to Death itself, all Men live as it were in a City without Walls or Bulwarks.

Besides, a young Man may die happy, if he consider, that he should find nothing more in a longer Life than what he hath already seen and experienc'd; and an old Man may live unhappy, if, like a Vessel full of Holes, he suffer the Goods of Life only to run thorough him, and so is never full of them, nor, as a sober Guest of Nature, after a plentiful Feast of Life, is willing to go away, and take his Repose.

Think not any old Man happy for dying old, but for dying full, and well satisfied with Goods.

[f] *Lastly, far more foolish and ridiculous is he, who saith, It is good either not to be born at all, or as soon as born to pass the Gates of Death: For, if he speak this in earnest, why does he not presently rid himself of Life, it being very easy for him so to do, if he hath well deliberated upon it? If in jest, he is perfectly Mad, because these are Things that admit not of Jesting. Again, in Life there is something amiable in itself;* and therefore they are no less to be reproved who desire Death than they who are afraid of it. What can be so ridiculous as to desire Death, having made your own Life unquiet by Fear of Death? Or, out of a Weariness of Life, to run to Death, when your own imprudent and constant Course of Life is the Cause of that Weariness.

You must rather take care to make Life not tedious to you, that you be not willing to part with it, unless either Nature, or some intolerable Chance summon you to surrender it: And in that respect we ought seriously to consider, whether it be more commodious, that Death comes to us, or that we go to Death. For tho' it be an Evil indeed to live in Necessity, yet is there no Necessity we should live in Necessity; since Nature, tho' she hath given us but one Way into Life, yet hath furnished us with many to get out of it.

But tho' it may sometimes so fall out, that it behoves us to hasten and fly to Death, before some greater Power intercept and rob us of the Liberty to quit Life, yet ought we not to attempt any thing, but when it may be attempted conveniently and opportunely; and when that long-waited-for Time comes, then to leap out of Life resolutely. For neither is it fit for him, who thinks of Flight, to sleep; nor ought we to despair of a happy Exit even out of the greatest Difficulties, if we neither hasten it before the Time, nor when the Time is come, delay it.

CHAP. XXII.

Of Fortitude against corporeal Pain.

CORporeal Pain is that, which alone would deserve the Name of Ill, even of the greatest Ill, did

[d] Laert. [e] Laert. ibid. [f] Laert. ibid.

did we not of ourselves add to it the Pain of the Mind, which is worse than that of the Body. For Discontent of Mind, taken at the Loss of Riches, Honours, Children, and the like, many times becomes more intolerable than the greatest corporeal Pains; but this is by reason of our own Opinion, which if it were right and sound, we should not be moved by any such Loss, in regard that all such things are without or beyond us, and touch us not indeed, but only by Mediation of that Opinion which we frame to ourselves. And thereupon we may infer, that there is no real Ill, but the Pain of the Body; and that the Mind ought not to complain of any thing, which is not joined to some Pain of the Body, either present or to come.

He therefore who is wise, will be very cautious that he draw not any corporeal Pain upon himself, or do any thing upon which corporeal Pain may ensue; unless it be done either for Avoidance of some greater Pain, or Acquisition of some greater Pleasure, as we formerly declared. Hence we may well wonder at those Philosophers, who, accounting Health, which is the State of Indolence, a very great Good, as to all other respects, do yet, as to this, hold it to be a thing indifferent; as if it were not a trivial playing with Words, or rather a high Folly to affirm, that to be in Pain, and to be free from Pain, is all one thing.

But if any Necessity, either of the natural Constitution, whereby the Body is obnoxious to Diseases, or of any external Violence done to him, which, as human Affairs stand, cannot sometimes be avoided, (for that a wise and innocent Person may sometimes be arraigned, condemned, beaten and tortur'd, is manifest) if either of these shall bring Pain upon him, then is it his Part to endure that Pain, with a constant and valiant Mind, and patiently to expect, either the Solution or Relaxation of it.

Certainly, Pain never continues long in the Body, but that which is great, or highly intense soon ceaseth; for either it is determined of itself, and succeeded, if not by absolute Indolence, yet by very great Mitigation, or is taken away by Death, in which there is no Pain. And as for that Pain, which is lasting, it is not only gentle, but hath many lucid Intervals; so that it will not be many Days, nay, not Hours, e'er the Body hath not only Ease, but Pleasure.

And may we not observe, that long or chronical Diseases have more Hours of Ease, and quiet Intervals, than of Pain and Trouble? For (not to mention that the Thirst which they raise, increaseth the Pleasure of drinking) they allow us Time for Repast, Strength to talk, some Recreation and Sports, and for the most part have many long Intermissions, in which we may apply ourselves to Studies and Business. Whence it is evident, that as great Pain usually is short, so long Pain is light; thus the Shortness makes amends for the Greatness, the Remissness for its Length.

Let us therefore often reflect, that Pain either is not intolerable, or not perpetual; for if it be long, it is light; if great, short. Provided that you remember the Bounds prescribed to the things themselves by Nature, and add nothing through your own Opinion, whereby you may think, and make it greater than it is; and oppressing yourself with Complaints, and impatient Exasperations, help only to render it more insupportable: Whereas, on the other side, nothing doth asswage Pain more than Constancy, and Inurance to Suffering. Whence it comes, that a wise Man, accustomed to Pain, can many times rejoice and smile, even in the Height of his Sickness.

Thus much can we testify of our Friend *Metrodorus*, who hath at all times behaved himself undauntedly, as well against Death, as Pain. For concerning myself, I need not say any thing, who frequently suffer such Pain in the Bladder and Bowels, as none can be greater: And yet full amends for all these is made by the Alacrity of Mind, which redounds to us from the Remembrance of our Dissertations and Inventions, and by our constant Patience; whereby we forbear not to esteem those very Days in which we are tormented with those Diseases and Pains happy.

And this indeed is the Reason, why we formerly said, that a wise Man, tho' in Torments, may yet be happy; because he both softens, by his Patience, the Necessity which he cannot break; and, as much as possible, withdraws his Mind from his suffering Body, conversing no otherwise with it, than as with a weak and querulous Part. He bethinks himself, what he hath at any time done honestly and generously; and fixing his Memory upon those things which he hath most admired, and have most delighted him, chears himself with the past Goods for which he is far from shewing himself, as Fools usually do, unthankful.

He also considers, that he can do nothing more worthy that Virtue and Wisdom which he professeth, than not to yield the Victory to Pain, tho' the most hard to be sustained of all things; to bear up couragiously, to repulse by Patience so dangerous an Enemy; and at length, to make so perfect a Conquest, as that the very Remembrance of it will be most delightful, and especially through absolute Indolency, which will be so much the more pleasing, as a quiet Haven is most welcome after a Tempest.

Now, if a wise Man is not without his Allevia-tions and Comforts in the greatest Pain, what shall we say of him in Remiss and gentle Pains, or at the Loss of some Limb or Sense? Truly, it was not without Reason that I said formerly, a wise Man tho' depriv'd of the best of Senses, Sight, would yet be happy: For if the Night doth not diminish the

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Happineſs of Life, why ſhould Blindneſs, that ſo nearly reſembles Night? However he may want ſome Pleaſures that depend upon the Light, yet are there ſeveral others left him, and what is much above all the reſt, he may delight his Mind with many things, and many ways without ſeeing.

For ſince to a wiſe Man, to live is to think, certainly his Thoughts are not oblig'd to his Eyes in the Buſineſs of ſearching into Truth. And that Man, to whoſe Doctrine I gave up my Name, could live long and happy, without being able to diſtinguiſh Colours: But without the Knowledge of Things, he could not have lived happy. Moreover, he was of opinion, that the Perſpicuity of the Mind was very much dimm'd by the Sight of the Eyes; and while others could ſcarcely be ſaid to ſee things that were before them, he travelled abroad into all Infinity, not ſtopping at any Bounds.

CHAP. XXIII.

Of Fortitude, againſt Diſcontent of Mind.

I Said, that Diſcontent of Mind is commonly taken at ſuch things as are conceived to be external Ills, and the Contraries to thoſe Goods which we moſt love and deſire. For Men call ſome things adverſe, others proſperous: And we may generally obſerve, that the Mind which is elevated, and inſolent with Proſperity, and caſt down with Adverſity, is abject and baſe. Hence is it, that all we ſhould here ſay concerning the Ills which cauſe Diſcontent, and againſt which we have need of Fortitune, may be ſufficiently inferred from what we formerly ſaid, touching thoſe Goods which are the general Objects of our Deſires or Inclinations, and in reſpect whereof we have need of Temperance.

Let it ſuffice in general to repeat what we formerly ſaid, That Diſcontent of Mind is not grounded upon Nature, but merely upon Opinion of Ill. Wherefore, whoever conceives himſelf to lie under ſome Ill, whether only foreſeen and expected, or already come upon him, muſt of neceſſity be diſcontented. For how comes it to paſs, that a Father whoſe Son is kill'd, and he knows it not, is not a whit leſs chearful or merry, than if he were alive? Or that he who hath loſt much of his good Fame abroad, or all his Goods and Cattle, by Robbery at home, is not at all ſenſible of either Loſs till he hear of it? Is it not Opinion only which diſcontents him? For, if Nature did it, at the ſame Minute wherein the Son was ſlain, the Father's Mind would be ſtruck with a Senſe of his Death; the like wou'd be perceived in the Loſs of Honours or Goods.

Therefore, to raiſe Diſcontent in the Mind, it is neceſſary that Opinion, not Nature, intervene. And that you may doubt the leſs of this, obſerve, that a Man who thinks a ſuppoſititious Child his own, and his own ſuppoſititious; if News be brought him of the Death of his own Son, he will not be moved, but if of his ſuppoſititious, he will be exceedingly afflicted; and this comes not from Nature, but Opinion.

But that thoſe things which afflict us are not indeed Ills to us, appears even from this, that they are without or beyond us, and cannot reach us of themſelves, but only by our own Opinion are made Ills to us. And hence it was, that I ſaid, it is Reaſon which makes Life happy or pleaſant, by expelling Opinions, for which the Mind is poſſeſſed with Trouble. For it is Diſcontent alone which diſturbs the Mind, and its Quiet and Content.

But how can Reaſon expel theſe Opinions? By teaching a wiſe Man to arm his Mind againſt Fortune. For the external things which we think Goods, and the Loſs of which cauſeth Diſcontent in our Minds, are termed the Goods of Fortune; becauſe indeed they are not ours, but come and go, as Fortune pleaſeth.

For this Reaſon, a wiſe Man eſteems them no more belonging to him than to others, nor poſſeſſeth them ſo, as not to be ready to part with them. He hath caſt off that Opinion which tells us, Such Goods are our own, and can never be loſt; and hath put on the right Opinion, which aſſures him they are uncertain and tranſitory, as indeed they are. And hereupon he conſiders with himſelf before-hand, what he ſhall do if he chance to loſe them; he conſiders, I ſay, before-hand, that when it happens, he may not be afflicted with vain Grief, but take it quietly, that Fortune redemands what ſhe gave not, but only lent.

Certainly to thoſe who think, that to be deprived of theſe Goods is an Ill, the moſt unhappy thing of all is, that Premeditation increaſeth the Ills which it might have much diminiſhed, if not wholly prevented; and thus becomes only a fooliſh Conſideration of Ill to come, and which perhaps will never come. Every Ill is of itſelf troubleſome enough when it comes; and if it chance never to come, we draw a voluntary Miſery upon ourſelves to no Purpoſe, and by that means ſhall never be free from Trouble, either by receiving or apprehending ſome Ill; for he who always thinks that ſome Ill or Adverſity will befal him, to him that very Thought is a continual Ill.

Now if it ſhall happen alſo to a wiſe Man, that, by being long accuſtomed to the Poſſeſſion and Uſe of the Goods of Fortune, he hath not quite blotted that Opinion out of his Mind, and ſo ſome little of Fortune intervene, and give him a Blow, by reaſon whereof, he falls into ſome Diſcontent, and perhaps grieves: In this Caſe, the Aſſuagement of his Diſcontent conſiſts in two things, formerly preſcribed as Remedies againſt corporeal Pain, *viz.* Diverſion of his Thoughts from his Loſs, or the Cauſe of it; and

an Application of them to thoſe things which he knows to be grateful and pleaſant to his Mind.

For the Mind of a wiſe Man is conformed to Reaſon, and follows the Conduct thereof; but Reaſon forbids to look on thoſe things which create and nouriſh Diſcontent; and thus he abſtracts the Mind from bitter Thoughts, to convert it to think upon Goods, either future or paſt, eſpecially thoſe which he knows pleaſe him moſt.

Thoſe ſad and importune Thoughts indeed are very apt to return, but he muſt inſiſt upon that Diverſion and Application of the Mind whereby it is brought by little and little to wear out, and deface its Sorrow. Neither doth Time diminiſh Diſcontent any other way, than by exhibiting various Occaſions of Divertiſement, which, by degrees, take the Mind off, and make her forget, as it were, the things that cauſed her Diſcontent.

CHAP. XXIV.

Of Juſtice in general.

IT reſts, we ſpeak of Juſtice, which, as I ſaid before, wholly relates to others, and therefore belongs to a Man, as living in a civil Society. And certainly it is a common Tye, without which, no Society can ſubſiſt, it being a Virtue which gives to every one that which is his, and takes care that none receive Injury.

And to begin with that with which I uſed to begin, in treating of the other Virtues, truly not unlike are the things that may be ſaid of this. For, as I ſhewed, that Prudence, Temperance, Fortitude, are inſeparably joined to Pleaſure; the ſame may be ſaid of Juſtice, which not only never hurts any one, but, on the contrary, always preſerves and nouriſheth ſomething that calms and quiets the Mind; and this, as well by its own Power and Nature, as by Hope, that none ſhall ever want any of thoſe things which pure undepraved Nature deſires.

Now, foraſmuch as Temerity, Luſt, and Cowardice, always excruciate the Mind, perplex and trouble it; it is impoſſible, that a Mind in which Injuſtice dwells, ſhould, for that very Reaſon, becauſe Injuſtice dwells in it, be otherwiſe than unquiet: Becauſe tho' ſuch a Mind ſhould attempt any unjuſt Action with the greateſt Secreſy imaginable, yet can it not perſuade itſelf but that it will at laſt come to light. And tho' ſome Men may think their Conſciences ſufficiently barricado'd and fortified by their Wealth, yet they dread the Divine Power, and imagine, that thoſe very Solicitudes and Troubles, which torture their Souls Day and Night, are ſent by the immortal Gods for their Puniſhment.

But, how can we expect, that unjuſt Actions ſhould diminiſh the Troubles of Life ſo much as Remorſe of Conſcience, Penalties of the Law, and the being hated by our Country-men increaſe them? And yet, in ſome Men, there is not any Bound or Moderation of Wealth, of Honour, of Power, of Luſt, of Gluttony, and other Deſires, which nothing that is unjuſtly gotten diminiſheth, but rather increaſeth and inflameth, ſo that they are fitter for Reſtraint than Inſtruction.

All ſound and judicious Perſons therefore, are, by right Reaſon, induced to Juſtice, Equity, Honeſty; but neither can unjuſt Actions benefit a Child or impotent Perſon, for ſuch can neither eaſily effect what they endeavour, nor obtain their Ends when they have effected it. Beſides, Riches are more ſuitable to Fortune, or a noble Genius, which they who enjoy, procure to themſelves a general Reſpect and Good-will, and (what moſt conduceth to quiet living) an Endearment from others, eſpecially there being no Cauſe of offending.

For the Deſires which proceed from Nature are eaſily ſatisfied, without injuring any Man; thoſe which come from vain Opinions are not to be followed, for they aim at nothing which is deſirable, and there is more Detriment in the Injury itſelf, than Advantage or Benefit in the things that are gained by the Injury.

Nevertheleſs, no Man can ſay rightly, that Juſtice is a Virtue, expetible only for itſelf, but becauſe it brings great Pleaſure along with it; for to be beloved, and to be dear to others, is pleaſant, becauſe it renders Life more ſafe, and Pleaſure more full. We therefore conceive, that Injuſtice ought to be avoided, not only for the Inconveniencies which happen to the unjuſt; but much more, for that as long as it is in the Mind, it never ſuffers it to take Breath, never to be at reſt.

Theſe Conſiderations might perhaps be ſufficient, yet I ſhall add ſomething partly concerning *Right* or *Juſt*, from which *Juſtice* is denominated, that we may come the better to underſtand what is its Original, among whom it is practiſed, what are its Benefits; and partly concerning ſome other Virtues nearly allied to Juſtice, as, *Beneficence*, *Gratitude*, *Piety*, *Obſervance*, and *Friendſhip*.

CHAP. XXV.

Of Jus *(Right) or Juſt, whence Juſtice is denominated.*

FIRST therefore, foraſmuch as *Juſtice* is ſo named, for that it preſerves the *Jus* or Right, due to one another, or performs that which is *juſt*; it is worth our knowing what that is, which ought to be eſteemed *right* or *juſt*.

Now in regard Juſtice was inſtituted in order to the common Good, neceſſary it is, that Right or Juſt, to which Juſtice hath Reſpect, ſhould be ſuch a Good as is common to all and every Member of the Society.

ciety. And becauſe every one, by the Direction of Nature, deſires what is good for himſelf, it is alſo neceſſary, that what is right or juſt be conformable to Nature, and therefore termed natural.

It is not without Cauſe that I hint this; for ſometimes it happens, that in a Society, ſomething is preſcribed as right and juſt, which is not good for the Society, and ſo being not natural, or contrary to Nature, it cannot, but by Abuſe, and only in Name, be reputed right or juſt, ſince that which hath the true Reaſon of natural Right or Juſt, is ſuch as that it is not only preſcribed as profitable and good, but is really ſuch.

Wherefore to ſpeak properly, Natural Right or Juſt is no other than a Symbol of Utility, or ſuch an Utility agreed upon by Concurrence of Votes, as may keep Men from hurting, or being hurt by one another, ſo that they may live ſecurely: A Good which every Man is taught by Nature to deſire.

I here take Profitable and Good for the ſame thing; and I conceive, that to a Thing's being juſt or rightly kept, two things are requiſite; one, That it be profitable, or reſpect the common Utility, that is, Security; the other, That it be preſcribed by the common Conſent of the Society; for nothing is compleatly juſt, but what the Society, by common Conſent or Agreement, hath decreed to be obſerved.

Hence it is, that the Name of Right or Juſt is uſually given to both theſe, ſince not only what is profitable is ſaid to be juſt, but alſo the very common Covenant or Preſcription of the Society, which is termed Law, as being that which preſcribes to every one what is profitable or juſt.

Some there are, who conceive all things that are juſt, to be juſt of their own proper and unalterable Nature; and that Laws do not make them to be juſt, but only declare and preſcribe, according to the Nature which thoſe things have. But it is not ſo, but rather after the ſame manner as is obſerved in other things which are profitable, as in thoſe which concern Health, and many others of the like Nature, which are beneficial to ſome Men, hurtful to others; by which means they often fail of their Mark, as well in common as in private.

And ſeeing that every thing is apprehended every where, always, and by all Men, to be really ſuch as it is in its own Nature, becauſe its Nature is unalterable, whether are thoſe things which theſe Men call juſt, juſt in all Places and always, and amongſt all Men? Ought they not to have obſerved, that many of thoſe things that are conſtituted by Laws, and conſequently accounted lawful and juſt, are not conſtituted and received amongſt all Nations alike, but are neglected by many as things indifferent, rejected by others as hurtful, and condemned as unjuſt? And are there not ſome, who account things not generally profitable, to be nevertheleſs ſuch; and accordingly embrace thoſe things which are not generally approved, if they find them advantageous in reſpect of their own Society, and ſeem but to promiſe ſome general Benefit?

In fine, that is univerſally juſt, or hath the Nature of Juſt, which is profitable or conformable to the Prænotion of Right or Juſt even now deſcribed: For particularly, according as Utility is various amongſt ſeveral Nations, ſo alſo is Right or Juſt, various; inſomuch as what is eſteemed juſt in one is unjuſt in another. Whence, if it be demanded, whether Juſt or Right be the ſame among all Men? I anſwer, that as to the general, it is the ſame, for it is ſomething that is profitable in mutual Society: But the Differences of ſeveral Countries, and various Cauſes amongſt them being conſidered in particular, it comes to paſs that it is not the ſame amongſt all.

And, (to deduce ſome few Particulars hence,) whatſoever is by Experience found profitable to a mutual Society, or the common Participation of ſuch Things as are eſteemed juſt, that Thing hath the Nature of Juſt or Right, if it be ſuch as its Utility extends unto all. But if any Man ſhall eſtabliſh ſuch a thing for juſt, and yet it ſhall happen not to be profitable to the mutual Society, it hath not the true Nature of Juſt or Right.

Again, tho' ſometimes the Utility of that which was eſteemed juſt may fail, nevertheleſs, if there be ſometimes ſome Utility in it, ſo that it correſponds to the Prænotion of Juſt or Right, it is truly juſt for that Time: They certainly will eſteem it ſo, who confound not themſelves with vain Loquacity, but look more generally into human Affairs.

Laſtly, where no new Circumſtance of things intervening, thoſe very things, which were eſteem'd juſt in the Actions of Men, are found not to correſpond with the Notion of juſt, they are not juſt at all: But where, upon Innovation or Change of Affairs, thoſe things, which we formerly decreed to be juſt, ceaſe to be profitable, they were juſt, as long as they continued profitable to mutual Society, but as ſoon as ever they ceaſed to be profitable they ceaſed to be juſt.

CHAP. XXVI.

Of the Original of Right and Juſt.

BUT that we may go higher and deduce the thing from its Original, it appears that Right and Juſt are as ancient, and Juſtice hath been kept amongſt Men as long as they have had Societies amongſt themſelves.

For, in the Beginning, Men wandring up and down like wild Beaſts, and ſuffering many Inconveniencies, as well from Beaſts as from the Injuries of Weather, a certain natural Agreement amongſt them (by reaſon of their Likeneſs in Form, and Soul, or Manners) perſuaded them to join together

in ſeveral Companies, and to make ſome Proviſion againſt thoſe Inconveniencies, by building Huts or Cottages, and furniſhing themſelves with other Shelters, as well againſt wild Beaſts as the Weather. But in regard every one was deſirous to be in a better Condition than another, hereupon there aroſe frequent Conteſtations about Food, Women, and other Conveniencies, which they took away from one another; until at length they perceiv'd, that they could not live ſecure and commodiouſly, unleſs they made a Covenant not to injure one another, and that in caſe any one did harm and injure another, the reſt ſhould puniſh him.

This was the firſt Band of Society; which, ſuppoſing that every one might have ſomething proper to himſelf, or which he might call his own, as being his, either by firſt Poſſeſſion, or by Purchaſe, or by Acquiſition through his own Induſtry, or otherwiſe, decreed, that it ſhould remain in the Poſſeſſion and Diſpoſal of that Perſon. Now this Band or Covenant was no other than a common Law, which all were equally bound to obſerve, and which did confirm to every one a certain Right or Faculty of uſing whatſoever was his own. Whereupon that very Law alſo came to be (as I formerly intimated) the common Right as it were of the Society.

I need not mention, how the whole Society tranſferred their Power of reſtraining or puniſhing, upon ſome few wiſe and good Perſons, or elſe on one, who was reputed the wiſeſt and beſt among them: I ſhall only obſerve, that in the Society thoſe were accounted juſt or Favourers of Juſtice, who being content with their own Rights, invaded not thoſe of other Men, but did Injury to none; thoſe unjuſt, or Doers of Injuſtice, who being not content with their own Rights, did aſſault the Rights of other Men; and, harming them by Rapine, perſonal Violence, or ſome other Way, became injurious to them.

Thus Men lived a while peaceably and happily, eſpecially being under one or more Kings or Princes, the wiſeſt and beſt, who being wholly intent upon the Conſervation and Utility of the Publick, made, and with Conſent of the People, eſtabliſhed divers Laws, to prevent Diſſentions from ariſing, or, if any did ariſe, to compoſe them. But, ſuch is the Corruption of Mens Manners, in Proceſs of Time the Government fell into the Hands of Princes or Kings that were not good; and thoſe being either depoſed or ſlain, it reverted to the People, whereupon Tumults were raiſed by the Factions of ſuch as aſpired to the Supreme Power until at length, the People languiſhing under Enmities and Diſſentions, and weary of living by Force and Hoſtility, became willing to ſubmit again to the Government of Magiſtrates or Princes. But becauſe the Wills of Princes had formerly paſs'd for abſolute Laws, they made a Covenant with their Governors, about thoſe Laws, according to which they deſir'd to be govern'd; and thus brought themſelves again under Laws, that is, under ſtrict Rights.

But not to deſcend to later Times, but to touch only upon that chief Head, which concerns the Preſervation of Life, for whoſe Security (as being the moſt precious of all things) Care was taken from the Beginning that it might be eſtabliſhed by common Covenant or Law; **It appears, that thoſe moſt wiſe and good Founders of Laws, having regard to the Security of Life, and to thoſe things which Men uſually do to each other, declared it a wicked Act to kill a Man, and decreed, that the Murderer ſhould be puniſhed with more than common Ignominy*, and Loſs of Life. And to this they ſeem to have been induc'd, partly by conſidering the Conciliation of Men among themſelves (of which I treated even now) in reſpect whereof Men ought not to be as forward to deſtroy an Animal of their own kind, as one of different kind, which it is lawful to kill; partly, indeed chiefly, by conſidering, that *Men ought to abhor, what is no ways advantageous to Life, but tends only to Evil.*

Indeed, from the Beginning, to thoſe who had regard to the Utility of that Conſtitution, there needed not any other Cauſe to make them contain themſelves from doing any ſuch Act: But they who could not ſufficiently comprehend of what great Concernment it was, abſtained from murdering one another, only out of a Fear of thoſe great Puniſhments; both which we may obſerve to have happened even in our own Days. They who conſider the great Advantages of ſuch a Conſtitution, are ſufficiently diſpoſed for a conſtant Obſervance thereof; but they, who are not capable of underſtanding it, conform themſelves to it out of Fear of the Puniſhments threatned by the Laws, and ordained by the more prudent, againſt ſuch as had no Regard to this Utility, the greater Part of the Multitude admitting them as legal.

For none of the Laws written or not written that have been derived to us, and ſhall be tranſmitted to our Poſterity, did at firſt ſubſiſt by any Force or Violence, but, as I ſaid, merely by the Conſent of thoſe who us'd it. For it was Prudence, not Strength of Body, or imperious Sway, wherein they who ſettled theſe Laws upon the People, tranſcended the Vulgar; and this, by inducing ſome Men to conſider, what would be profitable (eſpecially when they did not before ſo well underſtand it as they ought) and by terrifying others with the Greatneſs of the Puniſhments. Nor could they indeed make uſe of any other Remedy for Cure of the Peoples Ignorance of this Utility, than Fear of the Puniſhment preſcribed by the Law. For even now alſo, it is Fear alone that keeps the ordinary ſort of Men within the Bounds of their Duty, and hinders them from committing any thing againſt either the publick or private Good.

Now

* Porph. de non eſu carnium.

Now if all Men could alike understand, and bear in mind what is truly profitable, they should need no Laws at all, but would of their own accord beware of doing such things as the Laws forbid, and do what they enjoin; since only to know what is profitable and what hurtful, is more than sufficient to induce them to avoid this, and pursue that. But as for those who discern not what is beneficial, what hurtful, doubtless the Commination of Punishment against such is highly necessary; insomuch as the Fear of the Punishment impendent causeth them to suppress and bridle those Heats of their Passions, which instigate them to unjust Actions, and in a manner compel them, though against their Wills, to do what is right.

Hereupon was it the Law-makers ordained, that even involuntary killing of a Man should not be free from all Mulct and Punishment. Not that they might not, to such as were apt to commit wilful Murder, give any occasion of Pretext or Excuse to imitate that on set Purpose, which the others did unwittingly; but lest they might seem not to have used sufficient Caution and Diligence as to this Particular, whereupon many things would fall out, which indeed were not involuntary. Nor could this Course but prove beneficial for the same Causes for which Men were expressly prohibited to kill each other. So that considering, that of these Actions of this Kind that are done involuntarily, some happen from a Cause that could not be foreseen, nor prevented by human Nature; others merely through our Negligence and Heedlessness of the imminent Danger: therefore to prevent Negligence, which might tend to the Destruction of others, they provided that even the involuntary Action should not pass altogether unchastised, but took away the Frequency of this Sin by the Fear of Law.

Moreover, I conceive that even these Slaughters of Men, which were permitted by the Law, were made liable to those accustomed Expiations by publick Lustrations, (and that by Order of the same Persons who first ordained them) for no other Cause but this, that they had a mind to deter Men from involuntary Slaughter, which was too too frequent.

For the vulgar Sort of Men stood in need of something to restrain them from doing any thing rashly, which might not conduce to the publick Utility; which these first Law-makers understanding, not only decreed severe Punishments, but withal struck another Fear into their Minds, the Reason of which was not so manifest as the other, declaring that such as had killed a Man, by what Means or Accident soever, should be impure until they had used Lustrations.

Thus the brutish Part of the Soul, in which the Affections and Passions reside, being instructed and reform'd, came at length to that Gentleness which now flourisheth amongst us, by applying the Arts of taming and civilizing our savage Affections, which were invented and practised at first by those who ruled the Multitude; of which, this is one chief Act among the rest, that Men should not destroy one another without any Distinction.

CHAP. XXVII.

Between whom Right and Justice is to be exercised.

NOW since it may be demanded, Betwixt what Persons, as well Right, and the Violation of it, which is Injury, as Justice, and what is opposite to it, Injustice, properly consist? We shall therefore explicate this, by comparing Men with other living Creatures.

As therefore there is no Reason of Right or Injury, or Just and Unjust, betwixt Animals that could not make a common Agreement, not to hurt nor be hurt by mutual Invasion; so neither is there between those Nations which neither would not, or could not, enter into a mutual Engagement, not to hurt, nor be hurt by one another.

For Just or Right, the Conservation whereof is Justice, hath no Being at all, but in mutual Society; whence Justice is the Good of a Society, insomuch as by it every one of the said associated Persons lives securely, free from that Anxiety, which is caused by the continual Fear of Harm. Whence it follows, that whatever Animals, or what Men soever, either cannot or will not make an Association, nor enter into Covenant among themselves, must want this Good, not being reciprocally oblig'd by any Bond of Right or Justice, whereby they might live securely. And so to them there can remain no other Reason of Security than only this, to do no harm to others, that they be not harmed themselves.

As therefore, when one of those brute Animals, amongst which there hath past no such Agreement or Pact, doth hurt another; though it may be said that one hurts the other, yet it cannot be said that one doth an Injury to the other, because one was not bound by any Right, Compact, or Law, not to hurt the other: In like manner, if one Man of that Nation, among whom there is no Covenant, or Association, hurt another, it may be said that he hurts him, but not that he wrongs or doth him an Injury; because he was not obliged by any Compact or Law, not to hurt him.

I speak of brute Animals, not as if there were any even of those who live in Herds or Flocks, that are capable of entring into Covenant not to harm or be hurt by each other, and so might be conceived to be just if they do not hurt each other, and unjust if they do; but only to the End, that from thence it may be the better understood, that even among Men, Justice in itself is nothing, for that it is found only in mutual Societies, according to the Amplitude of every Country, in which the Inhabitants may conveniently enter into Agreements, and Covenants of not doing, or receiving any hurt; since otherwise,

and

and in a Man singly considered, there is no Justice at all; and what is Justice in one Society of Men, many times is, in respect of contrary Covenants, Injustice in another.

But can there be Justice betwixt Men and other Animals? Certainly not. For if Men could make a Covenant with brute Animals, as they can with other Men, that they should not kill, nor be killed by them, without any distinction; then indeed, might the Reason of Just or Right be founded betwixt them and us, since the End of that Covenant would be the Security of both Parties: But because it is impossible, that Animals void of Reason should be obliged by one Law with us, it must also be impossible for us to obtain more Assurance of Security from Animals, than even from inanimate Beings. So that, there is no other way for us to secure ourselves from brute Beasts, but only to execute that Power of destroying them, which Nature hath given us.

Perhaps you will, by the way, demand, why we kill even such Animals, as can give us no Occasion of Fear? This we may do either through Intemperance, and a certain natural Savageness or Cruelty, as we exercise Cruelty even upon Men who live out of our Society, and cannot give us any Fear. But it is one thing to break the Rules of Temperance, or any of its kinds, as Sobriety, Lenity, or Mansuetude, or, (if you please) mere Humanity or Goodness of Nature; another, to violate Justice, which presupposeth Laws and Covenants established by mutual Consent.

Nor [b] *can it be alledg'd, that we have a Power granted us by Law, to destroy any such Animals as are not offensive or destructive to Mankind. I confess, there is not any kind of living Creatures, among all those we are allowed to destroy, which being permitted to increase to vast Multitudes, would not prove pernicious to Mankind, but being preserved in such Number as ordinarily they are, are not some ways useful to Life.*

For Sheep, Kine, and all such like, as long as they are preserv'd to a moderate Number, afford us many Necessaries for Life: But if they were suffered to multiply in a far greater manner, certainly they could not but prove very hurtful to us, as well in regard of their Strength, as for that they would devour the Fruits of the Earth that should serve for our Subsistence. And for this very Cause is it, that we are not prohibited to destroy such Animals, yet preserve so many of them as may be useful to us, and easily ruled by us.

For, of Lions, Wolves, and all such as are called wild Beasts, (whether little or great) we cannot take a certain Number, which being preserved, may afford us any Relief necessary to Life, as we may of Kine, Horses, and the rest, that are called tame Creatures. Whence it comes to pass, that we endeavour wholly to exterminate those, and of these cut off only so many as are over and above a competent Stock.

Hereupon (to touch briefly on this also) we may conceive, that even among those Nations who make their Choice of certain sorts of Animals for Food, *the matter was determined and prescribed by certain Laws, grounded upon Reason correspondent to those we have now given. And as for those Animals that were not to be eaten, there was Respect had to their Utility and Inutility*, and for some Reason peculiar to each Country; to the Constitutions whereof there is no Necessity for us to adhere, who live not in those Places.

Hence we come to understand, that from the very Beginning a Difference was put betwixt the killing of Men, and the killing of all other Animals [c]; *For as to other Animals, it is manifest, that those primitive, wise Persons, who prescribed what we should do, and what not, did not forbid to kill any of them, because the Profit that ariseth from them is perfected by the contrary Action, that is, by killing them. For it could not be, that Men living promiscuously amongst Beasts, could preserve themselves in Safety otherwise, than by expelling or destroying them.*

But as concerning Mankind, [d] *Some, who at that time were more gracious than the rest (these perhaps were they that persuaded Men first to enter into the Covenant we spoke of) remembred, that in those Places, where Men lived promiscuously, they had sometimes abstained from Slaughter, out of a Respect to that Utility which conduced to their Safety; as also represented to others in their Meetings what had happened, that refraining from Slaughter of an Animal of the same kind, they might defend the Security of Life, which is generally the Cause of every Man's particular Safety. And it was profitable at first to quit the Society of either other Animals, or Men meeting together, at least not to hurt any, to avoid the incensing of, not only other Animals of several kinds, but also Men, who are all of the same, and apt enough of themselves to do harm. Whence, upon this Account, Men refrained laying Hands upon an Animal of their own* Species, *that offer'd itself to the Communication of Things necessary, and contributed some Benefit to Society.*

But in Process of Time, there being a great Increase on both sides, and Animals of different Species *being forc'd away, Men began to make use of their Reason (whereas before that Time they had trusted altogether to Memory) and to enter into Consultation what was to be done in order to their Safety, when they should come together, and conjoin their Habitations. For they endeavour'd strongly to restrain those who rashly and imprudently would murder one another, and thereby made the mutual Assistance, that Men were able to afford each other, daily the weaker; and this chiefly, because those great Inconveniencies which had frequently fallen out in former Times upon the like Cases, were utterly forgotten.*

[b] Porph. [c] Porph. [d] Porph.

Forgotten. Now whilſt they endeavoured to bring this to paſs, they at length introduced the Laws and Conſtitutions which continue in all Cities and Nations even to this Day; the common People of their own accord conſenting to them, as I ſaid; being ſenſible how much greater Utility would from thence accrue to them, living in mutual Society. In like manner it conduceth alſo to Security, both to deſtroy without any Pity what is pernicious, and to preſerve whatever is uſeful to exterminate it.

Thus it is probable, that upon theſe Conſiderations, the Slaughter of all other Animals came to be permitted, and that of Men prohibited. But I inſiſt too long hereupon.

CHAP. XXVIII.

With what Right Juſtice is to be exerciſed.

JUSTICE being eſtabliſhed by a mutual Agreement, it remains, that every Man, whether a Native or Alien, ought, from the time he hath given up his Name to a Society, to account himſelf a Member of that Society, upon this Condition, either expreſsly or tacitly, that he hurt none of his Fellow-members, nor be hurt by any other. Wherefore he muſt either ſtand to the Covenant, or depart out of the Society; for he is not to be ſuffer'd to live in the Society upon any other Terms. Whence it follows, ſince by Nature no Man is willing to receive harm from another, that he do not that to another which he would not ſhould be done to himſelf.

Hereupon it may be imagined, that the Laws in all Societies were made in Favour of the Wiſe, not to prevent wiſe Men from doing unjuſtly, but that others ſhould not injure them: For as for them, they are ſo well diſpoſed, as that, if there were no Laws, yet would they not do harm to any. They have preſcribed Bounds to their Deſires, and accommodate them to Nature, which requires nothing that muſt be obtained by ways of Injuſtice; nor indeed is there any of Nature's Pleaſures which induceth a Man to do Injury to another, but ſome exorbitant Deſire ariſing from vain Opinion.

For Nature having (for Example) provided Herbs, Corn, Fruits, for Food, competent and uſeful, and Water for Drink, Things eaſy to be had, it cannot be the Pleaſure of ſatisfying Hunger and Thirſt, that ſhould cauſe a Man to rob his Neighbour, or commit any of thoſe Injuries which they uſually do: But the vain Deſire of living at a higher Rate, more ſplendidly and wantonly, that ſo he may acquire Wealth enough to diſcharge the Expences of his Luxury. The ſame may be ſaid alſo of thoſe, who, not content with plain Apparel, a plain Houſe, a plain Match, and the like, through Ambition, Pride, Luſt, and other Paſſions, deſire more than Nature needs.

Moreover, ſeeing that a wiſe Man, as I hinted formerly, doth all things for his own ſake, nothing certainly can more conduce to his Advantage, than to obſerve Juſtice exactly. For in giving to every one his due, and harming no Man, he, to his utmoſt, preſerves and keeps ſafe that Society, which, unleſs it be ſafe, he cannot be ſafe himſelf; nor doth he provoke any Man to revenge an Injury ſuffered at his hand, or fear any Mulct or Puniſhment to be inflicted upon him by publick Decree. Thus being conſcious to himſelf of no ill done, he remains free from all Perturbation, which is the greateſt Benefit and Fruit of Juſtice; and while he reaps that, what can be more to his own Advantage?

Neither ought you to think, that he, who tho' ſecretly, and without the Knowledge of any Man, violates Right, or the Covenants ratified by general Conſent, to prevent the committing and ſuffering of Wrong, can live in the ſame Security and Indiſturbance as the juſt Man doth, becauſe (as I ſaid) he cannot aſſure himſelf that his Injuſtice ſhall never be brought to light: For Crimes, tho' they may be ſecret, can never be ſecure; nor doth it avail an Offender to be concealed from others, while he can never be concealed from himſelf.

Truly, though his Offence were never ſo well concealed for a time, yet it is very uncertain, whether it will continue ſo concealed till his Death. For firſt, there is a Jealouſy and Suſpicion that follows upon ill Actions; and again, there have been many who have detected themſelves, ſome in Dreams, others in raving Fits, others in Drink, others thro' Incogitancy. So that a wicked Man, tho' he may for a time lie hid both from Gods and Men, (as they ſay) yet he hath Reaſon to miſtruſt that he will not be concealed for ever.

Hence is it, that notwithſtanding Injuſtice is not an Ill in itſelf, becauſe what is reputed unjuſt in one Place, may be juſt in another; yet it is an Ill in reſpect of that Fear, which, ſtinging the Conſcience, creates in it a continual Suſpicion, that at ſome time or other his unjuſt Deeds will come to the Ears of the Avengers of Injuſtice, and ſo he be called to a ſevere Account for them. Thus there is nothing that more conduceth as to Security, ſo likewiſe to a quiet and pleaſant Life, than to live innocently, and upon no occaſion to violate the common Covenants of Peace.

Wherefore ſince the juſt and unjuſt are in this Oppoſition, that the juſt, of all Men, are the moſt free from Perturbations, What can be more profitable to thoſe than Juſtice? What more hurtful to theſe, than Injuſtice? For how can any Anguiſh of Mind, Solicitudes, daily and nightly Fears, be profitable to any Man?

Juſtice therefore being ſo great a Good, and Injuſtice ſo great an Ill, let us embrace one, and abhor the

the other. And if at any Time our Mind ſeem to ſtagger, and we are in Suſpence what to do, let us fix on ſome grave good Man, and ſuppoſe him to be always preſent with us, that we may live and do all things as if he looked upon us.

By this Means we ſhall not only avoid the doing of any thing openly againſt Juſtice, but alſo of offending in ſecret againſt the Rules of Honeſty. This good Man will be to us inſtead of a Guardian or Tutor, whom, becauſe we reverence, we fear to offend. Following this Counſel therefore, thus argue; If he were preſent, I would not do it; Why do I do it in his Abſence? He would find Fault with it, becauſe it is Ill; Why do not I ſhun Ill of myſelf? Thus, do all Things, as if ſome ſuch Perſon look'd on; for if you in this manner reverence another, you will ſoon come to be reverenced yourſelf.

CHAP. XXIX.

Of Beneficence, Gratitude, Piety, Obſervance.

WE come next to the Virtues which we ſaid were allied to Juſtice, for that they have Regard to other Perſons; and tho' they are not (as Juſtice is) preſcribed by Laws and Covenants, yet they import, out of Decency, a certain Obligation like that of Juſtice.

The firſt is *Beneficence*, or the doing Good to others, whereunto thoſe are obliged, who are able to aſſiſt or relieve others, either with their Hand or Purſe. If they deny the Aſſiſtance of their Hands, they are cenſured as barbarous, cruel, inhuman; if that of their Purſe, they are thought the ſame, as alſo ſordid, tenacious, covetous, and the like. But if they aſſiſt others, they are accounted courteous, civil, kind; as alſo liberal, munificent, magnificent, *&c.* So that they are obliged for their own ſakes to do good to others, ſo far as may be without Prodigality.

For thoſe who practiſe this Virtue procure to themſelves Good-will, and (what moſt of all conduces to quiet Living) Dearneſs or tender Eſtimation from others: They who uſe it not, Ill-will, and (what moſt occaſions troubleſome Life) Contempt and Hatred. Take heed therefore you omit not to be beneficent, at leaſt in ſmall Matters, that ſo you loſe not the Advantage of being accounted ready to gratify others, even in great.

Not without Reaſon did I ſay formerly, It is not only more honourable, but alſo more delightful to give than to receive a Benefit; becauſe the Giver thereby makes himſelf ſuperior to the Receiver, and reaps moreover the Intereſt of Thanks; and there is not any thing that joys a Man more than Thanks. A beneficent Perſon is like a Fountain, which if you ſhould ſuppoſe it to have a reaſonable Soul, what Joy would it not have at the ſight of ſo many Cornfields, and Paſtures, which flouriſh and ſmile, as it were, with Plenty and Verdure, and all by the Diffuſion of its Streams upon them.

The ſecond is *Gratitude*, to which every Man that receives a Benefit is reciprocally obliged, unleſs he would incur the greateſt Hatred and Ignominy. For Ingratitude is worthily hateful to all Men; becauſe ſeeing nothing is more ſuitable to Nature, than to be propenſe to receive a Good, it is highly contrary to Nature, not to be readily grateful towards the Author of that Good.

Now ſince no Man is more gratefully affected towards his Benefactors than the wiſe Man, we may juſtly affirm, that only the wiſe Man knows how to fulfil the Duty of Gratitude, becauſe he alone is ready upon all Occaſions to expreſs his Thankfulneſs to his Friends, both preſent and abſent, even to thoſe that are dead.

Others pay Thanks only to preſent Friends, when preſent, and this perhaps for their own farther Ends, to encourage them to ſome new Favour; but how few are there, who gratefully commemorate their abſent Benefactors? Who requite the Good they did them upon their Children, or other Relations? How few who honour their Memory after Death; who rejoice not rather, as if their Obligations were cancell'd? Who love thoſe that were dear to them, reſpect them, and as far as in them lies, do Good to them?

The third is *Piety*, the moſt ſacred Species of Gratitude. It looks upon our Parents in the firſt Place, to whom every Man is more obliged than to all the World beſides: For to others he may owe other things; but to his Parents he owes himſelf. Therefore if Ingratitude to others be hateful, that which is ſhewn to Parents muſt certainly be the moſt horrid and deteſtable.

We ſay, in the firſt place; becauſe Piety in the ſecond place extends to Kindred, and chiefly to our Brothers and Siſters, to whom we are obliged by the Intereſt of our Parents; in ſuch manner, as that we cannot ſhew ourſelves diſreſpectful and unkind to them, but we muſt be at the ſame time highly ungrateful to our Parents, and all our Progenitors, who, in the Circle of their Love and Benevolence comprehended all that were, and ſhould afterwards be derived from them.

Nor is this Piety diſtinct from that Dearneſs we are to bear towards our native Country, which comprehends our Parents and all our Kindred, and receives us at our Birth, brings us up and protects us. And as by the Intereſt of our Parents we are oblig'd to our Kindred, ſo by the Intereſt of our Country, we are obliged to reſpect all our Countrymen; but more eſpecially the Magiſtrates and Princes, who defend the Country itſelf, and the Laws of it, and give us this Benefit in particular, that under their Protection we may live ſecurely and peaceably.

The

The fourth is *Obſervance*, or that Reverence which we owe to all Perſons of Eminency in any kind. This is accompany'd partly with Gratitude and Piety, (for we cannot any way better expreſs the Grateſulneſs of our Minds, than by giving due Veneration and Worſhip to our Benefactors, Parents, Governors, Princes, and all Men of Dignity and Power) and partly with Honour and Reſpect, as it is the beſt Teſtimony we can give of our internal Sentiments of their Deſervings, who excel in Age, Wiſdom, Learning, and Virtue, the moſt honourable of all things.

To this Obſervance belongs that which Men call *Religion* and *Sanctity* toward the Gods, whom we are bound to reverence and honour no otherwiſe than our Parents, nor through Hope of any Reward, but (as I ſaid before) for their tranſcendent Majeſty and the Supremacy of their Nature. Becauſe, whatever is excellent deſerves a juſt Veneration, and no Excellency is greater than that of the Divine Nature, for it is immortal and moſt bleſſed.

Thus underſtanding, that the Gods neither create Troubles themſelves, nor give to others, we piouſly and holily reverence their moſt excellent Nature.

CHAP. XXX.

Of Friendſhip.

THE laſt is *Friendſhip*, to which all are mutually obliged, who love, and are reciprocally belov'd. And well may it be the Cloſe and Crown of this Diſcourſe; for amongſt all the Means procured by Wiſdom, to make Life happy, there is not any thing more full and pleaſant than Friendſhip; and the ſame Reaſon that confirms the Mind not to fear any laſting or eternal Ill, doth alſo aſſure, that, in Life, there is no Sanctuary ſo ſafe, no Protection ſo ſecure as that of Friendſhip, which, together with that Security, conferreth alſo very great Pleaſures.

For as Hatreds, Envies, Deſpites, are Enemies to Pleaſure; ſo are Friendſhips not only moſt faithful Conſervers, but effectual Cauſers of Pleaſures, as well to our Friend as to ourſelves: By which Men not only enjoy preſent things more fully, but are cheer'd with Hopes of thoſe to come. And a ſolitary Life, deſtitute of Friends being full of Fears, and ſubject to Treacheries, Reaſon itſelf adviſeth us to procure Friendſhips, by which the Mind is confirm'd, and poſſeſſed with Hopes of enjoying future Pleaſures.

Now, tho' Friendſhip is contracted in reſpect of Uſe and Utility, in like manner as we ſow the Earth in hope of a Crop hereafter; and the firſt Meetings and Converſations of Friendſhip are made in reſpect of the Utility and Pleaſures which are hoped from thence; yet when this Cuſtom hath gone on to Intimacy, then Love ſo flouriſheth, that tho' there were not any Benefit of Friendſhip, yet Friends would be loved for their own ſakes. If we love Places, Temples, Cities, Academies, Plains, Horſes, Dogs, Sports, out of an habitual Cuſtom of exerciſing or hunting, how much eaſier and more juſtly may we do this in Converſation with Men?

But in the Choice of our Friends, we muſt be exceeding cautious and prudent; for it concerns us to be more circumſpect with whom we eat, than what we eat. And tho' to eat alone without a Friend, be to lead the Life of a Lion or Wolf, yet we muſt be careful to chuſe ſuch a Friend, whoſe Converſation may be the beſt Sauce to our Meat. We muſt ſeek one to whom nothing is more in Eſteem, than Candor, Simplicity, and Sincerity; one that is not moroſe, querulous, and murmuring at all things, but who, by his Complacency, Alacrity, and Pleaſantneſs, may render our Life ſweet to us.

Friendſhip, I grant, conſiſts in, and is kept alive by the mutual Participation of Pleaſures or Goods which we may enjoy whilſt we live; yet is it not neceſſary that the Goods of Friends ſhould be put into one common Stock, as he conceived, who ſaid, *Amongſt Friends all things are common.* This implies a Diffidence, (that all their Wills may not continue conſtant) and they who are diffident are not Friends; ſuch only are Friends, who can with full Confidence and Freedom take and uſe ſo much of their Friends Goods or Eſtate, as they need, altho' kept in ſeveral, not in one Joint-ſtock, no otherwiſe than as if it were their own, eſteeming them to be no leſs their own, than if they had them in their own Poſſeſſion and Keeping.

This ſounds ſtrange in the Ears of the Vulgar: But what are they to us? There is no Faith or Conſtancy in their Kindneſs and Friendſhip, they being uncapable of theſe things and of the leaſt Part of commendable Wiſdom.

Moreover, he that is one of the Vulgar underſtands not what is profitable in private or publick, nor can diſtinguiſh betwixt good Manners and bad.

I ſpeak therefore of the Wiſe only, amongſt whom there is a kind of League and Covenant not to love their Friends leſs than themſelves, which we know may be done and ſee it often comes to paſs; whence is it manifeſt, that there can be nothing more conducing to pleaſant living than ſuch a Conjunction.

Whence alſo we underſtand, that the placing of the chief Good in Pleaſure is ſo far from being obſtructive hereunto, that without it there can be no Inſtitution of Friendſhip.

For it being impoſſible for us to conſerve the Sweetneſs and Security of our Lives firm and laſting without Friendſhip, and to preſerve Friendſhip, unleſs we love our Friends as much as ourſelves; this therefore and Pleaſure are the inſeparable Adjuncts of Friendſhip; for we rejoice in our Friends Joy as much as if it were our own, and are concern'd equally in his Grief.

A wise Man therefore will be alike towards his Friend as towards himself; what Labour and Pains he undergoes for his own Pleasure, the same will he undergo for the Pleasure of his Friend. And as he would rejoice to think, that he hath one that will sit by him, if he should be sick, and relieve him if he were cast into Prison, or fall into Want; so will he rejoice, as having one, by whom, if he should fall sick, he may sit, and whom, if imprison'd, or fallen into Want, relieve. And not only this, but his Love will be so great as to undergo the greatest Torments, even Death itself, for his Friend's sake.

We have known it certainly happen, (and that within the Memory of our Parents) that many, who had the Happiness of procuring to themselves full Confidence and Security in the Society of Men, living in the same Opinions and the same Affections with them, have, in the Assurance of this comfortable League, lived most sweetly together, and been conjoined with so absolute a Nearness as that one could without the least Reluctancy, wish to suffer for the other, condemn'd to die.

This is all I had to say concerning ETHICK, which in the Beginning I asserted to be the chiefest Part of Philosophy. You, whoever you are, that aspire to true Wisdom, practise and meditate upon these Rules, considering them as the Grounds of honest, well, and happy living.

Meditate, I say, upon them Day and Night, as well when you are alone, as when in Company of some faithful Companion who is like yourself, and to whom you may say, We are indeed alone, but by this Means we have the greater Opportunity of making Inquisition into Truth without Prejudice. I speak not to many, but to you; and you speak not to many, but to me; and that's enough, since each to other is a Theatre large enough.

Do you not now grant, that no Man can be compared to him, whose Mind is rightly informed as concerning the Gods, and is fearless of Death, and who hath so reasoned concerning the End of Nature, and the ultimate Good, as to understand, that it may be compleated and attained with the greatest Facility imaginable, and that whatever Ill he must endure, either is short, if vehement; if long, gentle; and telleth himself, that there is no such thing as an inevitable Necessity of Fates concerning him, but that he hath an absolute Freedom of Will, and that nothing at all, or very little of Fortune can at any time intervene to cross him; and the rest which we have laid down.

Certainly when you shall come to be such a Man as this, you will [b] never be troubled waking nor sleeping (for even in Sleep you will be just as you are when awake, by reason of the well Composedness of your Mind) but shall live like some Deity among Men. For that Man who spends his Life in the Enjoyment of immortal Goods, is far different from a mortal Creature. Hitherto *Gassendus*.

CHAP. XXXI.

Wherein Epicurus, *asserting Pleasure to be the ultimate Good, differs from the* Cyrenaicks.

THough *Epicurus* agrees with the *Cyrenaicks* in asserting Pleasure to be the ultimate Good yet [c] *concerning this Pleasure, they disagree. The* Cyrenaicks *admit not Pleasure to consist in Rest, but in Motion only*; Epicurus *allowed both, as well that of the Soul as of the Body; as he asserts in his Book* Of Election and Avoidance, *and in his Treatise of the* End, *and in his first Book of* Lives, *and in his Epistle* to the Philosophers at Mitylene. *Likewise* Diogenes *in the eleventh of his Select Rules, and* Democritus *in his* Timocrates. *For thus; Whereas Pleasure is twofold, one consisting in Motion, the other in Rest*, &c. *And* Epicurus, *in his Treatise* Of Elections, *expresly thus; Of Pleasures, Indolence, and Imperturbation, consist in Rest; and Delight, in Motion.*

Moreover he differs from the Cyrenaicks, *for that they conceived the Pains of the Body to be worse than those of the Mind; whence it comes to pass, that, upon Malefactors, corporal Punishment is inflicted as being the most grievous. But* Epicurus *held, that the Pains of the Mind are the greatest, for that no Ill can afflict the Body longer than whilst it is present; but besides the present, the past and future also torment the Mind; and by the same Reason, the Pleasures of the Soul are the greatest. Thus much of the* Epicurean, *the last of all the* Italick *Sect.*

[b] Laert. 10. 1581.

[c] Laert. 10. 136.

A CHRO-

A

CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE.

Olymp.	*Archons.*	*Olympick Victors.*
XXX		
2		
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XXXI		
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XXXII		
2		
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XXXIII		
2		
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XXXIV		
2		
3		
4		
XXXV		
2	*Damaſias.* See Life of *Thales*, Chap. 2.	*Sphærus* Dion.
3		
4		
XXXVI	*Epænetus.* Antig. Cariſt. Hiſt. Mir. 133.	*Phryno.* Euſeb. Probably the ſame with whom *Pittacus* fought. Pit. c. 1. but *Antigonus Cariſtius* calls the Victor this Year, *Arytamas.*
2		
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XXXVII		
2		
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XXXVIII		
2		
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XXXIX	*Draco.* Clem. Alex. Strom. 1. Tatian. Suid.	
2		
3		
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XL		
2		
3		
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1. *Thales* born. See *Thales, chap.* 2.
2. *Solon* born about this time.

2. *Ancus Martius* King of *Rome*. *Dion. Halic. lib.* 3.

4. *Periander* begun to reign at *Corinth. Periand. chap.* 2.

Arion. See *Periand. chap.* 4.

Olymp.	*Archons.*	*Olympick Victors.*
XLI	*Heniochides.* Halic. lib. 3.	*Cleonidas.* Dion.
2		
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XLII		
2		
3		
4		
XLIII		
2		
3		
4	*Ariſtocles*, (perhaps) Marm. Arund.	
XLIV		
2		
3		
4		
XLV	*Megacies* (perhaps) Plut. in Solon.	
2		
3		
4		
XLVI		
2	*Philombrotus.* Plut in Solone.	
3	*Solon.* Laert. in Solone.	
4	*Dropides.* Philoſtr. in Critia.	
XLVII	*Eucrates.* Laert in Amachars.	
2	*Simon.* Marm.	
3		
4		
XLVIII	*Philippus.* Clem. Strom. 1. Euſeb.	*Claucias.* Pauſan. *Glycon.* Euſeb.
2	Chron. 1.	
3		
4		
XLIX		
2		
3	*Damaſias* the Second. *Marm.* See *Thales's*	
4	*Life*, Chap. 2.	
L		*Epitelides.*
2		
3		
4	*Archeſtratides.* Dionyſ. Halic. lib. 4.	

		2. *Tarquinius Priſcus*, King of *Rome*. *Dionyſ. Halic. lib* 3. 3. *Allyattes*, King of *Lydia* begun to Reign.
	Anaximander born. *Laert.*	
	1. *Epimenides* luſtrates the City of *Athens*. *Laert.* 3. *Solon* made *Archon*. *Laert.*	
ÆRA PHILOSOPHICA.	1. *Anacharſis* came to *Athens* to viſit *Solon*, *Laert.*	
	4. *Periander* died. *Laert.*	
1 2	In the third Year, *Damaſias* being Archon, the Attribute of *Wiſe* was conferred on *Thales* and the reſt, from which the Philſophical *Æra* begins. *Thal. chap.* 5.	
3 4 5 6	*Theſpis* preſents Tragedies; reproved by *Solon*. *Sol. cap.* 10. *Anaximander* found out the Obliquity of the Zodiack. *Plin.*	4. *Servius Tullus*, King of *Rome*.

Olymp.	*Archons.*	*Olympick Victors.*
LI		
2		
3	*Ariſtomenes.* Laert.	
4		
LII		
2		
3		
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LIII		
2		
3	*Hippoclides.* Marcellin. in Vita Thucyd.	
4		
LIV		
2		
3		
4	*Comias.* Plut. in Solone Marm.	
LV	*Hegeſtratus.* Plut. in Solone.	
2		
3		
4		
LVI	*Euthydemus.* Marm. Laert. See Life of	
2	*Chilon.*	
3		
4		
LVII		
2		
3		
4		
LVIII	*Erixiclides.* Pauſ. in Phoc. See Thal.	*Diognetus.*
2		
3		
4		
LIX		
2		
3		
4		
LX		
2		
3		
4		

Æra Phil.		
7		
8		
9	*Pittachus* dies.	
10		
11		
12		
13		
14		
15	*Pythagoras* born.	
16		
17		
18		
19		
20		
21		
22		
23		1. *Cyrus* began his Reign over *Perſia.*
24		
25		
26		4. *Crœſus* King of *Lydia.*
27	Chilon Ephorus. *Laert.*	
28		
29		
30		
31		
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34		
35		
36		
37	*Pythagoras* went into *Ægypt.*	
38		
39		1. *Cyrus* vanquiſh'd *Crœſus.*
40		
41		
42		
43		
44		
45		
46		

Olymp.	*Archons.*	*Olympick Victors.*
LXI	——*næus* 1. Marm.	*Agatharcus.*
2		
3	*Theribles*, Diod. excerpt. p. 241.	
4	*Heraclides*, Dionyſ. Halic. 4. rather	
LXII		*Eryxidas.*
2		
3		
4		
LXIII		
2		
3		
4		
LXIV	*Miltiades*, Halic. 7.	
2		
3		
4		
LXV		
2		
3		
4		
LXVI		
2		
3		
4		
LXVII		
2		
3		
4		
LXVIII	*Iſagoras*, Halic. 1. & 5.	*Iſchomachus.*
2		
3		
4		
LXIX	*Aceſtorides*, Hal. 5.	*Iſchomachus.*
2		
3		
4		
LXX	*Myrus*, Hal. 5.	*Nicæas.*
2		
3		
4		

Æra Phil.		
47		
48		
49		4. *Tarquinius Superbus*, King of *Rome*.
50		*Halic.* 4.
51		
52		
53	(*Ariſt. Pol.* 5.	
54	*Piſiſtratus* died, having reigned 17 Years.	
55		
56		
57	*Cambyſes*, conquers *Egypt*, and ſends *Pythagoras*	2. *Amaſis* King of *Egypt* dies; *Pſammeticus*
58	Priſoner to *Babylon*.	his Son ſucceeds him.
59		
60		
61		
62		4. *Darius Hyſtaſpis*, King of *Perſia*.
63		
64		
65		
66		
67		
68		
69		
70	*Pythagoras* went into *Italy*.	
71		
72		
73		
74		
75		
76		
77		
78		
79		
80		
81		
82		
83	*Anaxagoras* born.	
84		
85		
86	*Pythagoras* died. *Euſeb.*	

Olymp.	Archons.	Olympick Victors.
LXXI	*Hipparchus.* Halic. 6.	*Tiſicrates.*
2	*Pythocritus,* Marm.	
3		
4		
LXXII	*Diognetus,* Hal. 6.	*Tiſicrates.*
2	*Phanippus* 2 Plut. in Ariſtide. *Hybrilides,* Hal. 7. Pauſ. El. 2.	
3	*Ariſtides,* Plut. ib. Marm.	
4	*Themiſtocles,* Thuc. 1. Pauſ. lib. 27.	
LXXIII	*Anchiſes,* Hal. 8. *Lacratides,* Schol.	*Aſtylus.*
2	Ariſt. Suid. *Phædon,* Plut.	
3	*Philocrates,* Marm.	
4		
LXXIV	*Leoſtratus,* Hal. 8.	*Aſtylus.*
2	*Nicodemus,* Hal. 8.	
3		
4	*Calliades,* Marm.	
LXXV	*Xantippus,* Marm. *Cal.* Hal. 9. Diod.	
2	*Timoſthenes,* Marm. *Xantippus,* Diod.	
3	*Idimantus,* Marm. *Timoſthenes.* Diod.	
4	*Adimantus,* Diod.	
LXXVI	*Phædon,* Hal. Diod.	*Scamandrus.*
2	*Dromoclides,* Diod.	
3	*Aceſtorides,* Diod.	
4	*Menon,* Diod.	
LXXVII	*Chares,* Marm. Halic. Diod.	*Dates.*
2	*Praxiergus.* Diod. (Socr. chap. 1.	
3	*Apſephion,* Marm. *Demotion.* Diod. See	
4	*Theagenides,* Marm.	
LXXVIII	*Theagenides,* Hal. Diod.	*Parmenides.*
2	*Lyſiſtratus,* Diod.	
3	*Lyſanias,* Diod.	
4	*Lyſithens,* Diod.	
LXXIX	*Archedemides,* Diod. *Archim.* Pauſ.	*Xenophon.*
2	*Euthippus,* Marm. *Thepolemus,* Diod.	
3	*Conon,* Diod.	
4	*Euippus,* Diod.	
LXXX	*Phaſiclides,* Diod. *Phraſides,* Hal.	*Torymbas.*
2	*Philocles,* Diod.	
3	*Bion,* Diod.	
4	*Callias* 1. Marm. *Mnetheſides,* Diod.	

Æra Phil.		
87		
88		
89		
90		
91		
92		2. The Fight at *Marathon.*
93		
94		
95		
96		
97		3. *Darius* dies, *Xerxes* ſucceeds.
98		
99		
100		
101		
102		
103	*Anaxagoras* went to *Athens.* *Laert.*	1. *Xerxes* croſt the *Helleſpont.*
104		The Fight at *Salamis.*
105		
106		
107		
108		
109		
110		
111		
112		
113	*Socrates* born. A Stone fell from Heaven,	
114	foretold by *Anaxagoras.*	
115		
116		
117		
118		
119		1. *Artaxerxes Longimanus,* King of
120		*Perſia.*
121		
122		
123	*Democritus* born, *Anaxagoras* being 40 Years	
124	old. *Laert.*	
125		
126		

Olymp.	Archons.	Olympick Victors.
LXXXI	*Collias*, Diod. Hal.	*Polymneſtus.*
2	*Soſiſtratus*, Diod.	
3	*Ariſton*, Diod.	
4	*Lyſicrates*, Diod.	
LXXXII	*Chærophanes*, Halic.	*Lycus.*
2	*Antidotus*, Diod.	
3	*Euthydemus*, Diod. lib. 12.	
4	*Pedieus*, Diod.	
LXXXIII	*Philiſcus*, Diod. Halic.	*Criſon.*
2	*Timarchides*, Diod.	
3	*Callimachus*, Diod.	
4	*Lyſimachides*, Diod.	
LXXXIV	*Diphilus*, Marm. *Praxitelles*, Diod.	*Criſon.*
2	*Lyſanias*, Diod.	
3	*Diphilus*, Diod. Halic.	
4	*Timocles*, Diod.	
LXXXV	*Munichides*, Diod.	*Criſon.*
2	*Glaucides*, Diod.	
3	*Theodorus*, Diod.	
4	*Euthemenes*, Diod.	
LXXXVI	*Nauſimachus*, Diod.	*Theopompus*, or, as *Plato*, *Diopompus.*
2	*Antilochides*, Diod.	
3	*Chares*, Diod.	
4	*Apſeudes*, Diod.	
LXXXVII	*Pythodorus*, Diod.	*Sophon.*
2	*Euthydemus*, Diod.	
3	*Apollodorus*, Diod.	
4	*Epaminondas*, Diod.	
LXXXVIII	*Diotymus*, Diod. Life of *Eucl. c.* 3.	*Symmachus.*
2	*Euclsdes*, Diod. *Euclees*, Ariſt. See	
3	*Euthydemus*, Diod.	
4	*Stratocles*, Diod.	
LXXXIX	*Iſarchus*, Diod.	*Symmachus* 2.
2	*Amintas*, Diod.	
3	*Alcæus*, Diod.	
4	*Aſtyphilus*, Marm. *Ariſton*, Diod.	
XC	*Ariſtophilus*, Diod.	*Hyperbius.*
2	*Archias*, Diod.	
3	*Antiphon*, Diod.	
4	*Euphormus*, Diod.	

Æra Phil.		
127		
128		
129		
130		
131	*Xenophon*, born about this time.	1. From the Building of *Rome* 300. *Halic.*
132		
133	*Anaxagoras* condemned, and baniſhed *Athens.*	
134		
135		
136		
137		
138		
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145		
146		
147		
148		
149		
150		
151		1. *Archelaus* King of *Macedon.*
152		2. The *Peloponneſian* War; Year 1
153		2
154		3
155	*Anaxagoras* died.	4
156		5
157		6
158		7
159	The Fight at *Delium*, in which were *Socrates* and *Xenophon*. The *Clouds* of *Ariſtophanes* acted.	8
160		9
161	The *Clouds* of *Ariſtophanes* acted the ſecond time.	10
162	The time of *Xenophon*'s Sympoſium.	11
163		12
164		13
165		14
166		15

Olymp.	*Archons.*	
XCI	*Ariſtomneſtus*, Diod.	
2	*Chabrias*, Diod.	
3	*Piſander*, Diod.	
4	*Cleocritus*, Diod.	
XCII	*Callias*, Diod. Halic.	
2	*Theopompus*, Diod.	
3	*Glaucippus*, Diod. Halic.	
4	*Diocles*, Diod.	
XCIII	*Euctemon*, Diod.	
2	*Antigenes*, Diod.	
3	*Callias*, Diod.	
4	*Alexias*, Diod.	
XCIV	*Pythodorus*.	
2	*Euclides*, Diod.	
3	*Micion*, Diod.	
4	*Exenætus*, Diod.	
XCV	*Laches*, Diod.	
2	*Ariſtocrates*, Diod.	
3	*Pithycles*, Diod.	
4	*Lyſiades*, Diod.	
XCVI	*Phormio*, Diod.	
2	*Diophantus*, Diod.	
3	*Eubulides*, Diod.	
4	*Demoſtratus*, Diod.	
XCVII	*Philocles*, Diod.	*Terires.*
2	*Nicoteles*, Diod.	
3	*Demoſtratus*, Diod.	
4	*Antipater*, Diod.	
XCVIII	*Pyrrhion*, Diod. *Pyrgion*, Halic.	*Soſippus.*
2	*Theodotus*, Diod.	
3	*Myſtichides*, Diod.	
4	*Dexitheus*, Diod.	
XCIX	*Diotrephes*, Diod.	*Dicon.*
2	*Phanoſtratus*, Diod.	
3	*Menander*, Diod.	
4	*Demophilus*, Diod.	
C	*Pytheus*, Marm. Diod.	*Dionyſidorus.*
2	*Nicon*, Diod. Halic.	
3	*Nauſinicus*, Diod. Halic.	
4	*Callias*, Marm. Diod.	

Æra Phil.		
167		16
168		17
169		18
170		19
171		*Thucydides* ends, *Xenophon* be- 20
172		gins. 21
173		22
174		23
175		2. The first Ascent of *Cyrus* into 24
176		*Asia*. 25
177		3. *Dionysius* made King of *Syra-* 26
178		*cuse*. 27
179	The 30 Tyrants at *Athens*. See *Socrat.*	
180	*chap.* 9.	
181	*Xenophon*'s Retreat. The 30 Tyrants put	
182	down.	4. The Ascent of *Cyrus* into *Asia*.
183	*Socrates* put to Death. End of *Xenophon*'s Re-	
184	treat.	
185		
186		
187		1. *Agesilaus* goes into *Asia* against the *Per-*
188		*sian*.
189		2. *Agesilaus* call'd him, fights with the *Bœo-*
190		*tians* at *Coronea*.
		3. *Conon* re-edifies the Walls of *Athens*.
191		
192		
193		
194		
195		
196		
197		
198		
199	*Aristotle* born. *Laert.*	
200		
201		
202		
203		
204		
205		
206		

Olymp.	*Archons.*	*Olympick Victors.*
CI	*Cariander*, Diod.	*Damon.*
2	*Hippodamus*, Diod.	
3	*Socratides*, Diod.	
4	*Aſteius*, Marm. Diod.	
CII	*Alciſthenes*, Diod. Demoſth. Halic.	*Damon.*
2	*Phraſiclides*, Marm. Diod. Dem. Pauſ.	
3	*Dyſnicetus*, Diod. *Dyſcinetus*, Pauſ.	
4	*Lyſiſtratus*, Diod.	
CIII	*Nauſigenes*, Marm. Diod.	*Pithoſtratus.*
2	*Polycelus*, Diod. *Polyzelus*, Halic.	
3	*Cephiſodorus*, Marm. Diod.	
4	*Chion*, Diod.	
CIV	*Timocrates*, Diod. Halic.	*Phocides.*
2	*Chariclides*, Diod.	
3	*Molon*, Diod. Halic.	
4	*Nicophemus*, Diod. Halic.	
CV	*Callimedes*, Diod. Halic.	*Porus.*
2	*Euchariſtus*, Diod. Halic.	
3	*Cephiſodorus*, Diod. Halic.	
4	*Agathocles*, Mar. Diod. Halic. Pauſ.	
CVI	*Elpinus*, Diod. Halic.	*Porus.*
2	*Calliſtratus*, Marm. Diod. Halic.	
3	*Diotymus*, Diod. Halic.	
4	*Eudemus*, Diod. Halic.	
CVII	*Ariſtodemus*, Diod. Halic.	*Suierinas.*
2	*Theſſalus*, Diod. Halic.	
3	*Apollodorus*, Diod. Halic.	
4	*Callimachus*, Diod. Halic.	
CVIII	*Theophilus*, Diod. *Theomneſtus*, Halic.	*Polycles.*
2	*Themiſtocles*, Diod. Halic.	
3	*Archias*, Diod. Halic.	
4	*Eubulus*, Diod. *Eudorus*, Halic.	
CIX	*Lyciſcus*, Diod. Halic.	*Ariſtolochus.*
2	*Pythodorus*, Diod. *Pythodotus*, Halic.	
3	*Soſigenes*, Diod. Halic.	
4	*Nicomachus*, Diod. Halic.	
CX	*Theophraſtus*, Diod. Halic.	*Anticles.*
2	*Lyſimachides*, Diod. Halic.	
3	*Charondas*, Diod. *Chæronidas*, Halic.	
4	*Phrynichus*, Diod. Halic.	

Æra Phil.		
207		
208		
209		
210		
211		
212		
213		
214		
215	*Eudoxus* flouriſhed. *Laert.*	1. *Dionyſius* the Elder dieth, ſucceeded by his Son.
216		
217		
218		
219		
220		
221		
222		
223		
224		
225		
226		
227		
228		
229		3. *Dion* murdered.
230		
231		
232		
233		
234		
235	*Plato* died 82 Years old, *Athen.*	
236	*Ariſtotle* went to *Hermias* at *Atarne.*	
237		
238	*Ariſtotle* went to *Myſilene. Laert.*	
239	*Ariſtotle* went to King *Philip*, *Alexander*	
240	being 15 Years old. *Laert.*	
241		
242		
243		
244		
245		
246		

Olymp.	Archons.	Olympick Victors.
CXI	*Pythodorus*, Diod. *Pythodemus*, Halic.	*Cleomantis.*
2	*Euænetus*, Diod. Halic.	
3	*Cteſicles*, Diod. Halic.	
4	*Nicocrates*, Diod. Halic.	
CXII	*Niceratus*, Diod. *Nicetes*, Halic.	*Gryllus.*
2	*Ariſtophanes*, Diod. Halic.	
3	*Ariſtophon*, Diod. Halic.	
4	*Cephiſophon*, Diod.	
CXIII	*Euthycritus*, Diod. Halic.	
2	*Chremes*, Diod. *Hegemon*, Halic.	
3	*Anticles*, Diod. *Chremes*, Halic.	
4	*Soſicles*, Diod. *Anticles*, Halic.	
CXIV	*Agaſias*, Diod.	*Micinas.*
2	*Cephiſodorus*, Diod. Halic.	
3	*Philocles*, Diod. Halic.	
4	*Archippus*, Halic.	
CXV	*Neæchmus*, Diod.	*Dinomenes.*
2	*Apollodorus.* Diod. Halic.	
3	*Archippus*, Diod. Halic.	
4	*Demogenes*, Diod. Halic.	
CXVI	*Democlides*, Diod. Halic.	*Parmenio.*
2	*Praxibulus*, Diod. Halic.	
3	*Nicodorus*, Diod. Halic.	
4	*Theophraſtus*, Diod. Halic.	
CXVII	*Polemon*, Diod. Halic.	*Apollonides.*
2	*Simonides*, Diod. Halic.	
3	*Hieromnemon*, Diod. Halic.	
4	*Demetrius Phalereus*, Diod. Halic.	
CXVIII	*Charinus*, Diod. *Cærimus*, Halic.	*Andromenes.*
2	*Anaxicrates*, Diod. Halic.	
3	*Corybus*, Diod. *Coræbus*, Halic.	
4	*Xenippus*, Diod. *Euxenippus*, Halic.	
CXIX	*Pherecles*, Diod. *Phericles*, Halic.	
2	*Leoſtratus*, Diod. Halic.	
3	*Nicocles*, Diod. Halic.	
4	*Calliarchus*, Halic.	
CXX	*Hegemachus*, Halic.	
2	*Euclemon*, Halic.	
3	*Mneſidemus*, Halic.	
4	*Antiphanes*, Halic.	

Æra Phil.		
247	*Ariſtotle* teacheth in the *Lycæum* 13 Years.	1. *Alexander* begun to reign.
248		
249		3. *Alexander*'s Expedition into *Aſia*, againſt *Darius*.
250		
251		
252		
253		
254		
255		
256		
257		
258		
259		
260		
261	*Ariſtotle* went to *Chalcis*, and died there,	
262	63 Years old. *Laert.*	
263		
264		
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286		

Olymp.

Olymp.	Archons.	Olympick Victors.
CXXI	*Nicias*, Halic.	
2	*Nicoſtratus*, Halic.	
3	*Olympyodorus*, Halic.	
4	*Philippus*, Halic.	
CXXII		
2		
3		
4		
CXXIII		*Idæus*, Pauſan. Eliac. 2.
2		
3		
4		
CXXIV		
2		
3		
4		
CXXV		
2		
3		
4		
CXXVI		
2		
3		
4		
CXXVII	*Pytharatus.* Cic.	
2		
3		
4		
CXXVIII		
2		
3		
4		
CXXIX	*Diognetus.*	
2		
3		
3		
CXXX		
2		
3		
4		

Æra Phil.		
287		
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Olymp.	*Æra Phil.*		
CXXXI	327		
2	328		
3	329		
4	330		
CXXXII	331		
2	332		
3	333		
4	334		
CXXXIII	335		
2	336		
3	337		
4	338		
CXXXIV	339		
2	340		
3	341		
4	342		
CXXXV	343		
2	344		
3	345		
4	346		
CXXXVI	347		
2	348		
3	349		
4	350		
CXXXVII	351		
2	352		
3	353		
4	354		
CXXXVIII	355		
2	356		
3	357		
4	358		
CXXXIX	359		
2	360		
3	361		
4	362		
CXL	363		
2	364		
3	365		
4	366		

Olymp.	*Æra Phil.*		
CXLI	367		
2	368		
3	369		
4	370		
CXLII	371		
2	372		
3	373		
4	374		
CXLIII	375		
2	376		
3	377		
4	378		
CXLIV	379		
2	380		
3	381		
4	382		
CXLV	383		
2	384		
3	385		
4	386		
CXLVI	387		
2	388		
3	389		
4	390		
CXLVII	391		
2	392		
3	393		
4	394		
CXLVIII	395		
2	396		
3	397		
4	398		
CXLIX	399		
2	400		
3	401		
4	402		
CL	403		
2	404		
3	405		
4	406		
CLI	407		
2	408		
3	409		
4	410		

Olymp.	*Æra Phil.*	
CLII	411	
2	412	
3	413	
4	414	
CLIII	415	
2	416	
3	417	
4	418	
CL IV	419	
2	420	
3	421	
4	422	
CLV	423	
2	424	
3	425	
4	426	
CLVI	427	
2	428	
3	429	
4	430	
CLVII	431	
2	432	
3	433	
4	434	
CLVIII	435	
2	436	
3	437	
4	438	
CLIX	439	
2	440	
3	441	
4	442	
CLX	443	
2	444	
3	445	
4	446	
CLXI	447	
2	448	
3	449	
4	450	
CLXII	451	*Clitomachus* flouriſhed.
2	452	
3	453	
4	454	*Carneades* died.

A Topographical TABLE.

A.

Abdera, a City of *Thrace*, ſituate next beyond the River *Neſtus*, toward the Eaſt; founded and named by *Abdera*, Siſter to *Diomedes*, in the 104*th* Year after the taking of *Troy:* And afterwards, *(Olymp.* 31.*)* re-edify'd by a Colony of *Clazomenians.*

Ægina, an Iſland over-againſt *Epidaurus*, in the *Saronian* Bay.

Ægos Potamos, a River in the *Thracian Cherſoneſus*, diſtant from *Seſtos* 15 Furlongs.

Ægypt, a Kingdom of *Africa*, moſt eminent; divided into the Upper and Lower: It had twenty thouſand Cities, the principal were *Memphis*, *Dioſpolis*, and *Heliopolis*; its River, *Nilus.*

Agrianes, a People of *Thrace*, dwelling upon the River *Agrianes*, betwixt the Mountains *Rhodope* and *Hæmus.* Of this Country perhaps was *Hippomedon* the *Pythagorean*, mentioned by *Jamblichus.* [*Doct. Pyth. p.* 1. *chap.* 8.]

Agrigentum. See *Pythag. chap.* 10.

Ambracia, an eminent City of *Epirus*, in the Bottom of the *Abracian* Bay, upon the River *Aracthus*, not far from the Sea. The *Ambracian* Bay parts *Epirus* from *Acarnania.*

Atarna, a City of *Myſia.*

Athens, the chief City of *Greece*, ſeated in *Attica*; founded by *Cecrops.*

Attica, an eminent Region of *Greece*, bounding on the Territory of *Megara*, on the Shore over-againſt *Salamis*; and on the Territory of the *Bœotians*, by Sea, at *Orpus*; by Land, at *Panacium*, at *Oenæ*, at *Hyſiæ.*

B.

Bœotia, a Region of *Greece*, between *Attica* and *Phocis*; reaching from the *Ægean* Sea to the *Corinthian* Iſthmus.

Brachmanes. See *Pythag. ch.* 5.

Branchidæ, a Town where there was a Temple to *Apollo*, on the *Mileſian* Shore, between the Promontory of *Poſideum*, and the City *Miletus.*

Byzantium, a City of *Thrace*, ſituate at the Entrance of the *Boſphorus*, over-againſt *Chalcedon*; *Conſtantine* afterwards enlarg'd it, from whom it is now called *Conſtantinople.*

C.

Caria, a Region of *Aſia*, bounded on the North by *Ionia*, on the Eaſt by *Lycia*, on the Weſt by the *Carpathian* Sea, on the South by the *Rhodian*: Its principal Cities were *Miletus*, *Mindus*, *Halycarnaſſus*, and *Gnidus.*

Catana. See *Pythag. chap.* 10.

Chalcedon, a City of *Bithynia*, over-againſt *Byzantium* in the Mouth of *Pontus Euxinus.* From its nearneſs to *Byzantium*, which is leſs than a Mile, it was termed (*Pliny* ſaith) *The City of the Blind.*

Chene, an obſcure Village, either belonging to *Oetæa*, or *Lacedæmonia*; not mentioned (that I know of,) by any Geographer.

Chios, an Iſland and City of the *Ionians*, diſtant from *Lesbos* about 400 Furlongs, and 900 Furlongs in Circuit.

Cilicia, an eminent Kingdom of *Aſia*, denominated from *Cilix*, Son of *Rhea*; lying betwixt *Pamphylia* to the Weſt, and *Syria* to the Eaſt, and Mount *Taurus* to the North, and the *Cilician* Sea to the South.

Cirrha, a maritime City of *Phocis*, ſeated in the *Corinthian* Bay, at the Foot of the Mountain *Parnaſſus*, over-againſt *Sicyon*, diſtant from *Delphi* 60 Furlongs. From *Delphi* to *Cirrha* runs the River *Phliſcus:* It is the Haven or Town of Shipping for *Delphi.* It bordereth on *Locris.*

Clazomene, an *Ionick* City in *Lydia*, ſituate in the *Cherſoneſus* of *Erythræa*, confining on the *Erythræans*, theſe being within the *Cherſoneſus*; the *Clazomenians* without it, in the narroweſt Part of the *Iſthmus.*

Cnidus, a City of the *Dorians* in *Aſia*, by the Sea, called *Tropium*; on the North is the *Ceraunian* Bay; on the South, the *Rhodian* Sea.

Cnoſſus, a City of *Creet.*

Corcyra, an Iſland in the *Ionian* Sea, over-againſt *Epirus*, from which it is but 12 Miles diſtant.

Corinth, an eminent City near the *Iſthmus* of *Peloponneſus*, governed Democratically.

Cos, an Iſland of the *Carpathian* Sea, with a City in it of the ſame Name, oppoſite to *Tarmerium*, a Promontory of the *Myndians.* It belonged to the *Dorians* of *Aſia*, called *Cos Meropidis*, becauſe inhabited of old by the *Meropians.* It was moſt eminent for being the Country of *Hippocrates* the Phyſician. [*Heraclit. chap.* 3.]

Cranon, a City of *Theſſaly*, bordering upon *Macedonia*, diſtant from *Crato* an 100 Furlongs.

Crete, an Iſland in the Mouth of the Ægean Sea, between *Rhodes* and *Peloponneſus*; famous for the Birth and Prieſts of *Jupiter*, and Laws of *Minos*; for both which viſited by many Philoſophers.

Crotona. See *Pythag. chap.* 10.

Cyclades, Islands in the *Ægean* Sea; so called, for that they lye round about the Island *Delos*; their Number and Order, according to *Strabo*, is this, *Helena*, *Ceos*, *Cythrus*, *Seriphus*, *Melos*, *Siphaus*, *Cimolis*, *Prepesinthus*, *Olearus*, *Naxus*, *Parus*, *Syrus*, *Myconus*, *Tenus*, *Andrus*, *Gyarus*.

Cyprus, an Island in the *Carpathian* Sea, situate betwixt *Syria* and *Cilicia*.

Cyrene, a City of *Africk*, the Metropolis of the *Cyrenaick* Province, which contained besides, *Apollonia*, *Barce*, *Teuchira* and *Berenice*.

Cythera, an Island in the *Ægean* Sea, opposite to *Malea*, a Promontory of *Laconia*, and distant from it 40 Furlongs, opposite directly to the City *Bœa*.

Cyzicus, an Island and City of *Mysia* in *Asia*, seated on the *Propontis*, at the Mouth of the River *Æsopus*; built after *Rome* 70 Years, at the same time as *Miletus*.

D.

Delium, a little Town in *Bœotia*, by the Sea-side, in the Territory of *Tanagra*, opposite to *Chalcis* of *Eubœa*. Here there was a Temple of *Apollo*.

Delos, an Island in the *Ægean* Sea, the chiefest of those that were called *Cyclades*, and in it a City, with a Temple of *Apollo*. It is distant from *Andros* 15 Miles, and as many from *Mycomus*; from *Eubœa* 30 Miles to the West.

Delphia, a City of *Phocis* in *Achaia*, at the Foot of the Mountain *Parnassus*, on the South Part of the Hill; famous for the Temple and Oracle of *Apollo*; threescore Furlongs from the Sea.

E.

Ælia, a City of *Magna Græcia*. See *Xenophanes*, *chap.* 1.

Elis, a Region on the West Part of *Peloponnesus*, bounded on the North by the Promontory *Araxus*, and divided from *Messenia* in the Parts towards the Sea, by the River *Neda*; the principal City thereof bore the same Name, distant from the Sea 120 Furlongs, from *Olympia* almost 300.

Ephesus, a Maritime City of *Ionia*, built by the Amazons, 40 Years after the taking of *Troy*. It was famous for the Temple of *Diana*, burnt by *Herostratus*, after it had stood 385 Years.

Epidaurus, a City of *Argia* in *Peloponnesus*, seated by the Sea, in the inmost Part of the *Saronian* Bay.

Eressus, a City of *Lesbos*, between *Pyrrha* and the Promontory *Sigrium*.

Eretria, a maritime City of *Eubœa*, between *Chalcis* and *Gerestus*, opposite to *Oropus* in *Attica*; distant from *Chalcis* 20 Miles to the East.

Eubœa, a great Grecian Island, opposite to the Continent of *Attica*, and *Bœotia*, and *Locris*, extending from *Sunium* as far as *Thessaly*; the Length of it is reckoned to be 150 Miles: Its principal Cities, *Chalcis*, *Carystus*, and *Eretria*.

G.

Galatæ, Galli.

H.

Hellas, first signified only a City of *Thessaly*, betwixt *Pharsalus* and *Melitæa*, named from *Hellen* Son of *Deucalion*, *Thucydides*, lib. 1. *Stephanus*: Whence *Eustathius*, throughout *Homer*, interprets Ἑλλάδα and Ἕλληνας, only that City of *Thessaly* and *Thessalians*. Afterwards the Word extended to all that Tract of Land, which is from the *Sunian* Promontory to *Acarnania* and *Athamenæ* on the East, and to *Thessaly* on the North, unto the *Melian* Bay. This is the *Hellas* of *Ptolemy*, who excludes *Thessaly*, which first gave that Name to *Greece*, out of the Name *Hellas*. Thirdly, in a larger Acceptation, besides that Tract, it includes also *Thessaly* and *Peloponnesus*, and most of the Islands in the *Ægean* Sea; and this is the *Greece* of *Strabo*. Lastly, besides those Countries, it implies *Asia* the lesser, and some Parts of the *African* Shore; and, in a word, all Places inhabited by the *Grecians*: In which Sense, it is most commonly used by the later Authors.

Heraclea of *Pontus*, a City of *Bithynia*, the Metropolis of the *Mariandyni*, seated upon the *Euxine* Sea. See *Xenoph.*

Himera. See *Pythag. chap.* 10.

Hyperboreans, a People of *Scythia*, so named from the *Hyperborean* Mountains.

I.

Imbros, an Island in the *Ægean* Sea, not far from the *Thracian Chersonesus*, distant from *Lemnos* 22 Miles.

Ionia, a Region of *Asia*, lying upon the *Ægean* Sea, inhabited by the *Grecians*, reaching from *Posideum*, a Promontory of *Miletus*, on the South, to *Phocea*, and the Mouth of the River *Hermus* on the North; its chief Cities, *Miletus* and *Ephesus*.

L.

Lacedæmon, the chief City of *Laconia*, on the West-side of the River *Eurotas*, remote from the Sea, lying beneath the Mountain *Taygetus*; to which was ascribed its Unhealthfulness. *Pyth.*

Lampsacum, a City of *Mysia*, seated on the *Hellespont*, at the Mouth of the River *Granicus*, having *Parius* on the North, and *Abydus* on the South.

Larissa, there were two Cities in *Thessaly* of this Name.

Lebedus, a maritime City of *Ionia*, between *Colophon* to the South, and *Teos* to the North; distant from each, 120 Furlongs.

Lesbos, an Island in the *Ægean* Sea, over-against *Æolis* in *Asia*, distant from *Lemnos*, *Tenedos*, and *Chios*,

Chios, almoſt equally; leſs than 500 Furlongs from the fartheſt of them. Cities, *Mitylene* and *Methymne*. Promontories; to the North, *Sigrium*; to the Eaſt, *Melea*.

Lindus, one of the three chief Cities of the Iſland *Rhodes*, ſituate on the right Hand to them that ſail from the City of *Rhodes* Southward.

Locri in *Italy*. See *Pythag. chap.* 10.

Lydia, a Kingdom of *Aſia*, lying betwixt *Ionia* to the Weſt, and *Phrygia magna* to the Eaſt.

M.

Magna Græcia. Ovid. *Faſt.* 4.

For the Italian *Land was* Greater Greece.
Hither Evander *did his Navy ſteer*,
Hither Alcides *ſail'd*; *both* Grecians *were*.
The Club-arm'd Traveller, *whoſe Herd did ſtray*
On Aventine, *here drunk of* Albula.
That here Ulyſſes *was*, Leſtrigons *beſt*,
And the Shore nam'd from Circe, *can atteſt*.
Not long ago, *of* Telegone *appear'd*
The Walls, *and* Tiber, *both by* Grecians *rear'd*.
Hither Haleſus *forc'd* Atrides *Death*,
Who to Faliſca *did his Name bequeath*.
Antenor *add*, *who for* Troy's *Peace did plead*;
And (*Son t'Apulian* Daunus) Diomed.
Hither Æneas, *ſince* Antenor, *came*,
And brought his Gods, *reſcu'd from* Ilion's *Flame*:
Him Solimus *from* Ida *did attend*,
From whom to Sulmo *did that Name deſcend*.

But though *Ovid* takes it for *Italy* in general, yet *Pliny* more cautiouſly ſaith, it comprehended *a great Part thereof* (*quotam Partem.*) *Athenæus* almoſt *all* Italy. And perhaps no otherwiſe is *Feſtus* to be underſtood, than as of a great Part, when he ſaith, Italy *was called* Major Græcia, *becauſe the* Sicilians *poſſeſſed it*, *or becauſe many great Cities thereof were derived from the Greeks*. And *Servius*, Italy *is called* Μεγάλη Ἑλλάς, *becauſe from* Tarentum *to* Cumæ, *all the Cities were built by the Greeks*. More expreſsly *Seneca*, *All that Side of* Italy, *which lies upon the low Sea*, *was called* Major Græcia. And ſo indeed is it ſet out by Geographers, but including alſo *Sicily*.

Mantinea, a City of *Arcadia* in *Peloponneſus*, confining on *Argia*, *Tegea*, *Methydrium*, and *Orchomenes*, near to *Megalopolis*.

Marathon, a Town of *Attica*, over-againſt *Eratria* of *Eubœa*, between *Rhamnus* and *Brauron*; diſtant from *Athens* ten Miles, and as much from *Cariſtus* in *Eubœa*.

Media, the greateſt Kingdom in *Aſia*, lying betwixt *Armenia* the Greater, to the Weſt, and *Parthia* and *Hyrcania* to the Eaſt; extending Northward to the *Caſpian* Sea, and Southward to *Aſſyria* and *Suſiana*.

Megara, a City confining with *Attica* at *Eleuſis*, diſtant from the Sea eighteen Furlongs.

Memphis, a City of *Egypt*, built by *Oſiris*, at the Point of *Delta*, over-againſt *Babylon*.

Metapontum. See *Pythag. chap.* 10.

Miletus, an Ionick City of *Caria*, the furthermoſt towards the South, next to *Poſideum*, ſituate 12 Furlongs from the Mouth of the River *Mæander*; built by *Miletus*, Son of *Apollo*.

Mitylene, the chief City of *Lesbos*, ſituate between *Methymna* and *Malea*, diſtant from *Malea* 70 Furlongs, from *Canæ* 120 Furlongs. *Cicero* much commends it for Situation, Beauty of the Buildings, and Fruitfulneſs of the Soil. *Cic. de leg. agr.* 2.

Munychia, a Promontory of *Attica*, which, with *Piræus*, made the Harbour of the *Athenian* Shipping, with three fair Havens within it. At the Mouth of the River *Liſſus*, on the Weſt is *Piræus*; on the Eaſt, the Promontory *Sunium*.

O.

Oetæa, a City of *Thaſſaly*, named from the Mountain *Oeta*.

Olympia, a Place in *Elis*, with a Temple dedicated to *Jupiter*, upon the Side of the River *Alpheus*, diſtant from the Sea 80 Furlongs. Here were celebrated the Games called *Olympick*.

P.

Parnes, a Mountain of *Attica*.

Paros, an Iſland in the *Ægean* Sea; one of the *Cyclades*.

Peloponneſus, a Grecian Peninſula, within the Iſthmus of *Corinth*, containing many Regions, whereof the Principal, *Achaia*, *Elis*, *Meſſenia*, *Laconica*, and *Argia*; the moſt eminent Cities, *Meſſena*, *Corinth*, *Tegea*, *Lacedæmon*, *Argos*.

Phœnicia, a Region of *Syria* lying next the Sea; it contained four eminent Cities, *Tripolis*, *Byblus*, *Tyre*, and *Sidon*. The *Phœnicians* were Inventors of Navigation and Arithmetick; great Merchants, but ſubtle, deceitful, and thieviſh to a Proverb, *Phœnicium more*. Whence *Polemo* ſaid of *Zeno*, *He came to ſteal Learning* (φοινικικῶς) *like a Phœnician* (not *Phœniceo amictu*, as rendered) *Zen. chap.* 2.

Phologondros, an Iſland to the Weſt of the Iſland *Ios*, of very mean Account, as appears by *Solon*'s Expreſſion, *chap.* 2.

Piræus, a Town and Haven of *Attica*, ſerving for the Shiping of *Athens*, in the midſt betwixt *Pegæ* and *Sunium*, diſtant from *Athens* 40 Furlongs.

Piſa, a City of the *Peloponneſus*, ſituate at the River *Alpheus* and the *Piſæan* Mountain.

Poſidonia, *Pæſtum*, a Maritime City of *Lucania* in *Italy*, betwixt *Salernus* to the Weſt, and *Velia* to the Eaſt; built by the *Darians* and *Sybarites*.

Priene, a Maritime City of *Caria* in *Ionia*, between the Mouth of *Mæander*, and the Mountain *Mycale*.

Pylus,

Pylus, a City of *Messenia*, in the Promontory *Coryphasium*, distant from *Methone* 100 Furlongs.

R.

Rhegium. See *Pythag. chap.* 10.

S.

Salamis, an Island in the *Saronick* Bay, betwixt *Peloponnesus* and *Attica*; adjacent to *Eleusis* of *Attica*, and to *Ægina*.

Same, a City in the Island *Cephalonia*, at the Passage between it and *Ithaca*. From hence went *Anæus*, who first planted a Colony in the Island *Samus*, which he so named from *Same*. See *Pythag. chap.* 1.

Samus, an *Ionian* Island, and a City of the same Name; the Island is 600 Furlongs about, and *Posideum*, a Promontory thereof, not above seven Furlongs from the Continent. The City standeth on the South Part of it, at the Sea-side. It was first called *Melamphylos*, as *Strabo*; or *Melamphyllos*, as *Jamblichus*. See *Pythag. chap.* 1.

Sardes, the Metropolis of *Lydia*, situate under the Hill *Tmolus*, upon the River *Pactolus*.

Scepsis, a City of *Troas* in *Asia*, seated on *Cottylus*, the highest Part of Mount *Ida*, whence floweth the River *Scamander*.

Sicinus, an Island not far from *Melos*, on the West of the Island *Ios*; obscure, and of no Esteem, as appears by *Solon*'s Expression, *chap.* 2. and *Aristophanes* in his *Clouds*, *Act.* 1. *Scen.* 2.

Sicyon, a City of *Peloponnesus*, Metropolis of the Kingdom of *Sicyenia*, between *Corinth* and *Achaia*, distant 100 Furlongs from *Phlius*.

Senope, a Maritime City of *Paphlagonia*.

Sparta, all one with *Lacedæmon*.

Stagyra, a City of *Thrace*, seated in the Bay of *Strymon*, between *Argilus* and *Acanthus*. See *Arist. chap.* 1.

Sunium, a Promontory in *Attica*, together with a Town of the same Name, between the *Saronean* Bay, and the Sea towards *Lubœa*.

Sybaris. See *Pythag. chap.* 10.

Syrus, an Island in the *Ægean* Sea, one of the *Cyclades*, 20 Miles distant from *Delus*, to the North. The Adjective is *Syrius*; as on the contrary, the Adjective of *Syria* is *Syrus*, which the Interpreters of *Clemens Alexandrinus*, *Eusebius*, *Theodoret*, *Diogenes Laertius*, and others, not observed, who, render φερεκύδην τὸν Σύριον, *Pherecidem Syrum*; much less they, who, as an Argument to prove that Learning was brought out of *Syria* into *Greece*, instance *Pherecydes*, Master to *Pythagoras*, the first Philosopher.

T.

Tanarus, a Promontory of *Laconia* in *Peloponnesus*, parting the *Laconian* and *Messenian* Bays.

Tarentum. See *Pythag. chap.* 10.

Tauromenium. See *Pythag. chap.* 10.

Taygetus, a Mountain of *Laconia*, at the River *Eurotas*, and the City *Sparta*, which City was subject to Diseases, by reason of that Mountain's hanging over it.

Thebes, a City of *Bœotia*, seated at the River *Asopus* and *Ismenus*; built by *Cadmus*.

Thyatira, a City of *Lydia*, seated upon the River *Lycus*, betwixt *Sardes* and *Pergamum*.

Troas, a Territory of *Asia* the Less, upon the side of the *Ægean* Sea, between *Æolis* and *Hellespont*; having a City of the same Name.

A TABLE of some memorable Passages in the Lives of the PHILOSOPHERS.

Aaris the Hyperborean, *Pyth. chap.* 23.

Academy, *Plat. chap.* 5.

Achillean Field, contested for by the *Mytelenæans* and *Athenians*, *Pit. chap.* 1.

Achilleum founded. *Pit. chap.* 1.

Acroatick Doctrine of the Peripateticks. *Arist. chap.* 6.

Ægyptian Priests. *Sal. chap.* 8. *Pyth. chap.* 2, 3.

Ægyptian Priests. *Thal. chap.* 3.

Ægyptian kind of writing. *Pyth. chap.* 4.

Ægyptian Year introduced into *Greece*. *Thal. chap.* 8. § 4.

Æthiops of *Ptolemais*, a *Cyrenaick* Philosopher. *Aristip. chap.* 9.

Agesilaus warreth against the *Persians*, returns to *Greece*, overcomes the *Thebans* at *Coronea*. *Xen. chap.* 5.

Adomena, what. *Thal. chap.* 11.

Alcibiades. *Socr.* 1. 17.

Alexander taught by *Aristotle*, *Arist. chap.* 5. began to reign, *Ibid.* sends all Rarities to *Aristotle*, *Arist. chap.* 8. visits *Diogenes*, *Diog. chap.* 3. dies, *Arist. chap.* 8.

Altars erected to *Anaxagoras*. *Anaxag. chap.* 5.

Amasis. King of *Ægypt*. *Thal. chap* 3.

Amasis, his Contest with the King of *Æthiopia*. *Thal. chap.* 9.

Amasis his Correspondence with *Bias*. *Bias*, *chap.* 1.
Amphibolis taken by *Brasidas*. *Socr. chap.* 8.
Analysis, what. *Plat. chap.* 7.
Annicerians, *Annif. chap.* 2.
Anniversary of *Anaxagoras*. *Anaxag. chap.* 5.
Antigonus. *Arcef. chap.* 3.
Antigonus Gonatas invites *Zeno*. *Zen. chap.* 4.
Antipater receives *Xenocrates* Ambassador from *Athens*. *Zenocr. chap.* 3.
Antipodes, the Word by whom first used. *Plat. chap.* 7.
Anytus accuseth *Socrates*. *Socr. chap.* 10.
Appelles the Painter, relieved by *Arcesilaus*. *Arcef. chap.* 3.
Apocarteron, a Book of *Hegesias* against Life. *Hegef. chap.* 1.
Archelaus, King of *Macedonia*. *Socr. chap.* 15.
Areopagus, when instituted, and when reformed. *Sol. chap.* 5.
Arete, Daughter to *Aristippus*, educated in Philosophy, *Arist. chap.* 8.
Arginusæ, a Sea-fight there, *Socr. chap.* 9.
Arymnestus, Son of *Pythagoras*, *Pyth.* 21.
Arion. *Per. chap.* 4.
Aristophanes his *Clouds* acted. *Socr. chap.* 10.
Aristotle drowned not himself. *Arist. chap.* 11.
Arithmetick, *Pyth*, *doctr. p.* 2. *Sect.* 1.
Artaxerxes Mnemon. *Xen. chap.* 2.
Aspasia, Mistress to *Pericles*. *Socr. chap.* 3.
Astrological Predictions of *Thales*. *Thal. chap.* 8. *Sect.* 5.
Astronomy. *Thal. chap.* 8. *Doct. Pyth. Part* 2. § 2.
Astu of *Athens*. *Per. chap.* 2.
Athens lustrated. *Sol. chap.* 3.
Atlantick Language or Story. *Sol. chap.* 8. 13. *Plat. chap.* 15.
Attalus, *Lacydes*.
Axes and *Cyrbes*. *Sol. chap.* 7.

C.

Cleobulæ, a Comedy of *Cratinus*. *Cleob. chap.* 1.
Callisthenes put to Death by *Alexander*. *Arist. cap.* 5.
Carneades sent on an Embassy to *Rome*. *Carn. cap.* 3.
Cato moves the Senate against the Philosophers. *Carn. chap.* 3.
Charicles, one of the 30 Tyrants. *Socr. chap.* 9.
Chersonesus Thracian, reduc'd by the *Athenians*. *Sol. chap.* 2.
Chio bestows a Talent upon *Speusippus*. *Speus. chap.* 1.
Chirisophus. *Xen. chap.* 4.
Chrysocopidæ, Who? *Sol. chap.* 4.
Cirrha reduc'd by the *Athenians* by a Stratagem. *Sol. chap.* 2.
Cleander, Governor of *Byzantium*. *Xen. chap.* 4.
Cleobis and *Bito*. *Sol. chap.* 11.
Cleobulina. *Cleob. chap.* 1.
Cleombrotus kills himself, upon reading of *Plato*'s *Phædo*. *Plat. chap.* 15.
Commentaries upon *Aristotle*. *Ar. chap.* 17.
Connus, a Lutanist. *Socr. chap.* 3.
Corinth, the wise Men meet there. *Sol. chap.* 8.
Crete, *Sol. chap.* 1. *Pythag. chap.* 6. famous for Religious Mysteries. *Thal. chap.* 3.
Critias, one of the 30 Tyrants. *Socr. chap.* 9.
Crito his Discourse with *Socrates*. *Socr. chap.* 11.
Critolaus sent on Embassy to *Rome*. *Carn. chap.* 3.
Cræsus diverted from his Expedition, *&c.* *Bias*, *chap.* 1. *Pitt. chap.* 1.
Cræsus his Discourse with *Solon*. *Sol. chap.* 11.
Cræsus taken Prisoner by *Cyrus*, and set at liberty. *Sol. chap.* 11.
Cræsus, how he passed his Army over *Halys*. *Thal. chap.* 10.
Crotonians, instituted Games in Emulation of those at *Olympia*. *Pyth. chap.* 18.
Cube duplicated. *Plat. chap.* 7.
Cylonian Impiety. *Sol. chap.* 3.
Cynosarges, whence so named. *Antisth. chap.* 2.
Cynosura, the lesser Bear. *Thal. chap.* 3. by whom found out. *Thal. chap.* 8. *Sect.* 2.
Cypselus, Son of *Periander*, *Periand. chap.* 6. at what time he reign'd. *Per. chap.* 1.
Cyrus his first Ascent into *Asia*, confounded with the second. *Xen. chap.* 2.

D.

Dæmon of *Socrates*. *Socr. chap.* 2. 6. 8.
Damasias, two of that Name, Archons, confounded one with the other. *Thal. chap.* 2.
Decree of the *Athenians* concerning *Zeno*. *Zen. chap.* 6.
Delium, a Fight there. *Xen. chap.* 1.
Delphi, the Wise Men meet there. *Sol. ch.* 8.
Delium, a Fight there. *Socr. chap.* 7.
Dialectic invented, *Zeno Eleat. chap.* 2.
Diogenes the *Babylonian*, sent on Embassy to *Rome*. *Diog.*
Dionysius, King of *Sicily*, entertains *Xenophon*. *chap.* 9. entertains *Æschines*. *Æsch. chap.* 1.
Dionysius, the Carthaginian. *Euclid. chap.* 2.
Dionysius the Elder, entertains *Plato*. *Plat. ch.* 9.
Dionysius the Younger, entertains *Plato*. *Plat. ch.* 9.
Dionysius entertains *Aristippus*, *Aristip. chap.* 5.
Diogenes the Stoick sent on Embassy to *Rome*. *Carn. chap.* 3.
Dion, Friend to *Plato*. *Plat. chap.* 9.
Diotyma, a learned Woman. *Socr. chap.* 3.
Distinctions of *Plato*, collected by *Aristotle*. *Plat. chap.* 8.
Divination, *Pyth. doct.* 2. *p.* 3. *Sect.* 3. *chap.* 4 *p.* 2. *Sect.* 1. *cap.* 15.
Divine Providence, the Expression by whom first used. *Plat. chap.* 7.
Dogmatise, what; and, whether *Plato* doth dogmatise. *Plat. chap.* 15.
Dorick Dialect, why used by the *Pythagoreans*. *Pyth. chap.* 22.

Eclipse,

E.

Eclipſe, by whom firſt foretold. *Thal. chap.* 8. *Sect.* 3.
Eclipſe parted the Armies of *Medes* and *Lydians*. *Thal. chap.* 8. *Sect.* 3.
Elatus, when *Ephorus*. *Chil. chap.* 1.
Ephori, when firſt choſen. *Chil. chap.* 1.
Epigrams of *Plato*. *Plat.* 1. 15.
Epimenides his long Sleep. *Epim.*
Euthydemus, when Archon. *Chil. chap.* 1.
Exoterick Doctrine of the Peripateticks. *Ariſt. chap.* 6.

F.

Feaſt, made by *Periander* for the Wiſe Men. *Anachar. chap.* 1.
Furies, their Habit. *Menedem.*

G.

Geographick Map, by whom firſt ſet out. *Anaximand. chap.* 1.
Geometry, by whom firſt introduced into *Greece*. *Thal. chap.* 7.
Geometry. *Pyth. doct. p.* 2. *Sect.* 3.
Geometrical Proportions. *Thal. chap.* 7. *Sect.* 1, 2.
Gnomonick, by whom invented. *Anax. chap.* 1.
GOD, from whom the *Grecians* firſt received the Names of God. *Thal. chap.* 6. *Sect.* 2.
Golden Verſes, by whom made. *chap.* 22.
Gorgias, a Sophiſt. *Socr. chap.* 10.
Grecian Army brought off by *Xenophon*. *Xen. ch.* 3.
Gryllus, Son of *Xenophon*, ſlain. *Xen. chap.* 6.

H.

Hectemori. *Sol. chap.* 3.
Hegeſiſtratus, Son of *Piſiſtratus*. *Pit. chap.* 1.
Heraclides, Friend to *Plato*. *Plat. chap.* 9.
Hermes Triſmegiſtus, the Books aſcribed to him ſuppoſititious. *Plat. chap.* 4.
Hermias King of *Atarna*. *Ariſt. chap.* 4.
Hermodomas, ſirnamed *Creophilus*. *Pyth. chap.* 2.
Hermolaus and others conſpire againſt *Alexander*. *Ariſt. chap.* 5.
Herpylis, Wife of *Ariſtotle*. *Ariſt. chap.* 13.
Hippias a Sophiſt. *Socr. chap.* 10.
Homacocion of *Pythagoras*, diſtinct from his private School. *Pyth. ch.* 16.
Horoſcopes, of what Uſe firſt. *Anax. chap.* 1.

I.

Jeremy the Prophet, not contemporary with *Plato*. *Plat. chap.* 1.
Jews, *Pythagoras* converſed with them. *Pyth. chap.* 5.
Immortality of the Soul, by whom firſt held. *Thal. chap.* 6. *Sect.* 4.
Immortality of the Soul, by whom *Pherec.*
Immortality of the Soul, of whom *Plato* learn'd it. *Plat. chap.* 3.
Indifference. *Theod. chap.* 2.
Induction, *Socr. ch.* 4. how uſed by *Socrates*. *ibid.*
Induction, its kind; how uſed by *Plato*. Plat. 15.
Ionian Common-Council Hall, *Thales* adviſed to be built in *Teos*, *Thales. chap.* 10.

L.

Labynitus King of *Babylon*. *Thal. chap.* 8. *Sect.* 3.
Lacydæan Gardens. *Lac.*
Lais. *Ariſt. chap.* 3.
Laws of *Solon*. *Sol. chap.* 6.
Laws of *Draco*. *Sol. chap.* 5.
Laws of *Pittacus*. *Pit. chap.* 1.
Laws given by *Plato*. *Plat. chap.* 10. 14.
Library of *Ariſtotle*. *Ariſt. chap.* 16.
Lycæum, School of the Peripateticks. *Ariſt. ch.* 6.

M.

Magna Græcia. *Pyth. chap.* 10.
Manes, Servant to *Diogenes*. *Diog. chap.* 1.
Mantinea, a Battle there. *Xen. chap.* 6.
Marius entertains *Theodorus*. *Theod. chap.* 1.
Marks affixed to *Plato*'s Writings. *Plat. chap.* 15.
Mathematick. *Pyth. doct. p.* 2. *chap.* 2.
Medicine. *Pyth. doct. p.* 3. *Sect.* 4.
Megacles. *Sol. chap.* 3.
Magarenſes Conteſt with the *Athenians*, concerning *Salamis*. *Sol. ch.* 2.
Megarenſes recover *Salamis*, *Sol. chap.* 2. take *Nyſea*. *Ibid. chap.* 3.
Megarenſes prohibited by Decree to come within the *Athenian* Juriſdiction. *Euclid. chap.* 1.
Melitus accuſeth *Socrates*. *Socr. chap.* 11.
Mentor. *Carn. chap.* 4.
Middle-Academy, *Arceſ. chap.* 2. upon what Occaſion *Lacydes* betook himſelf to it. *Lac.*
Mill-Song. *Pitt. chap.* 1.
Milo. *Pyth. chap.* 23.
Mind, *Anaxargorus* ſo termed. *Anax. chap.* 1.
Mneſarchus, Son of *Pythagoras*. *Pyth.* 21.
Moral Philoſophy, by whom invented. *Archelaus*.
Moſes afforded Light to *Plato*. *Plat. chap.* 4.
Munychia, the Haven of *Athens*. *Epim.*
Muſes. *Pyth. chap.* 13.
Muſick. *Pyth. doct. p.* 2. *Sect.* 2.

N.

Neleus, long before *Thales*. *Thal. chap.* 1.
New-Academy. *Carn. chap.* 2.
Nichomachus, Son of *Ariſtotle*. *Ariſt. chap.* 13.
Noumenia. *Sol. chap.* 7.

O.

Oath taken by the Senate of *Athens*. *Sol. chap.* 7.
Oblong-Number, what, *Plat. ch.* 7.
Olympia, Mother to *Alexander*. *Ariſt. chap.* 5.
Olympids,

Olympiads inſtituted by *Iphitus*, long before *Choræbus*, who is commonly conceived the firſt Victor. *Thal. ch.* 2.
Olympick Sect deſign'd by *Alexinus*. *Alex.*
Oracle miſtaken by *Diogenes*. *Diog. ch.* 1.
Oracle. *Pyth. ch.* 2.

P.

Palamedes, a Tragedy of *Euripides*. *Socr. ch.* 14.
Panionium, one common Temple belonging to 12 *Ionian* Cities. *Bias, ch.* 1.
Peloponneſian War. *Soc. ch.* 7.
Periander, at what time he began to reign. *Per. ch.* 2.
Pericles. *Anaxag. ch.* 5.
Peripateticks, whence ſo called. *Ariſt. ch.* 6.
Phalaris kill'd. *Pyth. ch.* 17.
Pherecydes, at what time he died. *Pyth. ch.* 2.
Philip receives *Xenocrates* Ambaſſador from *Athens*. *Xenocr. ch.* 3. Sends for *Ariſtotle*. *Ariſt. ch.* 5.
Philiſtus. *Plat. ch.* 9.
Philocyprus, King of *Cyprus*. *Sol. ch.* 8.
Philoſophers baniſh'd *Athens*. *Theophr. ch.* 2.
Philoſophy, why ſo called. *Pyth. ch.* 8.
Phryne, an *Athenian* Cortezan. *Xenocr. ch.* 2.
Phryno, ſlain by *Pittacus*. *Pit. ch.* 1.
Phthiriaſis. *Pherec.*
Piſiſtratus gains the Tyranny of *Athens*. *Sol. ch.* 10, 12.
Piſithanatos, Death's Orator, *Hegeſias*: Why ſo called. *Heg. ch.* 1.
Pittaceian Sentence. *Pit. ch.* 1.
Pittaceian Field. *Pit. ch.* 1.
Plato fought not at *Delium*. *Plat. ch.* 2.
Plato not ſupplanted by *Ariſtotle*. *Ariſt. ch.* 3.
The Word [Poem] by whom firſt uſed. *Plat.* 1.7.
Pompey viſits *Poſidonius*. *Poſid.*
Potidæa beſieged. *Socr. ch.* 7.
Predictions of *Anaxagoras*. *Anax. ch.* 3.
Predictions of *Thales*. *Thal. ch.* 13.
Predictions of *Epimenides*. *Epim.*
Predictions of *Anaximander*. *Anax. ch.* 1.
Predictions of *Chilon*. *Chil. ch.* 1.
Priene conquer'd. *Bias, ch.* 1.
Principle and Element, by whom firſt diſtinguiſhed. *Plat. ch.* 7.
Principle and Element confounded by the firſt Philoſophers. *Thal. ch.* 6. § 1.
Prodicus the Sophiſt. *Socr. ch.* 3.
Protagoras a Sophiſt. *Socr. ch.* 10.
Proverb, *Samian* Comet. *Pyth. ch.* 2.
Proverb, Theſe are under the Government of *Nino*. *Pyth. ch.* 18.
Proxenus accompanies *Cyrus* in his Expedition. *Xen. ch.* 2.
Proxenus educated *Ariſtotle*. *Ariſt. ch.* 2.
Pſamminitus, the ſame with *Amiſtæus* and *Semniſerteus*. *Pyth. chap.* 5.
Ptolomy, Son of *Lagus*, entertains *Theodorus* the Atheiſt. *Theod. chap.* 1.
Ptolomy's Queſtion to *Euclid*. *Eucl. chap.* 3.
Pyramid's height, how taken by *Thales*. *Thal. chap.* 7. § 2.
Pythagoras, his Time. *Pyth. chap.* 10.
Pythagoras the Wreſtler. *Pyth. chap.* 2. *bis*, *ch.* 6. *ch.* 22.
Pythagoras eſteem'd a God. *Pyth. doct. p.* 1. *ch.* 1.
Pythagoreans Exoretick. *Pyth. doct. p.* 1. *ch.* 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7.
Pythagoreans Eſoterick. *Pyth. doct. p.* 1. *ch.* 8, 9, 10, 11.
Pythagoreans and *Pythagoriſts*, how diſtinguiſh'd. *Pyth. ch.* 16.
Pythais, Wife of *Ariſtotle*. *Ariſt. ch.* 13.
Pythais, Daughter of *Ariſtotle*. *Ariſt. ch.* 13.

R.

Reſurrection of the Body. *Thal. ch.* 6. § 4.
Retiarii, *Roman* Gladiators. *Pitt. ch.* 1.

S.

Saitick Province in *Egypt*. *Plat. ch.* 3.
Salamis reduc'd by the *Athenians* by a Stratagem. *Sol. ch.* 1.
Saulius, or *Cadovides*, Brother to *Anacharſis* King of *Scythia*. *Anachar. ch.* 1.
Scylla, the Sea-Onion, a Book concerning it, written by *Pythagoras* the Phyſician. *Pyth. ch.* 22.
Scilluns, a Town beſtow'd on *Xenophon* by the *Lacedæmonians*. *Xen. ch.* 6.
Sentences of the wiſe Men, ſet up at *Delphi*. *Chil. ch.* 2.
Seuthes, King of *Thrace*, entertains the *Grecian* Army to fight for him. *Xen. ch.* 4.
Siſacthia, what. *Sol. ch.* 4.
Skin of *Epimenides*, a Proverb. *Epim.*
Socratick way of Diſcourſe, abrogated by whom. *Arceſ. ch.* 2.
Soleis in *Cilicia* built. *Sol. ch.* 11.
Soli in *Cilicia*. *Chryſ. ch.* 1.
Soli in *Cyprus* built. *Sol. ch.* 8.
Solœciſm, whence ſo termed. *Sol. ch.* 11.
Sophocles's Judgment of *Polemo*. *Pol.*
Stagira re-edify'd by *Alexander*. *Ariſt. ch.* 8.
Superficies, the Word by whom firſt uſed. *Plat. ch.* 7.
Superſtition, ariſing from Ignorance of phyſical Cauſes, confuted. *Anaxag. ch.* 4.
Style of *Plato*. *Plat. ch.* 15.
Stoe, Ποικίλη, the School of the Stoicks. *Xen. ch.* 3.
Stone fell from the Sun at *Ægos*. *Anax. ch.* 3.
Sun's apparent Diameter. *Thal. ch.* 8. § 2.
Sybarites and *Crotonians* fight. *Pyth. ch.* 17.
Syenneſes, King of *Cilicia*. *Thal. ch.* 8. § 3. *Xen. ch.* 4.

T.

Tarquinius Priſcus, miſtaken by *Pliny* for *Tarquinius Superbus*. *Pyth. ch.* 10.
Telauges. *Pyth. ch.* 21.
Tellus. *Sol. ch.* 11.
Temple of *Diana* at *Scilluns*, in Imitation of that at *Epheſus*. *Xen. ch.* 6.
Thales, the elder, confounded with the younger. *Thal. ch.* 2.
Thales, Contemporary with the later Prophets. *Thal. ch.* 2.
Thargelion the ſixth, a Day fortunate to the *Athenians*. *Soc. ch.* 1.
Theano, many of that Name. *Pyth. ch.* 21.
Theon Smyrnæus. *Plat. ch.* 7.
Theramenes accuſeth the ſix Commanders. *Soc. ch.* 9.
Theramenes put to Death. *Soc. ch.* 9.
Theſpis, when he firſt preſented Tragedies. *Sol. ch.* 10.
Thetis. *Sol. ch.* 3.
Thirty Tyrants. *Soc. ch.* 9.
Thraſibulus's Advice to *Periander*. *Per. ch.* 2.
Thraſimachus, a Sophiſt. *Soc. ch.* 16.
Toxaris, a *Scythian*. *Anachar. ch.* 1.
Triops, a Place at *Delphi*. *Pyth. ch.* 6.
Tripod of Gold. *Thal. ch.* 5.
Tropicks imply alſo Equinoxes. *Thal. ch.* 8. § 1.
Tinondas, King of *Eubœa*. *Sol. ch.* 3.

W.

Water, the Principle of all things, held by the *Phœnicians* and *Indians*. *Thal. ch.* 6. § 1.
Wiſe Men, when firſt ſo called. *Thal. ch.* 5.

X.

Xantippe, Wife of *Socrates*. *Soc. ch.* 16.
Xeniades buys *Diogenes*. *Diog. ch.* 2.
Xenophon's Armour. *Xen. ch.* 3.
Xerxes's Expedition into *Greece*. *Anaxag. ch.* 1.

Z.

Zamolxis. *Pyth. ch.* 21.
Zeno conſults the Oracle. *Zen. ch.* 1.
Zodiack's Obliquity, when found out. *Anaximand. ch.* 1.
Zoroaſtres. *Pyth. ch.* 5.

Authors that have written the Lives and Doctrine of Philoſophers.

Damaſtes (of *Sigeum*, a Promontory of *Troas*) Son of *Dioxippus*, Diſciple of *Hellanicus*, wrote *Of Sophiſts*, (*Suid.*) He lived before the *Peloponneſian* War, (*Dionyſ. Halicar. de Thucyd. Charact.*)

Xenophon, the Philoſopher, wrote firſt, *Of the Lives of Philoſophers*; (*Suid.*) perhaps meaning his Socratical Apologies and Commentaries.

Anaximander the younger, of *Miletus*, Contemporary with *Xenophon*, for he lived in the time of *Artaxerxes Mnemon*, wrote *An Explication of the Pythagorick Symbols*.

Theopompus, of *Chios*, the moſt eminent of all *Iſocrates*'s Diſciples, (*Dionyſ. Halic. Epiſt. ad Pomp.*) in the time of *Artaxerxes Ochus*, King of *Perſia*, and of *Philip* King of *Macedon*, wrote, *Concerning the Exercitations of* Plato. *Athen. Deip.* 11.

Timæus the *Locrian*, a *Pythagorean* Philoſopher, wrote *the Life of* Pythagoras, (*Suid.*)

Speuſippus wrote, *Of Philoſophers*, 1 Book. (*Laert.*)

Xenocrates, the Philoſopher, wrote Books, *Of Lives*. (*Laert.*)

Theophraſtes wrote of the *Wiſe Men*. (*Laert.*)

Ariſtoxenus of *Tarentum*, Diſciple of *Ariſtotle*, wrote, *Of the Lives of Eminent Perſons*; amongſt whom were *Pythagoras*, *Archytas*, *Socrates*, *Plato*.

Heraclides, of *Pontus*, heard *Speuſippus* and *Ariſtotle*; wrote, *Of the Pythagoreans*, and, *Of Lives*: Which laſt tho' reckoned by *Laertius* amongſt phyſical Writings, yet, as *Voſſius* (*de Hiſtor. Græc.* 1. 9.) conceives, they ſeem to have been rather hiſtorical, becauſe *Eutocius* cites his *Life of Archimedes*, (*in Archim.*)

Dicearchus of *Meſſene*, Diſciple alſo to *Ariſtotle*, (*Athen. Deip.* 11.) wrote *Of Lives*, (*Laert. in Plat.*)

Clearchus of *Soli*, Diſciple alſo to *Ariſtotle*, wrote, *Of Lives*, (*Athen. Deip.* 6.) Of this Work *Athenæus* cites the Firſt, Fourth, and Fifth Book; and out of it, *Agellius* takes what he writes of *Pythagoras*, ch. 11.

Phanias of *Eneſſus*, Diſciple alſo to *Ariſtotle*, wrote, *Of the Socraticks*. (*Laert. in Antiſth.*)

Epicurus wrote, *Of Lives*, Four Books: (*Laert.*) But *Gaſſendus* conceives, they contained not the Stories of any eminent Perſons, but moral Rules, whereby to lead a quiet Life. (*Laert.*)

Apollodorus, ſirnamed *Cepotyrannus*, Diſciple of *Epicurus*, wrote, *His Life*. (*Laert.*)

Bardeſanes, a *Babylonian*, living in the Time of *Alexander Severus*, wrote, *Of the Brachmanes* and *Samanæans*, *Indian* Philoſophers, whom the *Grecians* term *Gymnoſophiſts*.

Idome-

Idomenæus of *Lampſacum*, Diſciple to *Epicurus*, wrote Books, *Of the Socraticks*. (*Laert. in Socrat.*)

Antigonus of *Cariſtus*, lived in the time of *Ptolemæus Lagi*, and *Ptolemæus Philadelphus*; wrote, *Of Lives*, (*Laert.*) of which were particularly mentioned thoſe of *Polemo*, *Menedemus*, *Dionyſius*, *Metathemenus*, *Lyco*, *Zeno*, *Pyrrho*, *Timon*, by *Athenæus* and others,

Callimachus of *Cyrene*, a Poet, lived in the time of *Ptolemæus Philadelphus*; wrote a *Table or Deſcription of thoſe who were eminent in any kind of Learning, and of their Writings*. (*Athen. Deipn.* 6. & 14.)

Neanthes, of *Cyzicus*, the Orator, (Diſciple of *Philiſcus* the *Mileſian*, an Orator) who learnt of *Iſocrates*, wrote, *Of eminent Perſons*, cited by *Stephanus*, *Clemens Alexandrinus*, *Laertius*, *Porphyrius*, and *Heſychius Mileſius*.

Hermippus of *Smyrna*, about the time of *Ptolemæus Euergetes*, wrote Books, *Of Lives*, of which are particularly cited the Lives of *Plato*, *Arceſilaus*, *Ariſtotle*, *Theophraſtus*, *Lyco*, and others; by *Laertius*.

Spherus, in the time of *Ptolemæus Euergetes*, Diſciple to *Zeno* the *Cittean*, and to *Cleanthes*, wrote, *Of the Eretriack Philoſophers*, and *of Lycurgus and Socrates*, Three Books. (*Laert.*)

Chryſippus, the Philoſopher, wrote, *Of Lives*; to which, perhaps, appertained that which he wrote, *Of antient Phyſiologiſts*.

Sotion wrote a *Succeſſion of Philoſophers*, wherein, as *Eunapius* declares, he gave an Account of the Lives of the Philoſophers, as they ſucceeded one another. *Laertius* cites the third Book.

Heraclides, Son of *Serapion*, lived under *Ptolomy Philometor*, wrote a *Succeſſion* in ſix Books, doubtleſs *of Philoſophers*; perhaps the ſame with his Epitome of *Sotion*: *Laertius* cites both Titles.

Apollodorus, an *Athenian*, Son of *Aſclepiades*; he was a Grammarian, flouriſhed under *Ptolemæus Euergetes*, heard *Ariſtarchus* the Grammarian, and *Panætius* the Stoick, (*Suid.*) He wrote, *Of the Sects of Philoſophers*; and (if it were not the ſame Work) a *Collection of Doctrines*, both cited by *Laertius in Solone*, & *in Chryſippo*.

Clitomachus, Diſciple to *Carneades*, flouriſhed about the 162d Olympiad; wrote, *Of Sects*. (*Laertius in his Life.*)

Alexander Cornelius, Sirnamed *Polyhiſtor*, flouriſhed in the 173d Olympiad; wrote, *Succeſſions*. (*Laert.*)

Damis, the *Aſſyrian*, wrote the Life of *Apollonius Tyanæus*. (*Hierocles*, cited by *Euſeb.*)

Maximus, the *Ægiean*, Contemporary with *Damis*, wrote the Life of the ſame *Apollonius*. (*Hieroc. Ibidem.*)

Mocragenes wrote Four Books of the Life of the ſame *Apollonius*; diſcredited by *Philoſtratus*, *lib.* 1. *cap.* 4.

Plutarch (who flouriſhed under *Trajan* and *Hadrian*,) wrote of the *Opinions of Philoſophers*. Five Books extant.

Diogenes Laertius, or, as *Tzetzes* terms him, *Diogenianus*, whoſe ten Books, *Of the lives of Philoſophers*, are extant; out of which *Photius* affirms, that *Sopater* borrow'd much, (*Timem.* 161.) *Diogenes* therefore lived before *Conſtantine* the Great, who put *Sopater* to Death, (*Suid. in* Ἀλέξανδρος) but later than *Trajan*; for he mentions *Plutarch*, and *Sextus Empiricus*, and *Saturninus* Diſciple of *Sextus*. Whence *Voſſius* collects, he lived under *Antoninus Pius*, or ſomewhat later, *De Natura & conſtit. Rhetor. cap.* 9.

Lucian of *Samoſata*, under *Aurelius* and *Commodus*, wrote the Life of *Demonax*, a Philoſopher of that time.

Philoſtratus, flouriſhing from *Severus* to *Philippus*, (*Suid.*) wrote the Life of *Apollonius Tyanæus*, compriſing all that *Maximus* and *Damis* had written before; it conſiſts of eight Books extant.

Philoſtratus, Uncle and Father-in-Law to the other, living under *Macrinus* and *Heliogabalus*; wrote the *Lives of the Sophiſts*.

Porphyrius, living from *Galienus* to *Probus*, wrote Φιλοσόφου ἱστορίαν, *Hiſtoriam Philoſophicam*, concluding about the time of *Plato*, (*Eunap. Proem.*) It is mentioned by *Theodoret* and *Tzetzes* under the Title of, *The Lives of Philoſophers*. The third Book of it is cited by *Suidas*; part of the Life of *Pythagoras* belonging to it is extant, firſt ſet forth by *Ritterhuſius*, afterwards by *Lucas Holſtenius*.

Soterichus lived under *Diocletian*, wrote the *Life of Apollonius Tyanæus*. (*Suid.*)

Jamblichus, Maſter to *Julian* the Emperor, wrote the *Life of Pythagoras*, put forth by *Joannes Arcerius*.

Eunapius, living under *Valentinian*, *Valens*, and *Gratian*, an eminent Sophiſt, Phyſician, and Hiſtorian, wrote, at the Requeſt of *Chryſantius*, *The Lives of the Philoſophers and Sophiſts*, extant.

Marinus, a *Neapolitan*, a Philoſopher and Orator, Diſciple to *Proclus*, lived about the Times of *Zeno* and *Anaſtaſius*; wrote, *the Life of Proclus*, his Maſter and Predeceſſor in the School, in Proſe and Verſe. That in Proſe only is extant.

Heſychius illuſtris, a *Mileſian*, wrote a *Nomenclator*, or *Index of ſuch as were eminent for Learning*, extant.

Damaſcius, of *Damaſcus* in *Syria*, lived under *Juſtinian*, was a Stoick, Diſciple of *Simplicius* and *Elamita Phrygians*; wrote a *Philoſophical Hiſtory*. (*Suid.* in Δωρός.)

Of more uncertain Time are theſe following.

Amphicrates, who writ a Book of eminent Perſons, cited by *Laertius* and *Athenæus*.

Andron of *Epheſus*, who wrote a Treatiſe *of the Seven wiſe Men*; perhaps the ſame with his *Triped*,

the Subject of which was the Story of the Golden Tripod. *Laert. in the Life of Thal.*

Antiſthenes, a Peripatetical Philoſopher, writ the *Succeſſions of Philoſophers.* (*Laert.*)

Apollodorus, who wrote a *Collection of Doctrines.* (*Laert.*)

Ariſtocles of *Meſſena*, a Peripatetical Philoſopher, wrote ten Books, *Of Philoſophy*, in which he gave account of all the Philoſophers and their Opinions. (*Suid.*)

Damas wrote, *The Life of Eudemus*; *Eudemus* was a *Rhodian*, Diſciple to *Ariſtotle.*

Damon, a *Cyrenæan*, wrote a Book of *Philoſophers.* (*Laert.*)

Didymus lived in the time of *Julius* the Dictator; wrote, *Of the Pythagorick Philoſophy.* (*Suid.*)

Diocles wrote the *Lives of Philoſophers.* (*Laert.*)

Eubulides wrote a Book of *Diogenes*; and perhaps of *Socrates.* (See *Laert. Socr.*)

Herodotus wrote, *Of the Youth of Epicurus.* (*Laert. Dionyſ. Halic.*)

Heron, Son of *Cotys*, an *Athenian* Orator, wrote an *Epitome of the Hiſtories of* Heraclides. (*Suid.*)

Hippobotus wrote, *Of Sects*, (*Laert.*) not only of the Doctrines but Lives of Philoſophers; for there is cited alſo his Book, *Of Philoſophers*, perhaps the ſame. (*Laert.*)

Jaſon wrote, *Succeſſions of Philoſophers.* (*Suid.*)

Lycon of *Jaſia* wrote, *The Life of* Pythagoras. (*Athen.* 14.)

Meleager wrote *Of Opinions.* (*Laert. in Ariſtip.*)

Nicander of *Alexandria* wrote, *Of the Diſciple of* Ariſtotle. (*Suid.* in αἰχρῶν.)

Nicias of *Nice*, wrote the *Hiſtory*, or *Succeſſion of Philoſophers.* (*Athen.*)

Panætius wrote, *Of Sects.* (*Laert. in Ariſtippo.*)

Satyrus, a Peripatetick, wrote, *The Lives of eminent Perſons*; epitomiz'd by *Heraclides.*

Socrates wrote, *Succeſſions*, cited by *Laertius in Diogene*; but perhaps it ſhould be,

Soſicrates, a *Rhodian*, who wrote the *Succeſſions of Philoſophers.*

Theodorus wrote, *Of Sects.* (*Laert. in Ariſtip.*)

Timotheus, an *Athenian*, wrote, *Of Lives.* (*Laert.*)

Conjectures

Conjectures upon ſome Paſſages of the ſaid AUTHORS.

Ariſtotle.

DE anima, lib. 1. *cap.* 2. ἀπείρων γὰρ ὄντων σχημάτων καὶ ἀτόμων (Pacius, *cum enim infinitæ ſint figuræ & atomi.*;) perhaps, σχημάτων ἢ ἀτόμων. (*Democr. chap.* 9. *ſect.* 8.)

De generatione animalium, lib. 4. cap. 9. ἐν ᾧ τῇ μητρὶ (perhaps μήτρᾳ) γίνεσθαι φησι τὸν διαφορὰν τὸ θήλεος καὶ τὸ ἄῤῥενος. (*Democr. chap.* 9. *ſect.* 7.)

Baſil.

Homil. 24. *de legend. lib. Gentil.* ὅπως ἔφυ· ἢ παύσει χαλεπώτερον σαυτὸν κατασκευάζων τὸ δεσμωτήριον; perhaps, ἔτος, ἔφη, ἢ παύσῃ χαλεπώτερον ἑαυτόν, &c. (*Pythag. doctr. part* 3. *ſect.* 1. *chap.* 3.)

Ibid. Διὸ δὴ καὶ Πλάτωνα φασὶ τὸν ἐκ σώματος βλάσφημον, &c. perhaps σωματος. (*Plat. chap.* 5.)

Clemens Alexandrinus.

Stromat. lib. 1. ἤδει γάρ, οἶμαι, ὡς ἄρα ἦδη πολυμαθῆ νόον ἔχει· ὁ διδάσκει καθ' Ἡράκλειτον (render'd, *ſciebat enim, ut exiſtimo, eum multarum rerum ſcientem jam habere mentem, quod docet, ut eſt, Heraclitι ſententia*) perhaps, πολυμαθῆ νόον ἐχὶ διδάσκει. (*Heracl. chap.* 1.)

Lib. 5. for Ευρύσε πυθαγορείυ, perhaps read Ευρύτυ. (*Pyth. chap.* 24.)

Lib. 6. καὶ γὰρ ἄρα θήρυς, ἐν ταῖς ἄλωσιν ἔπ ἦσαν, the Senſe ſeems to require ἐκὶ ἦσαν. (*Democr. chap.* 4.)

Diodorus Siculus.

Hiſt. lib. 6. ἐπ' ἄρχοντος Δ' Αθλώνσι * φαινος, ſupply ἀψεφίωνος. (*Socrat. chap.* 1.)

Excerpt. Valeſ. p. 245. ſupply the Text (out of *Jambl. de vit. Pyth.* c. 29.) thus, ἦδειν γὰρ μεῖζον σοφὸς ἐπισήμως καὶ φρένησιν, ἔπ ᾧ ἦδ πάντων ἠμπειρίαν, τὸ διὼσθαι πολλὰ μνημονεύειν, (*Pyth. doctr. part* 1. *chap.* 10.)

Diogenes Laertius.

More frequently.

Etymologicum Magnum.

Σολοικοὶ οἱ βάρβαροι· ἀπὸ Σόλωμος κίλικος, perhaps ἀπὸ σόλων κιλικίω. (*Solon. cap.* 11.)

Gregory Nazianzen.

Adverſ. Julian. Orat. 3. Ἐπεὶ καὶ ἔστι μιμεῖσθαι μὲ λέγοντα ἦδ ἀνθρωπίνων τινὰ δελεασμάτων κακοτέχνως σεσπειρμένων· τούτοις μὲ τοι καὶ ἁλίσκοντα μὴ διωκμὸς ἐξίκεσθαι τὸ ἡμετέρω σοφῷ τ μιμήσεως; perhaps tranſpoſe, δελεασμάτων μὲ τι κακοτέχνως σεσπειρμένων τούτοις καὶ ἁλίσκοντα. (*Pyth. chap.* 22.)

Herodotus.

Lib. 4. ἴσω ὑπὸ τὸ ἀδελφιδεῦ ὑπδανών. (*Valla & Stephan. a patruele*) perhaps ἀδελφεῦ. (*Anacharſ. chap.* 1.)

Jamblichus *his Life of* Pythagoras,

Set forth corruptly by *Arcerius*; and corrupted yet more by his Tranſlation and Caſtigations, reſtored a little by the *Anonymous* Writer at the End of his Edition, and by *Deſiderius Heraldus* at the End of his *Animadverſions*, and by *Ritterhuſius* upon *Porphyrius*: But generally requires much more; as,

Cap. 2. for τὸν Σάμον τ ἐν τῇ Κεφαλωνίᾳ, read Σάμλω; and afterwards, p. 27. ἀντὶ τῆς Σαμίης read Σάμυς: for ſo the Oracle immediately following,

Αγκαῖ, (not Αγκαῖε) εἰναλίαν νῆσον Σάμον ἀντὶ Σάμης σέ

Οἰκίζειν κέλομαι· φυλλὰς (Heſych. φυλλὶς) δ' ὀνομάζεται αὐτή. (*Pyth. c.* 1.)

Pag. 29. καὶ κυέσης αὐτὴν, εἰ μὴ ἔτως ἐχέσης καταυῆσαι, read καὶ κυέσλω αὐτλὼ ἐκ (for ſo the MS.) μὴ ἔτως ἐχέσης. (*Pyth. c.* 2.)

Pag. 32. φεὶ γὰρ ἐκείνων καὶ ἑαυτὸν ἐφωδιάζεσθαι ταῦτα· διὸ σοφὸς ὄνομὰ τοῖς πολλοῖς νομίζεται, read παρὰ γὰρ ἐκείνων καὶ ἑαυτὸν ἐφοδιάσασθαι ταῦτα, δι ἃ (for the MS. had διὰ) σοφὸς, &c. and immediately, for ὅσον τ Πυθαγόραν καθορᾷ, read ὁσῶν and καθορᾷ. (*Pyth. ibid.*)

Chap. 3. κἂν τότον ὀλιγωπίαν, read κἂκ τότε. (*Pyth. c.* 3.)

Pag.

Pag. 32. καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις, καὶ φοινικοῖς ἱερογράμμασι, καὶ πάσαις τελεταῖς τελεταῖς ἐν τε Βύβλῳ καὶ Τύρῳ, καὶ κατὰ πολλὰ τῆς Συρίας μέρη ἐξ αἰῶνος ἱερογλύμματα, read and distinguish, καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις τῆς φοινίκης (or φοινικικοῖς) ἱερογράμμασι, καὶ πάσας τελεστὰς ἐν τε Βύβλῳ καὶ Τύρῳ, καὶ κατὰ πολλὰ τῆς Συρίας μέρη, ἐξαιρέτως ἱερογλύμματα. (*Pyth. ibid.*)

Pag. 34. Μόνον τὸ ὀπισθεγλύμμενον, εἰς Αἴγυπτον ὁ ἀπόστολος, perhaps ὀπισθεγλύμμενον τὸ, μὴ εἰς Αἴγυπτον ὁ ἀπόστολος. (*Pyth. c.* 4.)

Cap. 5. for κατ' ἐπαοιδὴν, read καθῶς. (*Pyth. c.* 6.)

Pag. 38. ἐνδιαλέξατο αὐτὸν, read ἣν διαλέξατο αὐτός. (*Pyth. ibid.*)

Pag. 39. διὸ νοῶν χαλάζειν, read νῶν. (*Pyth. ibid.*)

Cap. 8. p. 50. ἐν οἷς (read θεοῖς) ἥδιστος ἕλλην, &c. (*Pyth. c.* 12.)

Pag. 51. for ἐυδυμίας read ὀπυδυμίας. (*Pyth. ibid.*)

Cap. 9. ὁ δὲ πρῶτον μὲ αὐτοῖς συνεβάλλετο ἱδρύσασθαι μυσῶν, (read μυσεῖον) ἵνα πρᾶσιν τιὼ ὑπάρχῃ (read ὑπάρχωσαν) ὁμόνοιαν. (*Pyth. c.* 13.)

Cap. 10. μήτε ἄρχειν λοιδορίαν, read λοιδορίας; and afterwards, καὶ μόνοις διὰ πέλας ἀγνόησιν ὄρκου, &c. (*Ibid.*)

Pag. 60. for ἐλπλυθόσιν, read περιελπλυθόσιν. (*Ibid.*)

Cap. 11. ἕπως αὐτὰς περὶ πλείστου ποιεῖσθαι ὀπαδείαν, perhaps ἐπιμέλειαν. (*Pyth. c.* 14.)

Cap. 15. for ἀδιαφορῶσι, read ἀεὶ ἐφορῶσι. (*Pyth. doctr. part* 1. *sect.* 2. *c.* 7.)

Cap. 18. p. 89. ἱππομιδὼν ἄγειος Ἀινᾶς, perhaps Ἀγειανᾶς. (*Pyth. doct. part* 1. *c.* 8.)

Cap. 19. ἀκεράσατο πρὸς τιὼ ἀκέρασιν, perhaps ἀπεράσατο. (*Pyth. c.* 23.)

Pag. 93. for καὶ τὰ ἄζατα διαβαίνων, read καὶ; and afterwards, for ἄλλα τοιαῦτα τέχνη, perhaps ἴχνη. (*Ibid.*)

Cap. 21. p. 99. παρατίθεσθαι ἢ κρέα ζώων θυσιῶν ἱερέων, expunge ἱερέων, which seems a a Gloss. (*Pyth. doct. part* 1. *c.* 9.)

Cap. 25. καὶ ὅτι (read ἀπὸ) τοῦ ἕργων. (*Pythag. doctr. part* 1. *sect.* 2. *c.* 8.)

Cap. 26. ὃς μὲ τοὶ ἴσως ἐκείνων (perhaps ἐκεῖνο) Ἐλπίδα χρὴ πάντ' ἐπεὶ ἓν ἐς' ἐδὲν ἀέλπτον. (*Pyth. doctr. part* 4. *c.* 4. *symb.* 4.)

Pag. 135. θέαν * οἱ τῇ μητεὶ, read θεανοῖ. (*Pyth. c.* 21.)

Ibid. ὀρμηθεὶς ἐν Λιεήθερις, read ὀρμαθεὶς. (*Pyth. doctr. part* 2. *sect.* 1. *c.* 15.)

Marmora Arundeliana.

Pag. 10. line 38. ἄρχοντος Ἀθηνῶν τοῦ δήμου, (Mr. *Selden*, *archonte Athenis populo*) read Εὐδυδήμου. (*Chilon. c.* 1.)

Nicomachus *his Introduction to Arithmetick.*

(So supply the Title, ἀριθμητικῆς εἰσαγωγῆς; see p. 30, 35, 44, 62, 76.)

Pag. 7. ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅτι φύσει προηγούμενον ὑπάρχων ὅτῳ συναναιρεῖ μὲ ἑαυτῷ τὰ λοιπὰ, read προηγούμενόν ὑπάρχοντι συναναιρεῖ μὲ, &c. (*Pythag. doct. part* 2. *sect.* 1.)

His Enchiridion of Musick, *set forth by* Meibomius.

Pag. 10. continue the *fifth* Section, and distinguish thus, ὁ ἀεὶ τόνος ἐπόγδοος· ἢ ἢ κατ' ἀριθμὸν ποσότητα ταύτῳ, ἤτε διὰ πέντε, καὶ ἢ καθ' ἀμφοτέρων συῴδον, διὰ πασῶν λεγομένη, καὶ προσκείμενος μεταξὺ αὐτῶν δυὸ τετραχόρδων τόνος, ὅτῳ ποτὲ τῷ ὑπὸ τῶν Πυθαγόρου καταληφθέντα ἔχειν ἐβεβαιώθη. (Sect. 6.) Ἐν φρονήσει ποτὲ καὶ διαλογισμῷ, &c. (*Pyth. part* 2. *sect.* 2. *c.* 3.)

Pag. 11. ἰσοσφύρους, not ἰσορρόπους, as *Meibomius.* (*Pyth. part* 2. *sect.* 2. *c.* 4.)

Porphyrius *his Life of* Pythagoras,

Set forth by *Lucas Holstenius*, p. 2, and 10. Ἐρμοδάμαντι τῷ Κροτωνιάτῃ, perhaps τῷ Κροτωνιάτῃ, or τῷ Κροτώνατι. (*Pyth. c.* 2.)

Pag. 11. ἐν τῷ καλουμένῳ πεπόνει, perhaps πεῖσαι. (*Pyth. c.* 7.)

Pag. 27. τιὼ θάλατταν μὲ ἐκάλει εἶ (read Κῆνα) δάκρυον. (*Pyth. doct. part* 4. *c.* 1.)

Ibid. φωνῶ εἶ πινὸς ἀπὸ δαιμόνων ἐναπειλημμένῳ τῷ χαλκῷ, perhaps ἐναπειλημμένῳ. (*Pyth. doctr.* 3. *sect.* 3. *c.* 4.)

Proclus *upon* Euclid.

Lib. 1. chap. 12. τοῦτο γὰρ ὠφελοῦσας (read ἀφελοῦσας) ἀπὸ ἀπείρων τὰς ὑπονοίας καταναοεῖν, ὡς ὁ κενὸν ἢ καθ' ἑκάτερον ἀπειρίαν γνώσει λαβεῖν, transpose ὡς ὁ ἢ καθ' ἑκάτερον ἀπειρίαν γνώσει λαβεῖν κενὸν. (*Pyth. doctr. part* 2. *c.* 2.)

Ibid. καὶ ἢ ἀριθμητικὴ· καὶ ἢ ἢ ἕνωσιν τοῦ πλήθους, καὶ ἢ πρὸς ἑαυτὸ κοινωνίαν, καὶ ἢ νοήσασα ἑαυτὴν ἓν καὶ πολλὰ ὄσαν τάς τε ἀριθμὰς προβάλλει, καὶ ἢ τάτων γνῶσιν, καὶ σύνδεσμον * ἢ μουσικὴν, transpose the Lines, καὶ νοήσασα ἑαυτὴν ἓν καὶ πολλὰ ὄσαν, τάς τε ἀριθμὰς προβάλλει, καὶ ἢ τάτων, γνῶσιν ἢ ἀριθμητικήν. καὶ ἢ ἢ ἕνωσιν τοῦ πλήθους, καὶ ἢ πρὸς ἑαυτὸ κοινωνίαν καὶ σύνδεσμον, ἢ μουσικήν. (*Pythag. ibid.*) Ibid.

Ibid. for κατηχῆ read κτ' γένη. *Pyth. ibid.*

Lib. 3. c. 4. ἀπὸ αἰσθήσεως ἓν εἰς λογισμὸν, καὶ ἀπὸ τ * ἡ μετάβασις γένοιτ' ἂν εἰκότως, supply καὶ ἀπὸ τῦ λογισμῦ εἰς τ νῆν ἡ μετάβασις, &c. and presently after, for ὁς ἐφαπτόμθ, read ὡς ἐφαπτόμθ. *Thal. c. 7.*

Ibid. καὶ μέν τι καὶ φασὶν ὅτι Πτολεμαῖος ἤρετο ποτὲ αὐτὸν εἴ τις ὁδὸς περὶ γεωμετρίαν, πανοῦργος μᾶλλον ἦν, &c. supply, εἴ τις ὁδὸς περὶ γεωμετρίαν τ στοιχειώσεως βραχέων μέθοδος, ἁδρεία (φησὶν) ὦ βασιλεῦ, πρὸς γεωμετρίαν βασιλικὴ ὁδὸς πανοῦργος, &c.

Pag. 31. Τρεῖς γραμμὰς ὅτι πέντε πομαῖς εὑρὼν τὰς * πρωτικὰς, read τὰς πρωτικὰς εὑρών. *Thal. c. 7. sect. 1.*

Lib. 4. p. 109. ὅτ' ἂν γὰρ ἐυθείας ἐκκειμένης τὸ δοθὲν χωρίον πάσῃ τῇ ἐυθείᾳ συμπαραβαλεῖν ἐκεῖνο τὸ χωρίον φασὶν, ὅτ' ἄν μεῖζον δῇ ποιῆται, &c. supply, πάσῃ τῇ ἐυθείᾳ συμπερατίνης, ποτὲ παραβαλεῖν ἐκεῖνο τὸ χωρίον φασὶν· ὅταν ᾖ μεῖζον, &c. *Pythag. doctr. part 2. sect. 3. c. 2.*

Sextus Empiricus *his* Pyrrhonean Hypotypoſes.

Lib. 1. c. 4. καὶ τὸ, ἀνπδεπκῇ φαινομένων τε καὶ νοημάτων. καὶ ἧῆ, perhaps τῇ. *Sext. ibid.*

Cap. 14. ἓς καὶ λόγους καὶ τύπους συνωνύμους καλεῖσιν, perhaps τόπους. *Chap. 11.*

Ibid. p. 10. πολὺ δῆπου ἀλογώτερόν ὅτι. MS. ἐυλογώτερον, better. *Chap. 12.*

Chap. 33. p. 46. in the Verſes of *Xenophanes*, for ἀμφόλεφα βλεπᾶ MS. ἀμφολεφόβλεπῆ; for ὅπω read ὅπαν; for ἴσαδ' MS. ἴσαθ'; for Εα τ MS. Εκλον, perhaps ξίσον. *Chap. 31.*

Lib. 2. cap. 5. p. 61. ἀκόλυθον μὴ ἦν ἴσως, perhaps μὴ ἦν. *Ibid.*

Cap. 6. p. 64. τῇ διανοίᾳ καὶ τ αἰσθήσει κρινόμθ, πσὶ ᾖ μή. In the MS. of Sir *Henry Savile* and Mr. *Caſaubon* there is a Breach, to ſhew the Defect, thus; τ αἰσθήσει κρινόμθ * πσὶ ᾖ μὴ; preſently after for διὰ τῦτο κρίνειν, read τύτων. *Ibid.*

Ibid. lin. 36. ἤτοι ἀγαθός ὅτιν ὁ πλῆθος, ἢ κακὸς, ſupply ἢ ἀδιάφορος, otherwiſe it is not a defective Reaſon. *Ibid.*

Cap. 13. pag. 82. lin. 4. εἰ ἡμέρα ὅτι, ἐχὶ ᾖ φῶς ὅτιν, ἐκ ἄρα ἡμέρα ὅτιν; ſupply, εἰ φῶς ἐκ ὅτιν, ἐχὶ ἡμέρα ὅτι· ἐχὶ ᾖ φῶς ὅτιν· ἐκ ἄρα, &c. *Ibid.*

Cap. 22. pag. 101. lin. 18. ἐρώτημα ᾖ τί σε ποῆτον, εἰ ἄρα ἀσθενεῖς ἄρτοί εἰσιν, read ἐκ ἄρα. *Ibid.*

Cap. 23. p. 102. perhaps τὸ ἀποφατικὸν τ συμπλοκῆς ſhould be expunged, and is but a Repetition of the next Line. *Ibid.*

Lib. 3. cap. 8. line 30. for ἀλλ' εἰ μὴ ὑφ' ἑτέρε, perhaps read ἀλλ' ὅδε ὑφ' αὑτῦ ὅδε ὑφ' ἑτέρε. *Ibid.*

Cap. 16. pag. 136. lin. 40. εἰ ᾖ ὑποχωρεῖ, κινήμθον μεταβατικῶς, perhaps κινήμθον. *Ibid.*

Cap. 18. * ἄειτ Συλὰς, read ἀόριτ. *Ibid.*

Pag. 141. lin. 3. ἐκ ἄρα τὸ ζῶον ἕν ὅτιν, add καὶ τ ἑαυτῦ λόγον. *Ibid.*

Lin. 30. ὡς ὑπεμνήσαμθ, read ὑπεμνήσαμθ. *Ibid.*

Socrates *and the* Socraticks *their Epiſtles, ſet forth by* Leo Allatius.

Epiſt. 1. p. 2. ὅπως ὁμοίως ἀκόειν τῷ ἀεὶ ὄντι τε, καὶ μὴ; perhaps τῷ αἰωνι τε, καὶ μή. *Socrat. Epiſt. 1.*

Pag. 3. ὡς ὑμῖν πρέπει, perhaps ὡς ὑμεῖς ἡμῖν πρέπει. *Ibid.*

Pag. 5. ἀλλὰ τ μὲ ἑτέρων ἔχειν τ αἰτίαν, τὰ ᾖ καθάπαξ αὐτός. MS. τὰ μὲ ἑτέρων; perhaps ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲ ἑτέρ' ἂν ἔχοι τ αἰτίαν, τὰ δέ, καθάπαξ αὐτός. *Ibid.*

Pag. 9. ὅτι ἐκ ἀλλάττομαι τ ἐκεῖ τὰν δόξαν, ἀμείνω δοκῶν; perhaps ἄμεινον εἶ δοκῶν, or ἐμμένειν δοκεῖν. *Ibid.*

Epiſt. 5. Πρόξενον ᾖ καταλαβεῖν. εἰς τ Ασίαν; perhaps καταλαβεῖν τ Ασίαν, or διαβαλεῖν εἰς τ Ασίαν. *Socr. Epiſt. 5.*

Pag. 15. καὶ μακαριωτάτῳ ἐπάρχειν, read μακαριώτατον. *Ibid.*

Pag. 16. πρὸς οἷς ἠτύχει ἤδη καὶ τ ὄντως ἀνθρωπίνων ἀγαθῶν πρασαπεσέρηται, τ ὑπὲρ τ μελλόντων χρησὴν ἐλπίδα; perhaps πρὸς οἷς ἠτυχηκον ἤδη γε τ ὄντως ἀνθρωπίνων ἀγαθῶν, πρασαπεσέρηται, &c. or πρὸς οἷς ἠσύχει, ἤδη καὶ τ ὄντως ἀνθρωπίνων ἀγαθῶν πρασαπεσέρηται τ ἐπὶ τ μελλόντων, &c. *Ibid.*

Ibid. καὶ ἐ λόγοις μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἔργοις δηλώσαντες. MS. ἐαν ἐ λόγοις; which I chuſe, reading afterwards δηλώσαι τις. *Ibid.*

Pag. 18. περὶ ὧν μὲ ἦν πιθῆς τυγχάνει, read πειθῶν.

Epiſt. 7. p. 22. τῦτο μὲ γὰρ εἶναι ἔφη εἰ καὶ κρατήσασι πεποιηκέναι ἐβέλοντο τ συμμάχων, &c. perhaps τῦτο μὲ γὰρ εἶναι σφίσι γε κρατήσασι πεποιηκέναι εἰ ἐβέλοντο. *Ibid.*

Epiſt. 8. Οὐκ ἔστι τῦτο φιλοσόφε, τὸ πρὸς τυράννοις ἀνδράσι; perhaps add ζῆν. *Amiſth. c. 4.*

Epiſt. 9. ταῦτα γὰρ δοκέει ἀμείνω τῶν χαμαὶ εἶ, perhaps χαμαὶ, Dorice, for χθαμαὶ. *Ariſt. c. 7.*

Pag.

Pag. 26. ἤδειν ὅτι κακοδαιμονήσω ταῦτα παθὼν, καθάπερ σύ μοι γέφυρεις νυῦ. ἐλεῦντές με φευλέποντων Συρρακύσιοι, &c. read and distinguish, καθάπερ σύ μοι γέφυρεις. νυῦ ὐ ἐλεῦντές με φευλήπονται, &c. Dorice. *Ibid.*

Ibid. τὰς ὐ μανίας ἄς ἐμάνλω, read τὰς ὐ μανίας φεὶ ἄς ἐμάνλω. *Ibid.*

Ibid. ὅτι δὲ ἐγὼ γεγονῶς, &c. read ὅτι δῆ, &c. *Ibid.*

Epist. 13. Ακέω σε θαυμάζειν ἡμᾶς; perhaps τωθάζειν. *Simon.*

Ibid. μέμνησο μθύ τοι ἀεί με χὐ δίψης. Ταῦτα γὸ δωάϑ μέγα τοῖς σωφρεσυώλω διώκεσιν; read μέμνησο μθύ τοι λιμῦ χὐ δίψης. ταῦτα γὸ δωάϑ μεγάλα τοῖς σωφρεσυώλω διώκεσιν: for so *Stobæus*, Serm. 17. citing this Fragment *ex Simonis Epistola ad Aristippum*: whence supply the Inscription also. *Ibid.*

Stobæus.

Serm. 82. citing *Hierocles*, πολὺ ὐ διαφερόντως ἐπ' ἀδελφῦ, τὸ τῦ Σωκρόλυς; perhaps τῦ Σωκρατικῦ. *Euclid. c.* 3.

Themistius.

Orat. 4. ἐκ Κρότωνος ὐ εἰς Λόκρους, διὰ γύλωνα, read (as also in *Laertius*, *vit. Pyth.* for Κύδωνα) Κύλωνα; and in *Plutarch de Gen. Socr.* for Κυκλώνειοι, Κυκλώνιοι, twice. *Pyth. c.* 19.

Synes. Hymn. 4.

Πάτερ ἄγνωστε,
Πάτερ ἄῤῥητε,
Ἄγνωστε νόῳ,
Ἄῤῥητε λόγῳ,
Νόος ἐσσὶ νόῳ,
Ψυχᾶν ψυχὰ,
Φύσις εἶ φύσεων.

THE

HISTORY

OF THE

CHALDAICK PHILOSOPHY.

HISTORY

OF THE

CHALDAICK PHILOSOPHY

TO

Sir John Marſham, *Knt.*

SIR,

I SEND this Book to You, becauſe You firſt directed me to this Deſign. The Learned *Gaſſendus* was my Precedent; whom nevertheleſs I have not followed in his Partiality: For he, though limited to a Single Perſon, yet giveth himſelf Liberty of Enlargement, and taketh occaſion from his Subject to make the World acquainted with many excellent Diſquiſitions of his own. Our Scope being of a greater Latitude, affords leſs Opportunity to favour any Particular; whilſt there is due to every one the Commendation of their own Deſerts. This Benefit I hope to have received from the Variety of the Subject; but far more are thoſe I owe to Your Encouragement, which, if I could wiſh leſs, I ſhould upon this Occaſion, that there might ſeem to have been expreſſed ſomething of Choice and Inclination in this Action, which is now but an inconſiderable Effect of the Gratitude of,

Dear Uncle,

Your Moſt Affectionate Nephew,

and Humble Servant,

THOMAS STANLEY.

PREFACE.

WE *are entring upon a Subject which I confeſs is in itſelf harſh, and exotick, very unproper for our Tongue; yet I doubt not but they will pardon this, who ſhall conſider, that other Philoſophies and Sciences have been lately well received by ſeveral Nations tranſlated into their own Languages; and that this, as being the firſt, contributes not a little to the underſtanding of the reſt.*

Another Diſadvantage this Subject incurs far more conſiderable: There is not any thing more difficult to be retrieved out of the Ruins of Antiquities than the Learning of the Eaſtern Nations, and particularly that of the Chaldæans. *What remains of it is chiefly tranſmitted to us by the* Greeks, *of whom, ſome converted it to their own uſe, intermixing it with their Philoſophy, as* Pythagoras *and* Plato; *others treated expreſly of it, but their Writings are loſt. Of its firſt Authors nothing remains; what others took from it, is not diſtinguiſhable from their proper Philoſophy. The* Greeks *were firſt made acquainted with it by* Oſthanes, *and, long after, by* Beroſus; *the former living in the time of* Xerxes, *the other under* Ptolomæus Philadelphus. *Whence it may be inferred, that the* Diſcourſe *which* Democritus *writ of* Chaldæa, *and his* Commentary of the ſacred Letters at *Babylon, either came ſhort of theſe Sciences, or were ſo obſcure, that they conduced little to their Diſcovery. Neither ſeems the Treatiſe, entituled* Magicum, *aſcribed by ſome, to* Ariſtotle, *by others, to* Rhodon, *but indeed written by* Antiſthenes, *to have conſidered the Learning and Sciences, ſo much as the Hiſtory of the Profeſſors. Of which kind were alſo the Writers concerning the* Magi, *cited, under that general Title, by* Diogenes Laertius.

But there wanted not thoſe, who further explained to the Greeks *what* Oſthanes *and* Beroſus *had firſt communicated.* Hermippus *(to uſe* Pliny's *Words) wrote moſt diligently of* Magick, *and commented upon the Verſes of* Zoroaſter. *About the time of* Antoninus Pius *flouriſhed the two* Julians, *Father and Son, Chaldaick Philoſophers: The firſt wrote* concerning the Chaldaick Rites, *the latter,* Theurgick Oracles in Verſe, and other Secrets of that Science. *Afterwards wrote* Symbulus *and* Pallas, concerning the Magi; *and the latter,* Platonick *Philoſophers more frequently:* Amelius, 40 *Books of Confutation*; Porphyrius 4 *on the* Hiſtory of Julian the Chaldæan; Jamblichus 28, *entituled,* Of the moſt perfect Chaldaick Theology; *and* Syrianus 10, Upon the Oracles.

Of all theſe, there's nothing extant, unleſs) which we ſhall have occaſion hereafter to prove) the few Oracles, *diſperſed among the* Platonick *Writers, be part of thoſe which were, by the* Greeks, (Hermippus, Julian *the Son, and others) tranſlated out of the* Chaldaick. *Some of theſe* Pletho, *and* Pſellus *have explained with a Comment, adding too brief obſcure Summaries of the* Chaldaick *Doctrine, which we have endeavoured to ſupply and clear, by adding and digeſting the few Remains of thoſe Sciences which lie diſperſed among ſt other Authors; taking care to reject ſuch as are ſuppoſititious, or of no Credit, as in the hiſtorical Part,* Annius Viterbienſis, Clemens Romanus, *and the like: In the Philoſophical, the* Rabbinical Inventions, *which tho' incuriouſly admitted by* Kircher, Gaulmin, *and others, manifeſtly appear to have been of later Invention.*

THE

THE HISTORY OF THE CHALDAICK PHILOSOPHERS.

THE FIRST BOOK.

Of the Chaldæans.

PHilosophy is generally acknowledged even by the most learned of the *Grecians* themselves, to have had its Original in the East. None of the Eastern Nations, for Antiquity of Learning, stood in competition with the *Chaldæans* and *Ægyptians*. The *Ægyptians* pretended that the *Chaldæans* were a Colony of them, and had all their Learning and Institutions from them; but they who are less interested, and unprejudiced Judges of this Controversy, assert that [a] *The Magi* (who derived their Knowledge from the *Chaldæans*) *were more antient than the Ægyptians:* That [b] *Astrological Learning passed from the* Chaldæans *to the* Ægyptians, *and from them to the* Grecians; and, in a word, that the *Chaldæans* were [c] *antiquissimum Doctorum genus*, The most ancient of Teachers.

Chaldæa is a Part of *Babylonia* in *Asia*; the Inhabitants termed *Chasdim*, (as if *Chusdim*) from *Chus* the Son of *Cham*. But the Philosophy of the *Chaldæans*, exceeded the Bounds of their Country, and diffused itself into *Persia* and *Arabia*, that border upon it; for which Reason the Learning of the *Chaldæans Persians*, and *Arabians* is comprehended under the general Title of CHALDAICK.

Of these therefore we shall begin with that from which the other two were derived, and is more properly termed CHALDÆAN, in respect of the Country. In treating of which (as likewise of the other two) the first Part of our Discourse shall consider the Authors or Professors, and their Sects; the Second, their Doctrine.

The FOURTEENTH PART.
The Chaldæan Philosophers, Institution, and Sects.

SECT. I.
Of the Chaldæan Philosophers.

CHAP. I.
The Antiquity of the Chaldaick Learning.

THE Antiquity of the *Chaldaick* Learning, tho' such as other Nations cannot equal, comes far short of that to which they did pretend. When *Alexander*, by his Victories against *Darius*, was possessed of *Babylon*, (in the 4383*d* Year of the *Julian* Period) *Aristotle*, a curious Promoter of Arts, requested his Nephew *Calisthenes*, who accompanied *Alexander* in the Expedition, to inform him of what Antiquity the Learning of the *Chaldæans* might

[a] The Author of the Treatise Μαγικος, cited by Laertius in Proœm. [b] Joseph I. 8. [c] Cic. de Divin.

might with Reaſon be eſteemed. The *Chaldæans* themſelves pretended, that from the time they had firſt begun to obſerve the Stars until this Expedition of *Alexander* into *Aſia*, were 470,000 Years. But far beneath this Number were the Obſervations, which (as *Porphyrius* cited by [d] *Simplicius* relates) *Caliſthenes* ſent to *Ariſtotle*, being out of 1903 Years, preſerved to that time, which from the 4383*d* Year of the *Julian* Period upward, falls upon the 2480*th*. And even this may with good Reaſon be queſtion'd; for there is not any thing extant in the *Chaldaick* Aſtrology more ancient than the Æra of *Nabonaſſar*, which began but on the 3967*th* of the *Julian* Period. By this Æra they compute their Aſtronomical Obſervations; of which, if there had been any more ancient, *Ptolemy* would not have omitted them. [e] The firſt of theſe is the firſt Year of *Merodach*, [f] (that King of *Babylon* who ſent the Meſſage to *Ahaz* concerning the Miracle of the Dial) which was about the 27*th* of *Nabonaſſar*. The next was in the 28*th* of *Nabonaſſar*. [g] The third Obſervation is in the 127*th* of *Nabonaſſar*, which is the 5*th* Year of *Nabopolaſſar*. This indeed is beyond all Exception; for we have them confirmed by the Authority of *Ptolomy*, who ſhews the Reaſons and Rules for the Obſervations. What is more than this, ſeems to have been only hypothetical. And if we ſhall imagine a canicular Cycle, which conſiſts of 1461 Years, (and are 1460 natural Years) to have been ſuppoſed by *Porphyrius* to make up his Hypotheſis, then there will want but 18 Years of this Number.

CHAP. II.

That there were ſeveral Zoroaſters.

THE Invention of Arts among the *Chaldæans* is generally aſcribed to *Zoroaſter*. The Name *Zoroaſter* (to omit thoſe who give it a *Greek* Etymology from ζῶον and ἄστρον) *Dinon* cited by [h] *Laertius* interprets ἀστροθύτην, rendred by his Tranſlators a Worſhipper of the Stars. [i] *Kircher* finds Fault with this Etymology, as being compounded out of two ſeveral Languages, from the *Greek*, ἄστρον, and the *Chaldee*, *Zor*; and therefore endeavours to deduce it from [k] *tſura*, a Figure, or [l] *tſajar*, to faſhion, and [m] *as*, and [n] *ſtar*, hidden Fire, as if it were [o] *Zairaſter*, faſhioning Images of hidden Fire; or, [p] *Tſuraſter*, *the Image of ſecret Things*, with which the *Perſian Zaraſt* agreeth. But it hath been obſerved, that *Eſther* in the *Perſian* Language ſignifieth a Star. The former Particle *Zor*, [q] *Bochartus* derives from the *Hebrew*, *Shur*, to contemplate; and thereupon, for ἀστροθύτης, (in *Laertius*) reads ἀστροθεάτης, *a Contemplator of the Stars*. But we find *Zor* uſed among other Words (by Compoſition) in the Name *Zorababel*, which we interpret, *Born at Babylon*: *Zoroaſter* therefore properly ſignifies *the Son of the Stars*.

The ſame Name it is which ſome call *Zabratas*, others *Nazaratas*, others *Zares*, others *Zaran*, others *Zaratus*, others *Zaradas*; all which are but ſeveral Corruptions from the *Chaldee* or *Perſian* Word, which the *Greeks* moſt generally render *Zoroaſter*.

That there were ſeveral *Zoroaſters* (except *Goropius*, who paradoxically maintains there was not any one) none deny; but in reckoning them up, there is no ſmall Diſagreement amongſt Writers, grounded chiefly upon [r] *Arnobius*, whom they differently interpret; his Words are theſe, *Age nunc veniat quis ſuper igneam Zonam Magus interiore ab orbe* Zoroaſtres, Hermippo *ut aſſentiamur Authori: Bactrianus & illi conveniat, cujus* Cteſias *Res geſtas Hiſtoriarum exponit in primo*; Armenius, Hoſtanis *Nepos*, *& familiaris Pamphilius Cyri*. [s] *Patricius*, [t] *Naudæus*, [u] *Kircher*, and others, conceive that *Arnobius* here mentions four *Zoroaſters*; the firſt a *Chaldæan*, the ſecond a *Bactrian*, the third a *Pamphilian* (named alſo *Erus*) the fourth an *Armenian*, Son (as *Kircher* would have it) of *Hoſtanes*. [w] *Salmaſius* alters the Text thus, *Age nunc, veniat quæſo per igneam Zonam Magus interiore ab orbe Zoroaſtres, Hermippo ut aſſentiamur Auctori, Bactrianus. Et ille conveniat, cujus Cteſias Res geſtas hiſtoriarum exponit in primo, Armenius, Hoſtanis nepos, & familiaris Pamphilus Cyri*. Which Words, thus altered by himſelf, imply, as he pretends, but three *Zoroaſters*; *the firſt, according to ſome, an* Æthiopian, *(a Country near the torrid Zone) but according to* Hermippus, *a Bactrian*; *the ſecond*, Armenius, *Nephew of* Hoſtanes, *of whoſe Actions* Cteſias *gives Account in the firſt Book of his Hiſtories*; *the third named* Pamphilus, *Friend to* Cyrus. [x] *Urſinus*, from the ſame reading of the Words, infers that *Arnobius* mentions only two, that *he manifeſtly explodes the Bactrian* Zoroaſter *of* Hermippus, *and that* Cteſias *confuting the fabulous Relation of* Eudoxus, *proved* Zoroaſter *to have lived in the time of* Cyrus. But the Words of *Arnobius* ſeem not to require ſuch Alteration; which will appear more, if we mention particularly all thoſe on whom the Name of *Zoroaſter* was conferred.

The firſt a *Chaldæan*, the ſame whom [y] *Suidas* calls the *Aſſyrian*, adding that he died by Fire from Heaven; to which Story perhaps *Arnobius* alludes, or to that other Relation mentioned by [z] *Dion Chryſoſtom*, that *Zoroaſter* the *Perſian* (for their Stories are confounded) *came to the People out of a fiery Mountain*; or elſe by *fiery Zone*, he means the Seat of the *zoned Deities*, juſt above the Empyreal or Corporeal Heaven, according to the Doctrine of the *Chaldæans*;

[d] In lib. 2 de Cœlo, p. 123. l. 18. [e] Ptol. lib. 4. ch. 6, 7. [f] 2 Kings xx. 12. 1 Chron. xxxi. 31. [g] Ptol. l. 5. p. 125. [h] In Proœm. [i] Obeliſc. Pamphil. l. 1. c. 2. ſect. 1. [k] צורא [l] צוור [m] עש [n] סטור Phil. [o] עירבמפר [p] צוראסתר [q] Geogr. Sacr. l. 1. ch. 1. [r] Cont. gent. l. 1. [s] Mag. [t] Apol. Mag. 8. [u] Obeliſc. Pamphil. [w] Plin. Exercit. [x] In Zor. [y] In Zor. [z] Orat. Boriſth.

dæans; for I find not any where that *Zoroaſter* was eſteemed an *Æthiopian*, or of interior *Lybia*, as *Salmaſius* expounds. Concerning this *Zoroaſter*, *Arnobius* cites *Hermippus*; who, as [a] *Pliny* ſaith, *wrote an Explication of the Verſes, and added Tables to his Volumes.*

The ſecond a *Bactrian*; [b] *Juſtin* mentions *Zoroaſtres*, King of *Bactria*, contemporary with *Ninus* the *Aſſyrian*, by whom he was ſubdu'd and ſlain; adding, *He was ſaid to be the firſt that invented Magical Arts, and obſerved the Beginning of the World, and the Motions of the Stars.* *Arnobius* ſaith, [c] *he conteſted with* Ninus, *not only by Steel and Strength, but likewiſe by the magical and abſtruſe Diſciplines of the Chaldæans.* The Actions of this *Zoroaſter*, *Cteſias* recorded in the firſt Book of his *Perſica*; for ſo *Arnobius*, [d] *Bactrianus & ille conveniat, cujus* Cteſias *res geſta hiſtoriam exponit in primo.* The firſt ſix Books of that Work treated (as [e] *Photius* ſhews) only of the *Aſſyrian* Hiſtory, and Paſſages that preceded the *Perſian* Affairs. Whereupon, I cannot aſſent to the Conjecture of *Salmaſius*, who applies the Citation of *Cteſias* to the Nephew of *Hoſtanes*, ſince *Hoſtanes* (as [f] *Pliny* affirms) lived under *Darius*. But [g] *Diodorus* names the King of *Bactria*, whom *Ninus* conquered, *Oxyartes*; and ſome old MSS. of *Juſtin*) atteſted by *Ligerius*) *Oxyatres*, others *Zeoraſtes*: Perhaps the Nearneſs of the Names and Times (the *Chaldean* living alſo under *Ninus*, as [h] *Suidas* relates) gave occaſion to ſome to confound them, and to aſcribe to the *Bactrian* what was proper to the *Chaldean*; ſince it cannot be imagined, that the *Bactrian* was Inventor of thoſe Arts, in which the *Chaldean*, who lived contemporary with him, was ſo well skilled. *Elichmannus*, a *Perſian* Writer, affirms the *Arabians* and *Perſians* to hold, that *Zoroaſter was not King of the* Bactrians, *but a Magus or Prophet*; *who, by Perſuaſions, having wrought upon their King, firſt introduced a new Form of Superſtition amongſt them, whereof there are ſome Remainders at this Day.*

The third a *Perſian*, ſo termed by [i] *Laertius* and others; the ſame whom *Clemens Alexandrinus* ſtyles a *Mede*; *Suidas*, a *Perſo-Mede*, Inſtitutor of the Magi, and Introductor of the *Chaldaick* Sciences amongſt the *Perſians*. Some confound this *Zoroaſter* with the *Chaldean*, and both of them (as [k] *Kircher* doth) with *Cham* the Son of *Noah*, not without a very great Anachroniſm; for we find the Word *Perſian* no where mentioned before the Prophet *Ezekiel*, neither did it come to be of note till the Time of *Cyrus*; the Occaſion of which Miſtake ſeems to have been, for that *Zoroaſter* the *Perſian*, is by *Pliny*, *Laertius*, and others, ſtyled Inſtitutor of Magick, and of the *Magi*; which is to be underſtood no otherwiſe than that he firſt introduced them into *Perſia*. For [l] *Plutarch* acknowledgeth, *Zoroaſter inſtituted Magi amongſt the* Chaldæans, *in imitation of whom the* Perſians *had theirs alſo*: And the [m] *Arabick* Hiſtory, that Zaraduſſit *not firſt inſtituted, but reformed the Religion of the* Perſians *and Magi, being divided into many Sects.*

The fourth a *Pamphylian*, commonly called *Er*, or *Erus Armenius*. That he alſo had the Name of *Zoroaſter*, [n] *Clemens* witneſſeth: *The* ſame Author, (ſaith he, meaning *Plato*) *in the* 10*th of his Politicks, mentioneth* Erus Armenius, *by Deſcent a* Pamphylian, *who is* Zoroaſter; *now this* Zoroaſter *writes thus*, [o] "*This, wrote I*, Zoroaſter Armenius, *by Deſcent* "*a* Pamyhilian, *dying in War, and being in Hades*, "*I learned of the Gods.*" This *Zoroaſter*, [p] *Plato* affirmeth to have been raiſed again to Life, after he had been dead ten Days, and laid on the Funeral Pile; repeated by [q] *Valerius Maximus*, and [r] *Macrobius*. To this *Zoroaſter*, doubtleſs the latter Part of *Arnobius*'s Words, with which Interpreters are ſo much perplexed, ought to be referred, *Armenius Hoſtanis nepos, & familiaris Pamphilius Cyri.* Some conjecture he mentions two *Zoroaſters*; I rather conceive the Words relate only to this one, and perhaps are corrupt; thus to be reſtored and diſtinguiſhed, *Armenius Hoſtanis nepos & familiaris, Pamphilius Erus: Armenius*, Nephew and Diſciple (in which Senſe γνώριμος is uſually taken) of *Hoſtanes*, *Erus Pamphylius.*

The fifth a *Proconneſian*, mentioned by [s] *Pliny*; *Such as are more diligent* (ſaith he) *place another* Zoroaſter, *a* Proconneſian, *a little before* Hoſtanes. This *Zoroaſter* might probably be *Ariſteas* the *Proconneſian*, who, according to [t] *Suidas*, lived in the time of *Cyrus* and *Cræſus*. He adds, that *his Soul could go out of his Body, and return as often as he pleaſed.* [u] *Herodotus* relates an Inſtance hereof, not unlike that of *Erus Armenius*; That *he died ſuddenly in a Fuller's Shop at* Proconneſus, *and was ſeen the ſame time at* Cyzicus; *his Friends coming to fetch his Body, could not find it. Seven Years after he returned home, and publiſhed the Verſes which were afterwards called* Arimaſpian, a Poem deſcribing a happy Life, or rather an imaginary civil Government, after ſuch a manner as he conceived moſt perfect. This we may gather from [w] *Clemens Alexandrinus*, who ſaith, that *the* Hyperborean *and* Arimaſpian *Cities, and the* Elizian *Fields, are Forms of civil Governments of juſt Perſons*; *of which kind is* Plato's *Commonwealth.*

To theſe may be added a ſixth *Zoroaſter*, (for ſo [x] *Apuleius* calls him) who lived at *Babylon*, at what time *Pythagoras* was carried Priſoner thither by *Cambyſes*. The ſame Author terms him *omnis Divini arcanum*

[a] Lib. 30. [b] Lib. 1. [c] Cont. gent. [d] Loc. cit. [e] Biblioth. [f] Lib. 30. 1. [g] Lib. 2. p. 66.
[h] In Zor. [i] In Proœm. [k] Obel. Pamph. lib. 1. cap. 2. ſect. 1. [l] De Iſid. & Oſirid. [m] Set forth by *Erpenius*.
[n] Strom. lib. 5. [o] Reading τὰδε συνέγραφα Ζωροάστρης ὁ Ἀρμένιος. [p] Loc. cit. [q] Lib. 1, c. 8. [r] In Somn. Scip.
[s] Lib. 30. c. 1. [t] In Ariſteas. [u] Lib. 4. c. 14. [w] Strom. lib. 4. [x] Flor.

canum Antiſtitem; adding, that *he was the chief Perſon whom* Pythagoras *had for Maſter*; probably therefore, the ſame with *Zabratus*, by whom [y] *Diogenes* affirms, *he was cleanſed from the Pollutions of his Life paſt, and inſtructed from what Things virtuous Perſons ought to be free*; *and learnt the Diſcourſe concerning Nature* (Phyſick) *and what are the Principles of the Univerſe*; the ſame which *Nazaratas* the *Aſſyrian*, whom *Alexander*, in his Book of *Pythagorick* Symbols, affirms to have been Maſter to *Pythagoras*; the ſame whom *Suidas* calls *Zares*; *Cyril*, *Zarn*; *Plutarch*, *Zaratus*.

That there ſhould be ſo many *Zoroaſters*, and ſo much Confuſion amongſt Authors that write of them, by miſtaking one for another, is nothing ſtrange; for, from extraordinary Perſons, Authors of ſome publick Benefit, they who afterwards were eminent in the ſame kind, were uſually called by the ſame Name. Hence it is, that there were ſo many *Belus's*, *Saturns*, *Jupiters*; and conſequently, ſo much Confuſion in their Stories. The like may be ſaid of *Zoroaſter* the *Chaldean*, who being the Inventor of Magical and Aſtronomical Sciences, they who introduced the ſame into other Countries, as *Zoroaſter* the *Perſian* did, in imitation (as *Plutarch* ſaith) of the *Chaldeans*, and ſuch likewiſe as were eminently skilful in thoſe Sciences, as the *Bactrian*, the *Pamphylian*, and the *Proconneſian*, are deſcribed to have been, were called by the ſame Name.

CHAP. III.

Of the Chaldean Zoroaſter, *Inſtitutor of the Chaldaick Philoſophy.*

THE firſt of theſe *Zoroaſters*, term'd the *Chaldean* or *Aſſyrian*, is generally acknowledged the Inventer of Arts and Sciences amongſt the *Chaldeans*; but concerning the time in which he lived, there is a vaſt Diſagreement amongſt Authors.

Some of theſe err ſo largely, as not to need any Confutation; ſuch are [z] *Eudoxus*, and the Author of the Treatiſe entitled Μαγικὸν, commonly aſcribed to *Ariſtotle*, and ſo [a] *Pliny* cites it, who aſſerts he lived 5000 Years before *Plato*. Such likewiſe are *Hermippus*, *Hemodorus* the *Platonick*, *Plutarch* and *Gemiſtus Pletho* (following *Plutarch*) who place him 5000 Years before the Deſtruction of *Troy*.

Others conceive *Zoroaſter* to be the ſame with *Cham*, the Son of *Noah*; of which Opinion (not to mention the *Pſeudo Beroſus* of *Annius Viterbienſis*) were *Didymus* of *Alexandria*, *Agathias*, *Scholaſticus*, and *Abenephi*: *Cham* (ſaith the laſt) *was the Son of* Noah; *he firſt taught the worſhipping of Idols, and firſt introduced Magical Arts into the World*; *his Name is* Zuraſter, *he the ſecond* Adris, *a perpetual Fire.* Hither alſo ſome refer the Rabbanical Stories concerning *Cham*, that [b] *by Magick he emaſculated his Father*, &c. That [c] *Noah being by this means diſabled from getting a fourth Son, curſed the fourth Son of* Cham; That [d] *this Curſe* (which was, that he ſhould be a Servant of his Servants) *implied ſtrange Service*, viz. *Idolatry*; That [e] *hereupon the Poſterity of* Chus *became Idolaters*, Cham *himſelf being the firſt that made Idols, and introduced ſtrange Service into the World, and taught his Family the worſhipping of Fire.*

The greater Part of Writers place him later. *Epiphanius* in the time of *Nimrod*; with whom agree the Obſervations [f] ſaid to be ſent by *Caliſthenes* to *Ariſtotle* 1903 Years before *Alexander*'s taking *Babylon*; for from the Year of the *Julian* Period, in which *Babylon* was taken, the 1903d upward falls on the 2480 of the ſame *Æra*; about which time *Nimrod* laid the Foundations of that City, and there ſettled his Empire.

Suidas relates him contemporary with *Ninus*, King of *Aſſyria*; *Euſebius*, with *Semiramis*, Wife of *Ninus*; *Ninus* is placed by Chronologers above the 3447*th* of the *Julian* Period.

Suidas (elſewhere) reckons him to have lived 500 Years before the taking of *Troy*; *Xanthus*, 600 Years before *Xerxes*'s Expedition into *Greece*. *Troy*, according to the *Marmor. Arundelianum*, was taken 444 Years before the firſt Olympiad. *Xerxes*'s Expedition was on the firſt of the 75th Olympiad, *viz.* the of the *Julian* Period. The Account of *Suidas* therefore falls on the 3030*th*, that of *Xanthus* on the 3634th of the *Julian* Period. The lateſt of theſe ſeemeth to me moſt hiſtorical, and agreeable to Truth.

Of his Birth, Life, and Death, there is little to be found; and even that uncertain, whether applicable to him, or to the *Perſian*. *Plato* ſtyles *Zoroaſter the Son of Oromaſes*; but *Oromaſes* (as *Plutarch* and others ſhew) was a Name given to God by *Zoroaſter the Perſian*, and his Followers: Whence I conceive, that *Plato* is to be underſtood of the *Perſian Zoroaſter*, who, perhaps in regard of his extraordinary Knowledge, was either allegorically ſtyled, or fabulouſly reported to be the Son of God, or of ſome good Genius, as *Pythagoras*, *Plato*, and many other excellent Perſons were.

[g] *Pliny* reports, that *Zoroaſter* (not particularizing which of them) *laughed the ſame Day he was born*; and that *his Brain did beat ſo hard, that it heaved up the Hand laid upon it, a Preſage of his future Science*; and that *he lived in the Deſarts twenty Years upon Cheeſe ſo tempered, as that it became not old. The* Aſſyrian Zoroaſter, (ſaith *Suidas*) *prayed he might die by Fire from Heaven, and adviſed the* Aſſyrians *to preſerve his Aſhes, aſſuring them, that as long as they kept*

[y] Porph. vit. Pythag. [z] Laert in Proœm. [a] Lib. 30. c. 1. [b] R. Levi in Gen. R. Samuel in fortalitio fidei. [c] Ruffi.
[d] Aben Ezra in Gen. [e] R. Hanaſſe in Scuto fortium. [f] Simplic. [g] Lib. 30. c. 1.

kept them, their Kingdom should never fail; but *Cedrenus* attributes the same to the *Persian*.

Of Writings attributed to him, are mention'd,

[h] *Verses, two Millions*, upon which *Hermippus* wrote a Comment, and added Tables to them.

Oracles, perhaps Part of the foresaid Verses; upon these *Syrianus* wrote a Comment in twelve Books.

Of *Agriculture*, or *Mechanicks*; *Pliny* alledgeth a Rule for Sowing; and the Author of the *Geoponicks*, many Experiments under his Name: But this was either spurious, or written by some other *Zoroaster*.

Revelations; suppositious also, forged (as *Porphyrius* professeth) by some *Gnosticks*.

To these add, cited by the *Arabians*, *A Treatise of Magick*; and another of *Dreams, and their Interpretations*, cited by *Gelaldin* frequently; Inventions doubtless of later Times.

Some ascribe the Treatises of the *Persian Zoroaster* to the *Chaldean*; but of those hereafter.

CHAP. IV.

Of Belus, *another reputed Inventor of Sciences amongst the* Chaldeans.

SOME there are who ascribe the Invention of Astronomy to *Belus*; of which Name there were two Persons, one a *Tyrian*, the other an *Assyrian*, who reigned in *Babylonia* next after the *Arabians*, about the 2682d Year of the World, according to the Account of *Africanus*; for whose Inventions the *Babylonians* honoured him as a God. *There is yet standing*, (saith [i] *Pliny*) *the Temple of* Jupiter Belus; *he was the Inventor of the Sciences of the Stars*, and [k] Diodorus, speaking of the *Ægyptians*, *They affirm, that afterwards many Colonies went out of* Ægypt, *and were dispersed over the Earth*; *and that* Belus, *reputed to be the Son of* Neptune *and* Lybia, *carried one to* Babylon; *and making choice of the River* Euphrates, *to settle it, instituted Priests after the manner of those in* Ægypt, *exempt from all publick Charges and Duties, which the* Babylonians *call* Chaldeans; *these observed the Stars, imitating the* Ægyptian *Priests, Naturalists and Astrologers:* Thus *Diodorus*. But that *Belus* was Son of *Neptune* and *Lybia*, is nothing but *Greek* Mythology; that he brought a Colony out of *Ægypt* into *Babylon*, is fabulous. For the *Ægyptians* had not any Correspondence with Foreigners for a long time after. But to confirm that he was skilful in those Sciences, [l] *Ælian* gives this Relation:

Xerxes, *Son of* Darius, *breaking up the Monument of ancient* Belus, *found an Urn of Glass, in which his dead Body lay in Oil*; *but the Urn was not full, it wanted a Hand-breadth of the Top*; *next the Urn there was a little Pillar, on which it was written, That whosoever should open the Sepulchre, and did not fill up the Urn, should have ill Fortune; which* Xerxes *reading, grew afraid, and commanded that they shou'd pour Oil into it with all Speed*; *notwithstanding it was not filled: Then he commanded to pour into it a second Time*; *but neither did it increase at all thereby. So that at last, failing of Success, he gave over*; *and shutting up the Monument, departed very sad. Nor did the Event foretold by the Pillar deceive him: For he led an Army of* 50 *Myriads against* Greece, *where he received a great Defeat, and returning home, died miserably, being murdered by his own Son, in the Night-time, a-bed.*

To this *Belus*, *Semiramis* his Daughter [m] *erected a Temple in the middle of* Babylon, *which was exceeding high, and by the Help thereof the* Chaldeans, *who addicted themselves there to Contemplation of the Stars, did exactly observe their Risings and Settings.*

CHAP. V.

Other Chaldean *Philosophers.*

FROM *Zoroaster* were derived the *Chaldean* Magi and Philosophers his Disciples; amongst whom *Pliny* [n] mentions one *Azonaces* Master of *Zoroaster*; which doubtless must have been meant of some later *Zoroaster*, there being many of that Name, as we shewed formerly.

By the same [o] Author are mention'd of the ancient Magi, *Marmardius* a *Babylonian*, and *Zarmocenidas* an *Assyrian*; *of whom nothing is left but their Names, no Monuments extant of them.*

To these add, [p] *Zoroastres, a* Chaldean *Philosopher, who wrote Mathematicks and Physicks*; and *Teucer*, a *Babylonian*, an ancient Author, who wrote concerning the *Decanates*.

The Mathematicians also, saith [q] *Strabo*, *mention some of these, as* Cidenas, *and* Naburianus, *and* Sudinus, *and* Seleucus *of* Selucia, *a* Chaldean, *and many other eminent Persons.*

CHAP. VI.

Of Berosus, *who first introduced the* Chaldaick *Learning into* Greece.

AFTER these flourished *Berosus*, or, as the *Greeks* call him, Βηρώσσος, which Name [r] some interpret *the Son of* Oseas; for as is manifest from *Elias*, בר with the *Chaldees* is the same with כר in *Syriack*; whence *Bar-Ptolemeus*, as if the Son of *Ptolemy*, *Bar-Timæus*, and the like: *Gorionides* and

[h] Plin. lib. 30. c. 1. [i] Lib. 6. c. 26. [k] Lib. 1. [l] Var. Hist. 13. l. 3. [m] Diod. l. 2. [n] Lib. 30. c. 1.
[o] Loc. cit. [p] Suid. [q] Lib. 16. [r] Jos. Scal. in Euseb.

other Rabbins call him [s] *Bar-Hoſea*; the *Arabians* *Baraſa*; ſo *Abenepei*, and others.

Barthius [t] ſaith, that there are ſome who aſſert him Contemporary with *Moſes*; which Opinion juſtly he condemns as ridiculous; *Claudius* [u] *Verderius* in his Cenſure upon the *Annian Beroſus* affirms he lived a little before the Reign of *Alexander* the Great; upon what Authority I know not. That he lived in the time of *Alexander*, we find in the Oration of *Tatian* againſt the *Gentiles*; but the ſame *Tatian* adds, he dedicated his Hiſtory to that *Antiochus*, who was the third from *Alexander*. But neither is this Reading unqueſtionable; for [w] *Euſebius* cites the ſame Place of *Tatian* thus, Beroſus *the* Babylonian, *Prieſt of* Belus *at* Babylon, *who lived in the time of* Alexander, *and dedicated to* Antiochus, *the third after* Seleucus, *a Hiſtory of the* Chaldeans *in three Books, and relates the Actions of their Kings, mentions one of them named* Nabuchodonoſor, *&c.* Here we find μὴ Σέλευκον, but in the Text of *Tatian*, μετ' αὐτὸν *after Alexander*. And indeed this Reading ſeems moſt conſonant to the Story. The next to *Alexander* was *Seleucus Nicanor*: the next to him, *Antiochus* Σωτὴρ; the third, *Antiochus* Θεὸς, who began his Reign 61 Years after the Death of *Alexander*: Now, it is poſſible that *Beroſus* at the time of *Alexander*'s taking *Babylon* might be thirty Years old or leſs; and at the 90th Year, or ſomewhat younger, might dedicate his Hiſtory to *Antiochus* Θεὸς. Or we may ſay, that by *Antiochus* the third from *Alexander* is meant *Antiochus* Σωτὴρ, reckoning *Alexander* himſelf incluſively for one, *Seleucus* the ſecond, *Antiochus* Σωτὴρ the third; to whom from the Death of *Alexander* are but 44 Years: And in approving this Account we may retain the Reading of *Euſebius*, ſuppoſing the firſt to be *Seleucus*, the ſecond *Antiochus* Σωτὴρ, the third *Antiochus* Θεὸς: Neither is this inconſiſtent with *Geſner*'s Tranſlation of the Words of *Tatian*, χρ' Ἀλεξάνδρου γενόμενον, as in *Stephens*'s Edition of *Euſebius*; or, χρ' Ἀλεξάνδρου γεγονὼς, as in *Tatian* himſelf, *qui Alexandri ætate vixit*; which Interpretation [x] *Onuphrius Panuinus* alſo follows. But conſidering theſe Words more intently, it came into my Mind (ſaith *Voſſius*) that it might better be rendred, *qui Alexander ætate natus eſt*, whereby all Scruple may be taken away, ſuppoſing *Beroſus* to have been born but two Years before *Alexander*'s Death; by which Account he muſt have been but 64 Years old when *Antiochus* Θεὸς, to whom he dedicated his Book, began to reign: Which way ſoever it is, *Beroſus* publiſhed his Hiſtory in the Time of *Ptolemæus Philadelphus*; for he reigned 38 Years; and in the ſixth Year of his Reign *Antiochus Soter* began to reign in *Syria* in the 22d of *Antiochus* Θεὸς, to one of whom *Beroſus* dedicated his Book. But by no means we can aſſent to the Learned [y] *Conradus Geſnerus*, who by *Alexander* conceives to be meant not he who was ſirnamed the Great, Son of *Philip*, but that *Alexander* who ſucceeded *Demetrius Soter* in the Kingdom of *Syria*, and was ſucceeded by *Demetrius Nicanor*; by *Antiochus* underſtanding *Antiochus Sedetes* who reigned next after *Demetrius Nicanor*: For if it were ſo, *Beroſus* muſt have been a whole Age later than *Manetho*; but *Manetho* flouriſhed under *Philadelphus*, (as *Voſſius* elſewhere proves.) *Philadelphus* died in the third Year of the 133d Olympiad; but *Antiochus Sedetes* invaded *Syria* in the firſt of the 160th Olympiad: How then could *Beroſus* live ſo late, who was a little precedent to *Manetho*, as *Syncellus* expreſly affirms? Again, we may aſſert the time of *Beroſus* another way. *Pliny* [z] ſaith, he gave Account of 480 Years, which doubtleſs were of *Nabonaſſar*: Now the Æra of *Nabonaſſar* began in the ſecond Year of the 8th Olympiad; from which if we reckon 480, it will fall upon the latter End of *Antiochus Soter*'s Reign; wherefore *Beroſus* dedicated his Book either to him or to *Antiochus* Θεὸς his Son. Theſe Arguments will not ſuffer us to doubt of the Time of *Beroſus*.

This *Beroſus* is mentioned by many of the Ancients. *Vitruvius* [a] ſaith, he *firſt ſettled in the Iſland* Coos, *and there opened Learning*. *Joſephus* [b], that *he introduced the Writings of the* Chaldæans *concerning Aſtronomy and Philoſophy among the* Grecians. *Pliny* [c], that *the* Athenians, *for his divine Predictions, dedicated to him publickly in their* Gymnaſium *a Statue with a golden Tongue*. He is mentioned likewiſe by *Tertullian* [d], and the Author of the *Chronicon* [e] *Alexandrinum*.

He wrote *Babylonicks* or *Chaldaicks*, in three Books; for they are cited promiſcuouſly under both theſe Titles: *The* Babylonicks *of* Beroſus, *Athenæus* [f] cites; but *Tatian* ſaith, *he wrote the* Chaldaic *Hiſtory in three Books*. And [g] *Clemens Alexandrinus* cites *Beroſus, his third of* Chaldaicks; and elſewhere, ſimply his *Chaldaick Hiſtories*. And *Agathias* affirms, *he wrote the Antiquities of the* Aſſyrians *and* Medes; for thoſe Books contained not only the *Aſſyrian* or *Chaldæan* Affairs, but alſo the *Median*; *Agathias* [h], as ſomewhere *Beroſus* the *Babylonian*, and *Athenocles*, and *Simacus* relate, who have *recorded the Antiquities of the* Aſſyrians *and* Medes. Out of this Work [i] *Joſephus* hath preſerved ſome excellent Fragments; but the ſuppoſititious *Beroſus* of *Annius* is moſt trivial and fooliſh, of the ſame kind as his *Megaſthenes* and *Archilochus*: Many Kings are there reckoned which are no where to be found; and ſcarce is there any of thoſe Fragments which *Joſephus* cites out of the true *Beroſus*; on the contrary, ſome things are plainly repugnant; as when

[s] בר הושיע. [t] Voſſ. de Hiſt. Græc. l. 1. c. 13. [u] Adverſar. 51. 7. [w] Præpar. Evang. l. 10. [x] Lib. de Sibyl. [y] Tatian. [z] Lib. 6. c. 55. [a] Lib. 9. c. 7. [b] Contr. Appion. l. 1. [c] Lib. 7. c. 37. [d] In Apologet. c. 19. [e] P. 48. [f] Deipn. l. 14. [g] Strom. 1. [h] Lib. 2. [i] Antiquit. Jud. 1. 5. contra Appion. l. 1.

when he ſaith, *Semiramis* built *Babylon*, whereas *Joſephus* ſaith *Beroſus* wrote that it was not built by *Semiramis*.

A Daughter of this *Beroſus* is mentioned by *Juſtin Martyr* [k], a *Babylonian* Sibyl, who propheſied at *Cumæ*; this cannot be underſtood of that *Cumæan* Sibyl, who lived in the time of *Tarquinius Priſcus*; for betwixt *Tarquinius Priſcus*, and the firſt Pontick War, (in which time *Beroſus* lived) are 245 Years; but of ſome other *Cumæan* Sibyl, of much later Time. That there were ſeveral Sibyls, who propheſied at [l] *Cumæ*, *Onuphrius* hath already proved out of the *Treatiſe of wonderful Things* aſcribed to *Ariſtotle*; and out of *Martianus Capella*, and other Writers.

Beroſus being the Perſon who introduced the *Chaldaick* Learning into *Greece*, we ſhall with him cloſe the Hiſtory of the Learned Perſons or Philoſophers amongſt the *Chaldeans*.

SECT. II.

The Chaldaick *Inſtitution and Sects.*

CHAP. I.

That all Profeſſors of Learning were more peculiarly termed Chaldæans.

PHiloſophy or Learning was not taught and propagated by the *Chaldeans* after the *Grecian* Manner, communicated, by publick Profeſſors, indifferently to all ſorts of Auditors, but reſtrained to certain Families. Theſe were by a more peculiar Compellation termed *Chaldæans*, addicted themſelves wholly to Study, had a proper Habitation allotted for them; and lived exempt from all publick Charges and Duties.

Of theſe is [m] *Diodorus* to be underſtood; who relates, that Belus *inſtituted Prieſts exempt from all publick Charges and Duties, whom the* Babylonians *call* Chaldæans. *Strabo* adds, that *there was a peculiar Habitation in* Babylonia *allotted for the Philoſophers of that Country, who were termed* Chaldæans; and that *they inhabited a certain Tribe of the* Chaldæans, *and a Portion of* Babylonia, *adjoining to the* Arabians, *and the* Perſian *Gulf*.

There were thoſe *Chaldæans* who, as *Cicero* ſaith, *were named not from the Art, but Nation*. And of whom he is elſewhere to be underſtood, when he affirms that *in* Syria *the* Chaldæans *excel for Knowledge of the Stars, and Acuteneſs of Wit*; and *Q. Curtius*, who deſcribing the Solemnity of thoſe two who went out of *Babylon* to meet *Alexander*, ſaith, *Then went the Magi after their manner; next whom, the* Chaldæans; *Non vates modo, ſed Artifices Babyloniorum:* Where tho' ſome interpret *Artifices*, thoſe *Aſtrologers who made Inſtruments for the Practice of their Art*; yet *Curtius* ſeems to intend no more than the *Chaldeans* of both ſorts, the *Plebeian* Tradeſmen, and the Learned.

Of theſe *Chaldæans* peculiarly ſo termed, is [o] *Laertius* likewiſe to be underſtood, when he cites as Authors of Philoſophy *amongſt the* Perſians, *the Magi*; *amongſt the* Babylonians *or* Aſſyrians, *the* Chaldæans. And *Heſychius*, who interprets the Word *Chaldæans, a kind of Magi that know all things*,

CHAP. II.

Their Inſtitution.

THESE *Chaldæans* preſerved their Learning within themſelves by a continued Tradition from Father to Son. *They learn not*, (ſaith [p] *Diodorus*) *after the ſame Faſhion as the* Greeks: *For amongſt the* Chaldæans, *Philoſophy is delivered by Tradition in the Family, the Son receiving it from the Father, being exempted from all other Employment; and thus having their Parents for their Teachers, they learn all things fully and abundantly, believing more firmly what is communicated to them: And being brought up in theſe Diſciplines from Children, they acquire a great Habit in Aſtrology, as well becauſe that Age is apt to learn, as for that they employ ſo much time in Study. But among the* Greeks, *for the moſt part they come unprepared, and attain Philoſophy very late; and having beſtowed ſome Time therein, quit it to ſeek out Means for their Livelihood: And tho' ſome few give themſelves up wholly to Philoſophy, yet they perſiſt in Learning only for Gain, continually innovating ſome things in the moſt conſiderable Doctrines, and never follow thoſe that went before them: Whereas the Barbarians perſevering always in the ſame, receive each of them firmly: But the* Greeks *aiming at Gain, by this Profeſſion erect new Sects, and contradicting one another in the moſt conſiderable Theorems, make their Diſciples dubious; their Minds, as long as they live, are in Suſpenſe and Doubt, neither can they firmly believe any thing: for if a Man examine the chiefeſt Sects of the Philoſophers, he will find them moſt different from one another, and directly oppoſite in the principal Aſſertions.*

[k] Paræn. [l] Lib. de Sibyl. [m] Lib. 2. [n] Lib. 5. [o] In Proœm. [p] Lib. 2.

CHAP. III.

Sects of the Chaldæans *diſtinguiſhed according to their ſeveral Habitations.*

AS all Profeſſors of Learning among the *Chaldæans*, were diſtinguiſhed from the reſt of the People by the common Denomination of the Country, *Chaldæans*; ſo were they diſtinguiſhed among themſelves into Sects, denominated from the ſeveral Parts of the Country wherein they were ſeated: Whereof [p] *Pliny* and [q] *Strabo* mention *Hipparenes* from *Hipparenum*, a City in *Meſopotamia*; *Babylonians*, from *Babylon*; *Orchenes*, (*a third* Chaldaick Doctrine) from *Orchoë* a City of *Chaldæa*; and *Borſippenes*, from *Borſippe*, another City of *Babylonia* dedicated to *Apollo* and *Diana*. And though [r] *Diodorus* prefers the *Chaldæans* before the *Grecians*, for their Perſeverance in the ſame Doctrines without Innovations; yet we muſt not infer thence, that there was an univerſal Conſent of Doctrine amongſt them; but only that each of them was conſtant in Belief and Maintenance of his own Sect, without introducing any new Opinion. For, that amongſt theſe Sects there was no abſolute Agreement, is manifeſt from *Strabo*, who adds, that [s] *they did* (as indifferent Sects) *aſſert contrary Doctrines*; [t] *ſome of them calculated Nativities*, others diſapproved it; Whence [u] *Lucretius*,

The Babylonick *Doctrine doth oppoſe*
The Chaldee, *and Aſtrology o'erthrows.*

CHAP. IV.

Sects of the Chaldæans *diſtinguiſhed according to their ſeveral Sciences.*

ANother (more proper) Diſtinction of Sects amongſt the learned *Chaldæans*, there was, according to the ſeveral Sciences which they profeſt. The *Prophet* [x] *Daniel* relating how *Nebuchadnezzar* ſent for all the learned Men, to tell him his Dream, takes occaſion to name the Principal of them, which were four; *Hhartumim*, *Aſhaphim*, *Mecaſhphim*, *Chaſdim*.

Hhartumim, are by *Abrabaniel*, expounded *Magi*, *skilful in natural Things*; and by *Jachiades*, *thoſe Magi who addicted themſelves to contemplative Science*; which Interpretation ſuits well with the Derivation of the Word; not as ſome would have from *Charmini*, *Burnt Bones*, (for that the *Magi* performed their Rites with dead Mens Bones) nor from *Charat*, a *Pen*, or *Scribe*, (in regard the *Egyptians* uſed to call their wiſe Perſons Scribes,) for the Word in *Chaldee* is not taken in that Senſe; but from *Charad* a *Perſian* Word, (by Tranſmutation of ר into ש) ſignifying *to know*; whence *Elmacinus*, inſtead of this *Perſee-Chaldee*, uſeth two *Arabick* Words, *Alhochamaon*, *Walarraphaon*; *Wiſe and knowing Perſons*. The *Hhartumim* therefore were not (as commonly rendered) *Magicians*, but rather ſuch as ſtudied the Nature of all things; under which Contemplation is comprehended Theology and Phyſick, the Knowledge of Beings, Divine and Natural.

Aſhaphim [y] *Jachiades* expounds thoſe *Magi*, *qui ſcientiam activam excolebant*: So *Conſtantinus* renders him; but adds, *that Jachiades is miſtaken, and that the* Aſhaphim *were rather the ſame as* Souphoun *in* Arabick, *Wiſe, Religious Perſon*. This indeed is the more probable; *Souphoun* is an Attribute, proper to all thoſe who deliver'd all Theology myſtically and allegorically, deriv'd from *Souph*, *Wool*; either for that the Garments of theſe Profeſſors of Theology were made only of *Wool*, never of Silk; or from *attiring*, and *vailing* the things which concern the Love of God, under the Figures of viſible Things; whence is derived the Word *Hatſeviph*, *Myſtick Theology*; and perhaps from the *Hebrew* Root *Aſhaph*, comes to the *Greek* σοφὸς, the firſt Attribute given by the *Greeks* to Learned Perſons, afterwards changed into φιλόσοφος. Theſe *Aſhaphim*, the ordinary Interpretation of the Text in *Daniel* ſtiles *Aſtrologers*: And *Aben-Ezra* derives the Word from בשׁק *Twilight*, *becauſe they obſerve the Heavens at that Time*; but the Aſtrologers are meant afterwards by the Word *Chaſdim*, (laſt of the four.) The *Aſhaphim* of the *Chaldæans* ſeem rather to be the ſame with the *Magi* of the *Perſians*, Prieſts, the Profeſſors of Religious Worſhip, which they termed *Magick*.

Mecaſhphim, properly ſignifieth *Revealers*, (that is) of abſtruſe things: The Word is derived from *Caſhaph*, which the *Arabians* ſtill uſe in the ſame Senſe of *Revealing*: *Mecaſhphim* are generally taken, (as by *R. Moſes*, *Nachmarides*, *Abrabaniel*, and others) for ſuch as practiſed Diabolical Arts: Not improperly rendered, *Sorcerers*.

Chaſdim, (or *Chaldæans*) was an Attribute (as we ſhewed formerly) conferred in a particular Senſe upon the Learned Perſons of the *Chaldæans*: Amongſt whom, by a Reſtriction yet more particular, it ſignified the Profeſſors of Aſtrology; this being a Study, to which they were more eſpecially addicted, and for which moſt eminent; theſe are thoſe *Chaſdim*, whom *Strabo* [z] ſtiles χαλδαίους ἀστρονομικούς, *Aſtronomical Chaldæans*.

Beſides theſe four Kinds (which ſeem to have been the principal) there are ſeveral others mentioned, and prohibited by the *Levitical* Law. *Deut.* 18. 10. *Choſer*,

[p] Lib. 6. c. 26. [q] Lib. 16. p. 739. [r] Suprà citat. [s] Loc. citat. [t] Loc. citat. [u] Lib. 5. [x] Chap. 2. v. 2.
[y] In Dan. p. 34. [z] Lib. 16. p. 739.

Choſer, Caſmim, Megonenim, Menacheſhim, Hhober, Hhaber, Shel, Ob, Fideoni, Doreſh el Hammetim, R. Maimonides reciting them all, adds, that *they were ſeveral ſorts of Diviners, ſprung up of old among ſt the* Chaldeans. *Jachiades* mentions them as particular kinds of the *Mecaſhphim.*

The FIFTEENTH PART.

The Chaldaick Doctrine.

FROM the four general Kinds of the Profeſſors of Learning amongſt the *Chaldæans*, mentioned by the Prophet *Daniel*, (of which we [a] laſt treated) may be inferred, of what Parts or Sciences the *Chaldaick* Doctrine did conſiſt. The *Hhartumim* were employed in *Divine* and *Natural Speculation*; the *Aſhaphim*, in *Religious Worſhip* and *Rites*; the *Mecaſhphim* and *Chaſdim* in *Divination:* Theſe by *Aſtrology*, thoſe by *other Arts:* which two laſt, *Diodorus*, ſpeaking of the Learned *Chaldæans*, comprehends under the common Name of *Aſtrologers*; the other two, under that of *Natural Philoſophers*, and *Prieſts:* for he ſaith, *they imitated the* Ægyptian *Prieſts, Naturaliſts and Aſtrologers.*

In treating therefore of the *Chaldaick* Doctrine, we ſhall firſt lay down their *Theology* and *Phyſick*, the proper Study of the *Hhartumim:* Next, their *Aſtrology*, and other Arts of *Divination*, practiſed by the *Chaſdim*, and *Mecaſhphim:* Thirdly, their *Theurgy*; and Laſtly, their *Gods.* Which Contemplation and Rites were peculiar to the *Aſhaphim.*

SECT. I.

Theology and Phyſick.

THE *Chaldaick* Doctrine, in the firſt place, conſiders all Beings, as well Divine as Natural: The Contemplation of the firſt, is *Theology*; of the latter, *Phyſick.*

Zoroaſter [b] *divided all things into three Kinds; the firſt Eternal, the ſecond had a Beginning in Time, but ſhall have no End; the third, Mortal:* The two firſt belong to Theology. *The Subject of Theology*, (ſaith *Euſebius* [c], ſpeaking doubtleſs of the Followers of *Zoroaſter*) *they divided into four Kinds; the firſt is God, the Father and King; next him there followeth a multitude of other Gods*; in the third place they rank *Dæmons*; in the fourth *Heroes*; or, according to others, Angels, Dæmons, and Souls.

The third, or mortal Kind is the Subject of *Phyſick:* It comprehends all things material; which they divide into ſeven Worlds, one *Empyreal*, three *Ætherial*, three *Corporeal.*

CHAP. I.

Of the Eternal Being, God.

THE firſt Kind of Things (according to *Zoroaſter*) is Eternal, the Supreme God. *In the firſt place* (ſaith *Euſebius*) *they conceive that God the Father and King ought to be ranked.* This the *Delphian* Oracle (cited by *Porphyrius*) confirms.

> Chaldees *and* Jews *wiſe only, worſhipping*
> *Purely a ſelf-begotten God and King.*

This is that Principle of which the Author of the *Chaldaick* Summary ſaith, *They conceive there is one Principle of all things, and declare that it is one and good.*

[d] *God* (as *Pythagoras* learnt of the *Magi*, who term him *Oromaſdes*) *in his Body reſembles Light, in his Soul Truth:* That God (according to the *Chaldaick* Opinion) is Light, beſides the Teſtimony of *Euſebius*, may be inferred from the Oracles of *Zoroaſter*, wherein are frequently mentioned *the* [e] *Light, Beams*, and *Splendor of the Father.*

In the ſame Senſe they likewiſe termed God *a Fire*; for *Ur* in *Chaldee* ſignifying both *Light* and *Fire*, they took Light and Fire promiſcuouſly (as amongſt many others *Plato* doth, when he ſaith that *God began to compound the whole Body of the World out of Fire and Earth*; by which Fire he afterwards profeſſeth to mean *the Sun*, whom he ſtiles *the brighteſt and whiteſt of things*, as if Light and Fire, Brightneſs and Whiteneſs were all one;) this is manifeſt from the *Zoroaſtrean* Oracles alſo; wherein he is ſometimes called ſimply *Fire*, ſometimes the *paternal Fire, the one Fire, the firſt Fire above.*

Upon this Ground (doubtleſs) was the Worſhip of Fire inſtituted by the ancient *Chaldæans*, and [f] from them derived to the *Perſians*; of which hereafter, when we ſhall come to ſpeak of their Gods and Religious Rites.

CHAP. II.

The Emanation of Light or Fire from God.

GOD (as we have ſhewn) an intellectual Light or Fire, *did not* (as the Oracle ſaith) *ſhut up his Fire within his intellectual Power*, but communicated it to all Creatures; firſt and immediately to the firſt Mind (as the ſame Oracles aſſert) and to all other æviternal and incorporeal Beings,

[a] Part 1. Sect. 2. cap. 4. [b] Pſell. in Orac. p. 51. [c] Præp. Evang. l. 4. c. 3. [d] Porphyr. vit. Pythag. [e] Φῶς ἀυγαὶ καὶ φέγγος, φατρός. [f] Agath.

ings (under which Notion are comprehended a Multitude of God's Angels, good Dæmons, and the Souls of Men :) The next Emanation is the Supramundane Light, an incorporeal, infinite luminous Space, in which the intellectual Beings reſide; the ſupramundane Light kindles the firſt corporeal World; the Empyreum, or fiery Heaven, which being immediately beneath the incorporeal Light, is the higheſt, brighteſt, and rareſt of Bodies. The Empyreum diffuſeth itſelf through the Æther, which is the next Body below it, a Fire leſs refined than the Empyreum: But that it is Fire, the more condenſed Parts thereof, the Sun and Stars ſufficiently evince; from the Æther this Fire is tranſmitted to the material and ſublunary World; for tho' the Matter whereof it conſiſts be not Light, but Darkneſs, (as are alſo the material or bad Dæmons) yet this [f] *vivificative Fire* actuates and gives Life to all its Parts, inſinuating, diffuſing itſelf, and penetrating even to the very Center: *Paſſing from above* (ſaith the Oracle) *to the oppoſite Part, through the Center of the Earth.* We ſhall deſcribe this more fully when we treat of the Particulars.

CHAP. III.

Of Things Æviternal and Incorporeal.

THE ſecond or middle kind of Things (according to *Zoroaſter*) is that which is begun in time, but is without End (commonly termed æviternal.) To this belong that *Multitude of Gods* which *Euſebius* ſaith they *aſſerted next after God the Father and King*; and the Souls of Men: *Pſellus*, and the other Summariſts of the *Chaldaick* Doctrine, name them in this Order; *Intelligibles*; *Intelligibles and Intellectuals*; *Intellectuals*; *Fountains*; *Hyperarchii*, or *Principles*; *Unzoned Gods*; *Zoned Gods*; *Angels*; *Dæmons*; *Souls*. [g] All theſe they conceive to be light, except the ill Dæmons which are dark.

[h] Over this middle kind *Zoroaſter* held *Mithra* to preſide, whom the Oracles (ſaith *Pſellus*) call the Mind. [i] This is employed about ſecondary Things.

CHAP. IV.

The Firſt Order.

IN the firſt Place are three Orders, one *Intelligible*, another *Intelligible and Intellectual*, the third *Intellectual*. The firſt Order, which is of Intelligibles, ſeems to be (as the learned *Patricius* conjectures; for *Pſellus* gives only a bare Account, not an Expoſition of theſe Things) that which is only underſtood: This is the higheſt Order: The *ſecond* or middle Order is of Intelligibles and Intellectuals, that is, thoſe which are underſtood, and underſtand alſo; as *Zoroaſter*.

There are Intelligibles and Intellectuals, which underſtanding, are underſtood.

The *third* is of Intellectuals; which only underſtand: as being Intellect, either eſſentially, or by Participation. By which Diſtinction we may conceive that the higheſt Order is above Intellect, being underſtood by the middle ſort of Minds. The middle Order participates of the Superior, but conſiſts of Minds which underſtand both the Superior and themſelves alſo. The laſt Order ſeems to be of Minds, whoſe Office is to underſtand not only themſelves, but Superiors and Inferiors alſo.

Of the firſt of which Orders, the anonimous Author of the Summary of the *Chaldaick* Doctrine, thus: *Then* (*viz.* next the one and good) *they worſhip a certain paternal Depth, conſiſting of three Triads; each Triad hath a Father, a Power, and a Mind: Pſellus* ſomewhat more fully; *Next the one they aſſert the paternal Depth compleated by three Triads; each of the Triads having a Father firſt, then a Power middle, and a Mind the third amongſt them; which* (Mind) *ſhutteth up the Triad within itſelf; theſe they call alſo Intelligibles.*

This tripple Triad ſeems to be the ſame with the Triad mentioned in the Oracles of *Zoroaſter*. What *Pſellus* terms *Father*, he calls *Father* alſo.

The Father perfected all Things, and *Paternal Monad.*

Where the paternal Monad is.——

The ſecond, which *Pſellus* calls *Power*, he terms alſo *the Power of the Father.*

Neither did he ſhut up his own Fire in his intellectual Power.

And——*The Strength of the Father.*

And the *Duad* generated by the Monad, and reſident with him:

The Monad is enlarged, which generates two.

And again,

The Duad reſides with him.

This is alſo *the firſt paternal Mind*; for the third of this Triad, which *Pſellus* terms the Mind, he ſaith is the ſecond Mind.

The Father perfected all Things, and delivered them over

To the ſecond Mind, which all Mankind calls the firſt.

And as *Pſellus* ſaith that this Mind ſhuts up the Triad and patenral Depth within itſelf: So *Zoroaſter*:

It is the Bound of the paternal Depth and Fountain of Intellectuals.

And again,

It proceeded not further, but remained in the paternal Depth.

CHAP.

[f] Ζωογόνον πῦρ. [g] Euſeb. Prep. l. 4. c. 5. [h] Plut. in Iſid. and Oſirid. [i] Plut. Ibid.

CHAP. V.

The second Order.

NEXT *these* (saith *Psellus*) *there is another Order of Intelligibles and Intellectuals*; *this also is divided threefold, into Jynges, Synoches, and Teletarchs.* With him agrees the anonymous Summarist. *Then is the intelligible-Jynx*; *next which are the Synoches, the Empyreal, the Ætherial, and the Material*; *after the Synoches are the Teletarchs.*

The first are Jynges of which the Oracle;

Incelligent Jynges do themselves also understand from the Father,
By unspeakable Counsels being moved so as to understand;

Psellus saith, *they are certain Powers next to the paternal Depth, consisting of three Triads* (I would rather read, *the paternal Depth which consists of three Triads*, for so it is described in the foregoing Chapter by the same Author) *which, according to the Oracle, understand by the paternal Mind, which contains the Cause of them singly within itself:* Pletho, *They are intellectual Species conceived by the Father, they themselves being conceptive also, and exciting Conceptions or Notions by unspeakable Counsels.* These seem to be the Ideas described by the *Zoroastrean* Oracle;

The Mind of the Father made a jarring Noise, understanding by vigorous Counsels
Omni-form Ideas, and flying out of one Fountain,
They sprung forth; *for from the Father was the Counsel and End*;
But they were divided, being by Intellectual Fire distributed
Into other Intellectuals; *for the King did set before the multi-form World*
An intellectual, incorruptible Pattern, the Print of whose Form
He promoted through the World, and accordingly the World was framed,
Beautify'd with all kind of Ideas, of which there is one Fountain,
Out of which came rushing forth others undistributed,
Being broken about the Bodies of the World, which through the vast Recesses,
Like Swarms, are carried round about every Way,
Intellectual Notions from the paternal Fountain, cropping the Flower of Fire.
In the Point of sleepless Time, of this
Primigenious Idea, the first self-budding Fountain of the Father budded.

Upon which Words, *Proclus* having cited them as an Oracle of the Gods, adds, *Hereby the Gods declared as well where the Subsistence of Ideas is, as who that God is who contains the one Fountain of them, as also, after what manner the Multitude of them proceeded out of this Fountain, and how the World was made according to them. And that they are Movers of all the Systems of the World, and that they are all intellectual essentially. Others may find out many other profound Things, by searching into these divine Notions*; *but for the present, let it suffice us to know, that the Gods themselves ratify the Contemplations of* Plato, *forasmuch as they term those intellectual Causes, Ideas*; *and affirm, that they gave Pattern to the World, and that they are Conceptions of the Father: For they remain in the Intellections of the Father*; *and that they go forth to the making of the World, for ποίησις implies their going forth, and that they are of all Forms, as containing the Causes of all things divisible: And that from the Fountain's Ideas there proceeded others, which by several Parts framed the World, and are said to be like Swarms* (of Bees) *because they beget the secondary Ideas.* Thus *Proclus.*

The second are the *Synoches*, which *are three, the Empyreal, the Æthereal, the Material:* Answerable to the several Worlds which they govern. For they seem to be Minds, which receiving from *Hecate* the Influence of that Fire which dispenseth Life, infuse it into the Empyreal, Æthereal, and Material Worlds, and support and govern those Worlds, and give them vital Motion. The Oracle termeth them *Anoches.*

Each World hath intellectual Anoches inflexible; where *Psellus* interprets them *the most excellent of intelligible Species, and of those that are brought down by the Immortals in this Heaven, in the Head of whom is conceived to be a God, the second from the Father.*

The last of this Order are the *Teletarchs*, joined with the *Synoches* by the Oracle.

The Teletarchs *are comprehended with the* Synoches.

This second Order or Triad, *Proclus* and *Damascius* often mention, styling it by the double Name of *Intelligent and Intellectual.*

CHAP. VI.

The third Order.

THE last Order is of *Intellectuals.* [k] Psellus, *After the middle Order is the Intellectual, having one paternal Triad, which consists of the Once above, and of* Hecate, *and of the Twice above*; *and another* (Triad) *which consists of the Amilicti, which are three*; *and one, the Hypezocos: These are seven Fountains.* Anonymous Summarist, *After these are the fountainous Fathers, called also Cosmagogues*; *the first of whom is called the Once Above*; *next whom is Hecate*; *then the Twice Above, next whom three Amilicti*; *and last, the Hypezocos.*

Of the *Cosmegogues Psellus* interprets the *Zoroastrean* Oracle.

Ob

[k] Epist.

Oh how the World hath intellectual Guides, inflexible!

The Chaldeans, ſaith he, *aſſert Powers in the World, which they term Coſmagogi (Guides of the World) for that they guide the World by provident Motions. Theſe Powers the Oracle calls* ἀνοχῆας, *Suſtainers, as ſuſtaining the whole World. The Oracle ſaith, they are immoveable, implying their ſettled Power; ſuſtentive, denoting their Guardianſhip. Theſe Powers they deſign only by the Cauſes and Immobility of the Worlds.* Pletho interprets them *the moſt excellent of Intelligible Species, and of thoſe that are brought down by Immortals in this Heaven. The* Coryphaus, *of whom he conceives to be a God, the ſecond from the Father.*

The *Amilicti* alſo, and the *Hypezocos* are mentioned by the Oracle.

——— — *For from him*
Spring forth all the implacable (Amilicti) *Thunders.*
And the Receſſes (ſuſcipient of Preſters) of the omnilucent Strength.
Of Father-begotten Hecate, and Hypezocos the Flower of Fire.

The [l] *Amilicti* [implacable] are Powers ſo termed, for that they are firm, and not to be converted towards theſe inferior things; and alſo cauſe, that Souls be not allured by Affections.

CHAP. VII.

Fountains and Principles.

BESIDES this laſt Order of Intellectuals, which *Pſellus* ſtyles *ſeven Fountains*, and the Anonymous Summariſt, *fountainous Fathers*, the latter gives Account of many other Fountains. "They "reverence alſo (*ſaith he*) a fountainous [m] Triad "of Faith, Truth, and Love; they likewiſe aſ- "ſert a Principiative Son from the ſolar Fountain, "and Archangelical, and the Fountain of Senſe, and "fountainous Judgment, and the Fountain of Per- "ſpectives, and the Fountain of Characters; which "walketh on unknown Marks, and the fountainous "Tops of *Apollo*, *Oſyris*, *Hermes*, [n] they aſſert ma- "terial Fountains of Centers and Elements, and a "Zone of Dreams, and a fountainous Soul."

Next the Fountains, ſaith [o] *Pſellus*, are the Hyperarchii; the Anonymous more fully, "Next the "Fountains, they ſay, are the Principalities, for the "Fountains are more principal than the Principles:" Both theſe Names of *Fountains* and *Principles* are uſed by *Dionyſius Areopagita* frequently; even in the third Triad, he puts the Name of *Principles*, ἀρχῶν, (or Principalities) after whom the Arch-angels.

Of the Animal-productive Principles (continues the Anonymous) the Top is called Hecate, the Middle principitative Soul, the Bottom principitative Virtue. This ſeems to be that Hecate, whom *Pſellus* ſaith, they held to be the Fountain of Angels and Dæmons, and of Souls, and of Natures; the ſame which the Oracle means, ſaying,

On the left Side of *Hecate* is the Fountain of Virtue; For the *Chaldeans* (as *Pſellus* ſaith) "eſteem "[p] Hecate a Goddeſs, ſeated in the middle Rank, "and poſſeſſing as it were the Center of all the "Powers; in her right Parts they place the Foun- "tain of Souls, in her left the Fountain of Goods, "or of Virtues: Moreover they ſay, the Fountain "of Souls is prompt to Propagations; but the Foun- "tain of Virtues continueth within the Bounds of "its own Eſſence, and is as a Virgin incorrupted; "which Settledneſs and Immobility it receives from "the Power of the Amilicti, and is girt with a "Virgin Zone." What *Pſellus* here calls the Fountain of Souls, and the Fountain of Virtues, is the ſame which the Anonymous ſtyles, Principitative Soul, and Principitative Virtue.

CHAP. VIII.

Unzoned Gods and zoned Gods.

NEXT (the Hyperarchii, according to *Pſellus*) *are the Azoni*, (Unzoned Gods;) *there are amongſt them*, (ſaith the Anonymous Summariſt) [q] *unzoned Hecates, as the* Chaldaick, *the* Triecdotis, *Comas, and* Eccluſtick: *The unzoned Gods are* Sarapis *and* Bacchus, *and the* [r] *Chain of* Oſyris, *and of* Apollo; (continued Series of Geniuſes, connected in the manner of a Chain.) *They are called unzoned, for that they uſe their Power freely* (without Reſtriction) *in the Zones, and are enthroned above the conſpicuous Deities:* Theſe conſpicuous Deities are the Heavens and the Planets, (perhaps of the ſame kind as the Intelligencies, which the Peripateticks aſſerted Movers of the Spheres.) And whereas he ſaith, they live *in Power*, ἐν ἐξουσίαις, it is the ſame Attribute which *Dionyſius* gives the third of the ſecond Hierarchy, τὰ ἔγκοσμα ἐξουσίαν.

"[s] The zoned Gods are next: [t] Theſe are they "which have (Confinement to) particular Zones, and "are rolled freely about the Zones of Heaven, and "have the Office of governing the World; for "they hold, there is a zoned kind of Deity, which "inhabits the Parts of the ſenſible World, and gird- "eth, or circleth the Regions about the material "Place, according to ſeveral Diſtributions." The ſame Office *Dionyſius* ſeems to aſſign to the ſecond and third Hierarchies.

Theſe *Azoni* and *Zonæi* are mentioned alſo by *Damaſcius*; *This* (ſaith he) *ſendeth out of herſelf the Fountain of all Things, and the fountainous* [u] *Chain; but*

[l] Pſell. in Orac. [m] Ἀρχικὰ. [n] Συνθήματα. [o] Ἀρχαί. [p] In Orac. [q] Reading ἄζωνα
[r] Σείρα. [s] Pſell. [t] Amon. [u] Σειρὰ.

but That (ſendeth out of herſelf the fountainous Chain) *of Particulars; and paſſeth on to Principles and Arch-Angels, and* Azoni, *and* Zonei, *as the Law is of the Proceſſion of the renowned particular Fountains.* And by *Proclus*, * *The ſacred Names of the Gods, delivered according to their myſtical Interpretation, as thoſe which are celebrated by the* Aſſyrians, [w] Zonei, *and* Azoni, *and Fountains, and* Amilicti, *and* Synoches, *by which they interpret the Orders of the Gods.*

CHAP. IX.

Angels and immaterial Dæmons.

NEXT (the Zonei) *are the Angels.* [x] *Arnobius* ſaith of *Hoſtanes*, (one of the *Perſian* Magi, who received their Learning from the *Chaldeans*) that *he knew the Angels, Miniſters, and Meſſengers of God (the true God) did wait on his Majeſty, and tremble as afraid at the Beck and Countenance of the Lord*; the *Zoroaſtrian* Oracles mention *reductive Angels*, [y] which reduce *Souls to them, drawing them from ſeveral Things.*

The *next are Dæmons*; of theſe the [z] *Chaldeans* hold ſome to be good, others bad. The Good they conceive to be Light; the Bad Darkneſs. That there are good Dæmons, natural Reaſon tells us. Oracle:

Nature perſuades, that there are pure Dæmons.
The Bourgeons, even of ill Matter, are beneficial and good.

Nature, or natural Reaſon, ſaith *Pletho*, *perſuades, that the Dæmons are holy, and that all things proceeding from God, who is good in himſelf, are beneficial: If the Bloomings of ill Matter* (*viz.* of laſt Subſtances) *are good, much more are the Dæmons ſuch, who are in a more excellent Rank, as partaking of rational Nature, and being mixed with mortal Nature.*

CHAP. X.

Souls.

NEXT to *Dæmons*, *Pſellus* (in his Epitome of the *Chaldaick* Doctrine) placeth *Souls*, the laſt of æviternal Beings.

[a] Of Forms, the *Magi* (and from them the *Pythagoreans* and *Platoniſts*) aſſert three kinds; one wholly ſeparate from Matter, the ſuper-celeſtial Intelligences; another inſeparable from Matter, having a Subſtance not ſubſiſting by itſelf, but dependent on Matter, together with which Matter, which is ſometimes diſſolved by reaſon of its Nature, ſubject to Mutation; this kind of Soul is diſſolved alſo, and periſheth. This they hold to be wholly irrational.

[b] Betwixt theſe, they place a middle Kind, a rational Soul, differing from the Superceleſtial Intelligences, for that it always co-exiſts with Matter; and from the irrational kind, for that it is not dependent on Matter, but on the contrary, Matter is dependent on it; and it hath a proper Subſtance potentially ſubſiſtent by itſelf. It is alſo indiviſible, as well as the ſuperceleſtial Intelligences, and performing ſome Works in ſome manner ally'd to theirs, being itſelf alſo buſied in the Knowledge and Contemplation of Beings, even unto the Supreme God, and for this Reaſon is incorruptible.

[c] This Soul is an immaterial and incorpereal Fire, exempt from all Compounds, and from the material Body; it is conſequently immortal: for nothing material or dark is commixed with her, neither is ſhe compounded ſo as that ſhe may be reſolved into thoſe things of which ſhe conſiſts.

[d] This Soul hath a ſelf-generate and ſelf-animate Eſſence; for it is not moved by another. For if (according to the Oracle) it is a Portion of the divine Fire, and a lucid Fire, and paternal Notion, it is an immaterial and ſelf-ſubſiſtent Form; for ſuch is every divine Nature, and the Soul is Part thereof.

[e] Of human Souls they alledge two fountainous Cauſes, the paternal Mind, and the fountainous Soul: The particular Soul, according to them, proceeds from the Fountainous, by the Will of the Father.

[f] Now, whereas there are ſeveral Manſions; one wholly bright, another wholly dark; others betwixt both, partly bright, partly dark; the Place beneath the Moon is circumnebulous, dark on every ſide; the lunary, partly lucid, and partly dark; one half bright, the other dark; the Place above the Moon circumlucid, or bright throughout; the Soul is ſeated in the circumlucid Region.

[g] From thence this kind of Soul is often ſent down to Earth, upon ſeveral occaſions, either by reaſon of the flagging of its Wings *(ſo they term the Deviation from its original Perfection)* or in obedience to the Will of the Father.

[h] This Soul is always co-exiſtent with any æthereal Body as its *Vehiculum*, which ſhe by continual Approximation maketh alſo immortal. Neither is this her *Vehiculum* inanimate in itſelf, but is itſelf animated with the other Species of the Soul, the irrational (which the Wiſe call εἴδωλον, the Image of the rational Soul) adorned with Phantaſy and Senſe, which ſeeth and heareth itſelf whole through the whole, and is furniſhed with all the Senſes, and with all the reſt of the irrational Faculties of the Soul.

[i] Thus by the principal Faculty of this Body Phantaſy, the rational Soul is continually joined to

* In Proœm. Parmenid. [w] Read ζωναῖοι. [x] Pſell. [y] In Orac. [z] Pſell. in Orac. [a] Pletho in Orac. [b] Ibid. [c] Pſell. in Orac. [d] In Orac. [e] Epit. [f] Pſel. in Orac. [g] Pſell. & Pleth. p. 81. [h] Pleth. in Orac. [i] Loc. cit.

ſuch a Body, and by ſuch a Body ſometimes the human Soul is joined with a mortal Body, by a certain Affinity of Nature, the whole being enfolded in the whole enlivening Spirit of the Embryon; this *Vehiculum* itſelf being of the Nature of a Spirit.

[k] The Image of the Soul, *viz.* that Part which being itſelf void of irrational, is joined to the rational Part, and depends upon the Vehicle thereof, hath a Part in the circumlucid Region; for the Soul never layeth down the Vehicle adherent to her.

[l] The Soul being ſent down from the Manſion wholly bright to ſerve the mortal Body, that is, to operate therein for a certain Time, and to animate and adorn it to her Power, and being enabled according to her ſeveral Virtues, do dwell in ſeveral Zones of the World; if ſhe performs her Office well, goes back to the ſame Place; but if not well, ſhe retires to the worſt Manſions, according to the things ſhe hath done in this Life. [m] Thus (the *Chaldæans*) reſtore Souls to the firſt Condition, according to the Meaſure of their ſeveral Purifications, in all the Regions of the World; ſome alſo they conceive to be carried beyond the World.

CHAP. XI.

The Supramundane Light.

ALL theſe æviternal and incorporeal Beings are ſeated in the Supramundane Light, which itſelf alſo is incorporeal, placed immediately above the higheſt corporeal World, and from thence extending upwards to infinite.

Proclus (cited by *Simplicius* on this Oracle of *Zoroaſter*,
Abundantly animating Light, Fire, Æther, Worlds,)

ſaith, "This Light is above all the ſeven Worlds, "as a Monad before or above the Triad of the Em- "pyreal, Æthereal, and Material Worlds: adding, "that this primary Light is the Image of the pater- "nal Depth, and is therefore ſupramundane, be- "cauſe the paternal Depth is ſupramundane." And again, "This Light, ſaith he, being the ſupramun- "dane Sun, ſends forth Fountains of Light; and "the myſtick Diſcourſes tell us, that its Generali- "ty is among ſupramundane things, for there is the "Solar World, and the Univerſal Light, as the "*Chaldaick* Oracles aſſert."

And again, "The Centers of the whole World, "as one, ſeem to be fixed in this: for if the Ora- "cles fixed the Centers of the Material World above "itſelf, in the Æther, proportionably aſcending, "we ſhall affirm that the Centers of the higheſt of "the Worlds, are ſeated in this Light. Is not this "firſt Light the Image of the Paternal Depth, and "for that reaſon ſupramundane alſo, becauſe that is "ſo?"

CHAP. XII.

Of Things Temporal (or Corruptible) and Corporeal.

THE third and laſt Kind of Things, according to *Zoroaſter*, is Corruptible or Temporal; which as it began in Time, ſo ſhall it likewiſe in Time be diſſolved: The Preſident over theſe is *Arimanes*.

Under this third Kind are comprehended the Corporeal Worlds; the Empyreal immediately below the Supramundane Light, the Æthereal next the Empyreal, and the Material the loweſt of all, as the Oracle ranks them.

Abundantly animating Light, Fire, Æther, Worlds.
Theſe Corporeal Worlds are ſeven. *Orac.*
For the Father formed ſeven Firmaments of Worlds,
Including Heaven in a round Figure,
He fixed a great Company of inerratick Stars,
He conſtituted a Heptad of erratick Animals,
Placing the Earth in the middle, but the Water in the Boſom of the Earth;
The Air above theſe.

Pſellus explaining how they are ſeven, ſaith, *They affirm that there are ſeven Corporeal Worlds; one Empyreal and firſt; then three Æthereal; and laſtly, three Material, the fixed Circle, the Erratick, and the Sublunary Region.* But this Enumeration ſeems to fall ſhort; for he mentions but two Æthereal Worlds (the Orb of fixed Stars, and the Planetary Orb) and one Material (the Sublunary Region;) as the learned *Patricius* obſerves, who therefore reckons the ſeven thus; one Empyreal, three Æthereal, (the fixed Orb, the Planetary Orb, the Orb of the Moon) and three Elementary, (the Aereal, the Watry, and the Terreſtrial;) but perhaps it will better ſuit with the Oracle (which includes the Moon within the Planetary Orb, and placeth the Water under the Earth) as alſo with *Pſellus* (who calls the laſt three Worlds, Material) to diſpoſe them thus:

Corporeal Worlds Seven,
- *One Empyreal World.*
- *Three Æthereal Worlds;*
  - *The Supreme Æther next the Empyreum,*
  - *The Sphere of fixed Stars,*
  - *The Planetary Orb.*
- *Three Material Sublunary Worlds;*
  - *The Air,*
  - *The Earth,*
  - *The Water.*

Neither

[k] In Orac. [l] Pletho. in Orac. [m] Pſel. in Epit.

Neither can it ſeem ſtrange that the three laſt only ſhould be called Material; for the *Chaldæans* conceiving Matter to be a dark Subſtance, or rather Darkneſs itſelf, the Empyreal and Æthereal Worlds, which (as we ſhall ſhew) conſiſt of Light or Fire, cannot in their Senſe be ſaid to be Material, though Corporeal.

[n] *The* Empyreal or *Firſt* of theſe, (*Pſellus*) *they attributed to the Mind, the Æthereal to the Soul, the Material to Nature.*

CHAP. XIII.

The Empyreal World.

THE [o] *Firſt* of the Corporeal Worlds, is the Empyreal; (by *Empyræum* the Chaldæans underſtand not, as the Chriſtian Theologiſts, the Seat of God, and the bleſſed Spirits, which is rather analagous to the Supreme Light of the Chaldæans, but the utmoſt Sphere of the corporeal World.) It is round in Figure, according to the Oracle,

Incloſing Heaven in a round Figure.

It is alſo a *ſolid Orb, or Firmament:* for the ſame Oracles call it στερέωμα. It conſiſts of Fire, whence named the Empyreal, or, as the Oracles, *the Fiery World*; which Fire being immediately next the incorporeal ſupramundane Light, is the rareſt and ſubtileſt of Bodies, and by reaſon of this Subtilty penetrates into the Æther, which is the next World below it, and, by mediation of the Æther, through all the Material World. *This may be evinced more particularly,* ſaith *Proclus, from the Divine Tradition* (meaning the Zoroaſtrian Oracles:) *for the Empyræum penetrates through the Æther, and the Æther through the Material World; and thro' all the intellectual Tetrads and Hebdomads have a fountainous Order, and conſequently an Empyreal Preſident; nevertheleſs they are contained in the Worlds, ſince the Empyreal paſſeth through all the Worlds.*

Nevertheleſs, the Empyræum itſelf is fixed and immoveable; as *Simplicius*, further explicating the *Chaldaick* Doctrine, acknowledgeth, by this Similitude; *Let us imagine to ourſelves* (ſaith he) *two Spheres, one conſiſting of many Bodies, theſe two to be of equal Bigneſs; but place one together with the Center, and put the other into it; you will ſee the whole World exiſting in Place, moved in immoveable Light; which World according to its whole ſelf is immoveable, that it may imitate Place, but is moved as to its Parts, that herein it may have leſs than Place.*

CHAP. XIV.

The Æthereal Worlds.

AFter the Empyræum, the Oracle names the Æther, *Fire, Æther, Worlds*; confirmed by *Pſellus* and the anonymous Summariſt, who aſſert, that next the Empyræum are the three Æthereal Worlds; but of theſe three they mention only two, (and thoſe miſapply'd to the Material Worlds) *The Sphere of fixed Stars, and the Planetary Sphere:* The third (perhaps implied though not expreſs'd) might be the Æther which is betwixt the Empyræum and the Sphere of fixed Stars.

The Æther is a Fire (as its Name implies) leſs ſubtile than the Empyræum, for *the Empyræum penetrates through the Æther:* yet is the Æther itſelf ſo ſubtile, that *it penetrates through the Material World.*

The ſecond Æthereal World is the Sphere of fixed Stars, which are the more compacted or condenſed Parts of the Æthereal Fire, as *Patricius* ingeniouſly interprets this Oracle;

He compacted a great Number of inerratick Stars,
Forcing (or preſſing) *Fire to Fire.*

The Third Æthereal World is that of the Planetary Orb, which contains the Sun, Moon, and five Planets; ſtiled by the Oracles, Erratick Animals and Fire:

He conſtituted a Heptad of Erratick Animals.

And again, *He conſtituted them ſix; the ſeventh was that of the Sun,*
Mingling Fire in them.

CHAP. XV.

The Material Worlds.

THE laſt and loweſt are the Material Worlds; which *Pſellus* and the other Summariſts aſſert to be three, meaning doubtleſs the Air, Earth, and Water, for ſo the Oracle ranks 'em.

Placing the Earth in the middle, but the Water in the Boſom of the Earth,
The Air above them.

This is that laſt Order of Worlds, of which the *Chaldaick* Summary ſaith, *it is called Terreſtrial, and the Hater of Light: it is the Region beneath the Moon, and comprehends within itſelf Matter, which they call the Bottom.* By which Words it appears upon what ground the *Chaldæans* aſſerted only theſe Sublunary Worlds to conſiſt of Matter, but the Empyreal and Æthereal to be Immaterial though Corporeal: for Matter they underſtand to be the Hater of Light, Darkneſs, and the bottom of a Nature

[n] Epitom. 1. [o] Pſel.

quite different from the Empyræum and Æther, whoſe very Subſtance is Light itſelf, yet it is actuated by their vivificative Fire which penetrates quite through it even to the Center, as we ſhewed formerly.

[p] Concerning the Earth, *Diodorous Siculus* ſaith, they held Opinions peculiar to themſelves, aſſerting that *it is in Figure like a Boat, and hollow*; for which, as likewiſe for other things concerning the World, they abound with probable Arguments.

Pſellus adds, that *they ſometimes call this Sublunary Hades.*

CHAP. XVI.

Of Material Dæmons.

OF Dæmons, as we ſaid, they aſſerted two Kinds, ſome good, others ill; the good, light; the ill, dark. The former are thoſe whom [q] *Hoſtanes* calls the *Miniſters and Meſſengers of God, dwelling in his Preſence:* But theſe he deſcribes as *Terreſtrial, wandering up and down, and Enemies to Mankind.* Of the firſt we have treated already; of the latter, *Pſellus* in his Diſcourſe upon this Subject gives a large Account from one *Marcus* of *Meſopotamia*, who having been of this Religion, and well acquainted with their Inſtitutions, was afterwards converted to Chriſtianity: What he relates, as well from the Doctrine itſelf, as from the Place, ſufficiently appears to be of the *Chaldaick* Tradition. It is to this effect:

Theſe Dæmons are of many Kinds, and various Sorts, both as to their Figures and Bodies, inſomuch that the Air is full of them, as well that which is above us, as that which is round about us. The Earth likewiſe is full, and the Sea, and the moſt retired Cavities and Depths.

There are ſix general Kinds of theſe Dæmons. The firſt named *Leliurius*, which ſignifies Fiery. This Kind dwelleth in the Air that is above us: for from the Places next above the Moon, as being Sacred, all Kinds of Dæmons, as being Prophane, are expelled. The ſecond Kind is that which wandereth in the Air contiguous to us, and is by many peculiarly called Aereal. The third, Terreſtrial. The fourth, Watery and Marine. The fifth, Subterraneous. The ſixth, Lucifugous, and hardly ſenſible.

All theſe Kinds of Dæmons are Haters of God, and Enemies of Man. Moreover, of theſe ill Dæmons, ſome are worſe than others. Aquatile, and Subterraneous, and Lucifugous, are extremely malicious and pernicious: For theſe do not hurt Souls by Phantaſms and Deluſions, but by Aſſault, like the moſt ſavage Beaſts, accelerate the Deſtruction of Men. The Watery drown thoſe who are ſailing upon the Water. The Subterraneous and Lucifugous, inſinuating into the Entrails, cauſe Epilepſies and Frenzy. The Aereal and Terreſtrial circumvent Men by Art and Subtilty, and deceive the Minds of Men, and draw them to abſurd and illegal Paſſions.

They effect theſe things, not as having Dominion over us, and carrying us as their Slaves whitherſoever they pleaſe, but by Suggeſtion; for applying themſelves to the phantaſtick Spirit, which is within us, they themſelves being Spirits alſo, they inſtil Diſcourſes of Affections and Pleaſures, not by Voice verberating the Air, but by Whiſper, inſinuating their Diſcourſe.

Nor is it impoſſible that they ſhould ſpeak without Voice, if we conſider that he who ſpeaks, being afar off, is forced to uſe a greater Sound; being near, he ſpeaks ſoftly into the Ear of the Hearer, and if he could get into the Spirit of the Soul, he would not need any Sound, but what Diſcourſe ſoever he pleaſeth, would, by a way without Sound, arrive there where it is to be received; which they ſay is likewiſe in Souls, when they are out of the Body, for they diſcourſe with one another without Noiſe. After this manner the Dæmons converſe with us, privately, ſo that we are not ſenſible which way the War comes upon us.

Neither can this be doubted, if we obſerve what happens to the Air. For when the Sun ſhineth it aſſumeth ſeveral Colours and Forms, tranſmitting them to other things, as we may ſee in Looking-glaſſes. In like manner the Dæmons, aſſuming Figures and Colours, and whatſoever Forms they pleaſe, tranſmit them into our animal Spirit, and by that means afford us much Buſineſs, ſuggeſting Counſels, repreſenting Figures, reſuſcitating the Remembrance of Pleaſures, exciting the Images of Paſſions, as well when we ſleep, as when we wake, and ſometimes titillating the genital parts, inflame us with frantick and unlawful Deſires, eſpecially if they take, cooperating with them, the hot Humidities which are in us.

The reſt of the Dæmons know nothing that is ſubtle, nor how to breed Diſturbance, yet are they hurtful and abominable, hurting in the ſame manner as the Spirit or Vapour in *Charon*'s Cave: For as that is reported to kill whatſoever approacheth it, whether Beaſt, Man, or Birds; in like manner theſe Dæmons deſtroy thoſe upon whom they chance to fall, overthrowing their Souls and Bodies, and their natural Habits, and ſometimes by Fire, or Water, or Precipice, they deſtroy not Men only, but ſome irrational Creatures.

The Dæmons aſſault irrational Creatures, not out of Hate, or wiſhing them ill, but out of the Love they have of their animal Heat: For dwelling in the moſt

[p] Lib. 2. [q] Apud Minut. Fel.

moſt remote Cavities, which are extremely cold and dry, they contract much Coldneſs, wherewith being afflicted, they affect the humid and animal Heat, and, to enjoy it, they inſinuate themſelves into irrational Creatures, and go into Baths and Pits; for they hate the Heat of Fire and of the Sun, becauſe it burns and drieth up.

But they moſt delight in the Heat of Animals, as being temperate, and mixt with Moiſture, eſpecially that of Men, being beſt tempered; into which inſinuating themſelves, they cauſe infinite diſturbance, ſtopping up the Pores in which the animal Spirit, is inherent, and ſtrengthning and compreſſing the Spirit, by reaſon of the Groſſneſs of the Bodies with which they are indued. Whence it happeneth that the Bodies are diſorder'd, and their principal Faculties diſtemper'd, and their Motions become dull and heavy.

Now if the inſinuating Dæmon be one of the Subterraneous Kind, he diſtorteth the poſſeſſed Perſon, and ſpeaketh by him, making uſe of the Spirit of the Patient, as if it were his own Organ. But if any of thoſe who are called Lucifugous get privately into a Man, he cauſeth Relaxation of the Limbs, and ſtoppeth the Voice, and maketh the poſſeſſed Perſon in all reſpects like one that is dead. For this being the laſt of Dæmons, is more Earthly, and extremely Cold and Dry, and into whomſoever it inſinuates, it hebitates and makes dull all the Faculties of his Soul.

And becauſe it is irrational, void of all intellectual Contemplation, and is guided by irrational Phantaſy, like the more ſavage Kind of Beaſts, hence it comes to paſs, that it ſtands not in Awe of Menaces, and for that reaſon moſt Perſons aptly call it Dumb and Deaf, nor can they who are poſſeſſed with it by any other means be freed from it, but by the Divine Favour obtained by Faſting and Prayer.

That Phyſicians endeavour to perſuade us, that theſe Paſſions proceed not from Dæmons, but from Humours, and Spirits ill affected, and therefore go about to cure them, not by Incantations and Expiations, but by Medicines and Diet, is nothing ſtrange, ſince they know nothing beyond Senſe, and are wholly addicted to ſtudy the Body. And perhaps not without reaſon are ſome things aſcribed to ill affected Humours, as Lethargies, Melancholies, Frenzies, which they take away and cure, either by evacuating the Humours, or by repleniſhing the Body, if it be empty, or by outward Applications. But as for Enthuſiaſms, Ragings, and unclean Spirits, with which whoſoever is poſſeſſed is not able to act any thing, neither by Intellect, Speech, Phantaſy nor Senſe; or elſe there is ſome other thing that moves them unknown to the Perſon poſſeſſed, which ſometimes foretelleth future Events; how can we call theſe the Motions of depraved Matter?

No kind of Dæmon is in its own Nature Male or Female, for ſuch Affections are only proper to Compounds: but the Bodies of Dæmons are ſimple, and being very ductile and flexible, are ready to take any figure. As we ſee the Clouds repreſent ſometimes Men, ſometimes Bears, ſometimes Dragons, or any other Figures; ſo is it with the Dæmoniack Bodies. Now the Clouds appear in various Figures according as they are driven by exterior Blaſts or Winds: But in Dæmons, who can paſs as they pleaſe into any Bodies, and ſometimes contract, ſometimes extend themſelves like Worms on the Earth, being of a ſoft and tractable Nature, not only the Bulk is changed, but the Figure and Colour, and that ſeveral ways; for the Dæmoniack Body being by Nature capable of all thoſe, as it is apt to recede, it is changed into ſeveral Forms; as it is Aerial, it is ſuſceptible of all ſorts of Colours, like Air, but the Air is coloured by ſomething extrinſecal.

The Dæmoniack Body, from its intrinſecal Phantaſtick Power and Energy, produceth the Forms of Colours in itſelf, as we ſometimes look pale, ſometimes red, according as the Soul is affected either with Fear or Anger. The like we muſt imagine of Dæmons: for from within they ſend forth ſeveral kinds of Colours into their Bodies. Thus their Bodies being changed into what Figure, and aſſuming what Colour they pleaſe, they ſometimes appear in the Shape of a Man, ſometimes of a Woman, of a Lion, of a Leopard, of a wild Boar, ſometimes in the Figure of a Bottle, and ſometimes like a little Dog fawning upon us.

Into all theſe Forms they change themſelves, but keep none of them conſtantly: for the Figure is not ſolid, but immediately is diſſipated; as when we pour ſomething coloured into Water, or draw a Figure in the Air. In like manner is it with Dæmons, their Colour, Figure, and Form preſently vaniſh.

But all Dæmons have not the ſame Power and Will; there is much Inequality among them as to theſe. Some there are Irrational, as amongſt compound Animals; for, as of them, Man participating of Intellect and Reaſon, hath alſo a longer Phantaſy, extending alſo to all Senſibles, as well in the Heavens, as on Earth and under the Earth; but Horſes, Oxen, and the like, have a narrow, and more particular Phantaſy, yet ſuch as extends to the Knowledge of the Creatures that feed with them, their Managers and their Maſters. Laſtly, Flies, Gnats, Worms, have it extremely contracted and incoherent; for they know neither the Hole out of which they came, nor whither they go, nor whither they ought to go; they have only one Phantaſy, which is that of Aliment. In like manner there are different Kinds of Dæmons. Of theſe ſome are Fiery, others Aereal; theſe have a various Phantaſy, which is capable of extending to any thing imaginable. The Subterraneous and Lucifugous are not of this Nature; whence it comes to paſs, that they make not uſe of many Figures, as neither having Variety

of Phantasms, nor a Body apt for Action or Transformation. But the Watry and Terrestrial being of a middle Kind betwixt these, are capable of taking many Forms, but keep themselves to that in which they delight. They which live in humid Places, transform themselves into the Shapes of Birds and Women, whence termed by the Greeks *Naiades*, and *Nereides*, and *Dryades*, in the Feminine Gender. But such as are conversant in dry Places, have also dry Bodies, such as the *Onosceles* are said to be. These transform themselves into Men, sometimes into Dogs, Lions, and the like Animals, which are of a masculine Disposition.

The Bodies of Dæmons are capable of being struck, and are pained thereby, though they are not Compounds; for Sense is not only proper to Compounds. That thing in Man which feeleth, is neither the Bone nor the Nerve, but the Spirit which is in them: Whence if the Nerve be pressed, or seized with Cold, or the like, there ariseth Pain from the Emission of one Spirit into another Spirit: For it is impossible that a compound Body should in itself be sensible of Pain, but in as much as it partaketh of Spirit; and therefore being broken into pieces, or dead, it is absolutely insensible, because it hath no Spirit. In like manner, a Dæmon being all Spirit, is of his own nature sensible in every Part; he immediately seeth, and heareth, he is obnoxious to suffering by Touch; being cut asunder, he is pained like solid Bodies; only therein differing from them, that other things cut asunder can by no means or very hardly be made whole again; whereas the Demon immediately cometh together again, as Air or Water parted by some more solid Body. But though this Spirit joins again in a moment, nevertheless at the very time in which the dissection is made it is pained.

Hitherto the Theology and Physick of the Chaldeans.

SECT. II.

Astrology, and other Arts of Divination.

THE second Part of the *Chaldaick* Learning consists in Arts of Divination; the chief whereof is Astrology. This as it is generally acknowledged to have been their proper Invention, so were they most particularly addicted to it; for which *Ptolomy* gives a Reason out of the Art itself, *because they are under* Virgo *and* Mercury; but *Cicero* one much better, that *the Plainness and Evenness of the Country did invite them to Contemplation of the Stars.*

It consists of two Parts; 1. *Meteorologick*, which considers the Motions of the Stars; the other *Apotelesmatick*, which regards Divination. The first was known to the ancient *Græcians* by the common Names of *Astronomy* and *Astrology*; until the other being brought into *Greece* also, they, for Distinction, called the former more particularly *Astronomy*, the latter *Astrology*. The excellent [a] *Joseph Scaliger*, to advance the Credit of the *Greek* Learning, constantly avers, *that the* Chaldæans *had only a gross and general, not exact Knowledge of Astronomy*, ὁλοχερῆ, tantum, non etiam ἀκριβῆ, and that the Greeks *learned nothing therein of the* Chaldæans: whenas *Aristotle* ingenuously acknowledgeth the contrary: *The* Egyptians *and* Babylonians, saith he, *from whom we have many Informations concerning each of the Stars.* Though doubtless they were far short of that Height in this Art, to which the *Greeks*, who brought it out of the East, improved it: for *Diodorus Siculus* affirms, that [b] *they alledged very weak Reasons for the Eclipses of the Sun, which Eclipses they neither durst foretel, nor reduce to certain Periods.*

But of the *Apotelesmatick* Part they boasted themselves not only the Inventors, but Masters; insomuch that all the Professors of it, of what Country soever, were (as we formerly shewed) called after them, *Chaldæans.*

CHAP. I.

Of the Stars fixed and erratick, and of their Præsignification.

THEY first lay [c] down for a Ground, That Terrestrials sympathise with the Cœlestials, and that every one of those is renewed by the Influence of these.

For every Man's endued with such a Mind,
As by the Sire of Gods and Men's assign'd.

Above [d] all things they hold that our Act and Life is subjected to the Stars, as well to the Erratick as the Fixed, and that Mankind is governed by their various and multiplicious Course: That [e] the Planets are of the kind of efficient Causes in every thing that happens in Life, and that the Signs of the Zodiack co-operate with them: That [f] they confer all Good and Ill to the Nativities of Men, and that by Contemplation of their Natures may be known the chief things that happen to Men.

They

[a] Proleg. in Manil. [b] Lib. 2. [c] Sext. Emp. Adv. Mathem. l. 2. [d] Censor. [e] Sext. Emp. loco cit. [f] Diod.

They [g] held the principal Gods to be Twelve, to each of which they attributed a Month, and one of the Signs of the Zodiack.

Next [h] the Zodiack they aſſert twenty-four Stars, whereof half they ſay are ranked in the Northern Parts, the other half in the Southern: Of theſe they which are apparent they conceive to be deputed to the Living, the inapparent congregated to the Dead: Theſe they call Judges of all things.

But the greateſt Obſervation and Theory they hold to be that concerning the five Stars termed Planets, which they call the Interpreters [i], becauſe the reſt of the Stars being fixed, and having a ſettled Courſe, theſe only having a peculiar Courſe, foretel Things that ſhall come to paſs, interpreting and declaring to Men the Benevolence of the Gods: For ſome things (ſay they) they pre-ſignify by their riſing, ſome things by their ſetting, ſome things by by their Colour, if obſerved; ſometimes they foretel great Winds, ſometimes extraordinary Rains or Droughts. Likewiſe the Riſing of Comets, and Eclipſes of the Sun, and of the Moon, and Earthquakes; and in a word, all Alterations in the Air ſignify things advantageous or hurtful, not only to Nations or Countries, but even to Kings and private Perſons.

Beneath the [k] Courſe of theſe, they hold that there are placed thirty Stars, which they call Conſiliary Gods; that half of theſe overſee the Places under the Earth, the other half overſee the Earth and the Buſineſs of Men, and what is done in the Heavens; and that every ten Days one of theſe is ſent to thoſe below as a Meſſenger, and in like manner one of the Stars under the Earth is ſent to thoſe above, and that they have this certain Motion ſettled in an eternal Revolution.

CHAP. II.

Of Planets.

THE [l] greateſt Theory they hold (as we ſaid) to be that which concerns the Planets: Theſe they call the Interpreters; becauſe, whereas the reſt of the Stars are fixed, and have a ſettled Courſe, theſe having their proper Courſes, foretel what things ſhall come to paſs, interpreting and declaring to Men the Benevolence of the Gods.

Of the [m] Seven, they hold the Sun and Moon to be the chief, and that the other five have leſs Power than they, as to the cauſing Events.

Of the five [n], they affirm there are three which agree with, and are aſſiſtant to the Sun, *viz. Saturn*, *Jupiter* and *Mercury*; theſe they call diurnal, becauſe the Sun, to whom they are aſſiſtant, predominates over the things that are done in the Day.

As [o] concerning the Powers of the five, ſome they ſay are benevolent, others malevolent, others common; the benevolent are *Jupiter* and *Venus*; the malevolent, *Mars* and *Saturn*; the common, *Mercury*, who is benevolent with the benevolent, and malevolent with the malevolent.

CHAP. III.

The Diviſions of the Zodiack.

THE *Chaldæans* [p] having at firſt no certain Rule of Obſervation of the other Stars, inaſmuch as they contemplated not the Signs as within their proper Circumſcriptions, but only together with their Obſervation of the ſeven Planets, it came at length into their Minds to divide the whole Circle into twelve Parts: The manner they relate thus; they ſay that the Ancients having obſerved ſome one bright Star of thoſe in the Zodiack, filled a Veſſel (in which they bor'd a Hole) with Water, and let the Water run into another Veſſel placed underneath, ſo long until the ſame Star roſe again; collecting that from the ſame Sign to the ſame, was the whole Revolution of the Circle: Then they took the twelfth Part of the Water which had run out, and conſidered how long it was in running; affirming that the 12th Part of the Circle paſt over in the ſame Space of Time; and that it had that Proportion to the whole Circle which the Part of Water had to the whole Water: By this Analogy (I mean of the Dodecatemorion or 12th Part) they marked out the extreme Term from ſome ſignal Star which then appeared, or from ſome that aroſe within that time, Northern, or Southern; the ſame Courſe they took in the reſt of the Dodecatemoria.

That to each of theſe Dodecatemoria, the ancient Chaldæans apply'd a particular Figure and a Character, (as for Inſtance, to the firſt, the Figure of a Ram, and this Character ♈) tho' denied by the Learned [q] *John Picus Mirandula*, ſeems manifeſt enough from what we find aſcribed peculiarly to them, by *Ptolomy*, *Sextus Empyricus* and others, which we ſhall cite in their due Places.

[r] To each of theſe Signs they appropriated one of the principal Gods, which they held to be Twelve, and one of the Months; the Zodiack itſelf they termed the Circle Mazaloth, which the Septuagint render μαζωθ, interpreted by *Suidas*, *the Conſtellations which are commonly termed* Ζῳδία, *Signs*; for *Mazal* ſignifieth a Star. That they aſcribed ſeveral Gods to them,

[g] Diod. l. 2. [h] Diod. loc. cit. [i] Ibid. [k] Ibid. [l] Diod. l. 2. [m] Sext. Emp. adv. Mathem. [n] Sext. Emp. loc. cit. [o] Ibid. [p] Ibid. [q] Contra Aſtrol. lib. [r] Diod. l. 2.

them, agreeth with what is said of the Followers of *Baal* (whom Rabbi *Maimonides* conceives the same with these Chaldæans) [r] *they burnt Incense to Baal, to the Sun and to the Moon, and to the Mazaloth, and to all the Host of Heaven.* Hence some are of Opinion that *Homer* received this Doctrine from the *Egyptians*, as the *Egyptians* from the *Chaldæans*; alluding to it in the first of his Iliads, where he mentions the Entertainment of *Jupiter* and the rest of the Gods in *Ethiopia* twelve Days, with the several Houses built for them by *Vulcan.* And better deserve they to be credited than those *Ancients*, who (according to *Eustathius*) writ that [s] *Homer* first gave the Hint of this Opinion to the Mathematicians. Neither is what he adds in Explication of this Mythology dissonant from the *Chaldaick* Doctrine, [t] that the making those Mansions for the Gods or Stars, is ascribed to *Vulcan* in respect of the Etherial Heat of the Celestial Orb.

[u] Of the Signs some they call Masculine, others Feminine; some Double, others Single; some Tropical, others Solid.

The Masculine or Feminine are those which have a Nature that co-operates towards the Generation of Males or Females. *Aries* is a Masculine Sign, *Taurus* a Feminine, *Gemini* a Masculine; in like manner the rest alternately are Masculine and Feminine. In Imitation of whom, as I conceive, the *Pythagoreans* call the Monad Masculine, the Duad Feminine, the Triad Masculine, and so on thro' all Numbers, Odd and Even. Some there are who divide every Sign into 12 Parts, observing almost the same Order; as in *Aries* they call the first 12th part *Aries* and Masculine, the second *Taurus* and Feminine, the third *Gemini* and Masculine, and so of the rest.

Double Signs are *Gemini*, and its diametrically opposite *Sagittarius*; *Virgo* and *Pisces:* The rest are single.

Tropical are those to which when the Sun cometh he turneth back, and maketh a Conversion: Such is the Sign *Aries*, and its opposite *Libra*, *Capricorn* and *Cancer*; In *Aries* is the Spring Tropick, in *Capricorn* the Winter, in *Cancer* the Summer, in *Libra* the Autumnal. The Solid are *Taurus* and its opposite [x] *Scorpio*, *Leo*, and *Aquarius.*

Some *Chaldæans* there are who attribute the several parts of Man's Body to particular Signs, as sympathizing with them; To *Aries* the Head, to *Taurus* the Neck, to *Gemini* the Shoulders, *Cancer* the Breast, *Leo* the Sides, *Virgo* the Bowels and Belly, *Libra* the Reins and Loins, *Scorpio* the Secret Parts and Womb, *Sagittarius* the Thighs, *Capricorn* the Knees, *Aquarius* the Legs, *Pisces*, the Feet. This did they not without Consideration, for if any Star shall be in any Assention of these malignant Signs, it will cause a Maim in that Part which bears the same Name with it. Thus much in brief of the Nature of the Signs in the Zodiack.

Besides this Division of the Zodiack into Signs [y], they subdivided every Sign into 30 Degrees, every Degree into 60 Minutes, so they call the least indivisible Parts, (as *Empiricus* affirms; whence it may be argued, that the *Chaldæans* made not any lower Divisions into Seconds, or the like.) The [z] Degrees being in every Sign 30, are in the whole Zodiack 360; in some one of these the Sun must necessarily be at the Time of the Nativity; which Degree the *Chaldeans* properly call the Place of the Birth. Hence the *Greeks* call these Degrees μόιρας, in Allusion to the μοίρας, Goddesses of Destiny, these being our Fates; for it is of greatest Importance which of these Degrees is Ascendant at the Time of Birth.

Three other ways there are of dividing of the Zodiack ascribed to the *Chaldeans*, which are *Triplicities*, *Terms*, *Decanates.*

The [a] Trigons or Triplicities are these four. The first is *Aries*, *Leo*, *Sagittarius*; the second *Taurus*, *Virgo*, *Capricorn*; the third *Gemini*, *Libra*, *Aquarius*; the last *Cancer*, *Scorpio*, *Pisces.* That the *Chaldæans* divided the Zodiack according to these Triplicities is manifest from their way of collecting the Terms of the Planets described by *Ptolemy.*

Every Sign hath five *Terms.* The [b] *Chaldaick* way of finding out the Quantity of the Terms in every Sign is one, and that very plain, for their Quantities differ by an equal Diminution; every Term is less than the precedent by one Degree, for they made the first Term of every Sign to be eight Degrees, the second seven, the third six, the fourth five, the fifth four, which makes up 30 Degrees.

Lastly, the Signs are divided into Faces, for so the Ancients called them; in Hebrew *Phanim*, in Arabick *Mageah*, in Greek πρόσωπα; but the later Astrologers, *Decanates* δεκάνες; *Decanos* a Word (as *Scaliger* [c] observes) deriv'd from the *Roman* Militia; of these in every Sign there are three, each of which comprehends ten Degrees. That the *Chaldæans* were not ignorant of these is manifest, inasmuch as *Temer* the *Babylonian*, an Author of great Antiquity, wrote concerning them.

CHAP. IV.

Of the Planets considered in respect to the Zodiack.

THE *Chaldæans* held that the [d] Planets have not always Power alike, as the procuring of Good and

[r] 2 Kings 23. [s] In Iliad. 1. [t] Ibid. [u] Sext. Emp. [x] Sext. loc. cit. [y] Sext. Emp. [z] Censorin. de die natali.
[a] Ptol. [b] Ptol. [c] In Manil. [d] Sext. Emp.

and Ill; but that in ſome Places [or Signs of the Zodiack] [c] they are more efficacious, in others leſs; and that ſome Stars have greater Power being in their proper Houſes, or in their Exaltations [or Triplicities,] or Terms, or Decanates. All which the later Aſtrologers call their Eſſential Dignities.

[d] The moſt efficacious is that of Houſes. They hold the Sun's Houſe to be *Leo*, the Moon's *Cancer*, *Saturn*'s *Capricorn* and *Aquarius*, Jupiter's *Sagittarius* and *Piſces*, that of *Mars Aries* and *Scorpio*, that of *Venus Taurus* and *Libra*, that of *Mercury Gemini* and *Virgo*.

[e] They call the Exaltations and Depreſſions of the Planets, when they are in Signs wherewith they are delighted, or when they are in thoſe in which they have little (or no) Power: For they are delighted in their Exaltations, but have little (or no) Power in their Depreſſions. As the Sun's Exaltation is in *Aries*, when he is exactly in the nineteenth Degree thereof, his Depreſſion is in the Sign and Degree diametrically oppoſite to it.

The Moon's Exaltation is in *Taurus*, her Depreſſion (or Detriment) in the Sign diametrically oppoſite. That of *Saturn* is in *Libra*, of *Jupiter* in *Cancer*, of *Mars* in *Capricorn*, of *Venus* in *Piſces*; and their Depreſſions are in the Signs diametrically oppoſite to their Exaltations.

The Trigones or Triplicities of Planets are order'd by the *Chaldeans* after this manner. [f] The Lord of the firſt Triplicity (of the Zodiack) is *Jupiter*, of the ſecond *Venus*; the ſame Order they obſerve in the other two Triplicities, except that the third is ſaid to have two Lords, *Saturn* and *Mercury*: The firſt Part of the Day is aſſigned to *Saturn*, the Night to *Mercury*. The Lord of the laſt Triplicity is *Mars*. How much this differs from the vulgar Way (which takes in the Sun and Moon) will eaſily appear to thoſe who will take the pains to compare them. The latter Way ſee in *Firmicus*.

[g] They call the Terms of the Planets in every Sign thoſe in which any Planet from ſuch a Degree to ſuch a Degree is moſt powerful or prevalent. [h] The *Chaldaick* Way of Terms is gathered from the Lords of the Triplicities, (which is plainer and more effectual than that of the *Egyptians* from the Lords of the Houſes) yet neither in their Orders nor Quantities do they always follow thoſe Planets which govern the Triplicities. In the firſt Triplicity, their Diviſion of Terms in every Sign thereof is one and the ſame. The firſt Term they give to the Lord of the Triplicity, *Jupiter*, the ſecond to the Lord of the following Triplicity, *Venus*, the third and fourth, to the two Lords of the Triplicity of the *Gemini*, which are *Saturn* and *Mercury*; the fifth, to the Lord of the laſt Triplicity, *Mars*. In the ſecond Triplicity they divide every Sign alike, and allot the firſt Term to *Venus*, by reaſon of her Dominion in that Triplicity; the ſecond and third to the two Lords of the Triplicity of the *Gemini*, which are *Saturn* and *Mercury*; the fourth to *Mars*; the laſt to *Jupiter*. To *Saturn* are attributed in the Day 66 Degrees, in the Night 78, to *Jupiter* 72, to *Mars* 60, to *Venus* 75, to *Mercury* in the Day 66, in the Night 78.

c Sext. Emp. loc. cit. d Ibid. e Sext. loc. cit. f Plot. g Sext. Emp. h Plot.

The Terms of the Chaldeans *or* Babylonians.

Aries	Jupiter	8	Venus	7	Saturn	6	Mercury	5	Mars	4
Taurus	Venus	8	Saturn	7	Mercury	6	Mars	5	Jupiter	4
Gemini	Saturn	8	Mercury	7	Mars	6	Jupiter	5	Venus	4
Cancer	Mars	8	Jupiter	7	Venus	6	Saturn	5	Mercury	4
Leo	Jupiter	8	Venus	7	Saturn	6	Mercury	5	Mars	4
Virgo	Venus	8	Saturn	7	Mercury	6	Mars	5	Jupiter	4
Libra	Saturn	8	Mercury	7	Mars	6	Jupiter	5	Venus	4
Scorpio	Mars	8	Jupiter	7	Venus	6	Saturn	5	Mercury	4
Sagittarius	Jupiter	8	Venus	7	Saturn	6	Mercury	5	Mars	4
Capricorn	Venus	8	Saturn	7	Mercury	6	Mars	5	Jupiter	4
Aquarius	Saturn	8	Mercury	7	Mars	6	Jupiter	5	Venus	4
Piſces	Mars	8	Jupiter	7	Venus	6	Saturn	5	Mercury	4

The *Decanates* or *Faces* of the Planets have reference to thoſe of the Zodiack; the firſt Face is that Planet whoſe Sign it is; the ſecond, the next Planet; and ſo on. That theſe were of ancient *Chaldaick* Invention is manifeſt, not only in regard that *Teucer* the *Babylonian* wrote concerning them, but likewiſe

they were obſerved by the *Egyptians*, who (as *Joſephus* ſaith) derived this Learning from the *Chaldeans*. *Nicipſo* King of *Ægypt*, a moſt juſt Governor and excellent Aſtrologer, did (if we credit *Julius Firmicus*) collect all Sickneſſes from the *Decanates*, ſhewing what Diſeaſes every *Decanate* cauſed; becauſe one Nature was overcome by another, and one God by another. The ſame Author adds, that *Ptoſiris* touched this Part of Aſtrology but lightly; not as being ignorant of it, but not willing to communicate his immortal Learning unto Poſterity.

CHAP. V.

Aſpects of the Signs and Planets.

EVery [a] Sign of the Zodiack hath a mutual Aſpect to the reſt; in like manner the Planets have ſeveral Aſpects: [b] They are ſaid to be in mutual Aſpect or Configuration, when they appear either in Trine or Square. They are ſaid to behold one another in Trine, when there is an Interpoſition of three Signs between them; in Square or Quartile, when of two.

[c] The Sun paſſing into the Sign next to that wherein he was at the time of Birth, regards the Place of Conception either with a very weak Aſpect, or not at all; for moſt of the *Chaldeans* have abſolutely denied, that the Signs which are next to one another behold one another; but when he is in the third Sign, that is, when there is a Sign betwixt them, then he is ſaid to behold the firſt Place whence he came, but with a very oblique and weak Light, which Aſpect is termed Sextile; for it ſubtends the ſixth Part of a Circle; for if we draw Lines from the firſt Sign to the third, from the third to the fifth, and from thence to the ſeventh, and ſo on, we ſhall deſcribe an æquilateral Hexagon. This Aſpect they did not wholly rely on, for that it ſeemed to conduce the leaſt to the Nativity of the Child; but when he comes to the fourth Sign, ſo that there are two betwixt, he looks on it with a quarterly Aſpect: For that Line which his Aſpect makes, cuts off a fourth Part of the Circle. When he is in the fifth, there being three betwixt it, is a Trine Aſpect, for it ſubtends a third Part of the Zodiack: which two Aſpects the Quartile and Trine, being very efficacious, afford much Increaſe to the Birth. But the Aſpect from the ſixth Place is wholly inefficacious, for the Line there makes not a Side of any Polygon, but from the ſeventh Sign, which is the oppoſite to the Aſpect, is moſt full and powerful, and bringeth forth ſome Infants already mature, termed Septimeſtres, from being born in the ſeventh Month: But if within that Space it be not mature, in the eighth Month it is not born; for from the eighth Sign, as from the ſixth, the Aſpect is inefficacious; but either in the ninth Month, or in the tenth; for the Sum from the ninth Sign beholds again the Particle of the Conception in a Trine Aſpect, and from the tenth in a Quartile; which Aſpects, as we ſaid, are very efficacious: But in the eleventh Month they hold it cannot be born, becauſe then the Light being weak, ſends forth his languiſhing Ray in a Sextile Aſpect; much leſs in the twelfth, which Aſpect is not at all valid.

CHAP. VI.

Schemes.

THE way by which the [d] *Chaldeans* from the very Beginning obſerved the Horoſcope of any Nativity, correſponds with that of their Diviſion of the Zodiack *(mentioned formerly:)* For a *Chaldean* ſat in the Night-time on ſome high Promontory contemplating the Stars; another ſat by the Woman in Travel until ſuch time as ſhe was delivered. As ſoon as ſhe was delivered, ſhe ſignified it to him on the Promontory, which as ſoon as he heard, he obſerved the Sign then riſing for the Horoſcope, but in the Day he attended the Aſcendants and Sun's Motion.

Of the twelve parts or Houſes into which the Zodiack is divided, [e] thoſe which are predominant in every Nativity, and chiefly to be conſidered in Prognoſticks, are four, by which one common Name they term Centers or Angles, but more particularly they call one the Horoſcope or Aſcendant, another the *Medium Cœli*, (the tenth Houſe,) another the Deſcendant, (the ſeventh Houſe,) another the ſubterreſtrial and oppoſite to the *Medium Cœli*, (the fourth Houſe.) The Horoſcope is that which happens to be Aſcendant at the time of the Birth, the *Medium Cœli* is the fourth Sign incluſively from it. The Deſcendant is that which is oppoſite to the Horoſcope. The Subterreſtrial and *Imum Cœli*, that which is oppoſite to the *Medium Cœli*: As (to explain it by an Example) if *Cancer* be the Horoſcope, *Aries* is the *Medium Cœli*, *Capricorn* Deſcendant, and *Libra* Subterreſtrial. That Houſe which goes before either of theſe Houſes they call cadent; that which followeth ſucceedent: Now that which goeth before the Horoſcope being apparent to us, they affirm to be of the ill *Genius*; that next which followeth the *Medium Cœli*, of the good *Genius*; that which is before the *Medium Cœli*, the inferior Portion and ſingle Lot, and God. That which is before the Deſcendant, a ſlothful Sign, and the Beginning of Death; that which is after the Aſcendant, and is not apparent to us, the Fury and ill Fortune; that which cometh under the Earth, good Fortune, oppoſite to the good *Genius*; that which is beyond the *Imum Cœli*

[a] Cenſor. c. 8 [b] Sext. Emp. adv. Mathem. [c] Cenſor. ibid. [d] Sext. Emp. [e] Sext Emp.

Cæll towards the Eaſt, Goddeſs; that which followeth the Horoſcope, ſlothful, which alſo is oppoſite to to the ſlothful.

Or more briefly thus: [f] The Cadent of the Horoſcope is called the ill Genius; the Succeedent, ſlothful; the Cadent of the *Medium Cæli*, God; the Succeedent, good *Genius*; the Cadent of the *Imum Cæli*, Goddeſs; the Succeedent, good Fortune; the Cadent of the Deſcendant, ill Fortune; the Succeedent, ſlothful. Theſe, as they conceive, ought to be examined not ſuperficially.

[g] Upon theſe Grounds the *Chaldeans* made their *Apoteleſmatick* Predictions, of wfiich there is a Difference; for ſome of them are more ſimple, others more accurate: The more ſimple thoſe which are made from any one Sign, or the ſimple Force of a ſingle Star, as that a Star being in ſuch a Sign ſhall cauſe ſuch kind of Men: The more accurate, thoſe which are made by the Concourſe, and as they ſay, the Contemporation of many. As if one Star be in the Horoſcope, another in the Mid-heaven, another in the oppoſite Point to the Mid-heaven, others thus or thus poſited, then theſe or theſe Things will come to paſs. Theſe are all the Remains of this Art, which can be attributed to the ancient *Chaldeans*.

CHAP. VII.

Other Arts of Divination.

THE *Chaldeans*, beſides Aſtrology, invented and uſed many other ways of Divination, of which [h] *Diodorus Siculus* inſtanceth, Divination by Birds, Interpretation of Dreams, Explication of Prodigies, and Hieroſcopy. [i] *R. Maimonides* likewiſe affirms, that among the *Chaldeans* anciently there aroſe ſeveral Sorts of Diviners; in particular theſe, *Megnonemim*, *Menacheſhim*, *Mecaſhephim*, *Chober chaber*, *Shel ob*, *Jideyoni*, *Doreſh el hammetim*; all which are mentioned, Deut. xviii. 10, 11.

The firſt aſcribed by *Diodorus* to the *Chaldeans*, is Divination of Birds, οἰωνῶν μάντικη, or Augury: neither is it probable, that they who were ſo great Inquiſitors into the ſeveral kinds of Divination, ſhould be ignorant of this, which After-ages eſteem'd one of the moſt conſiderable. But they who underſtand the Word *Menacheſhim* in this Senſe, ſeem to have been drawn to it by a Miſtake of the Latin Word *augurari*, by which it is rendred.

The next, Interpretation of Dreams, ἐξήγησεις ἐνυπνιον, [k] *Philo Judæus* affirms to have been invented by *Abraham*. That it was profeſs'd by the ancient *Chaldeans* appears from their Anſwer to *Nebuchadnezzar*, [l] *Tell thy Servants the Dream, and we will ſhew the Interpretation.* There are extant many onirocritical Verſes, under the Name of *Aſtrampſychus*, collected out of *Suidas*, and digeſted by *Joſeph Scaliger*: *Aſtrampſychus* is mentioned among the Magi, by *Laertius*: And [m] there are who conceive the Name to be only an Interpretation of the *Chaldean* or *Perſian Zoroaſter*, which ſome render, a living Star.

The third, Explication of Prodigies, ἐξήγησεις τερατῶν; this kind the *Greek* Interpreters conceive included in the Word *Jydeyoni*, for they render it ἐποιδὰς καὶ τερατοσκόπους.

The laſt that *Diodorus* mentions is *Hieroſcopy*, by which I conceive to be meant *extiſpicium*, Divination by Inſpection into the Entrails (ἱερειῶν) of ſacrificed Beaſts. That the *Chaldeans* uſed this kind, may be argued from the Prophet *Ezekiel*; who ſaith of the King of *Babylon* (uſing Divination) [n] *he looked into the Liver.* Theſe ſeem to be the *gazrin*, reckoned by [o] *Daniel* among the *Chaldean* Diviners, from *gazar*, to cut; for they cut open the Beaſt, and divined by his Entrails.

Ob is rendered *Pytho*, or rather *Pythonicus Spiritus*: The Word originally ſignifieth a Bottle; and thereupon is taken for that Spirit which ſpeaketh *ex utero Pythoniſſæ*. The ſacred Text calls the Woman *Eſheth Baaleth Ob*, which the Septuagint render γυναῖκα ἐγγαστρίμυθον; and where *Saul* ſaith, [p] *I pray thee divine to me in Ob*; they tranſlate, μαντεύσαι δή μοι ἐν τῷ ἐγγαστριμύθῳ. *R. Maimonides* ſaith, ſhe that was *initiated, held in her Hand a Myrtle Wand, and received Suffumigations. R. Abraham ben David*, that *theſe Rites were uſually performed at ſome dead Man's Tomb.*

Doreſh el hammetim, is properly (as rendred) a *Necromancer*; [q] ſome affirm this kind of Divination had its Original in *Chaldea*.

Theſe and the reſt of this kind are all comprehended under the general Name *Mecaſhphim*; of which formerly.

SECT. III.

Magick, Natural, and Theurgick,

THE third Part of the *Chaldaick* Doctrine was *Magick*: for though the Name is conceived to be *Perſian* (by ſome derived from *Mog*, [r] a Sirname of the *Perſian Zoroaſter*, [s] by others, from the *Maguſſæans*) yet this Science itſelf was originally *Chaldean*, and properly the Study of the *Aſhapim*; of whom *Laertius* is to be underſtood, when he ſaith, that the *Chaldeans* were the ſame with the *Babylonians*, as the *Magi* with the *Perſians*: Hence it is alſo, that the Term *Magi* is ſometimes extended to the *Chaldean* Philoſophers.

[f] Sext. loc. cit. [g] Ibid. [h] Lib. 11 [i] Mor. Nev. l. 3. c. 29. [k] Suid. [l] Dan. 2. [m] Urſin. Zor. [n] Chap. 21. [o] Chap. 2. v. 21. [p] 1 Sam. 22. v. 8. [q] Fran. Mirand. de rer. prænot. lib. 4. p. 328. [r] Salmaſ. Suid.

Pliny indeed saith, that [t] *Magick* had its Beginning in *Persia* from *Zoroaster*; but adds, that whether this *Zoroaster* was one, or afterwards a second also, is not certain: And that he rather meant the *Chaldean*, than the *Persian*, may be inferred from his citing those Authors who placed this *Zoroaster* 6000 Years before *Plato*, or 5000 Years before the *Trojan* War; which Accounts (tho' extravagant) were doubtless intended of the most ancient *Zoroaster*, the *Chaldean*. He likewise instanceth, [u] as skilful in this Art, *Marmaridius* a *Babylonian*, and *Zormocenidas* an *Assyrian*, both so ancient, as that there are not any Monuments of them extant.

The few Remains we find of the *Chaldean Magick* may be reduced to two kinds, *Natural* and *Theurgick*.

CHAP. I.

Natural Magick.

THE first Part of the *Chaldaick* Magick is that which we commonly term *natural*; because it contemplates the Virtues of all natural Beings, cœlestial and sublunary, [w] makes Scrutiny into their Sympathy and mutual Application of them, produceth extraordinary Effects.

By this kind of Magick the *Chaldeans* professed [x] to perform many admirable Things, not only upon particular Persons, but upon whole Countries. *R. Maimonides* instanceth [y] the expelling noxious Animals, as Lions, Serpents, and the like, out of Cities; the driving away all kinds of Harms from Plants, Prevention of Hail, the destroying of Worms, that they hurt not the Vines. Concerning these (saith he) they have written much in their Books; and some there are who boast they can cause that no Leaves or Fruit shall fall from the Trees.

CHAP. II.

Magical Operations, their Kinds.

THEIR Operations [z] *R. Maimonides* reduceth to three kinds. The first of those which deal in Plants, Animals and Metals. The second, consists in Circumscription and Determination of some Time, in which the Operations are to be performed. The third consists in human Gestures and Actions; as in clapping the Hands, leaping, crying aloud, laughing, lying prostrate on the Earth, burning any Thing, kindling of Smoak, and lastly, in pronouncing certain Words intelligible or unintelligible. These are the kinds of their magical Operations.

[a] Some there are which are not performed but by all these kinds: As when they say, Take such a Leaf of such an Herb, when the Moon is in such a Degree and Place: Or, Take of the Horn of such a Beast, or of his Hair, Sweat, or Blood, such a Quantity, when the Sun is in the Middle of Heaven, or in some other certain Place: Or, Take of such a Metal, or of many Metals, melt them under such a Constellation, and in such a Position of the Moon; then pronounce such and such Words; make a Suffumigation of such and such Leaves, in such and such a Figure, and this or that Thing shall come to pass.

[b] Other magical Operations there are which they conceive may be performed by one of the forementioned kinds, only these (say they) are performed for the most part by Women, as we find amongst them: For the bringing forth of Waters, if ten Virgins shall adorn themselves, and put on red Garments, and leap in such a manner that one shall thrust on the other; and this to be done going backwards and forwards, and afterwards shall stretch out their Fingers towards the Sun, making certain Signs; this Action being finished, they say, that Waters will issue forth. In like manner they write, that if four Women, *&c.* using certain Words and certain Gestures, by this Action they shall divert Hail from falling down. Many other such like Vanities they mention all along their Writings, which are to be performed by Women.

[c] But none of these (as they imagine) can be performed without having Respect and Consideration of the Stars; for they conceive, that every Plant hath its proper Star. They ascribe also certain Stars to all living Creatures and Metals: Moreover, these Operations are peculiar Worships of the Stars, and that they are delighted with such an Action, or Speech, or Suffumigation, and for its sake afford them what they wish. Hitherto *R. Maimonides*, who only hath preserved these Remains of the ancient *Chaldaick* Superstition.

CHAP. III.

Of the Tsilmenaia (or Telesmes) used for Averruncation.

MOreover, the *Chaldeans* are by the Rabbies reported, to have been the first that found out the secret Power of Figures; neither was there any thing more celebrious than the Images of this kind, made by them.

They are called in *Chaldee* and *Persian*, *Tsilmenaia*, from the *Hebrew*, *Tselem*, *an Image*; in *Arabick*, *Talitsnam*, or *Tsalimam*, perhaps from the same Root; rather than as some conjecture from the Greek Word, Τελέσμα τετελέσμενοι.

These Images were prepared under certain Constellations, for several Purposes; some for Averruncation, others for Prediction.

Those

[t] Lib. 30. c. 1. [u] Loc. cit. [w] Psel. [x] Maimon. Mor. Ne. [y] Mor. Ne. l. 3. c. 37. [z] Mor. Ne.
[a] Loc. cit. [b] Loc. cit. [c] Maim. Mor. Ne.

Thoſe that ſerve for *Averruncation*, ſome conceive to have been of later Invention, and aſcribe them to *Apollonius Tyanæus*; he indeed was the firſt amongſt the *Grecians* that was famous for them: But it is moſt probable that he brought this Art out of the Eaſt, there being yet to be ſeen many of theſe Figures or Teleſms throughout the whole Eaſtern Part of the World, and ſome of them very ancient, which [d] *Gafferel* alledgeth, to confirm that the *Perſians*, or if you will, the *Babylonians*, were the firſt that found them out.

Theſe the *Greeks* term alſo στοιχεῖα, and στοχειώσεις, and the Makers of them *Stoicheiomaticks*: "[e] *Ptolemy*, "The generable and corruptible Forms are affected "by the celeſtial Forms; for which Reaſon the "*Stoicheiomaticks* make uſe of them, conſidering "the Entrance of Stars into them: On which "Words *Hali Aben Rodoan* (or as the *Hebrew* "Tranſlation, *Aben Giafar*) writes thus. In this "Chapter, *Ptolemy* means to diſcover many Secrets "of Images; and that the Figures which are here "below are correſpondent to the like Figurations "above, which predominate over them: As for In-"ſtance, the celeſtial *Scorpion* predominates over the "terreſtrial *Scorpions*, and the celeſtial *Serpent* over "the terreſtrial *Serpents*; and the skilful in Images, "(*Stoicheiomaticks*) obſerved, when a Planet was "out of his Combuſtion, and entred into any of "theſe Figures, then placing the Planet in the Ho-"roſcope, they engraved the Figure upon a Stone, "and having added what elſe was neceſſary, they "fitted it for Preſervation, or Deſtruction, as they "pleaſed; and this Power continued in the Stone a "long time after."

CHAP. IV.

Of the Tſilmenaia, uſed for Prediction.

ANother kind there was of Tſilmenaia, or Teleſmes, uſed for Prediction: "Theſe Images (ac-"cording to the Deſcription of [f] *R. Maimonides*) "they did erect to the Stars: Of Gold to the Sun, "of Silver to the Moon, and ſo diſtributed the "Metals and Climates of the Earth among the "Stars; for they ſaid, that ſuch a Star is the God "of ſuch a Climate. There they built Temples, "and placed the Images in them, conceiving that "the Power of the Stars did flow into thoſe Images, "and that thoſe Images had the Faculty of Under-"ſtanding, and did give to Men the Gift of Pro-"phecy; and in a word, did declare to them what "Things were good for them. So alſo they ſay of "Trees, which belong to thoſe Stars, every Tree "being dedicated to ſome Star, and planted to its "Name, and worſhipped for this or that Reaſon; "becauſe the ſpiritual Virtues of the Stars are infus'd "into that Tree. So that after the manner of "Prophecy, they diſcourſe to Men, and ſpeak to "them alſo in Dreams."

The Word *Teraphim*, in the ſacred Scripture, among other Significations, is ſometimes taken for theſe Images; whence [g] *Onkelos*, the *Chaldee* Paraphraſt, renders it *Tſilmenaia*, with which the *Syriack* Verſion agrees; the Septuagint δῆλως and ἀποφθεγγομένους, and φωτισμούς; implying, by all theſe Interpretations, that they were indued with the Gift of Prediction: Which is no more than the Text itſelf confirms; For [h] *Ezekiel* ſaith of the King of *Babylon*, uſing Divination, that *he conſulted the Teraphim.*

Of this kind are thoſe *Teraphims* conceived to be, which *Rachel* ſtole from her Father *Laban*; for he calls them his [i] *Gods*; the *Coptick* Verſion renders it, *the greateſt of his Gods*: *R. D. Kimchi* conceives they were made by Aſtrologers, to foretel Things to come, and that they were Images whoſe Figures we know not, by which the Ancients were informed of future Events, they being in ſome manner like the Oracles, which often ſpake by the Mouth of the Devil. *R. Eliezer*, that they were Statues made in the Figure of Men under certain Conſtellations, whoſe Influences (which they were capable of receiving) cauſed them to ſpeak at ſome ſet Hours, and give an Anſwer to whatſoever was demanded of them. *Aben Ezra*, That they were made after the Shapes of Men, to the end they might be capable of celeſtial Influence (and in the ſame manner interprets he the *Teraphim* placed by *Micah* in *David*'s Bed.) Adding, that the Reaſon why *Rachel* took them away, was not to take her Father off from Idolatry; for if it were ſo, why then did ſhe take them along with her, and not rather hide them in the Way near his Houſe? But by reaſon that her Father was skilful in Aſtrology, ſhe feared, leſt by conſulting thoſe Images and the Stars, he ſhould know which way *Jacob* was gone. And St. *Auſtin*, [k] that *Laban* ſaith, *Why haſt thou ſtolen my Gods?* It is perhaps inaſmuch as if he had ſaid he divined; [[l] *I divined the Lord becauſe of thee*;] for ſo the more ancient Expoſitors interpret the Word *Nicaſhti*; and the [m] *Jews* underſtand that Place, of Preſcience, Divination or Conjecture, as Mr. *Selden* obſerves.

Philo Judæus, ſpeaking of the [n] *Teraphim* of *Micah*, fancies that *Micah* made of fine Gold and Silver three Images of young Lads, and three Calves, and one Lion, one Dragon, and one Dove; ſo that if any had a mind to know any Secret concerning his Wife, he was to have Recourſe to the Image of the Dove, which anſwered his Demands; if concerning his Children, he went to the Boy; if concerning Riches, to the Eagle; if concerning Power and Strength, to the Lion; if it any thing concerned Sons

[d] Curioſ. inandit. [e] Centiloq. [f] Mor. Ne. [g] Gen. 3. [h] Ch. 21. 21. [i] Gen. 31. [k] Gen. quæſt. 94. [l] Gen. 30. [m] De Diis Syriis, Syntag. 1. [n] Judg. 17.

Sons and Daughters, he went then to the Calves; and if about the Length of Years and Days, he was to consult the Image of the Dragon. This, how light soever, shews that he also understood the *Teraphim* to be prophetical.

CHAP. V.

Theurgic Magick.

THE other Part of the *Chaldaick* Magick is *Theurgick*; to which perhaps *Plato* more particularly alluded, when he defined [o] the Magick of *Zoroaster*, the Service of the Gods. This they called also [p] the Method of Rites, the Works of Piety, and (as rendred by the *Greeks*) τελέσικην ἐπισήμην, *The teleſtick Science and Teliurgick*. Of what it did consist may be gathered from what *Suidas* saith of the two *Julians*; *Julian* (saith he) the *Chaldean*, a Philosopher, Father of *Julian*, surnamed the *Theurgick*; he wrote of Dæmons four Books; they treat of Preservatives of every Part of Man's Body, of which kind are the *Chaldaick* Telesiurgicks. And again, *Julian*, Son of the afore-mentioned, lived under *Marcus Antoninus* the Emperor; he also wrote Theurgick Initiatory Oracles in Verse; and all other Secrets of the Science.

Thus the Teleſtick Science was conceived to procure a Conversation with Dæmons by certain Rites and Ceremonies, and [q] to initate or perfect the Soul by the Power of Materials here on Earth; for the supreme Faculty of the Soul cannot, by its own Guidance, aspire to the sublimest Institution, and to the Comprehension of Divinity; but the Work of Piety leads it by the Hand to God by Illumination from thence. *Plato* indeed holds, that we may comprehend the ungenerate Essence by Reason and Intellect; but the *Chaldean* asserts, that there is no other means for us to arrive at God, but by strengthning the Vehicle of the Soul by material Rites; for he supposeth that the Soul is purified by Stones, and Herbs, and Charms, and is rendred expedite for Ascent.

It is likewise beneficial to the Body, as well as to the Soul; for [r] if a Man shall give his Mind to these, he shall not only render his Soul unvanquishable by Passions, but shall also preserve his Body the better in Health: for the usual Effect of divine Illuminations is to consume the Matter of the Body, and to establish Nature by Health, that we be not seized either by Passions or Diseases.

CHAP. VI.

Theurgick Rites.

BY *theurgick* or *teleſtick* Rites they conceived, that they could procure a Communication with the good Dæmons, and Expulsion and Averruncation of the bad.

The chief of these Rites was Sacrifice; concerning which, there is a remarkable Passage in [s] *Jamblichus*, who delivers the *Chaldaick* Opinion thus: The Gods give those Things that are truly good, to such as are purified by Sacrifices; with whom also they converse, and by their Communication drive away Wickedness and Passion far from them, and by their Brightness chase from thence the dark Spirit; for the evil Spirits, when the Light of the Gods cometh in, fly away as Shadows at the Light of the Sun: Neither are they able any longer to disturb the pious Sacrificer, who is free from all Wickedness, Perverseness, and Passion. But such as are pernicious, and behave themselves insolently in opposition to sacred Rites and Orders, these, by reason of the Imbecility of their Action, and Want of Power, are not able to attain to the Gods, but because of certain Pollutions, are driven away from the Gods, and associated with ill Dæmons, by whose bad Breath they are inspir'd, and depart thence most wicked, prophane, and dissolute; unlike the Gods in Desire, but in all things resembling the bad Dæmons with whom they converse daily. These Men therefore being full of Passion and Wickedness, by the Affinity that is betwixt them, draw the evil Spirits to them, by whom being quickly possest, they are again excited to all Iniquity, one assisting and strengthning the other, like a Circle whose Beginning and End meet.

Several other Rites they used also, which they conceived to be prevalent in Evocation of these Dæmons. They are allowed (saith [t] *Gregorius Nicephorus*) out of the Air and Earth, by certain Stones or Pulse, or certain Voices or Figures, which they call Characters, invented by the *Chaldeans* and *Egyptians*, who first found out the proper dignoscitive Sign of every Dæmon.

Some few of these are mentioned in the *Chaldaick* Oracles; as,

When thou seest the terrestrial Dæmon approach,
Sacrifice the Stone Mnizuris, *using Invocation.*

The Dæmons (saith *Psellus*) that are near the Earth, are by Nature lying, as being far off from the Divine Knowledge, and filled with dark Matter. Now if you would have any true Discourse from these, prepare an Altar, and sacrifice the Stone *Mnizuris:* This Stone hath the Power of Evocations; the other greater Dæmon who invisibly approacheth to the material Dæmon, will pronounce the true Relation of Demands, which transmits to the Demandant the Oracle the vocative Name, with the sacrificing of the Stone.

Another of these Rites mentioned by the same Oracles, is that of the *Hecatine Strophalus*.

Labour about the Hecatine Strophalus.

The

[o] Alcibiad. 1. [p] Psel. in Orac. [q] Psel. in Orac. [r] Psel. in Orac. [s] De Myster. Egypt. [t] De Anſommiis.

The *Hecatine Strophalus* (ſaith *Pſellus*) is a golden Ball, in the midſt whereof is a Saphire, they fold about it a Leather Thong, it is beſet all over with Characters; thus whipping it about, they made their Invocations. Theſe they uſe to call Jynges, whether it be round or triangle, or any other Figure; and whilſt they are doing thus, they make inſignificant or brutiſh Cries, and laſh the Air with their Whips. The Oracle adviſeth to the Performance of theſe Rites, or ſuch a Motion of the *Strophalus*, as having an expreſſible Power. It is called *Hecatine*, as being dedicated to *Hecate*. *Hecate* is a Goddeſs amongſt the *Chaldeans*, having at her right Side the Fountain of Virtues.

No little Efficacy was attributed to certain Words uſed in theſe Rites, which the *Chaldaick* Oracles expreſly forbid to be changed.

Never change barbarous Names.

There are certain Names (ſaith *Pſellus*) among all Nations delivered to them by God, which have an unſpeakable Power in Divine Rites; change not theſe into the *Greek* Dialect; As *Seraphim* and *Cherubin*, and *Michael* and *Gabriel*; theſe, in the *Hebrew* Dialect, have an unſpeakable Efficacy in Divine Rites; but changed into *Greek* Names, are ineffectual.

CHAP. VII.

Apparitions.

THE Apparitions procured by theſe Rites are of two kinds.

The [u] firſt is called ἐποπτεία, *Super-inſpection* (in reſpect to the initiated Perſon.) When he who orders the divine Rites ſeeth a meer Apparition, (as for inſtance) of Light in ſome Figure or Form, concerning which the *Chaldaick* [w] Oracle adviſeth, that if any one ſees ſuch a Light, he apply not his Mind to it, nor eſteem the Voice proceeding from thence to be true. Sometimes [x] likewiſe to many initiated Perſons there appears whilſt they are ſacrifiſing ſome Apparitions in the Shape of Dogs, and ſeveral other Figures. Theſe are Apparitions of the Paſſions of the Soul in performing divine Rites, meer Appearances, having no Subſtance, and therefore not ſignifying any thing true.

The ſecond is called [y] αὐτοπτία, *Self-inſpection*; this is when the initiated Perſon ſeeth the divine Light itſelf without any Figure or Form: This the Oracle calls ἐυιερὸν, [z] *Sacro-ſanct*, for that it is ſeen with a Beauty by ſacred Perſons, and glides up and down pleaſantly and graciouſly through the Depths of the World. This [a] will not deceive the initiated Perſon, but whatſoever Queſtion you ſhall propoſe, the Anſwer will be moſt true,

When thou ſeeſt (ſaith the Oracle) *a ſacred Fire without*
Form, ſhining flaſhingly thro' the Depths of the whole World,
Hear the Voice of Fire.

When [b] thou beholdeſt the divine Fire void of Figure, brightly gliding up and down the World, and graciouſly ſmiling, liſten to this Voice, as bringing a moſt perfect Preſcience.

But [c] theſe things which appear to initiated Perſons, as Thunder, Lightning, and all elſe whatſoever, are only Symbols or Signs, not the Nature of God.

CHAP. VIII.

Material Dæmons how to be repulſed.

AS it is one Property of *Theurgy* to evocate and procure a Converſation with good Demons, ſo is it another, to repulſe and chaſe away the material Demons, which, as they conceive may be effected ſeveral Ways; either by Words or Actions.

By *Words:* For (as [d] *Marcus* delivers the *Chaldaick* Opinion) theſe material Dæmons fearing to be ſent to Abyſſes and ſubterraneal Places, and ſtanding in awe of the Angels who ſend them thither, if a Man threaten to ſend them thither, and pronounce the Names of thoſe Angels whoſe Office that is, it is hardly to be expreſſed how much they will be affrighted and troubled; ſo great will their Aſtoniſhment be, as that they are not able to diſcern the Perſon that menaces them; and tho' it be ſome old Woman, or a little old Man that threatens them, yet ſo great is their Fear, that they depart as if he that menaces were able to kill 'em.

By *Actions:* For the Bodies of Dæmons (ſaith the ſame [e] Author) are capable of being ſtruck, and are pained thereby; Senſe is not the Property of Compounds, but of Spirits; That thing in a Man which feeleth, is neither the Bone nor the Nerve, but the Spirit which is in them: Whence, if the Nerve be preſſed or ſeized with cold, or the like, there ariſeth Pain from the Emiſſion of one Spirit into another; for it is impoſſible that a compound Body ſhould in itſelf be ſenſible of Pain, but in as much as it partakes of Spirit; and therefore being cut into Pieces, or dead, it is abſolutely inſenſible, becauſe it hath no Spirit. In like manner, a Dæmon being all Spirit, is of his own Nature ſenſible in every Part; he immediately ſeeth and heareth; he is obnoxious to ſuffering by Touch; being cut aſunder, he is pained like

[u] Pſel. in Orac. 15. [w] Ibid. 14. [x] Ibid. 19. [y] Ibid. 15. [z] Loc. cit. [a] Ibid. [b] Pſel. in Orac. 21. [c] Ibid. [d] Pſel. de Dæmon. [e] Ibid.

like solid Bodies; only herein differing from them, that other things being cut asunder, can by no means, or very hardly be made whole again; whereas the Dæmon immediately comes together again, as Air or Water parted by some more solid Body. But tho' this Spirit join again in a Moment, at the time in which the Dissection is made 'tis pain'd; for this Reason they are much afraid of Swords; which they who chase them away knowing, stick up pointed Irons or Swords in those Places where they would not have them come, chasing them away by things antipathetical to them, as they allure them by things sympathetical.

From these Material Demons, upon [f] those that worship them, descend certain fiery Irradiations, like those they call falling Stars, gliding up and down, which those mad Persons term Apparitions of God; but there is nothing true, firm, or certain in them, but Cheats, like those of Jugglers, which the common People term Wonders, because they deceive the Eye, [g] for being removed far from the Beatitude of divine Life, and destitute of intellectual Contemplation, they cannot presignify Futures, but all that they say or shew is false and not solid; for they know Beings μορφωτικῶς, by their Outsides, but that which knoweth Futures particularly, useth Notions indivisible and not figured.

SECT. IV.

Of the Gods, and Religious Worship of the Chaldæans.

IN the last place, as to the Explication of the *Chaldaick* Doctrine, (especially of that part which concerns their *Ashaphim*) it is necessary we give account of the Gods of the *Chaldæans*, and of their Religious Worship.

And tho' Mr. *Selden* hath reduced all the *Asiatick* Gods under the common Name of *Syrian* in his excellent Treatise upon that Subject; yet we shall take notice of such only as were proper to *Assyria*, (whether as being worshipped no where else, or from thence brought into *Syria* and other Countries) conceiving the rest nothing pertinent to the *Chaldæans* or *Babylonians*.

The Religious Worship of the *Chaldæans* may be reduced to three Kinds: The first, a Worship of the true God, but after an idolatrous manner: The second, of Demons, or Spirits: The third, of the celestial Bodies, and Elements.

CHAP. I.

Of their idolatrous Worship of the true God.

THE first kind of the *Chaldaick* Worship was of the true God, tho' after an idolatrous Manner: The Author of the *Chaldaick* Summary affirms, that *they held one Principle of all things, and declare that it is one and good.* That by this *one* and *good* they meant the true God, (to whom alone those Attributes belong) may be gathered from [h] *Eusebius*, who saith, (speaking doubtless of the Followers of *Zoroaster*) that *in the first place they conceive God the Father and King ought to be ranked*; for this Reason the *Delphian* Oracle, attested by *Porphyrius*, joins them with the *Hebrews*;

> Chaldees *and* Jews *wise only, worshipping*
> *Purely a self-begotten God and King.*

But (notwithstanding the Oracle) that this Worship, though of the true God, was idolatrous, is beyond doubt; so as to them might be applied what St. *Paul* saith of the *Romans*, *When* [i] *they knew God they glorify'd him not as God*, but [k] *changed the Glory of the uncorruptible God into an Image made like to corruptible Man.*

The Name and Image whereby they represented the supreme God was that of *Bel*, as appears by the Prohibition given by God himself, not to call him so any more; *Thou* [l] *shalt call me no longer Baali: Bel* with the *Chaldæans* is the same as *Baal* with the *Phœnicians*, both derived from the Hebrew *Baal*, *Lord*; this *Bel* of the *Babylonians* is mentioned by the Prophets *Esay* and *Jeremy*. They who first translated the Eastern Learning into *Greek*, for the most part interpret this *Bel* by the Word Ζεὺς, *Jupiter*. So *Herodotus*, *Diodorus*, *Hesychius*, and others: *Berosus* (saith *Eusebius*) was Priest of *Belus*, whom they interpret (Δία) *Jupiter*; the Reason of which seems to be, for that *Bel* was the chief God with the *Chaldæans*, as *Jupiter* with the *Græcians*, who by that Name meant the true God, as the *Chaldæans* by the other; for to him St. *Paul* applies that Hemistick of *Aratus*, τοῦ γὰρ καὶ γένος ἐσμέν, (*for we are also his Off-spring*) which hath Reference to the first Verse, ἐκ Διὸς ἀρχώμεσθα. And [m] upon these Words of St. *Peter*, *Worship ye God, but not as the Grecians*; *Clemens Alexandrinus* [n] observes, that he saith not, *Worship not the God whom the Grecians, but as the Grecians*; *he changed the manner of the Worship, but preached not another God.*

The Temple of this *Jupiter Belus* at *Babylon*, is exactly described by *Herodotus*, an Eye-witness, in whose time it was yet extant, thus: The [o] Gates were of Brass; the Temple itself square; every Side two Furlongs broad. In the midst of the Temple there was a solid Tower (not hollow) of Thickness and Height of a *Stadium*; upon which there was set another, and another upon that, and so on to eight: On the Outside of these were Stairs, by which to go up every one of them; in the midst of the Stairs were Seats for such as went up, to rest themselves:

[f] Psel. de Dæmon. [g] Psel. in Orac. 23. [h] Præpar. Evang. l. 4. [i] Rom. i. 20. [k] Verse 23. [l] Hos. ii. 16.
[m] Acts xvii. 28. [n] Strom. 6. [o] Lib. 1.

ſelves: In the higheſt Tower there was another Temple (or Chapel) and in it a Bed ſumptuouſly furniſh'd, and a Table of Gold; but neither in this was there any Statue, nor doth any Perſon lie here a-nights except one Woman, a Foreigner, of whom the God makes choice above all other, as the *Chaldæans* who are Prieſts of this God aver: for they ſay (tho' I hardly credit it) that the God himſelf comes into this Temple, and reſts in this Bed: There is moreover in this Temple another lower Chapel, in which there is a great Statue of *Jupiter* all of Gold, ſitting; and beſide it a Table and Bench all of Gold alſo, inſomuch that the *Chaldæans* value it at 800 Talents: Likewiſe without the Chapel there is an Altar of Gold, and another Altar very great, upon which are ſacrificed Sheep of full Growth; for upon that of Gold, it is not lawful to ſacrifice any but Sucklings: On this greater Altar the *Chaldæans* burn yearly of Frankincenſe to the Value of 100000 Talents, in ſacrifice to their Gods. There was alſo at the ſame time in this Temple a Statue 12 Cubits high, of maſſy Gold, which I ſaw not, but take upon the Report of the *Chaldæans*; this Statue *Darius* Son of *Hyſtaſpes* had a great Mind to take, but durſt not; but his Son *Xerxes* afterwards took it, and ſlew the Prieſt which forbad him to ſtir it: Thus was this Temple built and beautified, beſide infinite Gifts and Preſents. Hitherto *Herodotus*. He terms the Prieſts of *Belus*, *Chaldæans*; and *R. Maimonides* aſſerts the *Chaldæan* Idolaters to be the ſame with the Prophets of *Baal*.

The Feſtival of *Bel* is mentioned, 2 *Kings* x. 20. his Oracle by *Arrian*; the ſame which *Stephanus* means, ſaying, The *Chaldæans* had an Oracle which was no leſs in Eſteem with them, than that at *Delphi* was with the *Grecians*.

CHAP. II.

Worſhip of other Gods, Angels and Dæmons.

THE ſecond kind of their religious Worſhip, was that of other Gods, Angels and Dæmons: Next the ſupreme God (ſaith *Euſebius*, delivering their Opinion) there followeth a Multitude of other Gods, Angels and Dæmons. Theſe Gods they diſtinguiſhed into ſeveral Orders, *Intelligibles*; *Intelligibles and Intellectuals*; *Intellectuals*; *Fountains*; *Principles*; *Unzoned Gods*; *Zoned Gods*; *Angels and Dæmons*. To the Worſhip of theſe belongs what we have already delivered concerning their Theurgy.

CHAP. III.

The Chaldæan *Worſhip of the Cœleſtial Bodies.*

THE third kind of idolatrous Worſhip uſed by the *Chaldæans* and *Babylonians* was of the Celeſtial Bodies; into which, *Maimonides* [p] ſaith, they fell ſoon after the Flood; perhaps occaſioned by their continual Addiction to Contemplation of them, and grounded upon Obſervation of the great Benefits communicated to Mankind by their Influence.

The *Levitical* Law, in prohibiting this Idolatry, ſets down the Particulars of it; [q] *Leſt thou lift up thine Eyes unto Heaven, and when thou ſeeſt the Sun, and the Moon, and the Stars, even all the Hoſt of Heaven, ſhould be driven to worſhip them and ſerve them.* And of the *Jewiſh* Idolaters put down by *Joſiah* [r] (beſides thoſe that burnt Incenſe to *Baal*, of whom already) are reckoned thoſe that burnt Incenſe *to the Sun, and to the Moon, and the Planets* (or Signs, *Mazaloth*) *and to all the Hoſt of Heaven*. This doubtleſs they learned of their Neighbours the *Aſſyrians*, on whom the Prophet *Ezekiel* complains that they doted.

CHAP. IV.

Of the Sun.

THE Sun and Moon are firſt named and diſtinguiſhed from the reſt; with them perhaps this Kind of Idolatry began, before it came to be apply'd to any of the other Stars; for in the moſt ancient mention of it, (which is by *Job*, a Neighbour to the *Chaldæans*) we find theſe two only named: That the *Chaldæans* [s] eſteemed theſe the Principal, is confirmed by *R. Maimonides*, who ſaith, *They* [t] *held the reſt of the ſeven Planets to be Gods, but the two Luminaries the greateſt.*

But [u] *of theſe* (adds *Maimonides*) *they held the Sun to be the greateſt God.* What he farther relates in Confirmation hereof, out of the Books of the *Sabæans* concerning *Abraham*, and the like, was delivered formerly. Of the *Aſſyrian* Idols dedicated to the Sun, *Macrobius* mentions three, *Adad*, *Adonis* and *Jupiter Heliopolites*.

Adad [w] ſignifieth One; this God they adore as moſt powerful, but they join with him a Goddeſs named *Atargates*, aſcribing to theſe two an abſolute Power over all things; by theſe they mean the Sun and the Earth: That hereby they underſtand the Sun, is manifeſt, for the Image of *Adad* is very fair, and hath Beams bending downwards, to ſhew that the Power of Heaven conſiſts in the Beams of the Sun, ſent down upon the Earth. The Image of *A-*

[p] Mor. Ne. l. 3. [q] Deut. iv. 19. [r] 2 Kings xxiii. 5. [s] Cap. xxxi. v. 26. [t] Mor. Ne. l. 3. [u] Ibid. [w] Saturn. l. c. 21.

targetes hath Beams erected, to shew that the Earth produceth all things by the Power of the Beams sent from above: Thus *Macrobius*. But whereas he saith that *Adad* signifieth One, either he himself is mistaken, or his Text depraved, for (as Mr. *Selden* observes) with the *Syrians*, and *Chaldæans* or *Assyrians*, *Chad*, from the Hebrew *Achad*, signifieth One; but *Adad* or *Adod* which in the Scripture is *Hhadad*, is of a different spelling; *Drusius* reads (in *Macrobius*) *Hhada*, which signifies *One* in *Syriack*. Of this Idol perhaps is the Prophet *Isaiah* to be understood, *They* [x] *that sanctify and purify themselves after One in the midst of the Gardens*, dedicated to that Idol behind the Temple; *Subintelligendum enim Templum, pone Templum*, saith *Joseph Scaliger*.

Adonis [y] is derived from *Adon*, *Lord*. "That *Adonis* is the Sun (saith *Macrobius*) is not doubted, upon view of the Religion of the *Assyrians*, with whom *Venus Architis* (now worshipped by the *Phœnicians*) and *Adonis* were held in great Veneration: For the Naturalists worshipped the superior Hemisphere of the Earth, in part whereof we dwell, by the Name of *Venus*, the inferior they called *Proserpina*. Hereupon among the *Assyrians* or *Phœnicians*, the Goddess is introduced mourning, because the Sun in performing his annual Course passeth through the 12 Signs of the inferior Hemisphere; for of the Signs of the Zodiack, six are esteemed superior, six inferior; and when he is in the inferior, and consequently makes the Day shorter, the Goddess is believ'd to mourn, as if the Sun were snatch'd away by Death for a time, and detained by *Proserpina* the Goddess of the inferior Part, and of the *Antipodes*. Again, they conceive that *Adonis* is restor'd to *Venus* when the Sun surmounting the six Stars of the inferior Order begins to illuminate our Hemisphere, and lengthen the Light and Days."

The last is *Jupiter Heliopolites* [z]: "The *Assyrians* (saith the same Author) under the Name of *Jupiter* worship the Sun (whom they stile Διὰ ἡλιοπολίτην) with extraordinary Ceremonies: The Image of this God was taken from a Town in *Egypt*, named *Heliopolis* also, at what time *Senemus*, perhaps the same as *Senepos*, reign'd over the *Egyptians*. It was brought thither by *Oppias* Ambassador of *Delebois*, King of the *Assyrians*, and by the *Egyptian* Priests, the chief of whom was *Parmetis*; and having been a long time kept by the *Assyrians*, was afterwards removed to *Heliopolis* (in *Egypt*); the Reason of which, and why being carry'd out of *Egypt* it was brought back into the Place where now it is, and where it is worshipped with Rites that are more *Assyrian* than *Egyptian*, I forbear to relate, as being nothing pertinent to our Purpose. That this *Jupiter* is the same with the Sun, appears as well by their religious Rites, as by the Fashion of the Image; for its being of Gold, (of which Metal *Maimonides* describes those Telesmes to have been which the *Chaldæans* made to the Sun) and without a Beard, is sufficient Argument hereof. The Right Hand is lifted up, holding a Whip like a Charioteer, the Left holds a Thunder-bolt and some Ears of Corn; all which denote the consociate Powers of *Jupiter* and the *Sun*. Moreover, the Religion of this Temple is excellent for Divination, which is ascribed to the Power of *Apollo*, who is the same with the Sun: Likewise the Image of the *Heliopolitan* God is carried on a Bier, as the Image of the Gods are carried at the Solemnity of the Games of the *Circensian* Gods: Many Nobles of that Country follow, their Heads shaved, they themselves pure by a long Chastity; they are driven by divine Inspiration, not as they will themselves, but whither the God carries them. This God they consult even absent, by sending Table-books sealed up, and he writes back in order to the Questions inserted in them: Thus the Emperor *Trajan* being to go out of that Country into *Parthia* with his Army, at the Request of his Friends, zealous in this Religion, who having had great Experiments in this kind, persuaded him to enquire concerning the Success of his Expedition, proceeded with *Roman* Prudence, lest there might be some Deceit of Man in it, and first sent the Table-book sealed up, requiring an Answer in writing: The God commanded Paper to be brought, and ordered that it should be sent to him blank, to the Astonishment of the Priests. *Trajan* received it with Admiration, for that he also had sent a blank Table-book to the God. Then he took another Table-book, and wrote in it this Question, Whether having finish'd this War he should return to *Rome*; this he sealed up: The God commanded a Centurial Vine, one of those Gifts that were in the Temple, to be brought, and to be cut into two Pieces, and wrapt up in a Napkin and sent. The Event appeared manifest in the Death of *Trajan*, his Bones being brought back to *Rome*: For by the Fragments, the kind of Relicks (his Bones) by the Token of the Vine, the future Chance was declared." Hitherto *Macrobius*.

To these add *Bel*, or *Belus*, a Name tho' more peculiar to the supreme Deity, yet common to many of the *Chaldæan* Gods, and among others to the Sun, as *Servius* witnesseth. *In* Punick *Language* (saith he) *God is named* Baal; *but amongst the* Assyrians *he is called* Bel, *and* [a] *by a certain mystical Reason*, Saturn, *and the* Sun.

CHAP.

[x] Cap. 66. v. 17. [y] Saturn. l. 21. [z] Ibid. 23. [a] In Æneid. 11

CHAP. V.

The Chaldæan *Worſhip of the Moon.*

THE Moon was worſhipped by the *Chaldæans* under many Names, all which are feminine, and the greater Part anſwerable to thoſe of the Sun (laſt mention'd;) which ſeems to confirm what *R. Maimonides*[b] delivers of them, that they held the ſeven Planets to be Gods and Goddeſſes, male and female, marry'd to one another.

Now the *Chaldæans* (or rather they who firſt tranſlated the *Chaldaick* Learning into *Greek*) among other Names applied to the *Sun* thoſe of *Jupiter* and *Adonis*; in like manner did they give to the *Moon* the correſpondent Attributes of *Juno* and *Venus*.

To *Juno* belong *Ada* and *Belta*, for ſo interpreted by *Heſychius*;[c] *Ada*, *Juno*, with the *Babylonians*;[d] *Belthes*, *Juno*, or *Venus*. Both which are doubtleſs no other than the feminine Names anſwerable to *Adad* and *Bel*, two Names of the Sun. That by *Juno* Mythologiſts ſometimes underſtand the Moon, the learned[e] Mr. *Selden* confirms by the old Form of Incalation, which the *Roman* Prieſts uſed at the Nones of every Month, *dies te quinque calo Juno novella* (or *covella*, *Cæleſtis*.) To this *Juno* perhaps may more properly be referred what *Julius Firmicus* applies to the Air: "*The* Aſſyrians (ſaith he) *aſcribed the Principality of the Elements to the Air, the Image whereof they worſhipped, ſtiling it by the Name of* Juno *or* Venus *the Virgin; whom the Choirs of their Prieſts worſhipped with effeminate Voices and Geſtures, their Skin ſmoothed, and their Habit after the Faſhion of Women.* Thus he; but that the *Aſſyrians* worſhipped the Element of Air is not elſewhere eaſily found: What he adds concerning their immodeſt Rites, ſeems rather of Affinity with thoſe of *Venus*, as deſcribed by other Authors.

To *Venus* (taken for the Moon) belong the Names *Mylitta* and *Alilat*. They learnt (ſaith *Herodotus*, ſpeaking of the *Perſians*) of the *Aſſyrians* and *Arabians* to ſacrifice to *Urania*: the *Aſſyrians* call *Venus Mylitta*, the *Arabians* (or *Sabæans*) *Alilat*. Thus *Herodotus*; who indeed ſeems to make this *Mylitta* diſtinct from the Moon, (of whom he had ſpoken a little before); but that by *Alilat* was meant no other, is evident from its Etymology from *Lail*, *Night*. The Ancients (ſaith *Sibal Aſſemon*) among many other falſe Gods, ſerved one whom they called *Alilath*, and affirmed that ſhe is the Moon, as being the Miſtreſs and Queen of the Night.

CHAP. VI.

The Chaldæan *Worſhip of the Planets.*

THE reſt of the ſeven Planets (as[g] *Maimonides* ſaith) they held to be Gods alſo. To *Saturn*, whom *Diodorus* (if the Text be not depraved, which I ſuſpect) affirms they held to be the chiefeſt of the five, they gave the common Name of *Bel*. *Euſebius*, in the 28th Year of *Thara*, *Belus*, the firſt King of the *Aſſyrians*, died; whom the *Aſſyrians* ſtyled a God; others call him *Saturn*; and *Servius* cited elſewhere,[h] in the *Punick* Language God is named *Baal*; but among the *Aſſyrians* he is called *Bel*, and by a certain myſtical Reaſon, *Saturn* and the Sun.[i] Whence *Theophilus*, Patriarch of *Antioch*, Some worſhip *Saturn* as a God, and call him *Bel* and *Baal*; this is done chiefly by thoſe who dwell in the Eaſtern Climates, not knowing who *Saturn* is, and who *Belus*.

Some[k] conceive that the more particular Name of this Planet was *Chium* or *Remphan*; of which the Prophet *Amos*, *But ye have born the Tabernacle of your* Moloch *and* Chiun *your Images, the Stars of your God which ye made to yourſelves:* Which Text St. *Stephen* renders thus,[l] *Yea, ye took up the Tabernacle of your God* Remphan, *Figures which ye made to worſhip them*; what is the Hebrew *Chiun*, the Greek renders *Remphan*. By *Chiun Aben Ezra* underſtands the Planet *Saturn*, whom *Plautus* alſo, as *Petitus* obſerves, calls *Chiun*: *Rephan* (as *Kircher* atteſts) is uſed in the *Coptick* Language for the ſame Planet.

Of *Jupiter* (having ſpoken already in treating of *Bel* and the *Sun*, to both which this Name was applied) there is little more to be ſaid.

Mars (as the Author of *Chronicon Alexandrinum* relates) was firſt owned as a Deity by the *Aſſyrians*: The *Aſſyrians*, ſaith he, were the firſt who did erect a Column to *Mars*, and adored him as a God. They gave him the common Name of *Belus*, whence the *Babylonian Belus* is by *Hiſtiæus* interpreted Ζεὺς ἐνυάλιος, *Jupiter Martius*.

But a more particular Name of *Mars* was that of *Azizus*, under which he was worſhipped together with *Mercury* in the Temple of the Sun at *Edeſſa*, a City of *Meſopotamia*. They who inhabit *Edeſſa* (ſaith *Julian*) a Region of a long time ſacred to the Sun, place together with him in the Temple *Monimus* and *Azizus*. That by *Monimus* they underſtood *Mercury*, by *Azizus Mars*, and that both theſe were Aſſeſſors to the Sun, *Julian* acknowledgeth to have learned of his Maſter *Jamblicus*.

Some[m] there are who refer the Idol *Negal* (brought by the *Samaritans* out of *Aſſyria*) to this Planet; for the Rabbies fancy this Idol to have been in the Form of a Cock. Now the Cock being[n] ſacred to *Mars*, and ſtiled his Bird in regard of his Courage,[o] hence they infer that *Mars* was repreſented under that Form, as *Venus* under that of the Hen, by the Idol *Succoth Benoth*.

Venus was worſhipped by the *Aſſyrians* and *Chaldæans* under many Names: Three of which we

[b] Page 18. [c] In Ada. [d] In Belthes. [e] De Diis Syr. [f] Lib. 1. [g] Mor. Nev. [h] In Æneid.
[i] Ad Antolic. lib. 3. [k] Chap. 5. [l] Acts vii. 43. [m] 2 Kings xvii. 30. [n] Ariſtoph. Schol. in Aveſ. [o] Kircher.

find in *Heſychius*; the firſt *Belthes* (or rather *Belta*) which he interprets *Juno* and *Venus*. This was a Name common to the Moon alſo, and ſpoken of formerly.

The next, *Delephat*, a Name more appropriate to *Venus* than the former, as appears by its Etymology from the Syriack word *Delpha*, Coition.

The laſt, *Myleta*, as *Heſychius* reads, who adds, the *Aſſyrians* (ſo called) *Urania*. *Herodotus* writes it *Mylitta*: They learned (ſaith he, ſpeaking of the *Perſians*) from the *Aſſyrians* and *Arabians* to ſacrifice to *Urania*: The *Aſſyrians* call *Venus Mylitta*, the *Arabians Alilat*. Of which two Names, tho' *Alilat* (as was obſerved heretofore) was given to the Moon alſo; yet that of *Mylitta* ſeems peculiar to *Venus*, it being no other (as *Scaliger* obſerves) than the plain Syriack word *Mylidtha*, generative or prolifick: *Venus* Genetrix. With this Etymology well ſuit the Rites belonging to the Idol; of which thus *Herodotus*[p]: "The *Babylonians* have one abominable Law; "Every Woman of that Country muſt once in her "Life ſit in the Temple of *Venus*, and accompany "with a Stranger. Some of the richer Sort diſdain- "ing to aſſociate themſelves with the reſt of ordina- "ry Quality, are carry'd thither in covered Chari- "ots, and ſtand before the Temple, a Train of "Attendants coming after them: the greater Part "do in this manner. There are Women ſitting in "the Temple of *Venus* crowned with Garlands of "Flowers, ſome coming, others going. There "are alſo ſeveral Paſſages diſtinguiſhed by Cords, "which guide the Strangers to the Women; of "whom they made choice as they beſt like. No "Woman being once ſet there returns home, un- "til ſome Stranger have caſt Money in her Lap, "and taking her aſide, lain with her. The Stran- "ger who offers this Money muſt ſay, I invoke the "Goddeſs *Mylitta* for thee; the *Aſſyrians* call *Venus* "*Mylitta*; the Money ſhe muſt not refuſe what- "ever it be, for it is ſacred: Neither may the Wo- "man deny any Man, but muſt follow him that "firſt offers her Money, without any Choice on her "Part. As ſoon as ſhe has lain with him, and "performed the Rites of the Goddeſs, ſhe returns "home, nor from thenceforward can be allured by "any Price whatſoever. Such as are handſome are "the ſooneſt diſmiſs'd; but the deformed are forced "to ſtay longer before they can ſatisfy the Law; "ſometimes it happens that they attend a whole "Year, or two, or three in Expectation." Hitherto *Herodotus*; of which Cuſtom ſome interpret the Words of the Prophet *Baruch* concerning the *Chaldæan* Women, *The Women ſit in the Ways girded* (or rather ſurrounded, περιεζωσμέναι γυναῖκες) *with Ruſhes and burnt Straw; and if one of them be drawn away and lie with ſuch as come by, ſhe caſteth her Neighbour in the Teeth, becauſe ſhe was not ſo worthily reputed, nor her Cord broken.*

To theſe add [q] *Succoth benoth*, an Idol made by the Men of *Babylon*; the Signification of the Word being *the Tents of the Daughters*. Some conceive that hereby were meant thoſe Tents or Partitions by Cords deſcribed by *Herodotus*, in which the Women ſate to perform the Rites of *Venus Mylitta*; *Venus* being, as Mr. *Selden* is of Opinion, derived from *Benoth*: But from the Words of the ſacred Text it is manifeſt, that by *Succoth Benoſh* was meant rather an Idol, than Temple or Tents. The Rabbies fancy it to have been in Form of a Hen and Chickens; [r] for as they called a Hen *Succus*, that is, covering; ſo they called Hens *Succoth*, as brooding and covering; and *Benoſh* they interpreted her Chickens, which ſhe uſeth to cover with her Wings. Whence *Kircher* expounds it of *Venus Mylitta*.

CHAP. VII.

Of the other Stars.

NOR were the Planets only, but the Signs, and all the reſt of the Stars, eſteemed Gods by the *Chaldæans*; for they burnt Incenſe [s] *to the Mazaloth, and to all the reſt of the Hoſt of Heaven*. *Mazal* is a Star: they called the Signs the twelve *Mazaloth*; the Zodiack the Circle *Mazaloth*; and ſometimes changing ז into ד, *Mazaroth*; the Septuagint renders it μαζαρωθ, which *Suidas* interprets *the Conſtellations*, called ζωδια, *Signs*. This agrees with what *Diodorus*[t] reports of the *Chaldæans*, that they held the principal Gods to be Twelve, to each of which they attributed a Month, and one of the Signs of the Zodiack.

That they worſhipped the reſt of the fixed Stars as Gods alſo, is imply'd by the ſacred Text laſt cited, which adds, *and to all the Hoſt of Heaven*; and is more expreſsly aſſerted (among others) by *Diodorus*[u], who in his Account of their Doctrine affirms, that as they called the Planets *Interpreters*, ſo of the other Stars, they called ſome *the Judges of all things*, others *conſiliary Gods*; as we ſhall ſhew more particularly, when we come to ſpeak of their Aſtrology: Neither is it to be doubted, but that as they owned ſome of the fixed Stars by theſe common Titles of Dignity, *Judges* and *Counſellors*; ſo to the principal of them they attributed particular Names and Idols, as well as to the Planets. And ſince the *Chaldaick* Polytheiſm was not (like that of the *Greeks*) founded upon an imaginary Mythology, (tho' later Writers treat of it after the ſame manner) but had reference to the celeſtial Bodies, which they worſhipped under ſeveral Names and Idols; it is no leſs probable than conſonant to the *Chaldaick* Doctrine, that thoſe other

[p] Lib. 1. c. 199. [q] 2 Kings xvii. 30. [r] Radak. [s] 2 Kings. [t] Lib. 1. [u] Lib. 1.

other *Aſſyrian* Idols, (*Aſhim*, *Nibhaz*, *Tartak*, *Adrammelek*, *Anammelek*, *Niſroch*) mentioned in the Scripture, were of the ſame Kind with the reſt, and belonged to ſeveral other of the Stars: But this Conjecture is not eaſily evinced, in regard that there is little extant of thoſe Idols more than the bare mention of their Names.

CHAP. VIII.

Of Fire.

THERE are who reckon the Elements among the Gods which the *Chaldæans* worſhipped: That they had a particular Devotion to the Fire, is certain; by it, as ſome conceive, they repreſented the ſupreme God; as others, the Sun; the Ground of which Analogy we deliver'd formerly.

Concerning this Idolatry of the *Chaldæans*, there is a memorable Paſſage related by [w] *Rufinus*. "The "*Chaldæans*, in the Time of *Conſtantine the Great*, "travelled all over the Earth, to ſhew all Men that "their God excelled all other Gods, for they de"ſtroyed all the Statues of other Gods by their Fire. "At length coming into *Egypt*, and making this "Challenge, the *Egyptian* Prieſts brought forth a "large Statue of *Nilus*, filling it with Water, and "ſtopping up the Holes it had (which were many) "with Wax, ſo artificially, that it kept in the "Water, but could not hold out againſt the Fire." *Suidas* [x] relates this ſomething differently, as performed by a Prieſt of *Canopus*, who taking off the Head of an old Statue, put it upon a Water-pot, which (ſtopping the Holes with Wax) he painted over, and ſet up in the room of *Canopus*. "The *Chaldæans* "began the Conteſt with much rejoycing, and put "Fire round about the Statue; the Wax melted, "the Holes opened, the Water guſhing forth put "out the Fire, and the *Chaldæans* were laughed at "for their God."

CHAP. IX.

Of the Air and Earth.

OF the Air thus [y] *Julius Firmicus*: "The *Aſſy*"*rians* aſcribed the Principality of the Elements "to the Air, the Image whereof they worſhipped, "ſtiling it by the Name *Venus* the Virgin; whom "the Choirs of their Prieſts worſhipped with effemi"nate Voices and Geſtures, their Skins ſmoothed, "and their Habit after the Faſhion of Women."

As for the Earth, [z] *Macrobius* ſaith, "They "worſhipped the ſuperior Henniſphere of it, in Part "whereof we dwell, by the Name of *Venus*; the "inferior Hemiſphere of the Earth they called *Pro*"*ſerpina*." More of this Mythology, rather *Phœnician* than *Aſſyrian*, and perhaps more *Grecian* than either, ſee in *Macrobius*. Thus much concerning the Doctrine of the *Chaldæans*.

The SECOND BOOK

Of the Perſians.

BEyond *Chaldæa*, to the South, on one Hand lies *Perſia*; on the other, *Arabia*. Philoſophy (or Learning) was communicated to both theſe Countries by their Neighbours the *Chaldæans*. *Zoroaſter*, ſaith [a] *Plutarch*, inſtituted Magick among the *Chaldæans*, in Imitation of whom the *Perſians* had theirs alſo. *Perſia* is the moſt conſiderable Kingdom of *Aſia*; bounded, on the North, by *Media*; on the Eaſt, by *Cilicia*; on the Weſt, by *Suſiana*; on the South, by Part of the *Perſian* Gulf.

The SIXTEENTH PART.

The Perſian *Philoſophers, their Sects and Inſtitutions.*

SECT. I.

Of the Perſian *Philoſophers.*

CHAP. I.

Of the Perſian Zoroaſter, *Inſtitutor of Philoſophy among the* Perſians.

THE *Perſian* Learning is generally acknowledged to have been inſtituted by *Zarades*, *Zaraduſſit*, or *Zoroaſter*: But this Name, (as we obſerved formerly) ſeems to have been commonly attributed to ſuch Perſons as were eminently learned. Who therefore this *Zoroaſter* was, or [b] about what Time he lived, is uncertain. [c] *Laertius* ſtiles him a *Perſian*; [d] *Clemens Alexandrinus*, a *Mede*; [e] *Suidas*, a *Perſo-Mede*: Whence it may be argued, that he was not of ſo great Antiquity as moſt Authors conceive. For we find the word *Perſian* no where uſed before the Prophet *Ezekiel*; neither did it come to be of any Note until the Time of *Cyrus*. The later *Perſians*, ſaith [f] *Agathias*, affirm, he

[w] Hiſt. Eccl. lib. 2. c. 26. [x] In voce Καταπο. [y] De Error. profan. Relig. [z] Saturn. l. 1. c. 21. [a] De Iſid.
[b] Agath. l. 2. [c] In Proœm. [d] Strom. lib. 1. [e] Zor. [f] Lib. 2.

he lived under *Hystaspes*; but simply, without any Addition; so as it is much to be doubted, nor can it be certainly known, whether this *Hystaspes* were the Father of *Darius*, or some other. *Hystaspes* the Father of *Darius* was contemporary with *Cyrus*; neither doth it appear that the Persian *Zoroaster* lived much earlier.

But at what Time soever he lived, saith [g] *Agathias*, he was the Author and Introducer of Magical Religion among the *Persians*, and changing their old Form of sacred Rites, he introduced several Opinions. So likewise [h] the *Arabick* Historiographer; *Zaraduſſit* not first instituted, but reformed the Religion of the *Persians* and *Magi*, it being divided into many Sects.

A fabulous Tradition of the Occasion and Manner thereof, related by the *Persians* themselves, receive from [i] *Dion Chrysostom*: "They say, that "through Love of Wisdom and Justice he withdrew "himself from Men, and lived alone in a certain "Mountain: That afterwards leaving the Mountain, "a great Fire coming from above, did continually "burn about him; that hereupon the King, toge- "ther with the Noblest of the *Persians* came nigh "him, intending to pray to God; that he came out "of the Fire unharmed, appeared propitiously, bid- "ding them be of good Cheer, and offered certain "Sacrifices, as if God had come along with him in- "to that Place; that from thenceforward he conver- "sed not with all Men, but with such only as were "naturally most addicted to Truth, and capable of "the Knowledge of the Gods, whom the *Persians* "called *Magi*."

To this *Persian Zoroaster* [k] *Suidas* ascribes, *Of Nature*, four Books; *Of Precious Stones*, one; *Astroscopick Apotelesmes*, five. *Eusebius* [l], *A Sacred Collection of Persicks*, which by the Fragments he cites, seems to have treated of the *Persian* Religion. These some attribute to the *Chaldæan Zoroaster*; others, to some other, nor any with greater Certainty than the rest.

CHAP. II.

Of Hystaspes, *as a great Improver of the* Persian *Learning.*

THE Doctrine of the *Persian* Magi was much augmented by *Hystaspes*. He was (according to [m] *Herodotus*) of *Achæmenia*, a Region of *Persia*, Son of *Arsames*, or, (as other Editions) *Arsases*; he lived in the Time of *Cyrus*, whose Dream concerning *Darius*, the eldest Son of *Hystaspes*, prognosticating his being King of *Persia*, together with the Discourse betwixt *Cyrus* and *Hystaspes* concerning it, is related by [n] *Herodotus*. *Darius*, the Son of this *Hystaspes*, was born in the 4165th Year of the *Julian* Period, and was almost twenty Years old a little before *Cyrus* died. About the same time also [o] *Hystaspes* and *Aduſius* joining together, conquer'd all *Phrygia* bordering upon the *Hellespont*, and taking the King thereof, brought him Prisoner to *Cyrus*.

Hystaspes was (as [p] *Ammianus Marcellinus* affirms) a most wise Person; who adds, that boldly penetrating into the inner Parts of the upper *India*, he came to a woody Desart, whose calm Silence was possessed by those high Wits the *Brachmans*. Of these he learnt the discordant Concord of the Motions of the Stars, and of Heaven, and of pure Rites of Sacrifices; which, returning into *Persia*, he contributed as an Addition and Complement to Magick.

CHAP. III.

Of Osthanes, *who first introduced the* Persian *Learning into* Greece.

THE *Persian* Learning, (as [q] *Pliny* affirms) was first communicated to the *Græcians* by *Osthanes*. The first, saith he, that I find to have commented on this Art (Magick) is *Osthanes*, who accompanied *Xerxes*, King of the *Persians*, in the War which he made upon *Greece*. *Xerxes* set out from *Susa* upon this Expedition in the Beginning of the fourth Year of the 74th Olympiad; though *Diodorus Siculus*, confounding the Transactions of two Years in one, relates this done in the first Year of the Olympiad following. [r] *Herodotus* affirms, that this Provision was in making the three whole Years before this Year; but with a Note premised in the precedent Chapter, which cannot consist with the exact Course of the Times. For, saith he, from the subduing of *Egypt*, he was full four Years in gathering an Army, and in making his Preparations; and in the Beginning of the fifth Year he began to march with a huge Army: for indeed he set out from *Susa* in the Beginning of the fifth Year, not from his subduing of *Egypt*, but from his coming to the Crown. So that both [s] *Justin* out of *Trogus*, and *Orosius* following him, do unadvisedly attribute five Years; but most absurdly doth *Julianus*, in his first Oration of the Praises of *Constantine*, say that he was ten Years in making this Preparation. But more ingenuous than all those (yet not over exquisite in his Account) is [t] *Libanius*, where he saith, that between *Darius* and *Xerxes* there was ten Years time spent in making this Preparation against *Greece*; since we have formerly shewed out of *Plato*, that from the Fight at *Marathon*, to the Fight of *Salamis*, which was fought in the first Year of the 75th Olympiad (almost a full Year after *Xerxes* his setting out from *Susa*) there were only ten Years run out.

Hence

[g] Loc. cit. [h] Elm. [i] Boristhen. [k] In Zor. [l] Præp. Evang. l. 1. c. 7. [m] Lib. 1. c. 209.
[n] Loc. cit. [o] Xenoph. Instit. Cyr. lib. 7. [p] Lib. 23. c. 6. [q] Lib. 30. 1. [r] Lib. 7. c. 21. [s] Lib. 2. c. 20. [t] In Βασιλικῷ.

Hence it appears that *Pythagoras* and *Plato*, who were precedent in time to *Osthanes*, and in their Travels conversed with the *Persian* Magi, were not fully acquainted with the Depth of their Sciences, or else being more reserved forbore to communicate them, otherwise than as intermingled with those which they appropriated to themselves.

[u] *Pliny* adds, that *Osthanes*, whilst he accompanied *Xerxes* into *Greece*, scattered the Seeds as it were of his portentous Art *(Magick)* wherewith he infected the World, all the World whithersoever he went; and 'tis certain, that this *Osthanes* chiefly made the *Græcians* not desirous, but mad after his Art. Thus *Pliny*, alluding to *Goetick Magick*, of which the Author of the [x] Treatise μαγίκον, asserts the *Magi* to have been wholly ignorant. And [y] *Arnobius* affords him a better Character; That he was chief of the *Magi*, both for Eloquence and Action; that he made Address to the true God with due Veneration; that he knew the Angels did wait upon the true God, and the like.

By *Osthanes* (as we said) the *Persian* Learning was brought into *Greece*, and therefore we shall not proceed farther in our Enquiry after the Professors of it among the *Persians*.

SECT. II.

The Institution, and Sects of the Persians.

CHAP. I.

The Persian Magi *their Institution.*

ALL Professors of Learning among the *Persians* were termed *Magi*. [z] *Laertius:* It is said that Philosophy had its Original from the *Barbarians*, since among the *Persians* were *Magi*; among the *Babylonians*, or *Assyrians*, the *Chaldæans*; and *Gymnosophists* among the *Indians*; among the *Celtæ* and *Gallatæ*, where those who were called the *Druids*, or *Seninothei*, as *Aristotle*, in his Treatise *Magicum*, and *Sotion*, in the 23d Chap. of his Succession, affirms: Hence [a] *Suidas*, *Magi* among the *Persians* were *Philosophi* and *Philothei*. But their principal Study and Employment consisting in Theology and religious Rites, *Magus* is more frequently interpreted *a Priest*. Among the *Persians*, saith *Porphyrius*, those wise Persons who were employed about the Divinity, and served him, were called *Magi*; this is the Signification of *Magus* in their Dialect. And [b] *Apuleius*, *Magus* in the *Persian* Language signifieth the same as *Priest* in ours. *Hesychius*, A Worshipper of God, and *a Theologist*, and *a Priest*, is by the *Persians* styled *Magus*.

Some conceive they were so termed by *Zoroaster*, at their first Institution. [c] *Suidas*; *Zoroaster* the *Perso-Mede*, who first began the Name of *Magi* celebrious among them. [d] Others derive the Word from *Mog*, a Sirname of *Zoroaster*, or from *Mije Gush*, one that hath *short ears*, affirming that *Zoroaster* was such.

The Author of the Arabick History relates, that the Religion of the *Persians* being before *Zoroaster*'s Time divided into many Sects, he reformed it; *Agathius*, that he changed their old Form of sacred Rites, and introduced many new Opinions, and was the Author and Introducer of Magical Religion among the *Persians*.

[e] The *Magi* delivered their Learning successively in their Families from one Age to another; whence, after the Succession of many Ages, at this present, saith *Ammianus Marcellinus*, a multitude, sprung from one and the same Race, is dedicated to the Rites and Worship of the Gods. For, increasing by degrees, they grew at last to the Largeness and Name of a compleat Nation, dwelling in Towns not fortified with any Walls, and, being permitted to use their own Laws, they were honoured in respect of their Religion.

The Country of the *Magi* in *Persia* is mentioned by [f] *Clemens Alexandrinus*, who takes notice of three wonderful Mountains in it. And *Solinus* mentions, as belonging to them, the City *Pasargada*. *Suidas* and *Cedrenus* call them *Magussæans*, and affirm, that they were called *Magog* by those of their own Country.

So great was the Esteem which the *Magi* had among the *Persians*, that *Cicero* saith, the Kings of *Persia*, before they undertook the Government, were always initiated in the Sacred Mysteries of the *Magi*; which [g] *Plato* describes thus: "At fourteen "Years old they whom they call the Royal Pæda- "gogues take Charge of the Youth. These are "four Men chosen out of the most excellent of the "*Persians*, in the Prime of their Age. The most "wise, the most just, the most temperate, and the "most valiant. The first of these teacheth him "the Magick of *Zoroaster* the Son of *Horomases*, "(this is the Service of the Gods) and teacheth him "also the Royal Institutions." *Dion Chrysostom* "saith, that "the *Magi* were admitted to the "King's Councils, and were Assessors with him in "Judicature, as being well acquainted with the Na- "tures of things, and knowing after what manner "the Gods are to be served." "All publick Af- "fairs (saith *Agathias)* were managed by their Di- "rection and Advice. They adjudged Rewards or "Punish-

[u] Loc. cit. [x] Laertius proœm. [y] Cont. gent. [z] Proœm. [a] In voce Mag. [b] Apolog. 2. [c] In Zor. [d] Salmas. de Hellen. p. 368. [e] Ammian. Marcellin. l. 23. c. 6. [f] Strom. 6. [g] Alcib.

"Puniſhments." *Dion* elſewhere relates, that *Cambyſes*, upon his Expedition into *Ægypt*, reſign'd the Government of the *Perſians* into the hands of the *Magi*. [h] *Conſtantius Manaſſes* ſtiles them the Guardians of the Royal Palaces; and *Pliny*, ſpeaking of *Magick*, ſaith, It grew up at laſt to ſo great height, that even at this Day it is exceeding prevalent with many Nations, and in the Eaſt it beareth Sway over the King of Kings. King of Kings was the proper Title of the *Perſian* Monarch.

CHAP. II.

The Sects, Diſcipline and Manners of the Magi.

Eubulus, [i] who wrote the Hiſtory of *Mythra* in many Volumes, affirms, that amongſt the *Perſians* there were three kinds of *Magi*: the firſt, who were the moſt learned and eloquent of them, did eat no other Food but Meal and Oil. Thus *Eubulus* cited by St. *Hierom.* More of the Diſtinction of the *Magi* into three Sects we meet not elſewhere; but, probably, it had reference (as among the *Chaldæans*) to their ſeveral Studies; of which hereafter.

[k] *Dinon* and *Ariſtotle*, or rather the Author of the Treatiſe of *Magick* cited by *Laertius*, relate of the *Magi*, that they renounce rich Attire, and to wear Gold. Their Rayment is white upon occaſion, their Beds the Ground, their Food nothing but Herbs, Cheeſe, and Bread; inſtead of a Staff they carry a Cane, in the top whereof they put their Cheeſe, which as occaſion ſerved they did eat.

They had one of their Society chief among 'em, called by *Zozomene*, the Prince of the *Magi*.

[l] Their chief Employment was religious Worſhip, they being conceived to be the only Perſons whoſe Prayers the Gods will hear.

[m] They made Diſcourſes concerning Juſtice, and eſteemed it impious to burn the Bodies of the Dead, and lawful to lie with a Mother or a Daughter, as *Solion* in his 23d Book.

[n] *Herodotus* ſaith they differ, as from others, ſo from the *Ægyptian Prieſts*, in this, that theſe pollute themſelves with the Death of nothing but their Sacrifices, whereas the *Magi*, with their own Hands, kill any thing, except a Man and a Dog; yea they eſteem it a great Exploit, if they have killed very many Ants, or Serpents, or other creeping or flying things.

The SEVENTH PART.

The Doctrine of the Perſians.

THat which is delivered to us of the *Perſian* Doctrine and Opinions, is ſo little and ſo imperfect, as it will not eaſily admit of being knit together by any Method; yet, in regard of the near Affinity their Learning is conceived to have had with the *Chaldæans*, we ſhall obſerve the ſame Courſe in collecting and digeſting the few Remains of it: Firſt, to alledge what concerns their Theology and Phyſick; next their Arts of Divination; Thirdly, their Religious Worſhip and Rites, particularly termed *Magick*; and Laſtly, to give a Catalogue of all their Gods.

CHAP. I.

Theology and Phyſick.

THat the *Perſian Magi* were not unacquainted with Theology and Phyſick, is confirm'd by *Suidas*. *Magi*, ſaith he, among the *Perſians* are Philoſophers and Lovers of God. [o] *Laertius* affirms, they diſcourſed concerning the Subſtance and Generation of the Gods; and [p] *Dion Chryſoſtom*, that they were skilful in Natures.

[q] *Zoroaſter* the *Magus* in his ſacred Collection of Phyſicks, ſaith expreſly thus: "God hath the Head "of a Hawk: he is the firſt Incorruptible, Eternal, "Unbegotten, Indiviſible, moſt like himſelf, the "Charioteer of every Good, one that cannot be bri-"bed: the beſt of things Good; the wiſeſt of things "Wiſe: Moreover, he is the Father of Equity and "Juſtice: Self-taught, Natural, and Perfect, and "Wiſe, and the ſole Inventor of Sacred Nature."

[r] *Plutarch* relates of *Zoroaſter*, that he divided all things into three kinds. Over the firſt kind he conceived *Horomazes* to be Preſident, the ſame whom the *Oracles* call the Father. Over the laſt, *Arimanes*; over the middle kind, *Mythra*, whom the *Oracles* call the ſecond Mind. And that *Horomazes* made himſelf 3 times as big as the Sun (who in the *Perſian* Language is called *Cyrus*.) *Mythra* made himſelf twice as big (as the Sun) who was next to *Horomazes*. To which theſe Platonick Aſſertions are correſpondent, That all things are about the King of all, and that all things are for him. That he is the Cauſe of all good things. The ſecond is employed about the ſecondary things. The third is employed about the third kind of things. The three Parts into which *Zoroaſter* and *Plato* divided all things, are theſe; the firſt is Eternal; the ſecond had a beginning

[h] 30. 1. [i] D. Hieron. adverſ. Jovin. li. 2. [k] Laert. in procem. [l] Laert. ibid. [m] Laert. procem. [n] Lib. 1. 140.
[o] Voc. Mag. [p] In Procem. [q] Euſeb. Præp. Evang. l. 1. [r] Pletho in Orac. ad fin.

ning in Time, but is Eternal; the third is Corruptible. Thus *Pletho* citing *Plutarch*, whose own Words are these:

" [t] Some are of Opinion there are two Gods, one " opposite in Operation to the other; one, work- " ing good, the other ill. Others call him who is " the good, God; the bad, Dæmon. Of this Opi- " nion was *Zoroaster* the *Magus*, whom they re- " port to have preceded the Trojan War 5000 " years. This *Zoroaster* declared the Names of the " good to be *Oromazes*; of the bad, *Arimanius*; " adding, that, of sensible things, the one did most " resemble Light and Knowledge, the other Dark- " ness and Ignorance. Wherefore the *Persians* call " *Mythra* the Mediator. He further taught, that, to " one, we ought to offer Votives and gratulatory " Sacrifices, to the other, averruncative and dismal " Oblations. For, pounding a certain Herb, call- " ed *Omoni*, in a Mortar, they invoke Hades and " Darkness, then mixing it with the Blood of a " slain Wolf, they carry it forth and throw it into " a Place where the Beams of the Sun come not: " for, of Plants, they hold that some belong to the " good God, others to the ill Dæmon; and that of " Animals, some, as Dogs, Birds, and Porcupines, " belong to the good, the Aquatile to the bad; for " which reason they esteem him blessed who killed " most of that kind.

[u] " They likewise relate many fabulous things " concerning the Gods; of which kind is this I will " alledge, That *Oromazes* was produc'd of purest " Light, *Arimanes* of Darkness, and that these two " war against one another; That *Oromazes* made " six Gods; The first, of Benevolence; the second " of Truth; the third of Equity; the rest of Wis- " dom, Riches, and Pleasure, which good Things " are attendant upon the Maker: That then *Oro-* " *mazes* tripled himself, and removed himself so far " from the Sun, as the Sun is distant from the " Earth, and adorned the Heaven with Stars, ap- " pointed one the Dog-star, as Guardian and Watch " for the rest: That he made twenty-four other " Gods, and put them in an Egg, and that *Arima-* " *nius* having made as many more, they broke the " Egg. Whence it comes, that Good is inter- " mingled with Ill. That the fatal Time ap- " proacheth, in which these shall be destroyed by " Famine and Pestilence, and *Arimanius* utterly " destroyed, and the Earth made even and smooth: " There shall be one Life and one City (or com- " mon Society) of all Men living, and one Lan- " guage."

CHAP. II.

Arts of Divination.

AMong the other Parts of the *Persians* Learning, are to be reckon'd their Arts of *Divination* and Prediction, which [w] *Laertius* affirms were practised by the Magi. [x] *Cicero* adds, that they assembled in (*Fana*) in Temples or consecrated Places, to consult about Divination.

Hence [y] *Strabo* saith, that, by the Ancients, Diviners were much esteemed, such as among the *Persians*, were the Magi, and Necromancers, and Lecanomancers, and Hydromancers. [z] *Ælian*, that the Wisdom of the *Persian* Magi, besides all other things which it was lawful for them to know, did consist also in Divination. And [a] *Lucian* styles the Magi a kind of Persons skilful in Divination, and dedicated to the Gods. Of their Divination [b] *Cicero* giveth an Instance concerning *Cyrus*. [c] *Ælian*, another concerning *Ochus*.

Among other kinds of Divination, [d] *Velleius Paterculus* affirms, they foretold by the Marks of the Body. They seem to have been skilful likewise in Astrology; for [e] *Suidas* ascribeth to the *Persian Zoroaster* five Books of *Astroscopick Apotelesmes*. That they were also consulted concerning the Presignification of Prodigies, is manifest from the Relation of * *Valerius Maximus*, concerning that which happened to *Xerxes*.

CHAP. III.

Of the religious Rites, or Magick of the Persians.

THE chief Science and Employment of the *Persian* Magi; was termed *Magick*, from the Professors, *Magi*, and is defined by *Plato*, [f] the Service of the Gods, called also Μαχαιρισια. The Magi, saith [g] *Laertius*, are employed in the Service of the Gods, and about sacrificing and praying, as being the only Persons whom the Gods will hear. So [h] *Dion Chrysostom*; The *Persians* call them Magi, who are skilful in the Worship of the Gods; not like the *Greeks*, who, ignorant of the Meaning of the Word, call them so who were skilful in Goetick Magick; of which, that the *Persian* Magi were ignorant, [i] *Laertius* alledgeth the Testimonies of *Aristotle*, in his Treatise entituled *Magick*, and *Dinon* in the first Book of his Histories.

As concerning their religious Rites, [k] *Herodotus* and [l] *Strabo* affirm, that they had no Temples, Altars, or Images, but did impute it to Madness in such

[t] Isid. & Osirid. [u] Loc. cit. [w] In Proœm. [x] De Divinat. l. 1. c. 41. [y] Lib. 16. [z] Var. Hist. l. 2. c. 17. [a] Macrob. [b] Divinat. l. 1. [c] Var. Hist. [d] Lib. 2. [e] In Zor. [*] Lib. 1. c. 6. [f] Alcibiad. 2. [g] Proœm. [h] Borysthen. [i] Proœm. [k] Lib. 1. 131. [l] Ibid. 15.

as had; the Reaſon whereof, [m] *Herodotus* conceives to have been, for that they did not believe as the *Grecians*, that the Gods were [n] of human Form; or as [o] *Cicero*, for that they conceived the Gods, to whom the whole World was but a Temple or Houſe, could not be ſhut up within Walls; upon which Ground the Magi perſuaded *Xerxes* to burn the *Grecian* Temples.

But *Strabo* frequently elſewhere mentions Temples, Altars, and Images; whence it may be argued, either that in the time of *Herodotus* they had not any, and that *Strabo*, in affirming the ſame, with *Herodotus*, is to be underſtood only of their primitive Inſtitution, which when the *Macedonians* afterwards conquered them, became corrupted with *Grecian* Rites; or that there were different Sects among them from the Beginning; whereof ſome allowed Altars, Images, Temples, others diſallow'd them.

Herodotus and *Strabo* further add, that they ſacrificed in high Places. Their Rites and Sacrifices *Herodotus* deſcribes thus: "When they go about to ſacrifice, they neither erect an Altar, nor kindle Fire, nor uſe Libation, nor Flutes, nor Garlands, nor Cakes; but when any Man intends to ſacrifice to one of theſe Gods, he drives the Victim to a clean Place, and invocates that God; his Tyara being crown'd with Myrtle; 'tis not lawful for him who ſacrificeth to pray for good things for himſelf alone, but he muſt pray for all *Perſians* in general; and in particular for the King: for in praying for all *Perſians*, he includes himſelf. Having cut the Victim into little Pieces, he boils the Fleſh, and ſtrewing ſoft Herbs, eſpecially *Trifoly*, he lays the Fleſh on them; the Magus ſtanding by, ſings a theogonal Hymn; for this they conceive to be a powerful Incantation. Without a Magus it is not lawful for them to ſacrifice. Soon after, he who ſacrificeth, takes the Fleſh, and diſpoſeth of it as he pleaſeth."

[p] *Strabo* adds, "that when the Magus who declares the Sacrifice, hath diſtributed the Pieces of Fleſh, every one taking his Piece, they depart home; leaving no Part for the Gods; for they ſay the Gods require nothing but the Soul of the Victim: Yet ſome (it is ſaid) lay Part of the Fat upon the Fire."

CHAP. IV.

The Gods of the Perſians.

Herodotus [q] and *Strabo* [r] reckon the Gods of the *Perſians* thus: *Jupiter*, *the Sun*, *the Moon*, *Venus*, *the Fire*, *the Earth*, *the Winds*, *the Water*. *Laertius* [s] not ſo fully, *the Fire*, *the Earth*, and not *the Water*.

By *Jupiter*, as [t] *Herodotus* and *Strabo* affirm, they underſtood the whole Circuit of Heaven. *Agathias* adds, that they worſhipped *Jupiter* under the Name of *Bel*; which ſufficiently argues they derived this God from the *Chaldæans*.

To the Sun (as both [u] *Herodotus* and *Strabo* witneſs) they ſacrificed. *Strabo* adds, that they called him *Mithra*. This was the greateſt of their Gods, as *Cyrus* (introduced by [w] *Xenophon*) acknowledgeth, ſwearing by him. *Heſychius* likewiſe affirms it was the greateſt of their Gods, and that the greateſt Oath which the King himſelf took was by *Mithra*.

They repreſented him with the Face of a Lion, in a *Perſian* Habit, with a Tiara, holding with both Hands a Bull by the Horns, which ſeemed to ſtrive to get from him; ſignifying, that the Moon begins to receive her Light from him when ſhe leaves him.

[x] *Zoroaſter* firſt among the *Perſians* (as *Eubulus* affirms, who wrote many Volumes of the Hiſtory of *Mithra*) did conſecrate a natural Cave, in the Mountains next *Perſia*, in Honour of *Mithra*, the King and Father of all; ſignifying by this Cave the World framed by *Mithra*; by the other things diſpoſed within it, in fit Diſtances, the Elements and Quarters of the World. The Cave of *Mithra* is mentioned by many others.

In the *Mithrean* Rites (for ſo *Lampridius* terms them) *Celſus* (cited by [y] *Origen*) ſaith, the twofold Motion of the Stars, fixed and erratick, was repreſented, and the Paſſage of the Soul through them; in Sign whereof there was ſet up a high Pair of Stairs, having ſeven Gates, the firſt of Lead, the ſecond of Tin, the third of Braſs, the fourth of Iron, the fifth of Leather, the ſixth of Silver, the ſeventh of Gold: The firſt belongs to *Saturn*, the Lead ſignifying the Slowneſs of that Planet; the ſecond to *Venus*, to whom they compare Tin, for its Brightneſs and Softneſs; the third to *Jupiter*, as being moſt ſolid, with brazen Steps; the fourth to *Mercury*, for they hold him to be the ſtouteſt Undertaker of all Buſineſſes, cunning and eloquent; the fifth to *Mars*, in regard of its unequal and various Commixture; the ſixth to the *Moon*, of Silver; the ſeventh to the *Sun*, whoſe Colour, as alſo that of the Stars, reſembles Gold.

He who was initiated into theſe Rites, proceeded, as *Suidas* relates, through ſeveral Degrees of Contumely. [z] *Nonnus* upon *Gregory Nazianzen* ſaith twelve [a]; and of Pain, as Burning, Blows, and the like; by which Trial he was to give Teſtimony of his Sanctity, and of his being void of Paſſion.

Of the Rites of the Moon there is nothing ſaid in particular.

Concerning thoſe of *Venus*, [b] *Herodotus* ſaith they ſacrifice alſo to *Urania*, which they learnt of the *Aſſyrians*

[m] Loc. cit. [n] De leg. 2. c. 11. [o] Ανθρωποφύεας, *i. e.* ἀνθρωπομόρφους. [p] Lib. 15. [q] Ibid. 1. [r] Ibid. 15.
[s] Proœm. [t] Loc. cit. [u] Ibid. [w] Oeconom. [x] Porphyr. in antr. Nymph. [y] Lib. 6. contra Celſ.
[z] In Stelicut. [a] Gregor. Naz. [b] Lib. 1.

Syrians and *Arabians*; the *Assyrians* call *Venus* Militta, the *Arabians* Alilat, the *Persians* Metra. And as *Milidtha* in *Syriack* signifieth *generative, prolifick, Venus genetrix*; so *Mader*, or *Mater*, with the *Persians*, signifies (as *Raphelengius* observes) *a Mother*. This perhaps was that Mother of the Gods, which *Cicero* affirms to have been worshipped by the *Persians*, *Assyrians*, and all the Kings of *Europe* and *Asia*, with great Devotion.

The Fire, [c] *Julius Firmicus* saith, they preferred before all the other Elements; *Agathias* affirms, they learn'd to worship it of the *Chaldæans*: [d] *Strabo* relates, that in *Cappadocia* there was a great Number of Magi, called *Pyrethi*, and many Temples of the *Persian* Gods. They kill not the Victim with a Knife, but strike it down with a Club. Here also there are *Pyretheia* Chapels, in the Midst of which is an Altar, covered with great Store of Ashes, where the Magi preserve a Fire that never goes out, and coming in every Day sing almost the Space of an Hour, holding a Bundle of Rods before the Fire; (with which, as [e] Mr. *Selden* observes, they stirr'd it up whilst they sung) their Heads are covered with Woollen Tiaras, which being tied on both sides, hide their Lips and Cheeks: thus *Strabo*, an Eye-witness. These *Pyratheia* (or as *Suidas* terms them *Pyreia*) were those sempiternal Fires of the Magi mention'd by [f] *Ammianus Marcellinus*. Neither in Temples only did they use these Rites, but in private Caves, where [g] *Julius Firmicus* reports, they worshipped the Fire with many extraordinary Ceremonies; as among other Things, using to pronounce these Words, Μιθραβῶ μυσακῶ ὁ κλοπίνς σύνδεσε παλεῖς ἀγάνυ. Nor did this Worship extend to Fire only, but [h] to all things that resembled it, as *Dionysius* reports; whereof [i] *Strabo* instanceth the *Pyropus*. *Julius Firmicus* adds, that they called the Fire *Mithra*; by which, as also by their worshipping it in Caves, it is manifest, that (sometimes at least) they took it for the Sun, their greatest Deity.

Concerning the Worship of the Earth and Winds nothing particluar is deliver'd. That of the Water was performed in this manner, [k] They go to a Lake, River, or Spring, where they make a Trench, and kill a Victim; taking Care that none of the Blood come at the Water; then laying Myrtle and Laurel on it, they burn it with Rods, and making some Prayers, sprinkle Oil mixed with Milk and Honey, not in the Fire or Water, but on the Earth.

Other Gods the *Persians* had, tho' not reckon'd among these, whether as less principal, or of later Date; of these are mentioned by the same Author (*Strabo*) and by others, *Anaitis* (Venus), *Amandatus Sacæa*, *Sandes*, and *Nannæa* (Diana.)

Hitherto of the Doctrine of the *Persians*.

The THIRD BOOK.

Of the Sabæans.

ARABIA, the noblest Peninsula (if we may so term it) of *Asia*, is terminated by the *Persian*, the *Indian*, and the *Red Sea*, except that on one side it is conterminous to *Syria*; by which Vicinity was occasioned so near a Correspondence betwixt those Nations, that as the *Chaldæan* Learning overspreading all *Mesopotamia*, *Syria*, and *Assyria*, did on one side extend to their Neighbours the *Persians*; so on the other it reached to the *Arabians*: From which Nearness perhaps it was (not only of Situation, but Religion and Opinions) that *Pliny* useth their Names promiscuously, calling a great Part of *Mesopotamia*, *Arabia*; and the *Arabians* themselves, *Syrians*: And the later Eastern Writers, (especially the *Arabians*) under the Appellation of *Chasdim* or *Chaldanin* (*Chaldæans*,) comprehended not only the *Babylonians*, but the *Nabathæans*, *Charanæans*, and *Sabæans*; as (among others) *Muhamid Isacides* takes *Chasdanin* and *Nabathæa* to be synonimous; and *Ahmedus*, to his Book concerning the Religion of the *Sabæans*, gives this Title, *Of the Rites of the* Charanæan Chaldæans, *commonly known by the Name of* Sabæans. *He adds, commonly known by the Name of* Sabæans; because the *Sabæans* being the most considerable of these, they likewise, under the Appellation of *Sabæans*, included all the rest; even the *Chaldæans* of *Mesopotamia*: using the Terms of *Chaldæa* and *Sabæa* no less promiscuously than *Pliny* those of *Arabia*, *Mesopotamia*, and *Syria*; for which *R. Maimonides* (who doth so throughout all his Writings) gives this Reason; because the Doctrine of the *Chaldæans* extended thither, and that the Religion of all these Nations was the same.

Now, whereas *Arabia* is commonly distinguish'd into the *Stony*, the *Desart*, and the *Happy*, we here mean not that Part which is styled the *Desart*, lying on the North of *Sabæa*, and first planted by *Ismael*, whose Posterity afterwards, having learned the Language of the *Sabæans* (Arabick) were called *Arabians* also, or more properly, *Hagarens*, as descended from *Hagar*, and *Aarab Mastiaarabah*, *the made Arabians*; (that is, made such by Cohabitation and Conversation with the true *Arabs*); but those other true *Arabs*, the Inhabitants of the *Desart* and the *Happy*; whereof the former came from *Nebaiothus*, Son of *Ismael*, and are by *Pliny*, *Strabo*, and *Ptolemy*, called *Nabatæans*, as the Country itself, *Nabatæa*; the latter from *Saba*, Son of *Chus*, the Son of *Cham*, after whom stiled *Sabæans* (as the Country *Sabæa*)

[c] De Error. Prof. Relig. [d] Lib. 15. [e] De Diis Syr. Synt. 2. c. 7. [f] Lib. 23. [g] Lib. 1. [h] Perieg. [i] Lib. 15. [k] Strab. lib. 15.

and (in Distinction from the *made Arabians* of *Arabia the Desart*) *the native Arabians*. The *Charanæans*, mentioned together with these, were the Inhabitants of *Cara*, a City of *Arabia*, mentioned by *Pomponius Mela*, whose Inhabitants the *Carræans*, *Pliny* placeth next the *Sabæans*, distinct from *Hara* or *Caran*, in *Mesopotamia*.

The EIGHTEENTH PART.

The Sabæan *Philosophers.*

CHAP. I.

Of the Institutors of the Sabæan *Sect.*

CONcerning the first Institutor of Learning and Religion among the *Sabæans*, there is not any certain Agreement of Authors. *Saidus Patricides*, an *Arabian* Writer, attributes this Invention to a certain *Persian* named *Zoroaster*, contemporary with *Terah* Father to *Abraham*. *Zerodast* and *Zoroaster* are the same; whereby it appears, that *Patricides* means one of these two *Zoroasters*, whereof one was the first Author of Sciences among the *Chaldæans*; the other introduced the same Sciences among the *Persians*; and though he calls this *Zerodast* a *Persian*, yet by the Antiquity of the Time in which he conceives him to have lived, it is probable he rather intended the *Chaldæan*.

Others (adds *Patricides*) are of Opinion, that *Tachmurat*, King of *Persia*, gave Beginning to this Religion. The same perhaps whom *Elmacinus* (another *Arabian* Historian) calls *Tachurith*: Others (saith he) conceive, that the Religion of the *Sabæans* was manifested by a certain King of the *Persians*, whose Name was *Tachurirth*.

Elmacinus mentions another *Persian*, to whom the same Invention was attributed. In those Days, saith he, came forth *Nazarib*, a *Persian*, who, as is reported, was Author of the Religion of the *Sabæans*.

Others (continues *Patricides*) derive the Infancy of the *Sabæans* from a certain *Græcian*, named *Juvan* or *Javan*, Son of *Berkely*, and him they will have to be the City of *Zaituna*, which was built in *Attica*. Thus he. Where *Hottinger* for *Berkely* reads *Mercolim*, *Mercury*; confirmed by *Elmacinus* upon the same Subject: Others, saith he, affirm, that the Religion of the *Sabæans* was brought forth by a Man whose Name was *Juvan*, Son of *Markoli*, a *Græcian*, who first found out the Science of the Stars.

To these, *Patricides* adds, the Opinion of some others, who held, that the Authors of this Sect were some of those who were at the Building of the Tower of *Babel*. Thus the *Arabians*.

Some attribute the Institution of the *Sabæans* to *Cham*, Son of *Noah*; who, being banished from his Father's Sight, fled thither, and (to use the Words of *Lactantius*) settled in that Part of the Earth, which is now called *Arabia*. This was the first Nation that knew not God, because the principal Founder thereof had not received the Worship of God by Tradition from his Father: Thus *Lactantius*; with whom many agree in attributing the Original of Idolatry to *Cham*, and to his Son *Chus* the first Planter of *Chaldæa*, from whose Son *Saba*, the *Sabæans* were named; and, upon this ground, some have laboured to prove *Cham* and *Chus* to be the same with the first and second *Zoroasters*. Of which formerly.

Others (as *Damascene*) ascribe the Original of Idolatry to *Zerug*. *Epiphanius*, and the Author of the *Chronicon Alexandrinum*, affirm, that *Hellenism began in the Time of* Zerug. This *Hellenism* some conceive the same with the *Sabæan* Superstition; what the *Greek* Fathers call *Hellenism*, the *Rabbins* term *Goth*, the *Arabians*, *Algiaheleiton*, *the Time of Ignorance and Paganism*. And tho' to determine any thing of those early and obscure Times be very difficult, yet we cannot doubt, but that the idolatrous Worship of Fire, and of the Sun (ascribed to the *Sabæans*) was of great Antiquity among them, since mentioned by the most ancient Author, *Job*, who lived near them, as appears by the Inroad [l] which the *Sabæans* made upon him. *If I* [m] *beheld* (saith he) *the* [n] *Sun when it shined, and the Moon walking in Brightness, and my Heart hath been secretly enticed, or my Mouth hath kissed my Hand, this also were an Iniquity to be punished by the Judge; for I should have denied the God that is above*; where by kissing of the Hand is implied the ancient manner of Veneration.

CHAP. II.

Others of the Sabæan *Sect.*

THAT *Terah*, Father of *Abraham*, was bred up in this Doctrine, might be conjectur'd from *Joshua* xxiv. 2. where he is reckoned among those *that served strange Gods*. *Philo* [o] terms him an Astronomer, one of those that were versed in Mathematicks.

Of *Abraham*, Son of *Terah*, *R.* [p] *Maimonides* expressly saith, *It is well known that our Father* Abraham *was educated in the Faith of the* Zabians, *who held, there is no God but the Stars*; indeed [q] *Berosus* acknowledgeth *he was skilful in the Cœlestials*; and *Eupolemus*, cited by *Eusebius*, ascribes to him the Invention of *Astrology* and *Chaldaick*. These *Zabians* them-

[l] Chap. 1. v. 15. [m] Chap. [n] The Word is *Ur*, which signifieth as well *Fire*. [o] De Nobilit. [p] Mor. Nev. 3. 29. [q] Joseph Antiquit. 1. 8.

themſelves in their Annals give this Account of his Departure out of *Chaldea*. "*Abraham*, ſay [g] they, being educated in *Ur*, but diſſenting from the Vulgar, and aſſerting that there was another Creator beſides the Sun; they began thus, and objected againſt him, and among other Objections, they alledged the evident and manifeſt Operations of the Sun in the World: But *Abraham* anſwered them, You are right, which Sun is like the Axe which is in the Hand of him that ſtriketh therewith. Then they recite ſome of the Objections which he brought againſt them, and at laſt, they ſay, that the King caſt him in Priſon; nevertheleſs, he perſiſted in Priſon to oppugn them; whereupon, the King fearing leſt he might do ſome Hurt to his Kingdom, and ſeduce Men from their Religion, confiſcated all his Eſtate, and baniſhed him to the utmoſt Borders of the Eaſt. Thus the *Zabeans*. From which Relation *Joſephus* differs not much; who ſaith, that [h] Abraham *firſt undertook to convince the received erroneous Opinions of Men concerning the Deity; and that he firſt taught and proved that there is but one God; but ſeeing the* Chaldæans *and* Meſopotamians *began to mutiny againſt him for it, he thought it expedient to forſake the Country*.

The Rabbinical Traditions are more particular herein. *R. Solomon Hiarki* reports from an ancient Commentary, that *Terah* fell out with his Son *Abraham*, in the Preſence of *Nimrod*, for breaking his Idols, and that *Abraham* was thereupon caſt into a fiery Furnace. *Moſes Gerundenſis* confirms the ſame Story; but *R. Chain* relates it otherwiſe: *Abraham*, ſaith he, "met with a Woman holding a Diſh in "her Hand, and the Woman asking him whether "he would offer any thing to the Gods, he took a "Staff, and broke the Images which the Woman "had, and threw away the Staff; his Father coming "thither at the ſame time, demanded what was the "Matter? *Abraham* anſwered, ſhe had asked him "to make an Offering, and upon his anſwering that "he would firſt eat ſomething, there aroſe a Diſ-"pute betwixt them; but his Father urged that the "Buſineſs was otherwiſe, and that he was heard to "ſay many reproachful Things of *Nimrod*. The "Controverſy was brought before *Nimrod* the King "of *Babel*: He commanded *Abraham* to worſhip "the Fire that was ſet before him. *Abraham* an-"ſwered, If ſo, then adore you the Water, Water "which quencheth Fire. *Nimrod* ſaid to him, "Worſhip the Water. *Abraham* anſwered, If ſo, "worſhip the Clouds which diſtil the Water. *Nim-"rod* ſaid, Then worſhip the Clouds; whereupon "*Abraham*, If it be ſo, then the Wind is to be "worſhipped, which agitates and ſcatters the "Clouds. Again, *Nimrod*, Worſhip the Wind; "but *Abraham*, If ſo, then is Man much more to "be worſhipped who underſtands the Wind. At "length *Nimrod* growing angry, You talk, ſaith "he, idly, I worſhip none but the Fire, into the "midſt of which I will caſt thee. Let the God "whom thou worſhippeſt come and free thee by his "Right Hand. *Aran* ſtood by and talked; they "asked of which Opinion he was; he anſwered, if "*Abraham* get the better, I will be for him, if *Nim-"rod*, for *Nimrod*. After *Abraham* had gone into "the fiery Furnace and was freed, they ſaid to *Aran*, "Of which Side art thou? he ſaid, of *Abraham*'s: "Then they took him, and caſt him into the Fire, "and all his Bowels were burned, and he was taken "out dead in the Preſence of his Father. Thus *R. "Chain*." But *Cedrenus* affirms, that *Abraham* throwing his Father's Idols into the Fire, his Brother *Aran* endeavouring to reſcue them, was burned.

The *Arabians*, who imitate the *Jews* in Relations of this Kind, and fancy Superſtructures of their own upon Fables of the Rabbins, give a further Account of what happen'd to *Abraham* after his Departure from *Nimrod*, as appears by a Fragment of a Mahometan Writer, of which I ſhall cite only ſo much as moſt particularly concerns the *Sabæans*. "*Edris*, on whom be Peace, was the firſt who af-"ter *Enoch*, the Son of *Seth*, the Son of *Adam*, "on whom Peace, wrote with a Pen. This thing "afterwards *Edris* taught his Sons, and ſaid to them, "O Sons, know that you are *Sabæans*, learn there-"fore to read Books in your Youth. Now *Saba-"ans* are Writers, of whom the High, *he means* "Mahomet, ſaid (*Alc. Sur.* 2.) The *Sabæans* and "the *Nazarenes*. *The Author adds*, *that* they "ceaſed not to poſſeſs the Books of *Seth* and *Edris*, "by hereditary Right among themſelves, until the "Times of *Noah*, and of *Abraham*; after that the "High God aided him againſt *Nimrod*, on whom be "Malediction. But in that Day wherein *Abraham* "went out of the Land of *Irack*, and would go into "*Syria*, into the Land of his Fore-fathers, he went "to the Land of *Charan* and *Gheſira*, and there he "found a People of the *Zabians*, who read old "Books, and believed ſuch Things as were contain-"ed in them. But *Abraham* ſaid, *O my God, I did "not think that beſides myſelf, and thoſe that are with "me, there had been any of the Faithful, who believed "thee to be One*. And God breathed to *Abraham* this "Anſwer. O Abraham, *the Earth is never deſti-"tute, but that there are ſome in it that diſpute for "God*. But God commanded him to call them to "his Religion; and he called them, but they "would not, ſaying, how ſhall we believe thee, "when thou readeſt not a Book? And God ſent a-"mong them a Forgetfulneſs of thoſe things which "they knew of Sciences and Books; for they con-"ceived

[g] Mor. Nev. ibid. [h] Lib. 1. c. 3.

"ceived the Books which they used to be from God, "and some of them believed, others not. After- "wards the *Zabians* were divided, and some of them "believed, *viz.* the *Barbameans*, who did not sepa- "rate themselves from *Abraham*, of blessed Memory, "but the rest followed their Religion very eagerly, "*viz.* those who were in the Land of *Charan*, who "went not with *Abraham* into *Syria*, and said, we "follow the Religion of *Seth*, *Edris*, and *Noah*." Thus, according to *Kissæus*, the Religion of the *Sabæans* was the same with that of the *Haranæans*, or *Mesopotamians*. What he relates of *Abraham*'s being sent to the *Sabæans*, is all borrowed from the Rabbinical Traditions.

But that there were anciently learned Persons in *Arabia*, skilful in natural Philosophy, Astronomy, and other Sciences, is manifest from Testimonies far more authentick; (as particularly) from the Discourses betwixt *Job* and his Friends: Of the *Arabian* Philosophers it is understood, that *Solomon*'s *Wisdom* is said to have *excelled the Wisdom of all the Sons of the East*. *Tacitus*, describing *Judæa*, *the Lands and Bounds to the East are terminated by* Arabia. And that the *Jews* called *Arabia* the East Country, is evident from several Places in Scripture, as *Gen.* x. 30. and xxv. 6, 18. *Job* i. 3. *Judges* vi. 3, 4, *&c.* *Pliny* also mentions the Magi of *Arabia* (of whom he instanceth *Hippocus*). *Ptolomy*, *the Gulf of the Magi*, in *Arabia*; and *Porphyrius* (citing *Diogenes*) relates that *Pythagoras* (among other Countries to which he travell'd for Learning) *went also to* Arabia, *and lived with the King there.*

CHAP. III.

Their Writings.

THE *Sabæans* pretended (as was lately shewed out of *Kyssæus*) to have had the Books of *Seth* and *Edris*, and not only those, but some also written by *Adam*. For the same Author continuing the Story of *Abraham*'s coming among the *Sabæans*, adds, that "afterwards *Abraham* opened the Chest "of *Adam*, and behold, in it were the Books of "*Adam*; likewise the Books of *Seth*, and of *Edris*; "as also the Names of all the Prophets that were to "be sent after *Abraham*: But *Abraham* said, Hap- "py indeed are the Loins out of which all these "Prophets shall come: And God breathed to him "this Answer: Thou, O *Abraham*, art the Father "of them all, and they thy Children; and for this "Reason *Abraham* deserved to be called the *Father* "*of the Prophets*, upon whom be Peace.

Of the same Allay [i] *Maimonides* conceives the Book of Healings to have been, which was hid by *Ezekiel*.

The same [k] *Maimonides* cites many other Books of the *Sabæans*, translated into *Arabick*; of which the chiefest is entituled, *Of the Agriculture of the* Nabateans [l], translated by *Aben Vachschijah*; full of idolatrical Extravagancies: It treats of the making of *Tsilmenaias*; of the Descent of Familiar Spirits; of Conjurations of Dæmons; of Devils; of such as dwell in Deserts (as Satyrs were thought to do;) many other things it contained very ridiculous, by which nevertheless they conceived that they could confute the manifest Miracles of *Moses* and the Prophets.

Another entituled, *The Worship*, or, *of the Worship of the* Nabatæans; out of which [m] *Maimonides* cites a Story concerning *Abraham*, related formerly.

The [n] Book *Haistanchus*, ascribed to *Aristotle*, but falsly.

The [o] Book *Hatteleſmaoth*, of *Tsilmenaias*; *Buxtorfus* renders it, Of speaking Images; the Reason we have given formerly.

The Book *Tamtam*.

The Book of *Hassearab*.

The Book of the Degrees of the Cœlestial Orbs, and the Figures that are ascendent in every Degree.

Another Book concerning *Tsilmenaias*, which also is attributed to *Aristotle*.

Another Book ascribed to *Hermes*.

The Book of *Isaak* the *Zabian*, wherein he argues in Defence of the Laws of the *Zabians*.

A great Book of the Customs and Particularities of the Law of the *Zabians*, as of their Feasts, Sacrifices, Prayers, and other things concerning their Belief: All these (saith *Maimonides*) are Books which treat of idolatrical things, and are translated into the *Arabick* Tongue.

Besides these, (as *Maimonides* acknowledgeth) there are many others. *Hottinger* [p] cites, (in his own Possession) *A Treatise of* Mahomet *the Elder*, *Son of* Isaak, who is otherwise called *Abulsark*, the Son of *Abi Jakub*.

The NINETEENTH PART.

The Doctrine of the Sabæans.

WHAT is left to us of the Doctrine of the *Sabæans* is delivered upon later Authorities, than those from which we have the *Chaldaick*; and therefore perhaps is but an Account of what it was in later Times, degenerated from their primitive Doctrine, which was immediately derived from the *Chaldaick*. Nor is it impossible, but

[i] Mor. Nev. l. 3. 29. [k] Ibid. [l] Ibid. [m] Maim. Mor. Nev. ibid. [n] Ibid. [o] Ibid. [p] Histor. Oriental. l. 1. c. 8.

but that this Corruption might be somewhat aggravated by the eager Opposition of the *Talmudists*, and some *Arabick* Writers that follow them, from whose Hands only we receive it. However, we conceive it necessary to be annexed to the former; of which, tho' depraved, it pretends at least to be the continued Succession.

CHAP. I.

Of the Gods and Rites of the Sabæans.

THE [a] *Sabæans* held (as the *Chaldæans*) that the Stars are Gods, but the Sun the greatest God; for they plainly assert, that the Sun governs the superior and inferior Worlds; [b] and call him the great Lord, the Lord of Good. What they relate concerning *Abraham* refusing to worship the Sun, is delivered elsewhere. What they further fable of the Patriarchs, that *Adam* (not being the first Man, but begotten by a Man and Woman) was a Prophet of the Moon, and, by Preaching, persuaded Men to worship the Moon, and composed Books of Husbandry; That *Noah* was an Husbandman likewise, but believed not in Idols, for which they discommended him in all their Writings; That *Seth* also dissented from *Adam*, as to worshipping the Moon; see delivered more fully by [c] *Maimonides*.

Their Forms of worshipping these Gods was twofold, daily and monthly; the daily is by *Said Vahed* described thus: They make the first Day sacred to the Sun; the second to the Moon, the third to *Mars*; the fourth to *Mercury*; the fifth to *Jupiter*; the sixth to *Beltha Venus*; the seventh to *Saturn*.

The Description of their monthly Worship receive from a MS. of *Mahumed ben Isaac*, cited by *Hottinger*: They begin the Year from the Month *Nisan*, of which they keep holy the first, second, and third Days, adoring and praying to their Goddess *Beltha*: they go to her Temples, sacrificing Sacrifices, and burning living Creatures. On the sixth Day of the same Month they kill a Bull to their Goddess the Moon, and towards the Evening of the same Day eat it. On the eighth Day they keep a Fast, and likewise celebrate (at Night) a Feast in Honour of the seven Gods, and of the Dæmons, offering a Lamb to the God of the Blind (*Mars*.) On the fifteenth Day is the Festival of *Sammael*, (by this name the *Talmudists* understand the Devil) celebrated with many Sacrifices, Holocausts, and Offerings. On the twentieth they visit a *Cœnobium* of the *Hanaræans*, called *Cadi*, where they kill three Oxen, one to *Saturn*, another to *Mars* the blind God, the third to the Moon: they kill likewise nine Lambs, seven to their seven Gods (the Planets) one to the God of the Genius's, and one to the God of the Hours: they likewise burn many Lambs and Cocks. On the twentyeighth Day they go into the Temple which they have in the City *Saba*, at a certain Gate of *Charran*, called the Gate *Assarah*, and kill to *Hermes* their God, a great Bull; as also seven Lambs to their seven Gods; one to the God of the Dæmons, and to the God of the Hours, eating and drinking; but they burn nothing of any Beast that Day.

The second Month, which is *Jiar*, they begin also with Sacrifices, celebrating the Consecration of *Sammael*, and Feasting: The second day they keep in honour of *Aben Salem*; drinking, and filling their Hands with Tamarisk and other Fruits.

The twentythird Day of the third Month they keep in Honour of *Sammael*, whom they affirm to be the God that maketh the Arrows fly; the *Cumar*, or Priest, makes an Arrow take fire twelve times, by rubbing another Stick against it: the last time he creeps upon the Ground, and puts Flax to it; if their Flax kindle, they conceive their Rites well accepted of the Gods, otherwise not.

The fourth Month *Thammuz* had a peculiar Solemnity about the Middle of it, called the Festival *Albukal, of the Weeping Women:* The Original of which is thus related by *R. Maimonides*; In the same Book, saith he, they tell a Story of a certain idolatrous Pseudo-Prophet, named *Thammuz*; who calling upon the King to worship the seven Planets, and the twelve Signs of the Zodiack, and being by the King put to an ignominious Death, the same Night in which he was slain, all the Images from all parts of the Earth met in the Palace which was erected at *Babylon* to the great golden Image of the Sun, suspended betwixt Heaven and Earth: There this Image of the Sun fell down prostrate in the midst, and (all the rest of the Images standing round about it) bewailed *Thammuz*, and began to relate what hapned to him; whereupon the rest of the Images fell a weeping, and lamented all that Night: But as soon as the Morning appeared they all flew away, and returned home to their several Temples. Hence came the Custom, that on the first day of the Month *Thammuz* (*June*) they Weep, Lament, and Bewail *Thammuz*. This Custom of *Women Weeping for Thammuz* is mentioned also by the Prophet [d] *Ezekiel*, as imitated by the *Jews*: the twentyninth Day of this Month they consecrate to *Sammael* and to other Gods and Dæmons; sacrificing nine Lambs to *Hanan*.

In the fifth Month, which, as the *Syrians*, they call *Ab*, they press new Wine to their Gods, and give it several Names: this they do the eight first Days. They likewise kill a new born Infant to their Gods, which they beat all to pieces; then they take the Flesh and mix it with Rye-meal, Saffron,

[a] Maimon. Mor. Nev. 3. 8. [b] Idem. [c] Mor. Nev. ibid. [d] Chap. viii. 14.

Ears

Ears of Corn, Mace, and little Cakes like Figs; they bake this in a new Oven, and give it to the People of the Congregation of *Sammael* all the Year long; no Woman eats of this, nor Servant, nor Son of a Bond-woman, nor Man that is poſſeſſed, or mad.

The Rites of the ſixth Month, named *Eloul*, are thus deſcribed by the ſame Author: Three Days they boil Water to waſh themſelves, that they may perform the Rites of *Sammael*, who is the Prince of the Dæmons, and the greateſt God; into this Water they caſt ſome Tamarisk, Wax, Olives, Spice, *&c.* and when it is hot, take it before Sun-riſe, and pour it upon their Bodies, as an Amulet: The ſame Day alſo they kill eight Lambs, ſeven to their Gods, and one to the God *Sammael*; they eat alſo in their Congregations, and drink every Man ſeven Cups of Wine: The Prince exacts of every one of them two Drachms to be paid into his Exchequer. On the 26*th* Day of the ſame Month they go forth to a Mountain, celebrating the Rites of the *Sun*, *Saturn*, and *Venus*; burning eight Hen-chickens, eight Cocks, and as many Hens. He who made a Prayer and Requeſt to Fortune, takes an old Cock, or a Cock-chicken, to the Wings of which he ties two Strings, and ſets their Ends on Fire, and gives up the Chickens to the Goddeſs Fortune: If the Chickens are quite conſumed by the Fire his Prayer is heard; but if the Fire of thoſe Strings goes out before the Chickens be quite burnt, the Lord of Fortune accepts not his Prayer, nor Offerings, nor Sacrifices. On the 27*th* and 28th they have their Myſteries, Sacrifices, Offerings, and Holocauſts to *Sammael*, (who is the greateſt Lord,) to the Dæmons and Genus's, which compaſs them about, defend them, and beſtow good Fortune on them.

The ſeventh Month, which the *Syrians* and *Sabæans* call *the firſt Tiſchri*, hath peculiar Rites, thus deſcribed by the ſame Author: About the middle of this Month, they burn Meat to the dead, in this manner: Every one buys of every Sort of Meat that is in the Market; of all Kind of Fleſh, Fruits, green and dry; they likewiſe dreſs it ſeveral ways; all which they burn in the Night-time to the Dead, and wiſh it the Thigh-bone of a Camel; they alſo pour mixed Wine upon the Fire for the Dead to drink.

In the eighth Month, which is called the *latter Tiſchri*, they faſt on the 21*ſt* Day, and ſo on for nine Days, the laſt of which is the 29th; this Day they do in Honour of the Lord of Fortunes, *&c.*

The ninth Month, called *the firſt Canun*, is chiefly ſacred to *Venus*; on the fourth Day they ſet up a Tabernacle, which they call the Bed of *Beltha*, adorning it with ſeveral Leaves, Fruits, Roſes, *&c.* Before they offer their Sacrifices of Beaſts and Birds, they ſay, Let theſe Sacrifices be deſtined to our Goddeſs *Beltha*: This they do for ſeven Days; all which time they burn many Beaſts to their Gods and Goddeſſes. On the 30*th* Day of the ſame Month the Prieſt ſits in an high Chair, to which he gets up by nine Steps; and taking in his Hand a Stick of Tamarisk, ſtretcheth it out to them all, and ſtriketh every one of them with it, three, or five, or ſeven times. Afterwards he makes a Diſcourſe to them, wherein he declareth to the Congregation their Continuance, Multitude, Places, and Excellency above all other Nations; he likewiſe tells them the Largeneſs of their Empire, and the Days of their Reign: After which he comes down from the Chair, and they eat of the things offered to the Idols, and drink; and the Prince exacts of every one of them this Day two Drachms to the Exchequer.

The tenth Month, called *the other Canun*, ſeems particularly devoted to the Moon; for on the 24*th* Day thereof is the Nativity of the Lord, that is, the Moon; at what time they celebrate the Rites of *Sammael*, ſacrificing and burning fourſcore living Creatures, four-footed Beaſts and Fowl; they alſo eat, and drink, and burn *Badi*, Sticks or Canes of Palm, ſlender at the Bottom, to their Gods and Goddeſſes.

In the eleventh Month, *Sijubat*, they faſt ſeven Days together, beginning from the 9th Day, upon which they proclaim a Faſt to the Sun, who is the great Lord, the Lord of Good. They eat not in all this time any thing of Milk, nor drink Wine, nor pray during this Month to any but *Sammael*, the Genii, and Dæmons.

In the Month *Adar*, which is the twelfth and laſt, they faſt alſo to the Moon, eſpecially on the 28*th* Day: The Preſident diſtributes a Barley Loaf to the Congregation in Honour of *Mars*; the Prince exacts of every one of them towards his Exchequer two Drachms.

CHAP. II.

Other Rites of the Sabæans, *contrary to the* Levitical *Law.*

R. *Maimonides* [t] mentions ſeveral other Rites of the *Sabæans*, which were expreſly repugnant to the *Levitical* Law; adding, that he was acquainted with the Reaſons and Cauſes of many of the Laws of *Moſes*, by means of knowing the Faith, Rites, and Worſhip of the *Sabæans*. The Examples alledged by him and others are theſe.

They offered leavened Bread only, and, for their Offerings, made choice of ſweet things only, and anointed their Sacrifices with Honey; prohibited, *Lev.* ii. 11.

They uſed on a certain Day to feed on Swine's Fleſh; prohibited, *Lev.* xi. 7.

They

[t] Mor. Nev. 3. 29. & ſeq.

They held it unlawful to kill and feed on ſome Beaſts permitted to the *Jews*; as the Oxe, which *Maimonides* ſaith they much honoured for the great Profit he brings by Agriculture, and therefore held it unlawful to kill him, as alſo the Sheep; neither of which they killed.

Some of the *Sabæans* worſhipped Devils, believing they had the Shapes of Goats, and therefore called them *Seirim*; on the contrary, the *Levitical* Law prohibits to offer Sacrifices *le Seirim*, unto Goats, that is to ſay, Devils, appearing in the Forms of Goats, *Lev.* xvii. 7.

Though they did abominate Blood, as a thing exceeding deteſtable, yet they did eat it, believing it to be the Food of the Dæmons, and that he that did eat of it ſhould become a Brother, or intimate Acquaintance of the Dæmons, inſomuch that they would come to him and tell him future Events; prohibited, *Lev.* xvii. 10, 23.

They worſhipped the Sun at his Riſing; for which Reaſon, as our Rabbins expreſly teach in *Gemara*, ſaith *Maimonides*, *Abraham* our Father deſigned the Weſt for the Place of the *Sanctum Sanctorum*, when he worſhipped in the Mountain *Moriah*. Of this Idolatry they interpret what the Prophet [u] *Ezekiel* ſaith, of the *Men with their Backs toward the Temple of the Lord, and their Faces towards the Eaſt, worſhipping the Sun towards the Eaſt.*

Mahummed Ben-Iſaac relates, that they ſhaved themſelves with Razors, and branded themſelves with Fire; there were alſo married Women among them who ſhaved themſelves in the ſame manner; forbidden, *Lev.* xxi. 5.

They had a [w] Cuſtom of paſſing their Children, as ſoon as they were born, through the Fire, which they worſhipped, affirming, that ſuch Children as were not ſo paſſed would die. This was alſo expreſsly forbidden by the *Levitical* Law.

Another moſt obſcene Cuſtom they had of engraſting, deſcribed by [x] *Maimonides*, to which he conceives the *Levitical* Prohibition to allude.

Others there are of the ſame Kind cited by the ſame [y] Author; who concludes, that as concerning thoſe particular Laws, the Reaſons whereof are concealed, and the Benefit unknown to me, it proceeds from hence, that the things which we hear are not ſuch as thoſe which we ſee and perceive with our Eyes. For this Cauſe, thoſe things concerning the Rites of the *Sabæans*, which I have learnt by hearing, and from their Writings, are not ſo ſolid and certain, as with thoſe who have ſeen them practiſed, eſpecially ſeeing that their Opinions and Sects periſhed 1000 Years ſince, and their Names were aboliſhed.

With the *Sabæans*, we conclude the *Chaldaick* Philoſophy.

The Chaldaick *Oracles of* Zoroaſter *and his Followers.*

THE moſt conſiderable Remains of the *Chaldaick* Philoſophy are thoſe Oracles which go under the Name of *Zoroaſter*; ſome indeed condemn them as ſuppoſititious, *Forged* [a] *by ſome Pſeudo-Chriſtian* Greek; (perhaps the rather, becauſe *The* [b] *Followers of* Prodicus *the Heretick, boaſted that they had the ſecret Books of* Zoroaſter.) But this ſeems leſs probable, in regard they lie diſperſed among ſeveral Authors; nor are they to be neglected, in that they have been held in great Veneration by the *Platonick* Philoſophers. Which ſufficiently alſo argues, that they are none of the Writings charged by [c] *Porphyrius* upon the *Gnoſticks*, as forged by them under the Name of *Zoroaſter*; ſince thoſe (as he acknowledgeth) were by the *Platonick* Philoſophers, (of whom he inſtanceth *Plotinus* and *Amelius*) rejected, and demonſtrated to be ſpurious and ſuppoſititious.

Some argue, that they are not *Chaldaick*, becauſe many times accommodated to the *Greek* Style; but there are in them many ſo harſh and exotick Expreſſions as diſcover them to be originally foreign; and where they agree in Terms with that which is proper to the *Greek* Philoſophy, we may ſay of them as [d] *Jamblichus* upon another Occaſion, (on the Writings that go under the Name of *Hermes Triſmegiſtus*) as they are publiſhed under the Name of *Zoroaſter*, ſo alſo they contain the Doctrine of *Zoroaſter*, though they frequently ſpeak in the Style of the *Greeks*; for they were tranſlated out of *Chaldee* into *Greek* by Perſons skilful in the *Greek* Philoſophy.

To perſuade us that they are genuine, and not of *Greekiſh* Invention, [e] *Mirandula* profeſſeth to *Ficinus*, that he had the *Chaldee* Original in his Poſſeſſion, "I was (ſaith he) forcibly taken off from "other Things, and inſtigated to the *Arabick* and "*Chaldaick* Learning by certain Books in both "thoſe Languages, which came to my Hands, not "accidentally, but doubtleſs by the Diſpoſal of God, "in Favour of my Studies. Hear the Inſcriptions, "and you will believe it. The *Chaldaick* Books, "(if they are Books, and not rather Treaſures) are "the Oracles of *Aben Eſra*, *Zoroaſter*, and *Melchi-* "*or*, *Magi*; in which thoſe things which are faulty "and defective in the *Greek*, are read perfect and "entire. There is alſo (adds he) an Expoſition by

[u] Chap. viii. 16. [w] Maimon. Mor. Nev. 3. [x] Mor. Nev. 3. 37. [y] Ibid. 3. 44. [a] Beza. [b] Clem. Strom. l. 1. [c] Vit. Plot. [d] De Myſt. Egypt. [e] Epiſt. ad Marſil. Ficin.

" the *Chaldæan* wise Men upon these Oracles, short " and knotty, but full of Mysteries: There is also " a Book of the Doctrines of the *Chaldaick* Theolo- " gy, and upon it a divine and copious Discourse " of the *Persians*, *Grecians*, and *Chaldæans:*" Thus *Mirandula*; after whose Death these Books were found by *Ficinus*, but so worn and illegible that nothing could be made out of them.

Further, to confirm that these Oracles were (as we said) translated into *Greek* by Persons skilful in the *Greek* Philosophy, let us call to mind that *Berosus* [f] *introduced the Writings of the* Chaldæans *concerning Astronomy and Philosophy among the* Grecians; and that *Julian* the Son, a *Chaldaick* Philosopher, *wrote* [g] *theurgick Oracles in Verse, and other Secrets of that Science*; and probably, if these were no part of that *Chaldaick* Learning which *Berosus* first rendred in *Greek*, they yet might be some of the *Theurgick Oracles* (for such the Title speaks them) of *Julian*; for some of them are cited by *Proclus* as such. From the Account which *Mirandula* gives of those in his Possession, to which were added a Comment, and a Discourse of the Doctrines of the *Chaldaick* Theology, it might be conjectured, that what is delivered to us by *Pletho* and *Psellus*, who, besides the Oracles, give us a Comment on them, together with a *Chaldaick* Summary, was extracted out of that Author which *Mirandula* describes to have been of the same Kind and Method, but much more perfect and copious.

This Title of *Oracles* was perhaps not given to them only metaphorically, to express the divine Excellence of their Doctrine, but as conceived indeed to have been delivered by the Oracle itself; for [h] *Stephanus* testifies, that *the* Chaldæans *had an Oracle which they held in no less Veneration than the* Greeks *did theirs at* Delphi. This Opinion may be confirmed by the high Testimonies which the *Platonick* Philosophers give of them, calling them [i] *the* Assyrian *Theology revealed by God, and the Theology delivered by God.* And *Proclus* elsewhere having cited as from the Gods, one of those Oracles which speaks of the Ideas, (a *Platonick* Doctrine) adds, that *hereby the Gods declared the Subsistence of Ideas*, and acquiesceth as *satisfied that the Gods themselves ratify the Contemplation of* Plato.

Some of these Oracles which escaped the Injuries of Time, were first published by *Ludovicus Tiletanus*, *Anno* 1563. at *Paris*; together with the Commentaries of *Gemistus Pletho*, under the Title of *the Magical Oracles of the Magi descended from* Zoroaster; the same were afterwards translated and put forth by *Jacobus Marthamus*; and lastly, together with the Comment of *Psellus* also, by *Johannes Opsopæus* at *Paris*, 1607.

These by *Franciscus Patricius* were enlarged with a plentiful Addition out of *Proclus*, *Hermias*, *Simplicius*, *Damascius*, *Synesius*, *Olympiodorus*, *Nicephorus*, and *Arnobius*; increasing them [k], by his own Account, to 324. and reducing them, for the better Perspicuity, to certain general Heads, put them forth, and translated them into Latin, *Anno* 1593.

They were afterwards put forth in Latin by [l] *Otho Heurnius*, *Anno* 1619. under the Title of *The sincere magical Oracles of* Zoroaster, *King of* Bactria, *and Prince of the Magi*; but *Heurnius*, under the Pretence of [m] *putting them into good Latin*, (as he calls it) *and polishing them with a rougher File*, hath patched up and corrupted what *Patricius* delivered faithfully and sincerely; endeavouring to put these Fragments into a continued Discourse, which in themselves are nothing coherent, but dispersed among several Authors.

Patricius indeed hath taken much learned Pains in the Collection of them; but with less Regard to their Measures and Numbers, and, (as from thence may be shown) sometimes of the Words themselves: nor is there any certain means to redress this Omission by comparing them with the Authors out of which he took them, since few of those are extant; neither doth he, (as he professeth to have done) affix the Names of the Authors to the several Fragments, except to some few at the Beginning: However, we shall give them here according to his Edition, that being the most perfect; together with such Additions as we meet withal elsewhere, and some Conjectures to supply the Defect we mentioned.

And whereas many of these Oracles are so broken and obscure, that they may at first Sight seem rather ridiculous than weighty, yet he who shall consider, that as many of them as are explained by *Pletho*, *Psellus*, and others, would, without those Explications, seem no less absurd than the rest, but being explained, disclose the Learning of the *Chaldæans* in a profound and extraordinary manner, will easily believe all the rest, (even those which appear least intelligible) to be of the same Kind, and consequently ought no more to have been omitted than any of the rest.

[f] Joseph. contra Apion 1. barbar. [g] Suid. in voce Julianus. [h] De Urb. [i] Procl. in Tim. [k] Zor. pag. 4. b. [l] Philos. [m] Pag.

ΦΡ. ΠΑΤΡΙΚΙΟΥ ΤΑ ΤΟΥ ΖΩΡΟΑΣΤΡΟΥ ΛΟΓΙΑ.

FRANCISCI PATRICII ZOROASTRI ORACULA.

ΜΟΝΑΣ, ΔΥΑΣ, ΚΑΙ ΤΡΙΑΣ.

Ψελ. Ὅπι πατρικὴ μονάς ἔστι.
Δαμ. Ταμιεύει μονὰς ἡ δύο γονᾶ.
Προκ. Δαμ. Δυὰς γὰρ ὧδε τῷδε κάθηται, καὶ νοεραῖς ἀκριβέσι τομαῖς.
Καὶ τὸ κυβερνᾶν τὰ πάντα, καὶ τάττειν ἕκαστον ἐ ταχθέν.
Δαμ. Παντὶ γὰρ ἐν κόσμῳ λάμπει τριὰς, ἧς μονὰς ἄρχει.
Ἀρχὴ πάσης τομῆς ἥδε ἡ τάξις.
Προκ. Εἰς τρία γὰρ νοῦς εἶπε πατρὸς τέμνεσθαι ἅπαντα,
Οὗ τὸ θέλειν κατένευσε, καὶ ἤδη πάντα ἐτέλεσθη.
Εἰς τρία γὰρ εἶπε νοῦς πατρὸς ἀϊδίου,
Νῷ πάντα κυβερνῶν.
Δαμ. Καὶ ἐφάνησαν ἐν αὐτῇ ἥ τ' ἀρετὴ καὶ ἡ σοφία,
Καὶ ἡ πολύφρων ἀτρέκεια.
Τῇ τῶνδε ῥέει τριάδος μέλας πρὸ τ' ὄντος,
Οὐ πρώτης, ἀλλ' ἧς τὰ μετρεῖσθαι.
Ἀρχαῖς γὰρ τρισὶ ταῖσδε λάθοις θυλάσσειν ἅπαντα.
Ἱερὸς πρῶτος δρόμος, ἐν δ' ἄρα μέσῳ
Ἥειος, τρίτος ἄλλος, ὃς ἐν πυρὶ τ' ἀθάνατα θάλπει.
Καὶ πηγὴ πηγῶν, καὶ πηγῶν ἁπασῶν.
Μήτηρ συνέχουσα τὰ πάντα.
Ἔνθεν ἄρθμιον θρώσκει γλῶσσις πολυποικίλου ὕλης.
Προκ. Ἔνθεν συρίζων θρησκὸς ἀμυδρὸς πυρὸς ἄνθος,
Κόσμων ἐνθρώσκων κοιλώμασι. Πάντα γὰρ ἔνθεν.
Ἀρχὴ εἰς τὸ κάτω τείνειν ἀκτῖνας ἀγαστάς.

ΠΑΤΗΡ ΚΑΙ ΝΟΥΣ.

Ψελ. Ἑαυτὸν ὁ πατὴρ ἥρπασεν ἐκ' ἐν ἑῇ
Δυνάμει νοερᾷ κλείσας ἴδιον πῦρ.
Ψελ. Οὐ γὰρ ἀπὸ πατρικῆς ἀρχῆς ἀτελές τι θοχάζει.

Πάντα γὰρ ἐξετέλεσε πατὴρ,
Καὶ νῷ παρέδωκε δευτέρῳ,
Ὃν πρῶτον καλέζει πᾶν γένος ἀνδρῶν.
Προκ. Πατρογενὴς φάος, πολὺ γὰρ μόνος
Ἐκ πατρὸς ἀλκῆς ἀρεμβόμενος νόος ἄνθος.
Ἔργα νοήσας γὰρ πατρικὸς νόος αὐτογένεθλος,
Πᾶσιν ἐνέσπειρε δεσμὸν πυριβρεμῆ ἔρωτος.
Ὄφρα τὰ πάντα μένῃ, χρόνον εἰς ἀπέραντον ἐρῶντα.

MONAS, DYAS, TRIAS.

Psel. UBI paterna Monâs est.
Dam. Ampliata est Monâs, quæ duo generat.
Proc. Dam. Duitas enim apud hunc sedet, & intellectualibus fulget sectionibus.
Et gubernare cuncta, & ordinare quodcunque non ordinatum.
Dam. Toto enim mundo lucet Triâs, cujus Monâs est princeps.
Principium omnis sectionis hic est ordo.
Proc. In tria namque Mens dixit Patris secari omnia,
Cujus voluntas annuit, & jam omnia secta fuêre.
In tria namque dixit Mens patris æterni,
Mente omnia gubernans.
Dam. Et apparuerunt in ipsâ Virtus & Sapientia,
Et Multiscia Veritas.
Hinc fluit Triadis vultus ante essentiam,
Non primam, sed eam quæ mensuratur.
Principiis tribus hisce capias servire cuncta.

* * * *

Et fons fontium, & fontium cunctorum.
Matrix continens cuncta.
Indè affatim exilit generatio multifariæ materiæ.
Proc. Indè tractus prester exilis ignis flos,

Mundorum indens cavitatibus. Omnia namque indè.
Incipit deorsum tendere radios admirandos.

PATER ET MENS.

Psel. Seipsum rapuit pater neque suæ
Potentiæ mentali claudens proprium ignem.
Psel. Non enim à paterno Principio imperfectum quid rotatur.

Cuncta namque perfecit pater,
Et menti tradidit secundæ,
Quam primam vocat omne genus hominum.
Proc. Patrogenia lux, multum namque sola
E patris robore decerpens mentis florem.
Opera enim intelligens paterna mens è se genita,
Cunctis inseminavit vinculum ignigravis amoris.
Quo omnia maneant, tempus in interminatum amantia.

Μήτε πᾶσι τὰ πατρὸς νοερῶς ὑφασμένα φέρειν.

Ὡς ἐν ἔρωτι μένῃ κόσμου στοιχεῖα μένοντα.
Ἔχει τῷ νοεῖν πατρικὸν νοῦν ἐνιδρύσαι
Πάσαις πηγαῖς τε καὶ ἀρχαῖς.
Ἔστι γὰρ πέρας τοῦ πατρικοῦ βαθοῦς, καὶ πηγὴ τῶν νοερῶν.
Μήδε προῆλθεν, ἀλλ' ἔμεινεν ἐν τῷ πατρικῷ βαθῷ,
Καὶ ἐν τῷ ἀδύτῳ, καὶ τῶν θεοτρέμονα σιγῶν.
Οὐ γὰρ εἰς ὕλαν, πῦρ ἐπέκεινα τὸ πρῶτον
Ἑλὼν δυνάμιν καταπλήσει ἔργοις, ἀλλὰ νόῳ.
Σύμβολα γὰρ πατρικὸς νόος ἔσπειρε καὶ κόσμον

Ὃς τὰ νοητὰ νοεῖ καὶ ἄφραστα καλλονῇ,
Δαμ. Ὁλοφυὴς μερισμὸς, καὶ ἀμέριστος.
Νῷ μὲ κατέχει τὰ νοητὰ, αἴθησιν δ' ἐπάγει κόσμοις.

Νῷ μὲ κατέχει τὰ νοητὰ, ψυχῇ δ' ἐπάγει κόσμοις.

Neque omnibus quæ patri mentaliter contexta monſtret.
Ut in amore maneant mundi elementa manentia.
Habet ipſa intelligentia paternam mentem indere
Omnibus fontibus & principatibus.
Eſt enim finis paterni profundi, & fons mentalium.
Neque progreſſus eſt, ſed manſit in paterno profundo,
Et in adyto, per Deo-nutriens ſilentium.
Non enim in materiam, ignis trans primus
Suam potentiam claudit operibus, ſed mente.
Symbola enim paterna mens ſeminavit per mundum
Dam. Quæ intelligibilia intelligit, & ineffabilia exornat.
Tota partitio, & impartibilis.
Mente quidem continet intelligibilia, ſenſum verò inducit mundis.
Mente quidem continet intelligibilia, animam verò inducit mundis.

ΝΟΥΣ, ΝΟΗΤΑ, ΚΑΙ ΝΟΕΡΑ.

Δαμ. Καὶ τοῦ ἑνὸς νοῦ τοῦ νοητοῦ.
Πρόκ. Οὐ γὰρ ἄνευ νοὸς ἔστι νοητὸν· ἢ χωρὶς ὑπάρχει.
Τὰ μὲν ἔστι νοερὰ καὶ νοητὰ, ὅσα νοοῦντα νοεῖται.

Τερφθῆ δὲ τῷ νοοῦντι τὸ νοητόν.
Μάνθανε τὸ νοητὸν, ἐπεὶ νόος ἔξω ὑπάρχει.

Καὶ τοῦ νοῦ, ὃς τὸ ἐμπύριον κόσμον ἄγει.
Νοῦς γὰρ νοῦς ἔστιν ὁ κόσμου τεχνίτης πυρός.
Οἱ δ' ὑπέρκοσμον πατρικὸν βυθὸν ἔστε νοοῦντες.
Ἡ νοητὴ πάσης τμήσεως ἄγει.
Ἔστι γάρ τι νοητὸν, ὃ χρή σε νοεῖν νόῳ ἄνθει.

Δαμ. Ἡ γὰρ ἐπικλίνῃ, ὡς ἂν νοῦν, κἀκεῖνο νοήσῃ,
Ὡς τι νοοῦν, ἃ κεῖνον νοήσεις.
Ἔστι γὰρ ἀλκῆς ἀμφιφαὲς δύναμις,
Νοεραῖς στίλβουσα τομαῖσι, καὶ δὴ χρὴ
Σφοδρότητι νοεῖν τὸ νοητὸν ἐκεῖνο,
Ἀλλὰ νόῳ παναὲς παναῖῳ φλογὶ
Ἅπαντα μερίσαν, πλὴν τὸ νοητὸν ἐκεῖνο.
Χρεὼ δὲ τοῦτο νοῆσαι· ἢ γὰρ ἐπικλίνῃς
Σὸν νοῦν, κἀκεῖνο νοήσεις ἂν ἀτενῶς.
Ἀλλ' ἁγνὸν ἐπίστρεφον ὄμμα,
Φέροντα σῆς ψυχῆς τείναι κενεὸν νόον
Εἰς τὸ νοητὸν, ὄφρα μάθῃς τὸ νοητὸν,
Ἐπεὶ ἔξω νόος ὑπάρχει.
Τὸν δὲ νοεῖ πᾶς νοῦς θεὸν, ἃ γὰρ ἄνευ
Νοὸς ἔστι νοητὸν, καὶ τὸ νοητὸν ἀ νοῦ χωρὶς ὑπάρχει.

MENS, INTELLIGIBILIA, ET MENTALIA.

Dam. Et unius mentis intelligibilis.
Proc. Non enim ſinè intelligibili mens eſt: non ſeorſum exiſtit.
Quædam ſanè ſunt mentalia & intelligibilia, quæcunque dùm intelligunt intelliguntur.
Cibus verò intelligenti eſt intelligibile.
Diſce intelligibile, quandoquidem extra mentem exiſtit.
Et mentis, quæ Empyreum mundum ducit.
Mentis enim mens eſt quæ mundi eſt artifex ignei.
Qui ſupermundanum paternum profundum eſtis intelligentes.
Intelligibilis omnis ſectionis princeps eſt.
Eſt enim quoddam intelligibile, quod oportet te intelligere mentis flore.
Dam. Vel enim inclines, ut mentem, & illud intellexeris.
Ut aliquid intelligens, non illud intelliges.
Eſt enim roboris circumquaque lucidi potentia,
Mentalibus fulgens ſectionibus, non ſanè oportet
Vehementiâ intelligere intelligibile illud,
Sed mentis amplæ amplâ flammâ
Omnia metiente, præterquam intelligibile illud.
Opus ergò eſt hoc intelligere; nam ſi inclinaveris
Mentem tuam, etiam illud intelliges non parùm.
Sed purum converte oculum,
Ferentem tuæ animæ tendere vacuam mentem
In intelligibile; ut diſcas intelligibile,
Quandoquidem extra mentem exiſtit.
Deum hunc intelligit omnis mens, non enim ſinè
Mente eſt intelligibili, & intelligibile non ſinè mente exiſtit.

Ignis

Τοῖς ἢ πυρὸς νοερᾶ νοερῆς πρηστῆρσιν ἅπαντα
Εἴκαθε δυσλέοντα, πατρὸς πειθοῖδι βυλῇ.
Καὶ τὸ νοεῖν, ἀεί τε μένειν ἀόκνῳ σερφάλιγγι.
Πηγάς τε καὶ ἀρχὰς, δινεῖν, ἀεί τε μένειν ἀόκνῳ σερφάλιγγι.
Ἀλλὰ δ' ἔνομα σεμνὸν ἀκοίμητῳ σερφάλιγγι
Κόσμοις ἐνθρώσκων, κρεσσονὶ δὲ πατρὸς ἐπιπνὰ.
Τπὸ δύο νόων ἢ ζωογόνος πηγὴ σειέχει ψυχῶν.
Καὶ ὁ ποιητὴς, ὃς αὐτογᾶν τεκτήνατο τὸν κόσμον.
Ὃς ἐκ νόος ἔκθορε πρῶτος.
Ἑλαμπὸς πυρὶ πῦρ, συνδέσμων ὄφρα κεράσσῃ
Πηγαίους κρατῆρας, ἓν πυρὸς ἄνθος ὀπίζων.
Νοεραῖς ἀστραπῇσι τομαῖς, ἔρωτος δ' ἐπλησε τὰ πάντα.
Τὰ ἀπύπωτα τυπῶσι.
Σμήνεσιν ἐοικυῖαι φέρονται, ῥηγνύμεναι
Κόσμους σὺν σώμασι.
Ἃ νῶς λέγει, τῷ νοεῖν δή πω λέγει.
Ἡ μὲν γὰρ δυνάμις σὺν ἐκείνοις, νῶς δ' ἀπ' ἐκείνου.

ΙΥΓΓΕΣ, ΙΔΕΑΙ, ΑΡΧΑΙ.

Πολλαὶ μὲν αἵδε ἐπεμβαίνουσι φαεινοῖς κόσμοις.
Ἐνθρώσκουσαι, ἓν ἐν αἷς ἀκρότητες ἔασι τρεῖς,
Ὑπόκειται αὐταῖς ἀρχὸς αὐλῶν.
Ἀρχὰς, αἱ πατρὸς ἔργα νοήσασαι νοητὰ
Αἰθητοῖς ἔργοις, καὶ σώμασιν ἀπεκάλυψεν.
Διαπόρθμιοι ἑστῶτες φάναι τῷ πατρὶ καὶ τῇ ὕλῃ.
Καὶ τὰ ἐμφανῆ μιμήματα τῶν ἀφανῶν ἐργαζόμενοι.
Καὶ τ' ἀφανῆ εἰς τὰ ἐμφανῆ κοσμοποιίαν ἐγγεάφοντες.
Νῶς πατρὸς ἐῤῥοίζησε, νοήσας ἀκμαδὶ βυλῇ
Παμμόρφους ἰδέας. πηγῆς δ' ἀπὸ μιᾶς ἀποπᾶσαι
Ἐξέθορον. πατρόθεν γὰρ ἦν βυλή τε τέλος τε.
Δι' ὧν σωάπτει τῷ πατρὶ, ἄλλων καθ' ἄλλων
Ζωὼν, ἀπὸ μειζομένων ὀχετῶν.
Ἀλλ' ἐμερίσθησαν, νοερῷ πυρὶ μοιρηθεῖσαι,
Εἰς ἄλλας νοερὰς· κόσμῳ γὰρ ἄναξ πολυμόρφῳ
Περύσηκεν νοερὸν τύπον ἄφθιτον, ἃ κατὰ κόσμον

Ἴκνος ἐπειγόμενος μορφῆς κατὰ κόσμος ἐφάνθη.

Παντοίας ἰδέας κεχαρισμένος, ὧν μία πηγή.
Ἐξ ἧς ῥοιζοῦνται μεμερισμέναι ἄλλαι,
Ἁπλατοι, ῥηγνύμεναι κόσμοις σὺν σώμασι.
Αἱ σὺν κόλποισι σπερχαλέοις, σμήνεσιν ἐοικυῖαι,
Φορέονται τρεπτῶσαι· σὺν δ' ἀμφὶ ἄλλυδις ἄλλη.
Ἔννοιαι νοεραὶ πηγῆς πατρικῆς ἀπὸ
Πολὺ σπαδόμεναι πυρὸς ἄνθος
Ἀκοιμήτοις χρόνοις. ἀκμὴ ἀρχεγόνοις ἰδέαις
Πρώτη πατρὸς ἔβλυσε· τὰς δ' αὖτ' ἀθανάτης πηγῆς,
Νοέμεναι ἴυγγες πατρόθεν νοέουσι καὶ αὐταί.
Βυλαῖς ἀφθέγκτοισι κινέμεναι ὥστε νοῆσαι.

Ignis mentalis mentalibus presteribus cuncta
Cedunt servientia, Patris persuasorio consilio.
Et intelligere, sempérque manere impigrâ vertigine.
Fonte & principii, vertere, sempérque manere impigrâ vertigine.
Sed nomen venerandum insomni vertigini
Mundis indens, terribiles ob patris minas.
Sub duabus mentibus vitigenius fons continetur animarum.
Et factor, qui per se operans fabrefecit mundum.
Qui ex mente exiliit primus.
Indutus igne ignem, Vinculorum ut temperet
Fontanos crateras, sui ignis florem sustinens
Mentalibus fulget sectionibus, amoréque implevit omnia.
Infigurata figurans.
Examinibus similes feruntur, perrumpentes
Per mundi corpora.
Quæ mens dicit, intelligendo sanè dicit.
Potentia quidem cum illis, Mens verò ab illâ.

JYNGES, IDEÆ, PRINCIPIA.

Multæ quidem hæ scandunt lucidos mundos.
Insilientes, & in quibus summitates sunt tres.
Subjectum ipsis est principale pratum.
Principia; quæ patris opera intelligentes intelligibilia
Sensibilibus operibus, & corporibus revelârunt.
Transvectrices stantes dicere patri & materiæ.
Et manifesta imitamina latentium operantes.
Et latentia in manifestam Cosmopœiam inscribentes.
Mens patris striduit, intelligens vigente consilio
Omniformes Ideas. Fonte verò ab uno evolantes
Exilierunt. A patre enim erat consilium & finis.
Per quæ conjunguntur patri, per aliam atque aliam
Vitam, à compartitis canalibus.
Sed partitæ sunt, mentali igne dispositæ,
In alias mentales: mundo namque rex multiformi
Proposuit mentalem typum incorruptibilem, non per mundum
Vestigium promovens formæ per quæ mundus apparuit.
Omnifariam ideis gratiosus, quarum unus fons.
Ex quo strident dispertitæ aliæ,
Immensæ, perrumpentes mundi circa corpora:
Quæ per sinus immensos, examinibus similes,
Feruntur conversæ: circúmque alibi alia.
Conceptiones mentales fonte à paterno
Multum decerpentes ignis florem
Insomnis temporis. Vigor principigeniæ ideæ
Primus, patris emissus est: cujus per se florens fons.
Intellectæ Jynges à patre intelligunt & ipsæ.
Consiliis ineffabilibus moventur ut intelligant.

ΕΚΑΤΗ, ΣΥΝΟΧΕΙΣ, ΚΑΙ ΤΕΛΕΤΑΡΧΑΙ.

Ἐξ αὐτοῦ γὰρ πάντες ἐκθρώσκουσι
Ἀμείλικτά τε κεραυνοί, καὶ περισκεδάχροι κόλποι
Παμφεγγέος ἀλκῆς παλιγθυῆς Ἑκάτης.
Καὶ ὑπερζωκὸς πυρὸς ἄνθος, ἠδὲ κραταιὸν
Πνεῦμα πόλων, πυρίων ἐπίκεινα.
Φερτυρεῖν αὖ περισκέπτοις ἑοῖς ἀκρότητας ἔδωκεν.
Ἐγκεράσας ἀλκῆς ἴδιον μένος ἐν συνοχεῦσιν,
Ὅπως ἔχοι κόσμος νοερὰς ἀνοχὰς ἀκαμπεῖς.
Ὅτι ἐργάτις, ὅτι ἐκδότις ἐστὶ πυρὸς ζωηφόρου.
Ὅτι καὶ τὸ ζωογόνον πλήρωσε τ' Ἑκάτης κόλπον.
Καὶ ὑπῆρξεν τοῖς συνοχεῦσιν ἀλκὴν ζήθεον πυρὸς
Μέγα δυναμθόιο.
Ἀλλὰ καὶ φρουροὶ τ' ἔργων εἰσὶ τοῦ πατρός.
Ἀφομοιοῖ γὰρ ἑαυτὸν, ἐκεῖνος ἐπειγόμενος
Τὸν τύπον περιβάλλεται τ' εἰδώλων.
Οἱ τελεταρχαι συνείληπται τοῖς συνοχεῦσι.
Τοῖς δὲ πυρὸς νοεροῦ νοεροῖς περισκέπουσιν
Ἅπαντα εἰκάδε δουλεύοντα.
Ἀλλὰ καὶ ὑλαίοις ὅσα δουλεύει συνοχεῦσι.
Ἐναμβὸς πάντευκτον ἀλκὴν φωτὸς κελαδοῦντος.
Ἀλκὴ τριλίχῳ, νοῦν ψυχήν θ' ὁπλίσαντα.
Παντίας θεοῦ σύνθημα βάλλειν φρενί.
Μηδ' ὑπερκοιτᾶν ἐμπυρείοις ἀνεφάδην ὀχετοῖς,
Ἀλλὰ συναθρηδόν.
Οἱ δὲ τὰ ἄτομα, καὶ αἰδητὰ δημιουργοῦσι,
Καὶ σωματοειδῆ, καὶ καταταγμένα εἰς ὕλην.

ΨΥΧΗ, ΦΥΣΙΣ.

Ὅτι ψυχὴ πῦρ δυνάμει παντὸς ὅσα φαινόμενα,

Ἀθάνατός τε μένει, καὶ ζωῆς δεσπότις ἐστί·
Καὶ ἴσχει κόσμος πολλὰ πληρώματα κόλπων.
Νῷ γὰρ μίμημα πέλει, τὸ δὲ τεχθὲν ἔχει τι σώματος.
Μιγνυμένων δ' ὀχετῶν, πυρὸς ἀφθίτου ἔργα τελοῦσα.
Μετὰ δὲ πατρικὰς διανοίας ψυχὴ, ἐγὼ, ναίω·

Θερμὴ, ψυχοῦσα τὰ πάντα, κατέθετο γὰρ
Νοῦν μὲν ἐνὶ ψυχῇ, ψυχὴν δ' ἐνὶ σώματι ἀργῷ.

Ἡμέων ἐγκατέθηκε πατὴρ ἀνδρῶν τε θεῶν τε.
Ἄφθιτα ἐμψυχοῦσα φάος, πῦρ, αἰθέρα, κόσμους.
Συνυφίστα γὰρ τὰ φυσικὰ ἔργα τῷ νοερῷ φέρεται

Τῷ πατρός· Ψυχὴ γὰρ ἣ κοσμήσασα τὸν μέγαν
Οὐρανὸν, καὶ κοσμοῦσα μετὰ τοῦ πατρός.
Κέρατα δὲ καὶ αὐτῆς ἐστήκασιν ἄνω.
Νώτοις δ' ἀμφὶ θεᾶς φύσις ἄπλετος ἠέρται.

HECATE, SYNOCHES, ET TELETARCHÆ.

Ex ipso enim omnes exiliunt
Amilictíque fulmines, & presterocapaces sinus
Omnilucidæ vigoris patrogenii Hecates.
Et Hypezocus ignis flos, & fortis
Spiritus polorum, igneos trans.
Custodire presteribus suis summitates dedit.
Immiscens vigoris proprium robur in Synochis.
Quo mundus habeat mentales sustentatores inflexibiles.
Quia operatrix, quia largitrix est ignis vitiferi.
Quia & vitigenium implet Hecates sinum.
Et influit Synochis vigorem vitidonum ignis
Magni potentis.
Sed & Custodes operum sunt patris.
Assimilat enim se ipsum; ille urgens
Typum induere idolorum.
Teletarchæ comprehensi sunt cum Synochis.
His verò ignis mentalis mentalibus presteribus
Omnia parent servientia.
Sed & quæcunque materialibus serviunt Synochis.
Induti armorum vigorem luminis resonantis.
Vigore Triglicho, mentem animámq; armantem.
Pervarium Synthema jacere ratiocinio.
Neque super incedere empyreis sparsim canalibus,
Sed collectim.
Hi verò individua, & sensibilia efficiunt,
Et corporiformia, & destinata in materiam.

ANIMA, NATURA.

Quoniam anima ignis potentiâ patris existens lucidus,
Immortalísque manet, & vitæ domina est:
Et tenet mundi multas plenitudines sinuum.
Mentis enim imitamen est, partum verò habet quid corporis.
Mistis verò canalibus, ignis incorruptibilis opera efficiens.
Post verò Paternas conceptiones anima, ego, habito:
Calida, animans omnia, reposuit enim
Mentem sanè in animâ, animam verò in corpore inerti.
Nostri imposuit pater hominúmque Deúmque.
Affatim animans lucem, ignem, æthera, mundos.
Coexistunt namque naturalia opera mentali splendori
Patris. Anima enim est quæ ornavit magnum
Cœlum, & quæ ornat simul cum patre.
Cornua & ipsius firmata sunt sursum.
Humeros verò circa Deæ natura immensa attollitur.

Imperat

Ἄρχει δ' αὖ φύσις ἀκμάτη κόσμων τε καὶ ἔργων.
Imperat rursus natura infatigabilis mundisque operibusque:

Οὐρανὸς ὄφρα θέῃ δρόμον ἀίδιον καταδύων·
Καὶ ταχὺς ἠέλιος πρὸς κέντρον, ὅππως ἐθὰς ἔλθῃ.
Μὴ φύσεως ἐμβλέψεις εἱμαρμένον ὄνομα τῆσδε.
Cælum ut currat cursum æternum trahens:
Et celer sol circa centrum, ut assuetus veniat.
Non naturæ inspicias fatale nomen ejus.

ΚΟΣΜΟΣ.

Ὁ ποιητὴς ὃς αὐτεργῶν τεκτήνατο τὸν κόσμον.
Καί πς πυρὸς ὄγκος ἦεν ἕτερος· τὰ δ' πάντα
Αὐτεργῶν, ἵνα σῶμα τὸ κοσμικὸν ἐκλοιπαθῇ.
Κόσμος ἵν' ἔκδηλος, καὶ μὴ φαίνῃ ὑμῳώδης.

Τὸν ὅλον κόσμον ἐκ πυρὸς, καὶ ὕδατος, καὶ γῆς,
Καὶ παντοδόφε αἴθρης.
Τ' ἄρρητα, καὶ τὰ ῥητὰ συνθήματα τοῦ κόσμου.
Ἄλλῃ καθ' ἄλλην ζωὴν, ἀπὸ μεριζομένων ὀχετῶν.
Ἀνωθεν δίηκοντος ἐπὶ τὸ κατ' ἄντικρυ
Διὰ τοῦ κέντρου τῆς γῆς, καὶ πέμπτον μέσον, ἄλλον
Πυρίοχον, ἔνθα κάτεισι μέχρι ὑλαίων ὀχετῶν.
Ζωηφόρον πῦρ.
Κέντρῳ ἐπισπέρχων ἑαυτὸν φωτὸς καλάδος.
Πηγαῖον ἄλλον, ὃς τὸν ἐμπύριον κόσμον ἄγει.
Κέντρον ἀφ' οὗ πᾶσι μέχρις ἂν τυχὸν ἴσαι ἔασι.
Σύμβολα γὰρ πατρικὸς νόος ἔσπειρε κατὰ κόσμον.
Μέσον τε πατέρων ἑκάστης κέντρον φορεῖται.
Νοῦ γὰρ μίμημα πέλει· τὸ δὲ τεχθὲν ἔχει τι σώματος.
Factor qui per se operans fabrefecit mundum.
Etenim quædam ignis moles erat altera: hæc Omnia
Per se efficiens, ut corpus mundanum——
Mundus ut manifestus, & non videatur membraneus.
Totum mundum ex igne, & aquâ, & terrâ,
Et omni-alente aere.
Ineffabilia, & fabilia synthemata mundi.
Aliam per aliam vitam, à partitis canalibus.
Desuper permeantis in oppositum
Per centrum terræ, & quintum medium, alium
Igneum, ubi descendit usque ad materiales canales.
Vitifer ignis.
Centro incitans Seipsum lumine resonante.
Fontanum alium, qui Empyreum mundum ducit.
Centrum à quo omnes usque quo fortè æquales fuerint.
Symbola enim paterna mens seminavit per mundum.
Medium inter patres singulæ centrum fertur.
Mentis enim imitamen est: quod verò partum est habet quid corporis.

ΟΥΡΑΝΟΣ.

Ἑπτὰ γὰρ ἐξώγκωσε πατὴρ στερεώματα κόσμων·
Τὸν ἠερσὶν κυρτῷ σχήματι περικλείσας.
Πῆξε δὲ πολὺν ὅμιλον ἀστέρων ἀπλανῶν,
Ζώων δὲ πλανωμένων ὑφέσηκεν ἑπτάδα.
Γῆν δ' ἐν μέσῳ πιθεὶς, ὕδωρ δ' ἐν γαίας κόλποις,
Ἠέρα δ' ἀνωθεν τούτων.
Πῆξε δὲ καὶ πολὺν ὅμιλον ἀστέρων ἀπλανῶν.
Μὴ τάσει σπουδόνῳ πονηρᾷ.
Πήξῃ δὲ πλάνην ἐκ ἐχέσῃ φέρεσθαι.
Ἔπηξε δὲ καὶ πολὺν ὅμιλον ἀστέρων ἀπλανῶν.
Τὸ πῦρ πρὸς τὸ πῦρ ἀναγκάσας.
Πήξῃ πλάνην ἐκ ἐχέσῃ φέρεσθαι.
Ἓξ αὐτοὺς ὑπέστησεν, ἕβδομον ἠελίου,
Μεσεμβολήσας πῦρ.
Τὸ ἄτακτον αὐτῆς εὐτάκτοις ἀναπρεμάσας ζώναις.

Τίκτει γὰρ ἡ θεὰ, ἠέλιόν τε μέγαν, καὶ λαμπρὸν σελήνην.

Αἰθὴρ, ἥλιε, πνεῦμα σελήνης ἀέρος ἄνοι,
Ἡλιακῶν τε κύκλων, καὶ μηνοειδῶν καναχισμῶν,
Sex eos constituit, septimum Solis,
In medium jaciens ignem.
Inordinationem eorum bene-ordinatis suspendens zonis.
Parturit enim Dea Solemque magnum, & splendidam Lunam.
Æther, Sol, spiritus Lunæ, aeris ductores,
Solariúmque circulorum, & lunarium est crepitum,

Sinu-

Κάλπων τε ἠεῖων.
Αἴθρης μέλΘ, ἠελίς τε καὶ μιῶνς ἁρμονίη, ἥ τε ἠέρΘ·
Καὶ πλατὺς ἀὴρ, μιωνιάς τε δρόμΘ, καὶ πόλΘ ἠελίοιο.
Συλλέγει αὐτὸ, λαμβάνουσα αἴθρης μέλΘ,
Ἠελίς τε, σελήνης τε, καὶ ὅσα ἠέρι σύνεχονΘ.
Πῦρ πυρὸς ἐξοχέτδμα, καὶ πυρὸς τμῆσις.
Καὶ γὰρ ἐς ὀξὺ πεφυκότι φωτὶ βλέπονΘ.
Ἔνδα κρόνΘ.
Ἥλιος πάρεδρΘ ἐπισκοπέων πόλον ἀγνόν.
Αἰθέριός τε δρόμΘ, καὶ μιῶνς ἄπλετΘ ὁρμὴ,
Ἠέριοί τε ῥοαί.
Ἥλιόν τε μέγαν, καὶ λαμπρὴν σελήνην.

Sinuúmque aereorum.
Ætheris cantus, Solísque, & Lunæ canalium, & aeris,
Et latus aer, lunarísque cursus, & polus Solis.
Colligit ipsum, accipiens ætheris harmoniam,
Solísq; Lunæque, & quæcumque aere continentur.
Ignis ignis derivatio, & ignis penu.
Crines enim in acutum nato lumini conspiciuntur,
Ubi Saturnus.
Sol assessor intuens polum purum.
Æthereusque cursus, & Lunæ ingens impetus,
Aeriique fluxus.
Solémque magnum, & splendidam Lunam.

ΧΡΟΝΟΣ.

Θεὸν ἐγκόσμιον, αἰώνιον, ἀπέραντον.
Νέον, καὶ πρεσβύτην, Ἑλικοειδῆ.
Καὶ πηγαῖον ἄλλον, ὃς τὸν ἐμπύριον κόσμον ἄγει.

TEMPUS.

Deum mundanum, æternum, infinitum.
Juvenem, & senem——
Et fontanum aliud, quod empyreum mundum ducit.

ΨΥΧΗ, ΣΩΜΑ, ΑΝΘΡΩΠΟΣ.

Χρὴ σε σπεύδειν πρὸς τὸ φάΘ καὶ πατρὸς αὐγὰς,
Ἔνθεν ἐπέμφθη σοὶ ψυχὴ, πολὺν ἑσαμβύσα νέον.

Ταῦτα πατὴρ ἐνόησε, βροτὸς δ' οἱ ἐφύετο.

Σύμβολα γὰρ πατρικὸς νόΘ ἔσπειρε τῆς ψυχῆς,
Ἔρωτι βαθεῖ ἀναπλήσας τὸν ψυχήν.
Κατέθετο γὰρ νέον ἐν ψυχῇ, ἐν σώματι δ'
Ὑμᾶς ἐγκατέθηκε πατὴρ ἀνδρῶν τε θεῶν τε.
Ἀσώματα μὲν ὄντι τὰ θεῖα πάντα.
Σώματα δ' ἐν αὐτοῖς ὑμῖν ἕνεκεν ἐνδέδεται.
Μὴ δυναμένους καταχεῖν ἀσωμάτους τ' σωμάτων,
Διὰ τὸν σωματικὸν, εἰς ὃν ἐνεκεντρίσθητε, φύσιν.

Ἐν ᾧ θεῷ κεῖνται πυρσὸς ἕλκουσαι ἀκμαίους.
Ἐκ πατρόθεν καπόντες, ἀφ' ὧν ψυχὴ καπόντων

Ἐμπυρίων δρέπεται καρπῶν, ψυχόφορον ἄνθΘ.
Διὸ καὶ νοήσασα τὰ ἔργα τῆς πατρὸς
Μοίρης εἱμαρμένης τὸ πρὸν φεύγουσιν ἀναιδές.
Κἂν γὰρ τήνδε ψυχὴν ἴδῃς ἀποκαταπᾶσαν,
Ἀλλ' ἄλλην ἐνίησι πατὴρ, ἐναρίθμιον ἧ.
Ἡ μάλα δὴ κεῖναί γε μακάρται ἔξοχα πασέων
Ψυχάων, ποτὶ γαῖαν ἀπ' ἠερηνόθεν πρεχέουσι.
Κεῖναι ὄλβιαί τε, καὶ ἃ φατὰ νείματα ἔχουσι.
Ὅσσαι ἀπ' αἰγλήεντΘ, ἄναξ, σέθεν, ἢ ὃ καὶ αὐτῆς
Ἐκ Διὸς ἐξεγένοντο. Μίτε κρατερῆς ὑπ' ἀνάγκης
Ἠχέτω ψυχῆς βάθΘ ἄβροτον, ὄμματα δ' ἄρσω
Πάντα ἐπιπέτασον ἄνω.
Μήτε κάτω νεύσεις εἰς τὸ μελανωγέα κόσμον.

ANIMA, CORPUS, HOMO.

Oportet te festinare ad lucem & patris lumina,
Unde missa est tibi anima, multam induta mentem.
Hæc pater mente concepit, mortalísque ei est animatus.
Symbola enim paterna mens seminavit in animis
Amore profundo replens animam.
Reposuit enim mentem in animâ, in corpore verò
Vos reposuit pater hominúmque deúmque.
Incorporea quidem sunt divina omnia.
Corpora verò in ipsis vestrî causâ sunt alligata,
Non potentes continere incorporeos corpora,
Ob corpoream, in quam concentrati estis, naturam.
Inque deo jacent faces trahentes vălidas.
A patre descendentes, à quibus anima descendentibus
Empyreos carpit fructus, animam-alentem florem.
Ideóque mente concipientes opera patris
Parcæ fatalis alam fugiunt inverecundam.
Et si hanc animam videris redeuntem,
At aliam immittit pater, ut in numero sit.
Certè valde illæ sunt beatissimæ supra omnes
Animas, ad terram à Cœlo profusæ.
Illæque divites, & ineffabilia stamina habentes.
Quæcunque à lucente, ô rex, à te, vel ipso
Jove sunt progenitæ. Miti validâ à necessitate
Ducatur animæ profunditas immortalis oculósque affatim
Omnes sursum extende.
Nec deorsum pronus sis in nigricantem mundum.

Cui

Ὦ βαθὺς αἰὲν ἄπυθ' ἑωϊσχωταί τε, καὶ Ἅιδης

Ἀμφικυνεφὴς, ῥυπόων, εἰδωλοχαρὴς, ἀνόητε,

Κρημνώδης, σκολιὸς, πωρὸν βάθε αἰὲν ἑλίσσων,
Ἀεὶ νυμφίων ἀφανὲς δέμας, ἀρρὸν, ἀπνεύμον.
Καὶ ὁ μισοφανὴς κόσμε, καὶ τὰ σκολιὰ ῥεῖθρα
Τῷ ὧν πολλοὶ κατασείρουσι.
Ζήτησον παράδεισον.
Δίζεο σὺ ψυχῆς ὁχετὸν, ὅθεν, ἢ τίνι τάξει
Σώματι πνεύσας, δὸς τάξιν ἀφ' ἧς ἐρρύης
Αὖθις ἀνασήσεις, ἱερῷ λόγῳ ἔργον ἑνώσας.
Μήτε κάτω νεύσεις, κρημνὸς καὶ γῆς ὑπόκειται,

Ἑπταπόρε σύρων καὶ βαθμίδε· ἦν ὕπο
Δεινῆς ἀνάγκης θρόνος ἕδρῃ.
Μὴ σὺ αὔξανε τλῶ εἱμαρμένην.
Ψυχὴ ἡ μερόπων θεὸν ἄγχει πῶς εἰς ἑαυτήν.

Οὐδὲν θνητὸν ἔχουσα, ὅλη θεόθεν μεμέθυσται.
Ἁρμονίαν αὐχεῖ γὰρ, ὑφ' ἧ πέλε σῶμα βρότειον.

Ἐκτείνας πύρινον νῆν ἔργον ἐπ' εὐσεβείης,
Ῥυσὸν καὶ σῶμα σαώσεις.
Ἔστι καὶ εἰδώλῳ μιγὶς εἰς τόπον ἀμφιφάοντα.
Πανταχόθεν ἀπλάστῳ ψυχῇ πυρὸς ἴνια τείνον.
Ὁ πνευματαλωπῆς ἔννοια πρωτίστην ἔχει τάξιν.
Τῷ πυρὶ γὰρ βροτὸς ἐμπελάσας θεόθεν φάος ἕξῃ.
Δηθύνοντι γὰρ βροτῷ κρείσσονες μάκαρες τελέθουσι.
Αἱ ποιναὶ μερόπων ἀγκλεισμοί.
Καὶ τὰ κακῆς ὕλης βλαστήματα χρηστὰ, καὶ ἐσθλά.
Ἐλπὶς τρεφέτω σε πυρίοχος ἀγγελικῷ ἐνὶ χώρῳ.
Ἀλλ' ἐκ εἰσδέχεται κείνης τὸ θέλειν πατρικὸς νέος,
Μέχρις ἂν ἐξέλθῃ λήθης, καὶ ῥῆμα λαλήσῃ.
Μνήμων εἰδομένη πατρικῆ ζωθήμαλος ἀγνῆ.
Τοῖς μὲν διδακτὸν φάος ἔδωκε γνώεισμα λαβέσθαι.
Τοὺς δὲ καὶ νωνύμους ἔπος ἐνεκάρσιον ἀλκῆς.
Μὴ πνεῦμα μολύνῃς, μήτε βαθύῃς τὸ ὀπίσθιον.
Μήτε τὸ τ' ὕλης σκύβαλον κρημνῷ καταλείψεις.
Μὴ ἐξάξῃς, ἵνα μὴ ἐξίσσα ἔχῃ τι.
Βίῃ ὅτι σῶμα λιπόντων ψυχαὶ καθαρώταται.
Ψυχῆς ἐξωσῆρες, ἀνάπνοοι, εὔλυτοί εἰσι.
Λαιῆς ἐν λαγόσιν Ἑκάτης ἀρετῆς πέλε πηγὴ,
Ἔνδον ὅλη μίμνουσα, τὸ πάρθενον ἐ φυλάσσα.

Ὦ πολυμηχάνης φύσεως, ἄνθρωπε, τέχνασμα!
Μὴ τὰ πελώρια μέρα γαίης ὑπὸ σὴν φρένα βάλλε,

Οὐ γὰρ ἀληθείης φυτὸν ἐνὶ χθονί.
Μήτε μέτρει μέρα ἠελίου κανόνας ζωαθρήσας,

Ἀϊδίῳ βουλῇ φέρεται, ἐχ ἕνεκα σεῖο.
Μιωαῖον μὲ δρόμημα, καὶ ἀστρεῖον πρηστῆρα
Μίμνης ῥοίζου ἔασον, ἀεὶ τρέχει ἔργῳ ἀνάγκης

Cui profunditas ſemper infida ſubſtrata eſt, & Hades.
Circumquaque caligans, ſqualidus, idolis gaudens, Amens,
Præcipitoſus, tortuoſus, cæcum profundum ſemper involvens,
Semper deſponſans obſcuram faciem, inertem, Spiritu-carentem.
Et Oſor luminis mundus, & tortuoſi fluxus
A quibus vulgus attrahitur.
Quære paradiſum.
Quære tu animæ canalem, unde, aut quo ordine
Corpori inſerviens, in ordinem à quo effluxiſti
Rurſus reſtituas, ſacro ſermoni operam uniens.
Neque deorſum fis pronus, præcipitium in terrâ ſubeſt,
Septemvios trahens per gradus: quo ſub
Horribilis neceſſitatis Thronus eſt.
Nè tu augeas fatum.
Anima hominum Deum coget quodammodo in ſeipſam:
Nihil mortale habens, tota à Deo eſt ebria facta.
Harmoniam reſonat namque, ſub quâ eſt corpus mortale.
Extendens igneam mentem ad opus pietatis,
Et fluxile corpus ſervabis.
Eſt & idolo portio in loco circumlucente.
Undique inflictâ animâ ignis habenas tende.
Igne calens cogitatio primiſſimum habet ordinem.
Igni namque mortalis propinquans à Deo lumen habebit.
Immoranti enim mortali præſtò Dii aderunt.
Pœnæ hominum ſunt angores.
Et malæ materiæ germina utilia ſunt, & bona.
Spes nutriat te ignea Angelicâ in regione.
Sed non recipit illius velle Paterna mens,
Donec exeat ex oblivione, & verbum loquatur.
Memoriam indens Paterni Synthematis puri.
His quidem diſcibilem lucis dedit notitiam ſuſcipere.
Hos verò & ſomnolentos ſui fructum dedit roboris:
Nè ſpiritum macules, neque profundam fac ſuperficiem.
Neque materiæ quiſquilias præcipitio relinquas.
Nè educas, nè exiens habeat quidpiam.
Vi corpus relinquentium animæ ſunt puriſſimæ.
Animæ expulſores, reſpiratores, & faciles ſolutu ſunt.
Siniſtris in lumbis Hecates virtutis eſt fons,
Intùs tota manens, virgineum non adjiciens.
O audaciſſimæ naturæ, homo, artificium!
Neque ingentes menſuras terræ in tuam mentem pone,
Non enim veritatis planta eſt in terrâ.
Neque in menſuris menſuras Solis regulas congregans,
Æterno conſilio fertur, non gratiâ tui.
Lunarem quidem curſum, & aſtreum progreſſum
Lunæ ſtrepitum dimitte, ſemper currit operâ neceſſitatis

Ἀστέριον ποδὸς ἄθυρμα, σέθεν χάριν ἐκ ἐλοχεύθη.
Αἰθέριος ὀρνίθων θαρσὸς πλατὺς ἔ ποτ' ἀληθής.
Οὐ θυσιῶν σπλάγχνων τ' ὄπταμα· τάδ' ἀθύρματα πάντα,
Ἐμπορικῆς ἀπάτης σφίγματα· φεῦγε σὺ ταῦτα
Μέλλων εὐσεβίης ἱερὸν παράδεισον ἀνοίγειν.
Ἔνθ' ἀρετὴ, σοφία τε, καὶ εὐνομία συνάγονται.
Σὸν γὰρ ἀγλεῖον θῆρες χθονὸς οἰκήσουσι.
Αὐτὰς ἡ χθὼν καπόεικ' ἐς τέκνα μέλξις.

Astreus progressus; tui gratiâ non est partus.
Æthereus avium pes latus nunquam verus est.
Non sacrificia viscerâque cupio: hæc sunt omnia ludi,
Mercatoriæ deceptionis firmamenta; fuge tu hæc
Si vis pietatis sacrum paradisum aperire.
Ubi Virtus, sapientiáque, & bona lex congregantur.
Tuum enim vas bestiæ terræ habitabunt.
Ipsas autem terra sepelîit ad filios usque.

ΔΑΙΜΟΝΕΣ, ΤΕΛΕΤΑΙ.

Ἡ φύσις πίθει εἶ τὸς δαίμονας ἀγνούς.
Καὶ τὰ κακῆς ὕλης βλαστήματα χρησὰ, καὶ ἐσθλά.
Ἀλλὰ ταῦτα ἐν ἀδύτοις σηκοῖς διανοίας ἀνελίσσω.
Πῦρ εἶκελον σκυρτῆδὸν ἐπ' ἠέρι οἶδμα πταίνον,
Ἢ καὶ πῦρ ἀπύπτον, ὅθεν φωνὴν προσδέρκῃ,
Ἢ φῶς πλέσιον ἀμφιγυῆν, ῥοιζαῖον, ἑλιχθέν·
Ἀλλὰ καὶ ἵππον ἰδεῖν φωτὸς πλέον ἀστράπτοντα,
Ἢ καὶ παῖδα τεοῖς νώτοις ἐποχούμενον ἵππῳ,

Ἔμπυρον, ἢ χρυσῷ πεπυκασμένον, ἢ παλίγυμνον,
Ἢ καὶ τοξεύοντα, καὶ ἑσῶτα ἐπὶ νώτοις.
Πολλάκις ἦν λέξῃς μοι, ἀθρήσῃς πάντα λέοντα,
Οὔτε γὰρ ἠέρι κυρτὸς τότε φαίνεται ὄγκος.
Ἀστέρες ἢ λάμπουσι, τὸ μήνης φῶς κεκάλυπται,
Χθὼν ἔχ ἕστηκε, βλέπεται τε πάντα κεραυνοῖς.
Μὴ φύσεως καλέσῃς αὐτόπτεον ἄγαλμα,
Οὐ γὰρ χρὴ κείνης σε βλέπειν πρὶν σῶμα τελεσθῇ.
Ὅτε τὰς ψυχὰς θέλγοντες ἀεὶ ἁγνῇσι τελεταῖς ἀπάγουσι.
Ἐκ δ' ἄρα κόλπων γαίης θρώσκουσι χθόνιοι κύνες,
Οὐ ποτ' ἀληθὲς σῶμα βροτῷ ἀνδρὶ δεικνύντες.
Ἐνέργει περὶ τ' Ἑκατικὸν στρόφαλον.
Ὀνόματα βάρβαρα μήποτ' ἀλλάξῃς,
Εἰσὶ γὰρ ὀνόματα παρ' ἑκάστοις θεόσδοτα
Δύναμιν ἐν τελεταῖς ἄῤῥητον ἔχοντα.
Ἡνίκα βλέψῃς μορφῆς ἄτερ εὐειδὲς πῦρ,
Λαμπόμενον σκυρτηδὸν ὅλῳ κατὰ βένθεα κόσμου,
Κλῦθι πυρὸς φωνήν.

DÆMONES, SACRIFICIA.

Natura suadet esse Dæmonas puros.
Et malæ materiæ germina, utilia, & bona.
Sed hæc in abditis septis mentis evolvo.
Ignis simulacrum saltatim in aere in tumorem extendens,
Vel etiam ignem infiguratum, unde vocem currentem,
Vel lumen abundans radians, streperum, convolutum:
Sed & equum videre luce magìs fulgurantem,
Vel etiam puerum suis humeris inequitantem equo,
Ignitum, vel auro distinctum, vel spoliatum,
Vel etiam sagittantem, & stantem super humeris.
Multoties si dixeris mihi, cernes omnem leonem,
Neque enim cœlestis curvitas tunc apparet moles.
Astra non lucent, Lunæ lux opertum est,
Terra non stat, cernuntur verò cuncta fulminibus.
Neque naturæ voces per se visibile simulacrum,
Non enim oportet illos te spectare antequam corpus Sacris purgetur.
Quando animas mulcentes semper â Sacris abducunt.
Ergo ex finibus terræ exiliunt terrestres canes,
Nunquam verum corpus mortali homini monstrantes.
Operare circa Hecaticum turbinem.
Nomina barbara nunquam mutaveris,
Sunt enim nomina apud singulos à Deo data
Potentiam in Sacris ineffabilem habentia.
Quando videris formâ sine Sacrum ignem,
Collucentem saltatim totius per profundum mundi,
Audi ignis vocem.

The ORACLES *of* ZOROASTER; *collected by* FRANCISCUS PATRICIUS.

MONAD. DYAD. TRYAD.

WHERE the paternal *Monad* is,
The *Monad* is inlarged, which generates two;
For the *Dyad* fits by him, and glitters with intellectual Sections;
And to govern all things, and to order all things not order'd:
For in the whole World ſhineth the *Triad*, over which the *Monad* rules:
This Order is the Beginning of all Section.
For the Mind of the Father ſaid, that all things be cut into three;
Whoſe Will aſſented, and then all things were divided:
For the Mind of the eternal Father ſaid, into three, governing all things by Mind.
And there appeared in it (the *Triad*) Virtue, and Wiſdom,
And multiſcient Verity:
This Way floweth the Shape of the *Triad*, being pre-exiſtent.
Not the firſt (Eſſence,) but where they are meaſured:
For thou muſt conceive that all things ſerve theſe three Principles:
The firſt Courſe is ſacred, but in the Middle:
Another the third, aerial; which cheriſheth the Earth in Fire;
And Fountain of Fountains, and of all Fountains;
The Matrix containing all things.
Thence abundantly ſprings forth the Generation of multivarious Matter.
Thence extracted a Preſter, the Flower of glowing Fire;
Flaſhing into the Cavities of the World: For all things from thence
Begin to extend downwards their admirable Beams.

FATHER. MIND.

THE Father hath ſnatch'd away himſelf; neither hath he ſhut up his own Fire in his intellectual Power:
For the Father perfected all things, and deliver'd them over to the ſecond Mind,
Which the whole Race of Men call the firſt
Light, begotten of the Father; for he alone
Having cropp'd the Flower of the Mind from the Father's Vigour:
For the paternal, ſelf-begotten Mind, underſtandſtanding (his) Work,
Sowed in all the fiery Bond of Love,
That all things might continue for ever.
Neither thoſe things which are intellectually
Context in the Light of the Father in all things;
That being the Elements of the World they might perſiſt in Love:
For it is the Bound of the paternal Depth, and the Fountain of the Intellectuals.
Neither went he forth, but abode in the paternal Depth,
And in the Adytum, according to divinely nouriſhed Silence.
For the Fire once above, ſhutteth not his Power
Into Matter by Actions, but by the Mind;
For the paternal Mind hath ſowed Symbols through the World,
Which underſtandeth Intelligibles, and beautifieth Ineffables:
Wholly Diviſion and Indiviſible.
By Mind he contains the Intelligibles, but introduceth Senſe into the Worlds;
By Mind he contains the Intelligibles, but introduceth Soul into the Worlds.

MIND. INTELLIGIBLES. INTELLECTUALS.

AND of the one Mind, the intelligible *(Mind:)*
For the Mind is not without the intelligible; it exiſts not without it:
Theſe are Intellectuals and Intelligibles, which being underſtood, underſtand:
For the Intelligible is the Aliment of the Intelligent.
Learn the Intelligible, ſince it exiſts beyond the Mind,
And of the Mind, which moves the Empyreal Heaven:
For the Framer of the fiery World is the Mind of the Mind.
You who know certainly the ſupermundane, paternal Depth;
The Intelligible is predominant over all Section.
There is ſomething intelligible, which it behoves thee to underſtand with the Flower of the Mind:
For if thou inclineſt thy Mind, thou ſhalt underſtand this alſo;
Yet underſtanding ſomething (of it) thou ſhalt not underſtand this wholly; for it is a Power
Of circumlucid Strength, glittering with intellectual Sections (Rays):
But it behoves not to conſider this Intelligible with Vehemence of Intellection,
But with the ample Flame of the ample Mind, which meaſureth all things,
Except this Intelligible: But it behoves to underſtand this:
For if thou inclineſt thy Mind, thou ſhalt underſtand this alſo,

Not fixedly, but having a pure turning Eye (*thou muſt*)
Extend the empty Mind of thy Soul towards the Intelligible;
That thou may'ſt learn the Intelligible, for it exiſts beyond the Mind:
But every Mind underſtands this God; for the Mind is not
Without the Intelligible; neither is the Intelligible without the Mind.
To the intellectual Preſters of the intellectual Fire, all things
By yieiding are ſubſervient to the perſuaſive Counſel of the Father.
And to underſtand, and always to remain in a reſtleſs Whirling.
But inſinuating into Worlds the venerable Name in a ſleepleſs Whirling,
Fountains and Principles; to turn, and always to remain in a reſtleſs Whirling,
By reaſon of the terrible Menace of the Father.
Under two Minds the Life generating Fountain Souls is contained;
And the Maker, who ſelf-operating, framed the World,
Who ſprung firſt out of the Mind,
Cloathing Fire with Fire, binding them together, to mingle
The Fountainous Craters, preſerves the Flower of his own Fire.
He glittereth with intellectual Sections, and filled all things with Love.
Like Swarms they are carried, being broken,
About the Bodies of the World,
That things unfaſhion'd may be faſhion'd.
What the Mind ſpeaks, it ſpeaks by Underſtanding.
Power is with them, Mind is from her.

JYNGES, IDEAS, PRINCIPLES.

THESE being many aſcend into the lucid Worlds, Springing into them, and in which there are three Tops.
Beneath them lies the chief of Immaterials.
Principles which have underſtood the intelligible Works of the Father;
Diſcloſed them in ſenſible Works as in Bodies;
Being (as it were) the Ferry-men betwixt the Father and Matter,
And producing manifeſt Images of unmanifeſt things,
And inſcribing unmanifeſt things in the manifeſt Frame of the World.
The Mind of the Father made a jarring Noiſe, underſtanding by vigorous Counſel,
Omniform Idea's; and flying out of one Fountain,
They ſprung forth; for, from the Fathers was the Counſel and End,
By which they are connected to the Father by alternate
Life from ſeveral Vehicles.
But they were divided, being by intellectual Fire diſtributed
Into other Intellectuals; for the King did ſet before the multiform World
An intellectual, incorruptible Pattern. This Print thro' the World he promoting, of whoſe Form
According to which the World appeared
Beautified with all kind of Ideas; of which there is one Fountain,
Out of which come ruſhing forth others undiſtributed, being broken about the Bodies of the World, which through the vaſt Receſſes,
Like Swarms, are carried round about every Way.
Intellectual Notions from the paternal Fountain cropping the Flower of Fire.
In the Point of ſleepleſs Time, of this primigenious Idea,
The firſt ſelf-budding Fountain of the Father budded.
Intelligent Jynges do (themſelves) alſo underſtand from the Father:
By unſpeakable Councils, being moved ſo as to underſtand.

HECATE, SYNOCHES, TELETARCHS.

FOR out of him ſpring all
Implacable Thunders, and the Preſter-receiving Cavities
Of the entirely-lucid Strength of Father-begotten *Hecate.*
And he who begirds (*viz.*) the Flower of Fire, and the ſtrong
Spirit of the Poles fiery above.
He gave to his Preſters that they ſhould guard the Tops,
Mingling the Power of his own Strength in the *Synoches.*
O how the World hath intellectual Guides inflexible!
Becauſe ſhe is the Operatrix, becauſe ſhe is the Diſpenſatrix of Life-giving Fire.
Becauſe alſo it fills the Life-producing Boſom of *Hecate,*
And inſtils in the *Synoches* the enliv'ning Strength
Of potent Fire.
But they are Guardians of the Works of the Father.
For he diſguiſes himſelf, profeſſing
To be cloathed with the Print of the Images.
The *Teletarchs* are comprehended with the *Synoches.*
To theſe intellectual Preſters of intellectual Fire,
All things are ſubſervient.
But as many as ſerve the material *Synoches,*
Having put on the completely-armed Vigour of the reſounding Light,

With

With triple Strength fortifying the Soul and the Mind.

To put into the Mind the Symbol of Variety;

And not to walk diſperſedly on the Empyræal Channels;

But ſtiffly.

Theſe frame Indiviſibles, and Senſibles,

And Corporiforms, and things deſtin'd to Matter.

SOUL. NATURE.

FOR the Soul being a bright Fire, by the Power of the Father

Remains immortal, and is Miſtreſs of Life;

And poſſeſſeth many Complexions of the Cavities of the World:

For it is in Imitation of the Mind; but that which is born hath ſomething of the Body.

The Channels being intermixed, ſhe performs the Works of incorruptible Fire.

Next the paternal Conceptions I (the Soul) dwell;

Warm, heating all things; for he did put

The Mind in the Soul, the Soul in the dull Body.

Of us the Father of Gods and Men impoſed,

Abundantly animating Light, Fire, Æther, Worlds.

For natural Works co-exiſt with the intellectual Light of the Father, for the Soul which adorn'd the great

Heaven, and adorning with the Father.

But her Horns are fixed above,

But about the Shoulders of the Goddeſs, immenſe Nature is exalted.

Again, indefatigable Nature commands the Worlds and Works.

That Heaven drawing an eternal Courſe may run.

And the ſwift Sun might come about the Center as he uſeth.

Look not into the fatal Name of this Nature.

The WORLD.

THE Maker who operating by himſelf framed the World.

And there was another Bulk of Fire,

By itſelf operating all things that the Body of the World might be perfected,

That the World might be manifeſt and not ſeem membranous.

The whole World of Fire, and Water, and Earth,

And all-nouriſhing Æther,

The unexpreſſible and expreſſible Watch-words of the World.

One Life by another from the diſtributed Channels

Paſſing from above to the oppoſite Part,

Through the Center of the Earth; and another fifth middle:

Fiery Channel, where it deſcends to the material Channels.

Life-bringing Fire,

Stirring himſelf up with the Goad of reſounding Light.

Another fountainous, which guides the Empyreal World.

The Center from which all (Lines) which way ſoever are equal.

For the paternal Mind ſowed Symbols through the World.

For the Center of every one is carried betwixt the Fathers.

For it is in Imitation of the Mind, but that which is born hath ſomething of the Body.

HEAVEN.

FOR the Father congregated ſeven Firmaments of the World;

Circumſcribing Heaven in a round Figure,

He fixed a great Company of inerratick Stars;

And he conſtituted a Septenary of erratick Animals,

Placing Earth in the middle, and Water in the middle of the Earth.

The Air above theſe.

He fixed a great Company of inerratick Stars,

To be carry'd not by laborious and troubleſome Tenſion,

But by a Settlement which hath no Error.

He fixed a great Company of inerratick Stars,

Forcing Fire to Fire,

To be carry'd by a Settlement which hath not Error.

He conſtituted them fix; caſting into the midſt

The Fire of the Sun,

Suſpending their Diſorder in well-order'd Zones:

For the Goddeſs brings forth the great Sun and the bright Moon.

O Æther, Sun, Spirit, Guides of the Moon and of the Air;

And of the ſolar Circles, and of the monthly Claſhings,

And of the aerial Receſſes.

The Melody of the Æther, and of the Paſſages of the Sun, and Moon, and of the Air,

And the wide Air, and the Lunar Courſe, and the Pole of the Sun.

Collecting it, and receiving the Melody of the Æther,

And of the Sun, and of the Moon, and of all that are contained in the Air.

Fire, the Derivation of Fire, and the Diſpenſer of Fire;

His Hair pointed is ſeen by his native Light;

Hence comes Saturn.

The Sun Aſſeſſor beholding the pure Pole;

And the Ætherial Courſe, and the vaſt Motion of the Moon,

And the aerial Fluxions,
And the great Sun, and the bright Moon.

TIME.

THE Mundane God; Eternal, Infinite.
Young, and Old, of a ſpiral Form.
And another fountainous, who guides the empyræal Heaven.

SOUL. BODY. MAN.

IT behoves thee to haſten to the Light, and to the Beams of the Father;
From whence was ſent to thee a Soul cloathed with much Mind.
Theſe things the Father conceived, and ſo the Mortal was animated:
For the paternal Mind ſowed Symbols in Souls;
Repleniſhing the Soul with profound Love.
For the Father of Gods and Men placed the Mind in the Soul;
And in the Body he eſtabliſhed you.
For all divine things are incorporeal:
But Bodies are bound in them for your ſakes,
Incorporeals not being able to contain the Bodies,
By reaſon of the corporeal Nature in which you are concentrated.
And they are in God, attracting ſtrong Flames,
Deſcending from the Father, from which deſcending the Soul,
Crops of Empyræal Fruits the Soul-nouriſhing Flower.
And therefore conceiving the Words of the Father
They avoid the audacious Wing of fatal Deſtiny;
And though you ſee this Soul manumitted,
Yet the Father ſends another to make up the Number.
Certainly theſe are ſuperlatively bleſſed above all Souls; they are ſent forth from Heaven to Earth,
And thoſe rich Souls which have unexpreſſible Fates;
As many of them (O King) as proceed from ſhining Thee, or from
Jove himſelf, under the ſtrong Power of (his) Thread.
Let the immortal Depth of thy Soul be predominant; but all thy Eyes
Extend upward.
Stoop not down to the dark World,
Beneath which continually lies a faithleſs Depth, and *Hades*,
Dark all over, ſquallid, delighting in Images, unintelligible,
Precipititious, craggy, a Depth; always rolling,
Always eſpouſing an opacous, idle, breathleſs Body,
And the Light-hating World, and the winding Currents,
By which many things are ſwallowed up.
Seek Paradiſe;
Seek thou the way of the Soul, whence, or by what Order,
Having ſerved the Body, to the ſame Place from which thou didſt flow,
Thou may'ſt riſe up again, joining Action to ſacred Speech,
Stoop not down, for a Precipice lies below on the Earth;
Drawing through the Ladder which hath ſeven Steps; Beneath which
Is the Throne of Neceſſity.
Enlarge not thou thy Deſtiny.
The Soul of Man will in a manner claſp God to herſelf;
Having nothing mortal, ſhe is wholly inebriated from God:
For ſhe boaſts Harmony, in which the mortal Body exiſts.
If thou extend the fiery Mind
To the Work of Piety, thou ſhalt preſerve the fluxible Body.
There's a Room for the Image alſo in the circumlucid Place.
Every Way to the unfaſhion'd Soul ſtretch the Reins of Fire.
The Fire glowing, Cogitation hath the firſt Rank.
For the mortal approaching to the Fire, ſhall have Light from God.
For to the ſlow Mortal the Gods are ſwift.
The Furies are Stranglers of Men.
The Bourgeons, even of ill Matter, are profitable good.
Let Hope nouriſh thee in the fiery Angelic Region.
But the paternal Mind accepts not her Will
Until ſhe go out of Oblivion, and pronounce a Word, Inſerting the Remembrance of the pure paternal Symbol.
To theſe he gave the docible Character of Life to be comprehended.
Thoſe that were aſleep he made fruitful by his own Strength.
Defile not the Spirit, nor deepen a Superficies.
Leave not the Droſs of Matter on a Precipice.
Bring her not forth, leſt going forth ſhe have ſomething.
The Souls of thoſe who quit the Body violently, are moſt pure.
The Ungirders of the Soul which give her breathing are eaſy to be looſed.
In the ſide of ſiniſter *Hecate*, there is a Fountain of Virtue,
Which remains entire within, not omitting her Virginity.
O Man, the Machine of boldeſt Nature!
Subject not to thy Mind the vaſt Meaſures of the Earth; For the Plant of Truth is not upon Earth,

Nor

Nor meaſure the Meaſures of the Sun, gathering together Canons;
He is moved by the eternal Will of the Father, not for thy ſake.
Let alone the ſwift Courſe of the Moon; ſhe runs ever by the Impulſe of Neceſſity.
The Progreſſion of the Stars was not brought forth for thy ſake.
The ætherial wide Flight of Birds is not veracious,
And the Diſſections of Entrails and Victims, all theſe are Toys,
The Support of gainful Cheats; fly thou theſe
If thou intend to open the ſacred Paradiſe of Piety,
Where Virtue, Wiſdom, and Equity are aſſembled;
For thy Veſſel the Beaſts of the Earth ſhall inhabit.
Theſe the Earth bewails, even to their Children.

DÆMONS. RITES.

NAture perſuades there are pure Dæmons;
The Bourgeons, even all ill Matter, are profitable and good:
But theſe things I revolve in the recluſe Temples of my Mind.
Extending the like Fire ſparklingly into the ſpacious Air,
Or Fire unfigur'd, a Voice iſſuing forth,
Or Fire abundant whizzing and winding about the Earth;
But alſo to ſee a Horſe more glittering than Light,
Or a Boy on [thy] Shoulders riding on a Horſe,
Fiery, or adorned with Gold, or diveſted,
Or ſhooting, and ſtanding on [thy] Shoulders.
If thou ſpeak often to me, thou ſhalt ſee abſolutely that which is ſpoken:
For then neither appears the cœleſtial concave Bulk, nor do the Stars ſhine: The Light of the Moon is covered.
The Earth ſtands not ſtill, but all things appear Thunder.
Invoke not the ſelf-conſpicuous Image of Nature;
For thou muſt not behold theſe before thy Body be initiated.
When ſoothing Souls they always reduce them from theſe Myſteries.
Certainly out of the Cavities of the Earth ſpring terreſtrial Dogs,
Which ſhew no true Sign to mortal Man.
Labour about the *Hecatick Strophalus*.
Never change barbarous Names;
For there are Names in every Nation given from God, which have an unſpeakable Power in Rites.
When thou ſeeſt a ſacred Fire without Form,
Shining flaſhingly through the Depths of the World,
Hear the Voice of Fire.

Pletho, *his Expoſition of the more obſcure Paſſages in theſe Oracles.*

Seek thou the Way of the Soul, whence or by what Order,
Having ſerved the Body, to the ſame Order from which thou didſt flow,
Thou may'ſt riſe up again; joining Action to ſacred Speech.]

THE *Magi* that are Followers of *Zoroaſter*, as alſo many others, hold, That the human Soul is immortal, and deſcended from above to ſerve the mortal Body, that is, to operate therein for a certain Time, and to animate and adorn it to her Power; and then returns to the Place from which ſhe came. And whereas there are many Manſions there for the Soul, one *wholly bright*, another *wholly dark*; others betwixt both, *partly bright*, *partly dark*: The Soul being deſcended from that which is wholly bright, into the Body, if ſhe perform her Office well, runs back into the ſame Place; but if not well, ſhe retires into worſe Manſions, according to the things which ſhe hath done in Life. The Oracle therefore ſaith, *Seek thou the Soul's Path*, or the Way by which the Soul floweth into thee; or by what Courſe (*viz.* of Life) having performed thy Charge toward the Body, thou may'ſt mount up to the ſame Place from which thou didſt flow down, *viz.* the ſame Track of the Soul, joining Action to ſacred Speech. By ſacred Speech, he underſtands that which concerns divine Worſhip; by Action, divine Rites. The Oracle therefore ſaith, that to this Exaltation of the Soul, both Speech concerning divine Worſhip (Prayers) and religious Rites (Sacrifices) are requiſite.

Stoop not down, for a Precipice lies below on the Earth,
Drawing through the Ladder which hath ſeven Steps; beneath which
Is the Throne of Neceſſity.]

He calls the Deſcenſion into Wickedneſs and Miſery, a Precipice; the terreſtrial and mortal Body, the Earth: for by the Earth he underſtands mortal Nature, as by the Fire frequently the Divine; by the Place with ſeven Ways, he means Fate dependant on the Planets, beneath which there is ſeated a certain dire and unalterable Neceſſity: The Oracle therefore adviſeth, that thou ſtoop not down towards the mortal Body, which being ſubject only to

to the Fate which proceeds from the Planets, may be reckoned among those things which are at our Arbitrement; for thou wilt be unhappy if thou stoop down wholly to the Body, and unfortunate, and continually failing of thy Desires, in regard of the Necessity which is annexed to the Body.

For thy Vessel the Beasts of the Earth shall inhabit.]

The *Vessel* of thy Soul, that is, this mortal Body, shall be *inhabited* by Worms and other vile Creatures.

Enlarge not thou thy Destiny.]

Endeavour not to increase thy Fate, or to do more than is given thee in charge, for thou wilt not be able.

For nothing proceeds from the Paternal Principality imperfect.]

For from the paternal Power, which is that of the supreme God, nothing proceedeth imperfect, so as thou thyself mightest compleat it; for all things proceeding from thence are perfect, as appears in that they tend to the Perfection of the Universe.

But the paternal Mind accepts not her Will, until she go out of Oblivion, and pronounce a Word, inserting the Remembrance of the pure paternal Symbol.]

The paternal Mind, (*viz.* the second God and ready Maker of the Soul) admits not her Will or Desire until she come out of the Oblivion which she contracted by Connexion with the Body; and until she speak a certain Word, or conceive in her Thoughts a certain Speech, calling to Remembrance the paternal divine Symbol or Watch-word; this is the Pursuit of the Good which the Soul calling to Remembrance, hereby becomes most acceptable to her Maker.

It behoves thee to hasten to the Light, and to the Beams of the Father;
From whence there was sent to thee a Soul endued with much Mind.]

The Light and Splendor of the Father is that Mansion of the Soul which is circumlucid, from whence the Soul arrayed with much of the Mind was sent hither, wherefore we must hasten to return to the same Light.

These the Earth bewails, even to their own Children.]

Those who hasten not to the Light, from which their Soul was sent to them, the Earth or mortal Nature bewails; for that they being sent hither to adorn her, not only not adorn her, but also blemish themselves by living wickedly; moreover the Wickedness of the Parents is transmitted to the Children, corrupted by them through ill Education.

The Ungirders of the Soul, which give her breathing, are easy to be loosed.]

The Reasons which expel the Soul from Wickedness, and give her breathing, are easy to be unty'd; and the Oblivion which keeps them is easily put off.

In the Side of the sinister Bed there is a Fountain of Virtue,
Which remains entire within; not emitting her Virginity.]

In the left Side of thy Bed, there is the Power or Fountain of Virtue, residing wholly within, and never casting off her Virginity, or Nature void of Passion; for there is always in us the Power of Virtue without Passion, which cannot be put off, altho' her Energy or Activity may be interrupted; he saith the Power of Virtue is placed on the left Side, because her Activity is seated on the right: By the Bed is meant the Seat of the Soul, subject to her several Habits.

The Soul of Man will, in a manner, clasp God to herself.
Having nothing mortal, she is wholly inebriated from God;
For she boasts Harmony, in which the mortal Body consists.]

The human Soul will in a manner clasp God, and join him strictly *to herself*, (who is her continual Defence) by resembling him as much as we can possibly; *having nothing mortal* within her, *she is wholly drenched in Divinity*, or repleniſhed with divine Goods; for though she is fetter'd to this mortal Body, yet she *glories in the Harmony* or Union *in which the mortal Body exists*; that is, she is not ashamed of it, but thinks well of herself for it; as being a Cause, and affording to the Universe, that as Mortals are united with Immortals in Man, so the Universe is adorned with one Harmony.

Because the Soul being a bright Fire by the Power of the Father,
Remains immortal, and is Mistress of Life,
And possesseth many Completions of the Cavities of the World.]

The second God, who first before all other things proceeded from the Father and supreme God, these Oracles call all along, *The Power of the Father*, and his

his *intellectual Power*, and the *paternal Mind*. He ſaith therefore, that *the Soul procreated by this Power of the Father, is a bright Fire*; that is, a divine and intellectual Eſſence, and *perſiſteth immortal* through the Divinity of its Eſſence, *and is Miſtreſs of Life*, *viz.* of herſelf, poſſeſſing Life which cannot be taken away from her; for, how can we be ſaid to be Maſters of ſuch things as may be taken from us, ſeeing the Uſe of them is only allowed us? but of thoſe things which cannot be taken from us, we are abſolute Maſters: The Soul, according to her own Eternity, *poſſeſſeth many Rooms in the Receptacles of the World*, or divers Places in the World, which according as ſhe hath led Life paſt is allotted to every one.

Seek Paradiſe.]

The circumlucid Manſion of the Soul.

Defile not the Spirit, nor deepen a Superficies.]

The Followers of *Pythagoras* and *Plato* conceive the Soul to be a Subſtance not wholly ſeparate from all Body, nor wholly inſeparate; but partly ſeparate, partly inſeparate; ſeparable potentially, but never ſeparate actually. For they aſſert three Kinds of Forms, one wholly ſeparate from Matter, the ſuperceleſtial Intelligences; another wholly inſeparable from Matter, having a Subſtance not ſubſiſtent by itſelf but dependent on Matter; together with which Matter, which is ſometimes diſſolved by reaſon of its Nature ſubject to Mutation, this kind of Soul is diſſolved alſo and periſheth; this kind they hold to be wholly irrational. Betwixt theſe they place a middle kind, the rational Soul, differing from the ſuperceleſtial Intelligences, for that it always co-exiſts with Matter; and from the irrational kind, for that it is not dependent on Matter; but, on the contrary, Matter is dependent on it; and it hath a proper Subſtance potentially ſubſiſtent by itſelf: It is alſo indiviſible, as well as the ſuperceleſtial Intelligences, and performing ſome Works in ſome manner ally'd to theirs, being itſelf alſo buſied in the Knowledge and Contemplation of Beings, even unto the ſupreme God; and for this Reaſon is incorruptible. This kind of Soul is always co-exiſtent with an æthereal Body, as its *Vehiculum*, which ſhe by continual Approximation maketh alſo immortal: Neither is this her *Vehiculum* inanimate in itſelf, but it is itſelf animated with the other Species of the Soul, the irrational (which the wiſe call the Image of the rational Soul) adorned with Phantaſy and Senſe, which ſeeth and hears itſelf whole through whole; and is furniſhed with all the Senſes, and with all the reſt of the irrational Faculties of the Soul. Thus by the principal Faculty of this Body, Phantaſy, the rational Soul is continually joined to ſuch a Body, and by ſuch a Body ſometimes the human Soul is joined with a mortal Body by a certain Affinity of Nature, the whole being enfolded in the whole enlivening Spirit of the Embryon: This *Vehiculum* itſelf being of the Nature of a Spirit. The Dæmons Souls differ not much from the human, only they are more noble, and uſe more noble Vehicles: Moreover, they cannot be mingled with corruptible Nature. Likewiſe the Souls of the Stars are much better than the Dæmons, and uſe better Vehicles; are Bodies ſplendid by reaſon of the Greatneſs of the operative Faculty. Theſe Doctrines concerning the Soul, the *Magi*, Followers of *Zoroaſter*, ſeem to have uſed long before. Defile not this kind of Spirit of the Soul, ſaith the Oracle, nor deepen it, being a Superficies; he calls it Superficies, not as if it had not a triple Dimenſion, for it is a Body, but to ſignify its extraordinary Rarity; nor makes it become groſs by Acceſſion of more Matter to its Bulk; for this Spirit of the Soul becomes groſs, if it declines too much towards the mortal Body.

There is a Room for the Image alſo in the circumlucid Place.]

He calls the Image of the Soul that Part, which being itſelf void of irrational, is joined to the rational Part, and depends upon the Vehicle thereof: Now he ſaith that this kind of *Image hath a Part in the circumlucid Region*; for the Soul never layeth down the Vehicle adherent to her.

Leave not the Droſs of Matter on a Precipice.]

He calls the mortal Body *the Droſs of Matter*; and exhorteth, that we neglect it not being ill-affected, but take care of it whilſt it is in this Life, to preſerve it in Health as much as poſſible, and that it may be pure, and in all things elſe correſpond with the Soul.

Carry not forth, leſt going forth ſhe have ſomething.]

Carry not forth, meaning the Soul out of the mortal Body, *leſt by going forth*, thou incur ſome Danger, implying as much as to carry her forth beyond the Laws of Nature.

If thou extend the fiery Mind to the Work of Piety, thou ſhalt preſerve the fluxible Body.]

Extending up thy divine Mind to the Exerciſe of Piety, or to religious Rites, and thou *ſhalt preſerve the mortal Body* more ſound by performing theſe.

Certainly out of the Cavities of the Earth, ſpring terreſtrial Dogs,
Which ſhew no true Sign to mortal Man.]

Sometimes to many initiated Perſons there appear, whilſt they are ſacrificing, ſome Apparitions in the Shape of *Dogs*, and ſeveral other Figures. Now the Oracle ſaith, that theſe *iſſue out of the Receptacles of the Earth*; that is, out of the terreſtrial and mortal Body, and the irrational Paſſions planted in it, which are not yet ſufficiently adorned with Reaſon; theſe are Apparitions of the Paſſions of the Soul in performing Divine Rites; meer Appearances having no Subſtance, and therefore *not ſignifying any thing true.*

Nature perſuadeth that Dæmons are pure;
The Bourgeons, even of ill Matter, are profitable and good.]

Nature, or natural Reaſon, *perſuadeth that Dæmons are ſacred*, and that all things proceeding from God, who is in himſelf good, *are beneficial*; and the *very Bloomings of ill Matter*, or the Forms dependent upon Matter as ſuch: Alſo he calls Matter *ill*, not as to its Subſtance; for how can the Subſtance be bad, the Bloomings whereof are beneficial and good? But for that it is ranked laſt among the Subſtances, and is the leaſt participant of Good; which Littleneſs of Good is here expreſſed by the Word *Ill*. Now the Oracle means, that if the Bloomings of ill Matter, *viz.* of the laſt of Subſtances, are good, much more are the Dæmons ſuch, who are in an excellent Rank, as partaking of rational Nature, and being not mixed with mortal Nature.

The Furies are Stranglers of Men.]

The Furies, or the vindictive Dæmons, claſp Men cloſe, or reſtrain and drive them from Vice, and excite them to Virtue.

Let the immortal Depth of the Soul be predominant; but all thy Eyes
Extend quite upward.]

Let the *divine Depth of thy Soul* govern; and lift thou all thy Eyes, or all thy knowing Faculties *upward.*

O Man, the Machine of boldeſt Nature!

He calls Man *the Machine of boldeſt Nature*, becauſe he attempts great things.

If thou ſpeak often to me, thou ſhalt ſee abſolutely that which is ſpoken:
For there neither appears the celeſtial concave Bulk
Nor do the Stars ſhine: The Light of the Moon is covered,
The Earth ſtands not ſtill, but all Things appear Thunder.]

The Oracle ſpeaks as from God to an initiated Perſon, *If thou often ſpeak to me*, or call me, *thou ſhalt ſee that which thou ſpeakeſt*, viz. Me whom thou calleſt every where; for then thou ſhalt perceive nothing but *Thunder* all about, Fire gliding up and down all over the World.

Call not on the ſelf-conſpicuous Image of Nature.]

Seek not to behold the ſelf-ſeeing *Image of Nature*, *viz.* of the Nature of God, which is not viſible to our Eyes; but thoſe things which appear to initiated Perſons, as Thunder, Lightning, and all elſe whatſoever, are only Symbols or Signs, not the *Nature of God.*

Every way to the unfaſhioned Soul ſtretch out the Reins of Fire.]

Draw unto thyſelf every way *the Reins of Fire*, which appear to thee when thou art ſacrificing with a ſincere Soul; *viz.* a ſimple, and not of various Habits.

When thou ſeeſt a ſacred Fire, without Form,
Shining flaſhingly through the Depth of the World,
Hear the Voice of Fire.]

When thou beholdeſt the divine Fire, void of Figure, *brightly gliding up and down the World*, and graciouſly ſmiling; liſten to this Voice as bringing a moſt perfect Preſcience.

The Paternal Mind hath implanted Symbols in Souls.]

The Paternal Mind, viz. the ſedulous Maker of the Subſtance of the Soul, *hath ingrafted Symbols*, or the Images of Intelligibles *in Souls*, by which every Soul poſſeſſeth in herſelf the Reaſons of Beings.

Learn the Intelligible, foraſmuch as it exiſts beyond the Mind.]

Learn the Intelligible, becauſe it exiſts beyond thy Mind, viz. actually; for, tho' the Images of intellectual things are planted in thee by the Maker of All; yet they are but potentially in thy Soul; but it behoves thee to have actually the Knowledge of the Intelligible.

There's a certain Intelligible, which it behoves thee to comprehend with the Flower of thy Mind.]

The Supreme God, who is perfectly One, is not conceived

conceived after the ſame manner as other things; but *by the Flower of the Mind*, that is, the ſupreme and ſingular Part of our Underſtanding.

For the Father perfected all things, and deliver'd them over to the
Second Mind, which the Nations of Men call the firſt.]

The Father perfected all things, viz. the intelligible Species, (for they are abſolute and perfect) *and delivered them over to the ſecond God*, next him to rule and guide them: Whence, if any thing be brought forth by this God, and formed after the Likeneſs of him, and the other intelligible Subſtance, it proceeds from the Supreme Father; this other God *Men eſteem the firſt*, that is, they who think him the Maker of the World, to whom there is none ſuperior.

Intelligent Jynges do themſelves alſo underſtand from the Father;
By unſpeakable Counſels being moved ſo as to underſtand]

He calls *Jynges* the intellectual Species which are *conceived by the Father*; *they themſelves alſo being conceptive*, and exciting Conceptions or Notions, *by unſpeakable*, or unutterable *Counſels*: By *Motion* here is underſtood Intellection, not Tranſition, but ſimply the Habitude to Notions ſo as unſpeakable Counſels is as much unmoved; for ſpeaking conſiſts in Motion; the meaning is this, That theſe Species are immoveable, and have a Habitude to Notions not tranſiently as the Soul.

Oh how the World hath intellectual Guides inflexible.]

The moſt excellent of the intelligible Species, and of thoſe which are brought down by the Immortals in this Heaven, he calls *the intellectual Guides of the World*; the *Corypheus*, whom he conceives to be a God, which is the ſecond from the Father: The Oracle ſaying, that *the World hath inflexible Guides*, means, that it is incorruptible.

The Father hath ſnatched away himſelf;
Neither hath he ſhut up his own Fire in his intellectual Power.]

The Father hath made himſelf exempt from all others; not including himſelf neither *in his own intellectual Power*, nor in the ſecond God, who is next him; or limiting *his own Fire*, his own Divinity; for it is abſolutely ungenerate, and itſelf exiſting by itſelf; ſo that his Divinity is exempt from all others; neither is it communicable to any other, altho' it be loved of all: That he communicates not himſelf, is not out of Envy, but only by reaſon of the Impoſſibility of the thing.

The Father infuſeth not Fear, but Perſuaſion.]

The Father makes no Impreſſion of Fear, but infuſeth Perſuaſion or Love; for he being extremely good, is not the Cauſe of Ill to any, ſo as to be dreadful; but is the Cauſe of all Good to all; whence he is loved of all.

Theſe Oracles of Zoroaſter *many eminent Perſons have confirmed by following the like Opinions; eſpecially the* Pythagoreans *and* Platoniſts.

PSELLUS's EXPOSITION *of the* ORACLES.

There is a Room for the Image alſo in the circumlucid Place.]

IMAGES, εἴδωλα, with the Philoſophers, are thoſe things which are connatural to things more excellent than themſelves, and are worſe than they; as the Mind is connatural to God, and the rational Soul to the Mind, and Nature to the rational Soul, and the Body to Nature, and Matter to the Body. The Image of God is the Mind; of the Mind, the rational Soul; of the rational Soul, the irrational; of the irrational, Nature; of Nature, the Body; of the Body, Matter. Here the *Chaldaick Oracle* calleth the irrational Soul the Image of the rational, for it is connatural to it in Man, and yet worſe than it. It ſaith moreover, that there is a Part aſſigned to the Image in the circumlucid Region; that is to ſay, the irrational Soul, which is the Image of the rational Soul, being purified by Virtues in this Life, after the Diſſolution of the human Life, aſcends to the Place above the Moon, and receives its Lot in the *circumlucid Place*, that is, which ſhineth on every Side, and is ſplendid throughout; for the Place beneath the Moon is circumnebulous, that is, dark on every ſide: But the Lunary, partly lucid, and partly dark, that is, one half bright, the other half dark; but the Place above the Moon is circumlucid or bright throughout. Now the Oracle ſaith, that the circumlucid Place, is not deſign'd only for the rational Soul, but for its Image alſo; or the irrational Soul is deſtin'd to the circumlucid Place, when as it cometh out of the Body bright and pure; for the *Grecian* Doctrine aſſerting the irrational Soul to be immortal, alſo exalts it up to the Elements under the Moon; but the *Chaldaick Oracle*, it being pure and unanimous with the rational Soul, ſeats it in this circumlucid Region above the Moon. Theſe are the Doctrines of the *Chaldæans*.

Leave not the Dregs of Matter on a Precipice.]

By *the Dregs of Matter*, the Oracle underſtands the Body of Man, conſiſting of the four Elements; it ſpeaks to the Diſciple by way of Inſtruction and Exhortation, thus; Not only raiſe up thy Soul to God, and procure that it may riſe above the Confuſion of Life; but if it be poſſible, leave not the Body, wherewith thou are cloathed (and which is *Dregs of Matter*, that is, a thing neglected and rejected, the Sport of Matter) in the inferior World: For this Place, the Oracle calls a *Precipice*. Our Soul being darted down hither from Heaven, as from a ſublime Place. It exhorteth therefore, that we refine the Body (which he underſtands by the Dregs of Matter) by divine, or that, being ſtripped, we raiſe it up to the Æther; or that we be exalted by God to a Place immaterial and incorporeal, or corporeal but æthereal or cœleſtial, which *Elias* the *Tisbite* attained; and, before him, *Enoch*, being tranſlated from this Life into a more divine Condition, not leaving the Dregs of Matter, or their Body, in a Precipice; the Precipice is, as we ſaid, the terreſtrial Region.

Bring not forth, leſt going forth ſhe have ſomething.]

This Oracle is recited by *Plotinus* in his Book of the Eduction of the irrational Soul; it is an excellent and tranſcendent Exhortation. It adviſeth, that a Man buſy not himſelf about the *going forth of the Soul*, nor take care how it ſhall go out of the Body; but remit the Buſineſs of its Diſſolution to the Courſe of Nature; for, Anxiety and Solicitude about the Solution of the Body, and the Eduction of the Soul out of it, draws away the Soul from better Cogitations, and buſieth it in ſuch Cares that the Soul cannot be perfectly purified; for if Death come upon us at ſuch a time as we are buſied about this Diſſolution, the Soul going forth not quite free, but retaining ſomething of a paſſionate Life. Paſſion the *Chaldæan* defines, a Man's ſolicitous thinking of Death; for we ought not to think of any thing, but of the more excellent Illuminations; neither concerning theſe ought we to be ſolicitous: But reſigning ourſelves to the Angelical and Divine Powers, which raiſe us up, and ſhutting up all the Organs of Senſe in the Body and in the Soul alſo without diſtractive Cares and Solicitudes, we muſt follow God who calls us.

Some interpret this Oracle more ſimply: *Bring it not out leſt it go forth, having ſomething*; that is, anticipate not thy natural Death, altho' thou be wholly given up to Philoſophy; for as yet thou haſt not a complete Expiation: So that if the Soul paſs out of the Body by the way of educting, it will go forth retaining ſomething of mortal Life; for if we Men are in the Body as in a Priſon (as *Plato* ſaith), certainly no Man can kill himſelf, but muſt expect till God ſhall ſend a Neceſſity.

Subject not to thy Mind the vaſt Meaſures of the Earth:

For the Plant of Truth is not upon the Earth;

Nor meaſure the Meaſures of the Sun, gathering together Canons:

He is moved by the eternal Will of the Father, not for thy ſake.

Let alone the ſwift Courſe of the Moon; ſhe runs ever by the Impulſe of Neceſſity.

The Progreſſion of the Stars was not brought forth for thy ſake.

The æthereal broad-footed Flight of Birds is not veracious,

And the Diſſections of Entrails and Victims, all theſe are Toys,

The Supports of gainful Cheats. Fly thou thoſe,

If thou intend to open the ſacred Paradiſe of Piety, Where Virtue, Wiſdom, and Equity are aſſembled.]

The *Chaldæan* withdraws the Diſciple from all *Grecian* Wiſdom, and teacheth him to adhere only to God. *Subject not*, ſaith he, *to thy Mind the vaſt Meaſures of the Earth; for the Plant of Truth is not on Earth*; that is, enquire not ſolicitouſly into the vaſt Meaſures of the Earth, as Geographers uſe to do, meaſuring the Earth; for the Seed of Truth is not in the Earth. *Nor meaſure the Meaſures of the Sun, gathering together Canons; he is moved by the eternal Will of the Father, not for thy ſake:* That is, buſy not thyſelf about the Motion and Doctrine of the Stars, for they move not for thy ſake, but are perpetually moved according to the Will of God. *Let alone the ſwift Courſe of the Moon, ſhe runs ever by the Impulſe of Neceſſity:* That is, enquire not anxiouſly the rolling Motion of the Moon, for ſhe runs not for thy ſake, but is impelled by a greater Neceſſity. *The Progreſſion of the Stars was not brought forth for thy ſake*; that is, the Leaders of the fixed Stars, and the Planets, received not their Eſſence for thy ſake. *The æthereal broad-footed Flight of Birds is not veracious*; that is, the Art concerning Birds flying in the Air, called Augury, obſerving their Flight, Notes, and Perchings, is not true. By *broad Feet*, he means the walking or Pace of the Foot, in reſpect of the Extenſion of the Toes in the Skin. *And the Diſſections of Entrails and Victims, all theſe are Toys:* that is, the Art of ſacrificing, which enquireth after future Events, as well by Victims, as by Inſpection into the Entrails of ſacrificed Beaſts, are merely Toys. *The Supports of gainful Cheats: fly thou thoſe*; that is, fraudulent Acquiſitions of Gain. *If thou intend to open the ſacred Paradiſe of Piety, where Virtue, Wiſdom, and Equity are aſſembled.* Thou, ſaith he, who art under my Diſcipline, enquire not curiouſly after theſe things, if thou wouldſt that the ſacred Paradiſe of Piety be open to thee. The ſacred Paradiſe of Piety, according to the *Chaldæans*, is not that which the Book of *Moſes* deſcribes, but the

Meadow

Meadow of the ſublimeſt Contemplations, in which there are ſeveral Trees of Virtues; and the Wood, or Trunk of Knowledge, of Good and Evil; that is, dijudicative Prudence, which diſtinguiſheth Good from Evil; likewiſe the Tree of Life, that is, the Plant of divine Illumination, which bringeth forth to the Soul the Fruit of a more holy and better Life; in this Paradiſe, therefore, grow Virtue, Wiſdom, and Equity. Virtue is one in general, but hath many Species; Wiſdom comprehendeth within itſelf all the Virtues which the divine Mind pronounceth as only unſpeakable.

Seek thou the Way of the Soul, whence, or by what Order,
Having ſerved the Body, to the ſame Order from which thou didſt flow,
Thou may'ſt riſe up again; joining Action to ſacred Speech.]

That is, *Seek the Origin of the Soul,* from whence it was produced and ſerved the Body, and how Men cheriſhing and raiſing it up by the Exerciſe of Divine Rites, may reduce it to the Place whence it came. *Uniting Action to ſacred Reaſon,* is to be underſtood thus. *Sacred Reaſon* (or Diſcourſe) in us is the intellectual Life, or rather the ſupream Faculty of the Soul, which the Oracle elſewhere ſtiles the Flower of the Mind. But this ſacred Reaſon cannot by its own Guidance aſpire to the more ſublime Inſtitution, and to the Comprehenſion of Divinity; the Work of Piety leads it by the Hand to God, by Aſſiſtance of Illuminations from thence: But the *Chaldæan* by the Teleſtick Science, perfects, or initiates the Soul by the Power of Materials here on Earth. To this ſacred Reaſon, ſaith he, when thou haſt united Action, that is, joined the Work of Initiation to the ſacred Reaſon, or better Faculty of the Soul.

Our Theologiſt, *Gregory,* raiſeth the Soul to the more divine things by Reaſon and Contemplation: By Reaſon, which is in us the beſt and moſt intellectual Faculty; by Contemplation, which is an Illumination coming from above: But *Plato* affirms, that we may comprehend the ungenerate Eſſence by Reaſon and Intellect. But the *Chaldæan* ſaith, that there is no other means for us to arrive at God, but by ſtrengthning the Vehiculum of the Soul by material Rites; for it ſuppoſeth that the Soul is purified by Stones, and Herbs, and Charms, and is rendred expedite for Aſſent.

Stoop not down; for a Precipice lies below on the Earth.
Drawing through the Ladder which hath ſeven Steps, beneath which
Is the Throne of Neceſſity.]

The Oracle adviſeth the Soul which is next to God, that ſhe adhere only to him with her whole Mind, and bend not downwards; for there is a great *Precipice* betwixt God and the Earth, which draweth Souls down the *Ladder,* which hath *ſeven Steps:* The *Ladder of ſeven Steps,* ſignifies the Orbs of the ſeven Planets; if therefore the Soul decline, ſhe is carried to the Earth through the ſeven Orbs; but that Paſſage through the ſeven Circles leads her as by ſo many Steps to the Throne of Neceſſity, whither, when the Soul arriveth, ſhe is neceſſitated to ſuffer the terreſtrial World.

Never change barbarous Names.]

That is, there are certain *Names* among all Nations delivered to them by God, which have an unſpeakable Power in Divine Rites; change not theſe into the *Greek* Dialect; as *Seraphim,* and *Cherubim,* and *Michael,* and *Gabriel:* Theſe in the *Hebrew* Dialect have an unſpeakable Efficacy in Divine Rites; but changed into *Greek* Names are ineffectual.

The World hath intellectual Guides inflexible.]

The *Chaldæans* aſſert Powers in the World, and call them *Coſmogogi, Guides of the World*; for that they guide the World by provident Motions: Theſe Powers the Oracles call ἀνοχὰς, *Suſtainers,* as ſuſtaining the whole World. Unmoveable implies their ſettled Power; ſuſtentive, their Guardianſhip; theſe Powers they deſign only by the Cauſe and Immobility of the Worlds. There are alſo other Powers (*Amilicti*) implacable, as being firm and not to be converted towards theſe inferior things, and cauſe that Souls be never allured with Affections.

Labour about the Hecatine Strophalus.]

The *Hecatine Strophalus* is a golden Ball, in the midſt whereof is a Saphire; they fold about it a Leather Thong; it is beſet all over with Characters; thus whipping it about, they made their Invocations; theſe they uſe to call *Jynges,* whether it be round, or triangular, or any other Figure; and whilſt they are doing thus, they make inſignificant or brutiſh Cries, and laſh the Air with their Whips. The Oracle adviſeth to the Performance of theſe Rites, or ſuch a Motion of the *Strophalus,* as having an expreſſible Power. It is called *Hecatine,* as being dedicated to *Hecate: Hecate* is a Goddeſs among the *Chaldæans,* having at her right Side the Fountain of Virtues.

If thou ſpeak often to me, thou ſhalt ſee abſolutely that which is ſpoken:
For then neither appears the cœleſtial concave
Bulk, nor do the Stars ſhine; the Light of the Moon is covered;

The

The Earth ſtands not ſtill, but all things appear Thunder.]

The Lion is one of the twelve Signs of the Zodiack, and is called the Houſe of the Sun, whoſe Fountain, or the Cauſe of his Lion-formed Conſtellation, the *Chaldæans* call λεόντοχον: Now he ſaith, that amidſt the ſacred Rites, if thou call this Fountain by its Name, thou ſhalt ſee nothing elſe in Heaven but the Apparition of a Lion; neither will the *concave Bulk*, or the Circumference of Heaven appear to thee, neither ſhall the Stars ſhine, even the Moon herſelf ſhall be covered, and all things ſhall be ſhaken; but this Lion-having Fountain takes not away the Eſſence of thoſe, but their own predominating Exiſtence hides their View.

Every way to the unfaſhion'd Soul, extends the Reins of Fire.]

The Oracle calls the Soul ἄπλαστον, that is, *without Form and Figure*, or moſt ſimple, and moſt pure. Reins of Fire of ſuch a Soul are the expeditious Activity of the Theurgick Life, which raiſeth up the fiery Mind to the Divine Light; therefore by ſtretching the Reins of Fire to the inform Soul, he means, endeavour that all the Faculties conſiſting both in the Intellect, Cogitation, and Opinion, may receive divine Illuminations ſuitable to themſelves. This is the Meaning of *ſtretch the Reins of Fire*; but Nature uſeth to fail, and buſy itſelf in the ſecond or worſe Life.

Oh Man, the Machine of boldeſt Nature!]

Man is called a *Machine*, as being framed by God with unſpeakable Art: The Oracle likewiſe calleth him *audacious Nature*, as being buſied about excellent things, ſometimes meaſuring the Courſe of the Stars, ſometimes enquiring into the Orders of the ſupernatural Powers; contemplating alſo the things which are far above the cœleſtial Orb, and extending to diſcourſe ſomething of God. For theſe Endeavours of the Mind in Diſquiſition proceed from an audacious Nature; he calls it Boldneſs, not by way of Reproach, but to expreſs the Forwardneſs of Nature.

In the ſide of the ſiniſter Hecate *is a Fountain of much Virtue, which remains entire within, not emitting her Virginity.*

The *Chaldæans* eſteem *Hecate* a Goddeſs, ſeated in the middle Rank, and poſſeſſing as it were the Center of all the Powers; in her right Parts they place the Fountain of Souls, in her Left, the Fountain of *Goods*, or of *Virtues*; and they ſay, that the Fountain of Souls is prompt to Propagations, but the Fountain of Virtues continues within the Bounds of its own Eſſence, and is as a Virgin incorrupted: this Settledneſs and Immobility it receives from the Power of the *Amilicti*, the Implacables, is girt with a Virgin Zone.

When thou ſeeſt a ſacred Fire without Form
Shining flaſhingly through the Depths of the whole World,
Hear the Voice of Fire.]

The Oracle ſpeaks of *Divine Light*, ſeen by many Men, and adviſeth, That if any one ſee ſuch a Light in ſome Figure and Form, he apply not his Mind to it, nor eſteem the Voice proceeding from thence to be true; but if he ſee this without any Figure or Form he ſhall not be deceived: And whatſoever Queſtion he ſhall propoſe, the Anſwer will be moſt true; he calls this ἐυίερον, *Sacroſanct*; for that it is ſeen with a Beauty by ſacred Perſons, and glides up and down pleaſantly and graciouſly through the Depth of the World.

Invoke not the ſelf-conſpicuous Image of Nature.]

Αὐτοψία, *Self-inſpection*, is, when the initiated Perſon (or he who performs Divine Rites) ſeeth the Divine Lights: but if he who orders the Rites ſeeth an Apparition, this, in reſpect of the initiated Perſon is ἐποψία, *ſuper-inſpection*. The Image which is evocated at Sacred Rites, muſt be Intelligible and wholly ſeparate from Bodies: But the Form or Image of Nature is not every way intelligible: for Nature is for the moſt part an adminiſtrative Faculty. *Call not*, ſaith he, in the Rites *the ſelf-conſpicuous Image of Nature*; for it will bring thee nothing along with it but only a crowd of the four Natural Elements.

Nature perſuades that Dæmons are pure.
The Bourgeons even of ill matter are profitable and good.]

Not that Nature herſelf perſuades this, but that being called before her preſence, there floweth in a great Company of *Dæmons*, and many dæmonious Forms of ſeveral ſhapes appear raiſed up out of all the Elements, compounded and ſhaped from all the parts of the Lunar Courſe, and many times appearing pleaſant and gracious, they make ſhew of an Apparition of ſome good to the initiated Perſon.

The Soul of Man will in a manner claſp God to herſelf.
Having nothing Mortal ſhe is wholly inebriated from God.
For ſhe boaſts Harmony, in which the mortal Body exiſts.]

He

He saith that the Soul *forceth* (for that is the meaning of ἄγχειν,) the divine Fire into herself, through Immortality and Purity; for then she is *wholly inebriated*, that is, she is repleniſhed with the more excellent Life and Illumination, and exiſts as it were out of herself. The Oracle saith to her, *Boaſt of Harmony*; that is, glory in the obscure and unintelligible Harmony by which thou art tied together in arithmetical and musical Proportions: for under this unintelligible Harmony even the mortal and compounded Body is compoſed, having its Compoſitions derived from thence.

Let the immortal Depth of the Soul be predominant; but all thy Eyes
Extend upward.]

The *Depth of the Soul* is her threefold Powers; the Intellectual, the Intelligent, the Opinionative. Her Eyes are the threefold cognoſcitive Operations of theſe; for the Eye is the Symbol of Knowledge, as Life is of Appetite. Open therefore, saith he, the immortal Depth of the Soul, and extend thy cognoſcitive Powers upwards, and even thy own ſelf (to uſe our own Expreſſion) *transfer to the Lord.*

Defile not the Spirit, nor deep not a Superficies.

The *Chaldæans* cloath the Soul with two Garments: one they call Spiritual, woven for it by the ſenſible World; the other Luci-form, tenuious and intangible, which is here termed *Superficies: Defile not*, saith he, the ſpiritual Garment of thy Soul with Impurity, neither cauſe its Superficies to grow deep by certain material Additions; but preſerve both in their own Natures, one pure, the other undipt.

Seek Paradiſe,]

The *Chaldaick* Paradiſe is the whole Chorus of divine Powers about the Father, and the fiery Beauties of the creative Fountains: The opening thereof by Piety is the Participation of the Gods: the flaming Sword is the implacable Power which withſtands thoſe that approach it unworthily; to ſuch Perſons it is ſhut, for they are not capable of its Felicity. To the Pious it is open: To this place tend all the Theurgick Virtues.

This Veſſel the Beaſts of the Earth ſhall inhabit.]

The *Veſſel* is the compounded Mixture of the Soul; the Beaſts of the Earth are the Dæmons which rove about the Earth: our Life therefore being full of Paſſions ſhall be inhabited by ſuch Beaſts; for ſuch kinds are eſſentiated in Paſſions, and have a material Seat and Order. Wherefore ſuch as are addicted to Paſſions are glued to them by Aſſimilation, for they attract what is like them, having a Motive Faculty from the Paſſions.

If thou extend the fiery Mind to the Work of Piety, thou ſhalt preſerve the fluxible Body.]

That is, *If thou extend thy illuminated Mind* upwards, and the Work of Fire *to the Works of Piety*, (the Works of Piety with the *Chaldæans*, are the Methods of Rites,) thou ſhalt not only render the Soul unvanquiſhable by Paſſions, but ſhalt alſo preſerve thy Body the more healthful; for this ordinarily is the Effect of divine Illuminations, *viz.* to conſume the Matter of the Body, and to eſtabliſh Health, that it be not ſeized either by Paſſion or Diſeaſes.

Certainly out of the Cavities of the Earth ſpring terreſtrial Dogs,
Which ſhew no true Sign to mortal Man.]

The Speech is of material Dæmons: Theſe he calls *Dogs*, for that they are Executioners of Souls; *Terreſtrial*, for that they fall from Heaven, and are rolled about the Earth. Theſe, saith he, being removed far from the Beatitude of divine Life, and deſtitute of intellectual Contemplation, cannot preſignify Futures: whence all that they ſay or ſhow is falſe, and not ſolid: for they know Beings μορφολικῶς, by their outſides; but that which knoweth Figures μειεικῶς, particularly, uſeth Notions indiviſible and not figured.

For the Father perfected all things, and deliver'd them over to the ſecond
Mind, which all Nations of Men call the firſt.]

The firſt *Father of the Triad* having made the univerſal Frame, deliver'd it over to the *Mind*; which Mind the whole Race of Mankind (being ignorant of the paternal Excellency) call the *firſt God*: but our Doctrine holds the contrary, *viz.* that the firſt Mind the Son of the Great Father, made and perfected every Creature; for the Father, in the Book of *Moſes*, declareth to the Son the Idea of the Production of Creatures, but the Son himſelf is the Maker of the Work.

The Furies are Stranglers of Men.]

(Ἀναγωγοὶ ἄγγελοι) The reductive Angels reduce Souls to them, drawing them from general things; but the *Furies* (ποιναὶ) being the Tormentors of the Natures which are diſperſed, and Enviers of human Souls, entangle them in material Paſſions, and, as it were, ſtrangle them; and not only torture

ture ſuch as are full of Paſſions, but even thoſe that are converted towards the immaterial Eſſence; for theſe alſo coming into Matter and into Generation, ſtand in need of ſuch Purification; for we ſee many Perſons even of thoſe who live holily and purely, fall into unexpected Miſeries.

The Paternal Mind hath implanted Symbols in Souls.]

As the *Moſaick* Book ſaith, that Man was formed after the Image of God; ſo the *Chaldæan* ſaith, that the Maker and Father of the World *ſowed Symbols* of his Eſſence in the Souls thereof. For out of the paternal Seed, not only Souls, but all ſuperior Orders ſprung. But in incorporeal Subſtances there is one kind of Signs, *viz.* incorporeal, and individual; in the World, there are other Signs and Symbols, the unſpeakable Properties of God, which are far more excellent than the Virtues themſelves.

The Souls of thoſe who quit the Body violently are moſt pure.]

Whoſoever ſhall take this Saying rightly, will find that it contradicts not our Doctrine; for the crowned Martyrs who in Time of Perſecution leave their Bodies by a violent End, purify and perfect their Souls: but this is not that which the *Chaldæan* means. He praiſeth all violent Death, becauſe the Soul, which leaveth the Body with Trouble, abhors this Life, and hateth Converſation with the Body, and, rejoycing, flieth up to the things above; but thoſe Souls which forſake this Life, their Bodies being naturally diſſolved by Sickneſs, do regret its Propenſion and Inclination to the Body.

Becauſe the Soul being a bright Fire, by the Power of the Father
Remains immortal, and is Miſtreſs of Life,
And poſſeſſeth many Completions of the Cavities of the World.]

The Soul being an immaterial and incorporeal *Fire*, exempt from all Compounds, and from the material Body, is immortal; for nothing material or dark is commixed with her, neither is ſhe compounded, ſo as that ſhe may be reſolved into thoſe things of which ſhe conſiſts; but ſhe is the Miſtreſs of Life, enlightening the Dead with Life, ſhe hath the Complements of many Receſſes, that is, ſuſceptive of the Government of Matter; for ſhe is enabled, according to her different Virtues, to dwell in different Zones of the World.

The Father infuſeth not Fear, but inſtead of it Perſuaſion.]

That is, the Divine Nature is not ſtern and full of Indignation, but ſweet and calm; whence it doth not cauſe *Fear* in the Natures ſubject to it, but attracts all things by Perſuaſion and Graciouſneſs; for if it were formidable and minacious, every Order of Beings would have been diſſolved, none of them being able to endure his Power. And this Doctrine is in part eſteemed true amongſt us, for God is a Light, and a Fire conſuming the wicked: The Menaces and affrightings of God are the Intermiſſion of the Divine Goodneſs towards us, by reaſon of our ill Management of our Affairs.

The Father hath ſnatched away himſelf:
Neither hath he ſhut up his own Fire in his intellectual Fire.]

The Meaning of which Oracle is this: The God of all things, who is alſo termed Father, hath made himſelf Incomprehenſible, not only to the firſt and ſecond Natures, and to our Souls, but even to his own Power; for the Father, ſaith he, hath ſnatch'd himſelf away from every Nature. But this Doctrine is not Orthodox; for with us the Father is known in the Son, as the Son in the Father, and the Son is the Definition of the Father, and the Divine ſupernatural World.

For the Intelligible is ſomething, which it behoves thee to comprehend with the Flower of the Mind.]

The Soul hath a Power correſpondent to every thing that is conceivable by the Mind; as to Senſibles, Senſe; to Cogitables, Cogitation; to Intelligibles, Mind. Now the *Chaldæan* ſaith, that although God is an Intelligible, yet he is not comprehenſible by the Mind, bot only by the *Flower of the Mind.* The Flower of the Mind is the (ἑνιαῖα) ſingular Power of the Soul: ſince therefore God is properly One, endeavour not to comprehend him by the Mind, but by the ſingular Power: for that which is firſt One, can only be apprehended by that which is one in us, and not either by Cogitation or Mind.

The Ungirders of the Soul which give her breathing are eaſy to be looſed.]

Leſt any one ſhould ſay, I would free my Soul from my Body, but I cannot; the Oracle tells us, that the Powers which *thruſt the Soul* out of the natural Body, and give her breathing, as it were, from the Toil and Trouble of the Body, are eaſily *looſed*; that is, theſe Faculties are free, and not reſtrained by any Nature, and able to ſet the Body at Liberty generouſly from corporeal Bonds.

It behoves thee to haſten to the Light, and to the Beams of the Father,
From whence was ſent to thee a Soul cloathed with much Mind.]

Seeing that the Soul hath not its Being from Seed, neither conſiſts of corporeal Mixtures, but had its Eſſence from God above; therefore ſhe ought to turn towards him, and to make her Return to the *Divine Light:* for ſhe came down *cloathed with much Mind*; that is, ſhe was furniſhed by the Maker and Father with many Remembrances of the divine Sayings, when ſhe came hither, whence ſhe ſhould endeavour to return by the ſame Remembrances.

All things are produced out of one Fire.]

This is a true Doctrine, conformable to our Religion; for all Beings, as well intelligible as ſenſible, received their Eſſence from God above, and are converted to God alone; thoſe which have Being, only Eſſentially; thoſe which have Being and Life, eſſentially and vitally; thoſe which have Being, and Life, and Mind, eſſentially, and vitally, and intellectually. From *One* therefore *all things came*, and to One is their Return. This Oracle is not to be condemned, but is full of our Doctrine.

What the Mind ſpeaks, it ſpeaks by Intellection.]

When (ſaith he) thou ſhalt hear an articulate Voice, thundering from above out of Heaven, think not that the Angel, or God, who ſends forth that Voice, did articulate it after our manner enunciatively; but that he, according to his own Nature, conceived it only inarticulately: but thou, according to thy own Impotence, heareſt the Notion ſyllabically and enuntiatively. For as God heareth our Voice not vocally, ſo Man receiveth the Notions of God vocally, every one according to the Operation of his Nature.

Theſe the Earth bewails, even to their Children.]

It is meant of *Atheiſts*, that God extends his Vengeance even to their Poſterity: for the Oracle, to expreſs the Torments which they ſhall receive under the Earth, ſaith, *It howls beneath for them:* that is, the Place under the Earth bellows to them, and roareth like a Lion. Whence *Proclus* alſo ſaith, The Compoſition of Souls that are of Affinity with one another, is of like Nature; and thoſe which are not yet looſed from the Bands of Nature, are entangled and detained by like Paſſions. Theſe therefore muſt fulfil all Puniſhments, and ſince by natural Affinity they are infected with Pollutions, muſt again be cleanſed from them.

Enlarge not thy Deſtiny,]

The wiſeſt of the *Greeks* call Nature, or rather the Completion of the Illuminations which the Nature of Beings receiveth (εἱμαρμένην) *Fate*. Providence is an immediate Beneficence from God. But Fate is that which governs all our Affairs by the Concatenation of Beings. We are Subjects to Providence, when we act Intellectually; to Fate, when Corporeally. Increaſe not therefore, ſaith he, thy Fate, nor endeavour to ſurmount it, but commit thyſelf wholly to the Government of God.

For nothing proceeds from the paternal Principality imperfect.]

The Father (ſaith he) produceth all things perfect and ſelf-ſufficient according to their Order, but the Imbecillity and Remiſſion of the things produced ſometimes cauſeth a Defect and Imperfection, but the Father calleth back again that Defect to Perfection, and converts it to its Self-ſufficience. Like this, is that which *James* the Brother of our Lord pronounceth in the Beginning of his Epiſtle, *Every perfect Gift cometh down from above, from the Father of Lights.* For nothing proceeds Imperfect from the Perfect, and eſpecially when we chance to be ready to receive that which is primarily diſtilled from him.

But the paternal Mind accepts her not until ſhe come forth.]

The paternal Mind doth not admit the Impulſions of the Deſires of the Soul, before ſhe hath excluded the Forgetfulneſs of the Riches which ſhe received from the moſt bountiful Father, and called back to her Memory the ſacred Watch-words which ſhe received from him, and pronounce the good Speech imprinting in her Remembrance the Symbols of the Father who begot her. For the Soul conſiſts of ſacred Words and divine Symbols, of which thoſe proceed from the ſacred Species, theſe from the divine Monads; and we are (εἴκονες) Images of the ſacred Eſſences, but (ἀγάλματα) Statues of the unknown Symbols. Moreover, we muſt know that every Soul differs from another Soul ſpecifically, and that there are as many ſeveral Species of Souls as there are Souls.

When thou ſeeſt the terreſtrial Dæmon approach, ſacrifice the Stone Mnizuris, uſing Invocation.]

The Dæmons that are near the Earth are by Nature lying, as being far off from the divine Knowledge, and filled with dark Matter. Now if you

would have any true Diſcourſe from theſe, prepare an Altar, and *ſacrifice the Stone Mnizuris.* This Stone hath the Power of evocating the other greater Dæmon, who, inviſibly approaching to the material Dæmon, will pronounce the true Solution of Demands, which he tranſmits to the Demandant. The Oracle joineth the evocative Name with the ſacrificing of the Stone. The *Chaldæans* aſſert ſome Dæmons good, others ill; but our Religion defines them to be all ill, as having by a premeditated Defection exchanged good for ill.

Learn the intelligible, foraſmuch as it exiſts beyond the Mind.]

For though all things are comprehended by the Mind, yet God the firſt Intelligible exiſts *without* or *beyond the Mind.* This *without* you muſt not underſtand diſtantially, nor according to intellectual Alternity, but according to the intelligible Exceſs alone, and the Propriety of the Exiſtence, it being without, or beyond all Mind, whereby the ſuper-eſſential is manifeſted. For the firſt intelligible Mind is Eſſence, beyond which is the Self-intelligible. Beſides theſe is God, who is beyond the Intelligible, and Self-intelligible; for we aſſert the Divinity to be neither Intelligible nor Self-intelligible, it being more excellent than all Speech and Notion, ſo as that it is wholly unintelligible and unexpreſſible, and more to be honoured by Silence, than reverenced by wonderful Expreſſions; for it is more ſublime than to be reverenced, ſpoken, and conceived.

Intelligent Jynges do themſelves alſo underſtand from the Father,
By unſpeakable Counſels being moved ſo as to underſtand.]

Jynges are certain (Virtues or) Powers next the paternal Depth, conſiſting of three Triads. Theſe underſtand according to the paternal Mind, which containeth their Cauſe ſolely in himſelf. Now the Counſels of the Father in regard of their intelligible Sublimity, are not vocal; but the intellectual Marks of abſtract things, though underſtood by Secondaries (or Inferiors) are underſtood as without ſpeaking, and as it were abſtracted from intelligible Prolations. For as the Conceptions of Souls, they underſtand intellectual Orders, yet underſtand them as immutable: So the Acts of the Intellectuals underſtanding the intellectual Signs, underſtand them as not a vocal ſubſiſting in unknown Exiſtences.

Conjectures upon the Greek *Text of the Oracles.*

WHO it was that rendred theſe Oracles in *Greek* is (as we ſaid) uncertain; much more certain is it that they were all compoſed in Hexameter Verſe; though they are ſometimes cited indiſtinctly and abruptly by *Patricius*, ſeeming wholly irreconcileable with poetick Numbers, yet that the greater Part of them are Hexameters, none can deny; and whoſoever ſhall look more cautiouſly upon the reſt, will find Prints enough, by which they may be traced and demonſtrated to have been of the ſame kind, though confounded in the manner of Citations, ſometimes by the Authors out of which *Patricius* took them, ſometimes by *Patricius* himſelf, who was far more diligent to collect and digeſt, than curious to diſtinguiſh them, or to regard their Numbers; which Defect we ſhall endeavour, in ſome meaſure, to ſupply.

ΜΟΝΑΣ, ΔΥΑΣ, ΚΑΙ ΤΡΙΑΣ.

Ὅπερ πατρικὴ μονάς ἐστι.

The latter Part of the Hexameter —— ὅπερ πατρικὴ μονάς ἐστι· as is that alſo which immediately follows,

—— Ταναὴ [ἔστι] μονὰς, ἢ δύο γωνᾷ.

and the next,

—— Δυὰς [γὰρ] ἕπεται τῇδε κάθηται. That which follows is cited again by itſelf afterward,

Καὶ τὸ κυβερνᾷν]

This ſeems to be a looſe Citation of two ſeveral Hemiſtichs, with reference to the Phraſe (infinitively) not to the Verſe.

Ἀρχὴ πάσης τιμήσεως ἡ ὃ ἡ τάξις]

Read, perhaps,

Ἀρχή τοι πάσης τ' τιμήσεως, ἥδε ὃ τάξις.
Οὐ τὸ θέλειν κατένευσε, καὶ ἤδη πάντα ἐτέλεσμαι.]

The Verſe requires —— πάντ' ἐτέλεσμαι.

Εἰς τέλος γὰρ εἶπε νῆς παῖδός.]

Before,

Εἰς τέλος γὰρ νῆς εἶπε παῖδός.
Καὶ ἐφάνησαν ἐν αὐτῇ ἡ τ' ἀρετή.]

Perhaps [καὶ]

—— ἐφάνησαν ἐν αὐτῇ
Ἥ τ' ἀρετὴ, σοφίη τε, καὶ ἡ πολύφρων ἀβάκεια.
Ἱερὸς περὶ δρόμον, ἐν δ' ἄρα μέσῳ]

Read μέσῳ.

Καὶ πηγὴ πηγῶν.]

Perhaps,

Καὶ πηγὴ πηγῶν, μίξα σωέχουσα τὰ πάντα.

The reſt being a Gloſs.

Ἔνθεν ἀρθλω.

It ſhould be Ἔνθ' ἄρθλω.

Ἔνθεν συεμβρυον φρησὶ ἀμυδρὸν πυρὸς ἄνθος.]

Proclus reads ἀμυδρῷ in Theolog.

ΠΑΤΗΡ ΚΑΙ ΝΟΥΣ.

Ἑαυτὸν ὁ πατὴρ ἥρπασεν, ὃν' ἐν ἑῇ.]

Pletho reads,

Οὐδ' ἐν ἑῇ δυνάμει νοερᾷ κλείσας ἴδιον πῦρ·
Πάντα γὰρ ἐξετέλεσε.]

Pletho,

Πάντα γὰρ ἐξετέλεσε πατὴρ, καὶ Νῷ παρέδωκε
Δευτέρῳ, ὃν πρῶτον κλητίζει (perhaps κλητίζετο)
πᾶν γένος ἀνδρῶν.
Πολὺ γὰρ μόνος]

Diſtinguiſh,

—— πολὺ γὰρ μόνος ἐκ παῖδος ἀλκῆς]
Δρεπτάμενος νόος ἀνθος.
Πᾶσιν ἐνέσπειρε] ἐνέσπειρεν· and afterwards,
ἔσπειρεν καὶ κόσμον.
Μήτε πᾶσι τὰ παῖδος νοερῶς ὑφασμένα φέγγει.]

Perhaps,

Μήδεα πᾶσι παῖδος, &c.

Ἔχει τῷ νοεῖν πατρικὸν νῶν ἐνδιδόναι.]

Perhaps, —— ἔχει τὸ νοεῖν πατρικὸν νῶν
Ἐνδιδόναι πᾶσαισιν (ὁμῶς) φυταῖς τε καὶ ἀρχαῖς·
Οὐ γὰρ εἰς ὕλλον, πῦρ ἐπέκεινα τὸ πρῶτον]

Diſtinguiſh,

—— ὃ γὰρ ἐς ὕλλον
Πῦρ ἐπέκεινα τὸ πρῶτον ἑλὼ δυνάμων καταπλείων
Ἔργοις, ἀγὰ νόῳ——
Νῷ μὲ κατέχει.]

Diſtinguiſh,

—— νῷ μὲ κατέχει τὰ νοητὰ,
Αἰθῆσιν δ' ἐπάγει κόσμοις——

ΝΟΥΣ, ΝΟΗΤΑ, ΚΑΙ ΝΟΕΡΑ.

Οὐ γὰρ ἀνὰ νόος ἔστι νοητῶν ὃ χωρὶς ὑπάρχει.]

Afterwards cited thus,

Οὐ γὰρ ἀνὰ νόος ἔστι νοητῶν, καὶ τὸ νοητὸν
Οὐ νῶ χωρὶς ὑπάρχει.
Μάνθανε τὸ νοητὸν.]

Afterwards,

Ὄφρα μάθῃς τὸ νοητὸν——
Νῶ γὰρ νῆς ἔστιν ὁ κόσμος τεχνίτης πυρός.]

Diſtinguiſh,

——νῶ γὰρ νῆς ἔστιν ὁ κόσμος
Τεχνίτης πυρός——
Ἔστι γάρ τι νοητὸν] Ἔστιν.
Ἡ γὰρ ἐπιστροφὴ, ὡς ἂν νῆν.]

Read and diſtinguiſh,

Ἡ γὰρ ἐπιστροφὴ, σὺν νῆν, καὶκεῖνο νοήσῃ,
Ὡς τι νοῶν, ὃ κεῖνο νοήσεις· ἔστι γὰρ ἀλκῆς
Ἀμφιφανὲς δυνάμις νοερῆς στρέψασα τομαῖσι.
Οὐ δὴ χρὴ σφοδρότητι νοεῖν τὸ νοητὸν ἐκεῖνο,
Ἀλλὰ νόῳ ταναῇ ταναῇ φλογὶ, πάντα μετρήσῃ
Πλὴν τὸ νοητὸν ἐκεῖνο· χρεὼ δὲ τῆτο νοῆσαι.
Ἡ γὰρ ἐπιστροφὴ σὺν νῆν, καὶκεῖνο νοήσεις
Οὐκ ἀτενῶς, ἀλλ' ἀγνὸν ὑπὸ στρόφον ὄμμα, φέροντα
Τῆς ψυχῆς τεῖναι κενεὸν νόον εἰς τὸ νοητόν.
Ὄφρα μάθῃς τὸ νοητὸν, ἐπεὶ νόος ἔξω ὑπάρχει.

And preſently after,

—— ὃ γὰρ ἀνὰ νόος ἔστι νοητῶν, καὶ τὸ νοητὸν
Οὐ νῶ χωρὶς ὑπάρχει ——

ΙΥΓΓΕΣ,

ΙΥΓΓΕΣ, ΙΔΕΑΙ, ΑΡΧΑΙ.

Πολλαὶ μὲν·

Distinguish,

——πολλαὶ αἵδε ἐπιβαίνουσι φαεινοῖς
Κόσμοις, ἐνδρώσκουσιν, ἐν αἷς ἀκρότητες ἔασι
Τρεῖς.

Νῶς παῖς ἐρροίζησε·]

cited elsewhere by *Patricius* clearly, without

[Δι' ὧν σωάπτει τῷ πατρὶ, ἄλλων καὶ ἄλλων Ζωῶν, ἀπὸ μεριζομένων ὀχέων.] which belong to some other Place,

Ἐξ ἧς ῥοιζεῖν.]

Distinguish,

——μεμερισμένα ἄλλαι,
Ῥιπὺ μένα κόσμοις περὶ σώμασι· αἱ περὶ κόλπους
Σμερδαλέους, σμιλώεσσιν ἐοικυῖαι, φορέουσι.
Πολὺ δραπόμενα πυρὸς ἄνθος.]

Distinguish,

——πολὺ
Δραπόμενα πυρὸς ἄνθος ἀκοιμήτοις χρόνοις·
Ἀκμὴ Ἀρχέγονος ἰδέας περάτη παῖς ἔκλυσε· πᾶς δ'
Αὐτοθαλὴς πηγή.

ΕΚΑΤΗ, ΣΥΝΟΧΕΙΣ, ΤΕΛΕΤΑΡΧΑΙ.

Ἐξ ὧπερ γὰρ πάντες ἐνδρώσκουσι.]

Distinguish, ——ἀμείλικτοί τε κεραυνοὶ,
Καὶ πρυσιπερδόχοι κόλποι παμφεγγέος ἀλκῆς
Παλλομένης Ἑκάτης· καὶ ἐπεζωκὼς πυρὸς ἄνθος,
Ἡ δὲ κεφαλὰν πνεῦμα πόλων, πυείην ἐπέκεινα.
Ὅπερ καὶ τὸ ζωογόνον.]

Distinguish,

Τῆς Ἑκάτης κόλπον· καὶ ὑπρρεῖ τοῖς Σωοχοῦσιν
Ἀλκὴ ζείδωρον πυρὸς μέγα δυναμένοιο.

Ἀλλὰ καὶ φρουροί.]

Distinguish,

Ἔργων εἰσὶ πατρὸς. ἀφομοιοῖ γὰρ ἑαυτὸν
Κεῖνος ἐσειρόμενος.
Παντοίας ὅλος σιώπημα βάλλειν.]

Distinguish,

Παντοίας ὅλος σιώπημα βαλεῖν φρενὶ, μηδ' ὑπερίπτᾶν
Ἐμπυρίοις ἀπερύκλοις ὀχλοῖς, ἀλλὰ σιδαρηδόν·

ΨΥΧΗ, ΦΥΣΙΣ.

Ὅπου ψυχή.]

Pletho, Ὅπου.

Μετὰ δὲ πατρικὰς διανοίας.]

Distinguish,

——μὴ δὲ πατρικὰς διανοίας,
Ψυχὴ, ἐγὼ, ναίω. θερμοψυχόεντα τὰ πάντα.
Μὴ φύσεως ἐμβλέψεις.]

Proclus in Theolog.

Μὴ φύσιν ἐμβλέψῃς, εἰ μαρμάρου ὄνομα τῆς δε.

What follows under the Title of ΟΥΡΑΝΟΣ is very confused, the same Fragments being often repeated.

ΨΥΧΗ, ΣΩΜΑ, ΑΝΘΡΩΠΟΣ.

Most of these are perfect, being put forth by *Pletho* and *Psellus*.

Δίζεο σὺ ψυχῆς ὀχετὸν, ὅθεν, ἢ πίνει τάξει
Σώματα διπτύσας (so *Pletho*) ὅθι τάξιν ἀφ' ἧς
ἐῤῥύης
(read ἐῤῥύθης.)
Αὖθις, &c.

The rest may be corrected by the Edition of *Pletho* and *Psellus*.

FINIS.